A Decade of The IISS Manama Dialogue

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A Decade of The IISS Manama Dialogue:Premier Regional Security Summit in the Gulf

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

ManamaDialogue

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A Decade of The IISS Manama Dialogue:Premier Regional Security Summit in the Gulf

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

Contents

Foreword

Ten years of the IISS Manama Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Chapter one

1st Regional Security Summit, 3–5 December 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Chapter two

2nd Regional Security Summit, 2–4 December 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Chapter three

3rd Regional Security Summit, 8–10 December 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Chapter four

4th Regional Security Summit, 7–9 December 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Chapter five

5th Regional Security Summit, 12–14 December 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Chapter six

6th Regional Security Summit, 11–13 December 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Chapter seven


Chapter eight


Chapter nine


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Foreword

ManamaDialogue

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4 | The 10th IISS Regional Security Summit

For all of its long history the IISS has been a facilitator of

strategic discussion and debate in the service of better public

policy. In 2002, with the first IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Asia

Security Summit held in Singapore, the IISS began directly

to inspire intergovernmental defence diplomacy. Our anal-

ysis of the Asia-Pacific security landscape suggested that

it was necessary for a regional security architecture to be

developed that would invite direct dialogue between the

defence ministers of the region. While presidents, prime

ministers, foreign ministers and finance ministers met

regularly, defence ministers rarely consulted each other,

and certainly not in formations that involved more than

a couple of governments at any given time. Rather than

merely advocate the creation of an Asian defence minister

consultative structure, the IISS decided to create one and

encourage defence diplomacy at a multi lateral level. Now,

the Shangri-La Dialogue is seen as an integral part of Asia’s

regional security structures, recognised as such by govern-

ments, and indeed it has made it easier for defence ministers

subsequently to meet in formations of their own invention.

That success inspired the IISS to consider how it could

contribute to wider national security discussions in the

Gulf region. Here, the ministers of the Gulf Co-operation

Council (GCC) countries met regularly. However, there

was no available institutional forum where they could

meet with other immediate neighbours such as Iran, Iraq

and Yemen, or do so at the same time as consulting leaders

from other regions, including North America, Europe and

Asia, who had security interests in the Gulf. When large

conferences were held involving Westerners or others on

Gulf security, these tended to be held outside the region.

The need was for a summit that convened within the

region, giving voice to the governments and opinion-form-

ers of the area, and which was inclusive, engaging all those

with a stake in regional security. And so it was that in late

2003, following discussions held with the Crown Prince of

Bahrain and consultations with other GCC states that the

IISS began preparations for the first Gulf Dialogue held in

Manama in 2004. It was clear that a gap in the defence dip-

lomatic marketplace had been filled with that first meeting,

and within a few years we saw it confirmed as a much-

respected and needed annual summit, which we re-styled

the Manama Dialogue.

The Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

Prince Saud al-Faisal, laid out at the first Dialogue his vision

of a secure Gulf which would require: ‘a unified GCC, an

integrating Yemen, a stable Iraq and a friendly Iran.’ Those

four conditions appeared uncertain then, and remain fleet-

ing now. However, the Manama Dialogue over its first ten

years has played a central role in regional security consulta-

tions. It has provided a platform for ministers to announce

policy initiatives; an occasion for bilateral and multilateral

meetings between government leaders; an opportunity to

engage all relevant countries in regional security consulta-

tions simultaneously; and a place at which senior officials

could ‘off-the-record’ discuss policy options for challenges

of the day. All of these discussions engage opinion-formers

and analysts from both the region and outside. As a result,

it is at the Manama Dialogue that the strategic pulse of the

region is most accurately taken.

After ten years of development and growth the

Manama Dialogue in this 2014 anniversary year is now set

to grow further as a recognised informal regional security

institution. The Manama Dialogue has become a process,

not just an event. Constant contact throughout the year

between the IISS and participating governments helps to

establish the agenda and range of countries to be invited.

Preparatory ‘sherpa’ meetings involving senior officials

strengthen the lines of communication between the IISS

and governments and help to ensure that the broad agenda

is in keeping with the needs of the region. While the IISS

arranges the Manama Dialogue and chairs the plenary and

special sessions on the broad range of topics set each year,

it is the delegates of the Manama Dialogue who in fact

shape the agenda by the nature of their interventions and

the priority they give to certain issues.

Ten years of the IISS Manama Dialogue

Ten years of the IISS Manama Dialogue | 5

Each Manama Dialogue has had its impact. At the 2006

Dialogue the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia delivering the key-

note speech spelled out its likely response to a confirmed

Iranian nuclear programme. The 2007 Dialogue saw the

first appearance of the US Secretary of Defence with a

very large delegation that inspired, as in subsequent years,

a good deal of debate as to the nature and shape of US

engagement with the region. In 2008, the debate on sectar-

ian politics and transnational threats became more intense;

in 2009 Iran’s relationship with the region was again the

main theme; while in 2010 with the fullest participation

ever of all relevant powers, there was a very palpable sense

of the Manama Dialogue serving as the platform for balanc-

ing the initiatives from the region, with those from outside.

As the Dialogue moved to its 8th and 9th editions in

2012 and 2013, the governments attending deployed with

the intent not just of sending certain public messages, but

also to more deliberately co-ordinate and consult with col-

leagues from other countries. The Manama Dialogue in its

tenth year is now at the stage when the governments partic-

ipating in it can frame the strategic issues they face across

a number of areas, and try to work towards a more collec-

tive approach. The Manama Dialogue now is established

sufficiently for it to be used as an instrument of regional

security. To that end, the IISS will continue to strive hard

to offer the most congenial environment for constructive

defence and security consultations to take root. We thank

the Kingdom of Bahrain for its support to this summit

process and to all the participating governments for their

active engagement.

Dr John Chipman cmg,

Director-General and Chief Executive


20041ST REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT, 3–5 DECEMBER

8 | The 1st IISS Regional Security Summit

The rationale for the Gulf Dialogue was articulated most

eloquently and powerfully by the backdrop against which

it was convened: an intensifying insurgency in Iraq, with

elections scheduled for January 2005; a crisis over Iran’s

nuclear programme, put into temporary abeyance by a deal

reached in late November between Tehran, London, Paris

and Berlin; the death of Yasser Arafat and the prospect of

elections for a new Palestinian leader; and, at the close of

the conference, terror attacks in Saudi Arabia that further

underlined the prevalence of threats to Gulf security. Many

of the diplomatic, military and intelligence practitioners

whose decisions bear directly on these matters, and a good

number of the opinion-formers who help governments to

frame policies towards them, were present in Bahrain.

It was with this in mind that Sheikh Mohammed Bin

Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Bahrain’s Deputy Prime Minister and

Foreign Minister, noted in his welcoming dinner address

that the Gulf Dialogue represented a ‘unique opportunity

for open debate and private discussion’. Drawing on the

Bahraini saying ‘we all live around the same courtyard’, he

stressed the importance of developing regional institutions,

such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in pursuing

common interests and fending off common threats that

included, but were not limited to, terrorism and the prolif-

eration of weapons of mass destruction. The Gulf Dialogue,

too, he hoped, had its part to play in the formation of a

durable regional security structure.

But security and stability, he cautioned, would also

require nimble and adaptive policies at home. Diversifying

economies away from an over-reliance on energy sectors

would be key to sustaining the prosperity on which social

ease largely depended. Stability would be further enhanced

through more inclusive and consultative political systems.

Bahrain had been a pioneer in this last regard. Yet the Gulf

consisted of ‘young states and old civilisations’, which

needed to move towards reform at a pace consistent with

individual local conditions; nor should change be imposed

from outside. Turning to the wider strategic dimension of

Gulf security, he stressed the primary importance of a sta-

ble Iraq, but also looked to allies in the West for ‘a more

balanced approach’ towards the Israeli–Palestinian dispute

– the cause of much animus and militancy in the region.

The Manama Dialogue 2004

Sheikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the Crown Prince of Bahrain

The Manama Dialogue 2004 | 9

Terrorism was so pernicious, he concluded, not only

because of the risks posed to physical security, but because

of its tendency to fuel a climate of distrust that led to ‘bar-

riers of perception’.

Commenting on these remarks in his capacity as leader

of a US Congressional Delegation – also including Senators

Dianne Feinstein and Lincoln Chafee – that had come to

Bahrain fresh from high-level meetings in Rahmallah, Tel

Aviv, Amman and Baghdad, Senator Chuck Hagel spoke

of a moment of ‘historic and dramatic possibilities’ for Iraq

and the wider region. If it was not to be squandered, more

committed and visionary leadership from the US and the

Gulf states would be required. The IISS Gulf Dialogue, he

said, was ‘part of recommitting to a sense of urgency’ about

these matters. ‘As mighty as America is’, he went on, ‘we

cannot field enough armies to deal with these problems’,

and a ‘new sense of diplomacy’ was required.

Formally opening the conference, which he described as

an exercise in the promotion of collective security, Sheikh

Salman Bin Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Bahrain’s Crown

Prince and the Commander-in-Chief of its defence forces,

talked fluently about the tactical and strategic dimensions

of the counter-terrorism campaign. Tactically, for exam-

ple, the manpower of the terrorist networks would have to

be captured or killed; strategically, it was vital to prevent

further recruitment of terrorists through the resolution

of political conflicts that spawn radicalism. It was just as

important, in religious terms, that ‘outcasts’ should not be

allowed to ‘define what it is to be a Muslim’: extremism

would have to be combated through the active advance-

ment of a positive ‘counter-idea’.

In weighing up the magnitude of the threat of inter-

national terrorism, he assessed that it was in its potential

destructive implications less severe than the Cold War,

which was defined by a raw sense of nuclear antagonism.

Yet terrorism tended to provoke a fear that that was all too

much in evidence, and which needed to be controlled if it

was not to lead to rash action and poor policy. Following

his speech, the Crown Prince entered into a lively debate

regarding Bahrain’s strategy for economic modernisation

and political reform; the Israeli–Palestinian dispute and

what the Gulf states have to contribute to an eventual solu-

tion; and on whether and in what circumstances terrorists

ought to be engaged in a dialogue.

The first two plenaries in effect took the form of a

discussion between officials from within and outside the

Gulf on the practical and political dimensions of the cam-

paign against terrorism. Maj.-Gen. Dr Rashad Muhummad

Al-Alimi, the Interior Minister of Yemen, argued that his

country’s experiences in this regard had broad applica-

bility, combining domestic law-enforcement and fulsome

participation in international anti-terrorism efforts with

preventative measures to reintegrate into society and the

political system jihadist elements who had, perhaps, fought

the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and were prone to

sympathise with other radical causes.

Iraq’s National Security Advisor, Dr Kassim Daoud,

turned his attention to the importance of fostering con-

sultative democracy in efforts to stamp out the Iraqi

insurgency. In the debate that followed, he gave a detailed

account of technical preparations for January’s elections,

arguing that there were no practical grounds, nor any

Sheikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Bahrain’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs


legal justifications, for further delay to a timetable that was

well-established and formally prescribed. He described the

security situation inside Iraq by noting that 15 of 18 prov-

inces were essentially stable, and went on to comment on

the steady progress being made by Iraq’s own security

forces. Some of Daoud’s conclusions were challenged in a

spirited way by another Iraqi present at the conference, but

the National Security Adviser welcomed the fact that it was

now possible for a minister of state to be held to account by

a private Iraqi citizen in such a public manner.

Singapore, as a country that has been a target of the

al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiah, has evolved a com-

prehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Dr Tony Tan Keng

Yam, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating

Minister for Security and Defence, argued that this strategy

was in all its specifics not necessarily applicable to the pre-

cise circumstances of the Gulf, but in setting it out he felt it

did provide a useful example of the scope and forms of col-

lective and individual action which might be contemplated

by Gulf states. Domestically, Singapore’s strategy involved

capacity-building and the facilitation of interagency coor-

dination. Abroad, it comprised multilateral cooperation on

maritime security, intelligence exchanges and data collec-

tion, and a dialogue between law-enforcement and police

agencies throughout Southeast Asia.

A British perspective was provided by Sir Nigel

Sheinwald, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister

and Head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat of the

UK Cabinet Office. British counter-terrorism policy, he

said, was guided by the need to pursue terrorist at the

(l–r) Maj.-Gen. Dr Rashad Muhammad Al-Alimi, Yemen’s Interior Minister; National Security Advisor of Iraq, Dr Kassim Daoud; and IISS Director Dr John Chipman

US Senator Chuck Hagel


The conference then divided into three simultaneous

break-out groups. The first focused on regional border

controls and produced a lively and constructive discus-

sion, chaired by Ellen Laipson, President and CEO of

The Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington DC. The

discussion embraced a diverse range of issues, includ-

ing technical considerations, trade-offs between security

and commerce, and the social dimensions of counter-ter-

rorism policy. There was a consensus that while formal

boundary disputes in the Gulf had been substantially

resolved, enforcing borders remained a serious problem.

Some national officials aspired to ‘total security’, includ-

ing robust post-entry monitoring and inter-governmental

data-sharing, in the GCC. Discussants also cautioned that

the GCC was not amenable to a European Union-type solu-

tion of open internal borders, especially because common

tribal areas often traversed legal borders, rendering their

strict enforcement all the more important. Border security

enforcement, it was noted, would be eased by more effec-

tive economic policies that kept populations relatively

sedentary. Nevertheless, officials from the region acknowl-

edged that physical restrictions were only a single limited

ingredient of counter-terrorism, given the recruiting func-

tion that the internet and indigenous groupings performed.

Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa region were identi-

fied as sources of terrorists, and several proactive remedies

were put forward for stopping them. These included the

use of more advanced monitoring and tracking technology;

improved training for border troops; and close military and

law-enforcement coordination among GCC countries. The

need to secure Iraq’s border, especially jihadist infiltration

operational level; protect the homeland, for example

through enhancing aviation security; prepare for the con-

sequences of possible attacks; and prevent the rise of new

generation of terrorists by addressing terrorism’s underly-

ing causes.

Stephen Hadley, US National Security Advisor-

designate, characterised US policy towards the region as

both practical and idealistic. Its immediate focus would

be to confront terrorists and the states that support them;

its long-term objective was to advance freedom and

democracy. The lack of participatory and accountable gov-

ernment was linked to poverty and at the heart of many of

the region’s problems. The difficulties of the Middle East,

moreover, were the result of faulty policies rather than an

inevitable product of cultural and religious impulses and

traits. A striking political transformation was now being

achieved in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Hadley dwelt at length on the Israeli–Palestinian con-

flict, reaffirming Washington’s commitment to a two-state

solution, and stressing that it stood ready, along with the

EU and multilateral financial institutions, to work with a

reforming and accountable Palestinian leadership. Israel

would have to support the emergence of a viable Palestinian

state. Hadley noted that the Gaza pullout amounted to an

important ‘down-payment’ on that prospect. Yet Israel also

needed to help by facilitating the forthcoming Palestinian

elections, ensuring greater freedom of movement and ceas-

ing further settlement activity in the occupied territories.

In his concluding remarks, Hadley said in referring to the

Gulf Dialogue: ‘I hope it becomes a permanent feature of

the regional scene’.

Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence


the discussion focused on efforts to resolve the Iranian

nuclear issue, especially negotiations between Iran and

the EU-3 scheduled to begin in mid-December 2004. This

included an exploration of different potential ‘objective

guarantees’ that might serve to demonstrate that Iran’s

nuclear programme was intended for purely peaceful

purposes, and a consideration of how regional security

discussions and arrangements could be part of a final

diplomatic agreement. In addition, the group discussed

broader measures to combat proliferation, including the

importance of effective domestic controls over sensitive

materials and equipment, and proposals to strengthen

international norms and treaties to prevent the spread of

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their deliv-

ery vehicles. An issue of particular importance discussed

routes from Syria, drew comment. But Iran’s border chal-

lenges emerged as arguably the most acute in the region, in

light of the large number of countries that are contiguous

with it and their lack of political stability.

The second break-out group, on counter-prolifera-

tion challenges, was chaired by Thérèse Delpech, IISS

Council Member and Senior Research Fellow at the

Center for International Studies in Paris. Presentations

were made by William Ehrman, Chairman of the UK

Joint Intelligence Committee; Ambassador Hossein

Mousavian, Foreign Policy Chairman of the Supreme

National Security Council of Iran; Senator Robert Hill,

Australian Minister for Defence; and Shigeru Nakamura,

Director General of the Intelligence and Analysis Service

of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much of

Break-out group one: Border Controls

(l–r) General John Abizaid, Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command; Dr Kassim Daoud, Iraq’s National Security Advisor; and General Sir Michael Walker GCB, CMG, CBE, ADC Gen, Chief of the UK Defence Staff


by the group was the danger that non-state actors might

seek to acquire and use biological weapons.

The challenges of dealing with terrorism and insur-

gency, particularly in Iraq, dominated a break-out group

on ‘Military Trends and New Security Threats’. The ses-

sion was chaired by General Sir Michael Walker, Chief

of the UK Defence Staff, and included among its speak-

ers General John Abizaid, Commander, US Central

Command; Iraqi National Security Advisor Dr Kassim

Daoud; Admiral Bernard Merveilleux du Vignaux of the

General Staff Headquarters of France; and Major General

Mike Hindmarsh, Special Operations Commander of the

Australian defence forces.

While approaches to counter-terrorism and counter-

insurgency were the primary topic, other regional threats

such as nuclear proliferation were also mentioned. Armed

forces were adjusting themselves to deal with new, glo-

balised threats. The need for good intelligence, and for

coordination at every level in both the gathering and

sharing of information, was stressed by several delegates.

It was stated that intelligence on Iraqi insurgents had

improved considerably since the end of the combat phase

of the war in April 2003, but that there was still room for

improvement.

The nature and strategy of the Iraqi insurgency was

debated. Several delegates believed the media was giving

an unbalanced – even a distorted – picture of Iraq, and

regional media in particular were not adequately portray-

ing the true nature of the insurgents. One delegate referred

to a ‘huge disconnect’ between media coverage and reality.

A further strong theme of the discussion was that coalition

military presence, and denial of ‘safe haven’ to insurgents,

were not sufficient to bring stability to troubled coun-

tries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It was important that

national security forces were able to assume control for

elections to be successful and for domestic political resolu-

tions to be reached. The outside world needed to provide

not just mili tary support, but political, economic and other

civil assistance. A European delegate expressed the view

that a strong US role was required to bring stability to the

world’s crises, because America’s partners could not by

themselves ‘keep the lid on the cooking pot’.

The third plenary, which was introduced by Sheikh

Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, considered the

impact of political and economic reform on Gulf security.

In his presentation, Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdulla, the

Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs of Oman, concen-

trated exclusively on the contribution of economic policy

to stability. Extremism and terrorism, he felt, would best

be fought through economic development and increased

prosperity. Deeper and wider trade relations with pow-

ers outside the region would be crucial to this effort. The

Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar,

Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabber Al Thani, argued that

neglect of economic and political reform would present

the region with major challenges. Change should not be

imposed from outside, he said, but driven organically by

conviction and consensus. While this implied variations

in the speed of progress, there was a need for a timetable

for action and clarification of objectives. In the discussions

that followed, a number of delegates questioned whether

ruling elites in the region would in fact be willing to cede

Stephen Hadley, US National Security Advisor-designate


powers as part of a programme of political reform; others

argued that the emergence of greater pluralism would be

frustrated by an intolerance of political parties who might

represent sections of society.

The final plenary was devoted to the crafting of new

frameworks for regional security. Leading off the discus-

sion, Prince Saud Al Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia,

described this session as providing a ‘timely opportunity to

exchange views on a current and important topic’. Turning

to the GCC states, he called for greater efforts to enhance

defence capabilities in an integrated manner, including

exploring the scope for joint command-and-control mecha-

nisms and logistical arrangements. GCC states that had

defence or economic agreements with third parties should

not give these precedence over accords with fellow mem-

bers; there was a need to uphold the collective spirit and

combined bargaining power of the GCC. In the same vein,

he argued for the expansion of the GCC to include Yemen.

The GCC’s main regional priority in the short term was

to define its relations with Iraq and Iran. As far as former

was concerned, the recent Kuwait–Iraq accord provided a

model for how the GCC as a whole might come into asso-

ciation with Baghdad. Iran, meanwhile, needed to build

relations in the region on the basis of a policy of non-

interference, and through more active participation in the

campaign against terrorism. Yet Prince Saud Al Faisal also

argued that Iran had a right to security, and in this regard

Israel’s advanced nuclear capabilities were a source of par-

ticular concern. Ali Reza Moayeri, Iran’s Deputy Foreign

Minister for Research, speaking on behalf of Foreign

Minister Kamal Kharrazi, expressed his hope that the Gulf

Dialogue would ‘contribute to the promotion of peace

and security through open exchange of ideas’. Describing

the Gulf as an object of competition between great pow-

ers, whose interventions had detracted from the sum of

regional security, he advanced a plan for a ‘Persian Gulf

Collective Security Framework’. All states of the region

would participate in it, and none would form new alliances

with non-members. A ‘Regional Security Assembly’ would

be estab lished, which would handle pacts and treaties

while avoiding interference in the internal affairs of mem-

ber states. It would define the goals of regional interaction,

and its mandate would include crafting policies to combat

terrorism and its causes, and to pursue a Middle East free

of weapons of mass destruction. In the question and answer

session, attention focused in particular on the criteria that

Yemen would have to fulfil in order to be admitted to the

GCC. Other presentations on this panel were given by

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, Diplomatic Adviser to the

President of France, and Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al-Hamad

Al-Sabah, President of the National Security Bureau of

Kuwait.

Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

20052ND REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT, 2–4 DECEMBERRead a more detailed report online

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-gulf-dialogue-2005-dffe

16 | The 2nd IISS Regional Security Summit

An array of senior figures from 19 countries attended the

second IISS Regional Security Summit, The Gulf Dialogue,

in Bahrain from 2–4 December 2005.

There was intense discussion about counter-terrorism,

on means to deal with other regional security issues and, in

particular, about Iraq and the relationships between Arab

states and Iran. The conference featured vigorous debate

in the plenary sessions and break-out groups. Officials

engaged in many private bilateral meetings and delegation

leaders also attended a multilateral lunch.

Dr John Chipman, IISS Director, said in his opening

remarks that the summit was designed to bring together

the national security establishments of Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) members, Yemen, Iraq and Iran and key

outside powers that had a role to play in Gulf security.

The conference, held in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, built

on the success of the first Gulf Dialogue, held in the

same place a year earlier, as well as on that of the Asia

Security Conference, the Shangri-La Dialogue, convened

annually by the IISS in Singapore. The Dialogues pro-

vide an informal setting in which security issues can

be discussed both publicly and privately, in a unique

format that would be difficult for participating govern-

ments to organise for themselves.

To give the discussion more enduring form and value

– and in response to requests from delegates – the IISS

will circulate in early 2006 a substantial report on the Gulf

Dialogue’s content and lessons. (The report will be much

longer and will do better justice to interventions, both from

the podium and from the floor, than is possible in the lim-

ited space of this Newsletter.)

Delegations, with leaders of cabinet rank or sen-

ior level, attended from the six GCC members: Bahrain,

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates; three important regional states: Iran, Iraq and

Yemen; and ten non-regional countries: Australia, China,

France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, Singapore, the

United Kingdom and the United States.

The King of Bahrain, His Majesty King Hamad Bin Isa

Al Khalifa, welcomed delegation leaders at his palace. All

delegates were entertained at a reception and dinner by

the Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain


His Majesty King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa


Defence Force, His Highness Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad

Bin Isa Al Khalifa.

The King, in remarks to the delegation leaders, stressed

the importance of ‘information sharing through mean-

ingful dialogue’ in defeating terrorism which, he said,

‘threatens freedom as it threatens life itself’.

The need for such dialogue was emphasised by Sheikh

Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign

Affairs, in remarks at the opening dinner. ‘In the past we

have not had a forum that brings together interested parties

to address both individual issues and strategic challenges

in a detailed yet frank manner. I believe the Gulf Dialogue

can be such a forum’.

Iraq was inevitably a recurrent theme of the Dialogue.

Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawer, one of its two vice-presidents, said

in a keynote address at the opening dinner he hoped the

elections due in December would create a balanced par-

liament that would allow the political process to develop

further. Iraq faced abnormal and difficult conditions,

including terrorism, the influence of regional states, the

heritage of injustice under the former regime and the emi-

gration of skilled people. Foreign forces, he said, would

continue to be needed (subject to signature of a status-of-

forces agreement), while Iraq’s militias must be disbanded

and integrated into the security forces.

The US delegation was led by Frances Fragos Townsend,

Assistant to President George W. Bush for Homeland

Security and Counter-terrorism. Addressing the first ple-

nary session on ‘The US and Regional Security’, she said

international terrorist attacks were the work of a ‘diabolical

enemy’, fuelled by an ideology that distorted Islam. She set

out an agenda for co-operative action by regional countries

on two levels: practical measures such as sharing informa-

tion, securing borders and stopping the flow of terrorists’

funds; and on four fundamental policy issues: confronting

the ideology of violent extremism, halting state sponsor-

ship of terrorism, supporting the development of a stable

and peaceful Iraq, and helping the Palestinian Authority to

follow the ‘road map’ towards peace with Israel.

The second plenary featured regional, European

and Asian views on ‘Perspectives on GCC International

Security Relationships’. Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber

Al Thani, Qatar’s Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime

Minister, noted the many challenges facing GCC states,

including establishing political and economic re -form and

fighting terrorism in a globalised world.

Michèle Alliot-Marie, France’s Defence Minister, said

that to many people, the Gulf appeared to be the ‘exclusive

preserve of the United States’. She enumerated a number of

ways in which France and Europe could contribute to the

region’s security, including crisis management tools such

as European Union battlegroups and a gendarmerie force.

Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister, Professor S.

Jayakumar, who is also Co-ordinating Minister for National

Security, urged countries fighting terrorism to look beyond

the ‘operational aspects’. While it was important to tighten

aviation and maritime security and to disrupt terrorist

cells, Professor Jayakumar said: ‘If we do not tackle ideo-

logical aspects, we are only tackling half the problem’.

Only Muslims could do this, since non-Muslims had no

locus standi. Muslim leaders in Southeast Asia were mak-

ing efforts in this direction.

(l–r): Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawer, one of Iraq’s two Vice Presidents; and Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism


Sheikh Sabah Khalid Al Hamad Al Sabah, President of

the National Security Bureau, Kuwait, picked up this theme

in the third plenary session, ‘The Nature of the Regional

Terrorism Challenge’. ‘Many countries have been seared

by the flames of terrorism’, he noted before declaring that

‘Islam is innocent of such activities’. He listed measures

Kuwait had adopted, in education, religious training and

democratic and social reforms, to stop young people from

being led towards extremism.

The Interior Minister of Yemen, Maj.-Gen. Dr Rashad

Al Alimi, spoke of his country as the ‘strategic back garden

of this area’, and said it needed stronger co-operation with

GCC members in order to halt terrorism, organised crime

and arms trafficking, so that Yemen would not be used as a

safe haven. He agreed with suggestions for heightened co-

ordination, including in the exchange of information.

On Saturday afternoon the conference split into three

break-out groups, under the rules of which no participant’s

remarks can be publicly quoted.

A discussion on ‘Maritime Security in the Region’

was chaired by Admiral Jacques Lanxade, former Chief

of Defence Staff in France. Opening remarks were given

by Vice Admiral Patrick Walsh, Commander of US Naval

Forces, Central Command, and Commander of the US Fifth

Fleet, Admiral Sir James Burnell-Nugent, Commander-in-

Chief Fleet, UK Royal Navy and Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Yousef

Al Mulla, Chief of Naval Forces, Kuwait.

The break-out group heard that the Gulf and the west-

ern Indian Ocean were a ‘maritime crossroads’, where

maintaining freedom of sea communication was vital both

for littoral states and for extra-regional stakeholders. The

latter had a huge economic interest in the unimpeded flow

of hydrocarbons and, in some cases, a strategic interest in

assured naval access. Conflict in Iraq and increasing energy

demand, particularly from China and India, had accentu-

ated the critical importance of access. However, maritime

crime, notably piracy and trafficking, together with the

spectre of maritime terrorism, increasingly threatened to

undermine freedom of maritime communication.

The increased incidence of piracy posed a particularly

serious threat to shipping, contributing to concerns that esca-

lating maritime crime was entrenching a lawless environment

in which the potential for terrorism at sea was growing. This

threat was especially pronounced in the northern Gulf close

to Iraq, where unresolved territorial disputes may allow for

the exploitation of gaps in security coverage.

The US in particular was concerned that terrorist adver-

saries inspired by al-Qaeda would exploit regional waters

to move personnel, weapons and finances and use the sea

as a vector of asymmetric attack against US vessels and

those of friendly states. In response, the US and UK navies

were seeking to heighten co-ordination with regional and

international partners, notably in terms of intelligence-

sharing aimed at creating a more comprehensive and

accurate regional maritime picture.

At the same time, more conventional maritime security

concerns persisted. Western powers with naval forces in the

Gulf, as well as Arab states in the region, were concerned

over Iran’s potential maritime response if international

sanctions were imposed owing to its nuclear programme,

and accidental naval clashes were a worrying possibil-

ity. Some regional states feared a naval arms race. In this

unstable maritime environment, bilateral confidence-

building exchanges between major naval players would

(l–r): Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawer, one of Iraq’s two Vice Presidents; IISS Director Dr John Chipman; and Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minster of Foreign Affairs


Iran’s nuclear programme, clandestine support for terror-

ism and a desire to have a controlling hand in Iraq, Arab

participants seemed more anxious over Iran’s ascendant

power. Iranian participants, however, saw the problem as

groundless and best addressed by direct contacts between

Iran and regional actors, without the participation of

Europe or the US.

A fourth challenge revolved around the domestic insti-

tutions of regional states. Some saw the need for more

democracy and popular legitimacy, others for integrating

the region into the global marketplace of ideas and com-

merce, and still others for shoring up state security in the

face of untethered communications, porous borders, and

political violence.

Finally, the region was challenged by external actors:

many wanted a responsible role for the US but few were

happy with the status quo. Many welcomed Europe’s partic-

ipation but were sceptical about how vibrant that role would

be, while others were interested in linkages with rising

Asian powers, especially China and India as well as Japan.

Solutions to handling these diverse – and diversely

viewed – challenges centred on either new security struc-

tures or specific actions. Many favoured a broader Gulf

regional forum linking the six GCC states with Iraq, Iran,

Yemen and perhaps Jordan. Others worried that inclusiv-

ity was premature and that like-minded nations ought to

coalesce around steps to stabilise Iraq and to stem terror-

ism. Others preferred dealing with specific issues and put a

premium on bilateral relations, from intelligence sharing to

combined military exercises. Virtually everyone agreed on

the value of the IISS Gulf Dialogue for improving under-

standing and fashioning solutions.

be invaluable. However, inter-state tensions seemed likely

to rule out an over-arching multilateral regional security

arrangement in the foreseeable future.

A break-out group on ‘Regional Military Strategies

and Counter-terrorism Challenges’ was chaired by Field

Marshal The Lord Inge, former UK Chief of Defence Staff.

Introductory remarks were made by Lt-Gen. Fahd Al Amir,

Chief of Staff of the Kuwait Armed Forces, and Maj.-Gen.

Mohammed Bin Faisal Abo Sak, Saudi National Guard.

The group heard that the security challenges to the

region had altered considerably over the past decade. State

weakness and transnational terrorism were at the apex

of security concerns. Consequently, strategies adopted

by regional actors were undergoing a period of reflection,

debate and change. Participants concentrated on five issues.

Instability in Iraq posed the most immediate security

challenge. Clashing forces challenged a fledgling govern-

ment still in transition. Foreign forces were at once part

of the solution and the problem in the eyes of Gulf states,

which agreed on the objective but not necessarily the

means of stabilising Iraq. No-one expected an early end to

Iraq’s insurgency and sectarian political violence.

A second challenge was posed by terrorism. Whereas

most saw this as a vital common threat, group members

differed on specific threats or remedies. Clearly required

was a multi-faceted set of national and regional policies,

in which military intervention was only one policy instru-

ment. There could be wider co-operation among Muslims

on confronting the false narratives of those using a dis-

torted version of Islam to justify indiscriminate killing.

Iran’s growing influence and regional role posed a third

challenge. Whereas external participants worried over

(l–r): Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber Al Thani, Qatar’s Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister; and France’s Minister of Defence, Michèle Alliot-Marie


the region might be heading towards another extended

period of instability.

The group discussed the sources of this potential insta-

bility. The belligerent rhetoric that some states chose to

deploy in regional diplomacy was identified as a barrier

to good relations. However, participants from the GCC

states identified Iranian actions and possible motives as

the major source of concern. The nuclear issue dominated

their thoughts with Iran’s approach to negotiations over

the issue raising fears of a US military strike. In addition,

Iran’s influence and motives in Iraq were seen as a poten-

tial source of instability.

The break-out group considered a range of confidence-

building measures that could be undertaken to reduce

mistrust and to build stability. These should take the form

of a continued dialogue between regional states on the

A third break-out group discussed ‘Gulf Cooperation

Council Relations with Iran and Iraq: Energy Security

and Defence Implications’. It was chaired by Georg

Boomgarden, Secretary of State in Germany’s Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, and introductory remarks were given by

Yousuf Bin Alawi Bin Abdulla, Minister Responsible for

Foreign Affairs, Oman; Dr Abbas Maleki, Head of Iran’s

International Institute for Caspian Studies; and Labid

Majeed Abbawi, Under Secretary for Policy Planning in the

Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The discussion began with participants agreeing on the

global importance of the Gulf region for the stability and

growth of the world economy. Against this background,

the aftermath of regime change in Iraq and the conflict that

Iran was currently engaged in with the international com-

munity over its nuclear programme gave rise to fears that

(l–r): Maj.-Gen. Dr Rashad Al Alimi, Yemen’s Interior Minister; President, Kuwait’s National Security Bureau, Sheikh Sabah Khalid Al Hamad Al Sabah; and Professor S. Jayakumar, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister, Co-ordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Law

BREAK-OUT GROUP I: Maritime Security in the Region

(l–r): Admiral Sir James Burnell-Nugent, C-in-C Fleet, UK; Vice Admiral Patrick Walsh, Commander, US Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, US Fifth Fleet; and Maj.-Gen. Ahmad Yousef Al-Mulla, Kuwait’s Chief of Naval Forces. The group was chaired by Admiral (Retd) Jacques Lanxade, former Chief of Defence Staff, France


pressing issues of mutual defence, energy security and pro-

liferation. Such a dialogue should be aimed at balancing

the interests of individual states with those of the region as

a whole. It was suggested that in addition to the European

Union and the US, Pakistan and India should be brought in

as dialogue partners. Energy security, it was argued, would

only come from continuing discussion between producers

and consumers to regulate demand. Ultimately, energy

security could not be exclusive to individual states but was,

by its very nature, the work of multilateral institutions.

The group concluded that long-term stability in the

Gulf would only be achieved when states put aside military

and political rivalries and concentrated on the economic

and social development of their own populations.

On Sunday, attention continued to be focused on Iraq

and Iran. In the fourth plenary session, ‘Perspectives on the

Situation in Iraq’, Abdul Karim Al Anazi, Iraq’s Minister

of State for National Security Affairs, said Iraq needed

international and regional support to fight the threat of

terrorism, which was not a national but a regional phenom-

enon. He attacked the media – and he was not the first at

the Dialogue to do so – for what, in his view, was the provi-

sion of support to terrorism through coverage in the press

and on satellite television.

Dr John Reid, Secretary of State for Defence of the UK,

quoted Napoleon in arguing that endurance was required

to prevail in the struggle against terrorism in Iraq. The

effort would require not just force, but aid, trade, political

will and an understanding that not all opponents ‘should

be lumped together under the heading of international ter-

rorism’. Many people, he said, had genuine grievances and

felt let down by unfulfilled promises. Progress was being

BREAK-OUT GROUP II: Regional Military Strategies and CT Challenges

(l–r): Field Marshal Lord Inge KG GCB DL, former Chief of Defence Staff, UK; Lt-Gen. Fahd Al Amir, Chief of Staff of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces; and Maj.-Gen. Mohammed Bin Faisal Abo Sak of the Saudi National Guard

(l–r): Dr John Reid MP, UK Secretary of State for Defence; and Abdul Karim Al Anazi, Iraq’s Minister of State for National Security Affairs


made in Iraq, in building democracy, in restoring basic ser-

vices, in the economy and in training the security forces.

But there would still be challenges. ‘As things get better,

sometimes the activities of the terrorists will get worse’.

In the fifth plenary session, ‘Regional Relations: Iran

and Iraq’, Mohamed Reza Bagheri, Iran’s Deputy Foreign

Minister, said regional countries should set up a structure

that would allow security to be ‘indigenised’. The Persian

Gulf should be free of weapons of mass destruction: Iran

was committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

and the legal obligations it entailed. Iraq, he said, could be

a pillar of peace and security in the region.

In the sixth and final plenary, ‘Regional Security and

International Cooperation’, speakers from three external

powers presented their views. Ambassador Chinmaya

Gharekhan, India’s Special Envoy for West Asia, said India

had a vital stake in stability in the Gulf and believed a strong

web of international links would best ensure regional secu-

rity. Ambassador Wang Shijie, China’s Special Envoy for

the Middle East, said China favoured an international con-

vention to enhance cooperation against terrorism. Mikhail

Margelov, Head of the Russian Federation Council’s

Foreign Affairs Committee, noted that the establishment of

a security structure in the Gulf was in a ‘very preliminary

stage’ and that there was not unanimity among regional

states. Moves such as sharing intelligence data would be

helpful steps.

In conclusion, Dr Chipman paid tribute to the

Kingdom of Bahrain for its support for the Dialogue and

to the IISS staff who took part in its organisation. He

announced that the next Gulf Dialogue would be held on

8–10 December 2006.

Mohamed Reza Bagheri, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister

(l–r): Ambassador Chinmaya Gharekhan, India’s Special Envoy for West Asia; IISS Director Dr John Chipman; Mikhail Margelov, Head of the Russian Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee; and Ambassador Wang Shijie, China’s Special Envoy to the Middle East

BREAK-OUT GROUP III: GCC Relations with Iraq and Iran: Energy Security and Defence Implications

(l–r): Labid Majeed Abbawi, Under Secretary for Policy Planning in Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Georg Boomgarden, Secretary of State in Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Dr Abbas Maleki, Head of the International Institute for Caspian Studies, Iran

20063RD REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT, 8–10 DECEMBERRead a more detailed report online

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2006-2ded

24 | The 3rd IISS Regional Security Summit

The pressing security challenges of the Gulf and its sur-

rounding region were intensively addressed at the 3rd IISS

Regional Security Summit, The Manama Dialogue, held in

Bahrain from 8–10 December 2006.

At the close of the Dialogue, Dr John Chipman,

IISS Director-General and Chief Executive, said it had

demonstrated the value of creating an informal, inclu-

sive mechanism for discussing regional security issues.

Delegation leaders had requested that the IISS develop

and institutionalise the Dialogue. He warmly thanked the

Kingdom of Bahrain for its commitment to and support for

the Summit.

Delegates were addressed at a dinner at King Hamad’s

palace by Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa,

the Crown Prince, who praised the Manama Dialogue

and provided a clear and frank assessment of regional

security issues.

The topics discussed by the Crown Prince and other

speakers at the Dialogue underlined the multiplicity of

problems facing the region and the need for high-level dis-

cussions about them: the troubles of Iraq; apprehensions

about Iran’s nuclear programme; the Israel–Palestine

dispute; the travails of Lebanon; the threat of extrem-

ist terrorism; sectarian divisions; and the challenges of

Afghanistan. Speakers noted the growing importance of

energy security and maritime security as issues for the

region, as well as the continuing need for an overarching

security apparatus that would help regional countries to

address common issues.

The worsening violence in Iraq was a particular focus,

with the Dialogue commencing two days after the publica-

tion in Washington of the report of the Iraq Study Group

(ISG), comprising eminent former US officials led by James

Baker and Lee Hamilton, who recommended significant

and controversial shifts in US policy. The Dialogue was

addressed by Iraq’s national security adviser, its interior

and foreign ministers, as well as a former defence minister.

It was clear that Baghdad’s reaction to the report was far

from enthusiastic.

The Dialogue was attended by ministers, senior offi-

cials and military officers from 22 countries, including

Pakistan for the first time. As well as the six states of


Prince Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Chief of General Intelligence, Saudi Arabia


the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iran, Iraq and

Yemen, there was strong representation from the Asia-

Pacific region, Europe and North America. For example,

India and Japan were represented by their national security

advisers, Australia and Turkey by their defence ministers

and Sweden by its newly-appointed foreign minister, Carl

Bildt, a member of the IISS Council.

Chipman told the opening dinner: ‘Precisely because

this in an informal institution, a good deal of real diplo-

macy can happen during its course.’ As at the Shangri-La

Dialogue, the IISS Asia Security Summit held annually in

Singapore, delegations took the opportunity to hold bilat-

eral or multilateral meetings over lunch or dinner, as well

as to attend the plenary and break-out sessions.

The keynote speaker to the opening dinner was Prince

Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi Arabia’s Chief of

General Intelligence. Introducing him, Professor François

Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council, remarked that

the Prince’s position was not one that normally lent itself

to the public expression of opinions. However, Prince

Muqrin delivered a frank account of regional challenges,

focusing first on Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons,

which he described as a ‘dangerous threat’ to regional

security because proliferation by others would lead mod-

erate countries to initiate nuclear programmes. At the root

of this problem, he said, was the tension caused by the

Palestinian issue, and he noted that King Abdullah’s 2002

peace plan still provided a basis for resolution. Sectarian

violence and terrorism in Iraq was affecting regional

security. Other countries needed to help Iraq without

interfering in its internal affairs. The presence of foreign

forces would help fuel instability and terrorism – though

the Prince later qualified this remark by saying he did not

believe American forces should withdraw from Iraq yet.

Saudi Arabia was investing heavily in border security in

order to prevent infiltration into Iraq.

First Plenary Session: The United States and the region

The first plenary session, on ‘The United States and the Re-

gion’, was addressed by William Cohen, former Defense

Secretary and Senator, and now Chairman and Chief Ex-

ecutive Officer of the Cohen Group, and Richard Armit-

age, former Deputy Secretary of State and now President

of Armitage International. Though a strong delegation of

US officials and military officers attended the Dialogue, no

serving member of the Bush administration was able to ad-

dress delegates in plenary session.

Cohen noted that the mood had changed in the United

States since the invasion of Iraq, which President George

W. Bush had undertaken without much domestic chal-

lenge. It was clear that things had not gone as he had

planned. Following the November 2006 Congressional

elections, there was a short window of perhaps four or

five months to formulate a new US policy before the issue

became engulfed and fragmented by the politics of the

2008 presidential election.

As to the elements of a possible policy, Cohen asserted

that there was no military solution, but that support must

be given to a unified state. However, the view that the

new US focus should be on training Iraqi security forces

would be challenged by some in Washington. Cohen

supported engagement with Iran, provided this had the

backing, through the United Nations Security Council, of

China and Russia.

(l–r): William Cohen, former US Secretary of Defense; and Richard Armitage, former US Deputy Secretary of State


Armitage said the Bush administration was trying to

work out an overall regional policy rather than treating

the issues separately as it had before. America was nor-

mally an exporter of hope and enthusiasm, but since the

11 September 2001 attacks had exported fear and anger.

It was now time to step away from this mood, and to try

to be more open and welcoming. It was unfair to place

the same expectations of democracy on Iraqis as on post-

war Germany and Japan, both of which had professional

administrators and a democratic heritage. Armitage

reminded delegates that success in Afghanistan had to

be achieved, or else the world would be ‘in a whole new

ball game’.

Of the questioners, Lord (Charles) Powell, former

adviser to Margaret Thatcher as UK Prime Minister, was

dismissive of the ISG report as unrelated to the real situa-

tion and as a ‘plan for getting the President out of trouble’.

To Powell, the implication was that the United States

did not have the ability to see things through to the end.

Another challenge to US policy came from Sir Malcolm

Rifkind, former UK Foreign Secretary and Defence

Secretary. He suggested that the US should offer full nor-

malisation of bilateral relations to Iran.

Armitage agreed that there were ‘lots of reasons to sit

down with Iran’, which wanted ‘correct’ relations with

Washington. Cohen said there was a ‘grand bargain’ to be

struck with Iran, but bemoaned the current American lack

of leverage to achieve this. ‘They are reaping the benefit of

our lack of success’, he said. Both speakers agreed that the

ISG was a result of US politics. While Armitage asserted

that it was common sense for the Iraqi government to take

on more responsibilities, Cohen said that US criticism of

Bush’s approach would diminish if there were signs of

measurable progress.

Second Plenary Session: Regional security perceptions

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was the

first of three foreign ministers to address the second

plenary session on ‘Regional Security Perceptions’. He

called for collective security arrangements among re-

gional countries, without intervention by foreign forces.

On Iran’s nuclear programme, he said it was pursuing its

‘indisputable rights only within the framework of the Nu-

clear Non-Proliferation Treaty’. The issue could be solved

through dialogue and there was no basis for involving

the UN Security Council. Iran was willing to remove any

ambiguity on the issue and had already done much to do

so. On Iraq, Mottaki stated that it was vital that foreign

troops be pulled out, and Iran was ready to help the Unit-

ed States to do so.

Answering questions, Mottaki insisted that his coun-

try’s nuclear programme was peaceful and that it was not

seeking to make weapons. All its activities were moni-

tored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

and there was no evidence of divergence from their peace-

ful purpose.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari agreed that Iraq’s

difficulties in restoring stability – for which he blamed

Saddam’s ‘henchmen’ – were affecting its neighbours. He

saw it as one of five key regional security issues, the others

being rising sectarianism, the spread of nuclear weapons,

terrorism and the lack of a regional security system.

(l–r): Manouchehr Mottaki, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iran; and Hoshyar Zebari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq


Third Plenary Session: Asia’s role in the region

In the third plenary session, on ‘Asia’s Role in the Region’,

delegates heard from senior officials from India, Japan and

China. M.K. Narayanan, National Security Adviser to In-

dia’s Prime Minister, underlined the bonds of trade, cul-

ture and religion that tie India to the Gulf. Issues such as

energy security, terrorism and conflicts were of common

interest because together they threaten regional and inter-

national security. India was involved in the reconstruction

of Afghanistan, but these efforts were threatened by the re-

surgence of the Taliban ‘made possible by the existence of

support structures across the border’.

Narayanan also expressed concern about Iraq,

Palestine and Lebanon. Iran’s security concerns needed

to be addressed: non-engagement was not an option.

He expressed doubt about Iran’s intention to weapon-

ise, though he said India would oppose this. Terrorism

was ‘one of the greatest scourges that the world has ever

known’, and terrorist groups had ‘common operating pro-

cedures, common funding structures, common training

facilities, and a degree of cross-cultural compatibility’.

Yuriko Koike, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister for

National Security Affairs, Japan, said the Gulf and the East

were bound together by four key issues: energy, stability,

trade and climate. On the first of these, the GCC countries,

Iran and Iraq supplied 90% of Japan’s oil imports, and

Japan bought 27% of GCC output. Steps had been taken

to improve maritime security, but more could be done to

promote dialogue between producer and consumer and in

terms of investment cooperation. On peace and stability,

she expressed Japan’s grave concern about North Korean

Like Cohen and Armitage, Zebari argued that the ISG

was mostly to do with US politics. Iraqis, having begun

their political process with international support, would

fiercely resist any backward steps. Iraqi security forces

needed to be empowered, trained and equipped. Iraq

needed to talk to its neighbours, as it had begun to do so

with Iran and Syria, and would do with Jordan, Saudi

Arabia and Turkey.

Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed

Bin Mohammed Al Khalifa said the region faced four

inter-linked challenges: demographics, extremism, sec-

tarianism and terrorism. On the first of these, there was

a danger that extremism and terrorism could find a

favourable environment if countries failed to provide

employment, infrastructure and social services to keep

pace with growing populations. It was necessary to

ensure that expatriate populations did not displace local

workforces. Bahrain was addressing the issue through

labour-market reforms ‘to ensure that Bahrainis are given

all necessary skills and opportunities to find employ-

ment, without losing the flexibility to fill short-term gaps

through recruitment of expatriates’.

Sheikh Mohammed Al Abdallah Al Sabah, Director,

Citizens Services and Governmental Bodies Assessment

Agency, Kuwait, told the session that the withdrawal of US

troops from Iraq should not be an option as Washington

reassesses its policy. This would only increase violence

and instability. Expressing concern about the situations

in Lebanon and Palestine, Al Sabah called on Iran to build

international confidence about its nuclear programme by

dealing transparently with the IAEA.

(l–r): Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain; and Sheikh Mohammed Al Abdallah Al Sabah, Director of the Citizens Services and Governmental Bodies Assessment Agency, Kuwait


Participants heard that irregular challenges from both

states and non-state actors had escalated over the last dec-

ade: the threat to shipping, oil and gas installations, and

ports was now pervasive. Any substantial disruption of

seaborne energy supplies or more general maritime trade

could have global economic and political repercussions.

Particular concern was expressed over the vulnerability of

chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca,

though there was little consensus on how feasible it might

be for conventional armed forces or terrorists to block these

vital trade routes.

States in the Gulf region were already implementing

national measures to manage these threats, but only effec-

tive international cooperation involving extra-regional

stakeholders, as well as regional states, could deal effec-

tively with the widening array of contemporary maritime

security challenges. There was already substantial inter-

national maritime security cooperation in the Gulf region,

where US-led but thoroughly multinational naval task

forces operate in support of Operation Enduring Freedom

and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The US proposal for a global ‘1,000-ship navy’ and

interest in creating a global maritime operating picture

provided visions for intensified international cooperation

in the future. However, experience in Southeast Asia dur-

ing the current decade pointed to the value of littoral states

taking the initiative, and establishing regional maritime

security mechanisms in conjunction with user states.

There was broad consensus in the group that maritime

security was a global as well as a regional concern, and that

inter-regional cooperation was important. Notably, the

Gulf states should be concerned not only with maritime

and Iranian nuclear programmes and called for greater

cooperation to meet these challenges. Japan had pledged a

large amount of assistance to Iraq and was concerned about

the deterioration of security there. On trade and economic

security, Japan had commenced negotiations with the GCC

on a free-trade agreement. On climate, Koike, who was

previously Environment Minister, said the GCC could not

afford to be indifferent to global warming.

Sun Bigan, China’s Special Envoy for the Middle

East, expressed his country’s concern about the Israel–

Palestine conflict, Iran’s nuclear programme and Iraq.

Speaking in Arabic, Sun said that to build a harmonious

Gulf it was necessary to build mutual trust, to settle the

hotspot issues through dialogue, to promote economic

and social development, and to build exchanges between

civilisations.

On the afternoon of 9 December, delegates broke into

three groups for off-the-record discussions. While remarks

may not be attributed to the participants who made them,

the IISS records the sense of the discussion.

A session on ‘Energy and Maritime Security’ was

chaired by Heisbourg. Opening remarks were made

by Vice-Admiral David Nichols, Deputy Commander,

US Central Command; Vice-Admiral A.K. Singh,

Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command, India;

and Zainul Abidin Rasheed, Senior Minister of State for

Foreign Affairs, Singapore. The group focused on the

nature of contemporary threats to maritime security,

and particularly seaborne energy supplies, in the Gulf

and further afield. It discussed the modalities of regional

and international collaboration that might mitigate these

threats.

M.K. Narayanan, National Security Adviser, India


security in their immediate region, but also further afield,

and particularly in Southeast Asia, through which a high

proportion of their energy exports passes.

A break-out group on ‘Demographics, Sectarianism

and Gulf Security’ was chaired by Ellen Laipson, President

and Chief Executive Officer of the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Opening remarks were made by Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie,

Iraqi National Security Adviser; Dr Sadoun Al-Dulame,

Adviser to the Iraqi Prime Minister and former Defence

Minister; Wafaa Bassim, Egypt’s Deputy Foreign Minister;

Mohammed Bin Abdulla Al Rumaihi, Undersecretary of

State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar; and Dr Abdel

Aziz Al Shaibi, National Security Agency, Yemen. The

group focused on two main themes: the situation in Iraq

and the movement of people, whether foreign workers into

the Gulf or migration out of Iraq, and the impact of these

trends on regional security.

On Iraq, debate was sparked by two contrasting rep-

resentations of the situation in Iraq. One portrayed the

situation in Iraq as far better than that depicted by the

Western and Arab media; 80% of Iraq was stable and 14

out of 18 provinces were places where people lived a

normal life; and the issue of sectarianism was driven by

fringe groups on both sides of the Sunni–Shia divide. Iraq,

according to this view, was likely to recover and would

neither disintegrate nor descend into civil war. However,

the group was also presented with a vision of corruption,

which was said to be at the heart of the American and

Iraqi failure to establish strong security forces. For exam-

ple, it had allegedly cost $100 million to build a camp that

should have cost no more than $6m. The heart of the secu-

rity problem in Iraq was said to be the fact that terrorists

were better armed and better financed than the Iraqi secu-

rity forces.

BREAK-OUT GROUP I: Energy and maritime security

(l–r): Vice Admiral A.K. Singh, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command, India; Professor François Heisbourg, IISS Chairman; and Vice Admiral David Nichols, Deputy Commander, US Central Command; and Zainul Abidin Rasheed, Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Singapore

(l–r): Yuriko Koike, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister for National Security Affairs, Japan; and Sun Bigan, China’s Special Envoy to the Middle East


It was argued that migration created imbalances in

communities and put tremendous strains on Iraq’s neigh-

bours, which were likely to evolve into a security threat.

Participants debated whether the failure of GCC laws to

help migrants to settle as residents or citizens, and local

populations being far out-numbered by immigrant labour

forces, were indeed generating a long-term security threat.

The third break-out group discussed ‘Security

Guarantees and Regional Stability’, under the chairman-

ship of Field Marshal Lord Inge, former UK Chief of the

Defence Staff. Opening remarks were made by Dr John

Hillen, US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military

Affairs; Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, Director, Strategic

Affairs, Ministry of Defence, France; and Dr Seyed Hossein

Mousavian, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme

National Security Council, Iran.

The group heard that security guarantees from the

United States remained important in the Gulf region, but

no one country could bring or keep the peace. Participants

contrasted a traditional, state-centred, balance-of-power

system of security against a potentially emerging coopera-

tive and common security framework. The former system,

defended by some American participants, underscored the

disproportionate burdens of security either placed on or

assumed by the United States. Some voices from the region

expressed concern over the deleterious effects of an expan-

sive American military presence in the region. One blamed

the United States for the current troubles.

More optimistically, others called on all countries to

migrate towards a cooperative, common security sys-

tem. Such a system might perhaps be modelled on the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which

played a helpful role in moving East and West towards

reconciliation and the end of the Cold War. Another illus-

trative system was that of the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations, through which countries slowly overcame

differences by focusing first on economic cooperation.

Issues on which cooperative security might be based

ranged from countering proliferation and terrorism to mar-

itime security, energy and the environment. A few argued

for building on specific convergent interests, such as the

requirement of averting the collapse of the fledgling Iraqi

and Afghan governments. Iraq consumed much attention,

amid widespread concern that sectarian strife could spill

over into the region. The issue of Iran was more divisive:

while Iran accused the United States of destabilising the

region, participants from other states encouraged more

active engagement and diplomacy with Tehran.

Fourth Plenary Session: The situation in Iraq

The fourth plenary session focused on ‘The Situation in

Iraq’. Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Al Bolani said a demo-

cratic country could not build oppressive systems or start

wars against its neighbours. The government had em-

barked on a national reconciliation programme, but the

greatest danger came from al-Qaeda and jihadist organisa-

tions which, against religious principles, targeted civilians

and infrastructure. The media gave too dark a picture of

Iraq, failing to highlight the many reconstruction projects,

the revival of the southern marshes and improvements in

security systems.

Turkish Defence Minister Mehmet Vecdi Gönül com-

mented, however, that ‘the violence in Iraq has reached a

level that causes great pain for all of us’. Terrorist, sectarian

BREAK-OUT GROUP II: Demographics, sectarianism and Gulf security

(l–r): Ellen Laipson, President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center; Wafaa Bassim, Deputy Foreign Minister, Egypt; and Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie, National Security Adviser, Iraq


and criminal violence seemed to have engulfed the coun-

try. Reflecting Turkey’s long-standing concerns about

Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq, Gönül said Iraq’s oil

resources, including those from around the northern city of

Kirkuk, should be fairly used for the benefit of all the peo-

ple of Iraq and not any particular group. Iraqis needed to

set aside ethnic and sectarian interests, but political parties

had been cultivating them instead. Allowing the country to

divide on ethnic and sectarian grounds would create prob-

lems that would ‘engulf the entire region’.

Bildt sought to draw lessons for Iraq from his exten-

sive knowledge of nation-building. He asserted that the

territorial integrity of Iraq was vital, because ‘all par-

titions are written in blood’; the role of neighbours in

preventing instability was important; internal security

was key and police forces were more important than the

army; a constitutional compromise was essential; the

economy needed to be rebuilt; and reconstruction efforts

demanded ‘strategic patience’. Meanwhile, the efforts to

stabilise Iraq and Palestine were interdependent: if one

failed, so would the other.

Fifth Plenary Session: Europe’s role in the region

The fifth plenary dealt with ‘Europe’s Role in the Region’.

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, Diplomatic Adviser to Pres-

ident Jacques Chirac, said France favoured efforts to build

ties through dialogue, such as the long-running negotia-

tions to forge a free-trade agreement between the European

Union and the GCC. The Israel–Palestine issue, as well as

the troubles in Lebanon, must also be resolved through di-

alogue. A solution in Iraq could come only from Iraqis and

the task of other countries was to foster dialogue.

(l–r): Jawad Al Bolani, Interior Minister, Iraq; Mehmet Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defence, Turkey; and Carl Bildt, Foreign Minister, Sweden

BREAK-OUT GROUP II: Demographics, sectarianism and Gulf security

(l–r): Dr Abdel Aziz Al Shaibi, National Security Agency, Yemen; Dr Sadoun Al-Dulaime, Adviser to the Prime Minister, Iraq; and Mohammed Bin Abdulla Al Rumaihi, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar


Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces,

UK, focused on terrorism, arguing that those who claimed

that terrorist acts were part of a holy war were wrong:

there was no such war. Terrorist attacks had repeatedly

made the lives of Muslims worse, not better. Partnerships

between Muslim and non-Muslim communities and gov-

ernments were the best means of avoiding the schism the

terrorists sought to create. It was also necessary to resolve

the region’s troubles, such as Israel–Palestine, Lebanon and

Iraq; the UN, EU and NATO were all reforming themselves

so as to be more effective. A peaceful region would mean

that terrorists had failed.

Christian Schmidt, Parliamentary State Secretary,

Ministry of Defence, Germany, agreeing with other speak-

ers on the need to resolve many regional issues, said Iran

had been offered far-reaching cooperation by France,

Germany and the UK in their bid earlier in 2006 to make

progress on the nuclear issue. He was disappointed that

Iran had neither accepted nor published the offer.

Sixth Plenary Session: The future shape of regional

security

The sixth plenary session considered ‘The Future Shape of

Regional Security’. Muhammad Ali Al Anisi, Chairman of

the National Security Agency, Yemen, stressed the need for

a comprehensive approach to the region’s security, paying

particular attention to economic development. The prob-

lems of the Horn of Africa needed to be taken into account.

General Ehsan Ul Haq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Committee, Pakistan, underlined the close bonds

of civilisation, history, ethnicity, culture, faith and econ-

omy that tied Pakistan to the Gulf. He highlighted the

(l–r): Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic, France; Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, UK; and Christian Schmidt, Parliamentary State Secretary to the Federal Minister of Defence, Germany

BREAK-OUT GROUP III: Security guarantees and regional stability

(l–r): Dr John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, US; Jean de Ponton d’Amécourt, Director, Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, France; Dr Hossein Mousavian, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Supreme National Security Council; Vice President, International Issues, Center for Strategic Research, Iran; and Field Marshal Lord Inge, former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK


But there was plenty of good news in Iraq: in most parts,

people were leading normal lives.

Violence was being generated by extremist Sunni and

Shia elements and was fuelled by regional states. Rubaie

agreed with some elements of the ISG report, including the

acceleration of the capabilities of Iraqi security forces and

engaging with neighbouring countries. But he described

other recommendations as ‘half-baked’ and deplored any

tendency of the US to ‘cut and run’. The way forward

for Iraq was internal reconciliation, including a general

amnesty and a review of de-Ba’athification.

international issues at stake and the fact that foreign

military intervention could have both stabilising and desta-

bilising effects. There was also a need for regional states to

create a better consensus among themselves. The Manama

Dialogue represented a step in this direction.

Rubaie said his country was going through a paradigm

shift from the old to a new order and demanded patience

while Iraq endured the sacrifices that were necessary for

this to be completed. The country was developing a new

identity. While al-Qaeda was an immediate threat, the real

long-term threat came from elements of the former regime.

(l–r): General Ehsan Ul Haq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan; Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie, National Security Adviser, Iraq; and Ali Muhammad Al Anisi, Chairman, National Security Agency and Head of the Presidential Office, Yemen


20074TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT, 7–9 DECEMBERRead a more detailed report online

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2007-aac7


A forthright address by Robert Gates, US Secretary of

Defense, was the highlight of the fourth IISS Manama

Dialogue, held in Bahrain from 7–9 December 2007.

The Regional Security Summit took place just a few

days after the US Director of National Intelligence had

issued a National Intelligence Estimate concluding that

Iran had been conducting a nuclear weapons programme,

but that this had been suspended in 2003.

The week, Gates told delegates, had marked a water-

shed. ‘Astonishingly, the revolutionary government of

Iran has this week, for the first time, embraced as valid an

assessment of the United States intelligence community.’

He hoped that Tehran would also accept its conclusions on

Iran’s support for Hizbullah in Lebanon and insurgents in

Iraq, its uranium enrichment programme, its development

of ballistic missiles, and other activities.

Iran had committed itself to sending a strong del-

egation to Manama. However, it notified the Institute

on 7 December that it would not attend – thereby, in the

eyes of many delegates, missing an important opportu-

nity for engagement with the many countries that were

represented. In spite of its absence, Iran was inevitably one

of the Dialogue’s dominant themes.

John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief

Executive, kicked off the Dialogue by emphasising the rel-

evance of IISS research work to the security issues affecting

the Gulf region. He said: ‘We are keen to bring the perspec-

tives of this region into the mainstream of international

strategic debate; involve regional analysts in our work;

help to connect the debates here to those of other regions;

and ensure also that IISS analysis is organically part of the

region’s deliberations.’

The Manama Dialogue is continuing to develop as the

only forum that brings together national security estab-

lishments of the Gulf states with key outside powers.

Chipman thanked the Kingdom of Bahrain for supporting

the event, and for the logistical and other assistance pro-

vided by its government.

The speaker at the opening dinner, Sheikh Khalid Bin

Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of

Foreign Affairs, was introduced by François Heisbourg,

Chairman of the IISS Council. The minister said that in


Dr Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defense


recent weeks two events had built momentum towards a

new era of compromise in the region: the Annapolis sum-

mit, which had launched a new set of negotiations between

Palestinians and Israelis; and the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) summit in Qatar, at which Iran’s President

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had proposed security, economic

and scientific cooperation between the GCC and Iran.

Iran’s relations with the region and the world could

become a source of stability, rather than conflict, he said,

if no regional country was confrontational, and if Iran pur-

sued its nuclear programme in full cooperation with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

First Plenary Session: The United States and the

regional balance of power

Addressing the first plenary session on 8 December, Gates

said of Iran that ‘you cannot pick and choose only the

conclusions you like of this recent National Intelligence

Estimate’. It was, he said, Iran’s policy ‘to foment instabil-

ity and chaos’. He argued that the international community

should demand that Iran come clean about its past illegal

nuclear weapons development, and should insist that Iran

suspend enrichment and agree to inspection arrangements.

Answering questions, Gates expressed his frustration

– and that of President George W. Bush – at the diplo-

matic confusion caused by the release of the intelligence

assessment. Because of the independence of the Central

Intelligence Agency, he said, ‘the government of the United

States has virtually no say over the content of these esti-

mates or the timing of when they are issued … What were

we thinking of to put out something that was apparently so

unhelpful to the policy objectives we were seeking to pur-

sue? ... It has annoyed a number of our good friends. It has

confused a lot of people around the world in terms of what

we are trying to accomplish.’

Fleur de Villiers, chairman of the IISS Executive

Committee, responded that in spite of Gates’ call for inter-

national pressure and sanctions to be maintained, ‘is the

dominant sound … not one of slamming doors and bolt-

ing horses, and has the likelihood of that international

pressure … not been totally destroyed?’ Gates did not

think so. However, he did indicate that Washington’s

focus was on diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran,

rather than on military action. Answering concerns of del-

egates from the Gulf that they could be marginalised by

direct Washington–Tehran engagement, he gave assur-

ances that ‘the United States is not going to cut any kind

of a deal with Iran’ and that ‘we value the views of all of

our friends’.

Gates, who had just visited Iraq, said the level of violence

had recently been reduced and there had been ‘the return

of a semblance of daily life in many cities and communi-

ties’. While pointing to a number of positive developments,

he said progress was fragile and urged the Iraqi govern-

ment to push forward grassroots conciliation, to improve

government services, and to make life for all Iraqis better.

Underlining the consequences of failure, he urged regional

countries to help Iraq. He added that although US troop

levels in Iraq would start to fall, the staying power of the

United States should not be questioned.

Questioned on how the US would achieve a cohesive

stance on the contentious issue of Iraq, Gates said he had

Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs


been trying to create a bipartisan agreement on future

strategy. ‘I do not care how we arrived at where we are; the

fact is we are here. Now how do we move beyond where

we are?’ There was a growing appreciation in the US of the

need to keep a residual force in Iraq, with the Iraqi govern-

ment’s agreement.

Second Plenary Session: GCC security and economic

development

The second plenary session took the form of a dialogue be-

tween delegates and Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber

Al Thani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

of Qatar.

Among the themes were:

• the role of GCC states in Iraq: he did not believe

enough was being done. ‘Part of the problem in Iraq is to

find jobs for the people. If the people are busy then it will

put them away from thinking of other ways.’ However,

for Qatar to take a greater role, stability and safety were

important, and ‘we would like to see all the Iraqi peo-

ple treated the same … It has been promised that part

of the constitution of Iraq will be reviewed, and that is

something that is very important for us.’ Challenged on

this point by Mowaffak Al Rubaie, National Security

Adviser of Iraq, Sheikh Hamad said that while a strong

Iraq was very important for regional stability, ‘to be

frank, the unity of Iraq is still not there … Some parties

feel that they are not being taken as full citizens.’

• GCC relations with Iran: he stressed the neccessity

to work together. ‘We have to acknowledge that Iran

is a very important country in the region. We cannot

avoid dealing with Iran … I do not think we can solve

our problem through trying to seal Iran off from the

region … Yes, there are some issues, there are some dif-

ferences between us on some ideas, we know that, and

we always tell them this. What is very important is that

nobody tries to dominate the region.’ Washington and

Tehran should engage in direct dialogue, but Gulf states

should not be left out.

Third Plenary: Energy and regional security

The third plenary session tackled energy and regional se-

curity. M.K. Narayanan, National Security Adviser, India,

emphasised his country’s growing need for energy because

of its rapid economic growth. The country, he said, would

rely on a mix of energy sources, including nuclear power,

but was also investing in the Gulf. In return, India sought

GCC investment in Indian energy infrastructure. This un-

derlined India’s already strong ties to the Gulf, where near-

ly 5 million Indian citizens live. Amid the growing impor-

tance of energy security, peace in the Gulf was in India’s

vital interest. The Indian Ocean carries 66% of the world’s

oil supplies, 50% of containerised cargo, and 33% of bulk

cargo. Wide-ranging regional partnerships and common

approaches to problems, including terrorism, were cited as

priorities.

Sheikh Mohammed Al Abdallah Al Sabah, Director

for Government Delivery, Kuwait, said energy security

required protection of oil facilities from sabotage, and

this meant more broadly that it was necessary constantly

to try to neutralise regional tensions and conflict. For

this reason, the GCC summit had reaffirmed the impor-

tance of preserving Iraq’s unity and sovereignty, and the

need for other countries not to destabilise it or interfere

(l–r): Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS; and François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council


gap between haves and have-nots. She added that rising

demand for oil increased the dangers of global warming –

an issue on which Japan is active. ‘As Japan imports 90% of

its oil from the Middle East, stability of the region is vital,’

she said. Securing sea lines of communication was identi-

fied as an important goal.

After the third plenary session, four separate break-out

groups met simultaneously for off-the-record discussions.

The first was on inter-community relations and sectarian

conflict, chaired by Mamoun Fandy, IISS Senior Fellow for

Gulf Security. Opening remarks were made by Muhyideen

Al Dhabi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yemen;

Mevlut Cavusoglu, member of parliament and Vice-

President Foreign Affairs Department, AK Party, Turkey;

Sadoun Al Dulame, former Defence Minister, Iraq; and

Bandar Al Aiban, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee,

Majlis Al Shura, Saudi Arabia.

in its internal affairs. At the same time, leaders stressed

the importance of full cooperation between Iran and the

IAEA.

From Kuwait’s perspective, energy security was based

on providing oil and derivatives to consumer countries at

adequate prices, in a way that permitted the country to con-

tribute to international economic growth. It was noted that

prices were influenced not only by supply and demand, but

by security factors. More refining capacity was also neces-

sary, and Gulf states, including Kuwait, were investing in

it. Meanwhile, consumers needed to diversify their energy

sources – the world’s dependence on the Gulf meant that

any threat or security disruption in the region affected

international security and economic growth.

Yuriko Koike, recently Defense Minister of Japan,

noted the recent sharp rise in the price of oil, which was

creating a highly charged atmosphere and widening the

BREAK-OUT GROUP I: Inter-community relations and sectarian politics

(l–r): Muhiddeen Al Dhabi, Deputy Foreign Minister, Yemen; Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie, Iraq’s National Security Adviser; Dr Sadoun Al Dulame, Former Defence Minister, Iraq; and Wafaa Bassim, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber Al Thani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar at the second plenary session


secular party ruled, things improved. A Turkish delegate

said the solution in Turkey was the secular state.

The second break-out group tackled regional armed

forces and security policy. The chairman was Lord Guthrie,

former UK Chief of Defence Staff, and opening remarks

were made by Maj.-Gen. Issa Al Mazrouie, Director of Mili-

tary Intelligence, United Arab Emirates; Lt.-Gen. Sheikh

Mohammad Bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, Minister of State

for Defence Affairs, Bahrain; General Babakir Baderkhan

Zibari, Chief of Staff, Iraqi Joint Forces; and Mark Kimmitt,

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, United States.

The group heard that military establishments in the

Gulf region had a wide array of roles. Most importantly,

they acted as the ultimate guarantors of state authority,

while deterring threats to national sovereignty in an area

beset with territorial disputes and challenges from regional

powers on its periphery. At the same time, the Gulf was

The focus of the discussion was on the Sunni–Shia

divide in Iraq and its possible knock-on effects in the wider

region. But there was some dispute about whether it made

sense to look at clashes in Iraq and its region in terms of

this Sunni–Shia paradigm. At times of crisis, said one par-

ticipant, people went back to basic identities. In this sense

the return to sectarian identity was artificial. Even the

Arab–Israeli conflict, he argued, was not essentially a con-

flict between Muslims and Jews, but a conflict over land.

Since sectarian lines were not new, the question arose

as to why they were sharpening now. An Indian partici-

pant recalled that when India became independent, no one

thought it could survive – it was expected to fragment along

ethnic and sectarian lines. But this did not happen. The

democratic state played a basic role, as did secular politics.

In general, he argued, whenever a religious party came to

power, the threat of fragmentation increased. Whenever a

BREAK-OUT GROUP I: Inter-community relations and sectarian politics

(l–r): Dr Mamoun Fandy, Senior Fellow for Gulf Security, IISS; Dr Bandar Al Aiban, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Majlis Al Shura, Saudi Arabia; and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, member of parliament, and Vice President, Foreign Affairs Department, AK Party, Turkey

M.K. Narayanan, National Security Adviser, India


part of a wider Middle East in which the Israel–Palestine

conflict continued to be a major source of insecurity. Iran’s

nuclear programme and overall strategic stance were of

major concern to other Gulf states.

Delegates noted that governments in the region had

increased their defence spending, and major equipment

procurement programmes were under way. Iraq’s armed

forces faced acute challenges in reconstituting a national

defence capability while simultaneously taking a greater

share of the burden of fighting a multi-faceted insur-

gency that still seriously threatened national cohesion.

Multinational military cooperation was an essential com-

ponent of efforts to improve security, and the presence of

US and coalition forces in Iraq and the region as a whole

would remain important. At the same time, developing and

strengthening the GCC’s ‘Peninsula Shield’ force would

help to synergise national defence efforts.

Nigel Inkster, IISS Director of Transnational Threats

and Political Risk, chaired the third break-out group

on transnational threats. Opening remarks were made

by Admiral William Fallon, Commander, US Central

Command, United States; Gunter Gloser, Minister of

State, Federal Foreign Office, Germany; and Zamir Akram,

Foreign Policy Adviser to Pakistan’s prime minister.

Initial presentations encompassed a wide-ranging

definition of transnational threats going beyond the more

familiar challenges of terrorism, narcotics and interna-

tional crime to include energy and water security, climate

change, financial and banking systems, and the misuse

of cyberspace. Many such threats could be exacerbated

by conditions in failing states, by poor governance, lack

of border controls and corruption, and by destabilisation

arising from natural disasters. All agreed that such threats

needed to be tackled in a comprehensive manner and

BREAK-OUT GROUP II: Regional armed forces and security policy

(l–r): Maj.-Gen. Issa Al Mazrouie, Director of Military Intelligence, Armed Forces, United Arab Emirates; Lt.-Gen. Sheikh Dr Mohammad Bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, Minister of State for Defence Affairs, Bahrain; General the Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, Former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK; General Babakir Baderkhan Zibari, Chief of Staff, Iraqi Joint Forces, Iraq; and Mark T. Kimmitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Middle East, United States

Sheikh Mohammed Al Abdallah Al Sabah, Director for Government Delivery, Kuwait


across a broad front by means of military action, capacity

building, the fostering of collective awareness, dialogue

and enhanced cooperation. More specifically, the issue of

terrorism needed to be addressed in a historical context,

not as a snapshot.

Discussion focused on the effectiveness of international

and national institutions in dealing with the issues. Some

advocated a ‘ground up’ approach, making the best use of

the simplest mechanisms available or ones that might be

created. Others favoured better use of the United Nations

and the development of a ‘one-stop shop’ for dealing with

UN agencies. There was also scope for better use of existing

regional organisations, specialist institutions and non-gov-

ernmental organisations. At the domestic level, there was a

need better to coordinate the different objectives and val-

ues of government departments dealing with, for example,

defence, foreign policy and development cooperation.

The fourth break-out group, on economic security,

sanctions, and regional stability, was chaired by Swedish

Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, and featured presenta-

tions by Patrick O’Brien, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist

Financing at the US Treasury Department, and Sheikh

Mohammed Bin Issa Al Khalifa, Chairman of the Economic

Development Board of Bahrain.

Discussion centered on how sanctions could most effec-

tively be applied. It was noted that sanctions had evolved

over the past decades from broad embargoes against entire

economies such as in the case of apartheid South Africa,

to targeted ‘smart’ sanctions designed to prevent specific

activity, as in the case of action against terrorism financing

by non-state actors and nuclear and missile proliferation

by Iran. It was emphasised that smart sanctions must have

clarity as to the targeted activity and entities. Transparency

and predictability were vital to regional development,

BREAK-OUT GROUP III: Transnational threats

(l–r): Günter Gloser, Minister of State for Europe, Federal Foreign Office, Germany; Zamir Akram, Adviser to the Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan; Nigel Inkster, Director, Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS; and Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, US Central Command, United States

Yuriko Koike, former Defense Minister of Japan


especially in the Middle East, where the private sector was

the engine of growth. Sanctions needed the widest possible

application, hence the utility of adopting them through the

UN, although comprehensiveness often came at the price

of effectiveness. Developing trade links would help pro-

vide for better regional security.

On the evening of 8 December, delegates were hosted at

dinner by His Royal Highness Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad

Bin Isa Al Khalifa, Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief

of the Bahrain Defence Force.

Fourth Plenary Session: Iraq and the neighbourhood

Addressing the fourth plenary session on Iraq and the

neighbourhood on 9 December, Mehmet Vecdi Gönül,

Turkey’s Minister of Defence, welcomed improvements in

Iraq’s internal security, but said this remained of concern

and that nationwide political reconciliation was needed

between all Iraqi political groups. Turkey was maintaining

a dialogue with Iraqi leaders and groups, and was train-

ing Iraqi officers as part of the NATO training mission. But

Turkey was concerned that Iraq should not be fragmented

along ethnic and sectarian lines. It was worried about the

future status of the city of Kirkuk, and particularly about

Kurdish PKK infiltration into Turkish territory. ‘We will

not tolerate the use of Iraqi soil for the purpose of launch-

ing terrorist activities,’ Gönul declared.

Mowaffak Al Rubaie, Iraq’s National Security Adviser,

delivered an eloquent address in which he said: ‘From

where we sit in Baghdad, … the region looks like this:

competition turned into conflict between Saudi Arabia and

Iran, on the soil of Iraq.’ The region had been in conflict

with the West, and its countries had been fighting amongst

BREAK-OUT GROUP IV: Economic security, sanctions and regional stability

(l–r): Carl Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sweden; Patrick M. O’Brien, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, Department of the Treasury, US; and Sheikh Mohammed Bin Essa Al Khalifa, Chief Executive Officer, Economic Development Board, Bahrain

(l–r): Mehmet Vecdi Gönül, Turkey’s Minister of Defence; Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie, Iraq’s National Security Adviser; and Bob Ainsworth, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, UK


themselves. ‘The choice is ours: either regional reconcilia-

tion, or regional pettiness.’

To counter meddling by regional countries in Iraqi inter-

nal affairs, Iraq had been building up its security forces in

order to reach self-reliance and had embarked on political

reconciliation and regional engagement. Iran and Syria had

tightened border controls, and Saudi Arabia had taken steps

to stop the flow of jihadists and their funding to Iraq. It was

in the interest of GCC countries to engage more with Iraq. But

if they ‘continue to be imprisoned by their paranoia or scepti-

cism of an Iranian-influenced central government of Iraq, or

of a Shia-Kurd-dominated government in Baghdad, how long

is this going to last? Centuries?’ Iraq, Rubaie insisted, had a

democratic, parliamentary, constitutional system. A regional

security pact was necessary: ‘We will continue in this sectar-

ian conflict and religious extremism if we do not join forces.’

Iraq, he said, was ‘heading West’, building a strategic

partnership with the United States. It was feasible, he said,

for Iraq to have the US as a strategic ally, while also having

a good relationship with Iran.

Bob Ainsworth, Minister of State for the Armed Forces,

UK, said Britain remained committed to Iraq’s develop-

ment even as security improved and the British troop

presence was reduced. It was important that Iraq’s neigh-

bours helped to counter insurgent groups. Diplomatic

efforts needed to be kept up to get Iran to comply with its

international obligations.

Fifth Plenary Session: Regional framework for Gulf

security

The final plenary session was addressed by Tariq Al

Hashemi, Vice President of Iraq, who stressed that there

would be no regional security without a peaceful and

stable Iraq. The country needed national political agree-

ment, as well as economic, social and judicial policies

that were integrated with national security require-

ments, and modern, professional armed forces. At the

regional level, it was necessary to ensure non-interfer-

ence of regional and international parties in Iraqi affairs.

Outstanding disputes needed to be resolved, coopera-

tion enhanced, and contributions to Iraq’s development

stepped up.

Zhai Jun, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister for West

Asian, North African and African Affairs, stressed that

regional confrontation would produce no winners and

underlined that China was willing to play its part in the

resolution of regional problems.

Concluding the Dialogue, John Chipman noted that it

had been convened at a difficult time and that the security

picture in the region remained ‘extremely murky’. While

there had been advances over the past year in inter-state

security, it had to be remembered that for many in the

region, the state was not a key point of reference, and not

necessarily the paramount influence on their lives. The

Dialogue, he said, had helped to shape understanding of

how enlightened leadership could enable people to have

pride in their cultures and nations.

Chipman said the experience of the Shangri-La

Dialogue in Singapore had shown that it took about five

years for a Dialogue to become a regional institution. The

Manama Dialogue was 80% there, he said, and the IISS

would spare no effort to make the fifth summit, from 5–7

December 2008, a success. He thanked the IISS team who

had worked so hard to stage the 2007 Dialogue.

(l–r): Zhai Jun, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister for West Asian, North African and African Affairs; and Tariq Al Hashemi, Vice President of Iraq

20085TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT, 12–14 DECEMBERRead a more detailed report online

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2008-e791


Iran’s nuclear programme, piracy at sea and the future

of Afghanistan were among the themes extensively dis-

cussed at the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain from 12 to 14

December 2008.

Opening the Fifth IISS Regional Security Summit, John

Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive,

noted that this was a time of transition to the adminis-

tration of US President-elect Barack Obama. Rather than

waiting for his policies to emerge, other countries needed

to adopt an imaginative and extrovert approach. ‘Staying

silent or diffident and then complaining when the United

States or others adopt ill-suited strategies for regional

security is a diplomatic formula whose attractiveness

and effectiveness is low’, he said. The Manama Dialogue

offered Gulf states the chance to take the initiative and to

influence the United States and others on their approach

to regional security.

Robert Gates, who is to remain US Defense Secretary

under Obama, addressed the Dialogue for the second suc-

cessive year and advised participants that ‘a change in

administration does not alter our fundamental interests,

especially in the Middle East’. The transition had been

very extensively planned. ‘Anyone who thought that the

upcoming months might present opportunities to test the

new administration would be sorely mistaken.’

The conference heard addresses from the Deputy Prime

Minister of Iraq, Dr Barham Saleh, and Afghanistan’s

National Security Adviser, Dr Zalmai Rassoul, on the situ-

ation in their respective countries. General David Petraeus,

Commander, US Central Command, who previously com-

manded the multinational force in Iraq, offered proposals

for regional defence cooperation.

Bahrain’s Crown Prince, His Highness Sheikh Salman

Bin Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, entertained delegates to

dinner, and Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al

Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered the

conference’s opening keynote address.

The conference took place weeks after the attacks in

Mumbai, which were linked to a Pakistan-based group

and were a reminder of the continuing threat from terror-

ism. Dr Sanjaya Baru, former official spokesman and media

adviser to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, told


Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs


the conference that terrorism was not divisible. ‘There are

no good terrorists and bad terrorists. They keep changing

their name and their identity, but there are so many links

between one group and another, cutting across national

boundaries, that unless states act against non-state actors,

states have nothing to claim for themselves. This argument

about non-state actors cannot go to a point where states

pretend to be helpless. Why then do they exist?’

Three defence ministers gave plenary addresses:

John Hutton of the UK, Vecdi Gönül of Turkey and Teo

Chee Hean of Singapore. Other speakers were Carl Bildt,

Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mikhail Margelov,

Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of Russia’s

Federation Council, Yoshimasa Hayashi, Member of

Japan’s House of Councillors, Ali Muthna Hasan, Yemen’s

Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Pierre Lellouche,

member of the French National Assembly and its rappor-

teur on Afghanistan.

The conference featured a televised debate for Al

Arabiya news channel, in which Sheikh Khalid Bin

Ahmed and Dr Saleh took part, as well as Mark Kimmitt,

US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military

Affairs, William Hague, British member of parlia-

ment and ‘shadow’ foreign secretary for the opposition

Conservative Party, and Dr Mamoun Fandy, IISS Senior

Fellow for Gulf Security.

As is customary at IISS Dialogues, delegates met in off-

the-record break-out group sessions and private bilateral

meetings, as well as in plenary sessions. Sheikh Khalid Bin

Ahmed hosted a private lunch for delegation leaders.

Dealing with Iran

The question of how to deal with Iran preoccupies regional

neighbours and larger powers alike. As UK Defence Minis-

ter John Hutton said: ‘The combination of Iran’s ambition

to create an indigenous enriched uranium capability and

its constant refusal to abide by five separate UN Security

Council resolutions on nuclear technology proliferation

gives the international community every justification in

saying that Iran’s stated aim to contain its nuclear pro-

gramme for civil use cannot be taken seriously.’

President-elect Obama indicated during his election

campaign that he was willing to have discussions with Iran

without preconditions. But his precise approach remains to

be seen, and Tehran’s attitude is also not yet known. Gates

noted that the George W. Bush administration had been

willing to talk to Iran if enrichment was halted. ‘Whether

the new administration will broaden that aperture remains

to be seen.’ All countries needed to exert economic and

diplomatic pressure.

It was unfortunate that the Dialogue was denied the

opportunity to hear an Iranian view. Chipman told the

conference that he had held lengthy discussions in Tehran

on Iran’s attendance ‘at the highest level’; three officials in

turn had confirmed that they would come ‘and all have

failed to attend’.

Chipman raised the issue of how Gulf Co-operation

Council (GCC) members could best ensure that their inter-

ests were advanced. Could they become part of the formal

negotiating structure, just as Asian powers were part of the

Six Party Talks on North Korea? Even if not, they should be

Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council


clear on what security arrangements would fit their inter-

ests, so as to avoid being simply ‘part of the package’ in

some future settlement with Iran.

Dr Anwar Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign

Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, agreed it was impor-

tant that as Gulf states were asked to shoulder more

responsibilities within the region, they ‘should also be

fully in the picture with regards to incentivising Iran,

whatever incentive there is’.

Lively debate on Iran was sparked by Mikhail

Margelov. The chairman of the foreign affairs com-

mittee of the upper house of Russia’s parliament said

Washington would keep up the pressure on Tehran,

but Moscow opposed further tightening of sanctions.

For Russia, war was the worst-case scenario. But if Iran

became a nuclear power, its neighbours would also want

to go nuclear, and this would set the stage for nuclear ter-

rorism. If the Iranian threat could be dealt with through

negotiation, this would remove the issue of the missile

defences that the US wished to place in Europe, the sub-

ject of bitter dispute between Moscow and Washington

and mutual accusations of fuelling an arms race.

Margelov’s remarks prompted many comments: if

Moscow favoured neither sanctions nor military action

against Iran, how did it imagine Tehran might be per-

suaded to abandon its nuclear ambitions?

Abdulaziz Al Sharikh, Director-General of Kuwait’s

Diplomatic Institute, said Moscow’s position was perplex-

ing. ‘So okay, we support negotiation and we are against

military action, but then what, if you are also against

increasing sanctions?’ Dr Dana Allin, IISS Senior Fellow

for Transatlantic Affairs, noted that Russia had supported

a series of Security Council resolutions declaring Iranian

enrichment activity to be illegal. Was there not something

more that Russia could do to back that up? Dr Frederick

Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise

Institute, said that since Russia held Iran to be in viola-

tion of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations and

International Atomic Energy Authority inspections, it

would seem natural for Russia to refuse to assist its civilian

nuclear programme.

Margelov responded that ‘you can hardly find any

responsible politician in Russia who will support the idea

of granting the nuclear bomb to Iran. It is a nightmare even

for our radicals.’ Moscow was ready to cooperate with

Washington in sponsoring ‘a comprehensive and realis-

tic resolution’. But proposals so far had lacked realism.

Sanctions had not worked in former Yugoslavia or Iraq, and

American plans to site missiles in Europe to defend against

Iran aroused bad memories of the Pershing missile crisis in

the 1980s. ‘We think that if we seriously talk with our part-

ners about common threats we should together work out

mechanisms to combat those threats.’ Washington should

consider alternative sites that Russia had offered, since

Russia itself would be threatened by Iranian missiles. ‘I do

not know if Iranian nuclear warheads can be delivered to

the US by DHL’, Margelov said.

Beyond Iran’s nuclear programme, dealing with Tehran

poses challenges for regional neighbours. American offi-

cials referred repeatedly to Iran’s support for Hizbullah

in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. General Petraeus,

Commander, US Central Command, said Iraqi Prime

Minister Nuri al-Maliki had gone to Tehran and provided

evidence of the flow of weapons into Iraq and training

(l–r): Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS; and Dr Robert Gates, US Defense Secretary


marks were off the record in accordance with normal prac-

tice at IISS Dialogues.

The break-out group heard that pirates operating from

areas of Somalia outside the writ of that country’s tran-

sitional government had attacked more than 120 ships

during 2008 and had hijacked 40 vessels. At mid December,

15 ships (including the Sirius Star, a fully laden very large

tanker owned by Saudi Aramco), and 300 crew members

were being held to ransom. In response, states including

France, India, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea, the UK and

the US had stepped up naval patrols and had engaged

pirates, preventing some attacks. On 10 December a six-

ship European Union naval force under British command

commenced anti-piracy operations in the affected waters.

This was the EU’s first naval operation.

In plenary session, Yoshimasa Hayashi, a member of

the upper house of Japan’s parliament, highlighted the

issue’s importance, saying that around 90% of Japanese

crude oil imports came from the Gulf. ‘Japan has great

concerns about the instance of pirates flagrantly operating

off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.’ A law to

enable Japan to tackle piracy cases was being advocated by

some Japanese politicians.

Gates noted that the US Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, had

established patrols in the Gulf of Aden. But the coastal areas

of Somalia and Kenya covered more than a million square

miles, so there were limits to what patrols could do. General

Petraeus suggested combined maritime security operations

as one of five activities in which regional countries could

pool their efforts in order to improve defence capabilities.

However, Frank Gardner, Security Correspondent

of the British Broadcasting Corporation, pointed out

of Iraqi militias. There had recently been less evidence of

Iranian-influenced violence, but this could have been due

to losses suffered by militias in fighting rather than to an

Iranian decision to reduce training or weapons supply.

Lord (Douglas) Hurd, former UK Foreign Secretary,

asked Barham Saleh, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, to

describe how Baghdad assessed its day-by-day relation-

ship with Tehran. Saleh said Iran had long-standing

relationships with Iraqi political parties that had been in

opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime, and ‘there is no

denying that Iran has influence and ways and means by

which it can deal with the situation in Iraq’. Iran has ben-

efited from the removal of Saddam, and it was in Tehran’s

interest to support Iraqi stability and sovereignty.

Lara Setrakian of ABC News noted that Washington

and Tehran had a shared interest in a stable Afghanistan.

To help move towards better US–Iranian relations could

they work together to achieve a new security architec-

ture in Afghanistan? Zalmai Rassoul, the Afghanistan

National Security Adviser, said Iran had been very coop-

erative during the 2001 war which ousted the Taliban

regime, and had ‘understood that the presence of interna-

tional forces in Afghanistan is useful for Afghanistan’. But

while Afghanistan and Iran had good relations, these were

affected by the tension between Washington and Tehran.

Piracy and maritime security

The Dialogue took place against the background of escalat-

ing piracy off the Horn of Africa, particularly the Gulf of

Aden, and the international response to this. This was the

subject of energetic discussion both in the on-the-record

plenary sessions and in a break-out group in which re-

(l–r): Dr Barham Saleh, Deputy Prime Minister, Iraq; and Yoshimasa Hayashi, Member, House of Councillors, Japan


Piracy and maritime security have been a particular

focus of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, which takes place

annually in Singapore. That country’s defence minister,

Teo Chee Hean, said multilateral cooperation, including

air and sea patrols, had contributed to a sharp reduction

in piracy in the Malacca Strait. Littoral states had acted to

eliminate coastal staging areas. But there were important

differences with the Gulf of Aden: the Somali government

lacked the capacity to act.

India’s navy has been active in the anti-piracy opera-

tions. Vice Admiral DK Joshi, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff,

pointed out a key difference from the Malacca Strait: the

entire corridor of concern was in international waters,

beyond territorial limits of littoral states. This raised a

problem of what to do with people who were detained in

naval operations. During the Dialogue, the Indian navy

apprehended a pirate ship and arrested 23 suspects, who

were now on board ship in the port of Aden. Would Yemen

accept them to be tried under its laws?

Yemen came under pressure from other delegates,

several of whom also suggested that the problem needed

to be addressed more broadly. General Khalid Jamil Al

Sarayreh, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Jordan,

suggested Yemen should lead an Arab effort to find a solu-

tion to the Somali problem. Fighting piracy at sea would

not solve this. ‘While the Arab states are the most affected

by this problem, they have not done much until now on

the regional or inter-Arab arena to find a solution’, he

said. Nasser Al Jaidah, Chief Executive Officer of Qatar

Petroleum, said nobody was discussing what to do about

Somalia itself. ‘The issues of a country which has basically

disappeared from the map as a state are major issues that

that confused messages were being given. The US was

sponsoring a UN Security Council resolution calling for

authorisation to attack pirates’ land bases. However, the

Commander of the Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral William

Gortney (also present at the Dialogue) had been quoted

saying this would not be a good idea because of the dif-

ficulties of identifying pirates and the risk of killing

innocent civilians.

Gates said better intelligence was needed about Somali

clans that were behind the piracy before attacks could be

launched on land without endangering innocent people.

Success could only be achieved by a combination of meas-

ures, and ship-owners had to play their part. They should

‘give instructions to their captains to do minimally intel-

ligent things, such as speed up when the pirates come

along... The truth of the matter is that most ships can do

that. However, too many ships simply stop. Another piece

of advice is to pull up the ladders. This is not rocket sci-

ence!’ They could also take defensive measures. ‘I know

there is a concern among ship-owners about putting armed

people on their ships. However, my suspicion is that many

of these people in the business also have land-based ware-

houses with fences and guards on them. They might want

to think about that for their ships as well.’

Commodore Simon Williams, Head of the International

Plans and Policy Division (Military) in the UK Ministry of

Defence, agreed that industry had to play its part. An attack

by pirates was ‘a very low probability incident but very high

profile when it occurs and industry can do a great deal to

address the issue.’ Piracy could not be eliminated: ‘Getting

to a minimal acceptable level is probably the closest that one

can get.’

(l–r): John Hutton, Secretary of State for Defence, UK; and Dr Sanjaya Baru, Former Official Spokesman and Media Advisor to the Prime Minister of India


need to be addressed rather than simply dealing with a few

naval boats.’

On this point, Carl Bildt, Sweden’s Minister for Foreign

Affairs, said the European Union was ‘heavily engaged in

efforts to bring peace to Somalia itself ... That has not been a

smashing success so far, to put it mildly, but we now have

the Djibouti Peace Agreement and we must do whatever can

be done to support the implementation of that agreement.’

Ali Muthna Hasan, Yemen’s Deputy Minister of

Foreign Affairs, said Somalia could become ‘a magnet for

terrorist groups and radical groups of all kinds’. The inter-

national community’s failure to give it sufficient attention

had led to chaos, which in turn had laid the foundation for

the rise in piracy. He called on the international commu-

nity to help Yemen to absorb 700,000 Somali refugees, and

proposed the creation of a regional centre in Yemen to facil-

itate exchange of information between countries fighting

piracy. Hasan said Yemen had hosted many negotiations

between Somali factions, and had done all it could, but ‘the

question of Somalia is a concern for the entire international

community and the UN’.

In the break-out group session on piracy, there was a

clear consensus that collaboration was key to successful

naval operations, and that the EU initiative, which was

open to other states’ navies, was a highly positive develop-

ment. However, the role of international naval forces raised

difficult legal questions – most importantly, that of what to

do with captured pirates. Agreements with littoral states,

such as that recently negotiated by the UK with Kenya,

seemed the best way forward.

Naval patrols could not provide a comprehensive solu-

tion, the group heard. The pirates took cover amongst

legitimate fishing vessels and within 15 minutes could seize

vessels and take hostages. Navies were then effectively

(l–r): Mehmet Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defence, Turkey; and Ali Muthna Hasan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yemen

(l–r): Dr Gregory Gause, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Vermont; Dr Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS; Dr Majeed Al Alawi, Minister of Labour, Bahrain; and Dr Sanjaya Baru, former Official Spokesman and Media Advisor to the Prime Minister of India

BREAK-OUT GROUP I: Demographics, Labour and Security


powerless to take action. There was agreement that the

shipping industry needed to assume greater responsibility

by equipping ships with passive defences and by appropri-

ate responses, such as speeding up. More fundamentally,

piracy was a land-based problem and in this case was a

direct result of the collapse of the Somali state and econ-

omy. Intelligence-gathering was revealing more about the

organisation and scale of clan-based pirate enterprises.

Attacking pirates on land might become operationally fea-

sible, but would be legally dubious.

The challenges of Afghanistan

Previous Manama Dialogues had been heavily overshad-

owed by the situation in Iraq, where coalition and Iraqi

forces were battling a complex insurgency following the

US-led invasion in 2003. While the 2008 Dialogue certainly

did not omit discussion of Iraq, the tone was entirely dif-

ferent, especially in light of the just-signed Status of Forces

Agreement under which all American forces are due to

depart by the end of 2011. Deputy Prime Minister Saleh

devoted much of his speech to the country’s economic re-

generation. US Defense Secretary Gates heralded the dawn

of a new era, though he also warned that the reduction of

violence was reversible.

However, as security has improved in Iraq, interna-

tional attention has switched to the worsening Taliban

insurgency in Afghanistan. Considerable concern was

expressed at the Dialogue about the flow of insurgents

across the Durand Line from Pakistan into Afghanistan

and about Pakistan’s efforts – actual and desired – to stop

this. There were increasing worries that a true solution for

Afghanistan would require a broader regional settlement.

(l–r): Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Defence, Singapore; and Mikhail Margelov, Chairman, Committee for Foreign Affairs, Federation Council, Russia; Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on Sudan

BREAK-OUT GROUP II: Transnational Problems of Afghanistan in the Context of Regional Security

(l–r): Professor Ali Jalali, Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Lt.-Gen. Muhammad Mustafa Khan, Chief of General Staff, Pakistan; Nigel Inkster, Director, Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS; Yousuf Bin Alawi Al Ibrahim, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Oman; and Lt.-Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman, Military Committee, NATO


Chipman said NATO was struggling in Afghanistan,

and that more troops and money would not be enough to

turn the situation around. The United States is significantly

increasing the size of its forces there. Professor François

Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council, asked Gates

what he was expecting from European partners, and what

was the correct balance between military, political and eco-

nomic efforts.

While Gates welcomed increases in European commit-

ments, he said ‘the reality is that the European members

of NATO have approximately 2.5 million people under

arms ... and so I must admit to some frustration in trying

to get some few thousand more to help us in particular

to train the Afghan national army and national police’.

Significantly, however, Gates also indicated that he saw

a limit to the size of foreign forces. The Soviet Union had

120,000 troops in Afghanistan, but had lost ‘because they

never had the support of the Afghan people’. After the cur-

rent round of troop increases, ‘we ought to think long and

hard about how many more go in’. The important thing

was to improve Afghan capabilities – a huge challenge in

a country where the $2bn annual cost of maintaining a

national army of 134,000 was three times total government

revenues. International efforts to boost development and

Afghan institutions needed to much better coordination.

Mehmet Vecdi Gönül, Turkey’s Defence Minister,

agreed that ‘a military approach alone cannot solve the

problems in Afghanistan. All instruments – political, diplo-

matic, economic – need to be utilised together for a lasting

solution.’

Ahmed Rashid, Pakistani writer and journalist, noted

that extremist groups based in Pakistan could launch ter-

rorist attacks around the world and were also attacking

US and NATO convoys going through Pakistan. Pierre

BREAK-OUT GROUP III: Sectarian Politics

(l–r): Dr Thuraya Arrayed, Advisory Board Member for Saudi CIT (Commitee of International Trade); Egemen Bagis, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister; Vice Chairman, AK Party Foreign Affairs; and Member of Parliament, Turkey; Dr Mamoun Fandy, Senior Fellow for Gulf Security, IISS; Professor Ebtisam Al Kitibi, Professor, Department of Political Science, UAE University; and Dr Sadoun Al Dulame, former Defence Minister, Iraq

(l–r): General David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command; and Dr Zalmai Rassoul, National Security Adviser, Afghanistan


Lellouche, the French National Assembly’s Rapporteur on

Afghanistan, believed that if militants continued to have

sanctuaries in Pakistan, there was no way to solve the

Afghan problem, which he saw as part of a very gloomy

regional picture – one that other delegates disputed. ‘The

NATO taxpayer’, Lellouche said, ‘is bankrolling the largest

producer of heroin in the world.’

Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser, Dr Zalmai

Rassoul, pointed out that there had been considerable

progress: a free country; an elected government; a free

press; five million returned refugees; five million children

in schools, 40% of them girls; more roads than ever in the

country’s history; primary medical care. But the Taliban’s

return to a country without institutions, police or a judicial

system had caused chaos and had boosted production of

narcotics. While the Afghan National Army had been built

and police training has begun, other institutions were still

to be built and corruption was a problem. Development

was urgently needed to provide employment, as well as

education, so that young people would not be attracted by

terrorist groups. Full regional cooperation was required

to win the conflict, including a joint anti-terrorist strategy

and good relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A break-out group on Afghanistan heard that stability

would depend partly on the behaviour of outside powers,

including Pakistan. It was essential to improve governance,

since although most Afghans did not support the Taliban,

they were not prepared to oppose them in the cause of a

weak government. The current military priorities were to

provide security for elections due in 2009, build the capac-

ity of the Afghan National Army, and to improve security

on the Durand Line.

Two other break-out group sessions were held. A group

on ‘Demographics, Labour and Security’ found that issues

(l–r): Carl Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sweden; and Pierre Lellouche, Rapporteur on Afghanistan, French National Assembly

BREAK-OUT GROUP IV: Piracy and Regional Maritime Security

(l–r): Vice-Admiral Gérard Valin, Joint Forces Commander, Indian Ocean, France; Vice Admiral D.K. Joshi, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, India; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow for South Asia, IISS; and Mark Kimmitt, US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs; and Vice Admiral William Gortney, Commander, US Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, US Fifth Fleet


identities was a serious challenge to the Gulf region as a

whole. Countries’ varied experience illuminated the range

of instruments available and the varying chance of success.

The growth of sectarian politics was an unwelcome and

negative development which seemed likely to aggravate

tensions and divisions in states and the region. There was

a risk of threats to regional security, regression to primitive

concepts of identity, and a halt in progress towards equal-

ity. Policies which might be worthy of consideration across

the region included a regional focus on the corrosive effects

of sectarian politics on civil societies; refusal by political

parties to be associated with religious labels; applying the

benefits of economic and social progress without regard

to religious or ethnic identity; countering efforts to fos-

ter grievances between Sunni and Shia groups; greater

efforts to integrate Shia communities into economic and

social development programmes; discussion about how oil

wealth could best be exploited for the benefit of all; empha-

sis on shared historic and religious experiences common

to Sunni and Shia communities; and greater emphasis in

educational systems on social responsibility and cohesion.

of identity and social cohesion and the role of expatriate

labour were of vital importance in light of their potential

security implications. Bahraini moves to ensure labour

rights and improve expatriate workers’ conditions were

noted, and Gulf nations were looking to reassess legislation

on expatriate labour. The proportion of expatriate workers

in the Gulf varied from 40% to 90% of the population, and

posed a possible challenge to national and regional iden-

tity. Expatriates often lived in areas effectively cut off from

indigenous inhabitants geographically, socially, culturally

and linguistically. Security concerns were felt by nations

of origin as well as residence, and the Gulf was vulnerable

to fluctuations in the stability of countries of origin; vio-

lence could also arise from labour disputes. But another

participant stressed that this was not an international secu-

rity issue, rather one that could be dealt with nationally,

bilaterally and on the police level. The group also noted

the economic benefit that expatriate labour brought to the

Gulf, and to countries of origin in the form of remittances.

A break-out group on ‘Sectarian Politics’ noted that

the complex legacy of ideological, religious and group


20096TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT, 11–13 DECEMBERSee videos and transcripts online

http://www.iiss.org/en/events/manama%20dialogue/archive/manama-dialogue-2009-d51f


Pressing threats to regional security, including Iran’s

nuclear programme and the conflict in Yemen involving

Houthi rebels, were vigorously discussed at the 6th IISS

Regional Security Summit, held in Manama, Bahrain from

11 to 13 December 2009.

Iran sent a strong delegation to the Manama Dialogue.

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki addressed the first

plenary session and caused a flurry of media stories when

his answer to a question was interpreted as making a new

offer in the long-running international confrontation over

the country’s nuclear facilities.

The Yemen conflict was the subject of lively argu-

ment in a televised debate recorded at the Dialogue by

the Al-Arabiya network. As Saudi Arabian fighter aircraft

continued a campaign of air strikes against guerrillas in the

region bordering northwest Yemen, the main question was

whether Iran was providing support to the Houthi rebels.

Ministers, military chiefs, officials and experts from

many countries again took part in the Manama Dialogue.

The Crown Prince, Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, hosted a

dinner for official delegates on 12 December.

John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief

Executive, announced that the Institute would establish

a regional office in Bahrain in 2010. As well as undertak-

ing research activities, the office would help to ensure the

annual IISS summit ‘serves the evident needs of the region

for a more wide-ranging, trans-regional and inclusive

regional security dialogue’.

‘Current institutions and organisations do not serve that

purpose, and current freelance ad hoc diplomacy does not

provide the necessary coherence to advance wider regional

stability’, Chipman said. ‘A forum that requires the regular

assembly of parties who are often in dispute or at conflict

creates the possibilities for the planned discussions that are

a pre-condition to potential diplomatic reconciliation.’

Giving the Keynote Address to the opening dinner,

Sheikh Dr Muhammad Al Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, Kuwait’s

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs,

expressed the hope that the Manama Dialogue would pro-

vide such a forum ‘for many years to come’. Members of

the Gulf Cooperation Council must, he said, join forces to

contain threats to their national security. Their concept of


The Al-Arabiya debate (l–r) Dr Mamoun Fandy, Jeffrey Feltman, Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa, and Ali Muhammad Al Anisi


preventive diplomacy involved peaceful, transparent, good-

neighbourly relations that avoided the use of ideologies.

Sheikh Dr Muhammad was particularly concerned about

the challenge posed by demographic changes, including rapid

population growth, the increase in migrant worker numbers,

and the fact that the children of migrant workers were enter-

ing the competition for jobs. He added that it was essential for

Gulf countries to preserve their cultural identities.

Iran

With the United States and other countries considering

new sanctions against Iran because of lack of progress

in discussions on its nuclear programme, the country

provided a major focus for the Dialogue. Some Gulf

countries, in particular the United Arab Emirates, have

been stepping up purchases of military equipment,

apparently because they perceive a heightened threat.

In his speech, Mottaki said Iran opposed nuclear weap-

ons. Questioned on the nuclear programme, he noted that

the Tehran research reactor had been built with American

help, and the Bushehr nuclear power plant with French

and German support. But because all this help had been

withdrawn, Iran had determined to be self-sufficient – it

needed ten–15 nuclear plants for electricity generation.

‘Once bitten, twice shy’, Mottaki said.

Responding to a question from Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS

Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, Mottaki objected to

suggestions that Iran had not responded to a proposal

discussed in Geneva in October, under which Iran would

ship 1,200kg of enriched uranium out of the country, to

be further enriched into fuel for the Tehran reactor. Iran

was proposing a ‘middle way’ to allow the exchange to

take place on the Iranian island of Kish in phases of 400kg.

‘Is not that a response?’ he asked. ‘Why are you pleading

ignorance?’ Sanctions, he said, were illegal and ineffective,

and Iran would not give up its rights to develop nuclear

capabilities. While Washington soon indicated that it saw

nothing new in Mottaki’s remarks, it remained to be seen

whether a deal such as that tentatively agreed in Geneva

might still be possible.

The concerns of other countries about Iran were evi-

dent. Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa,

Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, said the biggest

threat to the region was the possibility of conflict between

Israel and Iran over the nuclear programme. ‘Lives will be

lost, vital resources will be put in jeopardy, the world econ-

omy will undoubtedly suffer and all our efforts towards

regional development and prosperity will be significantly

hindered,’ Sheikh Khalid said.

Relations between Iran and its neighbours needed

to be improved. Sheikh Khalid proposed several confi-

dence-building measures: coordination of responses on

disaster risk reduction, for example on severe dust storms;

a regional development programme providing expertise

and assistance in areas lacking basic resources; and regional

consultations to prevent a future regional nuclear disaster.

Kuwait’s Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Dr Muhammad

said Iran’s programme needed to follow the guidelines

of the International Atomic Energy Agency. If the United

Nations Security Council agreed on a new round of sanc-

tions, he said, ‘this region is going to enter into a period of

tension. Iran is a major player in the Gulf. Any tension with

(l–r): Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS; Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman, IISS Council; and Sheikh Dr Muhammad Al Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kuwait


Iran would reflect on the relationship between the GCC and

Iran.’

General David Petraeus, Commander, US Central

Command, said Iran’s posture had prompted a warmer

regional embrace of the United States. Far from encountering

a ‘credibility gap’ in the region – as one questioner sug-

gested – the US was strengthening its partnerships with Gulf

countries. The recruiting officer for such partnerships was

Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad, Petraeus said.

Over the past year, the United Arab Emirates had ordered

$18bn worth of American defence equipment, including

Patriot missile batteries. He suggested that the UAE’s fleet of

F-16s would be able to ‘take out’ the Iranian air force.

Calling Iran a ‘thugocracy’, Petraeus said that follow-

ing the ‘hijacked elections’, Iran’s Supreme Leader had

resorted to using the Revolutionary Guard and Basij mili-

tia to contain protests. This ever-growing control over the

levers of power made it ‘difficult to reach out to Iran and

find a willing partner at the other end’.

Regional conflicts

The region is beset by several ongoing conflicts. Since 2004,

the Manama Dialogue has provided an annual snapshot of

the war in Iraq, where the situation is now much improved

but still fragile. The 2009 Dialogue took place days after US

President Barack Obama set out a new strategy to deal with

the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. While the Dialogue

discussed this situation in depth, it was the flare-up of conflict

in Yemen that first caught the attention of delegates.

Sporadic fighting has occurred for five years between

Yemeni government forces and the Shia Houthi rebels.

Saudi Arabia denies its bombing raids in the mountainous

border area have hit targets across the border. Meanwhile,

Iran denies Yemeni government accusations that Iran is

providing support to the Houthis.

Al-Arabiya, the Dubai-based television network, made

the conflict the subject of its televised debate on the first even-

ing of the Dialogue. Ali Muhammad Al Anisi, Chairman of

Yemen’s National Security Agency, said foreign intervention

had contributed to the outbreak of violence. Jeffrey Feltman,

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs in the US State

Department, said Washington did not have independent

information to support allegations of Iranian interference,

but supported the government in its efforts against the insur-

gency. Mamoun Fandy, IISS Senior Fellow for Gulf Security

and Corresponding Director, IISS–Middle East, made fun

of the tendency to allege foreign intervention without spe-

cifically naming Iran; he referred instead to intervention by

Martians. An Iranian official denied his country was helping

the Houthis, and quoted love poetry to emphasise the close

ties between Tehran and Sanaa. Sheikh Khalid, the Bahraini

Foreign Minister, said Yemen’s stability was vital and it was

necessary to support the government there. The other pan-

ellists agreed: in Fandy’s view, there was a risk of Yemen

becoming a failed state, and the situation posed a real chal-

lenge to the security of the entire Gulf region.

The worsening conflict in Afghanistan has been of

primary concern to policymakers and military chiefs in

all Manama Dialogue participant nations throughout the

year. Karl Eikenberry, a frequent participant in IISS events

as a general and now US Ambassador to Afghanistan,

intervened from the floor to explain aspects of President

(l–r): Manouchehr Mottaki, Foreign Minister, Iran; Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain; and Hoshyar Zebari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq


Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s

Minister of Foreign Affairs, said the past eight years had

seen an inordinate focus on military solutions, with recon-

struction efforts not improving the lot of ordinary Afghans.

Pakistan welcomed Obama’s recent announcement and his

reaffirmation of partnership with Islamabad. However, he

said clarity and coordination was needed on implementa-

tion of the strategy and he looked forward to engagement

ensure there was no adverse effect on Pakistan.

Christian Schmidt, Parliamentary State Secretary to the

Minister of Defence, Germany, said much progress had

been made in Afghanistan since 2001, but the security situ-

ation had deteriorated considerably, including in the North

where Germany had responsibility. Based on the outcome

of the international conference planned for January in

London, Germany and other European countries would

reconsider their levels of civil and military commitment.

Amid the renewed efforts to end the conflict in

Afghanistan, there were continuing worries about the sus-

tainability of hard-won progress in Iraq. Hoshyar Zebari,

Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalled that before the era of

Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a positive impact on the Gulf,

flourishing culturally and economically as a ‘regional

trendsetter’. ‘We are now working hard to return Iraq to

the stability and prosperity it enjoyed before its down-

ward spiral, so that it can play the role we want it to play

in promoting stability, security and prosperity in the Gulf’,

Zebari said. Out of conflict had come new skills, such as

the expertise of special operations forces in combating ter-

rorists and insurgents. These, he said, were key elements

in expanding security in Iraq: following the American

Obama’s December announcement that 30,000 more

American troops would be sent. There were several aims:

to break the momentum of the Taliban-led insurgency, to

signal American resolve, and to move towards the com-

prehensive strategy – integrating military and civilian

efforts – that NATO had embraced. While the mid-2011

date for the beginning of the US troop withdrawal was

firm, the drawdown would depend on conditions and on

the growing aspirations of Afghan security forces. To the

‘clear-hold-build’ approach had been added the crucial

word ‘transfer’, and efforts were focused on creating condi-

tions in which this could be done. The new policy would

thus have a ‘forcing function’.

Masoom Stanekzai, adviser to President Hamid Karzai

on Home Security, said the government’s new approach

put stress on taking more responsibility for the security of

Afghanistan, building the capacity of the Afghan institu-

tions, and fighting corruption. He welcomed the strategy

of General Stanley McChrystal, the American commander,

to protect the population. But he drew attention to severe

problems such as drugs and endemic poverty, which drew

young unemployed men towards extremism. Regional

cooperation was essential: ‘There is a lot of discussion and

lot of good will, but there is a need for improved action

on the ground’, he said. An increasing number of youths

from the border region with Pakistan were finding jobs

in the Gulf. Using their income to support their families,

they gradually distance themselves from extremist groups

and ‘contribute to the well-being of the population in those

areas’. This showed scope for regional cooperation to

change the dynamics of the insurgency.

(l–r): Mehmet Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defence, Turkey; Kazuya Shinba, Senior Vice Minister for Defence, Japan; and M.K. Narayanan, National Security Adviser, India


of attacks and violent civilian deaths in November 2009 was

the lowest of any month since the US-led invasion in 2003.

Violent incidents had fallen by over 90% since spring 2007. As

the US drew down its forces in Iraq, it was working to fos-

ter closer relations between Iraq and other Arab countries. ‘I

would remind my Arab brothers that if there is concern about

certain influences in Iraq, then it would be wise to increase the

Arab influence in that critical country’, Petraeus said.

A plenary session was devoted to plans for nuclear

power. M.K. Narayanan, National Security Adviser to the

Indian Prime Minister, said the world was embarking on

a ‘nuclear renaissance’ and that much of the new activ-

ity was taking place in the Middle East and Asia. Nuclear

energy was the only way to fill India’s projected energy

deficit of 412MW by 2050. Indian scientists were working at

the cutting edge on fast breeder reactors and thorium-based

technologies. International cooperation was needed to shape

the growth of nuclear power and to ensure security and

safety needs were met. ‘The possibility of terrorists gaining

access to nuclear materials and technologies and the shadow

of nuclear terrorism is perhaps the gravest threat to global

security and mankind at this moment’, Narayanan said.

Kazuya Shinba, Japan’s Senior Vice Minister for

Defence, noted there was increasing momentum for

nuclear disarmament. While there were worries Japan

might acquire nuclear weapons in response to North

Korea’s nuclear development, he said ‘there is no way that

Japan will possess nuclear weapons’. Japan would con-

tinue to pursue disarmament through the Six-Party Talks

and hoped all nuclear weapon states would undertake

multilateral or bilateral reduction efforts.

withdrawal, there would be ‘no security vacuum to be

filled by any external players’. The coming elections in

March 2010, he said, would ‘determine Iraq’s future, fate

and course for years to come’.

Mehmet Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defence, Turkey,

agreeing that the Iraqi elections were of paramount impor-

tance, said Kirkuk was a source of concern, and a settlement

acceptable to all groups there was essential to ensure stabil-

ity. Zebari said relations with Turkey were improving, with

various agreements reached, but ‘we get sensitive when we

see our neighbours trying to interject ourselves on how this

country could be run or elected or governed’. Kirkuk was

an Iraqi city, and the Iraqi people had to decide its future.

Answering a question, Zebari said there had been seri-

ous problems in supply of water to Iraq from both Turkey

and Iran. New agreements were necessary between Turkey,

Iraq and Syria. On a recent series of car bombs in Iraq,

Zebari said these were aimed at paralysing and embar-

rassing the government, and further eruptions of violence

should be expected before the elections. However, it was

clear that terrorists were relying on ‘spectaculars’ and were

no longer able to sustain their attacks. Asked about Syria,

Zebari said relations were problematic and Baghdad had

intelligence that former members of Iraqi security forces

who were living there had strong connections with the

Syrian authorities. Recent bomb attacks, while not the

work of foreign fighters, had required the kind of logisti-

cal support that could only be found among such people.

Talks with Damascus on the issue had led nowhere.

Petraeus said progress in Iraq was ‘fragile and reversible’

but emphasised the sharp reduction in violence. The number

(l–r): Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan; Masoom Stanekzai, Adviser to the President on Home Security, Afghanistan; and Christian Schmidt, Parliamentary State Secretary to the Minister of Defence, Germany


Among other issues raised was the need for improved

security frameworks in the Gulf region. Petraeus said the past

year had seen an increase in the number of joint operations,

exercises, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

Interaction with partner countries had helped to develop the

concept he described as ‘multi-bilateralism’ – the integration

(l–r): General David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command; Ali Muhammad Al Anisi, Chairman of National Security Agency, Yemen; and Dr Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar, Adviser to the King of Bahrain on Diplomatic Affairs

(l–r) Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, US Department of Defense; Brigadier-General H.R. McMaster, Chief, Concept Development and Experimentation, Training and Doctrine Command, US Army; Consulting Senior Fellow, IISS; Brigadier Abdulrahman Al Hadoud, Director of Military Intelligence, Kuwait Armed Services; and Karl W. Eikenberry, Ambassador of the US to Afghanistan

BREAK-OUT GROUP 1: Military Transformation, Intelligence and Security Cooperation

The central question for the group was how to move from con-flict resolution into a much broader mode of conflict prevention and post-conflict consolidation. The Gulf region faced threats in-cluding conflicts between nation states, communal disturbances, illegal trafficking, piracy, terrorism, insurgency and resource de-pletion. While the strategic role of the Gulf was based on its oil resources, society was undergoing rapid change, economic and demographic developments were intensifying, and there was a growing awareness of human rights issues.

The security environment was now a major focus for discussion at Gulf Cooperation Council summits – involving redefinition of the role of the armed forces, development of military equipment and capabilities, new concepts of joint operations and, politically, joint defence policies.

A similar effort was needed in Afghanistan to recalibrate coali-tion efforts so as to meet the objectives of local control of security forces, development of the police force, judiciary and court system,

education and healthcare systems and greater agricultural expertise. This entailed enhancing civilian authorities and development of a regional structure overcoming the problems of distance, difficult ter-rain and patterns of regional and tribal loyalties. Aid programmes worked better if decentralised, but funds needed to be injected di-rectly and linked with stringent execution targets and performance monitoring.

The approach of the United States would be conditioned by the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review which would examine both state and asymmetric threats and the capacity of partners to meet them. In the Gulf, strengthening partnerships, dealing with daily threats such as improvised explosive devices, state support for non-state actors, cyber and maritime threats required not only funding for key programmes but reinforcing national synergies and capabilities. In Afghanistan, a ‘whole of government’ approach would be pursued, drawing in civilian professionals so as to create long-term stability.


BREAK-OUT GROUP 2: Iraq and the Region

The session agreed that Iraq had travelled a long way in a positive direction over the last two years. There had been a marked decline in violence and instability as well as sectari-an or sub-national identities. Iraq had passed through occupation and civil strife and was heading towards a position where it could completely reclaim its own sovereignty.

With the completion of the current round for foreign bids to invest in the oil industry, Iraq was poised to make the shift from eco-nomic backwater to regional powerhouse. The next stage would be national elections in March 2010. While the aftermath may see a messy and prolonged process of govern-ment formation, the result should be a new

government with a five-year term and a democratic mandate.

Relations between the United States and Iraq are now shaped by the Status of Forces Agreement passed by the Iraqi parliament in November 2008. The fact that Iraq did not face a security vacuum when US troops withdrew from the cities in June 2009 indi-cates the capacity of the Iraqi armed forces to control the country.

Relations with neighbours have in the past been volatile and unstable, driven by fear, economic competition and sectarian rivalries. Even today some regional pow-ers are apprehensive. For example, Iraq’s relations with Kuwait are mixed: Kuwait

backed regime change in Baghdad in 2003, but is uneasy that Iraq has been unwilling unambiguously to agree to the demarcation of borders.

Iraq is one of Turkey’s top foreign policy issues and forms a central part of its aim to have zero problems with its neighbours. Turkey kept its embassy in Baghdad open throughout the post-war violence and man-aged to keep an equal distance from all Iraq’s communities. Turkey continually urged Iraq’s Sunni population to take part in the reconciliation process. Overall, the break-out group was optimistic about the future of Iraq but it indentified continuing tensions between Iraq and its neighbours.

(l–r) Sheikh Thamer Ali Al Sabah, Vice President, National Security Bureau, Kuwait; Murat Ozcelik, Ambassador of Turkey to Iraq; Sadiq Al Rikabi, Political Adviser, Prime Minister’s Office, Iraq; Dr Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS–US and Corresponding Director, IISS–Middle East; and Jeffrey Feltman, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State

BREAK-OUT GROUP 3: Piracy and Maritime Security

Because of the geo-strategic importance of the region to trade and energy flows, and the continued high frequency of attacks on merchant vessels there, piracy has continued to constitute a significant security concern in the Gulf of Aden, and indeed the wider western Indian Ocean, over the last year. Maintaining free access through the Strait and ensuring unimpeded transit remain vi-tal for global well-being. International con-

cern has prompted unprecedented multina-tional naval intervention, with contributions from 17 states.

The group heard that in Southeast Asia, closer cooperation among littoral states helped to reduce the problem of piracy in the Malacca Strait to negligible levels. But in the Somali case, naval action can only address the symptoms and not the causes of piracy, which are rooted in the collapse of political

authority in Somalia.Nevertheless, the group heard that

international naval patrolling combined with defensive measures on the part of merchant vessels had significantly dis-rupted and deterred piratical activities: in 2008, the success rate for pirate attacks was approximately 30% for all attempted boardings; by late 2009, the rate had been reduced to 15%. However, only half of ves-

of bilateral activities to achieve multilateral effects. This was

occurring in shared early warning, air and missile defence,

and achievement of a common operational picture.

Dr Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar, Adviser to the King of

Bahrain on Diplomatic Affairs, and Chairman of the Bahrain

Centre for Strategic International and Energy Studies, said

the Gulf should aspire to ‘logical’ security arrangements

which would involve the GCC countries, Iran, Iraq and

influential outside powers. This would produce a stable,

inclusive architecture meeting the concerns and interests

of all parties. However, for the time being the region

would have to make do with what he called ‘the Realist

Perspective’ – ‘making the best of what we have, rather than

striving for an unreachable goal’. He outlined steps towards

the eventual goal, including the building of mutual confi-

dence and ensuring the region had ‘a credible voice in its

own security’. The GCC needed a new strategic concept set-

ting out a vision of its role in regional security.


sels attacked successfully in recent months had adhered to International Maritime Or-ganisation (IMO) guidelines.

Efforts to coordinate national maritime contributions take the form of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Committee and UN-IMO contact groups. Improved maritime situational awareness is necessary: this will require better intelli-gence-sharing.

There was agreement in the group that, while Somali piracy continues to pose a serious menace to shipping, wider mari-time security challenges should not be ignored. These challenges include traffick-ing, smuggling and the spectre of maritime terrorism. Concern was expressed over the vulnerability of submarine fibre-optic ca-bles to disruption.

While there are weaknesses and flaws in

current anti-piracy efforts, multinational na-val forces are engaged in an unprecedented level of diplomatic, military collaboration and coordination. This cooperation may have wider consequences in terms of build-ing confidence among the navies of states that are not all formal allies or even secu-rity partners, which could be useful in the future. As one participant pointed out: ‘You can surge forces, but you cannot surge trust’.

(l–r) Vice-Admiral M.P. Muralidharan, Chief of Personnel, Indian Navy; Vice-Admiral William Gortney, Commander, US Naval Forces, Central Command; Commander, US Fifth Fleet; Lt.-Gen. Desmond Kuek Bak Chye; Chief of Defence Force, Ministry of Defence, Singapore; Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia; Editor, Adelphis; Corresponding Director for Military Information and Analysis, IISS; and Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, UK

BREAK-OUT GROUP 4: Non-State Actors in Regional Security

The group heard that the phenomenon of Non-State Actors (NSAs) was of increasing importance as such groups were proliferat-ing, with greater inter-action between them and implications for relations between coun-tries and within wider regions. For example, concerns about insurgency in Yemen could affect relations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which could in turn impinge upon regional security. Such effects could be exacerbated if NSAs were serving a foreign agenda.

In Lebanon, Hizbullah was the domi-nant Shia party but had links with non-Shia groups, and worked patiently to a long-term timescale with wide political appeal. It had two ministers in the new government and

several supportive MPs. Its new manifesto placed more emphasis on its Lebanese con-text and underplayed its relationship with Iran. It possessed a strong military arsenal including anti-ship missiles, with rumours of anti-aircraft missiles. There was little sign that it would disarm, as required by UN resolutions.

In Pakistan, new NSAs had emerged in the last five years, with limited objectives but having links with international NSAs, especially al-Qaeda. A wave of terrorism had killed about 2,000 civilians and 2,250 military personnel and had caused massive damage. It was suggested that the actions of the United States, the NATO-led forces in Afghanistan and possibly India enhanced

the difficulty of dealing with NSAs in Paki-stan. Military operations in Swat and North Waziristan had proceeded well: the return of 2.6 million displaced persons in 4½ months was without parallel. A distinction had to be made between the Pakistani Taliban – which started by supporting the Afghan Taliban and were now opposing the Pakistani state in opposition to what they saw as a Western agenda – and the Afghan Taliban, a product of the anti-Soviet mujahadeen which the West had helped create in the 1980s. Alli-ances between them had allowed the Afghan Taliban to gain sanctuary in Pakistan. For the time being, Pakistan’s main focus was direct-ed against the Pakistani groups.

(l–r) Professor Aboumohammad Asgarkhani, Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Tehran; Dr Michael C. Williams, Under Secretary-General and Special Coordinator for Lebanon, United Nations; General Mansour Al Turki, Spokesperson, Interior Ministry, Saudi Arabia; Dr Mamoun Fandy, Senior Fellow for Gulf Security and Corresponding Director, IISS–Middle East; and Lt.-Gen. Muhammed Mustafa Khan, Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan



http://www.iiss.org/en/events/manama%20dialogue/archive/manama-dialogue-2010-3790


The drivers and dynamics of regional security in the Gulf

region and their links to global strategic affairs were once

again the subjects of intense debates at the 7th IISS Regional

Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue held in Manama,

Bahrain, from 3–5 December. The largest number to date

of top government officials, military officers and seasoned

analysts of international and regional affairs from the

Middle East, Asia, Europe and North America discussed

the main sources of instability in the region, detailed

existing responses to cope with and counter them, and

shared ideas for greater security cooperation and dialogue.

The summit took place against a backdrop of significant

processes and events, including the ongoing formation of a

government in Iraq, massive arms sales to the Gulf states,

the WikiLeaks disclosures and a nuclear meeting between

Iran and the P5+1 grouping. This provided a rich context for

the discussions but also for the well-established Al-Arabiya

televised debate and for the new ABC-Bloomberg televised

debate that preceded the official conference proceed-

ings. The situation in Yemen, Iran’s nuclear programme,

regional security cooperation, transnational security issues

and the linkages between security and development were

the main themes of these debates, which attracted consid-

erable attention.

Opening dinner

In the presence of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince

of Bahrain Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa and His Majesty

King Abdullah of Jordan, John Chipman, IISS Director-

General and Chief Executive, opened the proceedings

by noting that privatised defence diplomacy in fora such

as the Manama Dialogue allow for a candid exchange of

views in a world increasingly defined by the ‘fluidity

and dynamism of contemporary strategic realities’. He

explained that ‘the IISS has no agenda in mounting the

Manama Dialogue, other than to create a forum where the

agenda can be set by those responsible for security and

foreign policy and to have those perspectives seriously and

un-polemically debated with top analysts and experts’.

Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, gave the

opening address. She reiterated the US commitment to the

stability and development of the region and to the security


Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, US


of its allies, stressing that the US has ‘invested blood and

treasure to protect those stakes, those friendships and

those vital national security interests’ and will continue

doing so. She also called for a broader definition of security

that included development, diversification, and investment

in human resources and human security.

Secretary Clinton elaborated on the key principles of US

engagement in the region: respect for national sovereignty,

security partnerships, freedom of navigation, commit-

ment to human security and nuclear non-proliferation. She

welcomed Iraq’s progress towards full sovereignty and

forming an inclusive cabinet, saying the US was committed

to help Iraq achieve stability and self-reliance, and call-

ing on the Gulf states to upgrade their relations with Iraq

to help its regional integration. She envisioned ‘a future

in which Iraq does not pose a threat to regional security,

but instead a strength to it’. Secretary Clinton hoped that

current efforts to improve defence cooperation against

conventional and unconventional threats, including in the

areas of missile and air defence and maritime security,

would be sustained. She noted that such help goes both

ways, praising the roles of Bahrain, the UAE, Jordan and

Egypt in dealing with Afghanistan, Iraq and other humani-

tarian crises. She urged continued commitment and focus

on Yemen and reaffirmed America’s commitment to a two-

state solution between Israelis and Palestinians.

Secretary Clinton directly addressed the Iranian del-

egation led by the Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki,

which had considerable significance given the nuclear talks

that were occurring three days later. She said that the US

was ‘still committed’ to President Obama’s offer of engage-

ment with Iran, adding that Iran had ‘the right to a peaceful

nuclear programme’. She urged Iran to make the choice to

‘restore the confidence of the international community and

live up to [its] obligations’ as a peaceful nuclear power.

Responding to a question on US democracy policy by

Dr Alanoud Al Sharekh, IISS Senior Fellow for Regional

Politics, Secretary Clinton argued that the US continued

to advocate democracy but was adopting a comprehen-

sive approach that valued institution-building as much as

elections. Professor François Heisbourg, IISS Chairman,

asked about the significance of the WikiLeaks disclosures

and other cyber-security issues for diplomacy and national

security. Secretary Clinton explained that such breaches

were a regrettable downside of the need to share infor-

mation more broadly, because information stove-piping

could lead governments to miss gathering threats, as hap-

pened with the 11 September 2001 attacks. In response to

a question from Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for

Non-Proliferation, about US expectations for nuclear talks

with Iran, Secretary Clinton said that ‘Iran is entitled to

the peaceful use of civil nuclear energy’, but she stressed

the concerns of the international community. She warned

that ‘if anyone in Iran believes that either acquiring nuclear

weapons or the break-out capacity for nuclear weapons

will make Iran stronger and more dominant in the region,

that is an absolutely wrong calculation. It will trigger an

arms race that will make the region less stable and more

uncertain, and will cause serious repercussions far beyond

the Gulf.’

Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Professor François Heisbourg and King Abdullah of Jordan on their way to the opening dinner


Keynote speech

King Abdullah of Jordan delivered the keynote speech

on Saturday morning. He made an impassioned plea for

peace between Israelis and Palestinians and reiterated the

terms of the Arab Peace Initiative that offers full peace in

exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal. ‘This opportunity

cannot last forever’, he cautioned, noting that geographic

and demographic changes ‘are threatening the essence of

the initiative: a two-state solution, which will guarantee

the Palestinians the freedom and statehood they have long

been denied, and will ensure for Israel the security it seeks’.

He warned that radical forces would prevail if peace is not

attained, dragging the Middle East into greater turmoil.

Expressing support for the US-led efforts to jumpstart

peace talks, he noted that Israel’s refusal to extend a

moratorium on settlement building had undermined

existing good will. ‘We do not need new solutions. We

need will, we need commitment and we need courage to

make hard decisions,’ he argued.

Lord Powell of Bayswater, IISS Council Member, asked

about the consequences of not reaching peace. ‘Absolute

disaster,’ King Abdullah responded, adding that there

could be a time when the two-state solution would not be

viable anymore but stressing nonetheless that the window

of opportunity was still open. He saw linkages between the

Arab–Israeli conflict and a host of other issues that were

exacerbated by the failure to reach peace. ‘Fortress Israel’,

he said, was a mindset that prevented Israelis from project-

ing themselves into the future and realising the benefits of

peace and regional integration.

In response to a question on military cooperation

by Lord Astor of Hever, UK Under Secretary of State for

Defence, King Abdullah responded that Jordan maintained

strong bilateral relations with the GCC states but also with

NATO countries. Joint training and exercises were impor-

tant to create confidence between soldiers in real-time

conflict, not simply as a continuation of existing relations.

Military integration was key to achieving faster deployment

and better performance on the battlefield. He deplored the

lack of multilateral defence cooperation in the Middle East,

despite good bilateral relations, but saw this as a reflection

of the lack of regional peace, which also constrained other

important forms of integration and development.

First plenary

The first plenary session, entitled ‘Regional Security

Cooperation’, offered three visions for achieving regional

stability.

Bemoaning the fact that the Gulf region was being taken

advantage of because of its natural wealth, Manouchehr

Mottaki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, considered

that external actors were sowing discord and spoke of

‘evil intentions of planned mischief’ to create instability in

the Gulf region. Iran instead believed that the best way to

ensure stability was to engineer trust among local nations

and ‘indigenise’ regional security. To Iran, power and poli-

tics was not a zero-sum game. He insisted that Iran was no

threat to its neighbours because of their Muslim character,

and instead supported the development and stability of its

Arab neighbours. ‘Your power is our power. Our power

is your power,’ he told them. Countering accusations that

Iran was seeking a nuclear military capability, he asserted

that Iran was exercising its rights under the NPT to support

its own development.

King Abdullah II, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan


example the complete turn-around in Syrian–Turkish rela-

tions in recent years. Echoing King Abdullah’s speech, he

asserted that ‘the core of regional peace in our region is the

Arab–Israeli conflict ... We do not want a new roadmap; we

want to see the end of the road’. Recognising the GCC as a

central actor in the Middle East, Davutoğlu pledged that

Turkey would continue to deepen the strategic relationship

with its members. The complexity of current security issues

and their linkages to global affairs required new thinking.

Hoping that the nuclear negotiations between Iran and

the P5+1 group would be fruitful, Davutoğlu reaffirmed

Turkey’s opposition to nuclear weapons in the region and

its support for peaceful nuclear energy.

Responding to a question from Raghida Dergham,

Senior Diplomatic Correspondent and Columnist of Al

Hayat, Mottaki indicated that Iran supported the establish-

ment of a multilateral nuclear-fuel bank and that, given

Iran’s recent nuclear achievements, it would want to host

a branch on Iranian soil. Davutoğlu agreed but warned

about a new monopoly on alternative energy resources.

Second plenary

The second plenary, ‘Regional Conflicts and Outside

Powers’, offered an opportunity to examine the conflicts

that plague the Middle East and the role of outside actors

in fuelling or resolving them. Franco Frattini, Minister for

Foreign Affairs for Italy, noted that the region’s security

architecture remained fragmentary, even as security

challenges have grown in number and complexity.

Traditional bilateral cooperation was no longer enough

to progress and must evolve into genuine partnerships

Sheikh Khalid Bin Hamed, Minister of Foreign Affairs

of Bahrain, portrayed Bahrain as ‘an active, reasonable,

responsible player in the international arena’ in an oth-

erwise unsettled region. He stressed its commitment to

its GCC partners and its allies beyond the region. Sheikh

Khalid called the deteriorating situation in Yemen the

most immediate challenge facing the Gulf region, saying

‘we simply cannot afford to have it succumb to extrem-

ism and continued unrest’. He also underlined the threat

of piracy, and welcomed international efforts to counter it.

In addition, he noted that concerns over Iran’s nuclear pro-

gramme were a cause of tension and instability and called

for a successful outcome to the nuclear talks. He suggested

that an international civilian nuclear-fuel bank would best

meet the interests of Iran and the international community.

Echoing Hillary Clinton’s speech, Sheikh Khalid called for

‘incorporating Gulf security within a broad comprehen-

sive regional picture’ that acknowledged the positive and

adverse effects of globalisation and economic development

on stability. For the Gulf states, these range from trans-

national security issues to economic diversification and

nurturing human talent.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of

Turkey, detailed Turkey’s vision for regional security. He

too favoured a broader definition of security not limited to

military and defence matters. Instead of a reactive approach

to security problems, he argued for a ‘visionary’, upstream

one based on four principles: security for all, political

dialogue, economic interdependency, and multicultural

existence. The solution to the region’s crises necessitates

applying this methodology, Davutoğlu argued, using as an

(l–r): Manouchehr Mottaki, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iran; Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain; and Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey


sanctions and engagement fail to convince Iran to stop its

nuclear pursuits, General Mattis urged that more time be

given to the current track before considering the use of

force. Responding to a question from Dr Chipman, Dr Al

Qirbi detailed the economic and development assistance

that Yemen was receiving through the Friends of Yemen

grouping and bilaterally from the GCC states. Such help

reflected a growing global and regional awareness of

Yemen’s multi dimensional needs. He insisted ‘Yemen is

not weak. The government is in control.’

Third plenary

The third plenary, ‘Strategic Reassurance and Deterrence

in the Region’, showcased the various security strategies

that states can employ to defend themselves.

Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister

for Defence, Singapore, explained that his country’s

interest in the Gulf stemmed from ‘the recognition that

the complex security challenges we face today require

multinational and cooperative responses that involve

all the stakeholders’. Hoping to inspire his audience,

he proceeded to explain how Singapore and other

Southeast Asian nations built a security architecture

amid a complex international and regional picture. By

enshrining the principles of national sovereignty and

non-interference without over-formalising their security

cooperation, ASEAN has allowed its members to focus

on their national development. Teo Chee Hean explained:

‘Apart from deterrence and diplomacy, the story of

ASEAN would not be complete without a third ‘‘D’’, and

that ‘‘D’’ is development.’

built on trust and shared interests. Italy too approached

regional issues from a holistic perspective, Frattini said.

‘Security is not only about military capacity; it is also

about institution building, ownership, social cohesion,

rights and partnerships.’

Dr Abu Bakr Al Qirbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of

Yemen, urged the audience not to assume that regional

conflicts were necessarily the doing of local actors and that

outside powers were necessarily doing good by insert-

ing themselves in them. Today’s conflicts were no longer

geographically or strategically contained: Yemen may be

suffering from internal woes but it was also affected by

the Arab–Israeli conflict, piracy and other security chal-

lenges. Dr Al Qirbi prescribed three principles to deal with

conflicts in the Middle East: respect for the sovereignty

and independence of states; no foreign imposition of solu-

tions but rather support for indigenous ones; and a broad

understanding of conflict that considers economic and gov-

ernance factors.

General James Mattis, Commander, US Central

Command, sought to redefine what an external power was.

Rather than focus on geography in the age of globalisation

and interdependency, he urged the audience to focus on

values and norms and call ‘external’ a power that sought to

sow instability and division. He too believed that partner-

ships were the best mechanism to ensure stability. Using

naval cooperation as an example, he detailed how navies

from several nations were working together to counter

piracy off the Somali coast.

Asked by Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Professor of

Political Science, UAE University, about a Plan B should

(l–r): Dr Abu Bakr Al Qirbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yemen; General James Mattis, Commander, US Central Command; and Franco Frattini, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Italy


HH Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE

Foreign Minister, provided the perspective of a small but

rapidly growing nation eager to protect its development.

‘The best guarantor of security is sustainable economic and

social development’, Sheikh Abdullah said. Referring to

Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 Football World Cup,

he explained that the UAE and other Gulf states adopted

a positive and alternative vision of the Gulf’s place in the

world. Commenting on the challenges to world order and

to Middle East security, he insisted that ‘we cannot win an

ideological war except through changing mindsets’.

Outlining his government’s commitment to the Gulf,

Liam Fox, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, stressed

that the UK took the interests and security of its regional

partners seriously. While detailing the UK defence regional

involvement, he pledged that the UK would continue to

‘work closely with our Gulf allies and the United States’,

and ‘maintain the political will and military capabil-

ity required to deter regional aggression’. Turning to the

Iranian nuclear programme, he affirmed that ‘an Iranian

nuclear-weapons capability will not be tolerated by the

international community’.

In response to a question from Jean-Claude Mallet, IISS

Council Member, about the meaning of Western reassur-

ance in the Gulf, Liam Fox explained that lack of resolve on

the part of the Western powers regarding Iran would send

a negative message to their local allies. To a question about

regional security by Hayfa Ali Al Mattar of the Foreign

Ministry of Bahrain, both Teo Chee Hean and Sheikh

Abdullah believed that the Gulf region can learn some les-

sons from Asia.

Fourth plenary

The fourth plenary session, entitled ‘The Changing

International Framework and Regional Security’, was an

opportunity to examine the global context that defines

contemporary power dynamics.

Sheikh Dr Muhammad Al Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah,

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

of Kuwait, insisted that the main constant in interna-

tional affairs was the permanent state of change in the

fundamentals and dynamics of power. Global power has

shifted dramatically in recent years with the rise of new

powers and the impact of the global financial crisis. The

new multipolar reality has tangible aspects, ranging from

Qatar’s successful bid to stage the 2022 World Cup to the

UAE beating Germany to host the International Renewable

Energy Agency. Sheikh Muhammad also noted the chang-

ing nature of threats, from war-centric to more diffuse yet

more pernicious forms like environmental degradation

and transnational challenges. New actors, from NGOs

to non-state actors, increasingly influenced international

affairs as well. Another change on the horizon comes from

the divergent demographics of the North and the rest of

the world, which will pose challenges in terms of income,

integration and migration.

Kevin Rudd, the Foreign Minister of Australia, found

that the geopolitical and economic rise of Asia had pro-

found consequences for the world and the Middle East as

relations deepen between new power centres. Describing

Australia as a middle power with global interests, he

called for a more sophisticated understanding of the

new security dynamics. He urged Iran to reflect on the

(l–r): Dr Liam Fox, Secretary of State for Defence, UK; Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Singapore; and HH Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, UAE


impact of its nuclear programme on global security and

supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free

zone in the Middle East. Finally, he advised Gulf nations

to derive lessons from the ASEAN experiment to build a

stable regional order.

Fifth plenary

In the final plenary, ‘The Changing Nature of Regional

Security Issues’, broad lessons about the interplay of global

politics and regional security were outlined.

Carl Bildt, Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs,

insisted that ‘globalisation is truly the megatrend of our

times’. In an age where ‘there is no longer any national

security that is purely national’, the challenge was to man-

age flows of people, goods, capital, ideas and threats. In

the absence of reformed and better world governance,

however, regional security arrangements are getting

increasingly important in this regard. Asia and Europe

are good examples of that. In the Middle East, he believed

‘the GCC countries will be the core of the coming regional

cooperation structure of the wider region’. This should one

day lead to ‘the full integration of both Iran and Israel with

the entire region’ since regional prosperity was closely

linked to peace.

Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud,

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the King Faisal

Center for Research and Islamic Studies, agreed with

Bildt’s concluding point, saying that Israel had a choice to

make between democracy and peace or apartheid and con-

flict. Welcoming the idea of a nuclear-fuel bank, he recalled

a conversation with Manouchehr Mottaki, who suggested

that Saudi Arabia should become a shareholder rather

than a mere consumer in such a scheme. He concluded by

welcoming the consensus that emerged throughout the

conference on the need for a broader understanding of

security.

Responding to a question by Ali Al Shihabi, Chairman,

Rasmala Investment Bank, Prince Turki asserted that for-

eign troops posed a problem in countries like Iraq where

they forced themselves upon the local population, but not

in the Arabian Peninsula where agreements governed their

presence. To Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Professor of Political

Science, UAE University; and an IISS member’s concern

about the possible militarisation and nuclearisation of the

Gulf, Prince Turki stressed the Gulf’s commitment to non-

proliferation and argued that making the Middle East a

region free of nuclear weapons was an overriding priority,

one that must embraced by all players.

After Khalid Fahad Al Khater, Director of the Strategic

Dialogues Department of the GCC Secretariat, raised a

question about the status of Arab–Israeli peace, Minister

Bildt reaffirmed the Western commitment to reaching a

peaceful solution. He added that ‘the reality of the Arab

Peace Initiative has not yet sunk in, in Israeli society’, and

urged Arab states to do more to convince the Israeli popu-

lation of the benefits of peace.

To a question about Turkey’s future role by Mohammad

Al Sager, Chairman, Council for Arab and International

Relations, Minister Bildt affirmed the country’s importance

in today’s world, adding that ‘I do not think we will be able

to think of the global role of the EU some years down the

road without Turkey.’

(l–r): Sheikh Dr Muhammad Al Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kuwait; and Kevin Rudd, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Australia


SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION I: Securing Yemen’s Future

The challenges facing Yemen were high-lighted in this break-out group. Yemen has long dealt with issues concerning al-Qaeda, the instability in the south, and the Houthis. However, the core of those problems was described as stemming from economic and governance failures. Yemen is a rugged and barren country whose population is constantly growing but whose natural resources are in con-stant decline, especially when it comes to oil production, still a main source of Ye-men’s income. Stability in Yemen is de-pendent on development. Thus the inter-national community as well as Friends of Yemen must all strive to help the country overcome its challenges and look beyond

the security dimension. A possible full Ye-meni integration into the GCC could help tackle the high unemployment rate, while investing in modern education and prom-ising sectors in the economy such as tour-ism could alleviate the dire situation in the country.

Another delegate pointed to the fact that many of the issues facing Yemen also stemmed from political factors that must be addressed. In particular al-Qaeda should not be portrayed as a Yemen-based group, but a global problem that is not exclusive to Yemen. The solution is to maintain co-operative efforts not only domestically, but also to maintain international com-mitment and involvement. Also, Yemen’s

government must be able to achieve politi-cal compromise, especially with regards to the Houthis. The only viable solution to this conflict and other internal crises is a Yemeni solution.

Despite the challenges confronting Ye-men, the country is not a failed state. It is still an important member of the interna-tional community. It is, nevertheless, still facing a rising tide of new challenges in the forms of piracy, insurgency, and immigra-tion from neighbouring Somalia. Yemen is in acute need of global and regional aid, and only through the help and support of the international community will it be able to overcome its problems and secure its future.

(l–r): Carl Bildt, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden; and Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Chairman, Board of Directors, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies

(l–r): Professor Vitaly Naumkin, Director, Institute of Oriental Studies, The Russian Academy of Sciences; Michael Crawford, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East and South Asia, IISS; Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Chairman, Board of Directors, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; and Abu Bakr Al Qirbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yemen


SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION III: Iraq and the Region

The challenges facing Iraq were discussed in detail in the third special session. While violence has largely declined, Iraq remains a fragile state.

The current political instability stems from the prolonged, messy process of form-ing a government. While a tentative power-sharing agreement was reached in Novem-ber 2010, the eight-month political impasse has threatened regional security. The es-tablishment of a unity government in Iraq is therefore essential to the maintenance of regional stability.

Many of the participants argued that sec-tarianism remains a hindrance to a unified government in Iraq. Strong governance is necessary to ensure Iraq’s sovereignty. The group called for an inclusive government that incorporates all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. Some argued that this would require the revision of the Iraqi Constitution, which was drafted in 2005 without the full support of Sunni groups. Several partici-pants said the constitution is a foundation for sectarianism in Iraq and does not pro-mote political reconciliation.

Relations between Iraq and Iran were discussed in detail. Iran was cited as en-couraging sectarian division to ensure a weak Iraq, in order to destabilise the re-gion. An Iranian delegate refuted these claims, and stressed that Iran sought to uphold the Iraqi Constitution. Iran was called upon by some of the Arab Gulf par-ticipants in the group to play a more con-structive role in Iraq.

The group was hopeful for the future of Iraq, but cautioned that rising sectarian ten-sions could destabilise the country.

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION II: Maritime Security Operations and International Cooperation

The importance of maritime security to the Middle East was well described in the sec-ond break-out group. Some 90% of all glob-al trade travels by sea; for India, the group heard, that figure rises to 95% by value.

Yet, the difficulty in maintaining the security of this trade was also highlight-ed. Between 23,000 and 25,000 ships pass through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor annually, a thin strip of ocean that commercial shipping is encour-aged to use, but piracy continues to flour-ish in the Gulf region. Piracy has reached record levels this year: 127 piracy incidents have occurred in 2010 and 538 hostages

were being held on 27 hijacked ships, the group heard. One delegate noted that ‘pi-rates are adapting as we adapt’.

Combined Task Force 151, which comes under the command of NAVCENT and is currently commanded by Kuwait, is deployed to deal with the problem, while NATO, the EU and independent deployers India, China, Russia, Iran and Malaysia continue to patrol and convoy. This has led to regular interaction be-tween the various navies and practitio-ners, both through multilateral fora such as the Shared Awareness and Deconflic-tion group (SHADE) that meets every six

weeks in Bahrain and bilaterally, even between ostensible rivals such as the US and Iran.

While other maritime security issues, such as environmental protection and fishing rights, were mentioned, piracy dominated the group’s attention. The well-rehearsed argument that the solution to the problem ultimately lay on land was widely agreed upon, with the group con-curring that a comprehensive approach to Somalia would be the most effective rem-edy. However, in the meantime the prob-lem persisted and the navies would retain their presence.

(l–r): Vice Admiral R.K. Dhowan, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, India; Vice Admiral Mark Fox, Commander, US Naval Forces, Central Command; Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia, Director for Military Information and Analysis, IISS; Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, Canada; and Rear Admiral Bruno Nielly, Commander, French Forces in the Indian Ocean

(l–r): Dr Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS–US, Corresponding Director, IISS–Middle East; Murat Mercan, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission, Grand National Assembly, Turkey; HRH Prince Naef Bin Ahmed Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Adviser to Crown Prince Sultan, Saudi Arabia


SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION IV: Military Cooperation in the Region

During this special session, security experts and delegates discussed Military Coop-eration in the Gulf, emphasising its impor-tance amidst renewed threats in the region. Speakers noted that while there has been progress in recent years in terms of regional engagement in multilateral missions, as well as regional progress in command and control (exemplified by Bahrain’s imminent assumption of the command of Combined Task Force 152 for the second time), these developments have tended to take place through non-regional frameworks or with outside partners. This is due to several fac-tors that effectively impede multilateral de-fence cooperation. These factors range from the historical to the bureaucratic and politi-cal, and lead to a lack of movement towards more seamless military cooperation – partic-ularly in the areas of air- and ballistic-missile

defence. Speakers emphasised the impor-tance of enhancing defence capabilities of US partners in the Gulf through early warning of sale and transfer of defence equipment, as GCC states were also encouraged to take on a more active role in defence.

Speakers at the session also highlighted the importance of deterrence as a tool of ac-tive conflict-prevention, stating that Gulf states should remain equipped with en-hanced and advanced weapons capabilities in order to drive up the cost of potential aggression. It was also noted that the com-mon purpose of the United States and its Gulf allies to protect state sovereignty and national freedoms is also a deterrent against future threats. Enhanced peacetime coopera-tion and tactical training were also cited as important towards ensuring swift military victories in the event of a future attack.

Military strategy and tactics were also discussed at the session, with a speaker not-ing that the absence of a ‘grand strategy’ made it difficult to translate goals into effec-tive military plans. The absence of a unified vision between ISAF members in Afghani-stan was raised as an example of the costs of a fragmented vision. This led to a discussion on the importance of setting out clear goals prior to war and an agreement that a com-mon understanding of such goals was neces-sary for successful military cooperation.

The growing threat of cybercrime was also discussed, with a speaker stating that it was time to look beyond military coop-eration and towards a more holistic form of security cooperation that took into account threats stemming from new technology. The vulnerability of GCC states was raised in this regard.

(l–r): Lt.-Gen. Waheed Arshad Chaudhry, Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan; General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK; Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State; Dr Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS; and Lt.-Gen. Sheikh Dr Mohammad Bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, Minister of State for Defence Affairs, Bahrain



http://www.iiss.org/en/events/manama%20dialogue/archive/manama-dialogue-2012-f58e


The impact of Arab revolutions on the Middle East’s

regional order provided the backdrop for the 8th Manama

Dialogue, held in Bahrain on 7–9 December 2012. The

Regional Security Summit, convened after a one-year

hiatus, attracted an attendance of senior government

officials, military officers, national-security practitioners,

political analysts and journalists from the Middle East,

Asia, Europe and North America.

Participants reflected on a fast-changing regional secu-

rity agenda, which has significantly broadened in recent

years. Indeed, the Arab transformations, while carrying

hope for better governance and greater political participa-

tion in the medium term, have also engendered an even

more uncertain regional security landscape. Fierce domestic

competition over identity and power in transitioning coun-

tries is reshaping their politics in often unpredictable ways.

The fragility of burgeoning democratic systems, the rise

of Islamist movements across North Africa, the weakening

of once-dominant state security services, and a recognition

that the transformational process will be long and bumpy

have added layers of complexity to an already volatile

picture. In several countries, the transformations have exac-

erbated existing faultlines, including sectarian and political

ones. They have increased demands on governments at a

time when they are under pressure from budget problems

and lagging economic growth. Egypt’s internal problems

have adversely impacted its regional influence, despite its

central role in solving the recent Gaza conflict.

The Crown Prince of Bahrain, Prince Salman Bin

Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, addressed the Dialogue’s open-

ing dinner, giving a very personal speech which was his

first public address to a local or international audience in

over a year. He called for face-to-face dialogue with oppo-

sition parties – a call that they welcomed.

The escalating Syrian crisis and its profound regional

ramifications attracted particular interest. Beyond the fate

of the Assad regime, attention focused on the competition

for power inside Syria and its human and other costs; the

concern about a security vacuum and growing radicalisa-

tion; the potential use of chemical weapons; and the role of

external actors in fuelling the conflict and sponsoring spe-

cific groups and ideologies. As importantly, the audience


Prince Salman Bin Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, Crown Prince of Bahrain


focused on the potential of the already existing spillover on

Syria’s immediate neighbours to balloon and result in an

even greater destabilising impact.

The concern over Iran’s nuclear programme and its

suspected ambitions among participants and the related

potential for conflict remained acute. The re-election of US

President Barack Obama and positive signals from Iran

suggested that the prospects for war had been reduced

and that a window remained opened for diplomatic

engagement. Given the failed diplomatic attempts of 2012,

however, a sober sense of what can be achieved hovered.

The role of the United States in regional security was

also hotly debated. A sense that the US, motivated by the

pivot to Asia, domestic constraints and general fatigue

with the Middle East, was reducing its commitment to Gulf

security was palpable among regional participants. US

speakers strongly rejected this notion, although differences

over the current US approach to Syria indicated a tense

debate in Washington over the right degree and form of

involvement in the Middle East.

Opening Dinner

In his address to the opening dinner, the Crown Prince

directly addressed the problems faced by his country since

the Arab uprisings of 2011. During the protests in Bahrain,

the country had been divided, he said, and many wounds

were still to be healed. He stressed the importance of

dialogue to overcome Bahrain’s traumatic divide. ‘Security

is not the only guarantor of stability,’ he said. ‘Without

justice there can be no freedom, and without freedom

there can be no true security.’ He rejected the sectarian and

political polarisation that poisoned the Kingdom’s politics:

‘I am not a prince of Sunni Bahrain; I am not a prince of

Shia Bahrain. I am a prince of the Kingdom of Bahrain and

all mean a great deal to me personally.’

He called for direct talks: ‘I soon hope to see a meet-

ing between all sides – and I call for a meeting between all

sides – as I believe that only through face-to-face contact

will any real progress be made.’ The Crown Prince’s call

for dialogue was welcomed by Bahrain’s main opposition

parties, including Al-Wefaq.

Prince Salman offered thanks to Saudi Arabia and the

United Arab Emirates, which had sent troops to ensure

security in the face of any possible aggressor, and to people

who had supported his efforts to promote dialogue with

the political opposition. He praised the UK which, he said,

had stood ‘head and shoulders’ above others, engaging

with all stakeholders.

‘There is more work that we need to do,’ the Crown

Prince said. Reform and capacity-building were necessary

for the judiciary, so as to create a legal system that was fair,

just and inclusive. Laws that went against the protections

of the constitution needed to be changed. Selective applica-

tion of the law must stop.

Addressing the opposition, Prince Salman said lead-

ers and ayatollahs must condemn violence. He added

that the silent majority, including people who lived in

mixed Sunni/Shia communities, felt insecure and their

voices unheard. Responsible leadership was needed. The

majority of people wanted a solution that put the events

William Hague, Dr John Chipman and the Crown Prince of Bahrain, Prince Salman Bin Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa


of last year firmly in the past. Political groups must be

reconciled in face-to-face meetings. ‘So we have our work

cut out,’ said the Crown Prince. ‘Wishing for peace never

works, but peacemaking does.’

Introducing him, John Chipman, IISS Director-General

and Chief Executive, thanked the Kingdom for its support

for the Manama Dialogue, which was, he said, ‘not just an

annual summit, but a continuous effort by the IISS to pro-

mote international cooperation on matters of security and

stability in this region’. He hoped for a ‘transparent and

influential debate on all matters affecting the future of the

Gulf and the wider Middle East region’.

Chipman explained that the 2012 summit was pre-

ceded by two Sherpa meetings in Bahrain, in February

and October, at which officials from many countries

discussed the issues for the Dialogue to debate. In addi-

tion, the Institute had strengthened its regional office in

Manama and had held numerous international confer-

ences, seminars and lectures in Bahrain on geo-economic

issues ranging from currency wars to trade and security

matters. ‘The IISS–Middle East office housed here will

cover regional issues from the Levant to North Africa, and

thematic questions of geo-economics, geostrategy, demo-

graphics and cyber security amongst others. It will develop

further programmes and activities while always support-

ing the Manama Dialogue process.’

Syria forum

A pre-Dialogue discussion forum tackled the Syrian

uprising. Mustafa Sabbagh, Secretary-General of the

National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition

Forces, said the coalition was building the institutions that

would be needed in the immediate aftermath of the end of

President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It was conscious of the

need for regional stability and good relations.

Sabbagh called on Russia and Iran to cease their sup-

port for the ‘killing machine’ of the regime, and on Gulf

countries to provide humanitarian relief, especially to

address the huge challenge created by the displacement of

3 million people. Responding to a question from Dr John

Chipman, he expected the United States to recognise the

coalition as have some European and all GCC countries,

and said the Higher Military Council soon to be formed

would embrace most of the opposition forces now ranged

against the regime.

However, American reservations were plainly in view

in remarks from Mike Rogers, Chairman of the US House

Intelligence Committee. While noting that the ‘dangerous

days of desperation’ are starting to take hold, he expressed

concern about what might happen on the fall of Assad.

Citing the experience of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, he

feared that extremist elements of the opposition would

take advantage of a power vacuum and would get control

of both chemical and conventional weapons. He called for

transparency about the opposition.

Rogers also said the problem of loose weapons could

be quickly handled with American help and training, and

that there was a debate in Washington about the level of

intervention that the US should undertake in Syria. He per-

sonally opposed giving weapons to ‘elements that we don’t

understand just yet’, but noted that Washington had pro-

vided humanitarian aid. Russia, he noted, ‘was in a unique

place to be helpful, but has not been helpful’. Sabbagh

acknowledged that the opposition contained extremist

Special Opening Session: Global views on Syria


democratic reforms; after touching on difficulties in Egypt,

Libya, Morocco, and Jordan, he addressed the situation in

host-nation Bahrain. Burns emphasised Bahrain’s continued

importance to the United States as a strategic partner and

long-time friend, and he gave credit to the government

for having begun to implement the recommendations of

the independent commission of inquiry into the traumatic

events of 2011 in the country. But it was ‘crucial’, he added,

‘to move decisively down that path, without violence from

any quarter’. Third, he said that no reform processes in the

Middle East more generally could succeed without a sense

of economic possibility. Fourth, despite frustrations so far, a

two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict remained a

key US priority. While Burns insisted that the Palestinians’

successful bid for UN recognition as an observer state

was not going to help the situation, he also insisted that

continued Israeli settlement activity ‘continues to corrode’

prospects for peace.

Senator John McCain, who was highly critical of the

Obama administration, followed the Deputy Secretary.

‘The message I hear again and again’, McCain said of

his visits to the region, was that peoples and govern-

ments wanted greater US engagement and leadership.

‘Unfortunately, there is a visceral sense that they are not

getting as much support as they desire.’ In particular, he

argued, America’s failure to intervene earlier and more

effectively in Syria was leading to precisely the increase

in extremism, brutal regime violence, and now the threat-

ened use of chemical weapons that so many had feared.

Overall, said McCain, the ‘perception that the United States

is distracted can be very dangerous’, encouraging hard-

line elements. Referring to Obama, McCain concluded by

elements, but said they were ‘small and weak’.

Naci Koru, Turkey’s Deputy Foreign Minister, saw a

grave situation resulting from the regime’s repression,

with a particular effect on Turkey, which had received

135,000 refugees and was being armed with Patriot missiles

to guard against the risk of attack by missiles armed with

chemical warheads. However, Turkey still did not seek to

impose a no-fly zone over Syria.

China’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Wu Sike, said

he was concerned by the spillover of the conflict into neigh-

bouring Turkey, Israel and Lebanon. He urged support for

UN diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis, saying a mili-

tary solution would only bring greater disasters to Syria

and the region. He reiterated China’s position that only its

people should determine Syria’s destiny.

First Plenary Session: The US and the Region

The overarching theme of the first plenary session

concerned the effectiveness and staying power of American

engagement in the region. William Burns, US Deputy

Secretary of State, insisted that ‘for all the logical focus on

pivots’ of US strategic attention to the Asia-Pacific, America

could not and would not neglect ‘what is at stake in the

Middle East’. He added, however, that ‘America’s chief

foreign-policy challenge is domestic renewal’ and said that

there is a ‘natural…fatigue’ in the American body politic

after wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But he laid out what he

said would be four continuing US priorities in the Middle

East. The first priority was security, and the main problems

concerned ‘Iran’s refusal to meet its nuclear obligations’;

Washington was committed to increasing the pressure

‘until it does’. The second concerned political openness and

(l–r): William Burns, US Deputy Secretary of State; US Senator John McCain; and US Congressman Charles Ruppersberger


journalist and blogger for Foreign Policy, asked how the US

administration could continue to call for a political solution

in Syria now that it has officially recognised the opposition

council as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people.

In response to the questions, Burns said that events

were clearly shifting against the Syrian regime and that

the US remained committed to a negotiated transition,

but warned that the longer the bloodshed continued, the

greater the danger of extremism and spillover. To the

more general questions about US commitment, he said

there was no substitute for American leadership and that

the Middle East would remain at the centre of US focus.

But McCain remained critical: ‘Pivot is a word that should

never have been used.’ It was true, he said, that Asia-

Pacific required greater US involvement, ‘but to somehow

assume that we can pivot away from this part of the world

is the height of foolishness’.

Second Plenary Session: Priorities for Regional

Security

Three sets of priorities dominated the discussion in the

second session. Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, discussed external

security challenges facing the GCC states and Bahrain’s

efforts to overcome domestic challenges. Dr Khalid Bin

Mohammad Al Attiyah, Minister of State for Foreign

Affairs of Qatar, focused on the Syria question.

Sheikh Khalid described the methodical pace that has

enabled the GCC to grow resilient in the face of external

threats such as those posed by Iran’s nuclear and mis-

sile programmes and threats to the trade routes and

saying that ‘if the President does the right thing and leads,

and takes greater action to support friends and values in

Syria, he will have my support’.

The third speaker, Democratic Congressman Charles

Ruppersberger, insisted that the idea of a strategic pivot

towards Asia-Pacific did not mean ‘we are leaving the

Middle East’. He surveyed several aspects of that contin-

ued commitment: containment of an Iran that was ‘flexing

its muscles’; an Egyptian president who had construc-

tively conducted negotiations between Israel and Hamas,

but then moved to consolidate excessive power in Egypt;

and the potential threat of the Syrian regime using chemi-

cal weapons. Against that threat, he said that Russia could

have a positive diplomatic role.

During the questions and comments, several Arab del-

egates supported McCain’s contention that US engagement

appears to be wavering. Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla of the

United Arab Emirates suggested that constant US affirma-

tions that it was not leaving the region suggested, in fact,

that the opposite was true. Dr Ebtesam Al Ktebi, also of

the UAE, echoed that theme, questioning the US long-term

strategy in the region and asking why it has been unable

to alter Iranian behaviour. The Bahraini ambassador to

France warned of one political transformation to which

US leaders appeared blind: as a result of ballots in Tunisia

and Egypt, hardliners appeared to be taking over the Arab

Awakening, just as a hardline clerical regime had hijacked

the Iranian revolution in 1979. François Heisbourg,

Chairman of the IISS Council, suggested that a transforma-

tion in the US energy supply would logically diminish the

importance that the US attaches to the region. Josh Rogin, a

(l–r): Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain; and Dr Khalid Bin Mohammad Al Attiyah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Qatar


sovereignty of GCC states. Notions of security must also

encompass human security, he said, and address long-term

needs for food, water and energy that have the potential

to provoke a regional crisis. On human security, Bahrain

has recommended that the Arab League establish an Arab

Court of Human Rights.

Domestically, he said his government had initiated

a new stage of reform, and that ‘while implementation

may not be complete, we are resolute to see it through’.

Answering questions from the floor, he said issues of

capacity, such as in the judicial system, needed to be over-

come, but that Bahrain was ‘committed to implementing

fully all the recommendations’ of the Bahrain Independent

Commission of Inquiry (BICI), and that reconciliation will

require efforts from all players.

Dr Attiyah summarised Qatar’s efforts regarding the for-

mation of the Syrian Opposition Coalition and preparations

for the upcoming Friends of Syria conference in Marrakech.

He described two sorts of groups in Syria: ‘those who seek

total chaos and those who want controlled chaos.’ To him,

the latter meant continued gridlock, but Qatar did not seek

total chaos either. The key, he said, was for countries to

‘fly in formation’ toward the objective of democratic Syria,

because ‘if we fly solo we won’t get anywhere’.

In the ensuing debate, rather than imposing a no-fly

zone in Syria, he said, foreign countries should enable

opposition groups to impose a no-fly zone themselves.

When François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council,

suggested that this could risk anti-aircraft missiles ending

up being used by terrorist groups against civilian aircraft,

Dr Attiyah insisted that the supply of such weapons could

be properly supervised, but that such transfers would have

to be authorised by the UN. He parried the suggestion by

Professor Volker Perthes, Director of the German Institute

for International and Security Affairs, that Qatar was sup-

porting only the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. He firmly

opposed bracketing any rebel group as ‘terrorists’, saying

that this would create a ‘sleeping monster’ and forego the

means of changing their philosophy. With regard to chang-

ing Russia’s policy toward Syria, he said it was too early to

declare diplomatic failure, but he suggested that action be

considered through the UN General Assembly to break the

impasse in the UN Security Council.

Sheikh Khalid said the GCC would not be declared a

union until a special summit for this purpose to be held

at an unspecified date in Riyadh; parties were still work-

ing out the means of integration. Answering Azerbaijan

Ambassador-at-Large Yashar Aliyev’s question about the

GCC accepting observer states, Sheikh Khalid said the

current structure would not change. Rejecting the assess-

ment by Dr Seyyed Kazem Sajjadpour, from the School

of International Relations in the Iranian Foreign Ministry,

that the GCC countries had miscalculated in supporting

Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran, Sheikh Khalid,

said, at the time, there had been daily threats from Iran

about destabilising GCC states.

Third Plenary Session: Intervention and Mediation

Prince Abdulaziz Bin Abdullah Al Saud, Deputy Minister

of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, said that the Kingdom

was making strenuous efforts to support regional security

and stability. Referring to the Arab Spring, he said that

violence should cease and that changes in the region should

be organic. Turning to Bahrain, he said that the unity and

solidarity of GCC states made them stand together in

response to recent events. ‘The security and destiny of the

GCC states are one and may not be divided,’ he declared.

‘Collective security has become a reality’ and no state could

enjoy security and stability on its own. Riyadh supported

Manama’s efforts to promote dialogue and undertake

reforms meeting ‘citizens’ desires’, again without allowing

foreign interference in domestic affairs.

Turning to Syria, he deplored that this crisis had seen

many regional and international initiatives and meetings,

all so far unsuccessful due to a lack of international will.

Riyadh looked forward to the international community

‘providing the means to resolve [the situation] through

utilising all necessary measures, whether political, secu-

rity or humanitarian in support of the Syrian people and

their aspirations’.

Dr Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the

Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, out-

lined the lessons from Yemen’s crisis and from the GCC’s

role in accompanying its transition. Aware of the seri-

ousness of Yemen’s slide, the GCC adopted an inclusive

approach, engaging all parties to the dispute. This inter-

vention was based on the principle that there should be

a smooth transfer of power and no subsequent reprisals.

This Gulf Initiative helped Yemen avoid civil war thanks

to a sequencing of steps. The first phase ended with the

formation of a national government and military/security

committee. A second one is expected to result within two

years in a new parliament. The Gulf Initiative, he said, is a

successful model of mediation.


In contrast to Prince Abdulaziz’s reference to a lack

of international will over Syria, Al Zayani said that GCC

leaders played an important role in Yemen by assiduous

attention to the process. They had clear and specific objec-

tives, and were conscious of the need to be independent.

Lessons included the need for persistent mediation, and

the importance of trust in the mediator.

Dr Jon Alterman, Director of the Middle East Program

at CSIS, asked Prince Abdulaziz his opinion on the ques-

tion of arming Syrian opposition groups. Prince Abdulaziz

said that the outflow of weapons from Libya was a major

concern; Riyadh didn’t want this replicated in Syria.

Alterman also asked Al Zayani what the GCC had learned

from the struggle to uproot al-Qaeda elements in Yemen.

Dr Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research

Center, said, in a question to Al Zayani, that there was no

collective GCC–US agreement. Rather, security agreements

were bilateral between regional states and the US. Would it

be worth looking instead at a collective NATO–GCC agree-

ment? In response, Al Zayani said that the main lesson from

Yemen was rapid action: every time the international com-

munity was late in reaching agreements, it inadvertently

gave groups like al-Qaeda more space. It was essential to

expedite agreements as happened in Yemen. Responding

to Dr Sager, he noted the bilateral nature of regional states’

agreements with the US. In relation to NATO, he high-

lighted the participation of some states in the Istanbul

Cooperation Initiative. Here again, relations were bilateral.

Khalid Al Haribi, Director of Tawasul, asked whether

reports of the resurgence of old guard elements in Yemen

undermined the success of the Gulf Initiative. Al Zayani

answered that the national dialogue in Yemen would deal

with all remaining political issues. Amy Kellogg, Senior

Foreign Affairs Correspondent at Fox News, asked whether

Saudi Arabia was concerned by the apparent stalling of the

P5+1 negotiations on Iran, and Riyadh’s position on this.

Prince Abdulaziz stated that there should be a time frame

on the P5+1 talks; these had been going for some time,

with no results yet. Dr Abdullah El Kuwaiz, Chairman of

the Fund Manager of ICD Food and Agribusiness Fund,

asked what further efforts must be made to ensure stability

in Bahrain. Prince Abdulaziz said that Bahrain was on the

right path and urged all parties to cooperate with the gov-

ernment. The King and Crown Prince were, he said, ‘open

to an open and constructive dialogue’.

Fourth Plenary Session: The Influence of Sectarian

Politics in Regional Security

Dr Chipman began the session by noting that when politics

become sectarian, they risked becoming dysfunctional.

Moreover, because of the communications revolution,

domestic issues in one state could cross into another state.

William Hague, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs, began on an optimistic note: there

was nothing inevitable about sectarian strife, because dif-

ferent peoples could peacefully coexist and so too could

diverse states. The example of Europe over the past 200

years should offer encouragement. He proceeded to make

four observations. Firstly, that sectarianism was not a

driver of the Arab Spring – rather it was the desire for dig-

nity, opportunity and freedom that mobilised people from

different walks of life. Meeting these aspirations would be

(l–r): Prince Abdulaziz Bin Abdullah Al Saud, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia; and Dr Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf


difficult for societies in transition but it was incumbent on

all parties to be peaceful and inclusive, and foreign states

should respect the popular will. Secondly, sectarian poli-

tics should not be regarded as the defining security issue

in a region where national interests, nuclear proliferation

and the Palestinian issue also loomed large. It was vital,

he went on, that in the next year, negotiated progress was

made on Syria, the Iranian nuclear issue and a two-state

solution for Israel and Palestine – otherwise, 2013 could

prove to be a very dark year. Thirdly, all states shared an

interest in dampening sectarian tensions. Syria was the

most pressing case, as every passing week inflicted further

sectarian wounds on the Syrian body politic. Fourthly,

the only way to defuse sectarian tension was by peaceful

means. This implied a transition towards open societies,

with inclusive systems and equal rights, to ensure the

legitimacy of states and governments. The particular path

should be a national choice in all cases, rather than one

prescribed from outside.

Nasser Judeh, Foreign Minister of Jordan, observed that

the region was undergoing fundamental change – by evo-

lution in some states, and revolution in others. He noted

different interpretations of when sectarianism ignited as

a political issue – the 2003 intervention in Iraq, the 1980s

Iran–Iraq war or the 1970s civil war in Lebanon. While that

was contested, what was evident was that sectarian and

ethnic factors became more prominent in states undergo-

ing war or revolution, where security institutions have

collapsed and national identity has been weakened. This

was the principal fear across the region about Syria: that the

civil war, now of a political nature, could become sectarian

and so irrevocably damage the social fabric of the coun-

try. It was also important to tackle the Palestinian issue,

which he described as the root cause of regional instability.

Judeh went on to speak about progress in Jordan, which

he described as a Middle Eastern ‘melting pot’ society

featuring a parliamentary system within a constitutional

monarchy. He later added that Jordan’s rotation of gov-

ernments was a function of its constitution, but that legal

changes and institutional innovations promised to herald a

new era of more stable governments.

From the floor, Dr Barham Saleh, former Prime Minister

of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government, disagreed with

Judeh regarding the recent triggers of a rise in sectarian

identity. He argued that sectarianism has been a feature of

the region for centuries and that it has been strongly felt in

Iraq for decades prior to the 2003 invasion. He described the

role of religion in political life as the elephant in the room.

Faisal Abbas, editor-in-chief of Al Arabiya, asked whether

it was possible to develop western models of democracy

that featured debate, compromise and the rotation of power

in political systems that featured actors, such as the Party

of God, which asserted that religious imperatives trumped

national interests. Hague responded that the experience of

Europe showed that, over time, the influence of religion on

politics would decline. Staffan de Mistura, Deputy Foreign

Minister of Italy, asked whether al-Qaeda and other radical

groups were looking to infiltrate the groups who came to

power via the Arab Spring. Judeh responded that unsta-

ble situations provided fertile ground for militants, which

underlined the importance of establishing stability in coun-

tries that have undergone revolutionary change.

(l–r): William Hague, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; and Nasser Judeh, Foreign Minister of Jordan


Fifth Plenary Session: Middle East Security in a

Global Context

In his opening statement, Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister

of Australia, attempted to address the set of challenges

facing the Middle East. He questioned the significance of the

region within the wider global context, in terms of foreign-

policy and security-policy priorities. He emphasised the

importance of understanding ‘the interests and the values

of the others, and the priority that they attach to them,’

in order to ‘minimise conflict and manage competition’.

Rudd explained that given recent global developments

and challenges, the Middle East ‘looms as a significant, but

by no means the major, set of priorities that confront the

US administration right now’. Despite the shifts in power

balances amidst the rise of China, Rudd highlighted the

‘pivot’ of American leadership in the region in relation to the

Arab-Israeli conflict, the Syrian crisis and Iranian threats.

With regards to Palestinian statehood, Rudd asserted

that ‘it is paramount that US leadership comes to the fore

in bringing this peace process to a conclusion consistent

with the principles of the Arab peace plan of 2002’. On

Syria, Rudd warned of a ‘strategic vacuum’ that could

emerge in post-Assad Syria in the absence of a clear man-

date and operational plan. He reaffirmed the ‘continuing

significance of the region on the global map’, in spite of the

‘multiple conflicting and overriding priorities’.

Dr Barham Saleh stressed the enduring relevance of

the region to global security, even with ‘the prospects of

lessening dependency on Middle Eastern oil’. By looking

at the historical regional context today, Salih concluded

that the recent developments in the region have ‘unleashed

forces of history that have been dormant for much of the

twentieth century’. He asserted that the Arab states today

were actors and not simply ‘pawns’ caught in a ‘game of

strategic power-play’. In spite of the undeniable chal-

lenges pertaining to economic development, employment

and education, the region was no longer ‘contained’ in an

‘unshakeable control of authoritarian governments’.

He then questioned the significance placed on reli-

gion and its role in Middle Eastern society in relation to

legitimacy and governance. He contended that the import

of secularism to the Middle East has ‘failed’. The ‘internal

dynamic’ of the relationship between religion, power and

politics would undoubtedly have a significant impact on

inter-state relations. He then explored the lessons learnt

from the Iraqi experience and developments since the

demise of Saddam Hussein. In the face of sectarianism, he

placed great importance on the constitution, which must

‘reflect a genuine pact’ amongst citizens. He concluded

with a reality-check of the significance of the American

commitments to the region. He asserted that no matter

how powerful those commitments were, they would be

superfluous in tackling regional failures in governance.

Questions from the audience addressed a wide range of

issues from the role of religion and the question of identity

to the external role played by global powers in the region.

Dr Sanjaya Baru, Director for Geo-economics and Strategy

at IISS–Middle East, highlighted successful examples of

creating democratic processes in non-Arab countries with a

significant number of Muslims, such as Indonesia and India.

Nabil Fahmy, Dean of the School of Public Affairs at the

American University in Cairo, proposed that the dysfunc-

tional dynamic between religion and politics in the Middle

East was a symptom of the Arab world’s ‘search for identity’.

(l–r): Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia; and Dr Barham Saleh, former Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government, Iraq


On the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Geoffrey

Tantum, Director of Gulf Consultancy Services, criticised

American diplomacy as well as Israel’s settlement build-

ing. Dr Dana Allin, IISS Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy

and Transatlantic Affairs, questioned the effectiveness of

diplomacy as well and asked whether other alternatives

should be explored. In response to these questions, Rudd

stressed the role of diplomacy in dealing with Israel and

pointed out the recent Australian abstention in the UN General

Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood as an example.

Plenary Session

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION I: Counter-terrorism

The challenges of counter-terrorism (CT) were addressed from a multitude of angles in the first breakout session. The issue has been at the forefront of policymakers’ minds for at least the past decade. It defined the for-eign and security policies of the presidency of George W. Bush and has transformed global approaches to security.

With the death of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May 2011, however, some of the key principles and assumptions of counter-terrorism were being reexamined. Al-Qaeda as a unified global network had faded in importance even before the US Spe-cial Forces’ raid on bin Laden’s hide-out. But a loosely linked, fragmented, and leaderless web of groups have emerged and/or been re-inforced throughout the world, particularly in South and Central Asia, the Sahel, and the Gulf region. Participants grappled with the implications of this shift, and what it meant for international cooperation on counter-ter-rorism and our understanding of terrorism

more broadly as a global, rather than purely local or regional, phenomenon.

Participants noted that the Arab Spring has, in certain countries, and particularly in Yemen, allowed these groups to find fertile ground to pursue their destructive agendas. The crisis in Yemen has created instability to the point where al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been able to take control of some parts of the country and declare sharia law. Over 8,000 Yemen army and security forces have died confronting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen needed the international community’s assistance to counter the threat.

There was consensus among partici-pants that terrorism required a comprehen-sive approach, both within countries and globally. In the aftermath of the Mumbai at-tacks, for example, the Indian government overhauled its counter-terrorism toolkit by establishing more robust counter-terrorism response troop units, boosting inter-agency

communication, and now giving due con-sideration to the creation of a National Counter Terrorism Centre.

While domestic responses could now benefit from widely accepted international best practices on the technical aspects of CT, international and particularly international-legal mechanisms remained the subject of dispute. On one hand, international organ-isations (IOs) that were founded to con-front different challenges, such as NATO, were now innovating to take on the terror-ist threat and CT partnerships – bilateral, as well as between states and IOs and among IOs – were flourishing. On the other hand, legal mechanisms have not kept pace with developments on the ground. Disparities in legal approaches to dealing with terror-ists – particularly human-rights concerns and divergences on the need for an interna-tional treaty framework for CT – have often become a barrier to full intelligence-sharing and cooperation.

(l–r): Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS; Maj.-Gen. Ali Al Ahmadi, President of the National Security Bureau, Yemen; Latha Reddy, Deputy National Security Adviser, India; and Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Secretary-General, NATO


SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION III: Syria and regional security

Discussions in this group focused on when and how the regime in Damascus might fall; the strengths and weaknesses of the military and political opposition fighting to remove it; divisions within the international com-munity about Syria; and finally, what a post-regime Syria may look like.

The majority of the debate focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the new opposi-tion alliance, the National Coalition for Syr-ian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, led by Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib. It was recognised that divisions within the National Council and between it and groups fighting within Syria still existed. However, those who cel-ebrated the formation of the National Co-alition argued it was the only way forward at this late stage in the conflict. If it was not backed with resources and diplomatic recog-

nition, the violence in Syria may reach a point of no return and political chaos would ensue. The appointment of al-Khatib as its leader was seen as a positive step forward as he was a moderate centrist politician with strong credentials. Another source of the National Council’s legitimacy was the fact that some of its leaders had only been out of Syria for a matter of months. It was also seen as repre-senting Syria’s religious diversity.

It was expected that the upcoming Friends of Syria meeting in Marrakech would see the formation of a government in exile. The next step would be for it to be rec-ognised as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, especially by the US. It could then rapidly gain capacity to take over the running of governance in liberated areas and avoid the complete collapse of the state

when the Assad regime fell.However, a number of opposition weak-

nesses were noted. Firstly, their senior military leadership had little training. Their campaign to take Aleppo lacked a political-military strategy, which led to mistakes and civilian dissatisfaction.

Discussion then turned to the destabilis-ing effect the Syrian conflict was having on Lebanon where 140,000 Syrians had sought refuge. So far, Lebanon had proved remark-ably resilient in its handling of the Syrian cri-sis, with the majority of political groupings adopting a policy of ‘disassociation’ from the conflict. However, the arrival in Lebanon of much larger numbers of refugees, driven out by an increase in fighting around Damascus, could result in much greater tensions. To date, the assassination on 19 October of Gen-

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION II: Strategic Reassurance and Deterrence

The fundamental and often testing concerns of strategic reassurance and deterrence in the Middle East were explored in this wide-ranging and challenging special session.

Security issues remained of paramount importance as the region and partner na-tions continued to absorb the ramifications of the Arab Spring, struggle with the im-mediate challenge of Syria, manage Iran’s nuclear challenge, and face the impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian front.

The strategic environment was further complicated by discomfort within states in the region that looked to the US as a guar-antor of security as Washington’s focus moved to the Asia-Pacific region, and as its energy reliance on the region waned then so would its commitment. ‘There is a clear concern… Part of deterrence is political

will,’ said one participant. It was a worry Washington was aware of, and US partici-pants in the discussion stressed the coun-try’s continuing commitment to ensuring regional security and stability.

The provision of reassurance and deter-rence was made all the more challenging by the geopolitical flux that continued to af-fect the region – a point alluded to by sev-eral contributors, as was the more fungible way in which countries were identified as ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’.

Deterrence for the region presently was all too practical a notion rather than theo-retical, as illustrated by the threat posed by the cornered Syrian regime’s chemi-cal weapons arsenal. The potential conse-quences of a failure of deterrence with Syr-ia, and options for a response, were also a

recurrent theme, with the implications of preemptive and immediate retaliatory re-sponses by the US and its allies prompt-ing comment. While a pre-emptive strike would be ‘legally difficult’, politicians would be faced with a ‘moral policy deci-sion as to which is the lesser evil,’ noted one participant.

Beyond the pressing issue of Syrian chemical weapons use, concerns remained deep over Iran’s nuclear programme and the profound worries of other states in the region that this was intended to provide Tehran with a nuclear weapons capability. There was also a plea, however, to attempt to understand strategic perceptions from Iran’s perspective. Washington’s problem with Iran, said one US contributor, was with the regime, not with its people.

(l–r): Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-proliferation and Disarmament, IISS; Admiral Édouard Guillaud, Chief of the Defence Staff, France; General James Mattis, Commander, US Central Command; and Muammer Türker, Secretary-General, National Security Council, Turkey


SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION IV: Security in the Strait of Hormuz

The importance of the Strait of Hormuz was widely appreciated in the fourth breakout session. More than 35% of all seaborne oil and 20% of all oil traded globally transits through the strait. It was therefore of strategic importance for countries beyond the region, as demonstrated by the 33 nations that par-ticipated in the multinational mine counter-measures exercises held in September and the 27 different nations that currently operate under the Combined Maritime Forces.

It was not just oil that made the Gulf stra-tegically important: the US presence began in earnest in 1948, when the US was an oil exporter and largely energy self-sufficient. Therefore, a return to self-sufficiency in com-ing decades alone may not lead to a US with-drawal from the region.

Nonetheless, the strait was one of six strategic chokepoints and there were vari-ous ways in which it could be affected by a belligerent country: through greater in-spections of vessels; harassment of civilian vessels; covert attacks, replicating the M Star terrorist attack of 2010; or mine-laying. Mine-laying may not be restricted to the strait; during the Tanker War of the 1980s, more than 1,000 mines were laid in the Gulf, but none were in the strait itself.

Yet, it was unclear that Iran would under-take such actions, as it relied as heavily on the strait for economic stability as any other coun-try. Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hor-muz, as occurred in early 2012, were therefore a similar strategy to nuclear deterrence: the damage wrought to both the global and Ira-

nian economies would be equally severe.Beyond the strait, counter-piracy opera-

tions were another area of naval cooperation. In late 2011, there were more than 700 hos-tages and 70 ships held off the coast of Soma-lia; by late 2012, these figures had dropped to 137 hostages and five vessels. This was owing to a variety of reasons: multilateral naval operations, Best Management Prac-tices employed aboard ships, and indepen-dent naval escorts (India, for example, has escorted more than 2,200 vessels, of which only 280 were Indian-flagged). Although there was disagreement over the morality of using private-security companies, it was also true that they have been very effective, with no vessel embarking private-security companies having been pirated.

(l–r): Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, IISS; Maj.-Gen. Faris Al Mazrouei, Assistant Foreign Minister for Security and Military Affairs, UAE; Sir Derek Plumbly, Under Secretary-General and Special Coordinator for Lebanon, United Nations; Eric Chevallier, Ambassador of France to Syria; and Sergei Vershinin, Special Representative on the Middle East Settlement, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia

eral Wissam al-Hassan, the head of police intelligence, had given rise to a new peak in political tension.

It was clear from the meeting that the UN Security Council remained deeply di-vided on the issue of Syria. There was some suggestion that China’s policy had recently begun to change but Russia remained reso-lute in its opposition to external interference

in the conflict. Russia called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis – a political transition through dialogue with Syrians themselves working towards a negotiated settlement. Only this political solution, it was argued, could avoid more deaths on the ground.

Finally, the discussion turned to Syria’s post-Assad shape. There was disagreement about how long the current regime had left

in power, with several voices arguing that 2013 would see its removal. It became evi-dent that substantial work had already been undertaken to create an international trust fund to pay for post-conflict reconstruction. Once regime change had taken place, it was thought that there would be a major role for the United Nations, which should start de-tailed planning for this now.

(l–r): Michael Elleman, Senior Fellow for Gulf Security Cooperation, IISS; Vice Admiral John Miller, Commander, US Naval Forces, Central Command; Vice Admiral Marin Gillier, Joint Commander, French Forces in the Indian Ocean and the UAE; and Vice Admiral Pradeep Chatterjee, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy


2013 9TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT, 6–8 DECEMBERSee videos and transcripts online

http://www.iiss.org/en/events/manama%20dialogue/archive/manama-dialogue-2013-4e92


A fast-changing regional environment in the Middle East

was the focus of the 9th Manama Dialogue, successfully

held in Bahrain on 6–8 December 2013. The Regional

Security Summit once again brought together senior

government, diplomatic and military officials as well as

parliamentarians, senior analysts and journalists from the

Middle East, North America, Europe and Asia to discuss

the regional and domestic threats and opportunities

affecting Middle Eastern stability.

This year’s regional landscape proved particularly chal-

lenging, defined primarily by the escalating civil war in

Syria, the troubled transition in Egypt, the interim nuclear

deal between Iran and the great powers, uncertain attempts

at integrating Gulf foreign and defence policies and ques-

tions about the intentions and role of the United States in

regional security. Together with the bumpy transitions in

North Africa and Yemen, these crises suggested a possible

regional re-ordering whose nature and shape remained,

however, very much unclear.

In particular, the possibility and contours of a detente

with Iran received much scrutiny. The recognition that

newly elected President Hassan Rouhani desired better

regional and international relations, best reflected in the

interim nuclear deal reached in November 2013, was bal-

anced by structural and political suspicions. Even as the

prospect of a war over Iran’s nuclear programme receded,

there was scepticism that Iran’s regional behaviour

(especially in Syria) and commitment to Islamist ideol-

ogy would change. There was also pervasive doubt over

whether Rouhani actually had the influence to deliver on

his promises. The Gulf states wondered how to respond

to Iranian outreach and to American interest in a rap-

prochement with Iran. Several Gulf ministers present

at the Manama Dialogue, who had recently met senior

Iranian officials, pledged to take a constructive approach

to solving bilateral disputes.

The magnitude and complexity of the Syrian crisis also

dominated the discussion. The military advances of the

Assad regime, the fragmentation of the opposition, the

rise of jihadi groups and the absence of any appetite for

foreign intervention considerably changed the equation

from where it stood in late 2012. The regional competition


William Hague, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UK


over Syria remained intense, with the direct involvement

of Iranian forces and Shia militias from Lebanon and Iraq

balanced by Gulf financial and material support for the

opposition. Although the Geneva II conference was sched-

uled for early 2014, the feeling was that the prospects for a

quick political settlement remained dim. In the meantime,

the humanitarian catastrophe and the related burden on

Syria’s neighbours demanded urgent action, yet the inter-

national response continued to pale.

The role of the US generated interrogations and scepti-

cism which senior US officials sought to address. Tensions

between the US and several Gulf states over Egypt,

Syria and Iran were evident. The US backtracking on its

announcement that it would punish Assad militarily for his

use of chemical weapons came under intense criticism, but

was countered by US insistence that the removal of chemi-

cal weapons from the Syrian battlefield was a net security

gain. The US was also criticised for how it conducted its

diplomacy with Iran and for not involving its Gulf allies, to

which US officials responded that future diplomacy look-

ing at regional arrangements would associate them more

closely. Underlying all this was a concern that the US was

decreasing its regional involvement to the benefit of Iran.

Whether Washington desired such an outcome was hotly

debated among Arab participants.

To counter such suspicions, senior US officials were

keen to reiterate Washington’s commitment to Gulf secu-

rity: they stressed the strength of the various military

relationships and the presence of 35,000 US troops in the

region, and insisted that the United States’ other global and

fiscal priorities did not undermine its posture in the Gulf.

The US pledged to support the defence capabilities of its

Arab allies, and in particular offer greater cooperation on

air and missile defence.

Divisions between the Gulf states on crucial matters

complicated regional politics. Qatar, still supportive of the

ousted Muslim Brotherhood, remained at odds over Egypt

with most other Gulf states, who extended support for the

military and the civilian government. While all Gulf states

agreed on the objective of removing Bashar al-Assad from

power, each country adopted a different strategy and culti-

vated different interlocutors in the Syrian opposition.

To cope with regional threats, Saudi Arabia promoted

greater Gulf unity, especially in the security and foreign-

policy realms, supported in this regard by Bahrain. Other

states, notably Oman and Qatar, viewed such a move with

deep scepticism, primarily out of concern for how it would

affect sovereignty.

Opening Televised Panel

The Manama Dialogue was preceded by an opening

televised panel hosted by Sky News Arabia entitled ‘The

Future of the Middle East: Conflict and Change’. Moderated

by Fadila Souissi, the panel included Hoshyar Zebari,

Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Prince Turki Al Faisal, Chairman

of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic

Studies, Senator Tim Kaine, Chairman of the US Senate

Subcommittee on Near Eastern, Central and South Asian

Affairs and Sheikh Dr Muhammad Al Sabah Al Salem Al

Sabah, Kuwait’s former Deputy Prime Minister and former

Opening Televised Panel (l–r): Hoshyar Zebari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq; Sheikh Dr Muhammad Al Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, former Deputy Prime Minister; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kuwait; Senator Tim Kaine, Chairman, Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, US Senate; Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Chairman of the Board, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia; Fadila Souissi, Presenter, Sky News Arabia


Minister of Foreign Affairs. The discussion focused on the

implications of the interim nuclear agreement between the

P5+1 and Iran, and the future of Syria.

Al Faisal welcomed the recently signed interim deal,

but emphasised that any resolution to rid the region of

the nuclear threat should be both permanent and include

other states in the area in possession of these weapons. For

his part, Kaine described the agreement as an important

confidence-building step between all the involved actors

ahead of a final settlement. While remaining cautious,

Kaine explained that the deal was a net security gain for

the region as it provides early warning should Iran move

towards developing nuclear weapons.

Discussing the Syrian conflict, Zebari described how it

undermined Iraq’s security and stability. He stressed Iraq’s

support for a peaceful resolution of the war and argued that

no military options are currently available. With regards

to the upcoming Geneva II conference, Al Faisal stated

that neither the Syrian regime nor, to an extent, Russia

should be involved in this process. Al Sabah reminded the

audience that the US has intervened in Bosnia and more

recently Libya for humanitarian reasons and therefore,

he questioned the United States’ rationale for staying out

of Syria, especially as the country is becoming a breeding

ground for radical jihadi groups.

Following the panel discussion, Baria Alamuddin,

Foreign Editor at Al-Hayat newspaper, asked Al Faisal

whether the Gulf states lack media and strategic commu-

nication instruments to respond to Iranian propaganda. Al

Faisal saw no need to create additional Arab media outlets,

saying existing ones provided adequate responses to Iran’s

inflammatory channels. Asked by Alamuddin whether

Iraq could play a mediating role between Iran and the

GCC, Zebari emphasised that the Gulf states already have

strong lines of communication between them and Iran, and

that Iraq is always open to playing a bridging role between

the GCC states and Tehran.

Opening Dinner and Keynote Address

Held under the patronage and in the presence of the Crown

Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister of Bahrain, Prince

Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the opening dinner featured

a keynote address by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague.

Hague called for making 2014 a year of bringing

a two-state solution to the Middle East peace process

within reach, turning the corner on the Syria conflict,

and negotiating a comprehensive settlement with Iran

on its nuclear programme. On the peace process, Hague

said the EU and Arab nations must be ready to play their

part in providing incentives needed to reach a settlement.

If negotiations falter as Israeli settlements continue to

expand and Palestinian divisions remain, then the possi-

bility of a two-state solution could be gone forever. On

Syria, the agreements to eradicate chemical weapons and

to set a date for the Geneva II conference have opened

up a sliver of light to the extraordinarily difficult task of

ending the conflict. Otherwise a humanitarian crisis of

potentially unmanageable proportions beckons, which

could see a fifth of the country gain refugee status. Noting

that the UK has donated £500 million in humanitarian aid,

he called on other countries to play their full part in the

donor conference in Kuwait in January.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, Hague said the UK recog-

nised and welcomed the Iranian government’s change in

Opening Dinner


Alamuddin, Foreign Editor of Al-Hayat newspaper, asked

how Hague proposed to effect the ‘change of soul and

mind’ that would be required to bring Iran around on the

other issues in the area. Hague replied that changing Iran’s

soul was not an objective at the outset, but that outsiders

can argue with the Iranian mind. Just as Iranian negotiators

themselves contend that it would not be in Iran’s interest to

develop nuclear weapons, so should it be possible to argue

that it is in Iran’s interests to pursue different policies on

other subjects of concern.

Picking up on the Syria issue, Jamal Khashoggi, General

Manager and Editor-in-Chief of Al Arab News Channel,

asked if the UK parliamentary vote against intervention

set a precedent that would prohibit British engagement

if an emergency erupted elsewhere in the Middle East.

Hague said it would be a mistake to derive wider conclu-

sions about British foreign policy from one debate and one

argument. The UK would continue to be an active player

in the world and ready to stand by allies. The need to con-

sult Parliament does not constrain Britain’s ability to act in

an emergency or in defence of allies or to fulfil treaty obli-

gations as soon as possible. In the 2011 intervention with

France to save Benghazi, the parliamentary vote was taken

afterwards, for example.

Finally, in response to Yousef Mashal, Chairman of the

Mashal Group, who asked if military action might follow

next summer if the three goals spelt out for 2014 are not

achieved, Hague quipped that he was not about to declare

war just before dinner. While acknowledging the difficul-

ties, we must have a positive attitude, he said, noting that

‘sometimes it is amazing what diplomacy and pressure

together can do.’

tone and substance. Noting the sincerity of Iranian Foreign

Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in reaching a diplomatic

agreement, he said the power of diplomacy must now be

tested to the full. It is vital that the interim nuclear deal’s

monitoring and implementation be strictly upheld on all

sides and that remaining sanctions are enforced so that

Iran has every incentive to reach a comprehensive agree-

ment. Hague assured delegates that the interim agreement

with Iran does not imply any diminution in the UK’s com-

mitment to alliances in the region, to the security of sea

lanes or to the struggle against terrorism. ‘Engagement on

the nuclear question should not mean a free pass for Iran

on other issues in the region,’ he said.

Iran was the focus of most of the questions put to Hague.

In response to IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Dr John Chipman, Hague said, in the short term, much

could go wrong with the implementation of the huge num-

ber of detailed steps that need to be taken. For the medium

term, a comprehensive and final agreement would have

to cover all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, includ-

ing enrichment activities defined for practical and peaceful

purposes. He emphasised that the Geneva agreement is ‘a

transaction on the nuclear deal, not a relationship at this

stage’. Whether, in the long term, it can turn into a relation-

ship, depends on changes in policy by Iran on a range of

issues that deeply trouble the UK and other countries.

Answering a question by Odeh Aburdene, Senior

Adviser at Capital Trust Group, as to whether Saudi

Arabia and the GCC could be included in negotiations,

Hague said efforts had been made to ensure that Gulf part-

ners were kept well informed and consulted, but that it is

important to find new mechanisms of consultation. Baria

(l–r): William Hague, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UK; and Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS


surveillance and reconnaissance assets to provide a continu-

ous picture of activities in and around the Gulf’ and ‘our

most advanced fighter aircraft, including F-22s’. He claimed

that, ‘no target is beyond our reach.’

Hagel acknowledged that the US Department of

Defense will face a serious budget problem, but Gulf

commitments would have priority, the US would still

‘represent nearly 40%’ of global defence spending, and its

military would ‘remain the most powerful in the world’.

The United States, he intoned, is ‘not retreating from any

part of the world’.

He also emphasised efforts to build up the capabilities of

Arab states in the Gulf and elsewhere. Since 2007, he noted,

the Department of Defense has approved over US$75 billion

in arms sales to GCC states, ‘worth nearly as much as those

made totally in the previous 15 years’. This included a recent

US$11bn package that included F-15s, F-16s and advanced

munitions constituting ‘the most advanced capabilities that

we have ever provided to this region’.

To strengthen GCC cooperation, the Defense Secretary

announced three new initiatives. Firstly, he proposed add-

ing missile defence cooperation to the regular air and air

defence chiefs’ conference between the US and GCC coun-

tries. Secondly, he suggested coordinating US defence sales

through the organisation of the GCC. Thirdly, he invited

GCC states to ‘participate in an annual US–GCC Defence

Ministerial’ meeting for the purposes of ‘coordinating our

defence policies and enhancing our military cooperation’.

The first such meeting, he suggested, should take place

within the next six months.

To conclude, Hagel reminded his audience that he was

speaking on the anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl

First Plenary Session: Global Security Priorities for

the US

Responding to the main concern of the audience, US Defense

Secretary Chuck Hagel opened with an insistent statement

of reassurance to the United States’ Gulf Arab partners that

any rapprochement with Iran would not come at the expense

of their security. He was ‘under no illusion’ about Iran, and

acknowledged the ‘daily threats facing this region’ and

the ‘anxieties’ linked to diplomacy with Iran. In describing

the interim deal reached with Iran, Hagel maintained that

‘we have bought time for meaningful negotiation, not for

deception.’ Moreover, even if further nuclear negotiations

produce success, ‘I know that Iran’s nuclear programme is

only one dimension of the threats Iran poses in the region.

I’m briefed virtually every day about these threats.’

He added, however, that ‘no strategy is risk-free’ and

that diplomacy requires ‘courage’ and ‘vision’. Diplomatic

success would depend on ‘America’s military power’ as

well as the credibility of ‘assurances to our allies and part-

ners in the Middle East that we will use it’. He expressed an

‘absolute’ commitment to core American interests, includ-

ing ‘defending against external aggression; ensuring the

free flow of energy and commerce; dismantling terrorist

networks that threaten America or its allies; and stopping

the spread of weapons of mass destruction’.

In arguing for US ability to defend those interests, Hagel

catalogued the United States’ formidable assets in the Gulf.

These included ‘a ground, air and naval presence of more

than 35,000 military personnel’, some ‘10,000 forward-

deployed soldiers in the region, along with heavy armour,

artillery, and attack helicopters’, an ‘array of missile defence

capabilities’, the United States’ ‘most advanced intelligence,

Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, US


Harbour, which brought the US not only into the Second

World War, but also ‘ushered in a new era of American

leadership and responsibility in world affairs’. He quoted

Franklin D. Roosevelt who insisted, after three years of

global war, that it would be ‘our own tragic loss if we

were to shirk ... responsibility’. ‘Today,’ Hagel promised,

‘as America emerges from a long period of war, it will not

shirk its responsibilities.’

In the ensuing Q&A, François Heisbourg, Chairman of

the IISS Council, wondered about the long-term US pres-

ence in the Gulf, given the rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific,

as well as the possibility that negotiations with Iran might

resolve some of the most acute security challenges. In

response, Hagel reiterated that the US would not retreat,

but also that it would not try to ‘dictate to the world’ – and

that capacity building of partners was a way to square

that circle. Raghida Dergham, Founder and Executive

Chairman, Beirut Institute; columnist for Al-Hayat, asked

what kind of security arrangement might emerge between

the United States and Iran, and alleged that the US turned

‘a blind eye to Iran’s military role in Syria’. Seyed Hossein

Mousavian, a former Iranian official and now Visiting

Research Scholar at Princeton University, asked how the

Secretary justified unrelenting pressure against Iran while

ignoring Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Hagel responded, with-

out specifically mentioning Israel, that it is Iran that has

‘been in violation of many United Nations resolutions’.

Second Plenary Session: Evolving Regional Security

Architecture, Conflicts and Outside Powers

The second plenary session saw a lively discussion on the

future role and nature of the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) as the region faced up to dealing with multiple

threats. An activist plan for reform was set out by Dr

Nizar Bin Obaid Madani, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State

for Foreign Affairs. He called for a union between GCC

members, urging them to ‘loosen their grip on traditional

concepts of sovereignty’. There was an urgent need to

safeguard the gains that Gulf countries had made in spite

of the risks and threats that they faced. As dangers grew,

the GCC should not stand and watch, Madani said; rather

it should itself be an engine in Gulf affairs, instead of being

weak and divided. Gulf security would be better guaranteed

if they took greater responsibility for it through closer

integration. GCC countries, he argued, had a joint destiny

and faced similar challenges, but also had differences, both

in political directions and strategic vision. The marked

increase in threats provided an impetus towards reform of

the GCC based on a new consensus and common vision, so

that mutual security could be better guaranteed. Instead of

blaming external powers, Gulf countries needed to face the

reality that the region itself was a source of threats. While

Saudi Arabia had always been open to resolving disputes

with Iran, and was hopeful that this could be done, any

agreement must be based on mutual respect and on non-

interference in each other’s internal affairs.

Dr Abdullatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, Secretary-General

of the GCC, reminded the audience of the successes that

the GCC had achieved, especially in conflict resolution. For

example, it helped Yemen to avoid a civil war and create

a peaceful transfer of power. It adopted a principled posi-

tion towards the Assad regime as the conflict developed

in Syria, and donor conferences for humanitarian aid had

been organised in Kuwait. Gulf countries had helped each

other, for example in liberating Kuwait after the Iraqi inva-

sion, in the United Arab Emirates’ island dispute with Iran,

and in the activation of common defence arrangements to

assist Bahrain in 2011. Such cooperation had allowed GCC

members to ‘cross to the shore of safety and prosperity’.

Nabil Fahmy, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs,

reflected on the nature of the threats and conflicts that

the region was dealing with. In the past, these had been

largely ‘strategic’ and involved outside powers – for exam-

ple, the Cold War. More recently, conflicts had increasingly

become ‘sub-regional’ and some took a sectarian flavour

in which non-state actors participated. While this was

occurring, regional countries had been reconsidering the

role of outside powers who had a presence in the region.

They did not want to admit that these powers were part of

their security system, but they also did not want them to

leave. Now, they needed to confront new realities: change

would happen and outside powers’ desire to play a role in

the region would diminish. Regional countries would need

to be more self-reliant and solutions to problems would

need to be more regional. Outside powers would not pro-

vide security, Fahmy said – a statement in stark contrast

with the assurances provided by Hagel in the previous

session. However, Fahmy said this change would happen

gradually and that there needed to be a strategic dialogue

involving outsiders and Arabs so that no security vacuum

would develop.

From the audience came a vigorous riposte to the Saudi

vision of closer GCC unity. Yousef Bin Alawi Al-Ibrahim,

the minister responsible for Oman’s foreign affairs, rejected


the Saudi proposal of a GCC union. If the other five mem-

bers agreed to unite, he said, Oman would not be part of

this arrangement. The GCC had failed to develop a unified

economic system and its members still needed to provide

a secure economic future for its populations, of whom 60%

were young people. It should not take on a military iden-

tity and it should keep away from regional conflicts.

Questions focused on Iran’s negotiations with for-

eign powers on its nuclear programme, with a specific

mention of the absence of a role for GCC countries in the

talks. Delegates from both sides of the Gulf sought to

look beyond any eventual nuclear agreement and asked

whether Iran could be involved in the region’s future secu-

rity architecture.Al Zayani commented that trust needed to

be built, both among GCC members and with Iran. Given

Tehran’s new desire for engagement, the first opportunity

to build such trust was to deal with the UAE island dispute.

Madani said Saudi Arabia was seeking a GCC role in nego-

tiations with Iran, and it was premature to judge where the

current six-month accord between Iran and the P5+1 would

lead. He reiterated his call to cement GCC unity. Fahmy

noted that concern about interference in domestic affairs

was common in the Middle East, and asked Iran to make a

commitment to stop doing so.

Third Plenary: Syria and the Regional Impact

Opening the third session, Qatar’s Foreign Minister,

Khalid Bin Mohammed Al Attiyah, deplored the inability

of the international community to address the deepening

humanitarian crisis in Syria and called on it to reach an

agreement that would ease the plight of Syria’s people

ahead of winter. He argued that the diplomatic push that

has yielded recent agreements on Syrian chemical weapons

and Iran’s nuclear programme should now be directed to

other aspects of the Syrian conflict, and stated that Qatar was

eager to participate in this endeavour. The minister argued

that Qatar and other Gulf states stood firm in the defence of

Syria’s people, including through military aid to opposition

groups because of the failure of the world community to

protect Syrians. If international action is not possible, then

Arab League or GCC action should be contemplated.

Senator Tim Kaine, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign

Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and

Central Asian Affairs, shed light on the reasoning behind

the deep reservations in the US Congress about the use of

force to punish Assad for his use of chemical weapons. He

detailed four questions that his congressional colleagues

wrestled with; these might inform future decisions over the

use of force too. Firstly, would US military action make a

positive difference? There were doubts as to whether the

military tool was the most appropriate one in this instance.

Secondly, would US military action be appreciated and

valued within the region? The failure to reach a Status of

Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, and the dif-

ficulty on agreeing terms with the Afghan president, has

given the US cause to consider the value placed on its mili-

tary footprint in the broader region. Thirdly, would the

US have partners in military action? In the case of Syria, it

seemed to have very few. Finally, what might the ultimate

consequence of military action be? Within Congress, there

are considerable reservations over the plausible alterna-

tives to Assad, and the role of extremists in a post-Assad

(l–r): Dr Abdullatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, Secretary-General, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf; Dr Nizar Bin Obaid Madani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia; and Nabil Fahmy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt


government that US military action could help bring to

power. If these criteria were applied to future crises, they

would not necessarily rule out the use of force by the US.

However, they underlined that in the current political cir-

cumstances it might be more difficult to obtain a political

consensus for military action.

Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, noted the

failure of regional and international diplomacy to settle

the conflict and outlined the negative impact of this on

Iraq. Echoing the comments of his Qatari counterpart, he

bemoaned the fact that it took the chemical-weapons issue

to get the UN Security Council operating in a unified direc-

tion. He was not convinced that the chemical-weapons

agreement would lead to a political solution to the Syrian

conflict. The minister focused on the rising security threats

to Iraq that emanated from Syria. He said that terrorist

groups had mushroomed, so that today there were thou-

sands of terrorists, including 25,000 in the al-Nusra Front.

Some Syrian and Iraqi extremist groups have united. He

evoked the disturbing possibility that Iraq could become

another ungoverned space, as Afghanistan had been.

Zebari recalled that he had warned the Syrian government

in 2005, which he regarded as being complicit in facili-

tating the entry of terrorists into Iraq, that such a course

invited blowback on Syria. Touching on relations between

Baghdad and Damascus, he denied that the Iraqi gov-

ernment was helping to arm the Syrian government as a

matter of policy; indeed, Iraq would respect the will of the

Syrian people if they ousted Assad from power. The min-

ister attributed the failure to interdict supplies as partly a

consequence of Iraq’s weak airpower.

Responding to a question by Heisbourg, about arms

supplies to insurgent groups, Al Attiyah argued that there

were no terrorist groups operating in Syria when Qatar

began to dispense military aid. He suggested that the scale

of the problem had been exaggerated by Syrian govern-

ment propaganda.

Prompted by a question from Dr Toby Dodge,

Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the IISS,

Zebari conceded that the rise in violence in Iraq in recent

years was also a result of shortcomings in Iraq’s inter-

nal security arrangements and policies. Questions and

comments were also made regarding the democratic aspi-

rations of the Syrian opposition, the risks of the Syrian

conflict being much more destabilising regionally than

Iraq’s civil war, and in particular the threat of sectarianism

spreading across the region – which could be viewed as

having a destructive potential comparable to Syria’s chemi-

cal weapons.

Fourth Plenary Session: Middle East Stability:

Intervention, Mediation and Security Cooperation

The fourth plenary session involved the participation of

extra-regional foreign ministers. Børge Brende, Minister of

Foreign Affairs of Norway, outlined his view of regional

stability and his country’s role in it. He insisted that

regional stability was primarily a responsibility for regional

countries, but that despite this, the effects of insecurity in

the Middle East are not limited to the region, and that any

approach to improve stability must be comprehensive.

This latter point was a defining aspect of Norway’s

view of the underlying causes of conflict, which lie in

(l–r): Khalid Bin Mohammed Al Attiyah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qatar; Senator Tim Kaine, Chairman, Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, US Senate; and Hoshyar Zebari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq


political-economic structures, particularly the lack of inclu-

sivity in economic growth. In this realm, the region faces

significant challenges: 40 million jobs need to be created

by 2020, while more than 50% of the region’s popula-

tion is under the age of 20. There is therefore a significant

challenge for countries in the region to foster sufficient eco-

nomic growth, and yet make it inclusive enough to ensure

stability. To aid stability, Norway has demonstrated its

willingness to commit military assets, through the deploy-

ment of a frigate to counter-piracy operations in the Indian

Ocean. However, non-military interventions include sup-

port for an alternative livelihood programme in Somalia

and mediation in negotiations in the Israel–Palestine

conflict.

While Brende attempted to portray Norway as a secu-

rity exporter, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs

of Yemen, was candid in his view of his country as a secu-

rity importer, noting that the country currently lacked the

capabilities to ensure stability overall. Yemen, he noted, is a

potential cornerstone of regional stability, given its position

astride a major sea line of communication, its control over

the chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandeb and its occupation of

a large area of the southern Arabian Peninsula. However,

it is also key to regional insecurity, given the presence of

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Syrian refugees in

Yemen. The primary concern for Yemen, though, is lack of

resources. Some 18m Yemenis are in need of humanitar-

ian assistance. Al-Qirbi outlined Yemen’s assistance needs,

from direct intelligence, security and military support,

through equipment and training, to non-military forms of

humanitarian assistance.

John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, struck

a cautious note on regional stability. While the recent nuclear

agreement with Iran was a positive outcome, Canada

remained ‘deeply sceptical’ of Tehran’s long-term ambition

to de-nuclearise. Baird implored Iran to undertake more

comprehensive steps, such as adopting Additional Protocol

safeguards, in order to build confidence in its intentions.

Similarly, while Canada supported the decision to destroy

chemical weapons in Syria, Baird noted that Assad should

be held accountable for the attacks that have occurred thus

far. While a political settlement is the top priority, Assad’s

legitimacy should not be enhanced by the chemical-weap-

ons deal. In terms of Canadian support for the region, Baird

noted Ottawa’s support for the GCC as an organisation to

enhance regional stability and for its recent decision to label

Hizbullah a terrorist organisation. Canada has contributed

CAD100m to assist Syrian refugees in Jordan, comparing the

influx in terms of ratio of population to the entirety of the

Canadian population crossing the border to the US.

Questions from the floor focused on Iran and Syria.

Sultan Mohammed Al-Nuaimi, Researcher at the UAE

Ministry of Defence, noted the differences in perception of

the Iranian nuclear agreement among GCC states, the US

and Iran, suggesting this was a fundamental weakness.

In response to a question about whether Norway could

destroy the Syrian chemical weapons, Brende answered

that Norway was unable to do so for capacity and climatic

reasons by the expected deadline of 1 January, but it had

pledged US$15m in support of UNSCR 2118.

Asked whether Norway and Canada would be happy to

take in Syrian refugees, Baird pointed out that Canada already

(l–r): Børge Brende, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway; Dr Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yemen; and John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada


accepts the largest number of Syrian refugees, but this was

not a long-term solution, while Brende stated that Norway

had increased the number of Syrian refugees it accepts and

was the sixth-largest humanitarian donor to Syria, pointing

out, however, major problems in aid distribution.

Seyyed Kazem Sajjadpour, Director of Policy Planning

at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, highlighted

Baird’s failure to mention Israel’s nuclear-weapons arse-

nal even while criticising Iran’s nuclear programme. Baird

answered that he did not desire a regional arms race and

wanted allies to feel secure.

Aykan Erdemir, Member of Parliament, Turkey, asked

Brende what concrete policies could be undertaken to

ensure the inclusive approach to politics outlined by the

Norwegian minister. Brende answered that the first step

was actually any economic growth, which has been lacking

in many countries for several years. Recent trade agree-

ments helped, but more was needed to ensure wealth

trickles down to individuals.

Alamuddin and Amy Kellogg from Fox News asked

how Yemen intended to counter terrorism. Al-Qirbi noted

that the GCC had adopted the Gulf Initiative for Yemen,

which had now gathered wide support, despite initial divi-

sions. In terms of counter-terrorism, the minister suggested

that any approach should be comprehensive.

Fifth Plenary Session: International Interests in

Middle East Security and Non-Proliferation

In his opening speech, Salman Khurshid, Minister of

External Affairs of India, outlined the strong relationship

between his country and the GCC states. He referred to

the Gulf region as ‘India’s extended neighbourhood’, and

as ‘an important artery for the flow of goods and ideas

and movement of people’. In addition to trade, energy

and investment, Khurshid emphasised the potential for

increasing cooperation in counter-terrorism, fighting

money laundering and anti-piracy measures.

Discussing the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Khurshid

reaffirmed that his country’s position favours ‘democratic

pluralism and religious moderation’, but warned against

radical groups hijacking genuine political demands. He

paid special attention to the unfolding of events in Syria,

expressing his country’s condemnation of violence by all

sides. He pointed to the brokered deal to rid Syria of its

chemical weapons as confirmation that ‘global, non-dis-

criminatory regimes on non-proliferation matter’.

Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Chairman

of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies,

suggested transforming the Middle East into a zone free

of weapons of mass destruction. However, the success of

this zone hinges upon the five permanent members of the

United Nations Security Council providing two necessary

guarantees. Firstly, these five states must guarantee the

protection of the regional states from any threats that they

may face, including those of a nuclear nature. Secondly, the

permanent members of the UN Security Council should

guarantee that they will seek to punish economically, polit-

ically, as well as militarily, any state in this zone that may

attempt to develop nuclear weapons.

Al Faisal described the interim nuclear agreement

between the P5+1 and Iran as ‘an important achievement’.

However, he emphasised the need to ensure that Iran will

(l–r): Salman Khurshid, Minister for External Affairs, India; Prince Turki Al Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Chairman of the Board, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia; Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Associate Research Scholar, Princeton University; former Head, Foreign Relations Committee, Supreme National Security Council, Iran; and Dr Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University


not break the agreement and that it will eventually lead to

guaranteeing the ‘permanence of non-proliferation’. At the

same time, Al Faisal questioned the sincerity of Iran’s new

diplomatic approach to the region. He asserted that Iranian

statements hold little value if not implemented. Arab states

are prepared to cooperate with their neighbour, according

to Al Faisal, but it is time for Iran to stop interfering in their

domestic affairs.

At the beginning of his remarks, Seyed Hossein

Mousavian, Associate Research Scholar at Princeton

University, declared that the US cannot remain engaged in

the region at the same level indefinitely. He pointed to four

key guidelines to guarantee regional security and stability.

Firstly, no single country can dominate the Middle East.

Secondly, the current hostilities between Iran and GCC

member states should not continue. Thirdly, he cautioned

against looking at regional developments as a zero-sum

game. Finally, he argued that the region is in need of

paradigm reordering, making sure that all states’ security

concerns are recognised.

Mousavian stressed that the interim nuclear agreement

carries with it the opportunity to stabilise the region as a

whole. He urged regional states to support the Iran–US rap-

prochement and called for the easing of tensions between

Iran and Saudi Arabia. He also pushed for the creation of

a regional security-cooperation system that incorporates

GCC states, Iran and Iraq.

According to Dr Gary Samore, Executive Director for

Research at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, much of

the discussion on the interim agreement was ‘vastly exag-

gerated’, highlighting that it is simply a ‘six month truce’.

Washington is not going to accept anything less than oblit-

erating Iran’s physical ability to produce weapons-grade

material quickly, while President Rouhani had already

stated that his country will not dismantle any of its existing

nuclear facilities.

Even though President Obama used some of his ‘bar-

gaining chips’ to secure this interim agreement, this does

not necessarily mean that Tehran will accept the final terms

of a nuclear agreement. However, in Samore’s opinion,

neither side would like to see the collapse of negotiations.

Therefore the current interim agreement may only lead to

another interim agreement.

Questions from the audience addressed a wide range

of issues from the role of the US in the Middle East follow-

ing its deal with Iran, to the future of regional bodies such

as the GCC. Dr Ali Ansari, Professor of Modern History at

the University of St Andrews, asked whether the United

States’ role is crucial to any regional security framework

and whether Iran could accept a continued US presence in

the Gulf. In response to his question, Mousavian stated that

the US should support a regional cooperation system, but

that it should not have a permanent presence in the Middle

East. Asked by Dergham about Oman’s recent threat to

withdraw from the GCC should it turn into a union, he

affirmed Oman’s right to express its views on the Gulf

union initiative. However, he described the union as inevi-

table, with or without Oman’s participation.

Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain at the Opening Reception


SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION I: Regional Implications of the Syrian War

Speakers in this session debated the military, humanitarian and diplomatic aspects of the Syrian crisis. In particular, they examined the prospects and modalities of the upcom-ing Geneva talks meant to devise a political solution to the Syrian crisis. Diplomacy, it was agreed, needed to be pursued in order to test the Assad regime but many feared that it could legitimise it and play in its favour.

Some made the case that there was no military solution to the Syrian war because of its practical challenges. In response, it was argued that a military solution exists, but it is the appetite for intervention that is lim-ited. Some said that there will be no political solution in Syria without changing the mili-tary balance through strikes and serious ma-terial support to the opposition. In essence, changing military dynamics will place the opposition in a strong negotiating position

at the Geneva II talks, and compel Assad to negotiate in good faith. If such a shift in power materialises, the opposition might be able to extract significant terms from the Syrian regime.

The unfolding of the Syrian crisis changed local perceptions of regional and global actors. The Syrian crisis has eroded Russia’s image in the Arab world, and Mos-cow now has to prove its ability to deliver on a transition. That said, its steadfast sup-port of Assad has also enhanced its cred-ibility as an ally, as its cunning diplomacy contrasted positively with American inde-cision. Russia, it was argued, supported the principle of a negotiated transition and would endorse any arrangement accept-able to all Syrian parties.

It was also agreed that changing global conditions could compel Iran to reduce its

role in Syria. The question of whether, and how, to include Iran in the Geneva talks could prove key to this possibility.

Some speakers warned that the legacy of the intervention in Iraq tainted the policy-making debate on Syria. Uncertainty over potential post-intervention dynamics and power dispensation was considerable, es-pecially with the rise of jihadi groups. At the same time, the longer the conflict, the more unstable the region, the more sectar-ian the conflict and the greater the humani-tarian catastrophe.

Amid this climate, the audience agreed that Geneva II provides an opportunity for all concerned parties to engage construc-tively. The international community could capitalise on recent diplomatic successes to craft a long-term strategy to stabilise Syria.

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION II: The Dangers of Sectarianism and Extremism in Politics

This session began with a candid survey of the problems faced by states in the Middle East when it came to divisive political iden-tity. Sub-state sectarian identities flourished when states failed to deliver government services in an efficient and equitable man-ner. Education was also central to counter-ing the growth of radical politics. An educa-tion system that focused on a unitary nation-al identity and piety, instead of extremism, would help.

Beyond the failures of states, the second cause of the increased sectarian identities was the negative influence of other states. It was argued that there was a clear difference between a political identity based on divisive

sectarianism – encouraged by outside actors and inefficient government – and a unitary national identity anchored in strong and co-herent government institutions.

The comparative example of Southeast Asia was then discussed, examining the suc-cess of recent negotiations to end sub-state conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines. In these cases, both the state and insurgent groups set aside years of mistrust to reach compromise and end violent conflict. The Singapore case study was then examined in detail. Singapore suffered from race riots in the 1950s, but had then set in place a series of policies designed to avoid the dominance of communal politics. A unitary national iden-

tity was developed not only to combat the di-visive effects of sub-state communal politics, but also to mobilise all groups to unite behind a project of economic development. The re-sult was a multiculturalism based on a num-ber of government policies that banned polit-ical parties that sought to represent only one ethnic group. Government housing policies also sought to deliberately create communi-ties that mixed Singapore’s different religious and ethnic groups.

Finally, attempts at countering radical Islamism in Afghanistan were discussed. It was argued that education, a vibrant media and an empowered civil society had all been essential in reducing the influence of the

(l–r) Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Regional Security, IISS–Middle East; Alistair Burt, Member of Parliament, Former Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK; Ambassador Faris Mohammed Ahmed Al Mazrouei, Assistant Foreign Minister for Security and Military Affairs, UAE; Lapo Pistelli, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Italy; Sergey Vershinin, Director, Middle East and North Africa Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia; and Wu Sike, Special Envoy to the Middle East, China


Taliban after their removal from power. Key to its continuing success would be the reform of the security forces and the bolstering of the rule of law.

The Afghan case also served to highlight the dangers of fomenting radicalism as a tool

of foreign policy; this was bound to cause harm to those who sought to encourage it in other states as ‘snakes cannot be trained only to bite other people’. To counter this strategy, the Afghan government had engaged in an active policy of regional alliance building.

The discussion concluded by focusing on the link between democratisation and the rise of identity politics and how best to move political mobilisation away from a fo-cus on religion, towards a focus on govern-ment efficiency.

(l–r): Dr Toby Dodge, Senior Consulting Fellow for the Middle East, IISS; and Sheikh Thamer Ali Al Sabah, President, National Security Bureau, Kuwait; Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman, Minister of State for Defence, Singapore; and Zalmay Rassoul, Presidential Candidate and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan

(l–r): Steven Simon, Executive Director, IISS–US; Corresponding Director, IISS–Middle East; General Lloyd James Austin III, Commander, US Central Command; General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK; and Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Secretary-General, NATO

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION III: The Shifting Regional Balance and Outside Powers

Iran was at the heart of discussions in this session – specifically, how Tehran’s chang-ing relationship with Washington and with neighbouring states could reshape the re-gion. Discussions were framed by the ques-tion of whether the region actually showed a tilt in the balance of power, and whether or not perceptions of reduced US commitment were justified.

The possibility of recasting relations be-tween Washington and Tehran is facilitated by the interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear pro-gramme, which is intended to address wide-spread concern that Iran’s goals for the project are military, rather than civil. Iran may also be emboldened by its intervention in Syria’s civil war, an action that could yet prove decisive.

In parallel to the proposition of an ascendant Iran, was the notion of fray-

ing ties between Washington and its traditional regional allies. US allies in the Gulf had been unsettled by the United States’ ‘rebalance’ to Asia, by suspicion over the motivation for a deal with Iran and by concerns that the pending withdrawal from Afghanistan presages a wider disengage-ment.

Such perceptions and concerns were ac-knowledged, but it was argued by several participants that they were inaccurate, and that Washington would continue to main-tain a robust military posture in the region. This reflected the United States’ ‘deep and enduring security interests’ in the Middle East.

However, even if the interim agreement paved the way to a lasting nuclear deal, there remain other areas of concern over Iran’s con-

ventional military capabilities. In particular, efforts to build up a more capable missile-defence architecture in the Gulf could be viewed as a security guarantor, in the event that the nuclear deal falters.

Broader capacity building within the Gulf states remains a goal for the US and its allies. NATO also has a growing interest in supporting capability developments in the region, as some Gulf states begin to partici-pate – on an ad hoc and small-scale basis – in military roles, as part of alliance operations such as in Afghanistan and Libya. This ca-pacity will be confined to limited areas only for some time, however, before the region can become a ‘net exporter’ of security.

There emerged a consensus view that any shift in the regional balance was still only po-tential, rather than actual.


SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSION IV: Changing Energy Markets and Middle East Security

This session focused on changes in the inter-national energy landscape, and what they mean for Middle East exporters, as well as energy dynamics in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries themselves. There was more agreement on the latter.

The rapid growth of energy consumption in GCC states is now widely perceived as one of the main strategic threats to the economic security of the region. GCC countries have, until recently, fuelled exponential growth in electricity generation with natural gas. Now, all except Qatar experience severe natural-gas shortages. Kuwait and the UAE import growing volumes of liquefied natural gas, and Saudi Arabia has to burn ever-larger vol-umes of crude oil in power plants to gener-ate heavily subsidised – and therefore largely wasted – electricity. Panellists agreed that this is a serious problem that countries in the

region have to address – through politically difficult measures to reduce subsidies, as well as investment in renewable energy and nuclear-energy generation.

Speakers’ interpretations of global en-ergy market developments and their im-plications for the Gulf were more diverse. On the supply side, the new sources of oil production in North America, especially ‘tight oil’, are perceived by some as a short-term phenomenon bound to recede later in this decade or early in the next, while oth-ers see it as a structural competitive threat to Gulf producers. The growth in Iraqi oil-production capacity is potentially a threat to OPEC’s ability to manage the price of oil, but some are confident that OPEC mem-bers will find a compromise to accommo-date Iraqi oil. The potential ramping-up of Iranian exports, if and when sanctions are

removed, means that other cartel members would have to cut back.

On the demand side, although there is wide agreement that improving efficiency, fuel-switching and technological innovation are moving energy systems towards a new era, it is unclear to what extent this threatens Gulf energy producers, and when these ef-fects would begin to be felt strongly.

Two other important developments were highlighted in the session. Firstly, that en-ergy markets are rapidly shifting eastwards. Asian economies – starting with China – are now the main energy-trading partners of Gulf producers, as Atlantic markets recede in importance. Secondly, Gulf producers are in-volved in infrastructure investment projects (pipeline systems and export terminals) that will reduce their reliance on the Strait of Hor-muz as an export outlet.

(l–r): Dr Sanjaya Baru, Director for Geo-Economics and Strategy, IISS–Middle East; Sheikh Mohammed Bin Khalifa Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Chief Executive, The Oil and Gas Holding Company, Bahrain; Nizar Al-Adsani, Chief Executive Officer, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation; and Dr Mohammed Al Sabban, Former Senior Economic Advisor to the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Saudi Arabia

2004

2007

2010

2005

2008

2012

2006

2009

2013

10 YEARS OF THE IISS MANAMA DIALOGUE

Countries Represented:

AFGHANISTAN

AUSTRALIA

AZERBAIJAN

BAHRAIN

BRAZIL

CANADA

CHINA

EGYPT

ESTONIA

FRANCE

GERMANY

INDIA

IRAN

IRAQ

ITALY

JAPAN

JORDAN

KUWAIT

MOROCCO

NORWAY

OMAN

PAKISTAN

QATAR

RUSSIA

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

SAUDI ARABIA

SINGAPORE

SWEDEN

SYRIA

TURKEY

UAE

UK

US

YEMEN

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2008-e791

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2013-4c33

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-gulf-dialogue-2005-dffe

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2009-f651

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2006-2ded

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2010-c6a3

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/the-manama-dialogue-2007-aac7

http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2/manama-dialogue-report-book-2012-3f62

This publication is also available as an e-book at www.iiss.org.

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A Decade of The IISS Manama Dialogue

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