FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY CONSIDERS SIGNING A FREE AGENT:

An Analysis of Options

AN ACTION REPORT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES & PUBLIC POLICY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

REUBIN O’ D. ASKEW SCHOOL

OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY

By

JOSHUA RAYMOND LECAPPELAIN

(440) 969-5465

Jrl13f@my.fsu.edu

August 1, 2015

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

ABSTRACT

The Tampa Bay Rays desire a new baseball stadium. The team, which plays in Pinellas County, has expressed an interest in moving across the region to a new ballpark in Hillsborough County. Funding for this ballpark would hypothetically come from new and existing revenue streams, but it is difficult to figure out a clear path towards financing the stadium. This study looks at the history of the Rays in Tampa Bay, as well as funding of new stadiums in baseball’s recent history. Economists and academia nearly unanimously agree that funding stadiums is a bad business decision for any governing body, with most projects ultimately losing money over the course of the stadium’s lifespan. Information from baseball websites and the U.S. Census provides much of the data used. Consideration of three options for Hillsborough County – building in downtown Tampa, building elsewhere in the county, and declining to build a new stadium – using the evaluative criterions of cost to taxpayers, growth potential, and political support, leads to a recommendation of Hillsborough County passing on construction.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Problem Statement 3

Background 5

Literature Review 11

Methodology 15

Policy Options 17

Summary Table 30

Appendix A – Stadium Cost 31

Appendix B – Public Percentage of Cost 32

Appendix C – Rising Cost of Stadiums 33

Appendix D – Attendance Before and After the New Stadium 34

Appendix E – Winning Percentage Before and After the New Stadium 35

Appendix F – Winning Effect on New Ballpark Attendance 36

Bibliography 37

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PROBLEM STATEMENT

The long-term future of Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Tampa Bay Rays in the Tampa

Bay area is tenuous at best. The team wants a new stadium built to replace the aging Tropicana

Field in St. Petersburg. The believed preference of MLB and Rays’ ownership involves

relocating the team across Tampa Bay to a new home in downtown Tampa. While most privately

owned businesses move at their own discretion and do what is best for their bottom-line, the vast

majority of professional sports teams and their parent organizations expect and demand local

taxpayers, through their cities, counties, and states, to finance their majestic new sports

cathedrals. The Rays are no exception to this norm. Elected officials in Tampa and Hillsborough

County seem interested in pursuing the team and building them a new state-of-the-art ballpark,

but it is unclear if that is the best option for the citizens of Hillsborough County heading forward

and their future interest, as building a stadium would tie up many of their revenue streams.

Taxpayers largely pay for the financing of new stadiums. Florida’s other MLB team, the

Miami Marlins, opened a new stadium in 2012. Marlins Park cost more than $634 million to

build, with more than 80 percent of the funding coming from the city of Miami and Miami-Dade

County (Martin, Albergotti, & Futterman, 2011). This number does not include cost overruns,

which routinely occur when building new stadiums. It also does not include necessary

infrastructure improvements to the local area to accommodate the new ballpark and the increased

number of people in the area. These financial oversights and the burdens they bring, as well as

other expenses that inevitably pop up when building new stadia, fall on the same surrounding

cities and counties that finance the projects, not the team owners. These oversights, as well as

bad financing decisions, will ultimately cost taxpayers upwards of $2 billion (Elfrink, 2011).

Although estimates supplied by the Rays come near what Marlins Park cost (Nohlgren, 2015), it

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is likely a new Rays stadium would be more than $600 million when considering factors beyond

just ballpark construction.

Some cities are still paying the price for building new stadiums decades after their

completion. Elected officials in Hamilton County, Ohio, voted in 1996 to increase the local sales

tax by a half-penny to help fund new stadiums for the National Football League’s Cincinnati

Bengals and MLB’s Cincinnati Reds. The expectation was that growth would continue to

increase at around 3 percent per year. In reality, this overly generous estimate led to a shortfall in

operating budgets and cuts in the local education system and other public infrastructure to close

the gap (Belson, 2009). Cleveland prioritized funding three new stadia during the 1990s while its

school system lost hundreds of millions of dollars and led to Cleveland school superintendent

Richard A. Boyd stating, “(our schools) are in the worst financial shape of any school district in

this country” (Cagan & deMause, 2008). The creation of two new stadiums in Baltimore’s Inner

Harbor area in the same decade led to the loss of one thousand manufacturing jobs where the

stadiums once stood (Cagan & deMause, 2008), and to this day costs taxpayers in the area $11

million annually (Hamilton & Kahn, n.d.). Similar stories are commonplace in cities that have

funded new stadia. The stress of these shortfalls resonates unfairly throughout the community, as

citizens with lower income and less upward mobility deal with making due with less, while

financing stadiums they cannot afford to go to for teams they may not care about in the first

place (Cagan & deMause, 2008).

Hillsborough County should consider the pros and cons of building the Rays a new

stadium before recklessly entering into a deal that jeopardizes the area’s long-term growth

potential. While the Rays would prefer a downtown stadium, it may be beneficial to

Hillsborough County to approve construction elsewhere in the county instead. Passing on

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financing a new stadium for the Rays is a possibility as well. It is important that Hillsborough

County elected officials understand what they are getting their citizens into and realize the

impact of their decision will resonate in the county for generations.

BACKGROUND

In an effort to entice any MLB franchise away from its current home, St. Petersburg

financed the building of the Florida Suncoast Dome for $115 million, with the entire cost footed

by Pinellas County taxpayers. The domed stadium, completed in 1990, quickly became a favorite

of MLB owners, who threatened to pack up and move unless they had their stadium demands

met. The Chicago White Sox, Seattle Mariners, and San Francisco Giants each appeared headed

to the Tampa Bay at one time or another, but eventually found ways to get new stadiums built in

their cities. As the city tired of playing a bridesmaid, hope emerged in 1990 when MLB

announced it would be expanding to two new markets. While Tampa Bay was a finalist to land a

team, Denver and Miami ended up victorious, with the latter especially stinging due to its close

proximity. This reflected what then-MLB Commissioner Peter Ueberroth said in 1986 when,

discussing St. Petersburg’s plan to build a domed stadium, he stated, “In our evaluation of

potential cities for relocation or expansion, St. Petersburg is not among the top candidates. You

must recognize that (this decision) to undertake construction of a facility capable of housing

Major League Baseball will be made by your community without any encouragement

whatsoever on the part of Major League Baseball” (Bennett, 2012).

MLB’s feelings about Tampa Bay changed drastically over the next five years, as it

awarded St. Petersburg and Phoenix expansion teams in the next round. The stadium was no

longer vacant, however, as the National Hockey League’s Tampa Bay Lightning had begun

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playing their games in the renamed Thunderdome. An additional $85 million, 79 percent funded

by taxpayers (Ballparks of Baseball, n.d.), would be required to renovate the stadium back to its

original baseball configuration in time for the new baseball team’s arrival.

On March 31, 1998, in the now-named Tropicana Field, Tampa Bay (Devil) Rays’

pitcher Wilson Alvarez threw the first pitch in team history. From that historic moment, the

Rays’ home was already outdated and inferior to new baseball stadiums popping up around the

country on an almost annual basis. Beginning with the opening of the Baltimore Orioles’ Orioles

Park at Camden Yards in 1992, the architectural design of new fields had reverted to a “retro”

look, capturing the feel of long-gone fields such as Brooklyn’s Ebbets Field, Cincinnati’s

Crosley Field, Pittsburgh’s Forbes Field, and Philadelphia’s Shibe Park, to name a few. Wider

seats, open areas, an abundance of food vendors, and picturesque views of city scenes had

become commonplace. Instead of being greeted by this new norm, Rays fans instead get to watch

“its baseball team (play) in a giant warehouse,” in a location that should instead “be hosting

millions of Fed-Ex packages” (Seher, 2012).

Almost immediately upon their birth into the baseball world, the Rays have sought a new

stadium to call home. The focus has largely centered on other locations in St. Petersburg and

Pinellas County, but rumors linked the team’s and MLB’s preference to be across Tampa Bay

and into a waterfront ballpark in downtown Tampa (Berthiaume, 2011). Repeatedly St.

Petersburg elected officials refused to even consider allowing the team to break their lease early

(it ends in 2027) to leave the area (Belson, 2012), most recently earlier this year (Nolhgren,

2015).

Such a move would greatly increase the number of fans located within 30 minutes of the

baseball team. Arguments suggest this is one of the most crucial factors in attendance numbers,

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especially for weeknight games compared to weekend games. The Rays saw a 51.7 percent

increase in attendance on the weekends during the 2014 season, jumping to 21,692 fans per game

on the weekend versus 14,297 Monday-Thursday (Lortz, 2015). It is difficult for Hillsborough

County residents to travel to St. Petersburg during rush hour during the working week, which

hypothetically causes fans to skip going to games and instead enjoy them at home. Currently the

Rays have the lowest number of fans in MLB within 30 minutes of the stadium, with only

670,000 meeting that criterion. In comparison, the next lowest market is Pittsburgh, with 1.18

million fans within 30 minutes. If the team moved to Tampa, the number would increase to 1.24

million, which would put the Rays above Pittsburgh and Milwaukee, but still below every other

MLB city (Brown, 2011).

Elected officials in Tampa and Hillsborough County appear ready to open their

checkbooks and sign the Rays away from St. Petersburg and Pinellas County if the opportunity

becomes available. Tampa Mayor Bob Buckhorn admitted in 2013 that he wants the build the

team a new downtown stadium (Henderson, 2013). Buckhorn has called a downtown ballpark

“within reach,” and stated, “it’s either going to be Tampa or someplace else, not St. Petersburg,”

that is the Rays next home (Calcaterra, 2013). Different sites are under consideration, with a few

emerging as front-runners (Nohlgren, Danielson, & Thalji, 2014). If Pinellas County relents and

allows the Rays to look at options outside of the county, the Rays and Hillsborough County will

likely become fast friends.

The cost of a new Rays’ ballpark, regardless if located in Pinellas County or

Hillsborough County, will likely surpass $600 million. All of the last four stadiums built (minus

the New York Yankees’ new Yankee Stadium – an extreme outlier at nearly $1.5 billion) neared

or exceeded this figure. This is a huge increase from what Orioles Park at Camden Yards, Jacobs

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Field, and the Ballpark at Arlington cost when they kicked off the ballpark boom era, even when

adjusted for inflation (See Appendix for bar charts on rising stadium costs). This also does not

include the development of the area around the ballpark, removing existing properties from the

selected location, or infrastructure improvements, such as adding or improving freeway exits,

that accompany stadium development. When the Miami Marlins were negotiating for their new

stadium, it was a necessity to have a retractable roof, given the unbearable summer humidity in

Florida. The Rays have played under a closed roof during their entire existence in St. Petersburg,

so the cost of a roof – be it fixed or retractable – should be factored into the estimate.

If the Rays were willing to purchase the stadium and the land themselves, there would be

no issue to consider. However, the funding of baseball stadiums has drastically changed in the

last 50 years. Previously team owners funded ballparks either entirely on their own or with

minimal government assistance. In the 1960s baseball teams began to relocate at a higher degree

than previously, with municipal areas offering huge incentives to “steal” teams away from their

established homes (Cagan & deMause, 2008), a trend continuing to this day. Since 1992,

taxpayers funded more than 70 percent of new ballparks. This figure does not include ballparks

for both New York City teams (the Yankees paid a large percentage as they wanted an overly

elaborate home, while the Mets built at the same time and could not secure a much better deal

than the Yankees), the San Francisco Giants (who lost referendums four times to have taxpayers

build a new stadium and decided to do it themselves), the Atlanta Braves (their stadium, built in

1996 for the Summer Olympics, was entirely funded by the Atlanta Olympic Committee, but is

being replaced already by the team after less than 20 seasons), and the St. Louis Cardinals (who

built in the footprint of their old stadium, so they could turn the old location into an

entertainment district they own).

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Orioles P

ark at C

amden Yards

Jacobs F

ield (Progressi

ve Field)

Ballpark

in Arlington (G

lobe Life Park

in Arlington)

Coors Field

Bank One Ballp

ark (Chase

Field)

Safeco Field

Comerica Park

Enron Field (Minute M

aid Park)

PNC Park

Miller P

ark

Great Americ

an Ballpark

Citizens B

ank Park

Petco Park

Nationals Park

Target Field

Marlins P

ark0%

10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

Stadium Financing Since 1992

Public Financing Private Financing

Cities and counties often own the ballparks, charging minimal rent to owners to play in

the stadiums and, often times, even giving the owners large percentages of the income from other

events held in the ballpark when the team does not have any home games. Owners also receive

the monies paid by corporations to brand the new stadiums, with those fees considered part to the

owner’s share of the construction costs (Cagan & deMause, 2008). It seems likely that the Rays’

will follow this trend, provided they remain in the Tampa Bay area.

As more teams talk taxpayers into building them new homes, the newness of the new

ballpark phenomenon has worn off. Whereas once a new ballpark all but guaranteed a large

attendance increase, now some teams are actually seeing attendance figures dip below what they

drew in the old ballpark after the end of the honeymoon period. A comparison of new ballpark

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attendance figures and a team’s winning percentage found a strong correlation between larger

attendance and winning. (See appendix for scatterplot on winning percentage and attendance).

The price tag on a new ballpark will likely exceed $600 million. The Greater Tampa

Chamber of Commerce and the St. Petersburg Area Chamber of Commerce co-authored a

stadium finance summary in 2012 to investigate how funding a new stadium for the Rays (in

either of their respective counties) could work. The commission found some advantages to St.

Petersburg’s path to funding a new stadium, but came up with five ways that Hillsborough

County and Tampa could generate revenue to fund a stadium. These revenues included

community redevelopment area funds, pro sports facilities, community investment tax, auto

rental surcharge, and tourist development tax (The Baseball Stadium Financing Caucus, 2012).

The road to a new stadium appears much easier to navigate in Pinellas County, but that does not

mean Hillsborough County is without hope (Pransky, 2014). However, Mayor Buckhorn admits

that he does not know how to make the funding work, claiming that it will take a “creative” deal

to bring the Rays across Tampa Bay (Gurbal Kritzer, 2014).

The team seems committed to making it work somewhere in the region, but the rhetorical

games about the team’s future are well underway at this point. “Major League Baseball at this

point no longer believes in the Tampa Bay area,” stated Rays' owner Stu Sternberg in January

2013 (Keri, 2013). Sternberg went on to add that he still has faith in the region and is committed

to it, but he has to do what is best for the team. What is best for the team apparently includes

highly publicized flirting with the city of Montreal, which lost its MLB team in 2005 when the

Montreal Expos moved to Washington, D.C., and became the Washington Nationals. The New

York Daily Times reported in late 2014 that Sternberg had held high-profile talks with associates

about the possibility of crossing the Canadian border (Madden, 2014). MLB Commissioner Rob

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Manfred publically stated a return to Quebec could happen, adding, “Montreal’s a great city. I

think with the right set of circumstances and the right facility, it is possible” (Nicholson-Smith,

2015). Montreal Mayor Denis Coderre met with Manfred in May 2015 about the possibility of a

team returning to the city, stating, “I want Montreal to gain back a team eventually…I clearly

wanted to show that it’s not just about gaining back a team — it’s about how can we get baseball

back to Montreal?” (Macramalla, 2015). While Coderre did not directly mention the Rays, it

appears clear that the team is on Montreal’s radar.

The Rays’ rumblings about their “need” for a new ballpark are growing louder and

louder. The team slashed payroll, bottoming out among the lowest 10 percent of teams in the

league in 2015 (Spotrac, n.d.). The team traded away star pitcher David Price last July, citing its

“challenging” financial situation as the reason for moving him (ESPN Wire Services, 2014). The

belt tightening of the Rays’ payroll will continue, according to Sternberg (Gaines, 2014). Fans

are going to lose, until the team gets what it wants. Even then, they might still be losing.

LITERATURE REVIEW

New stadiums do not stimulate economic growth (Delaney & Eckstein, Public dollars,

private stadiums: The battle over building sports stadiums, 2003). Economists are nearly

unanimous in agreeing that the economic benefits of stadium development are overrated and

often nonexistent. Robert Baade, one of the most prominent researchers on actual benefits of

stadium development, reviewed 48 cities over a 30-year span and found that a “professional

sports team generally have no significant impact on a metropolitan economy” (Baade, 1994). He

concluded that public funding of sports stadiums is not a “sound civic economic investment,”

and oftentimes had a negative effect on the community. Economist Dennis Zimmerman agrees

with Baade’s assessment, stressing in a report to Congress that stadium development results in

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high opportunity cost for citizens (Zimmerman, 1996). He used a study of the economic impact

of 30 cities following stadium projects as evidence, finding no evidence in 27 of the cities. The

remaining three cities had negative impacts. The lone voices claiming that stadiums do create

positive economic impacts are those funded by the teams desiring new stadiums and are often

posted directly to the team’s websites (Conventions, Sports, and Leisure, 2009) (Cushman &

Wakefield, 2014).

Another area of consensus by economists and academia studying stadium development is

spending at and around the stadium being an example of substitution effect, not new spending.

This does not create a net increase in city or county tax revenue, it just shifts the location it

occurs at from elsewhere in the community to the stadium region (Delaney & Eckstein, Public

dollars, private stadiums: The battle over building sports stadiums, 2003). The only real increase

in a stadium development would be that from tourists to the city that only come because a

baseball team is there, which is estimated at between 5 and 20 percent of the fans at any

professional sporting event (Siegfriend & Zimbalist, 2000). Cagan and deMause (2008) build on

the substitution effect theory by discussing leakage, where the spending at the stadium actually

has a negative effect on the local economy, as it is not recirculated because the owner lives

elsewhere and does not put the money back into the local economy the way a local business

owner would.

Not only do stadium development projects not create economic growth in regions, they

do little economically for the citizens that fund their creation. “One should not anticipate that a

team or a facility by itself will either increase employment or raise per capita income in a

metropolitan area,” stated economics professor Andrew Zimbalist (Hare, 2014). Jasina and

Rotthoff (2008) found that, at the county level, “real per capita income falls when sports

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franchises are present.” Their three key findings were no creation exists, that they just move

between different industries; that payrolls decrease; and that total employment and payroll of a

county are independent of the existence of a sports franchise (Jasina & Rotthoff, 2008). Coates

and Humphreys (2000) found that “the impact of an existing baseball franchise playing in a

stadium of average size is a reduction in real per capita income of over $850 per year below the

average level of income across cities,” in their 37-city sample. Given this type of information, it

is little wonder “many economists argue that public investments in new factories and schools

would generate greater and longer-term economic returns to the community than investments in

new stadiums and arenas” (Clark, 2014).

Baade compares stadium development to Pascal’s Wager, where “we believe that there is

an economic impact because we really can’t take the chance that there isn’t one” (Cagan &

deMause, 2008). This is faulty, though, as there is an economic impact that always occurs when

building a new stadium – an impact belonging entirely to a team’s ownership. Focusing on how

new stadium’s help owners increase their profits, as well as the value of their teams, is not the

best message to send to taxpayers. Therefore, the rhetorical strategies have shifted somewhat to

something more palatable to taxpayers (Sapotichne, 2012). While some claims of economic

booms with stadium development still exist, increasingly the debate focuses more on social

benefits brought on by building a new ballpark (Wilhelm, 2008).

Painting the debate in this light is advantageous to team owners. The value of these

impacts is largely unknown (Chapin, 2002), but are known to exist. They include a sense of

community in attending a game together, identifying with the local team, experiencing the ups-

and-downs of competition, a feeling of living in a “major league” area, and sports as a local

amenity, to name a few (Coates, 2007). As the value of them is hard to ascertain, difficulty exists

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in measuring their impact and importance when deciding on stadium funding. There is no clear

answer, although attempts are underway to reach some level of understanding (Coates &

Humphreys, 2008). This shift away from looking at economic benefits and costs towards social

benefits is increasing in the public debate over stadium subsidies (Sapotichne, 2012). An

example of this occurred with the National Football League’s Seattle Seahawks and their

(successful) attempt to get a new stadium built in the late 20th century. A study of articles written

in 1997 in support of the new stadium rhetorically focused 81 percent on the social value of

building a new stadium, with the remaining articles giving the economic and social values equal

weight. The opponents of the stadium reacted in the opposite manner, with 90 percent of the

articles written focusing on the economic cost to the county, with the other 10 percent dealing

with the social cost.

Delaney and Eckstein (2003) credit the surge in stadium subsidies in the strength of local

growth coalitions. They claim that these coalitions serve as the “arbiters of what economic

growth should look like in a community,” and that they collaborate with local governments, who

implement policies to “facilitate the coalition’s vision of economic growth, especially when tax

dollars are contributing to that vision.” The appeal to the growth coalition is using sports as an

incentive to attract new talent to their organizations. Individuals affiliated with successful growth

coalitions state that attracting top talent to cities can be hard, but can be helped by trips to a

stadium’s luxury box (Delaney & Eckstein, Public dollars, private stadiums: The battle over

building sports stadiums, 2003). Luxury seating is the one area of economic growth potential

most apparent in new ballparks, as owners look to find more ways to get corporations to spend

more inside their doors (Cagan & deMause, 2008). However, stadiums do not attract new

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businesses to a community, claims Baade (as cited by Bennett, 2012). Instead, the local tax

climate drives corporate growth.

These local growth coalitions, in partnership with elected officials, are willing to put their

money where their mouths are to get new stadiums built. When anti-stadium groups rise up to

combat the “corporate welfare” being offered to team owners (Cagan & deMause, 2008), they

are outspent to tremendous degrees (Coates, 2007). An example of this appeared when Seattle

Seahawks owner Paul Allen financed a statewide referendum for a new stadium for his team at

the cost of $4.2 million (Cagan & deMause, 2008). With his measure up for a vote, Allen spent

almost $6 million in support of the stadium, whereas his opponents spent $160,000 – a 37.5:1

ratio (Fort, 1999). This is commonplace when strong growth coalitions come out in support of

stadium development (Delaney & Eckstein, 2003).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The majority of secondary data sources used include baseball-centric websites.

Attendance, win-loss records, costs of stadiums, and the breakdown of funding (public/private)

are included in this data. Usage of U.S. Census data supports growth trends and the increased

number of fans within 30 minutes of the ballpark with a move. Suggested funding sources, as

well as their potential financial contributions, also are relied upon (deMause, 2012).

Estimating the total cost of a stadium can be difficult, given cost overruns and other

expenses that are funded by taxpayers, but not directly linked to the stadium development (such

as adding new interstate exits to accommodate increased traffic). As current estimates for the

new Rays’ stadium approach $600 million, this evaluation adds a $50 million buffer to better

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estimate total costs. This buffer may be lower than is actually needed (i.e. Marlins Park added

more than $100 million in overruns during its construction).

Another factor complicating the data is performance measures. Building a new stadium

does not guarantee increased attendance. Estimating a team’s future performance is difficult,

especially when its payroll may increase substantially, moderately, or even decrease when it

moves into a new stadium. This project will not make assumptions on the Rays’ winning

percentage in its new stadium and will instead use data from teams that have moved to new

fields since 1992.

One of the main benefits of building a new stadium is its social benefits. This is also the

hardest benefit to estimate and evaluate, as it immeasurable, abstract, and can largely be

unknown even to those people experiencing it. This is another limitation in this study, and serves

as a “tie-breaker” of sorts, if the decision to recommend creation of a new stadium is on the

borderline.

A final limitation of the project directly linked to social benefits is the possibility that the

team leaves the Tampa Bay region if no ballpark is constructed. A reluctance to move teams out

of their established markets is increasingly common in MLB (with some exceptions). The

evaluation will consider this possibility, but consider it less likely than Pinellas County building

the Rays a new stadium if Hillsborough County passes.

The main evaluative criterion is cost. Using the secondary data mentioned, as well as

estimates from how a new stadium could be funded in Tampa or elsewhere in Hillsborough

County, (The Baseball Stadium Financing Caucus, 2012), this project tests the feasibility of

funding a new ballpark. Consideration of additional possible revenue streams occurs if funding

options do not meet the $650 million threshold.

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A secondary evaluative criterion is growth potential. Building a new stadium presents

benefits and challenges to Hillsborough County’s future. Each of the policy options considered

weighs the future of the county and if building a ballpark affects that future. Tampa’s downtown

development plan, as well as the Hillsborough and Nebraska Corridor Plan, provides structure

and support to this section (InVision Tampa, 2012). As these are approved visions for Tampa

and Hillsborough County’s future, a major development plan such as this should fit into the

plans.

The final evaluative criterion is political feasibility. Each of the three plans needs the

support of elected officials, even if only to state they will not be pursuing a new ballpark in the

county. Ideally, Tampa and/or Hillsborough County residents would support the selected plan as

well, although this is often not the case when stadiums are funded (Delaney & Eckstein, Public

dollars, private stadiums: The battle over building sports stadiums, 2003). Elected officials’

support and concern over building a new ballpark is already on the public record.

POLICY OPTIONS

Building a new stadium in Tampa

Building a new baseball stadium for the Rays in downtown Tampa appears to be MLB

and the team’s desired outcome. That does not mean they will be cutting Hillsborough County a

break though. The building of baseball stadiums, minus four outliers1, received 70.3 percent

1 The four outliers are New York City (twice), St. Louis, and San Francisco. The New York Yankees wanted to build a stadium to trump all other stadiums. Their stadium cost double the amount of any other stadium considered. Along with the Mets, there were limits on the funds offered to each team by the city by then-Mayor Mike Bloomberg. Bloomberg’s predecessor, Rudy Giuliani, offered totally funding new $800 million stadiums for each team in one of his last acts in office. Bloomberg spoke out against it and refused to let it happen. The San Francisco Giants tried four times to get San Francisco city and county residents to build them a new stadium, with rejection occurring each time. The team finally gave up and agreed to build using private funds. The St. Louis Cardinals took less state and city funding in exchange for favorable terms in building a new stadium and entertainment district next to the new stadium.

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public funding since 1992. Using that as a projection for what the Rays could receive from

taxpayers in moving to Hillsborough County, an estimated public contribution of more than $456

million is required to fund a stadium project. This monetary figure, using 2015 dollars (Federal

Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2015), represents a larger cost to taxpayers than all but three other

stadium projects evaluated.

The Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce developed five potential revenue types that

could raise capital for a new Rays stadium (The Baseball Stadium Financing Caucus, 2012)

using a zero percent growth rate. This growth rate, and the figures it produced, is overly cautious.

The caucus listed revenue streams by their feasibility, beginning with community redevelopment

area funds. Based on their findings, these funds would generate $13 million annually, with a

funding capacity of up to $115 million dollars over 30 years (estimation of all funding capacities

occurs over this same period).

The second revenue stream is a $2 million annual subsidy from the state of Florida to

professional sports teams that reside in the state. This stream has an estimated revenue capacity

of $37 million. Recent developments leave this stream in flux, however, as efforts are underway

to change how teams receive the subsidy. SB 1216 became a law in May 2015. It is too early to

suggest how it will work for a variety of sports teams, but stadium experts believe it will increase

the state money available to teams (Pransky, 2015). Tampa Bay’s two other sports teams, the

National Football League’s (NFL) Buccaneers and the National Hockey League’s Lightning,

currently receive this subsidy.

The third revenue stream is a community investment tax. Under this revenue stream, the

new stadium project receives a portion of the five-cent Hillsborough-wide tax. Estimated yearly

revenue of this stream is $6 million, with a funding capacity of up to $80 million. Current

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spending levels form this estimate. If the Rays were to cross the bay, it is likely this number

would increase somewhat based on their relocation. While economists nearly-unanimously agree

that building a new stadium does not create new economic growth, in this circumstance 100

percent of the spending would move from Pinellas County to Hillsborough County.

The final two revenue streams are aimed at Tampa Bay tourists - a new five-cent

surcharge on all car rentals in Hillsborough County, and a one-cent tax increase (to six cents) on

hotels and rental properties in Hillsborough County. These options are very popular in stadium

funding, for the perceived reason of non-residents being affected, not local taxpayers. However,

experts believe this overlooks car rentals by residents, as well as hotel rentals by residents as

well (Bennett, 2012). The auto rental surcharge estimates at a yearly revenue stream of $9.5

million and a $150 million funding capacity, while the tourist development tax estimates at $3.5

million annually and up to $45 million in total. Hillsborough County is currently not eligible for

the sixth cent tourist development tax increase, as currently only counties deemed to have high

tourism rates can impose the increase. Hillsborough County should cross this threshold in the

near future, potentially within three years (Thalji, 2014).

Using these estimates, with both low and high estimations, we arrive at revenue sources

of between $383 million and $427 million. A funding deficit of at least $30 million occurs under

this estimate. It is possible the Rays pay this gap, but history suggests it is more likely MLB

sticks taxpayers with the burden, given the league's track record. The caucus, and Mayor

Buckhorn, deemphasized imposing any new taxes on Hillsborough residents to make this

stadium projected possible, however, so any additional revenue stream would need to either

break those vows or operate outside of them (Nohlgren, 2012). If the city and county were to

19

sign a contract with the Rays making the team responsible for all cost overruns directly related to

the stadium, the funding may be possible as is.

There are drawbacks to using these revenue streams for building a new ballpark. Any

spending of tax dollars creates an opportunity cost, overlooking other viable options. Tapping

these streams would affect their future usage, up to and including negating any additional when

the next major project needs funding. Tampa and Hillsborough County must also consider a

likely reaction that will occur if they build a new stadium for the Rays – that their current

residents, the NFL’s Buccaneers, will likely want a new stadium as well. Since 1992, almost

unanimously spending on one stadium leads to spending on another. Only Washington, DC, has

not experienced any public requests for a new stadium for their football team since building the

baseball team a new stadium. Rumors suggest that will change in the near future, however, as the

NFL’s Redskins reportedly want a new stadium to replace 18-year-old FedEx Field (Steinberg,

2015). If Tampa and Hillsborough County struggle to find financing for a $650 million baseball

field, how are they going to secure similar funding for a new football stadium?

N/A No Renovation Requested Yes0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

New Football Stadium Built Same Time/After Baseball Park

20

A new stadium in downtown Tampa is the best option for growth potential, according to

Buckhorn (Gurbal Kritzer, 2014). Some disagreement exists between experts in this regard

theoretically, however. Arthur C. Nelson, University of Utah Metropolitan Research Center

director, states, “The farther away from downtown you get, the greater the likelihood of local

economic failure, even if the team does well” (Jacobson, 2015). Other experts suggest that new

ballparks are not what drives growth, but rather succeed when they are used as a capstone to

existing development plans, such as with Baltimore’s Inner Harbor revitalization and the creation

of Oriole Park at Camden Yards (Delaney & Eckstein, Public dollars, private stadiums: The

battle over building sports stadiums, 2003). Lightning Owner Jeff Vinik owns massive amounts

of land near Amalie Arena (where his team plays) and has advanced a $1 billion development

plan for the area (Thalji, 2014). While building a new Rays stadium on his land appears unlikely

(Danielson & Nohlgren, 2014), building it near his development and in conjunction with it could

help Tampa’s downtown become the thriving 24/7 neighborhood it longs to become (Gurbal

Kritzer, 2015). Mayor Buckhorn prefers to use land in Ybor City, however, and it is less likely

that would provide the same growth potential. Both plans would mesh with the Tampa Center

City Plan developed by InVision Tampa.

Delaney and Eckstein (2003) stress that local growth coalitions are instrumental in

getting new stadiums built. This is an area that Tampa and Hillsborough County struggle in, as of

the six Fortune 1000 Companies based in the Tampa Bay region, only two – WellCare Health

Plans, Inc., and Blooming Brands, Inc. – are located within the county. While other corporations

have local offices in the county, they are unlikely to be as invested in the growth of Tampa’s

21

entertainment scene. By contrast, Pinellas County has three Fortune 1000 companies within its

borders – Raymond James Financial, Inc., Jabil Circuit, Inc., and Tech Data Corporation.

Public support from Tampa and Hillsborough County officials for a building a new Rays

stadium is ample and obvious (Hobson, 2014). Taxpayers are another story. A 2013 poll found a

large gap among Tampa voters in funding a new stadium with public subsidies (Pransky, 2013),

with 56 percent of voters against using them, to 36 percent in favor. When pressed about their

preferences for using available revenues, the stadium option polled below homeless solutions,

transportation projects, and increased police and fire support. The team’s performance has

plummeted since that poll, making it possible that the difference between the two sides has

increased in favor of those against using public subsidies. Fan support has decreased to the point

that the Rays are now the fourth-most popular MLB team among Tampa Bay fans (Lortz, 2015).

While elected officials may desire creating a new ballpark for the Rays, their constituents are less

enthusiastic. If taxpayers vote on any of these measures via public referendum, much work

remains to garner public support.

Building a stadium for the Rays in Tampa seems to be the most likely outcome of the

three scenarios, but it is not a sure thing. As soon as the team can negotiate with Hillsborough

County, development of a real, comprehensive plan explaining funding and an overall scope for

the stadium must occur. Taxpayers, whose support is important of any plan, need to realize what

they are getting themselves into and have realistic expectations of what developing a stadium

would do for their city. If experts are correct, the answer to that question is likely very little.

Building a new stadium elsewhere in Hillsborough County

22

Since construction began on Oriole Park at Camden Yards in Baltimore, MLB’s location

preference is in the heart of the team’s city. Only two new stadiums – Miller Park in Milwaukee

and Globe Life Park in Arlington, Texas – are located outside of city limits. In both of those

cases, land previously used as parking lots for the team's old homes became the new footprints

for these new stadiums. The most recent stadium built, Marlins Park in Miami, was strategically

position in Miami’s “Little Havana” neighborhood in the hope of spurring development in the

area. This has not happened yet, to say the least. Immediately upon leaving Marlins Park, low-

income housing, parking garages, and a few new apartments and condominiums surround fans.

Cash flows in the area occur inside the stadium, not in the neighborhood (Elfrink, 2011).

City County0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Location of New Ballparks

Funding a new stadium outside of Tampa would be difficult. The same revenue streams

mentioned previously could apply, except for the community redevelopment funds. A downtown

Tampa district would generate those funds, and it is unlikely that Mayor Buckhorn would allow

them to go to a new stadium outside of the city. That leaves an additional $115 million shortfall

on top of the minimum of $30 million missing previously. Sternberg seems interested in a

23

downtown stadium (be it in Tampa or St. Petersburg), so getting him to cover the shortfall seems

unlikely.

Other potential funding sources mentioned by Tampa lawyer Ron Weaver (whom

Buckhorn asked for ideas) include EB-5 money and Federal New Markets Tax Credits

(deMause, 2013). EB-5 money comes from foreign investors seeking to earn the rights to

immigrate to the United States with their families. Other stadium projects dubiously used this

stream to secure funding. (Sasso, 2012). It is unknown how much potential revenue this program

could create, but estimates put it well below $100 million. It also appears that Hillsborough

County officials would prefer using EB-5 money in other directions (Nohlgren, 2012). The

federal government approves Federal New Markets Tax Credits, designating the credits to go to

low-income communities. President Barack Obama desires removing tax benefits aimed at

building new ballparks for billionaires out of taxpayer’s wallets, so this revenue source may be

drying up quickly (Temple-West, 2015). Even if these options were possible, funding in

Hillsborough County outside of Tampa appears to be difficult.

While the growth potential around new ballparks is questionable at best (Buckman &

Mack, 2012), no attempts to build a ballpark outside of a city to spur development have occurred

during the period observed. Investigating potential locations outside of Tampa for a new stadium

makes sense, if it fits into a greater growth plan for an area. Plant City and Temple Terrance are

the only other two cities located in Hillsborough County, while Brandon is the biggest area in

population after Tampa. None of those places appears ready to take on a project of this size, as

well as all the infrastructure improvements that would be necessary to accommodate the

ballpark.

24

In 2008, an updated version of the Future of Hillsborough Comprehensive Plan for

Unincorporated Hillsborough County became legally enforceable. The plan, a 20-year

framework, serves as a guidepost for land use and growth (Hillsborough County City-County

Planning Commission, n.d.). The vision of planning commission’s long-range plan, Imagine

Hillsborough 2040, includes high-levels of growth along Interstates 4 and 75. An argument in

support of a stadium project to bring people east of Tampa makes a certain degree of sense

(ignoring all the literature that states stadiums creating growth is a myth), but also raises

problems from the Rays’ perspective. The team currently feels too far away from its fan base.

The further east Hillsborough County builds a ballpark, the further away the Rays become from

their Pinellas County fans, which hypothetically cuts down on the fan base likely to attend games

during the week. Sternberg likely would be reluctant to spend more money to move further away

from his prospective fan base, causing Hillsborough County to pay a larger percentage of the

development costs.

With any stadium developments in Tampa or elsewhere in Hillsborough County, the

question of increasing social benefits arises. These social benefits appear already to be in place in

the Tampa Bay region. Increasingly proponents use these benefits to garner support, as thus far

academia finds them immeasurable. The team identifies already as the Tampa Bay Rays and a

move to Tampa would probably not see a name change (both the Lightning and Buccaneers list

"Tampa Bay" as their hometown). Passionate fans that identify with the team already exist. Some

increased support of the team is likely (just as some decreased support from Pinellas County

fans), but it seems reasonable to suggest the social benefits of having a “hometown” team

already exist in Hillsborough County. Social benefits are more likely to increase if the team is

25

performing at a higher level of sustained success than moving 20 miles across the Tampa Bay,

something impossible to guarantee before agreeing to construction.

Mayor Buckhorn largely drives the he push to bring the Rays to Hillsborough County. It

is hard to imagine a scenario where the team moves to somewhere in Hillsborough County and

he supports it. Per reports, Buckhorn sees bringing the Rays to Tampa as part of his legacy in the

area (Henderson, 2013). While Hillsborough County commissioners may still support the deal,

having such a large, vocal voice against the deal could evaporate local support, which already is

lacking.

Weighing all the evidence, there appears to be little reason to consider any areas outside

of Tampa. The cost of construction rises, the potential fans attending games decreases, the

growth potential shrinks, the political support evaporates, and the social benefits remain largely

the same.

Declining to build a new stadium

Hillsborough County is not required to build the Rays a new ballpark. Funding stadium

projects is bad business for communities, according to research from economists and academia,

citing low return on the investment. Elected officials should consider how the lives of the

taxpayers that voted them into office would be different if they forgo a stadium project. Two

paths emerge when considering this option – either Pinellas County builds a new stadium for the

Rays or the team leaves the region. Both options are possible, but baseball’s history suggests that

every effort to keep the team in Tampa Bay rather than relocating it to a baseball-hungry city

such as Montreal is likely.

26

The revenue streams suggested for funding ballpark construction exist independently of

the proposed stadium concept. Stated differently, Hillsborough County does not lose any of those

revenue streams if it decides to go in a different direction. Voters in Tampa prefer other

alternatives to a new ballpark according to Pransky (2013). If academia is correct and stadium

projects create little economic growth, there would be little opportunity cost experienced by

passing on the new stadium. Then, spending the money on quality-of-life improvements, such as

new parks or libraries, or improving infrastructure, is possible. Those revenue streams would

also still be available when the NFL’s Buccaneers eventually want a new stadium, which should

occur within the next 10 years. Experts state that Super Bowls are the one professional sporting

event that brings significant financial growth into an area (Peter, 2015). Tampa served as the host

of the Super Bowl four times previously, and the NFL often rewards cities that build new NFL

stadiums by awarding them Super Bowl games. Building a convertible or domed NFL stadium

would also increase the chance that other large sporting events such as the NCAA Men’s Final

Four Basketball Championship, FIFA’s World Cup, World Wrestling Entertainment’s annual

WrestleMania (dubbed the Super Bowl of Wrestling), or the NCAA College Football National

Championship Game. A new baseball stadium would not be able to host any of those events.

The social benefits impact of the Rays moving to a new stadium in Pinellas County from

Tropicana Field would be minimal to Hillsborough County residents. Depending on the

stadium’s location, their travel time to games is unlikely to increase. The team’s name probably

would not change. Rays’ games would still air on local television and be covered by Tampa

newspapers. If the team were to relocate, the social benefit impact intensifies greatly. However,

Tampa and Hillsborough County residents would have many positives in their lives, including

two other professional sports teams. “We don’t need a new stadium. There are plenty of cities

27

that have great stadiums but they don’t have a beach, great weather, Disney (amusement parks),

and everything else Tampa Bay has to offer,” stated Jeff Berlinicke, Clearwater Gazette writer,

in a 2014 editorial. Spending of other social benefits could surge if a stadium is not funded,

which potentially could provide a greater social benefit to the county.

Spending money in other ways could also positively influence Hillsborough County’s

growth potential. Evidence shows us that stadium development projects do little for a region’s

economic growth (with a few exceptions). Current growth plans for downtown Tampa and

unincorporated Hillsborough County do not include references to a new ballpark for the Rays. It

is more likely that building a stadium would require a reworking of those plans than it is that a

stadium would augment them nicely. It is hard to forecast growth potential without the stadium

project without knowing how the where the money goes instead.

Political support from elected officials appears in support of the stadium project, but

Mayor Buckhorn also appears realistic in his belief that obtaining funding will be difficult. It

seems likely that political support for declining to fund a new ballpark would increase when

elected officials realize the relatively few benefits and large costs to funding these projects.

Taxpayers historically vote the politicians that support stadium projects out of office (Elfrink,

2011). Not wanting financial burden in the future, taxpayers already appear opposed to funding a

new stadium (although certainly Tampa/Hillsborough County fans of the team would like to

have it located closer than St. Petersburg). Knowing how Hillsborough County spends the money

alternatively improves the ability to forecast in this area.

Of the three options presented, passing on a stadium seems to make the most sense for

Hillsborough County. It keeps potential revenue streams open and eliminates large future

burdens for taxpayers, while keeping potential physical spaces open for better growth options.

28

Social benefits will not change much if the team stays in St. Petersburg. If the team relocates,

however, there is a substantial drop in social benefits. However, the negative social impact of the

team leaving the region is not reason enough to build a new stadium. Hillsborough County

officials should heed the words Miami-Dade County Commissioner Javier Souto, who initially

supported funding Marlins Park. After seeing the burden funding left his county with, he

changed his tune. "I told (former Miami-Dade County mayor) Alex Penelas years ago when I

met (Marlins owner) Jeffrey Loria: 'This guy only cares about the money, not us, not the county,

not the people. There were so many promises about all the things that would be happening

around the stadium, in Little Havana, and I haven't seen anything…The best thing that could

happen is for this ownership group to get the hell out of here for the good of the community”

(Munzenrieder, 2012).

29

SUMMARY TABLE

Cost Growth Potential Political

Feasibility

Summary

Evaluation

Building in

downtown

Tampa

Possible, but

requires flexibility

Possible in right

area, harder in

others

High political,

mediocre public

support

This is the best

location to build a

new stadium, if

building occurs.

Doing so will be

financially difficult.

Benefits are more

likely from a social

aspect than an

economic aspect.

Building elsewhere

in Hillsborough

County

Difficult Less likely Mediocre political,

mediocre public

support

Building a stadium

in Hillsborough

County anywhere

besides Tampa

seems impossible

and foolish.

Declining to build

a new stadium

None

(Opportunity cost)

Depends on

alternative plans

Low political,

medium-high public

support

This is the best

option for

Hillsborough

County in terms of

financial stability

and growth

potential.

Recommended.

30

31

APPENDIX A – Stadium Cost

Stadium (New Name) City Year Built Cost (mil) 2015 Cost (mil)Oriole Park at Camden Yards Baltimore 1992 96.0% $ 100.0 $ 170.8 $ 164.0 $ 6.8 Jacobs Field (Progressive Field) Cleveland 1994 48.0% $ 175.0 $ 283.0 $ 135.8 $ 147.2 Ballpark in Arlington (Globe Life Park in Arlington) Arlington 1994 71.0% $ 191.0 $ 308.9 $ 219.3 $ 89.6 Coors Field Denver 1995 78.0% $ 215.0 $ 338.2 $ 263.8 $ 74.4 Turner Field Atlanta 1997 0.0% $ 235.0 $ 350.9 $ - $ 350.9 Bank One Ballpark (Chase Field) Phoenix 1998 68.0% $ 349.0 $ 513.2 $ 349.0 $ 164.2 Safeco Field Seattle 1999 66.0% $ 517.6 $ 744.8 $ 491.6 $ 253.2 Comerica Park Detroit 2000 38.0% $ 300.0 $ 417.6 $ 158.7 $ 258.9 Pacific Bell Park (AT&T Park) San Francisco 2000 4.0% $ 357.0 $ 497.0 $ 19.9 $ 477.1 Enron Field (Minute Maid Park) Houston 2000 68.0% $ 250.0 $ 348.0 $ 236.6 $ 111.4 PNC Park Pittsburgh 2001 70.0% $ 262.0 $ 354.7 $ 248.3 $ 106.4 Miller Park Milwaukee 2001 77.5% $ 400.0 $ 541.5 $ 419.7 $ 121.8 Great American Ballpark Cincinnati 2003 86.0% $ 325.0 $ 423.5 $ 364.2 $ 59.3 Citizens Bank Park Philadelphia 2004 50.0% $ 346.0 $ 439.1 $ 219.6 $ 219.6 Petco Park San Diego 2004 57.0% $ 456.8 $ 579.7 $ 330.4 $ 249.3 Busch Stadium III St. Louis 2006 12.0% $ 365.0 $ 434.0 $ 52.1 $ 381.9 Nationals Park Washington D.C. 2008 100.0% $ 611.0 $ 680.2 $ 680.2 $ - Citi Field New York City 2009 27.0% $ 600.0 $ 670.4 $ 181.0 $ 489.4 Yankee Stadium II New York City 2009 17.0% $ 1,300.0 $ 1,452.4 $ 246.9 $ 1,205.5 Target Field Minneapolis 2010 72.0% $ 544.4 $ 598.4 $ 430.8 $ 167.6 Marlins Park Miami 2012 80.0% $ 634.0 $ 653.3 $ 522.7 $ 130.7

SUM 1185.5% $ 8,533.8 $ 10,799.6 $ 5,734.5 $ 5,065.1 AVERAGE 59.3% $ 426.7 $ 540.0 $ 286.7 $ 238.0

Public Percentage

Gov't $ 2015 (mil)

Private Sector $ 2015 (mil)

APPENDIX B – Public Percentage of Cost

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Public Percentage of Cost

Public Percentage

APPENDIX C – Rising Cost of Stadiums

Oriole Park at Camden Yards

Jacobs Field (Progressive Field)

Ballpark in Arlington (Globe Life Park in Arlington)

Coors Field

Turner Field

Bank One Ballpark (Chase Field)

Safeco Field

Comerica Park

Pacific Bell Park (AT&T Park)

Enron Field (Minute Maid Park)

PNC Park

Miller Park

Great American Ballpark

Citizens Bank Park

Petco Park

Busch Stadium III

Nationals Park

Citi Field

Yankee Stadium II

Target Field

Marlins Park

$0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1,000 $1,200 $1,400 $1,600

Rising Cost of Stadiums

2015 Cost (mil)

34

APPENDIX D – Attendance Before and After the New Stadium

City 5 years before Before Average After Average Net ChangeBaltimore 22,386 20,759 31,299 24,815 43,034 44,475 45,816 44,442 19,627 Cleveland 15,871 15,126 12,828 14,608 42,034 42,806 42,820 42,553 27,945 Arlington 25,234 25,096 28,367 26,232 36,361 36,141 34,216 35,573 9,340 Denver N/A N/A N/A - 46,823 42,976 40,681 43,493 43,493 Atlanta 37,993 47,960 46,168 44,040 39,930 34,858 32,142 35,643 (8,397)Phoenix N/A N/A N/A - 33,783 39,494 34,636 35,971 35,971 Seattle 25,096 22,510 33,628 27,078 43,740 40,352 35,863 39,985 12,907 Detroit 16,402 14,427 16,854 15,894 16,892 23,667 24,993 21,851 5,956 San Francisco 17,243 17,243 20,875 18,454 40,307 39,718 39,272 39,766 21,312 Houston 18,942 24,394 25,269 22,868 30,299 38,122 34,627 34,349 11,481 Pittsburgh 16,652 20,457 19,271 18,793 19,750 22,435 22,982 21,722 2,929 Milwaukee 16,385 18,050 22,365 18,933 25,462 27,297 28,835 27,198 8,265 Cincinnati 22,144 25,137 31,431 26,237 26,353 25,415 25,415 25,728 (510)Philadelphia 22,535 19,911 22,001 21,482 38,374 42,254 44,453 41,694 20,211 San Diego 31,155 29,043 29,360 29,853 34,445 29,970 23,699 29,371 (481)St. Louis 37,922 37,182 35,931 37,012 41,275 40,756 38,197 40,076 3,064 Washington D.C. N/A N/A 33,728 33,728 24,256 29,269 32,746 28,757 (4,971)New York City 28,629 34,937 41,723 35,096 27,689 26,366 26,528 26,861 (8,235)New York City 46,609 50,502 52,445 49,852 43,733 40,489 41,995 42,072 (7,780)Minneapolis 25,114 28,210 28,350 27,225 30,588 27,785 27,546 28,640 1,415 Miami 16,920 16,482 18,075 17,159 21,759 N/A N/A 21,759 4,600

- - - Average 24,624 25,968 28,946 26,513 33,661 36,560 35,656 35,292 8,780

4 years before

3 years before

3 years after

4 years after

5 years after

(Ongoing – As of 7/29/15)

APPENDIX E –Winning Percentage Before and After the New Stadium

City Net ChangeBaltimore 41.4% 33.5% 53.7% 42.9% 49.3% 54.3% 60.5% 54.7% 11.8%Cleveland 45.1% 47.5% 35.2% 42.6% 53.4% 54.9% 59.9% 56.1% 13.5%Arlington 51.2% 51.2% 52.5% 51.6% 47.5% 54.3% 57.6% 53.1% 1.5%Denver N/A N/A 41.4% 41.4% 47.5% 44.4% 50.6% 47.5% 6.1%Atlanta 60.5% 64.2% 59.6% 61.4% 58.6% 54.3% 63.1% 58.7% -2.8%Phoenix N/A N/A N/A N/A 56.8% 60.5% 51.9% 56.4% N/ASeattle 43.8% 54.5% 52.8% 50.4% 57.4% 57.4% 38.9% 51.2% 0.9%Detroit 41.7% 32.7% 48.8% 41.1% 26.5% 44.4% 43.8% 38.2% -2.8%San Francisco 46.5% 42.0% 55.6% 48.0% 62.1% 56.2% 46.3% 54.9% 6.8%Houston 52.8% 50.6% 51.9% 51.8% 53.7% 56.8% 54.9% 55.1% 3.4%Pittsburgh 45.1% 48.8% 42.6% 45.5% 44.7% 41.4% 41.4% 42.5% -3.0%Milwaukee 49.4% 48.4% 45.7% 47.8% 41.6% 50.0% 46.3% 46.0% -1.9%Cincinnati 47.5% 58.9% 52.5% 53.0% 49.4% 44.4% 45.7% 46.5% -6.5%Philadelphia 47.5% 40.1% 53.1% 46.9% 54.9% 56.8% 57.4% 56.4% 9.5%San Diego 45.7% 46.9% 48.8% 47.1% 54.6% 38.9% 46.3% 46.6% -0.5%St. Louis 57.4% 59.9% 52.5% 56.6% 56.2% 53.1% 55.6% 55.0% -1.6%Washington D.C. 51.2% 41.4% 50.0% 47.5% 49.7% 60.5% 53.1% 54.4% 6.9%New York City 43.8% 51.2% 59.9% 51.6% 45.7% 45.7% 48.8% 46.7% -4.9%New York City 62.3% 58.6% 59.9% 60.3% 58.6% 52.5% 51.9% 54.3% -5.9%Minneapolis 51.2% 59.3% 48.8% 53.1% 40.7% 43.2% 52.5% 45.5% -7.6%Miami 43.8% 52.2% 53.7% 49.9% 42.0% N/A N/A 42.0% -7.9%

Average 48.8% 49.6% 51.0% 49.8% 50.0% 51.2% 51.3% 50.6% 0.8%

5 years before

4 years before

3 years before

Before Average

3 years after

4 years after

5 years after

After Average

(Ongoing – As of 7/29/15)

36

APPENDIX F – Winning Effect on New Ballpark Attendance

(20,000) (10,000) - 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000

-15.0%

-10.0%

-5.0%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

Winning Effect on New Ballpark Attendance

Winning effect on new ballpark at -tendance

37

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