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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-142-Caliphate-ISIS-15

If not us, who? If not here, where? If not now, when?

So who’s next? If the answer is not the five-dozen moderates trained by the Pentagon, it will be one of the two extremist militias who control the most territory in Syria: Isis and al-Qa’eda (called by its local name Jabhat al-Nusra). A horrible choice, you might argue, but for many it’s the only choice. Ahmed Rashid

Backing a non-IS caliphate. So could al-Qa’eda, once considered the most deadly terrorist organisation in the world, end up with their own state; as masters of the caliphate, with the support of their neighbours? And if so, how on earth did we reach such a surreal and sorry state of affairs? Why? Because, as so many countries learn in wartime, the enemy of one’s enemy can become one’s ally. No matter how ugly the enemy. These Arab states consider Iran as a larger national security threat than AQAP.

Things are now moving fast. A relationship is evolving and formal talks between the Arab states and al-Qa’eda may soon take place without the West at the table. It’s a strategic decision: the Arabs regard an extremist victory in Syria as inevitable so they have decided to go with al-Qa’eda as the lesser of the two evils — especially if that evil is willing to resist Iran.

Daesh is able to advance because it is not being effectively stopped.  That is because the international community is not prioritising the threat from Daesh high enough.

These five questions address the current role of Daesh and the threat it is posing to the rest of the world, asking why it is not being defeated and how it could potentially be defeated.

Following the announcement of British deaths in Iraq and Somalia, it has become clear that foreign fighters are attracted to various battlefields. However, there has been a noticeable shift away from Somalia to Syria/Iraq in travel patterns from the UK.

IS was able to penetrate the GCC countries on the ideological level by convincing a large number of people that its project is politically legitimate, based on two foundations of Islamic tradition. The first is the Prophet Muhammad's prophecy of five political stages that Muslims pass through, the last being the return of the caliphate. The second is the pledge of allegiance, or "baia," whereby the elite and then the public choose a ruler (a prince or caliph).

In light of the historical ideological conflict that fuels the political disputes among Gulf countries, the caliphate project adopted by IS is a dream that attracts the youth from the Gulf region and beyond.

Britain is committed to working with the US to destroy the "caliphate" set up by Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, the prime minister has said.

"If you are a boy, they will brainwash you, strap bombs to your body and blow you up. If you are a girl, they will enslave and abuse you," he will say. 'Standard practice'

Speaking about the UK's possible role in fighting the group, Mr Cameron told NBC: "I want Britain to do more. I'll always have to take my parliament with me.

"We're talking and discussing at the moment, including with the opposition parties in Britain, what more we can do. But be in no doubt, we're committed to working with you to destroy the caliphate in both countries."

19 JUL, The elusive Islamic State (Isis) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may have been operating out of Raqqa, the terror group's de facto capital in Syria, during Ramadan, suggest US intelligence sources based on their surveillance.  But the intelligence was not precise

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enough to launch air-strikes on him and in any case, the intelligence inputs "dried up" about three weeks ago.

Backing a non-IS caliphate : Yet according to Ahmed Rashid in The Spectator, the end-game is nigh, with the Gulf states and Turkey now "heavily arming, funding and talking to al-Qaeda, regarding it as a safer bet than Isis" and Iran building a bunker for Assad in Latakia. If Rashid is right, the West and its traditional Middle East allies are fighting two separate wars - the West against IS and al-Qaeda, the Sunni states against Iran and its allies. Which leaves the West with a dilemma. The US and UK have fought a 15-year war against al-Qaeda terrorism but now their allies are supporting the creation of an alternative non-IS caliphate in Syria, backed by groups like al-Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, the latter now pitching for Western support with a slick PR campaign.  We may all agree that IS are an abomination that must be fought, but it has been understand that they emerged from the UK-US invasion of Iraq, the sectarian policies of the post-2003 Shia government and the support given to militant Sunni groups by Turkey and the Gulf states in their ongoing effort to topple Assad. Nobody comes up smelling good in this sectarian hate-fest.  Western support for so-called moderate FSA fighters in Syria has stalled. Currently, the only effective non-Islamist force fighting in Syria is the Kurds - secular, pro-equality and our natural allies. Through supporting the YPG, the US has been able to hold off IS in the north, to the chagrin of Turkey. Meanwhile IS has advanced to seize half of Syrian territory.

Indirect Western cooperation with Assad is already under way in airstrikes against IS. Nobody is saying it, but the West appears now to want to keep Assad in power to prevent either an al-Qaeda or IS takeover. Equally, despite requests from activists and White Helmet rescue workers, Western forces are not offering intelligence to rebel-held areas to provide advance warning about Assad's indiscriminate bombing. This is where it gets tricky for

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Western politicians - if they do anything decisive to stop the killing, they may end up "owning" the conflict. Now that the Iran nuclear deal is done, the next priority must be to move toward a negotiated settlement involving all non-IS forces fighting in Syria and their external allies. If that means the cantonment of the country and some kind of alliance with militant Sunni forces to defeat Islamic State, so be it. Such a negotiation will make even the Iran deal look easy, given all the blood spilled. But without it, no amount of bombing will end the war, and the sectarian poison of hate and revenge could explode into a bigger conflict. - Joe Gill has lived and worked as a journalist in Oman, London, Venezuela and the US,

The enemy's enemy: how Arab states have turned to al-Qa’edaFear of Isis is leading the Arab states to lend support to the lesser of two evilsAhmed Rashid 18 July 2015After plunging Syria into five years of a bloody civil war that has killed 300,000 and displaced 10 million, Bashar al-Assad is preparing for the endgame. He has been digging a bunker for himself, creating an enclave in the mountains around the coastal city of Latakia where his community, the Alawites, are in a majority. The Iranians are helping him set up this new retreat, but his hope of hanging on to Syria is dying. The question being asked in the region is not whether he’ll survive, but who will run Damascus once he falls — and what will happen should the country be split along ethnic and sectarian lines.When considering the future, Syrian moderate rebel groups don’t feature much in the equation. They have little standing in the pecking order because the US and the Arabs have failed to support them. Ash Carter, the US defence secretary, stunned the Senate last week when he admitted that the Pentagon had trained just 60 moderate Syrians to fight Isis — a far cry from the planned 5,400 announced last year. Meanwhile, in Iraq, the contingent of 3,500 American soldiers dispatched to train the Iraqi army have ended up training only 2,600 Iraqi soldiers. This is clearly no way to win a war — either against Isis, or the Assad regime.The Arab world, which has been anxiously watching all of this for years now, is coming to some hard conclusions. Assad is finished — this much is clear. So who’s next? If the answer is not the five-dozen moderates trained by the Pentagon, it will be one of the two extremist militias who control the most territory in Syria: Isis and al-Qa’eda (called by its local name Jabhat al-Nusra). A horrible choice, you might argue, but for many it’s the only choice.The Arab Gulf states and Turkey have already made up their mind. They are heavily arming, funding and talking to al-Qa’eda, regarding it as a safer bet than Isis. It might once have seemed unimaginable but Isis has surpassed even al-Qa’eda in the brutal horrors it inflicts on its victims.So could al-Qa’eda, once considered the most deadly terrorist organisation in the world, end up with their own state; as masters of the caliphate, with the support of their neighbours? And if so, how on earth did we reach such a surreal and sorry state of affairs?

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The first thing to note is that neither Washington nor London have any enthusiasm for backing al-Qa’eda. Its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remains on the USA hit list and there’s a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture. Backing al-Qa’eda is too bitter a pill for the West, with the memories of 9/11 and 7/7 so vivid. So it’s easy to see why US diplomats are appalled by the turn of events in Syria. But if the Obama administration is not prepared to deploy troops on the ground to tackle Isis, it cannot criticise its own allies (such as Saudi Arabia) if they want to cosy up to al-Qa’eda.

The West offers no decent alternative plan. Its policy on the Middle East has been riven by contradictions, and characterised by a lack of commitment and a state of denial. So it’s the Middle Eastern states that have started calling the shots (as arguably they must do) and it’s they who have chosen al-Qa’eda as their new ally. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Gulf Emirates are supporting al-Qa’eda with arms, money and a strategic dialogue. While the Gulf states are following Saudi Arabia’s lead and are also petrified of Isis terrorist hits in their vulnerable city states, such as the recent beach attack in Tunisia and the several Isis bomb blasts in Saudi Arabia, the Turks are deeply concerned that Syrian Kurds will carve out a separate state for themselves and draw Turkey’s own Kurds in.But its not just al-Qa’eda in Syria; other al-Qa’eda offshoots are also being redefined as friends, not foes. In Yemen, Washington has long pursued a drone campaign against the group known as al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has included the recent killing of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, its leader. Washington believes that AQAP is still trying to target the US mainland. Yet many of America’s Arab allies are now essentially siding with AQAP in a Saudi-led war against Iran. Why? Because, as so many countries learn in wartime, the enemy of one’s enemy can become one’s ally. No matter how ugly the enemy. These Arab states consider Iran as a larger national security threat than AQAP.

So, on the battlefields of Syria and Yemen, the Arab states are not only opposing American attacks on al-Qa’eda but actively offering support to its leader, al-Zawahiri. So two quite separate super-wars are now being fought.

The first is the war waged by the US and its western allies in an attempt to defeat al-Qa’eda and Isis in Syria and Yemen. Significantly the Arab states are taking no part in this war and providing the Americans with no intelligence.

The second war is being fought by all the regional Arab states and Turkey — against Assad and other Iranian-backed forces in the region, as well as Isis. In this war, the Arab states openly avoid bombing or attacking al-Qa’eda in Syria and AQAP — and, indeed, provide both with logistical support. This is because both al-Qa’eda offshoots have now declared aims which are shared by the Arab states: they want to topple the Assad regime and oppose Iran.Things have been moving so fast that any western policy forged more than a year ago is now hopelessly out of date. Not only has Isis come from nowhere to run a chunk of territory the size of Great Britain — in both Iraq and Syria — but it can claim to have terrorist hit squads in a dozen countries stretching from Tunisia to Pakistan. Isis now has affiliated militant groups in at least 11 countries, including Nigeria and Russia. As the newspapers document daily, Isis is also adept at grooming and recruiting young western Muslims — from Luton to Lagos — and persuading them to join the jihad. It is succeeding in its state-building project and rapidly adapting to change.But while the world’s focus has been on Isis and its stunning transformation, the equally dramatic changes in al-Qa’eda have barely been scrutinised. Although depleted by years of drone strikes, it is still a major presence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. It continues to inspire

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Afghan and Pakistani militants, who provide sanctuaries to keep its leadership alive. And unlike Isis, which demands absolute subjugation of the inhabitants of any territory it conquers (‘surrender or be executed’), it is cooperating with other anti-Assad groups. Al-Qa’eda recently joined the ‘Army of Conquest’, an Islamist alliance of rebel militias in northern Syria.While Isis depends on foreign recruits, fighters for al-Nusra, al-Qa’eda’s Syrian arm, are almost wholly Syrian — making them more committed to Syria’s future. They have toned down their aims of implementing a brutal version of Islamic law. Most significantly, in recent interviews, al-Nusra leaders have vowed not to attack targets in the West. This is quite a departure from Osama bin Laden’s concept of ‘global jihad’, and a new leaning towards more ‘nationalist jihadism’.Some reports suggest that al–Zawahiri has even called off attacks on the US. If true, this shows a very un-Isis-like ability to put vendetta and revenge to one side for the sake of a more enticing goal. It’s true that al-Zawahiri loathes America, all the more because his wife and two children were killed in a drone strike. Yet he is proving able to play the long game. Al-Nusra’s leader, Abu Mohammed al’Julani, recently told Al Jazeera that ‘the instructions that we have are not to use al-Sham [Syria] as a base to launch attacks on the West or Europe — so as not to muddy the current war’.It’s not just talk. Al-Qa’eda most dramatically demonstrated its new soft line when AQAP seized the Yemeni province of Hadramut this spring. It inflicted little damage, executed nobody, declined to run the local government and instead installed a council of elders to govern.How long would this new less violent attitude last? Nobody knows. Perhaps it is just tactics to win support on the ground. It might only become really clear when it’s too late. The Arabs may be right to conclude that there are at least some grounds for thinking that al-Qa’eda is evolving.However the real test will be whether al-Qa’eda will truly tolerate minorities and let other sorts of Muslims exist, as and when they gain power? One indicator is Afghanistan, where al-Qa’eda and their Taleban allies have not attacked or massacred Afghan Shias since 11 September 2001. Before the US invasion they did so openly. But it is too early to say what al-Qa’eda’s long-term attitude to minorities will be. Meanwhile, Arab states have shown little sympathy for non-Muslim minorities and Shias when they are being attacked by Isis.Things are now moving fast. A relationship is evolving and formal talks between the Arab states and al-Qa’eda may soon take place without the West at the table. It’s a strategic decision: the Arabs regard an extremist victory in Syria as inevitable so they have decided to go with al-Qa’eda as the lesser of the two evils — especially if that evil is willing to resist Iran. Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, since he came to the throne in January, has pursued a far more aggressive policy toward Iran and Syria. For the US and Europe it will be extremely difficult in terms of domestic politics and national security to strike a relationship with al-Qa’eda, but ultimately that may be the only choice, especially if the West’s Arab allies are going ahead.Just a few years ago, the ‘war on terror’ was defined as extinguishing al-Qa’eda. Now, for many of our Arab allies, it means shoring up al-Qa’eda and praying that they’re not as bad as had once been believed. One thing in all this murky double-dealing is clear: the US and Britain are paying a bitter price for refusing to remove Assad when they genuinely had the chance four years ago. Acting has its risks, but failing to act has its consequences too — as we will all now find out.Ahmed Rashid is the best selling author of numerous books on militant Islam. His latest book is Pakistan on the Brink - The Future of America, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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The Islamic State is coming for the Gulf Author: Ibrahim al-HatlaniPosted July 9, 2015 An Islamic State suicide bomber struck the Shiite Imam Sadiq mosque in the center of Kuwait City June 26. On May 29, in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, another suicide bomber struck the entrance of a Shiite mosque just kilometers away from the site of a May 22 suicide bombing, also against a Shiite mosque, in the town of Qudaih, in the Shiite-majority Qatif province. That attack killed 21 and wounded more than 100. IS may have chosen to target Kuwait as part of prior planning, but it is just as likely that the weak security coordination between Gulf countries has made Kuwait an alternative to the Shiite targets in Saudi Arabia, where security has been tightened.

IS is certainly planning its operations intelligently, choosing the right times and places and young operatives who believe in the idea of the caliphate and who are GCC residents with clean security records. For them, traveling within the GCC countries — which IS refers to as Wilayat Najd — does not require visas. The Saudi Interior Ministry released a statement June 28 following the attack against the Kuwaiti mosque, identifying the perpetrator as Saudi citizen Fahd Suleiman al-Qabba and stressing that Qabba was not wanted by the authorities and had never traveled outside Saudi Arabia.

Many Sunni and Shiite liberal writers and analysts, such as Mohammed al-Mahmoud and Fuad Ibrahim, blame Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi religious curricula and satellite channels, especially Wesal TV and Safa TV, for the targeting of Shiite mosques in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Despite some truth in these accusations, they do not represent the main motives behind such bombings. These accusations represent an ideological stance that is anti-Salafism rather than logical analysis. This stance could be only partly true, for the following reasons:

The sectarian violence began in the Gulf region in the 1980s. The Kuwait bombings from 1983 to 1988 were carried out by Lebanese and Iraqi Shiite organizations, and the Mecca bombings in 1989 were carried out by 16 Shiite Kuwaitis.

IS deems the leaders of the Saudi religious establishment apostates, who in turn consider IS un-Islamic and an organization Muslims should not join.

The young people who carried out the bombings in Shiite mosques were rebels against their governments who chose to emigrate to the caliphate state as they considered their societies un-Islamic. They targeted Shiite mosques following the directives of the caliphate they pledged allegiance to and on historical texts — not based on Wahhabi fatwas.

The influence of the Salafist TV stations Wesal and Safa cannot be compared to the influence of more than 40 Shiite channels that are broadcast widely, such as the Iraqi Alulbayt channel and the Kuwaiti Fadak channel, whose programs disparage Sunni doctrine.

In light of the historical ideological conflict that fuels the political disputes among Gulf countries, the caliphate project adopted by IS is a dream that attracts the youth from the Gulf region and beyond. They feel important, as they think they are contributing in the establishment of a new state after being politically marginalized. For this reason, they do not hesitate to carry out the orders of their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. According to IS’ unofficial news agency Aamaq news, from its perspective, a person is either a believer who pledges allegiance to Baghdadi’s caliphate or an apostate that deserves to die, with no room for a third category. This is IS’ policy toward all Islamic communities, including the Sunnis, whether they are Salafists or civilian fighters in Iraq, Syria, Libya or Egypt. As of mid-June, 148 security personnel had been killed in Saudi Arabia, the land of the Two Holy Mosques. They have been officially called the “martyrs of duty” by the Saudi Interior Ministry.

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IS was able to penetrate the GCC countries on the ideological level by convincing a large number of people that its project is politically legitimate, based on two foundations of Islamic tradition. The first is the Prophet Muhammad's prophecy of five political stages that Muslims pass through, the last being the return of the caliphate. The second is the pledge of allegiance, or "baia," whereby the elite and then the public choose a ruler (a prince or caliph).

Through its terror operations, IS wants to showcase the ruling regimes’ inability to protect their Shiite citizens and weaken their prestige. It boldly claims responsibility for these operations to show Sunnis in the Gulf and the world that IS is keen and able to protect Sunni beliefs and symbols. Official sources in the Gulf worry that terrorist attacks targeting Shiites are part of a wider scheme whereby IS is provoking the Shiites to form armed groups, such as the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq. IS would be happy to see Shiite Gulf leaders respond to the deadly provocations and take to the streets to confront the Gulf authorities for being unable to protect them, as happened in Qatif. On May 23, Sheikh Taher al-Shamimi from Qatif called for the formation of protective popular forces as he doubted the government’s ability to protect its Shiite citizens. On the same day, Sheikh Abdul Karim al-Hubail also demanded the region’s citizens establish and manage protection committees. However, on May 28, Saudi Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef rejected this call and said that he would not allow anyone to take up the role of the state. In the absence of national projects, the ruling regimes in the Gulf will remain threatened by IS and the risk of the Sunni caliphate project expanding within the Gulf communities is looming. As long as the Gulf governments do not reform their political regimes by allowing for greater popular participation in managing wealth, the angry youth will continue to be driven by extremist organizations and terrorism will go on.

Islamic State says emir for Khorasan province is aliveBy Bill Roggio | July 13, 2015 |

Hafiz Saeed Khan, the Islamic State’s emir for Khorasan province (left); Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost (right). A former detainee at Guantanamo Bay who was one of the first jihadists to defect to the

Islamic State in the Afghan-Pakistan region has denied reports that the group’s emir for its Khorasan province was killed last week in a US airstrike. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, who was detained at Guantanamo for three years, “rejected the killing of Hafiz Saeed Khan,” the emir for Khorasan province, according to Pajhwok Afghan News. Dost denied Saeed’s death in a telephone interview with the Afghan news organization.Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) claimed that the United States killed Saeed in a July 10 airstrike in the Achin district in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar

Chechen commander in Syria pledges to Islamic Caucasus EmiratesBy Bill Roggio | July 10, 2015 |

Salahuddin Shishani, the former emir of the Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar who now leads a group of jihadists from the Caucasus in Syria, swore allegiance to the new leader of the Islamic

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Caucasus Emirate. Shishani and his deputy, Abdul Karim Krymsky, were removed from the leadership of Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar (the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, or Muhajireen Army) just last month. Shishani announced his pledge to Muhammad Abu Usman in a short video, nearly three minutes long, that was released by Akhbar Sham, a Russian-language website that previously promoted Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar’s activities and leaders in Syria. The video was also published by Kavkaz Center, which supports the Islamic Caucasus Emirate. A translation of the video was obtained by The Long War Journal.The video is titled “Emir Salahuddin Shishani and mujahideen of the Caucasus Emirate in Syria pledge allegiance to the emir of the Caucasus Emirate Abu Usman Gimrinski.” Shishani has called his group of fighters “the Caucasus Emirate in Syria” in the past, and even has been photographed with a flag emblazoned with the words “Imarat Kavkaz.” [See LWJ report, Terrorism in the Caucasus and the threat to the US homeland.]

In the video, Shishani is seen with a group of masked fighters who are armed with an assortment of assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades. An anti-aircraft gun is also seen in the background. Shishani begins by lamenting the “various kinds of discord that has [sic] been recently sown among mujahideen that inflicts huge damage on the jihad,” which he notes has occurred “on all fronts of jihad,” even in Syria. He is likely referring to divisions caused by the Islamic State’s rise, but may also be referring to the incident that led to his removal as the emir of Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar. But, he argues, “discord is not the reason to abandon jihad.” “In order not to stray away from this path, we shall orient ourselves to the unanimous opinion of jihad theologians,” Shishani continues. “We, the Caucasus mujahideen, are pleased to have received the news of appointment of Abu Usman Gimrinski as emir of the Caucasus Emirate… I, the representative of the Caucasus Emirate in Sham, Shishani, pledge allegiance to Abu Usman Gimrinski and I will obey him as long as he follows the Koran and Sunnah. We also urge all Muslims of the Caucasus to follow suit and consolidate around Sheikh Abu Usman.”Shishani’s pledge to the Islamic Caucasus Emirate is a much needed boost to the al Qaeda-linked jihadist group, which has been plagued by a string of defections to the Islamic State. However, it is unclear how many fighters Shishani still commands. [See LWJ report, Amid defections, Islamic Caucasus Emirate publicly recognizes new leader.]

Shishani and his deputy, Abdul Karim Krymsky, were removed from their leadership positions in Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar and ordered to leave northern Idlib in Syria in mid-June. The two were accused of threatening members of the group with force and with rejecting sharia, or Islamic law. A judicial official close to Shishani denied the charges. Akhbar Sham interviewed Sheikh Abd al Mahdi Razziq, originally appointed to serve as a judge who would review the decision to remove Shishani and Krymysky; Razziq described Shishani’s dismissal as a “mistake” and denied that he rejected sharia. A transcript of the interview was published by Kavkaz Center. Razziq also claimed that the judges had already decided to support Shishani’s dismissal, so he resigned. It is unlikely that either group will defect from al Qaeda’s camp and join the Islamic State anytime soon. Shishani’s oath to the Islamic Caucasus Emirate puts him in al Qaeda’s sphere of influence. In the past, Shishani denounced the Islamic State for creating divisions in Syria.The new leadership of Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar also appears to remain loyal to al Qaeda. The Al Nusrah Front was involved in the decision to remove Shishani and Krymysky, and that decision was favorable to Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar’s new leadership. According to a translation of the judicial decision by From Chechnya to Syria’s Joanna Paraszczuk, “both parties did agree that Jabhat al Nusra shall enter into the role as an additional partner in this question.” This is supported by Razziq, who noted that Sheikh Abdallah Muhammad al

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Muhaysini, an influential cleric who is closely aligned with al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, was also involved in settling the dispute.

TEHRAN (FNA Jul 9)- The Iraqi security forces captured the main ISIL base in the Eastern Diyala province and purged the terrorists from the region. The successful operations of the Iraqi army and popular forces in the strategic town of al-Matibjah on the border of Diyala and Salahuddin provinces led to the freedom of the town and cleaning up the terrorists from the region. During the operations in Matibjah and its surroundings, also tens of ISIL terrorists were killed and 5 training centers of the terrorist group were destroyed completely.

Last month, the Iraqi army attacks in the Eastern province of Diyala killed 300 Takfiri terrorists from different nationalities. Abdol Amir al-Zaidi, the commander of Iraq's Tigris operations, was quoted as saying by Sumeriya News that his forces have killed over 100 foreign non-Arab terrorists and 200 Takfiri terrorists with different Arab nationalities.He added that the non-Arab terrorists were from the European and Asian countries, most of them ISIL ringleaders. The Iraqi forces liberated the entire Diyala province from the control of the ISIL terrorists in January

TEHRAN (FNA Jul 9)- The Iraqi army and popular forces along with the country's Sunni tribesmen have made major advance in areas near Fallujah, and the city will go under siege from 4 directions in coming hours.The Iraqi forces purged the terrorists from al-Fani district in Saqlavia region, Northwest of Fallujah, on Thursday and are now advancing towards the Center of Saqlavia.Once the strategic region of Saqlavia is completely cleaned, the ISIL terrorists in Fallujah will be surrounded completely from four sides. Iraqi army forces, backed by volunteer forces, launched the operation to liberate the strategic city of Fallujah from the control of the ISIL terrorists on Monday. Iraqi officials said the offensive to retake the troubled city, located roughly 69 kilometers (43 miles) West of the capital, Baghdad, began on Monday night, and that government troopers together with volunteer fighters reached the gates of Fallujah.The authorities said that Iraqi forces were in full control of the Western, Southern and Eastern areas leading to the city.

Why is Daesh not Being Defeated – In Five QuestionsRUSI Analysis, 29 Jun 2015By Afzal Ashraf, Consultant Fellow, International Diplomacy These five questions address the current role of Daesh and the threat it is posing to the rest of the world, asking why it is not being defeated and how it could potentially be defeated. Particularly following the recent attacks in France and Tunisia, it is clear that Daesh is strong and unless it is eliminated, one cannot hope for peace and stability. 

1. Why is Daesh advancing in Syria and Iraq? Is the international coalition failing?

Daesh is able to advance because it is not being effectively stopped.  That is because the international community is not prioritising the threat from Daesh high enough. When Saddam invaded Kuwait, the USA put together the largest coalition in history and removed him with 6 months. Last week, President Obama met with Gulf leaders in Washington to discuss the Yemen Conflict, but no such meeting has taken place to address Daesh. Yemen is currently a contained problem while Daesh is a threat to the West and to all Muslims, including Sunni and Shia. This shows a lack of regional and international priority.This lack of priority means that no one is taking overall responsibility.  One of the basic principles of warfare is clear command and coordination of forces. That singularity drives a

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strategy and a plan in a focused way. There appears to be no such thing in Iraq let alone in Syria. The de facto strategy of Iraqi ground forces being trained and supported by Coalition airpower has a couple of fundamental flaws:  Insurgencies are good at adapting their fighting style over time. Conventional forces are good at reacting quickly to threats and opportunities. The current slow pace of operations against Daesh plays to the strengths of the Daesh insurgency, while not exploiting the strengths of conventional forces of nation states.  Airpower has a tremendous ability to disrupt and destroy an enemy's capability, but its impact is perishable over time. Airpower without effective land forces capable of exploiting its advantages is unlikely to succeed. 

2. Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are supporting the rebels fighting Assad. Does that help Daesh succeed?Anything that weakens the Assad regime will inevitably strengthen Daesh, as the Assad forces are the only opposition to Daesh on the ground.  This situation is another symptom of poor prioritisation by regional powers. It is one of the reasons why the conflict in Syria is protracted.   Despite the help of outside powers, the other rebel forces together only control about the same amount of territory as Daesh, indicating the ineffectiveness of the current strategy. It would be better to freeze the issue of Assad until Daesh is tackled. In the longer term, Daesh is a greater threat to a greater number of people than Assad.  

3. What is the role of the Tehran regimen in the conflict?It is apparent that the Iranians have been providing training and support to Shia militias whereas the USA has been concentrating mainly on re-training the Army and providing some support to the Peshmerga. The Iranians have also provided some aircraft and pilots to the Iraqi Air Force. Unlike the USA trainers, the Iranians seem to be providing support in combat judging by the number of Iranian officers killed. While the Iranian trained militia appear to be doing better than the Army in some operations, their use in the long term is likely to weaken the authority of the government and add to the already great sectarian divisions in the country. Therefore, it is preferable to support the Iraqi Army with Sunni troops from other countries than relying on sectarian militia.

4. What Threat Does Daesh Pose to Europe?Europe has suffered a number of Daesh inspired terrorist attacks such as the Paris Charlie Hebdo shootings in January 2015. These attacks are becoming bolder and harder to stop. There is a continuing flow of fighters and supporters including women and children from Europe to Syria. Those that are stopped from going pose a threat as they may wish to conduct the violence they crave on European soil instead of the Middle East. Those that go threaten Western economic interests in the Middle East and may pose a serious threat if any of them return radicalized and trained in terror tactics. In the meantime, the increasing scale of surveillance and monitoring by security agencies and the police is putting a strain on the resources of nearly all European countries.The recent attacks in Tunisia indicate that the spectrum of direct threats to UK and European publics is rapidly evolving. Perhaps the greatest damage to economic prosperity, social cohesion and political stability will be felt several years from now if the migrant crisis in Europe, mostly fueled by refugees from Al-Qa’ida and Daesh inspired conflicts, continues. Of Syria’s almost 12m refugees, about 4 million are living abroad, many determined to move to Europe. A smaller but significant number are similarly fleeing Iraq.  Only when Daesh is eliminated can any hope of peace and stability arise in those countries.

5. What should the Obama administration do in order to defeat Daesh?The US Administration needs to recognise that Daesh is an existential threat to all nations and peoples of the region. It is also a security threat to the USA and Europe through terror activities carried out by Daesh supporters in those countries. Daesh has further been

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responsible for the greatest increase in international radicalisation ever recorded and it has contributed to the largest displacement of people in history.  All of these issues should make Daesh the greatest threat to US interests, making it the top priority. Only when it is truly prioritised as the greatest and most urgent threat facing the USA will the necessary leadership and strategy for the fight against Daesh emerge within both the International community and the regional powers.  The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.

Top ISIL leader in Afghanistan 'killed in drone strike'Shahidullah Shahid killed along with five fighters in eastern Afghanistan, intelligence official says.09 Jul 2015 [EPA]A top Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group commander in Afghanistan has reportedly been killed in a US drone strike in the country's east this week, an Afghan intelligence officer has said. Shahidullah Shahid, a former member of the Pakistani Taliban who defected to ISIL and was operating in Afghanistan as the group's third senior most leader, was killed along with five fighters on Tuesday, Hasib Sediqi, spokesman for the Afghanistan National Directorate of Security (NDS), said. "He wanted to expand IS (ISIL) operations in the country and with his death, it will have an impact on their activities," he told the Reuters news agency on Wednesday. ISIL fighters have recently gained ground in the eastern Achin district of Nangarhar province after pushing out the Taliban. Bordering areas inside Pakistan, Nangarhar is one of the provinces where ISIL fighters are most active.ISIL loyalists, mostly former Taliban fighters disillusioned by the movement's unsuccessful bid to return to power in Kabul, are often accompanied by dozens of foreigners, hoisting black flags in several districts in the province.

From Al-Shabaab to Daesh RUSI Analysis, 23 Jun 2015By Raffaello Pantucci, Director of International Security Studies Following the announcement of British deaths in Iraq and Somalia, it has become clear that foreign fighters are attracted to various battlefields. However, there has been a noticeable shift away from Somalia to Syria/Iraq in travel patterns from the UK. Understanding why and how this has taken place might offer some ideas for how to stifle some of the attraction of Syria and Iraq. Thomas Evans’s death fighting against Kenyan forces in Lamu the same weekend that it was revealed that Talha Asmal was involved in a suicide bombing in Iraq reminds us once again that Syria/Iraq is not the only battlefield drawing British foreign fighters. There has always been a curious connection between the Somali and Levantine battlefields, with both conflicts proving able to project a global narrative that appealed to excitable young Britons. However, over time, Somalia’s attraction has shrunk while Syria and Iraq’s has grown: it is therefore an interesting question to try to understand this shift better to see if there are policy lessons that can be learned to counter Daesh’s current draw.

Al-Shabaab’s draw Emerging from the ashes of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) Al-Shabaab was an organization that had a strong link to the Al Qa’ida cell operating in East Africa (AQEA). Led by prominent jihadists Saleh Ali Nabhan Saleh and Fazul Mohammed, the AQEA cell was a key draw and conduit for Western fighters going to the Horn of Africa.

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Amongst those who went was Bilal el Berjawi, a Lebanese West Londoner who, alongside his close childhood friend Mohammed Sakr, ended up fighting alongside the group before both were killed in drone strikes. They were both were young men brought up in West London and excited by the narratives of global struggle and jihad that had most prominently taken root in East Africa in the mid-to-late 2000s. Al-Shabaab had managed to show itself as a key point in the global struggle championed by Al- Qa’ida and, as Afghanistan/Pakistan became harder to travel to, Somalia offered itself as an alternative location with a strong link to Al-Qa’ida core. At the same time, the popular radical preacher Anwar al Awlaki championed Al-Shabaab’s fight from his base in Yemen, amplifying its attraction to the young international warriors.And for a brief while, Somalia was the big draw to excitable young men and women seeking the glories of jihad in foreign fields. The group would release videos with good production values venerating their dead or re-playing their battles using actors and graphics reminiscent of Hollywood productions. They were even active online (with some who still are now), with their warriors taking to Twitter to communicate with the world and spread ideas, videos and information. All of which is very reminiscent of what ISIS and the battlefield in Syria and Iraq are currently producing.

Shifting networksIt is therefore not that surprising that over time it was observable that the networks sending people to Somalia started to show up in the background stories of those going to fight in Syria. Repeated videos and narratives have emerged in which tales tell of people finding Somalia too difficult and instead turning to Syria. Mohammed Emwazi is the most prominent example of this, who first tried to go to East Africa, but instead ended up in Syria after getting turned back. Others include dead West Londoners like Mohammed el Araj or Choukri Ellekhfi, who came from the same networks that had produced Bilal el Berjawi and Mohammed Sakr. Up in North London, a group that included TPIM absconders Ibrahim Magag and Mohammed Ali Mohammed started off sending people to Somalia and Afghanistan, to more recently helping people go fight in Syria. On the continent of Europe, a network sending people from Belgium to Somalia also ended up re-directing fighters to Syria. In many ways, Thomas Evans’ death is a left over from this earlier time when Somalia was the main conflict and he seems to have simply been one of the few Brits still left fighting out there, as the fight in the Levant slowly became the biggest draw for those seeking jihadi battlefields.

Lessons Learned? The key policy question here is why did Somalia start to lose its appeal? And are there lessons that can be learned from that experience that might help with Daesh and the appeal of Syria and Iraq? In this light, four aspects are worth considering.

First, sometime in 2011, Al-Shabaab started to undergo internal ructions. Different factions vied for control, leading to others getting killed off. There was widespread belief that Bilal el Berjawi’s death, for example, was the product of these internal tensions, and other prominent foreigners were believed to have been felled in similar ways. The result was to scare some foreign fighters off as they saw prominent contacts getting killed and Al Shabaab turning it on itself.

Second, the conflict in Somalia was always a difficult one to get to. Direct flights to Somalia are hard to get, and even getting to neighbouring countries does not make it easy to get to Shabaab’s camps. Over time, this became harder as regional security forces focused ever more on foreigners travelling to neighboring countries with the intention of trying to get into Somalia.

Third, over time, it became increasingly obvious that Al-Shabaab was losing territory and land. No longer able to project an image of success and ruling territory, the narrative

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around the conflict instead became of internal struggles, a group on the run and headlines about strikes taking out key leaders.

Fourth, the conflict in Syria took off in late 2011 and soon after that became the brightest light on the jihadi map. Over time, this slowly sucked all the air out of other fields and when taken in conjunction with the previous points, made Syria overall far more attractive than what was going on in Somalia.

The lessons learned are blunt. An unstable conflict in which groups are under substantial external pressure is one that is less attractive to the foreign warriors. Difficulty in getting to the field, a fractured leadership and a narrative of failure is important in reducing the groups' appeal. Media output – which Al-Shabaab continues to produce with high production values, but no longer attracts attention – is not the key factor. This is important to consider in the sometimes excessive focus on online activity as the key aspect of Daesh that needs countering. In fact, more traditional responses of making life difficult for groups to operate is in fact key in stemming growth. Daesh needs to be seen to be losing and fracturing on the ground before it loses its appeal to the foreign warriors drawn to fight alongside it.

Trusting Iran to stop terrorism is like inviting an arsonist to join the fire brigadeIran remains one of the world's most prolific sponsors of terrorism. How can we expect it to stop once they have a nuclear deal?

By Dore Gold10 Jul 2015 Iran's foreign minister, Javad Zarif, has written an op-ed in the Financial Times which sets forward a distinct sequence for ostensibly resolving the daunting security challenges of the Middle East. First, the P5+1 - the group of powerful nations negotiating with Iran - should come to a deal over its nuclear program. As a result, he argues, Tehran will "open new horizons" and join "the international battle" against "the increasingly brutal extremism that is engulfing the Middle East."

The idea that Iran is a partner in the fight against terrorism is not only disingenuous but also absurd. What Zarif is seeking is a leap of faith by his Western readers, who are asked to believe that a country which has been repeatedly identified as the largest state supporter of terrorism in the world will suddenly be altered by an agreement over its nuclear program into an ally against terrorism. He is asking the world to simply trust Iran that this transformation is about to happen. There is no evidence that the trust Zarif seeks is warranted in any way. Iran operates globally through cells controlled by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), often backed by operatives of Hizbollah. During the nuclear negotiations, this network has not been reduced in size; it operates in some 30 countries and on five continents - Iranian-backed attacks have taken place in such diverse locations as Argentina, France, Austria, Bulgaria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, Thailand and even the United States.

Indeed, in October, 2011, the US uncovered a plot by an IRGC operative to recruit members of a Mexican drug cartel to conduct a mass casualty attack in Washington DC aimed at the Saudi Ambassador to the US. Since that time IRGC activity has only intensified. Yet another Iranian terrorist cell was discovered in Cypus just last month. Some in the West hope that since Iran is led by a Shiite government it can be recruited in the fight against Sunni extremism, including against the Islamic State (Isil). This analysis often overlooks Iran's proven willingness to cross the Sunni-Shiite divide to promote Sunni jihadism as well. Just after 9/11, Sunni extremists, including al-Qaeda, fled Afghanistan and sought asylum in Iran. These included Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the future commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which eventually became Isil. Iranian backing for Sunni jihadists, with arms and training, has extended to Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as to the Taliban in Afghanistan. A nuclear deal

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is likely only to intensify Iranian support for global terrorism for two reasons. First, the lifting of sanctions on Iran will result in a windfall of cash for the Iranian treasury, which could reach $150 billion in the first year. As Iran decides which Middle Eastern insurgency to back with its IRGC units, it often has to establish priorities because it is operating under clear economic constraints. These constraints will be removed as Iran obtains the wherewithal to fully fund and even expand its terrorist activity worldwide.

Second, in past decades, states supporting terrorism feared retaliatory operations by the West, such as the US attack on Libya in 1986. Deterrence could be created. But if Iran becomes a nuclear threshold state, as a result of its impending agreement with the P5+1, what are the chances that deterrence of this sort will hold? Iran will seek to act with impunity as the terrorism it sponsors acquires a protective nuclear umbrella. Zarif is the last Iranian official who should talk about rejecting terrorism. Last January, he paid a highly publicized visit to Lebanon and laid a wreath at the grave of Imad Mughniyeh, the mastermind of Hizbollah terrorism, who was responsible for the attacks in the 1980s on American and French forces in Beirut, hijacking civilian aircrafts and taking international hostages. Winston Churchill has been attributed with the saying that he refused to be impartial between the fire brigade and the fire. To take his distinction a step further, depending on Iran to fight terrorism is like making an arsonist part of the fire brigade. There is no basis for believing this will possibly work. Iran must unequivocally abandon its backing of international terrorism if it ever wants to rejoin the world community. Dr. Gold is the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel

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