Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-142-Caliphate-ISIS-26

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-142-Caliphate-ISIS-26

If not us, who? If not here, where? If not now, when?

Enemy of Enemies: The Rise of DAESH, some years ago I warned about the growing danger of salafist ideologists perusing the Caliphate and the unknown and unprecedented force that become unleashed when the spirit was allowed to leave the bottle if the Caliph would be declared; nobody listened. –Cees.

A new photo of an alleged geography textbook for students in school in the Islamic State shows the growing holdings of the terrorist state in Asia and Africa.The cover however does not include currently disputed regions claimed by ISIS. Last month, ISIS made the announcement of the annexation of India and Bangladesh for “Wilayat Hindi” or “State of Hind” on Twitter. The tweets announcing the new “state” were tweeted by Abu Talot Khorasani, who describes himself as a “former Taliban Commander, [who] pledged allegiance to Islamic State.”

Michael T. Flynn, former head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, When you drop a bomb from a drone… you are going to cause more damage than you are going to cause good.

Tariq Ramadan, Islamic scholar; An 'Islamic Caliphate', a 'Caliph' - terms that are now in headlines across the globe, mostly thanks to one extremist group, The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

As ISIL captures territory declaring their caliphate, minorities have fled and journalists have been beheaded. Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL, has called on Muslims to take up arms, and thousands of fighters from around the world have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight for the self-declared caliphate. “They [ISIL] are distorting the whole message. So we have to respond to this by saying ... what you are doing, killing innocent people, implementing so-called 'Sharia' or the so-called 'Islamic State', this is against everything that is coming from Islam," says Tariq Ramadan, a prominent Islamic scholar.

"It is not a caliphate," Ramadan says about ISIL. "It is just people playing with politics referring to religious sources. And this is why [as] Muslim scholars, Muslim intellectuals, we have to be quite clear about this. We have to speak the truth and be quite clear about the fact that if they are not representing what are the Islamic principles, many of the dictators today are not representing Islam either.

"They have nothing to do with [Islamic] principles because our principles are clear: that the one who is leading should be chosen by people who are followers or citizens. So many countries who are dealing with the West are not as bad as Daesh (ISIL) today, but they are bad," he adds. “The main problems of Muslims are coming from the Muslims; from Muslim-majority countries," he says. "And then when we start to be critical

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston Churchill

Cees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent Page 1 of 14 01/05/2023

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and say we are going to speak out against all the dictators, then some of the scholars who responded to Daesh today and are speaking about the so-called Islamic State, saying this is wrong in Islam, they are the same scholars that are supporting dictators."

Spokesman of the Russian Defense Ministry Major General Igor Konashenkov TEHRAN (FNA)- Terrorist groups in Syria have begun fighting each other: the ISIL group organized three terrorist attacks on field commanders of the al-Nusra Front, Spokesman of the Russian Defense Ministry Major General Igor Konashenkov said.

He said the defense ministry has information about growing contradictions between various terrorist groups, which are caused by fighting for control over territories and money flows, Itar-Tass reported Sunday. "According to intercepts, last week only IS(IL) organized near the city of Idlib three acts of terror using mined cars, aiming against field commanders of the Jabhat-an-Nusra (al-Nusra Front)," he said."IS(IL) leaders demand from field commanders they use more often at roads and in settlements vehicles filled with explosives, thus aiming at the attacking Syrian armed forces."

The region’s Muslim communities in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia still largely practice a moderate vision of Islam, based on Hanafi jurisprudence and Sufi traditions inherited from decades of Ottoman rule. However, Saudi-led efforts following the fall of the region’s communist regimes have attempted to make the Balkans a bastion of Salafist and Wahhabist doctrines and practice. One outcome of this process is that in the last two years, over 1,000 foreign fighters from the Western Balkans have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq

(Twitter / ISIS)A previously released map of Islamic State territorial claims did not include India or Bangladesh but included the Middle East, including Israel, the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Europe including the Balkans and Spain.

Enemy of Enemies: The Rise of ISIL Al Jazeera explores the origins and evolution of the world's most feared and powerful insurgent group - ISIL.18 Oct 2015 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been truly devastating to





those it comes in contact with and bloody to those under its control.Its sudden rise and expansion in 2014 has perplexed many. It has humiliated its enemies, including those in Damascus, Baghdad, Tehran and Washington. Armed with extensive weaponry, boasting an international fighting force and adept in the art of digital media propaganda, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has become the de facto authority across an area the size of Jordan. his two-part series peels back the rhetoric to examine how a volunteer organisation managed to rise up from the ashes of post-invasion Iraq and defeat standing armies many times its size and capacity.How did it begin? How did it grow so astonishingly quickly? And how is it being used by global and regional powers to change the geopolitical map of the Middle East?With critical testimony from informed insiders and experts from across three continents, as well as original footage from Syria and Iraq, this series mixes documentary and discussion to unravel the interweaving nexus of events and alliances, at once aligned and conflicting, that have given rise to the world's most notorious, and powerful, insurgent group.Al Jazeera's former Middle East correspondent, Sue Turton, narrates the documentary and also moderates a studio discussion between Iraq's former national security adviser, Mowaffak al Rubaie; Ali Khedery, special adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq; and Australian journalist and Middle East correspondent, Martin Chulov.Enemy of Enemies: The Rise of ISIL 25 Oct

Like Russia, Chechnya Is Being Increasingly Drawn Into Syrian ConflictPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 182October 8, 2015 04:44 PM Age: 10 daysBy: Mairbek Vatchagaev

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov (C) (Source: AP)Russia officially declared its intentions to intervene in the Syrian civil war only in September, but Moscow has been backing President Bashar al-Assad’s regime since the start of the conflict. Perhaps the most interesting part of Russia’s campaign in Syria is the current question of how far Moscow is prepared to go in its joint land operations with Iran and al-Assad. For example, is Russia planning to dispatch additional ground forces made up of specially trained Chechens to Syria?Nearly all of Russia’s governors have expressed support for the Kremlin’s actions in Syria. Chechnya’s governor, Ramzan Kadyrov, stated that he fully supported the decision by the Russian leadership to use force in Syria to fight the Islamic State terrorist group. “I fully support the decision of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, about using the Russian the armed forces to fight terrorists in Syria,” Kadyrov posted on Instagram (Instagram.com, September 30). Kadyrov said Russia’s involvement in Syria would prevent the Islamic State from descending on Russian cities and villages. Once again, the governor of Chechnya offered his services to Putin.While waiting to see whether Chechen special forces would be sent to Syria, Kadyrov held military exercises to show the military preparedness of his forces. On September 30, he looked in on his “Flying Squad” special forces unit, with his aide on cooperation with law enforcement agencies, Daniil Martynov, saying that “just in the past two weeks, the troops have made over forty parachute jumps. The troops acquired the experience of landing on





mountain slopes, in the forest, and in deep snow. All officers have acquired the skills of carrying out special operations under a variety of conditions” (Lifenews.ru, September 30).Two days later, on October 2, large-scale counterterrorist exercises were conducted in the village of Chervlyonnaya, in Chechnya’s Shelkovskoi district, with the participation of the regional police and the security services (Kavkazsky Uzel, October 2). In September, the Southern and the North Caucasian Federal Districts jointly held large-scale command post and special tactical exercises in Chechnya for the first time. Media coverage primarily focused on the counterterrorist part of the exercises (Chechnyatoday.com, September 17). The head of the Russian Ministry of Interior’s Support Division for the Activities of Special Forces and Aviation, Major-General Ivan Birnik, expressed high regard for the preparedness of the Chechen special forces. Birnik’s mission was to assess the ability of the Chechen forces to operate in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, as well as in a larger context inside Russia. It appears that the Russian officials were satisfied with what they saw in Chechnya and appreciated Kadyrov’s efforts to create special services units that are on a par with some of the best such units in the Russian armed forces.Kadyrov has indicated that the Chechen special services carry out more operations than those officially reported. Chechnya’s governor said his government works outside Chechnya to identify terrorists and Islamic State recruiters. “We send people to fetch them from Syria. We return those who have not reached their destination and did not participate [in military action],” Kadyrov said (Rusnovosti.ru, October 2).Although Kadyrov only mentioned his government’s efforts to return young Chechens from Syria, he may be using the same channels to find out about the Chechens who are fighting in the Middle East in the ranks of various groups of militants. According to Chechnya’s interior ministry, between 2013 and the summer of 2015, 405 individuals left the republic for Syria, at least 104 of whom were killed and 44 returned home (Kavkazsky Uzel, October 3).Those are only the people the police and the Federal Security Service (FSB) have identified as participants in the conflict in Syria. In reality, the number of Chechens who went to Syria to fight is far larger because the security services have a hard time determining the whereabouts of everyone who has left Chechnya. All Chechens who fly from the North Caucasus to Istanbul come under suspicion automatically because Turkey is the transit point for many Muslims who want to join the militants in the Middle East. The Islamic State is one of the most popular groups among the Chechen recruits because a widely known Chechen, Umar Shishani (Tarkhan Batirashvili), plays an important role in the organization. The Caucasus Emirate of the Middle East is the second most attractive group to the Chechen recruits. This Middle Eastern branch of the Caucasus Emirate has been set up by another Chechen, Salahudin (Faizulla Margoshvili). The third most popular group of militants is Junud al-Sham, which is led by another Chechen, Amir Muslim (Muslim Margoshvili). Junud al-Sham is especially appealing to Chechen recruits from Europe. The fourth-most popular group, Ajnad Kavkaz, is also rapidly growing. It is under the command of another famous Chechen in Syria, Amir Abdul-Khakim (Rustam Azhiev).Since the official start of Russia’s military involvement in Syria to back President al-Assad’s embattled Alawite-dominated regime, Ramzan Kadyrov has stated almost daily that his forces should be sent to the Middle East. However, if Kadyrov’s forces turn up in Syria, Chechnya’s governor will collide with all the Sunni Muslim leaders in the Middle East who have maintained friendly relations with him. By siding with the Alawites, Russia is essentially challenging the Sunnis, including Russia’s Muslims, 99.99 percent of whom are Sunni. The conflict in Syria, therefore, could have a great impact on the North Caucasus and Russian Muslims in general, and in ways that are completely unpredictable.





Afghan General Abdul Rashid Dostum Meets With Ramzan Kadyrov in GroznyPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 183October 9, 2015 By: Mairbek Vatchagaev

Afghan Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum meeting with Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen RepublicThe vice president of Afghanistan, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, made an unexpected visit to Grozny earlier this month. Dostum attended celebrations for the birthday of Chechnya’s ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, surprising all analysts who follow developments in the North Caucasus (Ridus.ru, October 5). The official press release said that the two men discussed “issues pertaining to economic, trade and cultural cooperation.” Precisely what types of goods would be traded between Chechnya and Afghanistan was not disclosed. It is also unclear what a cultural exchange between Chechnya and Afghanistan would entail. However, news reports quickly changed after Kadyrov stated he was prepared to help Afghanistan fight terrorists. Russia’s foreign ministry stated that Chechnya set a good example for volatile Afghanistan, which has been torn by conflict for decades.Dostum is a highly controversial figure in Afghan society. The fact that he studied in the Soviet Union and started his career as an agent of the Afghan KGB under Afghanistan’s pro-Soviet government has probably had an impact on his present behavior. Dostum made alliances with a variety of other leaders and later abandoned and betrayed them at his convenience. The general created a special zone in his ethnic stronghold in Afghanistan’s Jowzjаn province, which is populated by Uzbeks and not controlled by Kabul. In 2014, Dostum embarked on a series of secret visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in an attempt to find allies in anticipation of the withdrawal of the United States’ forces from Afghanistan (see EDM, March 10, 2014). Some experts fear the country could fall apart along ethnic lines after US troops leave (Regnum, January 31, 2014). Dostum most likely found a way to Vladimir Putin via official channels in Astana. Officials in Moscow, however, must have decided that he should first meet with Kadyrov before developing closer relations. In an interview with a Russian TV channel, Dostum said that his visit to Chechnya was interesting and helpful because Kadyrov “has a close relationship with Mr. Putin” (Lifenews.ru, October 5).At the meeting with Dostum, Kadyrov emphasized that his government paid special attention to combatting terrorism in general and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in particular. Chechnya’s governor lined up his special forces for Dostum in Grozny (Instagram.com, October 6). During his meeting with Kadyrov, Dostum said the Islamic State was trying to gain a foothold in Afghanistan (Kavkaz.versia.ru, October 5). Russian media portrayed Dostum’s statement as if Kabul was asking for Russian assistance to prevent the Islamic State’s expansion. Kadyrov said he was confident that Russia’s leadership would extend support to the Afghan government (Rosbalt, October 5). The Afghan visitor tried to be diplomatic in his statements and said that “Russia and the US must leave aside their minor differences and try to prevent this conflict by political means” (Regnum, October 5).Moscow does not emphasize this side of Kadyrov’s activities, but for the past two or three years, the governor of Chechnya has become an intermediary connecting Moscow and the Islamic world. First the war in Afghanistan, followed by two wars in Chechnya, dramatically diminished Moscow’s influence in the Arab and Muslim world due to the





brutality of their “cleansing operations.” The Kremlin values Kadyrov for advancing Moscow’s interests among Arab countries. Chechnya’s leader maintains close relationships with various Arab leaders, including the Saudi royal family. He also has friendly relations with the emirs of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The Chechen leader calls his relations with the King of Jordan “brotherly.” Senior Middle Eastern officials often stop off in Grozny on their way home from Moscow. Kadyrov is allowed to do many things that his neighbors cannot even dream of. He frequently opens mosques, hafiz schools and madrassas. He also introduces dress codes and behavior codes for the republic’s Muslims. The arrival in Grozny of an Afghan general of Uzbek origin and with a Soviet background can best be interpreted as part of Moscow’s bid to revive ties with the Muslim world that were lost in previous decades.Moscow is signaling that the tripartite union of Russia with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Iran is open to other members. Afghanistan, North Korea or even far-away Venezuela could also join. Russia’s leadership is also trying to show the Russian population that the country is a global power and that no problem in the world can be solved without taking Russian interests into account. Moscow could be contemplating the notion of deploying Kadyrov’s Chechen special forces for a ground operation in Syria to work alongside Russian forces operating there. Ramzan Kadyrov is prepared to send his special services (see EDM, September 18, October 8). However, this step will certainly deepen the conflict in the Middle East and alienate the region’s Sunni Arab majority from Moscow.

As Moscow’s Military Involvement in Syria Receives More Attention, Its Officials Focus on Russians Fighting Against al-AssadPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 172September 24, 2015 By: Mairbek Vatchagaev

The Russian media ramped up coverage of Syria after reports emerged that the Russian military is actively taking part in the conflict on the side of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. To distract Russian citizens from domestic issues and justify intervention in the conflict, the authorities in Moscow have started providing figures on the number of Russian citizens fighting in Syria against al-Assad.Last summer, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Yevgeny Lukyanov stated that up to 2,000 Russian citizens were fighting in Syria and Iraq, in the ranks of the Islamic State (IS) extremist militant organization. According to Lukyanov, some of those militants have started to return home. The majority of those fighters, he said, were from the North Caucasus, although he conceded that some of them came from other Russian regions. Russian citizens have participated in the conflict in Syria and Iraq for a long time (Islamreview.ru, July 25). Lukyanov said that if al-Assad’s regime were to fall, the IS radicals would next target Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. The latter statement must have been aimed at signaling to the United States that its interests in the region would be affected if the regime in Syria crumbled.Two months after Lukyanov’s statements, the chairwoman of the science consulting council under the Antiterrorist Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, Marianna Kochubei, put forward different estimates. “According to the National Antiterrorist Committee, from 800 to 1,500 citizens of Russia are fighting in the ranks of the ‘Islamic State’ in Syria,” she said. “Over 170 of them have been killed.” Kochubei specified that the figure for





those killed covered the entire period of the existence of the Islamic State (Newsru.com, September 16).The consulting council under the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS countries apparently receives less reliable information than other government bodies. Otherwise, it is hard to explain where the estimate of 170 casualties among the Russian citizens fighting with the Islamic State for the entire duration of the war in the Middle East comes from. Earlier reports suggested that there were large casualties among the Chechens fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State in the Syrian city of Kobanî (a.k.a. Ayn al-Arab) alone (Warsonline.info, Oсtober 25, 2014). According to unconfirmed sources, the Chechens suffered over 100 casualties out of the entire toll of several hundred casualties in the fighting against the Kurds in Kobanî. IS military commander Umar al-Shishani stated that his group lost 500 militants in the fighting with the Syrian opposition in 2013 alone. An estimated 300 Chechens died during the siege of Syria’s Minnag military airport. Chechnya’s ruler Ramzan Kadyrov has also spoken of large casualties among the Chechens in Syria (YouTube, May 21, 2013). It is therefore unclear where the estimate of 170 casualties comes from. Perhaps, the figure reflects only those casualties that the Russian government could reliably confirm.The day after Kochubei’s statements, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev put forward another set of figures. “According to the interior ministry, 1,800 Russian citizens are fighting in the ranks of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—a former name for the Islamic State],” he said. “We have launched 477 criminal inquests” (TASS, September 17). This statement indicates that the Russian government has managed to identify 477 out of 1,800 fighters and launched criminal investigation against them for participating in armed activities abroad.The day after Kolokoltsev’s statement, the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) First Deputy Sergei Smirnov came out with yet another estimate, stating that 2,400 Russian citizens are fighting with the Islamic State, noting that “this is a fairly large number” (Echo.msk.ru, September 18).One of Ramzan Kadyrov’s closest associates, Chechen parliamentary speaker Magomed Daudov, stated last month that “according to the latest information, over 3,000 of our young people are participating in war in Syria” (YouTube, August 30). Daudov’s figure may be the most accurate: indeed, 3,000–4,000 Chechens may be fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State and other groups fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. About a thousand Dagestanis and hundreds of individuals from other ethnic groups in Russia, such as the Ingush, Kabardins, Karachays, Tatars and others, are also in the Middle East. Thus the total number of militants from Russia fighting in Syria may be up to 5,000. As time goes by, some of those fighters will return to the Russian Federation from the Middle East and try to use their fighting experience against Russia. Russian government forces recently killed one such militant, Abu Dujan (Magomed Abdullaev), in Dagestan (Graniru.info, August 17). The Russian authorities have put some of the people who returned from Syria on trial. However, nobody can guarantee that a number of the fighters did not slip through the Russian authorities’ defenses and are currently waiting for the right moment to declare a “worldwide jihad.”In confronting the West in Syria, Russia may be igniting a fire it will not be able to extinguish on its own.

Is Moscow Set to Target Russians Fighting Against Assad in Syria?Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 177October 1, 2015 By: Mairbek Vatchagaev





Salahudin Shishani, head of recently formed Syrian militant group, Imarat Kavkaz (Source: chechensinsyria.wordpress.com)Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict on behalf of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad may take the war in the Middle East to a new level. The main concern of North Caucasians will be whether Moscow’s involvement in the conflict results in it sending military personnel from Russia’s Muslim regions to the Middle East.If the Russian government dispatches pro-Moscow Chechen forces to Syria, they will prioritize killing the Chechens who are already on the ground fighting against al-Assad’s regime. First of all, the pro-Moscow Chechens will target the anti-Assad Chechen groups located in the areas of Latakia, Idlib and Aleppo. The largest of these anti-Assad groups is Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Army of the Emigrants and Partisans), which unites mostly citizens of the former Soviet republics (Centrasia.ru, September 24).Last summer, a conspiracy group within Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar removed the Chechen leader of the group, Amir Salahudin Shishani (Feizulla Margoshvili) (see EDM, July 10). A Saudi national, Mutgasim Billah al-Madani, led the coup in the group. Even though al-Madani subsequently appointed a Dagestani who had supported the coup as the group’s military amir, it is unlikely the group will remain intact, since a majority of its Chechens have left to fight under amir Salahudin Shishani. The outflow of the North Caucasians and of other Russian speakers from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar will increase as the new group established by Salahudin Shishani gains traction. The new leadership of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar broke the main principle of the group—to avoid affiliation with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. The new leadership of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar has been looking for ways to bolster its credentials as it loses its North Caucasian members. The group has officially pledged allegiance to the leadership of the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra (Warsonline.info, September 24).Meanwhile, the dismissed amir, Salahudin Shishani, established a new group of militants in Syria, Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate). The militant leader recently made a brief statement, saying that he left Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar three months ago. According to Shishani, Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar was founded primarily by militants from the Caucasus Emirate in the North Caucasus. He emphasized that his new group would not become part of any other militant unit operating in the area (Sendvid.com, September 26). Shishani has implemented a clever marketing strategy for his group by giving it the name “Caucasus Emirate.” This will help it attract Russian-speaking militants who do not want to be under the command of Arab fighters.Russian security services are likely to target Amir Muslim (Muslim Margoshvili), whose group still operates independently. Muslim’s group Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Syria) suffered losses after many of its Chechen members left it for the group of Umar Shishani (Tarkhan Batirashvili) after the so-called Islamic State was proclaimed. Still, Amir Muslim’s group remains a combat-ready unit that operates in the area (YouTube, July 30). Apart from Amir Muslim, other Chechen commanders are also part of his group, such as Abu Turab, Abu Bakr, Abudullah Shishani and many others. The group is located in the area of the city of Jisr al-Shughur, in the province of Idlib, which borders Latakia.Amir Abdul-Khakim Shishani (Rustan Azhiev) is of no less interest to the Russian





security services. He commands a group called Ajnad al-Kavkaz, which is part of Ansar al-Sham (Partisans of the Levant), which in turn is part of a larger organization, the Jaysh al-Fateh (Conquering Army) coalition. Ansar al-Sham, prior to its membership in Jaysh al-Fateh, was part of al-Jabhat al-Islamiyya (Islamic Front), and prior to that, it was part of al-Jabhat al-Islamiyya al-Suriyya (Syrian Islamic Front). Amir Abdul-Khakim Shishani is one of the few militants with substantial experience fighting in the wars in Chechnya. This is why he is so valued by the local militants. Abdul-Khakim Shishani’s group operates in both Latakia and Idlib, which puts it on the forefront of the battle if the Russian security services stage an attack.One of the primary military amirs of the so-called Islamic State, Umar Shishani, is the most probable target of the Russian security services. Russian media has declared him dead on at least eleven occasions over the past three years.Apart from these commanders, there are others who are less known but also quite active in the fight against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. For example, Amir Musa (Ansar Sham—Levant Partisans), Amir Al Bara Shishani, Amir Muhannad al-Shishani are among others fighting in the Idlib area. There are also separate groups of militants, such as Dirr Al Islam, Tarkhan and others that are mostly made up of Chechens. Normally, these groups do not provide membership figures, so their size can only be guessed from auxiliary information (Warsonline.info, April 15). Despite the lack of clarity about the figures, it can be said that several thousand militants from the post-Soviet space may be fighting in Syria in a variety of groups. The vast majority, probably over 3,000, are estimated to be Chechens.It is unclear why Russia sat back for so long and allowed the militants in Syria to consolidate. Now, they pose a danger not only to the Russian North Caucasus, but also to areas in Central Asia adjacent to Russia. Citizens of Central Asian states have also started to resettle in Syria in large numbers. Thus, Russia will try not only to help President al-Assad, but also to kill as many of its own citizens—and citizens from states neighboring Russia—who are fighting in the Middle East as possible, before they return to their homelands.

Is the Middle Volga About to Become a Second North Caucasus?Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 185October 14, 2015 04:09 PM Age: 4 daysBy: Paul Goble

President of the Republic of Tartarstan Rustam Minnikhanov (Source: president.tartarstan.ru)For the last several years, numerous Russian politicians, commentators and activists have repeatedly suggested that the ethnic and religious situation in Russia’s Middle Volga region—which includes the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Mordvinia, Mari El and Udmurtia—is rapidly deteriorating. And they have argued that as a result, the region, long one of the most quiescent of the Russia’s non-Russian portions, is on its way to becoming a second North Caucasus.An article this week by Rais Suleymanov, who has been the source of many such stories and who is widely viewed by Muslims and Tatars as a provocateur, is typical. He suggests that the Taliban and the Islamic State are now recruiting actively in the Middle Volga and setting the region’s indigenous Muslim population against the Russians with explosive consequences for both. And he urges, as he has before, that Moscow must take harsh measures not only against the population of the Middle Volga but also against the leaders of the republics there





who, he says, are protecting the radicals or even promoting their growth (APN, October 8).The Middle Volga’s overall population numbers more than 25 million. The region sits astride all the communications and transportation links between European Russia and Siberia, and it is the location of much of the country’s oil and natural gas reserves. Therefore, given Moscow’s current ideological concerns and taking into account the Middle Volga’s size as well as geographic and economic importance, it is not surprising that articles like Suleymanov’s inevitably attract so much attention in Russia. Were things to go in the direction he suggests, that development would represent a far greater challenge to Moscow than even the North Caucasus has demonstrated. And considering the fears of what that might mean, many have extrapolated from any ethnic or religious problems there to predict an apocalypse, certain that they will have an audience for such suggestions and that they will not be held to the same standards of evidence that might be required from others about other parts of the Russian Federation.But such projections almost certainly are overblown or at least misdirected, given the reasons why so many Russians and others accept them. Specifically, these projections are alarmist precisely because the region is so central and therefore the object of tight control by Moscow. Moreover, the Middle Volga has for centuries been deliberately Russified and is located far from the Russian Federation’s external borders. For all these reasons, it is extremely unlikely that the region’s security situation is nearly as dire as Suleymanov and those who think as he does now suggest. Igor Barinov, the head of the new Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs, argued last week that the situation in Tatarstan, the largest and most politically important or the Middle Volga republics, is “one of the best in Russia” and that the authorities there have things well in hand (Nazaccent.ru, October 9).At a meeting in Bolgar, on October 8, Barinov argued that “in Tatarstan, there is one of the best regional programs for strengthening the unity of the Russian nation and the ethno-cultural development of the peoples of Russia.” He also suggested that other regions in the Russian Federation should learn from Kazan’s actions. To that end, the Russian nationalities official signed a cooperation accord with Tatarstan’s President Rustam Minnikhanov.While in Tatarstan, Barinov also took part in a Tatar conference entitled, “Muslim Theological Thought: National, Regional and Civilizational Dimensions.” He spoke approvingly about the opening of the Bulgar Islamic Academy and stressed that the measures Tatarstan’s Muslims were taking must be directed at responding to any radical or extremist ideology. He noted that there had been 50 extremist crimes in Tatarstan in 2014, but that 87.8 percent of the republic’s population said that inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations were good—a view that never finds expression in the works of those like Suleymanov.It is clear that the Middle Volga does pose a challenge to Moscow and perhaps an increasing one. But it comes from an entirely different direction than what those like Suleymanov suggest. It is not so much ethnic or religious radicalism that is at issue, as has been the case in the North Caucasus since Moscow launched its wars against Chechnya. Instead, it is the demand of the leaders of the republics of the Middle Volga—especially those of Tatarstan—for greater autonomy and control. Those demands receive less attention than do the claims of radicals, but they are often more effective.Tatarstan, despite having had to give up many of the attributes of sovereignty over the last decade, is the only republic in the Russian Federation that still has a “president,” a status that Vladimir Putin himself has recognized as being an issue for the people of Tatarstan to decide. That is real power, as is the fact that Tatarstan controls a larger share of its resources than do most other non-Russian republics; and its officials often rise to positions





of power in Moscow itself. Given the hyper-centralization of Putin’s Russia, that kind of power is a far more real threat to Moscow than the supposed Islamic State and Taliban hordes in the region that do not, in fact, exist.

The Gloves Come Off: The Dutch Response to Jihadists in Syria and IraqPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 19September 17, 2015 By: Anno Bunnik, Thomas de Zoete

Omar Yilmaz, one of The Netherland's most notorious jihadists who traveled to Syria and Iraq (Source: Instagram).In December 2014, a video testament emerged in which 19-year-old Sultan Berzel, from the Netherlands’ southern city of Maastricht, called on Muslims to make hijra (a religious migration) to the self-proclaimed Islamic State group. He delivered his message in a quiet voice and with a local Maastricht accent. The video, however, ended with the message that Berzel, a.k.a. “Abu Abdullah al-Hollandi,” had carried out a suicide bombing at a police office near the Iraqi capital Baghdad, killing over 20 officers.Earlier that year, the Netherlands’ public got a first glimpse of the Dutch jihadists in Syria through an interview with Omar Yilmaz, a Dutch citizen of Turkish descent, on the current affairs TV show Nieuwsuur. [1] Yilmaz stood out as a highly charismatic character who argued that his sole reason for traveling to Syria was to help the suffering Syrian people. He also made the case that Western inaction essentially forced him to act, a rationale given by many of the European fighters who traveled to Syria in 2012 and 2013. By emphasizing how much he missed a specific Dutch snack, he became even more likable to a wider public. A year or so later, however, evidence emerged that Yilmaz had joined the Islamic State (De Telegraaf, September 4).The cases of Berzel and Yilmaz perhaps elucidate the variety of Dutch jihadists. Yilmaz was a former Dutch soldier and traveled to Syria in the early days of the civil war. By contrast, Berzel arrived after the Islamic State had declared a caliphate and committed his martyrdom operation within months of arrival. Some estimates of the numbers of people who are thought to have traveled to Syria and Iraq:· 200 Dutch jihadists have traveled to Syria or Iraq, of which 32 are confirmed dead;· Most joined the Islamic State; relatively few joined Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in the region, and other groups;· Over 35 women have made the journey, with most based in Raqqa, the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed capital;· At least 3 individuals are known to have committed suicide attacks in Syria or Iraq;· Around 35 have returned to the Netherlands. [2]The cases of Yilmaz and Berzel illustrate that Dutch jihadists are not afraid to reach out to Muslims back home, and even to the wider public. This contrasts with countries like Belgium, where jihadists have been fairly quiet. [3] While this difference could simply reflect different national characters—Belgians are known to complain that Dutch are loud and arrogant—this development calls for a response by the Dutch authorities.The ‘Dutch Approach’During the 1970s, some acts of politically motivated violence in the Netherlands—culminating in the infamous hostage taking of a whole train in 1977 by Moluccan youngsters—stood at the base of a policy





framework that came to be known as the “Dutch approach”: talking them down and out. [4] Through endless conversations the government tried to keep all (violent) parties aboard its democratic system, stressing that communication is more significant than any other form of response, such as a violent intervention. Much has changed since the seventies, but current Dutch counter-terrorism policy still values dialogue and communication as vital elements of a coherent strategy for defending a pluralist society.But where Moluccan youths did not exclude themselves from the democratic system, today’s jihadists fundamentally reject the Western state and its democratic legal order. And as jihadists focus on the power of the individual to act and/or decide whether violence is permissible and legitimate, unbound by any other community (or religious) authority, it is a valid question to what extent the Dutch approach can still work when its adversary does not want to join the conversation, does not recognize the state and its institutions and values actions over words. [5] For example, during a rally in The Hague in June 2014, for “Abou Yazied,” who had been detained on suspicion of planning to travel to Syria for terrorist purposes, the main speaker—Abou Moussa—made very clear that “Democracy = hypocrisy,” and that “Western civilization is like a Fata Morgana [mirage]. From a distance it looks promising, but from a closer look, it turns out to be nothing.” [6]The Gloves Come Off: An Integrated Approach to JihadismDuring the summer of 2014, the Dutch government’s efforts to counter the threat from jihadists in a robust and proactive way were set out in a new comprehensive program of action called “An Integrated Approach to Jihadism.” [7] This has three objectives: (1) protecting the Dutch democratic system and the rule of law, (2) combating and weakening the Dutch jihadist movement and (3) removing any breeding grounds for radicalization. It focuses both on individuals and on the Dutch jihadist movement as a whole by targeting hard-core jihadists with penal and administrative measures, and aims to prevent the growth of the movement by countering radicalization. The 38 measures listed in the program can be divided into five main categories: addressing the issue of jihadist travelers, travel interventions, tackling radicalization, social media and information-sharing and (international) cooperation. This approach may be familiar, but the integrated execution—prompted by pressure from top government officials—is new.Three individual proposed measures particularly stand out: the proposals to take away Dutch citizenship without the need for a criminal conviction, to combat online dissemination of violent jihadist content and to record the travels of all Dutch citizens. However, after being heavily disputed on privacy grounds, the plan to keep travel records was shelved, but the proposal to refuse or declare Dutch passports and ID cards of potential Dutch jihadists invalid, to prevent them from traveling abroad, was recently agreed upon by the Dutch Council of Ministers. [8] [9]Coming Home to Roost?Considering these measures, the Dutch government has clearly chosen to take the offensive in combating the jihadist threat. Regarding its action program, it even speaks of “defending our legal order, through which our free society will prevail.” [10] As has been said in the context of the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, Western governments have the clock, while jihadists have the time. Similarly, past evaluations of Dutch counter-terrorism policies have shown that—through electoral or budgetary reasons, or a false sense of “mission accomplished”—the threat tends to resurface again when it is ignored and deprioritized by the state. Symbolic of this was the decision by the Dutch Council of Ministers in 2012, to cut the budget of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst—AIVD) by one-third, at a time when the first signs that Dutch jihadists were gearing up for the armed struggle in Syria were already visible. The decision left deep scars in the AIVD, which will be felt for years, and





threatens its desired intelligence position and its operational capacity to deal with the jihadist threat. [11]Another challenge is the widespread sentiment that the government should not intervene if Dutch jihadists want to travel to (not from!) war zones. This opinion was voiced most notably by the Dutch-Moroccan mayor of Rotterdam, Achmed Aboutaleb: “If you do [not] like our freedom... sod off” (NOS, January 7). One less jihadist in the Netherlands is one less threat to homeland security appears to be his reasoning. However, recent attacks in Australia and Canada have showed that if stopped at their borders, would-be jihadists are liable to turn against their own country and conduct domestic attacks (Time, September 24, 2014; CBC News, October 21, 2014). On the other hand, giving jihadists a free pass to commit war crimes in Syria and Iraq is a policy option clouded with moral ambiguity.More problems arise with the reach of certain measures: although Dutch passports and ID cards can now be annulled, this does not seem to affect jihadists who have already traveled to Syria much. Some jihadists have burned their own European passports to emphasize that they do not recognize the nation-state system, and argue that there will be no borders when the caliphate is established across the globe, meaning that revoking their nationality will have little ideological impact on jihadists. Jihadists do not have to fear the Dutch government efforts to freeze financial assets either: investigations take months, and when Dutch jihadists return to the Netherlands, they can still legally sign on for Student Welfare. [12] Underlining the measures’ relatively limited impact on committed jihadists, as Dutch Islamic State fighter Yilmaz said on his Tumblr page; “I have a home to go to and a wife to go to, so I consider myself a rich man yes :-) Alhamdulillah.” [13]Looking AheadSeveral Dutch jihadists have committed suicide attacks in Syria and Iraq instead of in the West. This signifies that jihadists from the Netherlands are already involved in an increasingly intertwined civil war in Syria and Iraq, and underlines that their operations currently primarily target the Islamic State’s local and regional foes, not the country they grew up in. However, due to the complexity and unpredictability of the jihadist threat and its links with networks in Europe, this could change in time. Having come to this conclusion, the Dutch government has decided to take off their gloves and go on the offensive. The question remains, however, if such national solutions are sufficient to counter a global problem.Anno Bunnik is a Ph.D. Fellow at Liverpool Hope University, the Centre for Applied Research in Security Innovation. Thomas de Zoete is a lecturer at the University of Amsterdam’s Ad de Jonge Centre for Intelligence & Security Studies.Notes1. Nieuwsuur, Uitzending, January 21, 2014, http://www.uitzendinggemist.net/aflevering/251054/Nieuwsuur.html#.2. NCTV, “Samenvatting Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 39,” June 2015, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2015/06/30/tk-samenvatting-dreigingsbeeld-terrorisme-nederland-39-juni-2015/lp-v-j-0000008524.pdf.3. Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Dutch Foreign Fighters – Some Testimonials from the Syrian Front,” Jihadology, October 13, 2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/10/13/guest-post-dutch-foreign-fighters-some-testimonials-from-the-syrian-front/.4. De Graaf, B. (2010), Theater van de angst, Amsterdam: Boom; Bootsma, P. & Dortmans, H. (2000), De Molukse Acties, Treinkapingen en gijzelingen 1970-1978, Amsterdam: Boom.5. “Global Jihadism: Analysis of the Phenomenon and Reflections on Radicalisation,” NCTV, 2014, https://english.nctv.nl/Images/globaljihadism-uk-webversie_tcm92-575175.pdf.





6. “Vrijdaggebed: Hun democratie, niet de onze,” Geenstijl.nl, June 27, 2014, http://www.geenstijl.nl/mt/archieven/2014/06/kunt_u_deze_video_afkijken.html.7. “Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme,” NCTV, August 29, 2014, https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/actieprogramma-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme/index.aspx.8. Maartje van der Woude, “Radical Times, Concerning Measures?,” Leiden Law Blog, September 3, 2014, http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/radical-times-concerning-measures.9. “Wijziging Paspoortwet maakt vervallen paspoort en identiteitskaart jihadgangers mogelijk,” Rijksoverheid, September 4, 2015, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2015/09/04/wijziging-paspoortwet-maakt-vervallen-paspoort-en-identiteitskaart-jihadgangers-mogelijk.10. “Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme,” Tweede Kamer 2013-2014, 29 754, nr. 253, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/08/30/integrale-aanpak-jihadisme; “Bezuinigingen en intensiveringen bij de AIVD - gevolgen van de budgettaire turbulentie in de periode 2012-2015,” Algemene Rekenkamer, 2015, http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Publicaties/Onderzoeksrapporten/Introducties/2015/05/Bezuinigingen_en_intensiveringen_bij_de_AIVD.11. Ibid.12. “Asscher wil uitkering jihadisten sneller stopzetten,” NRC, July 15, 2015, http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/07/15/uitkering-jihadisten-direct-stopzetten-bij-is-deelname/.13. Yilmaz answer one of his anonymous followers on Tumblr, see: Chechclear.tumblr.com/post/127236772569/do-you-have-a-lot-of-money-i-read-that-IS-makes.

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