Alweiss, The Bifurcated Subject

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [Cornell University Library]On: 9 May 2011Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 934587173]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Journal of Philosophical StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713685587

The Bifurcated SubjectLilian Alweissa

a Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

To cite this Article Alweiss, Lilian(2009) 'The Bifurcated Subject', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17: 3, 415— 434To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09672550902948944URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550902948944

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713685587

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550902948944

http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Vol. 17(3), 415–434

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

ISSN 0967–2559 print 1466–4542 online © 2009 Taylor & Francishttp://www.informaworld.com

DOI: 10.1080/09672550902948944

The Bifurcated Subject

Lilian Alweiss

Taylor and FrancisRIPH_A_395066.sgm10.1080/09672550902948944International Journal of Philosophical Studies0967-2559 (print)/1466-4542 (online)Original Article2009Taylor & Francis1730000002009Dr [email protected]

Abstract

Michel Henry wishes to salvage Descartes’s first principle ‘I think, I am’ byclaiming that there is no need to appeal to the world or others to make senseof the self. One of his main targets is Edmund Husserl, who claims thatthought is necessarily intentional and thus necessarily about something that isother to thought. To show that this is not so, Henry draws on passages fromDescartes’s texts which emphasize that we should not equate the

cogito

withthinking but with sensation and imagination. This allows Henry to explore thenotion that the self has its own form of manifestation. This paper questionsHenry’s reading of Descartes and his critique of Husserl on two fronts. First,the passages Henry draws upon, if anything only confirm, rather than questionHusserl’s claim that consciousness is intentional. Second, Henry believes thathe can show that the life of the self is infinitely rich without having to appealto other persons or, indeed, to the world. Yet, I wish to contend that Henry ismistaken: as Husserl has shown convincingly, a life without others and theworld is not only impoverished and bereft of meaning, but remains entirelyindeterminate. The self only manifests itself with respect to others and theworld.

Keywords:

Michel Henry; Husserl; Descartes; the self; embodiment; first person perspective

Introduction

Hardly any philosopher today would accept Descartes’s first principle: ‘Ithink, therefore I am.’ The general consensus is that Descartes was simplymistaken when he made the

metaphysical

claim ‘that this I, that is thinking,is an

immaterial substance

with no bodily elements’.

1

Modern neuroscienceand phenomenology argue that the idea that thinking can take place withoutembodiment must be wrong. Kant and post-Kantian philosophers questionwhether it is legitimate to refer to a substance when we look at the natureof thinking. And Heidegger believes that Descartes presupposes an under-standing of existence which he leaves unexplored. When I say that there ishardly a philosopher who would accept Descartes’s first principle, I haveone exception in mind: Michel Henry. What singles him out is that hisphilosophy tries to reverse this trend. He believes that something valuable

Downloaded By: [Cornell University Library] At: 01:05 9 May 2011

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

416

can be retrieved from Descartes’s first principle, and that the flaw lies withthose who have accepted the view that ‘man cannot be conceived as aspecific autonomous reality’;

2

a view which resulted in what Henry hastermed ‘

ontological monism

’.

3

The Bifurcated Self

One of Henry’s main concerns is that even philosophers who advocate aphilosophy of consciousness (

Bewußtseinsphilosophie

) and agree withDescartes that the

ego cogito

is a first principle fail to do justice to Descartesand, more importantly, to the self. Rather than taking the first-personperspective seriously, they alienate the subject from its self. The self is neverinvestigated as it is

in itself

; it is only seen as bifurcated or split. The focus ison self-transcendence, namely the fact that the subject is oriented to theworld or things that are by definition ‘other’ to the subject. Kant refers tothe I think that needs to

accompany

all my representations (Kant, 1933:B131); Husserl to the

inseparability

of the ‘cogito–cogitatum (qua cogi-tatum)’ (Husserl, 1964: p. 14); and Heidegger to Dasein’s ecstatic structure(Heidegger, 1962). For Henry this means that the subject has beenwrenched from itself, has been broken apart, bifurcated and ruptured. It isalways in

exile

, ecstatic and, indeed, alienated from itself. The subject under-stands itself only through that which is opposite to it, its object or product.‘Consequently it manifests itself only in the form of the object, and not at allwithin itself, not at all as pro-ducing, as manifesting.’

4

The problem can best be illustrated by looking at Kant’s depiction of thesubject. In the ‘Paralogisms of Reason’ Kant accuses Descartes of providinga false syllogism when he says ‘I think, therefore I am.’ The problem is notthat Descartes does not logically (syllogistically) deduce the

sum

from the

cogito

5

and that the equation between thinking and existence is merelyassumed, but that the particle

ergo

is misplaced since the inference is simplyfalse. The equation between thinking and existence (

sum

) cannot besubstantiated because thought is

necessarily

reflexive. As soon as I amconscious of an object, including being conscious of myself, there must be aself that implicitly – as Kant puts it (using Leibnizian terminology) – ‘apper-ceives’ my being thus conscious. We need to differentiate between a‘transcendental self’ that accompanies all my representations, even therepresentation of myself, and an ‘empirical self’ that appears or can berepresented in time and space. As Kant says, ‘it must be possible for the “Ithink” to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something wouldbe represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equiva-lent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least wouldbe nothing to me’ (Kant, 1933: B131/2). Without the transcendental self, noexperience or representation is possible. Representations need to be attrib-uted to a subject that can have these representations. They are only possible


THE BIFURCATED SUBJECT

417

if they appear

to

someone. In short, every appearance has its dative; it isnecessarily an appearance of something

for

someone.Henry applauds Kant for giving significance to the first-person perspec-

tive; however, he deplores the fact that he takes with one hand what he giveswith the other. Although Kant assumes the

ego cogito

in order to make senseof experience, he insists that it has no intrinsic property. It can only beunderstood in relation to its representation, i.e., as relating to that which isessentially

other

to itself. To avoid infinite regress, Kant comes to argue thatthis ‘someone’ to whom these appearances are attributed can never berendered into an appearance. This leads him to conclude that only theempirical ego

exists

to the extent that it can be turned into an object of reflec-tion; however, the ego that is aware of the fact that it is thinking does notexist because it can never be represented. Undoubtedly for Kant, Descartespresents a false syllogism. When Descartes says ‘I think, therefore I am’, hefails to draw a distinction between the empirical and the transcendental self.He does not realize that we cannot infer from the

formal

conditions ofthought (which Kant regards as transcendental) to a

substance

of thought(empirical) (see Kant, 1933: A41 / B399ff.). Kant believes that what can bemarked out is the necessity for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my represen-tations. No further existential claims are legitimate.

6

What can be known isonly the self as a representation, but not the pure spontaneity of the repre-senting self. Ludwig Wittgenstein illustrates this well when he says: When Ilook into the mirror, I can see myself (as an object of reflection), however,I cannot see myself looking: “But you do

not

really see the eye.”

7

Henry is perplexed by this criticism. Not only is the subject treatedschizophrenically – we are meant to be somehow both a transcendental selfand an empirical self

at the same time

– but, more importantly, we are onlymeant to experience ourselves in this schizophrenic tension and never as a(transcendental) subject

as such

. There is a paradox here: on the one handthe

ego cogito

is treated as a first principle; on the other, we are told that noth-ing pertains to it – it can only be thought as a necessary

correlate

of experience– as it is nothing ‘outside’, or independent of that experience. Indeed, Kantrepeatedly argues that the ‘I think’ or ‘transcendental unity of apperception’has no other meaning than that of being the unifying activity of combinationand reflection on the sensible given. Moreover, there is

no

unity of self-consciousness aside from its spontaneity, effort or

conatus

toward judgment.This is why Kant asserts that the transcendental unity of apperception is the‘highest point’ (Kant, 1933: B134) (

höchste Punkt

) – an analytic unity, whichcan only be thought of as a correlate to the synthetic unity of representations(cf. Kant, 1933: B134). It is nothing in itself. It only has a function: it is a vehi-cle for all concepts of the understanding. It can explain the nature of theappearing and the conditions of possibility for appearances or manifestationswithout, however, ever appearing itself. As Wittgenstein observes, it allowsus to make sense of the claim that the ‘world is

my

representation’ cf.



418

Wittgenstein 1981 5.62; however, it does not allow us to say anything

mean-ingful

about it. This leads Wittgenstein to refer to this ‘I’ as a philosophicalself. ‘It is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, whichis the subject of psychology, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit ofthe world – not a part of it.’

8

Kant arrives at an equally paradoxical positionwhen he says that the simple representation ‘I’ is in itself empty of all content‘and we cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bareconsciousness which accompanies all concepts’ (Kant, 1933: A346/B404). Itis ‘a simple expression, not even a concept’.

9

It has no special designation inthe list of concepts because it serves only to introduce all our thought.

To Henry this proves that Descartes’s first principle has been denied anysignificant value. In his view it should not surprise us that post-Kantianthinkers such as Sartre come to equate consciousness with ‘nothingness’,

10

or Wittgenstein the philosophical self with ‘nonsense’.

11

To be transcenden-tal is to fail to be one of the things that constitutes all there is. It is to fail tobe. Indeed, the justification for the use of the first-person pronoun becomesquestionable. Although Kant refers to an ‘

I

’ that thinks in that it accompa-nies all

my

representations, it is no longer clear how to understand thisindexical expression since this ‘I’ points to nothing specific. Apart frombeing a facilitator, there is nothing that justifies the use of the first-personpronoun. The ‘I’ in question is not referring to a personal identity (see Kant1983: A363) or anything that is indistinguishably mine. It is not surprisingthat Kant once even refers to this ‘I’ as an ‘I or he or it (the thing) thatthinks’ (Kant, 1933: A346/B404). Nothing seems to prevent us from takingthe next step (which Kant wishes to avoid at all cost) and argue that wecannot infer from the fact that ‘there is thinking’ to the fact that there is an‘I’ that thinks. It turns out to be a linguistic illusion to ascribe states ofconsciousness at all.

12

In view of this Henry asks disparagingly:

How can one not be struck by this extraordinary conceptual situation:it is precisely with Kant, who related the Being of all beings to theSubject, that the Subject becomes the object of a radical dispute whichdenies it all possible Being. Or to put it in another way: it is at the verymoment when philosophy sees itself clearly as a philosophy of thesubject that the foundation on which it explicitly and thematicallybases itself, and which it systematically endeavours to elaborate,escapes it and slipping from its grasp, tips over into the void of inanity.

13

In other words, Henry asks how one can accept that the

ego cogito

is the firstprinciple while at the same time denying its existence. ‘How can the

cogito…

be “certain”, in such a way that everything rests on it, when one has toadmit that it is nothing in itself?’ cf. Henry 1988: 152. Surely philosophypulls the rug from under its own feet, because it rests on a foundation whichturns out to be none.



419

The ‘New’ Descartes

Henry turns against this trend in philosophy and seeks to breathe new lifeback into the subject. He believes that it is possible to do so by returning tothe very thinker the tradition of philosophy has dismissed: Descartes. In hisopinion, the criticisms raised against Descartes’s first principle are not onlyillegitimate but moreover miss something fundamental, namely that the

ego cogito

does not refer to an empty vessel or a disembodied cognitive abil-ity. It seems obvious to most readers of Descartes that when referring to the

ego cogito

, he assumes that to think necessarily means to represent tooneself. As Heidegger, for example, observes: ‘In important passages,Descartes substitutes for

cogitare

the word

percipere (per-capio)

, to takepossession of a thing, to seize something, in the sense of presenting-to-oneself by way of presenting before one-self,

representing

.’

14

Yet Henrybelieves that a closer look at Descartes’s texts reveals passages which clearlyindicate that ‘the

cogito

has nothing to do with thought processes nor (sic)with thought itself.…

Cogito means everything, except I think

.’

15

Henryacknowledges that Descartes himself is responsible for equating the

cogito

with the ‘I think’ because his final goal is to found knowledge (

connais-sance

) and through it all theoretical knowledge (

science

). However, whenwe look at the

phenomenological

description of the

cogito

, nothing becomesmore apparent than that for Descartes the

cogito

has nothing in commonwith what we call thought and, furthermore, that the

cogito

itself assumes aform of embodiment.

Let us take a look at two interrelated aspects of Descartes’s work whichinterest Henry – one is that thought is not reflexive or intentional and theother that the

cogito

should not be confused with an ‘I think.’(1) Descartes states clearly that it makes no sense to argue that

all

thoughtis reflexive:

My critic says that to enable a substance to be superior to matter andwholly spiritual (and he insists on using the term ‘mind’ only in thisrestricted sense), it is not sufficient for it to think: it is further requiredthat it should think that it is thinking, by means of a reflexive act, orthat it should have awareness of its own thought. This is as deluded asour bricklayer’s saying that a person who is skilled in architecturemust employ a reflexive act to ponder on the fact that he has this skillbefore he can be an architect.

(Descartes, AT VII, 559; CSM II: 382 also cited in Marion, 1999b:p. 104)

By

cogito

Descartes does not mean

cogito me cogitare

; rather he refers to athinking prior to reflection. There is an ‘internal awareness which alwaysprecedes reflective knowledge’ (Descartes, AT VII, 422, CSM II: 285 also



420

cited in Marion, 1999b: 104). Kant is simply mistaken in his criticism: not allmy thinking is accompanied by my awareness that I am thinking.

Moreover, Descartes claims that it does not make sense to argue that thesubject understands itself only through that which is its opposite. In a slight-ing comment to Gassendi he observes:

It is also surprising that you maintain that the idea of a thing cannot bein the mind unless the ideas of an animal, a plant, a stone, and all theuniversals are there. This is like saying that if I am to recognise myselfto be a thinking thing, I must also recognise animals and plants, sinceI must recognise a thing or the nature of a thing.

(Replies to the Fifth Objection, AT VII, 362; CSM II, 250, citedby Henry, 1993: p. 41)

Descartes does not believe that the

ego cogito

deprived of its

cogitatum

(object of thought) would have no meaning whatsoever. Rather he assertsthat ‘we are only by virtue of the fact that we are thinking’

16

and need notrely on the objects of thought to recognize ourselves as thinking things.Clearly I can think without an ‘other’ in my thought.

(2) Henry now tries to substantiate this claim by showing that it rests ona convincing argument. It is the method of doubt that proves to us that wecan arrive at the

ego cogito

without having to appeal to something that is‘other’ to thought. Take the following passages as an example:

The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing isso evident that I see no way of making it any clearer. But it is also thecase that the ‘I’ who imagines is the same ‘I’. For even if, as I havesupposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power ofimagination is something which really exists and is part of my thinking.Lastly, it is also the same ‘I’ who has sensory perceptions (

sentiens

), oris aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, Iam now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so allthis is false. Yet I certainly

seem

to see, to hear, and to be warmed. Thiscannot be false; what is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is strictlyjust this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.

(Descartes AT VII, CSM: 19 29, also cited by Marion 1993: 60, cf.Henry, 1989: 158)

Thus often when we sleep, and sometimes even when we are awake,we imagine certain things so forcibly, that we think we see them beforeus, or feel them in our body, although they do not exist at all; butalthough we may be asleep or dreaming, we cannot feel sad or moved



421

by any other passion without its being very true that the soul actuallyhas this passion within it … we may be mistaken therein regarding theperceptions which relate to objects which are outside us, or at leastthose which relate to certain parts of our body, but that we cannot beso deceived regarding the passions, inasmuch as they are so close to,and so entirely within our soul, that it is impossible for it to feel themwithout their being actually such as it feels them to be.

(Descartes:

Passions of the Soul

, cited by Henry, 1989: p. 158)

These citations are of importance to Henry for two reasons: The first is thatwhen Descartes says ‘it seems to me’ that I am walking or dreaming or beingwarmed, he is claiming that even if all the appearances (walking, dreaming,the sensation of heat) may be false, what cannot be questioned is ‘the imme-diacy of

videor

, “it seems to me”’. I cannot doubt my awareness, though Ican doubt that the content of my awareness is real (ontologically ‘in theworld’). ‘It seems to me’ remains valid, even when doubt disqualifieseverything that we see – i.e., all our representations. Even if there is nointentional object, a seeing and, indeed,

sensing

still takes place. We shallreturn to this observation later.

The second aspect that interests Henry is that these citations clearly showthat when we refer to the cogito, we also refer to our sensory awareness. Ican see light, hear noise and feel heat even when it turns out that I have beendreaming. This sensory awareness itself is a form of thought. Hence, whenDescartes refers to the cogito, he does not only refer to the cognitive facultyof a thinking being or, indeed, to something straightforwardly mental, sinceit includes imagination and sensation:

By the term ‘thought’, I understand everything which we are aware ofas happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it. Hence,thinking is to be identified here not merely with understanding, willingand imagining, but also with sensory awareness (imaginans quoque etsentiens).

(Descartes AT VIIIA, 7) CSM I: 195

Commentators generally believe that through his argument that sensoryawareness belongs to thinking Descartes’s position becomes problematic ashe concedes that there are certain states which can no longer be classified asbelonging either to thought or to extension. Take the following passagefrom the Principles as an example:

But we also experience within ourselves certain other things whichmust not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone.



422

These arise, as will be made clear later on, in the appropriate place,from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. This listincludes first, appetites like hunger and thirst, secondly, the emotionsor passions of the mind which do not consist of thought alone, such asemotions of anger, joy, sadness and love, and finally, all the sensations,such as those of pain, pleasure, light, colours, sounds, smells, tastes,heat, hardness and the other tactile qualities.

(Descartes: AT VIII A, 23; CSM I, 208–9)

There are certain sensations which require the union of mind and body.Yet this implies that the body belongs to the sphere of the cogito (or, as

Henry would put it, the sphere of immanence). Indeed, Descartes suggestsas much. When Frans Burman interviewed Descartes in April 1648, askinghim what he means when he says that sensation and imagination are ‘facul-ties for special modes of thinking’, he is reported to have responded:

When external objects act on my senses, they print on them an idea, orrather a figure of themselves. And when the mind attends to theseimages imprinted on the gland [i.e., on the pineal gland] in this way itis said to have sense-perceptions (sentire). When, on the other hand,the images on the gland are imprinted not by external objects but bythe mind itself, which fashions and shapes them in the brain in theabsence of external objects, then we have imagination. The differencebetween sense-perception and imagination is really just this, that insense-perception the images are imprinted on the brain by externalobjects which are actually present, while in the case of imagination theimages are imprinted by the mind without any external objects, andwith the windows shut, as it were.

(Cited by Cottingham, 1985: p. 238. Descartes: AT VI, 162–3; seealso Cottingham, 1976: pp. 27, 74ff.)

Sense-perception, just like imagination, requires physiological activity.The point here is not that we need an eye or a nose to see or smell thingsor that we need a brain in order to receive information, because thiswould not distinguish our cognitive faculty from sensation. Rather,Descartes’s point is more subtle. What is distinct about imagination andsense-perception is that they require a physiological activity or somethingcorporeal, unlike doubting, affirming, denying, willing, which refer to‘pure actions of the soul’ and can occur without any physiological inter-vention. We need to have a body to feel heat or pain. This is why onlycorporeal beings have sensations.17 As Descartes states in a much-citedpassage of the Sixth Meditation:



423

If this were not so [that is if the I and the body did not form a unit] Iwho am nothing but a thinking thing would not feel pain when thebody was hurt but perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as asailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken. Similarly,when the body needed food or drink, I should have an explicit under-standing of the fact, instead of having confused sensations of hungerand thirst. For these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on, arenothing but confused modes of thinking which arise from the unionand as it were intermingling of the mind with the body.

(Descartes: AT VII, Sixth Meditation, 76, line 9; SCM II, 53; alsocited by Cottingham, 1985: p. 240)

These passages suggest that there are sensations that require the union ofthe mind and body. A purely intellectual judgment could never reveal to us“what it is like” to have sensations of pain and hunger.18

There are various ways of interpreting these passages. As I said above,the standard reading is that Descartes clearly defies his own dualism: itcannot cope with the causal interaction between mind and body.Conversely, John Cottingham argues that these passages prove somethingquite different. They show that Descartes ‘classifies human attributes interms not of a dualistic but of a threefold or trialistic pattern’ (Cottingham,1985: p. 225). There are faculties that belong strictly neither to a res cogitansnor to a res extensa. Certain phenomena including perceptions, emotionsand sensations belong neither to the mind nor to the body alone but to theunion of the two.

Henry pursues an entirely different line of interpretation. Instead ofquestioning Descartes’s dualism, he believes that these special modesconfirm that there is a special form of existence that pertains to the subject.They do not suggest a trialism or causal picture but show that whatDescartes calls ‘thought’, i.e., the ‘cogito’, goes far beyond what we callthinking. The point is that ‘thinking’ is not to be identified merely with“understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness”.19

Sensory awareness is a mode of thinking. These passages clearly suggestthat what is distinctive about thinking is not its cognitive activity, but affec-tivity. In a word, ‘affectivity belongs to the essence of pure thought’ and notextension.20

Henry advances this view to show what is distinctive about our self. Whatmarks out the self is that it experiences itself as being alive. We experienceourselves as living beings, as beings who have a certain sensory awarenessor pathos. When we think, we experience our own living. For Henry thisliterally means that we sense ourselves breathing, moving, laughing, beinganxious or in pain.21 Thought does not happen in a void, but is accompaniedby sensory awareness.



424

We need not go outside ourselves to find this life. Our awareness is notof something other to thought; rather our sensory awareness pertains tothinking or to the subject itself. When we experience pain, are embar-rassed, happy or anxious, critical or bored, we cannot draw a distinctionbetween the object of awareness and our awareness. These feelings ormoods define our way of being. We have no control over them; rather weare subjected to them. To this extent they are immediate and passive. Thisis how I am given to myself. Henry calls this auto-affection. In the sameway as I think, I am; I feel, I am; I fear, I am or I cry, I am; we are by virtueof the fact that we think, feel and have passions.22 In these affective stateswe feel ourselves; they manifest our very singularity. Pain is not simplypain but my pain, a pain that no-one can bear with me. It can only beunderstood from my first-person perspective. It is precisely our sensoryawareness that singles us out. Only I sense myself moving, feeling, touch-ing, laughing; and there need be no object for this experience to take place.This insight leads Henry to claim that there is an understanding of self-hood or egoity that precedes any alterity. The cogito needs no other to beitself; I sense, (therefore) I am.

In Henry’s view, Descartes thereby shows how the self manifests itselfwithout leaving itself. It does not need to appeal to an object to know itself;it is an originary subjectivity which is truly in itself. Initially it is difficult tounderstand why Henry believes that he has avoided what he has called an‘ontological monism’. Clearly sensory awareness is a bodily awareness. Inthis case the passages suggest the opposite, namely that a dualism is unten-able because embodiment necessarily inheres in thought. Henry realizes asmuch, but this does not deter him from arguing that there is more than onetype of manifestation or phenomenality. There is a type of manifestationthat inheres in the subject and another that inheres in the world. He drawson Edmund Husserl’s distinction between the lived body (Leib) and anobjective one (Körper) to articulate the difference.23 The lived body refersto our kinaesthetic sensory awareness.24 For example, our hand touchinganother hand which is distinct from the hand that is being touched. Ourlived body refers to a life or sensing that is prior to and invisible to ourbodies. It has its own form of manifestation. It is immediate and cannot beobjectified. My sense of touching, breathing, of what it is like to experiencefear or happiness or to taste something sour. This sensory awareness isquite distinct from the objective body, the object that is being touched,feared or tasted.

Henry believes that the distinction allows him to claim that he can upholda dualism: that of the lived body and the objective world. He draws on thepassages cited above to illustrate what is at issue. There Descartes showedthat I can doubt that the content of my awareness is real, but I cannot doubtmy awareness. This sensory awareness points to what Henry calls a radical,‘acosmic’ and monadic interiority which is totally distinct from any worldly



425

manifestation and hence distinct from the visibility of objects. This is hisdualism. I feel, I am.

Henry thinks that Descartes has thereby paved the way for what he callsa ‘material phenomenology’:25 the self is no longer understood as an emptyvessel or ‘highest point’, but as infinitely rich and diverse.

When we speak of the unity of the absolute life of the ego, we in noway wish to say that this life is monotonous; actually it is infinitelydiverse, the ego is not a pure logical subject enclosed within its tautol-ogy; it is the very being of infinite life, which nevertheless remains onein this diversity.26

The self that feels pain is not identical to the self that is happy or the self thatthinks abstract thoughts; rather the self is infinitely rich and diverse.

There are two issues I should like to address. First, I am not at one withHenry’s reading of Descartes. The passages Henry draws upon, if anything,only confirm rather than question Husserl’s claim that consciousness isintentional. Second, Henry believes that he can show that the life of the selfis infinitely rich without having to appeal to other persons or, indeed, to theworld. Yet, I wish to contend that Henry is wrong: As Husserl has shownconvincingly, a life without others and the world is not only impoverishedand bereft of meaning, but remains entirely indeterminate.

The ‘Other’ Descartes

When we take a closer look at the passages Henry cites to underpin hisposition, I believe that they disclose something entirely different. Henryclaims that they show that Descartes’s material phenomenology is distinctfrom traditional, Husserlian phenomenology insofar as Descartes returns toa subjectivity that is not marred by transcendence.27 Were this the case,Descartes’s position would clearly be contrary to that of Husserl, whoclaims that we can only understand the ego cogito with respect to its cogi-tatum. This claim in itself would reveal nothing new as Husserl has distancedhimself from Descartes precisely for this very reason. We only need to recallthe following passages from the Cartesian Meditations and the ParisLectures:

The expression ego cogito must be expanded [erweitert] by one term.Every cogito contains a meaning: its cogitatum, as that which it graspsin intentionality [als Vermeintes] … the fundamental property of modesof consciousness, in which I live as my own self, is what is known asintentionality. Consciousness is always consciousness of something.

(Husserl, 1964: pp. 12–13)



426

The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadenedby adding one more member. Each cogito, each conscious process, wemay also say, ‘means’ something or other and bears in itself, in thismanner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum.

(Husserl, 1960: Sec. 14, p. 33)

However, in this critique Husserl does not have Henry’s Descartes in mindbut Descartes as he is traditionally understood, namely as affirming that theonly thing that we can be certain of is that we are a thinking thing. Contraryto this, Husserl wishes to show that we cannot think without thinking ofsomething. Thought is necessarily intentional.

It is important to understand how Husserl arrives at this position. It mayshed some light on why Henry was perhaps too ready to dismiss the claim thatconsciousness is necessarily intentional. Husserl argues that we can arrive atthis insight by radicalizing Descartes’s method of doubt. For Descartes, doubtis a form of negation: it negates what we had previously affirmed. However,Husserl believes that doubt reveals that whatever cannot be seen clearly anddistinctly cannot be judged: we can neither affirm nor deny its existence sincewe can see neither its existence nor its non-existence clearly and distinctly.This leads Husserl to argue that doubt should be a moment not of negationbut of suspension of judgment. Husserl calls it epoch or bracketing.28 Whatshould be bracketed or questioned is our capacity to judge, since we have noway of asserting or denying the existence of the object. However, what liesbeyond doubt is that we see an object even though we do not know whetherit actually exists. When we dream of the sea, or imagine what it must be liketo walk on Mars, or, indeed, when we think about impossible objects likeround squares, or objects which we clearly know do not exist, such as Pegasus,we still dream, imagine or think of something and not of nothing.

This is precisely what Henry wishes to deny when he draws on Descartes.Indeed he seems to defend Descartes’s view that doubt is necessarily a formof negation. When Descartes says ‘I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to bewarmed’ (CSM II, 19), even though it may turn out to be false because I amasleep, Henry believes that what remains after the reduction (doubt) is the‘at certe videre videor – yet I certainly seem to see’ (cf. Henry 1993: 42). Thevideor (it seems to me) remains valid and incontestable even when doubtdisqualifies the videre and all the other forms of representations. Descartes,so Henry, ‘holds that this vision, however fallacious it may be, at the veryleast exists’29. This leads him to conclude that Descartes is justified in refer-ring to thought as an ‘immediate awareness of itself which excludes the exte-riorisation of exteriority’.30 In contemporary philosophy of mind thisposition would be called ‘individualism’ or ‘internalism’: our thoughts donot depend on our relation to the physical or social environment.31 In otherwords, one’s introspectively based judgments about one’s mental states

e



427

enjoy a range of epistemological privileges that judgments about non-mental reality or, indeed, the mental states of others do not enjoy. They areimmune to error, we cannot doubt that we are doubting, but we can doubtthe existence of others and the world.

However, I believe that quite a different scenario comes to light. Unwit-tingly Henry draws on citations that in my view substantiate, if anything,rather than question Husserl’s articulation of the epoch . Henry admitsthat the passages on which he draws do not present the full picture ofDescartes. The truth is that Descartes himself comes to understand the egocogito as a representing self. As we move from the Second to the ThirdMeditation, the initial insights are lost. ‘The cogito is dismembered; the firstsemblance of the videor (it seems to me) is suppressed in favour of thesemblance of the videre and all other forms of representations.’ This leadsHenry to conclude that in the final analysis ‘Cartesian “thought” is nolonger the soul and no longer life, but its opposite: it becomes the thoughtof the moderns, knowledge.’32 Yet this thought of the moderns is preciselylinked to the view that doubt is a form of negation leading to knowledgewhich Husserl comes to criticize. It is the stage where the cogito becomesthe condition of the cogitatum. The cogito ‘“becomes the clear and distinct”perception of what is known as the criterion of all possible truths’.33

Yet, what is so intriguing about the passages of the First Meditation citedby Henry is that something quite different comes to light. They actuallyconfirm Husserl’s contention that even if we have reasons to doubt anobject, even if we come to realize that the object does not exist, we cannotdeny that ‘it’, nonetheless, appears in our imagination and dreams. We stillsense something and, indeed, have sensations. In my view precisely thisproves Husserl’s insight that thought is intentional. This remains true eventhough the object of thought does not exist. When we dream, we dreamabout something; when we think about something impossible or when weimagine an object, our thought and imagination are still about somethingeven when we know that the object we are thinking about does not exist.What cannot be doubted is that I was dreaming. My dreams are not empty:they are clearly about something.

When Husserl says that “there is no cogito without its cogitatum”, he isnot so naïve as to assume that the cogitatum necessarily exists. In such a casewe would not be able to differentiate between illusion and reality. However,the purpose of the reduction is to show that at this stage such an assumptionis illegitimate. We can neither affirm nor deny the existence of the object ofthought. All we can affirm with certainty is that our thought is necessarilyabout something even when the question of existence has been bracketed.This reflects exactly what Descartes is saying in the passages that Henrycites. There can be a sensing even if it turns out that there is no object thathas caused these sensations in me. We nonetheless sense something. I amstill feeling the heat of what turns out to be an imaginary flame; I am

e



428

imagining an object; I am thinking of Pegasus. In each instance I am think-ing about something despite the fact that I know that none of these objectsexist. The passages above, if anything, indicate a proximity between Husserland Descartes in so far as both realize that the cogito is not free from tran-scendence or intentionality even when we think about objects that do notexist.34 What cannot be questioned is the intentional structure of conscious-ness: thought is outside itself even when we are concerned with our affectivestates.

Against Henry’s ‘Acosmism’

As I have said, one of Henry’s aims is to show that the subject is not anempty shell, as Kant has come to conceive it, but infinitely rich. It does notsimply accompany our representations, but has a life of its own. Yet Ibelieve that Husserl shows convincingly that as long as the self is treated inisolation – Henry calls it “acosmic” – it remains nothing more than an emptyshell. The ipseity of the self only becomes meaningful in the presence of theworld and other selves. Without the other I have no sense of a self; indeed,I have no sense of what makes me distinct. In Husserl’s opinion, Henrywould appear too hasty in attributing a selfhood to this affective awareness.As noted above, Husserl would be in agreement with Henry that experienceis necessarily owned and that this ownership is ‘felt’ and can be felt withoutever being represented. The fact that it cannot be represented does notmean that it does not exist. However, Husserl holds that this alone is notsufficient to single out a notion of selfhood. Although Husserl constantlyrefers to a ‘self’, ‘ego’ and, indeed, ‘I’, he comes to realize that he has nottaken account of its manifestation. By simply attributing a life, existence andkinaesthesia to this unsubstitutable viewpoint, he has failed to mark outwhat is unique about our perspective or sense of mineness.35,36

It should be possible to specify criteria of singularity and identity of theself. My sense of mineness cannot emerge in isolation; it requires the pres-ence of others. As Husserl points out: ‘The I has its peculiar ownness in thethou and is only constituted in contrast to it’ (Husserl, 1973: p. 247). Torecognize experience as mine, to apprehend itself as an ‘I’ or self, the egorequires a thou. As long as the self is treated in abstraction from the worldor any ‘hetero-affection’, there is nothing that can possibly single out my selffrom others. The indexical ascription only becomes meaningful in the pres-ence of others and the world and is empty and meaningless without them.

Husserl realizes that we cannot make sense of our perspective as aperspective if no other perspective is available. I only recognize that I havea particular point of view or take on the world when I realize that it refersto one of many possible points of view. For Husserl this has an importantimplication. It leads him to affirm the existence of an objective, i.e.,intersubjective world. We only recognize the point of view of the other if it



429

is a point of view of one and the same object. Were the other ego to perceivea world that is radically distinct from mine, I would never be able to draw acomparison between my perspective and that of the other; indeed, the otherwould simply fail to manifest herself as other.37 Talk about perspectives onlymakes sense when we refer to different points of access to one and the sameobject/world. In short, we recognize our take on the world to be perspectivalonly because we realize that there is a shared (intersubjective) world, i.e.,that there are other points of view. As Husserl says in Cartesian Meditations:

A priori, my ego, given to me apodictically – the only thing I can positin absolute apodicticity as existing – can be a world-experiencing egoonly by being in communion with others like himself: a member of acommunity of monads, which is given orientedly, starting fromhimself…. I cannot conceive a plurality of monads otherwise than asexplicitly or implicitly in communion. This involves being a pluralityof monads that constitutes itself an Objective world.

(Husserl, 1960: Sec. 60, p. 139)

I can only experience the world by being in communion with others, and Ionly experience the alter ego if we share a common ground.38

In view of this, Husserl argues that I can only make sense of my perspec-tive as a perspective if other viewpoints are available to me. Reference tomineness without a contrasting viewpoint is simply non-sensical. Husserlsuggests as much in the following passage:

The absolute I – which in utterly unbroken constancy is prior to everyexistent and bears every existent within itself, which in its own ‘concre-tion’ is prior to all concretions – this absolute I bearing each and everyconceivable existent within itself is the first ‘ego’ of the reduction – anego that is wrongly so called, since for it an alter ego makes no sense.

(Husserl, 1973: p. 586)

Here Husserl makes clear that we cannot refer meaningfully to an ego ifthere is no alter ego. Without a thou we cannot truly refer to an ‘I’. Withoutreference to an alter ego, there is no objective world for the subject, andwithout world, there is no I.39

This, I believe, points to something important. If Henry does not wish tounderstand the self as an empty vessel but as infinitely rich, then he has torealize that this ‘richness’ only manifests itself with reference to the worldand others. Without the world and without others, the ‘I’ remains indistin-guishable and can only be ‘called “I” by equivocation’ (Husserl, 1970:p. 185). Husserl compares the ‘I’ without community with a dreamless



430

sleep40 because it would be an ‘I’ that could not function as an ‘I’. In manyways it would be truly mad (verrückt):41 it could not make sense of its view-point as a viewpoint.

Henry can only refer to an acosmic interiority when he is able to justifythe claim that it is radically distinct and indeed unsubstitutable from anyother perspective. Yet, as I have shown via Husserl, we can only recognizeour perspective as a perspective if another perspective is available to us.Hence, otherness is thus paramount to the ipseity of the self. It does not, asHenry believes, undermine our fundamental subjectivity; rather it allowsfor its manifestation. That is why without the world there is no subject.

This analysis should demonstrate that Henry presents us with a falsealternative. He believes that either the subject is alienated from itself andthe subject turns out to be not ‘anything but the objectivity of the object’,42

or there is an acosmic interiority, a subjectivity which need not pass throughthe world. Yet Husserl shows convincingly that we need not opt for eitheralternative. The subject is not an empty shell, nor is it self-enclosed. Rather,the subject is necessarily bifurcated. This does not mean that it is alienated,but that it has a dual nature. It is something in itself – namely a sensingbodily consciousness – and, at the same time, it is necessarily outside itselftoward the world, for without the world and others the self can be called aself only by equivocation.

Trinity College Dublin, Ireland

Abbreviations

AT Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (eds) Œuvres de Descartes, newedition, 11 vols, Paris: CNRS and Vrin, 1964–76 (cited by volume,page and sometimes line number)

CSM John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (trans.)The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 vols, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1985–6

CSMK John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch andAnthony Kenny (trans.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,Vol. 3, The Correspondence, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1991

Notes

1 Descartes: Letter to Mersenne, 25 May 1637. AT I, 376 (not included in theEnglish translation), cited by Marion, 1999a: p. 131.

2 Henry, 1988: p. 147.3 Henry, 1973: p. 74.4 Henry, 1989: p. 154.



431

5 It is worth noting Descartes’s response: ‘When someone says “I am thinking,therefore I am, or I exist”, he does not deduce existence from thought by meansof a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition ofthe mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by means of asyllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major premise:“Everything which thinks is, or exists”; yet in fact he learns it from experiencingin his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing. It is inthe nature of our mind to construct general propositions on the basis of ourknowledge of particular ones’ (AT VII, 140/1; CSM II).

6 To follow Kant: ‘The proposition “I am simple” must be regarded as an immedi-ate expression of apperception, just as what is referred to as the Cartesian infer-ence, cogito, ergo sum, is really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans)asserts my immediate existence. “I am simple” means nothing more than thatthis representation, “I”, does not contain in itself the least manifoldness and thatit is absolute (although merely logical) unity’ (Kant, 1933: A355).

7 Wittgenstein, 1981: pp. 116–17, 5.633. A similar objection was already raised byGassendi when he said: ‘And why, do you think, does the eye, though incapableof seeing itself in itself, yet see itself in the mirror?’ (‘Objection Against theMeditations of Descartes’, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes II, trans.Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1967), pp. 162–3), cited by Henry, 1973: p. 376. Descartes’s response to thisis discussed below.

8 Wittgenstein, 1981: 5.641.9 Henry, 1988: p. 149.

10 J.-P. Sartre, 1979.11 Wittgenstein, 1981: p. 27.12 Strawson calls such a view a non-ownership theory (see Strawson, 1959: p. 106).

It is ascribed to Nietzsche and Lichtenberg.13 Henry, 1988: p. 148.14 Cited in Henry, 1989: p. 152.15 Henry, 1988: pp. 152–3, my italics.16 CSM I, 195; AT VII, 362.17 For Descartes such a being is clearly a human being. He holds that God has no

body and animals ‘do not see as we do when we are aware that we see’ (CSMK61–2; AT I, 413; II, 14–20). They are like automata. They do not ‘think’ or sensewhat they mechanically perceive.

18 Descartes explicitly states that a non-corporeal being (e.g. God) does not havesensory experience. See Principles I, 23 (CSM I, 200f.; AT VIII, 13).

19 The point is to show that ‘imagination, sensation and will are intelligible only ina thinking thing’ (CSM I, 211; AT VIIIA, 25).

20 Henry (1975: 141). It is important to note that Henry does not wish to reinstan-tiate Descartes’s dualism of res cogitans and res extensa as such; rather he drawson Descartes to show what is unique about the subject, a uniqueness thatprecedes any worldly manifestation.

21 There is the ‘knowing-how-to-move one’s-hands, the knowing-how-to-moveone’s-lips, the knowing-how-to-move one’s-eyes’. Henry, 1989: p. 164.

22 ‘We are only by virtue of the fact that we think’ (Principles: CSM I, 194; AT IX-2, 28).

23 Although Henry draws on Husserl, he insists that he nonetheless departs fromhim. According to Henry, the problem is that Husserl seeks to account for theself-manifestation of the self by insisting that it has its own form of temporaliza-tion. This leads Henry to conclude that Husserl still regards the self as ecstatic,



432

bifurcated or mediated. Henry here adopts Derrida’s criticism of Husserl.Derrida understands this self-temporalization of the self as a loss of presence(Derrida, 1973). However, as I have shown elsewhere, Husserl widens the notionof presence rather than questioning whether the self can ever be truly present toitself. He thus equally argues that the self is fully present to itself. See Alweiss,(1999a, 1999b and 2003: Ch. 2).

24 When Descartes refers to our sensory perception, he has various kinds ofmovements in mind (see CSM I, 280; AT VIIIA, 316).

25 Henry, 1993: p. 45.26 Henry, 1975: p. 92.27 A phenomenological elucidation of Descartes ‘gives the idea of phenomenology

a radical meaning still unnoticed today’ (Henry, 1993: p. 40).28 See Held, 2000: pp. 43ff.29 Henry, 1993: p. 42.30 Ibid., p. 44.31 Tyler Burge claims that ‘individualism is a theory of mind derive[d] from

Descartes’ (1986: p. 117), more specifically Descartes’s First Meditation whichreveals that the individuation of thoughts is unaffected by possible differentenvironments (p. 122).

32 Henry, 1993: p. 48.33 Ibid.34 For a detailed discussion of how we can make sense of non-existent objects see

Alweiss, 2009.35 Although in Ideen I he constantly refers to the self, he acknowledges that he has

not yet shown how he arrives at this notion of mineness (see Husserl, 1982:pp. 61, 85).

36 Husserl does not merely wish to argue that we live in our experiences but, more-over, that all our experiences are unified by an Ego-pole which stands apart fromthe experiences. There is as Husserl put it famously a ‘transcendence in imma-nence’. This comes to light when we concern ourselves with recollection and actsof presentification. In such cases self-awareness is act-transcendent. I canremember my childhood and think of myself now and I can compare myself withthe way I was when I was 13. I do not merely live in these experiences; rather Iexperience a fissure or gap. I experience myself both as remembering the pastand experiencing my self sitting at home remembering the past. As EduardMarbach has shown, it is only at these moments when the subject displaces itselffrom its present situation that the pure ego emerges. Yet this would imply (andindeed Marbach suggests as much) that experience is not necessarily egologicalbut merely becomes so in such acts of self-division. Marbach believes that this hasled Husserl to argue that only humans have a true sense of self precisely becausethey have the ability to make themselves present through acts of imagination,reflection and recollection (Marbach, 1974: Ch. 9).

37 Husserl seems to anticipate Donald Davidson, who convincingly shows that radi-cal perspectivism is incoherent. ‘Different points of view make sense, but only ifthere is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existenceof a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability’ (Davidson,1984: p. 184.

38 There is a fundamental asymmetry between the first-person and the second-person perspective. They are asymmetrical not because we can never have accessto another person’s mental life but because I necessarily have a different view-point and thus type of access to that of another person. I can only see the other’sperspective from my point of view. I believe that Husserl would argue just like



433

Wittgenstein that ‘my thoughts are not hidden from [the other] but are open tohim in a different way than they are to me’ (Wittgenstein, 1982: pp. 34–5). Thatis, the problem is not one of introspection but of points of view or types of access.I can never occupy an alter ego’s first-person perspective. As Wittgenstein wouldsay, when ‘you see the eye you see something going out from it. You see the lookin the eye’ (Wittgenstein, 1967): Sec. 222). When I experience a person’sperspective or ray of regard (Blickstrahl) I can only experience it from myperspective. I can draw analogies between my perspective and the perspective ofthe alter ego; however, this analogy is never complete, and I can never take overanother person’s perspective. The other is never really present but made present(Husserl, 1960: Sec. 51) from my perspective. There is no pure third person’sperspective. Whatever is experienced as given necessarily involves a first-personperspective.

39 Cited by Marbach, 1974: p. 330 from an unpublished manuscript: K IV 3, 57.40 Cited by Smith, 2008 and Zahavi, 2001: p. 112.41 Marbach, 1974: p. 331.42 Henry, 1993: p. 49.

References

Alweiss, L. (1999a) ‘The Enigma of Time’, Phänomenologische Forschungen 4(3):150–203.

Alweiss, L. (1999b) ‘The Presence of Husserl’, Journal of the British Society forPhenomenology 30: 59–75.

Alweiss, L. (2003) The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique ofHusserl, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Alweiss, L. (2005) ‘I Am, I Exist’, in Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy (eds) Givennessand God: The Work of Jean-Luc Marion, New York: Fordham University Press,pp. 37–46.

Alweiss, L. (2009) ‘Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl’s Account ofIntentionality’, Inquiry 52(1): 53–78.

Burge, T. (1986) ‘Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception’, in P. Pettit andJ. McDowell (eds) Subject, Thought and Context, Oxford: Clarendon Press,pp. 117–36.

Cottingham, John (1976) Descartes’ Conversation with Burman, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Cottingham, John (1985) ‘Cartesian Trialism’, Mind 94(374): 218–30. Reprinted inG. Moyal (ed.) René Descartes, Critical Assessments, London: Routledge, 1991,Vol. III, pp. 236–48.

Davidson, D. (1984) ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’ (1974), in Truthand Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 183–98.

Derrida, J. (1973) Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory ofSigns, trans. David B. Allison, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robin-son, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Held, K. (2000) ‘The Controversy Concerning Truth: Towards a Prehistory ofPhenomenology’, Husserl Studies 17: 35–48.

Henry, M. (1973) The Essence of Manifestation, trans. Girard Etzkorn, The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff.

Henry, M. (1975) Philosophy and the Phenomenology of the Body, trans. GirardEtzkorn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Henry, M. (1988) ‘Critique of the Subject’, Topoi 7: 147–53.



434

Henry, M. (1989) ‘Phenomenology of the Unconscious’, Stanford Literary Review 6:149–69.

Henry, M. (1993) ‘The Soul According to Descartes’, in Stephen Voss (ed.) Essayson the Philosophy of Science of René Descartes, Oxford: Oxford University Press,pp. 52–74.

Husserl, E. (1960) Cartesian Meditations – An Introduction to Phenomenology,trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1964) The Paris Lectures, trans. Peter Koestenbaum, The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenol-ogy, trans. David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Husserl, E. (1973) Husserliana, Vol. 13, Zur Phänomenologie der IntersubjektivitätI, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1982) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomeno-logical Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology,Collected Works, Vol. II, trans. F. Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Kant I. (1933) Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman KempSmith, London: Macmillan Press.

Marbach, E. (1974) Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls, TheHague: Nijhoff.

Marion, J.-L. (1993) ‘Generosity and Phenomenology’, in Stephen Voss (ed.) Essayson the Philosophy of Science of René Descartes, Oxford: Oxford University Press,pp. 52–74.

Marion, J.-L. (1999a) On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution andLimits of Onto-theo-logy in Cartesian Thought, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, Chicago/London: Chicago University Press.

Marion, J.-L. (1999b) Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics, Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press.

Sartre, J. P. (1989) Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London:Routledge.

Smith, A. D. (2008) ‘Husserl and Externalism’, Synthese 60: 313–33.Strawson, P. (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Oxford:

Oxford University Press.Wittgenstein, L. (1967) Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans.

G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Wittgenstein, L. (1981) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden,

London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Wittgenstein, L. (1982) Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I,

Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations, ed G. H. vonWright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue,Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Zahavi, D. (2001) Husserl and Transcendental Interobjectivity: A Response to theLinguistic Pragmatic Critique, trans. E. Behnke, Athens OH: Ohio UniversityPress.


Date post:	21-May-2017
Category:	Documents
Upload:	micaela-szeftel
View:	219 times
Download:	0 times

Alweiss, The Bifurcated Subject

Documents