An Adaptation Mosaic - World Banksiteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/817372... · and India (by Rama...

THE WORLD BANK

FINAL DRAFT

A SAMPLE OF THE EMERGING WORLD BANK WORK

IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

Ajay Mathur, Ian Burton,and Maarten van Aalst, eds.

February 2004

World Bank Global Climate Change Team

Ajay Mathur, Ian Burton,and Maarten van Aalst, eds.

February 2004

World Bank Global Climate Change Team

An

Adaptation

Mosaic

An�

Adaptation

Mosaic

A SAMPLE OF THE EMERGING WORLD BANK WORK

IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

FINAL DRAFT

An Adaptation Mosaic

A sample of the emerging World Bank workin climate change adaptation

Ajay Mathur, Ian Burton and Maarten van Aalst, eds.

2004

World BankGlobal Climate Change Team

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Part 1, Pages 1-32

MATHUR, BURTON AND VAN AALST, EDS.AN ADAPTATION MOSAIC

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction – an Adaptation Mosaic page 1Ajay Mathur, Ian Burton, and Maarten van Aalst

1. The Socio-economic Costs of Disasters page 5Margaret Arnold and Alcira Kreimer

2. Vulnerability and Adapation in Pacific Island Countries page 15Maarten van Aalst and Sofia Bettencourt

3. Vulnerability and Adaptation in Bank work: Progess and Prospects page 41Ian Burton and Maarten van Aalst

4. Climate Influence on World Bank Agriculture Portfolio in Brazil and India page 53Rama Chandra Reddy, Ariel Dinar and Robert Mendelsohn

5. Climate Variability in Kenya: Impacts and Responses page 71Hezron Mogaka, Sam Gichere, James Richard Davis and Rafik Hirji

6. Climate Change and Agriculture - Impacts and Adaptations page 83Pradeep Kurukulasuriya

7. Weather Indexes for Developing Countries page 99Panos Varangis, Jerry Skees, and Barry Barnett

8. Building Effective Catastrophe Insurance Programs at the CountryLevel: a Risk Management Perspective page 119Eugene Gurenko


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Acknowledgements

The editors wish to thank all the participants of the climate change training course held duringESSD week on March 13/14, 2003; in particular the session chairs Bob Watson, Ajay Mathur,and Ariel Dinar, and presenters Alcira Kreimer, Bob Mendelsohn, Maarten van Aalst, RamaChandra Reddy, Ian Burton, James Richard Davis, Pradeep Kurukulasuriya, Panos Varangis, andEugene Gurenko.


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Introduction – an Adaptation Mosaic

Ajay Mathur1, Ian Burton2 and Maarten van Aalst3

1 Ajay Mathur ([email protected]) is team leader of the World Bank Global Climate Change Team2 Ian Burton ([email protected]) is emeritus professor of the University of Toronto and independentscholar and consultant3 Maarten van Aalst ([email protected]) is a climate change specialist at Utrecht University

MATHUR, BURTON AND VAN AALST

INTRODUCTION

An Adaptation Mosaic

The papers in this collection were presented at a climate change training seminar held at theWorld Bank during ESSD week 2003. They were selected to provide a sample of current Bankwork relating to adaptation to climate change, and to facilitate an exchange of ideas about theemerging agenda for Bank work in this area. What is presented here are fragments of anincomplete mosaic. The complete picture has yet to be drawn, but its pieces already provides anindications of the pattern of work that is now developing. The collection serves as a companionpaper to Look Before You Leap, a strategic paper prepared for the Climate Change Team by IanBurton and Maarten van Aalst, which proposes future directions for the Bank's work in this area.

In the past few years, adaptation to climate change has emerged onto the climate agenda to standnext to the reduction of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere as an essential part ofthe response to the risks of climate change. Poor countries, and poor people in all countries, arelikely to be hit hardest by the negative consequences of climate change. Climate change thusdirectly affects the World Bank’s mission of reducing poverty4. The Bank’s clients clearly needassistance in developing their own approach to climate risks and their own adaptation priorities.At the same time, the Bank has to ensure that its own investments are not exposed tounacceptable risk. In some cases, new adaptation funding opportunities under the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) might be used for these tasks5.

It is widely accepted that the Bank's main efforts in climate change adaptation should be focusedon the integration of climate risk management in policies and projects in client countries, whereappropriate. While this process is urgent, it is not trivial how it should be shaped. The papers inthis Mosaic collection exemplify the experiments and the valuable lessons from the "learning bydoing" that characterises Bank experiences in this area so far.

While anthropogenic climate change is a new item on the global environment and developmentagenda, climate variability and extreme weather events have always been a concern. The maincapability in the Bank for dealing with these issues rests with the Disaster Management Facilityand it is in that direction that we can look for lessons from the experience of dealing with climate

4 See the recent interagency paper on Poverty and Climate Change at www.climatevarg.org5 As discussed in Look Before You Leap (Burton and Van Aalst, 2003), the UNFCCC-related fundingmechanisms do not necessarily match the World Bank mandate to mainstream adaptation in the context ofpoverty reduction and sustainble development. In contrast to greenhouse gas mitigation, adaptation has noclear quantitative measures of success like atmospheric concentrations or emission levels. Adaptation is aplace-based phenomenon and the benefits fall largely where the adaptation policies and measures areadopted. In the absence of global yardsticks the adaptation process lacks coherence, and seems to beevolving on two different tracks. One track, in the context of the UNFCCC and its funding mechanisms,aims at strictly climate change related adaptation activities. The other track focuses on adaptation as part ofmainstream economic and sustainable development, and sees climate change as just one element in acomplex development process, which should not be isolated. The World Bank’s mission relates more to thelatter. At the same time, there are good opportunities to combine adaptation measures and UNFCCC-related funding with the Bank's development work, both at the national level and in the project cycle. SuchBank activities would benefit from, and could also contribute to, a harmonization of the two tracks.


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impacts. The first paper in the set (by Margaret Arnold and Alcira Kreimer) therefore describesthe impacts of disasters. The story is not reassuring. Despite considerable efforts the toll ofdisaster losses continues to rise in both developed and developing countries, although there hasbeen considerable success in reducing the motality and morbidity associated with disasters. Thisexperience shows that adapting to climate change variability and extremes is not a straightfowardtask and easy and quick successes are not to be expected.

The subsequent papers in this set focus on the assessment of the additional risk that climateimpacts place on development; emerging examples of how adaptation options to mitigate this riskcan be integrated into the Bank’s operations; and innovative illustrations of how the „irreduciblerisk“ can be spread and shared .

The experience related to risk assessment comes from countries that are particularly vulnerable toclimate change. Among them are many small island states, especially in the Pacific Ocean.Already vulnerable to tropical cyclones, droughts and floods, they now also face climate changeand incremental sea level rise. The second paper (by Maarten van Aalst and Sofia Bettencourt)describes two World Bank activities in the Pacific Region: a study on the potential economicimplications of climate change, and an ongoing project to mainstream adaptation into economicplanning in Kiribati, a particularly vulnerable atoll country.

In addition to the Pacific islands study, the World Bank has been involved in similar activities toexplore vulnerabilities to climate change and adaptation options in Bangladesh and theCaribbean islands - both also areas of high vulnerability and relatively low adaptation capacity.The third paper (by Ian Burton and Maarten van Aalst) draws lessons from these three studies, onthe basis of recent project reviews.

Carrying out special studies on climate impacts, vulnerability and adaptation is one element ofaddressing the new risks, but in many ways it represents the easy part of the task. More difficult isthe incorporation of adaptation and climate risk management into Bank operations. The Kiribatiproject (discussed in the second paper) aims to integrate climate risk management in theeconomic planning of a client country. Other steps towards the integration of climate riskmanagement in operational work include an analysis of agriculture and irigation projects in Braziland India (by Rama Chandra Reddy, Ariel Dinar, and Robert Mendelsohn), and of water resouresmanagement and climate variability in Kenya (by Hezron Mogaka, Sam Gichere, James RichardDavis, and Rafik Hirji). Another sectoral approach is the review of impacts and adaptationoptions for agriculture (by Pradeep Kurukulasuriya).

The last two papers in the set deal not directly with adaptation measures and policies themselves,but with ways of risk sharing and spreading through insurance. Again the experience comes notfrom climate change work but from the field of natural disasters. Panos Varangis, Jerry Skees,and Barry Barnett describe the use of weather derivatives as an approach to dealing withcatastrophic risk and Eugene Gurenko describes the Bank’s work in helping to establish a pool ora fund for earthquake insurance in Turkey.

MATHUR, BURTON AND VAN AALST

INTRODUCTION

Special studies of climate risk, vulnerability and adaptation; lessons from natural disasterexperience including new insurance initiatives; and the beginnings of the incorporation of climaterisks into Bank operational work are three ways in which progress is being made in thedevelopment of a Bank approach to climate change adaptation. The next few years are likely tosee a considerable expansion of all three kinds of work, leading to the day when assessment ofclimate risks will have become a routine part of Bank operations. As these papers show this is nota matter of devising new safeguards to be imposed upon Bank work at country and projectlevels. Rather it a matter of taking advantage of the opportunities for the Bank to assist its clientsin the face of many risks, old and new - including a changing climate. This adaptation mosaic isthe beginning of a long story, most of which has yet to be written.

AN ADAPTATION MOSAIC

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1 The Socio-economic Costs of Disasters1

Margaret Arnold and Alcira Kreimer2

1 Additional information relating to the topics raised in this paper can be found in a number of publicationsby the World Bank Disaster Management Facility, available at http://worldbank.org/dmf2 Margaret Arnold and Alcira Kreimer ([email protected]) are the World Bank DisasterManagement Facility

ARNOLD AND KREIMER

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COSTS OF DISASTERS

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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates an increase of 1.4 to 5.8degrees centigrade in surface temperature over the current century, a rise that is withoutprecedent in the last 10,000 years. Changes in this range will affect the intensity and frequency ofextreme weather events, including floods, droughts, heat waves, and storms. Hence, disaster riskreduction and climate change adaptation are intimately linked. This chapter discusses theworrying trends in natural disasters, their impacts on development and poverty, and the role ofthe World Bank in disaster risk reduction.

1. Introduction

The mission of the World Bank is to fight poverty. An important part of this mission it to assistdeveloping countries to prevent, prepare for and recover from natural disasters. Vulnerability todisaster impacts is an important and often overlooked dimension of poverty. Between 1990 and1998, 94% of the world’s disasters and 97% of all natural-disaster-related deaths occurred indeveloping countries. Natural disasters comprise a key source of risk for the poor, including lossof life, shelter, livelihoods. The reduction of disaster risk is essential to achieving the MillenniumDevelopment Goals, in particular those of eradication extreme poverty and hunger; ensuringenvironmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development.

2. What’s to Come

In 2002, the cost of the world’s natural disasters reached US$55 billion. Over the last 50 years,there has been a 14-fold increase in the global cost of natural disasters, with weather-relatednatural disasters accounting for two-thirds of all losses. Annual economic losses due to naturaldisasters in the last decade reached an estimated US$54 billion per annum, with a high percentageof losses in infrastructure. In Asia alone, disasters caused losses to infrastructure investmentamounting to US$10 billion per year in the 1990s. These direct losses from catastrophessignificantly impact the poor and their livelihoods.

Developing countries are not only facing the potential of more frequent weather-related events.Rapid urbanization, the increased concentration of assets, environmental degradation, and otherfactors are also increasing the vulnerability of poor communities to disaster impacts. Since 1950,the urban population has been increasing at the rate of 4% per year compared with a 1.9% rate ofincrease for the world’s population. In the year 2020 it is expected that the total world populationwill reach approximately 8.5 billion, with a large percentage of these people located in urbanareas with high exposure to natural hazards. Especially vulnerable to natural disasters aremegacities like Jakarta, Istanbul, Buenos Aires, Athens, Sao Paulo, and Mexico City.


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3. Understanding the Developmental Impacts of Disasters

The impacts of disasters include direct, indirect and secondary losses. The direct effects ofdisasters comprise the physical losses such as loss of life, collapsed buildings, and destroyedinfrastructure. Indirect costs refer to the loss of earnings and output due to interrupted activitiesafter a disaster occurs. Examples of indirect costs include loss of earnings, unemployment, lossof productivity due to death, illness and injuries, and increased public finance expenditure.Secondary effects of disasters include macroeconomic impacts and longer-term impacts such asbalance of payments, trade deficits and GDP growth. All of these impacts have significantadverse effects on the social and economic development of developing countries. For example,Honduras’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, prepared by the Government, details the effects ofHurricane Mitch, stating that it caused an increase of an estimated 165,000 poor peoplenationwide. The strategy paper cites employment, housing, factors of production and income asareas affected by this disaster. Box 1. below provides some more details on the macroeconomicimpacts that disasters can have.

Box 1. Modeling the macroeconomic impacts of disasters

Often perceived as “acts of God,” natural catastrophes have frequently been overlooked in policyplanning. On an aggregate level, the consequence of this limited planning is a serious challenge

to socioeconomic development as scarce funds are diverted from longer-term developmentobjectives to short-term emergency relief and reconstruction needs. However, if disaster impacts

are integrated as a component of macroeconomic projections, than more effective planningoptions at the country and international level can be explored.

An exercise to model the macroeconomic impacts of disasters in Argentina, Honduras, andNicaragua developed a framework to analyze the economic impacts of natural disasters in

developing countries and facilitate the analysis of policies designed to reduce the economicimpacts of natural catastrophes and minimize the impact of catastrophes on the poor. The

country exercises first estimated annual expected losses due to natural catastrophes for eachcountry. The results were an annual expected loss of $320 million a year for Argentina

(representing 0.025% of capital stock), $64 million a year for Honduras (0.49% of capital stock),and $22 million a year for Nicaragua (0.43% of capital stock).

The country exercises then estimated the macroeconomic impacts of these direct losses. Inorder for Argentina to achieve growth projections with annual expected losses of $320 million as

a result of flooding, the country must be able to mobilize the funds necessary for emergency reliefand reconstruction investment. These funds can come from either tapping into foreign savings by

increasing imports and/or decreasing private consumption. By stochastically integratingcatastrophe exposure into a macroeconomic model for Argentina, the exercise projects for one

sample year that government consumption is expected to increase by $48 million, importsincrease by $93 million, external debt increase by $160 million, and private consumption

decrease by $410 million. These expected adjustments to existing forecasts derive solely fromaccounting for catastrophe losses, demonstrating that knowledge of the magnitude, probability

and range of the impacts of catastrophes on macroeconomic projections is valuable for planningfor disasters.

ARNOLD AND KREIMER


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Real GDP

4000

4500

5000

5500

6000

6500

7000

7500

8000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

mill

ion

US

D

Original projection Projection incorporating catastrophic exposure

Figure 1: Effect of incorporating catastrophe exposure on GDP projections in Honduras

The Honduras and Nicaragua examples considered cases in which access to post-disasterfinancing may be limited. Figure 1 demonstrates that if access to foreign savings is limited post-event, catastrophes could stagnate GDP for Honduras over the next 8 years. The first trajectory,marked with boxes, represents World Bank projections for expected annual growth rates of 5% to6%. The second growth trajectory, marked with triangles, incorporates the effects of catastrophicexposure assuming Honduras can not obtain sufficient external funds to finance post-disasterlosses. This new growth trajectory demonstrates that catastrophe exposure has the potential toimpede future growth of the Honduran economy.

The study on Nicaragua extended the Honduras' analysis to understand the impacts ofcatastrophes on the poor. Using a household level model, the macroeconomic estimates ofdecreased economic growth were translated into poverty impacts. Two scenarios on proportionaland disproportional impacts showed that an inability to reconstruct or provide relief post-catastrophe can stall poverty eradication efforts.

Another threat to long-term development is the reallocation of expenditure that occurs followinga disaster. Following the 1985 earthquake in Mexico, it is estimated that as much as 30% offunds earmarked for water sector projects were diverted to deal with emergency needs. Ad hocreassignments of funds becomes frequent if not routine in disaster-prone countries, and even iffunds are used well for disaster reconstruction, a sudden, unplanned reallocation can destabilizeor sacrifice longer-term development objectives. Responding to disasters also underminesbudgetary planning, investment confidence and interrupts ongoing projects and reduces theabilities of communities and governments to pursue long-term development goals. Internationalorganizations and local financing institutions also reallocate funding from ongoing projects toprovide urgently needed support in emergency situations, which detracts from development goalsset out by those activities.


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People in Poverty

1,800,000

1,900,000

2,000,000

2,100,000

2,200,000

2,300,000

2,400,000

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Current policy objective, to reduce the number of poor

Catastrophe, number of poor does not meet current policy objective

Figure 2: Catastrophes can slow or stall the reduction of poverty

The dotted line in figure 2 shows the current policy objective for Nicaragua: to reduce the numberof people in poverty. The dotted line indicates that, in the absence of a catastrophe, GDP growthalone reduces the number of people in poverty by 500,000 people by 2008. In the case of acatastrophe where a country does not obtain additional aid (shown by the solid line), the impacton poverty is substantial. For the decade following a 1998 catastrophe, the number of peopleliving in poverty decreases only slightly. Towards the end of the projected period, the number ofpeople in poverty begins to rise slightly.The country cases demonstrate that the ability to finance losses following a disaster is crucial torecovery. Including disaster risk management as a formal component of development planningfor countries with high disaster exposure is essential if development efforts are to be trulysustainable.

Adapted from Freeman, Paul et al. Catastrophes and Development: Integrating NaturalCatastrophes into Development Planning, Disaster Management Facility, World Bank, June 2002.

In every case, it is the poor that are disproportionately affected by disaster. Low-income familiestypically live in the informal sector, on marginal lands, and have few, if any, resources to mitigateand respond to disasters. When information is available on risk identification, people withresources can take measures to avoid the risk, while the poor are forced to accept a higher level ofrisk. Although they live in more vulnerable areas, the daily struggle to survive takes priority overinvestment in mitigating the impacts of potential disaster events.

ARNOLD AND KREIMER


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4. The Role of the World Bank in Reducing Disaster Impacts

The World Bank has a long tradition of supporting the disaster management efforts of its clientcountries. Since 1980, the Bank has approved approximately 500 operations related to naturaldisasters, amounting to more than $40 billion. This figure includes both post-disasterreconstruction operations as well as projects with components to mitigate losses before disasterstrikes. The figure requires some explanation, as it does not include the amounts of funding thatare reallocated from ongoing development projects in response to a disaster emergency, which arequite substantial. Following a disaster event, the World Bank in many cases reallocates fundingfrom ongoing projects in a country’s lending portfolio in order to get urgently needed liquidity tothe emergency situation. These funds however, remain under the original project name, and aredifficult to capture in disaster lending figures. In addition, on the side of “mitigation projects,”the $40 million figure includes the entire loan amount of projects that may comprise a fewcomponents to risk reduction measures. An example may be a forestry development project thatincludes components to train firefighters and communities on fire prevention, build firebreaks,etc. In short, while the $40 million provides a ballpark figure regarding World Bank investmentfor disaster management, it is important to note that the proportion of funding aimed at post-disaster reconstruction is much more significant than that supporting “stand-alone” disaster riskreduction investments. A regional breakdown of the lending support for disasters is provided inFigure 3.

Figure 3. Lending Volume of Disaster-related Projects Approved since 1980

In terms of sectoral coverage, Bank-supported reconstruction projects are typically multi-sectoral,and implemented in both urban and rural areas. Affected countries generally give a high priorityto housing reconstruction after a natural disaster, thus, many projects have housing reconstructionas a major component. Bank projects have focused even more on repairing infrastructure anddamaged community facilities as well as economic recovery through emergency import support.

7,288

9,1544,384

9,0162,383

8,558

- 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000

Funding ($m)

Africa

East Asia and Pacific

Europe and Central Asia

Latin America and Caribbean

Middle East and North Africa

South Asia


CHAPTER 1

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Rebuilding in urban areas has often focused on health facilities, such as hospitals that arethemselves important to the recovery process. Where full reconstruction was not necessary,projects have concentrated on rehabilitation.

Institutional strengthening measures—through information and early warning systems, forinstance—have also featured prominently in reconstruction project design. Some reconstructionprojects have successfully built up the capacity to respond to future emergencies throughinstitutional development.

Projects aimed at disaster mitigation have addressed three likely weather-related events, namelyfloods, forest fires and droughts, all with long lead times against which mitigation can be mosteffective. Among the main components are forest fire prevention such as fire breaks and floodprotection measures ranging from coastal defenses to terracing. Institutional development isextremely important for mitigation to promote disaster awareness, planning and early warningsystems. As part of institutional development, the enforcement of land use and building codes toavoid settlement in hazardous areas or in vulnerable structures, has been widely pursued by theseprojects.

5. Stepping up Efforts to Reduce Disaster Impacts

Recognizing the increasing vulnerabilities to hazards, the World Bank has been stepping up itsefforts to better integrate disaster risk reduction into its development efforts. In 1998, the Bankestablished a Disaster Management Facility (DMF) to serve as a central resource for technicalsupport and cross-regional learning on disaster-related issues. The DMF serves the Bank and itsclients by providing four main services:

• technical support to Bank operations;• corporate strategy and policy analysis and development;• knowledge generation through work with Bank Group and external partners; and,• learning and training activities for Bank staff and clients.

The DMF’s objectives are to facilitate a more strategic response to disaster emergencies, and,more importantly, to enhance the Bank’s poverty alleviation efforts by integrating effectivedisaster risk reduction into development activities. To reduce the impacts of disasters and tofacilitate the adaptive capacity of developing countries to the impacts of climate change, acomprehensive risk management strategy is necessary. This approach comprises three maincomponents:

ARNOLD AND KREIMER


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• Risk identification: Identifying hazards, who and what is vulnerable to disaster impacts;and, developing a complete understanding of the economic, financial and social impactsof disasters.

• Risk reduction: Developing strategies and tools to avoid hazards (e.g. land use anddevelopment planning) and resist disaster impacts (e.g. building codes, socio-organizational measures).

• Risk sharing/transfer: Mechanisms to protect investments and better manage thefinancial impacts of disasters (e.g. insurance mechanisms, contingency financingarrangements, social safety nets).

The DMF has been working actively to develop tools and capacity for mainstreaming thiscomprehensive disaster risk management strategy into practice through World Bank strategiesand operations. A great deal of documentation has been generated by the DMF, in partnershipwith other organizations to develop a better understanding of the economic and developmentalimpacts of disasters, thus justifying the benefits of disaster prevention investments (all DMFpublications are accessible on the website (www.worldbank.org/dmf). Tools developed withpartners to facilitate improved disaster risk management include standards and a methodology forassessing post-disaster damage and needs; construction guidelines for disaster resistant hospitalsand health centers; and guidelines for microfinance institutions on how to best operate in disastersituations (to both protect the institution and support the recovery of the communities they serve).

Through awareness raising and training, Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) are increasinglyaddressing disaster risk management, and the governments of countries such as Vietnam, Malawi,Mozambique and Cambodia are incorporating disaster prevention and preparedness into theirPoverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

Operations are also increasingly focusing on integrating disaster prevention into developmentplanning. For example, reconstruction projects implemented following the Marmara earthquakein Turkey and the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat are going beyond mere rebuilding to focus ondeveloping communities that are more resilient against future disaster events. In Honduras andNicaragua, natural disaster vulnerability reduction projects focus exclusively on buildingemergency preparedness and response capacity at the national and municipal levels. Projectsunder preparation in Mexico and Colombia are supporting the development of ex ante measuresto better manage the financial impacts of disasters. Further analyses are underway countries inEastern Europe, South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific regions to explore how to strengthencapacity for disaster risk reduction.

Studies show that disaster prevention measures save lives and livelihoods and are a soundinvestment in future security. The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)estimates that every dollar spent to mitigate disasters saves two dollars spent on response andrecovery. A study in Argentina found that US$590 million invested in flood prevention avoidedan estimated US$1.4 billion in damages from floods. Installing dams and improving drainage inthe World Bank’s Rio Flood Reconstruction and Prevention project in Brazil reduced floodable


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areas by over 40% and achieved a 6.5 benefit -cost ratio for significant stretches of the Iguaçu andSarapui rivers.

6. Conclusion

We are facing a dangerous trend of an increasing occurrence of disaster events and equallyincreasing vulnerability to disasters. We are surrounded by recent reminders that sustainabledevelopment cannot be attained without mitigating hazard risks. Cumulative experience withdisasters points to an urgent need to move away from fatalism to prevention and from mobilizingresources after the fact to reducing risk before disasters occur. Developing countries and theagencies that assist them can not continue to formulate development plans and investmentprojects without due consideration to the risks posed by natural hazards.

Measures taken to reduce the impact of disasters provide an effective vehicle to make substantialadvances in the fight against poverty. Solutions include implementing mechanisms to increasepublic awareness of natural hazards, promoting investment in disaster mitigation, and providingregulatory and financial incentives for safe construction and development. The fruits of suchprevention efforts are considerable: less frequent and severe disasters, lives saved, propertyprotected, and more resilient and prosperous communities.

ARNOLD AND KREIMER


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CHAPTER 2

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2 Vulnerability and Adaptation inPacific Island Countries

• Vulnerability and Adaptation Analysis:Cities, Seas and Storms

• Operationalizing Adaptation:the Kiribati Adaptation Project

Maarten van Aalst1 and Sofia Bettencourt2

1 Maarten van Aalst ([email protected]) is a climate change specialist at Utrecht University.2 Sofia Bettencourt ([email protected]) is a senior natural resources economist at the World Bank (andtask team leader for the Kiribati Adaptation Project)

VAN AALST AND BETTENCOURT

VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION IN PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES

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2.1 Cities, Seas and Storms: Vulnerability and Adaptation Analysis3

3 Summary of Cities, Sea, and Storms, Managing Change in Pacific Island Economies, Volume IV: Adapting toClimate Change (World Bank 2000).

Climate change is likely to have substantial andwidespread impacts on Pacific Island countries,affecting sectors as varied as health, coastalinfrastructure, water resources, agriculture,forestry and fisheries. This summary examinesthe possible impacts of climate change on a highand a low island of the Pacific, and discusseskey adaptation and financing strategies.

A. Key Challenges

Across the Pacific, atoll dwellers speak ofhaving to move their houses away from theocean because of coastal erosion; of having tochange cropping patterns because of saltwaterintrusion; of changes in wind, rainfall, and oceancurrents. While these events may simply reflectclimate variability, they illustrate the types ofimpacts likely to be felt under climate change.

Rising Vulnerability to Weather Events

Many policymakers dismiss climate change as aproblem of the future. But impacts similar tothose likely to result from climate change arealready being felt, as the Pacific Islands becomeincreasingly vulnerable to extreme weatherevents and climate variability. Growingurbanization and squatter settlements,degradation of coastal ecosystems, and rapidlydeveloping infrastructure on coastal areas areintensifying the islands’ exposure to extremeweather events. At the same time, traditionalpractices promoting adaptation such asmulticrop agriculture are gradually weakening.These factors are contributing to increasinglysevere impacts from weather events. In the1990s alone, the cost of extreme events in thePacific Island region exceeded US$1 billion(table 1).

Compounding Impacts ofClimate Change

Arriving on top of this increased vulnerability,climate change will likely exacerbate the currentimpacts, whether or not climate variabilityincreases in the future—and there is someevidence that it may. In low islands, the mostsubstantial damage would come from losses tocoastal infrastructure as a result of inundation,storm surge, or shoreline erosion. But climatechange could also cause more intense cyclonesand droughts, the failure of subsistence cropsand coastal fisheries, losses in coral reefs, andthe spread of malaria and dengue fever. Theseimpacts could be felt soon: if climate changemodels are correct, the average sea level couldrise 11–21 centimeters and average temperaturescould rise 0.50–0.60C by 2025

Table 1. Estimated Costs of Extreme WeatherEvents in the Pacific Island Region during the 1990s

(millions of US$)

Event Year CountryEstimated

losses

Cyclone Ofa 1990 Samoa 140Cyclone Val 1991 Samoa 300Typhoon Omar 1992 Guam 300Cyclone Nina 1993 Solomon Islands –Cyclone Prema 1993 Vanuatu –Cyclone Kina 1993 Fiji 140Cyclone Martin 1997 Cook Island 7.5Cyclone Hina 1997 Tonga 14.5Drought 1997 Regional > 175a

Cyclone Cora 1998 Tonga 56Cyclone Alan 1998 French Polynesia –Cyclone Dani 1999 Fiji 3.5

– Not available.a. Includes losses of US$160 million in Fiji (Stratus 2000).Note: Minor events and disasters in Papua New Guinea not included. Costs are not adjusted for(inflation.Source: Campbell 1999.


CHAPTER 2

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B. Climate Change Scenarios

In 1999-2000, the World Bank helped sponsor astudy of potential impacts of climate changescenarios and adaptation options in the PacificIsland region.4 Based on the best scientificinformation available for the region, thefollowing scenarios were used (table 2):

Rise in sea level. Sea level may rise 0.5 meters(in a “best-guess” scenario) to 1 meter (in a“worst-case” scenario) by 2100.

Increase in surface air temperature. A i rtemperature could increase 1.60–3.40C by 2100.

Changes in rainfall. Rainfall could either rise orfall—most models predict an increase—by about20 percent in 2100, leading to more intensefloods or droughts.

Increased frequency of El Niño-like conditions.The balance of evidence indicates that El Niñoconditions may occur more frequently, leadingto higher average rainfall in the central Pacificand northern Polynesia.

Increased intensity of cyclones. Cyclones maybecome more intense in the future, with windspeeds increasing by as much as 20 percent; it isunknown, however, whether cyclones willbecome more frequent.

4 The study was a collaboration with the InternationalGlobal Change Institute, the Pacific Islands ClimateChange Assistance Programme teams in Fiji andKiribati, the South Pacific Regional EnvironmentalProgramme, Stratus Consulting Inc., the Center forInternational Climate and Environmental Research,and experts from numerous other national andregional agencies (as listed in World Bank 2000).

How certain is climate change? TheIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) stated in 1995 that “the balance ofevidence suggests a discernible human influenceon global climate change” (IPCC 1996).Uncertainties remain, however, particularly atresolutions with sufficient detail to encompasssmall island states.Some changes are more certain than others.There is emerging consensus that global averagetemperatures and sea level will increase.Rainfall changes remain highly uncertain,however, as does the relationship betweenclimate change and extreme events. Uncertaintyalso increases with time: projections for 2100are less certain than projections for 2050. Globalchanges are more certain than regional or island-specific changes. And impacts on coastal areasand water resources are generally more certainthan impacts on agriculture and health.Although there are uncertainties on themagnitude and timing of the changes, moststudies consider the Pacific Islands to be at highrisk from climate change and sea level rise(Kench and Cowell 1999).Based on the results of the study, the physicaland economic impacts of climate change in thePacific Island region are illustrated here by theexample of a high island – Viti Levu in Fiji –and a group of low islands – Tarawa atoll inKiribati. To give perspective to the analysis, theeconomic damages were estimated for 2050 as ifthe impacts had occurred under today’s socio-economic conditions. Ranges represent a “bestguess” scenario (lower bound) and a “worstcase” scenario (upper bound). Costs reflect 1998US dollars, and assume no adaptation.

Table 2. Climate Change and Variability Scenarios in the Pacific Island Region

Impact 2025 2050 2100 Level of Certainty

Sea level rise (centimeters) 11–21 23–43 50–103 ModerateAir temperature increase (degrees Centigrade) 0.5–0.6 0.9–1.3 1.6–3.4 HighChange in rainfall (percent) Fiji -3.7–+3.7 -8.2–+8.2 -20.3–+20.3 Low Kiribati -4.8–+3.2 -10.7–+7.1 -26.9–+17.7 LowCyclones Frequency Models produce conflicting results Very low Intensity (percentage increase in wind speed) 0–20 ModerateEl Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) A more El Niño –like mean state Moderate

Note: Ranges given reflect a best-guess scenario (lower value) and a worst-case scenario (higher value). For details, see World Bank (2000), annex A.



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B. The Likely Impacts of Climate Change

Impact on Coastal Areas

Climate change is likely to affect coastal areas inthree major ways: through a rise in sea level,leading to erosion and inundation; through moreintense cyclones and storm surges; and throughhigher sea surface temperatures, leading to adecline in coral reefs (figure 1).

High islands may experience similar impacts asViti Levu, where coastal erosion may claim 2 to4 percent of the land below 10 meters altitude by2050, leading to average annual losses ofUS$2.9–$5.8 million. By 2100, the proportionof land eroded could reach 5 to 10 percent. Dueto the existing level of coastal protection and thetopography, the impact of inundation is expectedto be relatively minor. However, in years ofstrong storm surge, Viti Levu could experiencelosses in capital assets of US$75–$90 million bymid-century. If the worst case scenarios of sealevel rise materialize by 2100, downtown Suvacould experience serious flooding even duringmoderate cyclones.

The impact of sea level rise would be mostsevere in the low islands of the Pacific. InTarawa, though the impact of coastal erosion isexpected to be modest (3–4 percent of the landby 2100), inundation could lead to annualaverage damages of US$6.6 – US$12.4 millionby 2050. Periodic storm surges could result inthe inundation of up to 55–80 percent of landareas in North Tarawa, and 25–54 percent ofareas in South Tarawa by 2050 (figure 2).

The net impact of sea level rise on mangroves isunclear, and could even be beneficial in somesites if the sea level rises gradually. Coral reefs,on the other hand, could be significantly affectedby climate change. Many corals may not be ableto adapt to warmer sea surface temperatures andto increased concentration of carbon dioxide inthe atmosphere, both of which inhibit coralgrowth. Bleaching events and subsequent reefmortality are expected to become more frequent,leading potentially to a decline in reef fisheriesand a long-term reduction in coastal protection.

Figure 2: Scenarios of Inundation of Bikenibeu Island,South Tarawa (Kiribati)

A: Present status; B: Residual island under a worst case scenario, 2100; C: Residual island under worst case scenario and storm surge, 2100 Source: Background studies to Worldbank (2000)

Figure 1. Likely Impact of Climate Change onCoastal Areas of Pacific Island Countries

Sea LevelRise

Impacts onCoral Reefs

sssssssssProcesses

Increase waveEnergy

Reducesediment

production

Increasedexposure

to inundation

Increasedcoastalerosion

IncreasedTropicalCycloneIntensity

IncreasedSea

SurfaceTemperature

ShorewardRetreat of

Mangroves

IncreasedRiver

Flooding


CHAPTER 2

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Impact on Water Resources

Climate change is likely to affect the waterresources of Pacific Island countries throughvariations in rainfall, evapo-transpiration –caused by rising temperatures – and a rise insea level. It is also possible that islands suchas Viti Levu would experience greaterclimate variability, with alternating floodsand droughts brought on by more intensecyclones and fluctuations in El Niño/La Niñaevents.

For Tarawa (and perhaps for many other lowislands in the Pacific) such trends wouldimpact the vital groundwater resources of theatoll. If climate change scenarios provecorrect and rainfall changes by 7–10 percent,the sea level rises by 0.4 meters, and theislands’ width is reduced through inundation,the thickness of Tarawa’s main groundwatersupply could decline by 19–38 percent by2050. The resulting economic losses couldaverage US$0.7–$2.7 million a year, andrequire the development of alternativegroundwater sources, desalination, or rainfallcollection.

In Viti Levu, rainfall variations could cause a10 percent change in river flow by 2050 and a20 percent change by 2100. This could lead tosubstantial river flood damage if scenarios ofincreased rainfall materialize. Provided thatthe distribution system was kept fullyefficient, a scenario of reduced rainfall wouldnot become a substantial threat for the watersupply of western Viti Levu until the secondpart of the century, but could then result indemand outstripping supply by as much as 38percent by 2100.

The combination of a warmer – and possiblydrier – climate with potentially more prevalentEl Niño conditions could lead to more intensedroughts in Viti Levu. Droughts of the severityof the 1997/98 event – which caused losses ofmore than US$70 million, not counting impactson agriculture – could become the norm in thefuture.

Regional studies indicate that cyclone intensitymay increase by 0–20 percent as a result ofclimate change (Jones and others 1999; Holland1997). A 20 percent increase in maximum windspeed could result in 44–100 percent higherdamages than experienced today,5 costing VitiLevu up to US$11 million a year by 2050 (table3).

5 Based on the costs of actual events recorded by theFiji Meteorological Services, Clark (1997) and J.Terry (personal communication, May 2000).

Figure 3. Likely Impact of Climate Change on the WaterResources of a Low Island (Tarawa, Kiribati)

Table 3. Estimated Average Annual Economic Impact of Climate Change on Water Resources of Tarawa and Viti Levu, 2050 (millions of 1998 US$)

Category Annual damage

Tarawa Atoll: Combined effect of sea level rise, changes in rainfall and reduced island widtha 0.7_2.7 Total 0.7_2.7

Viti Levu: Changes in average rainfall + Increased severity and/or frequency of El Niño–related drought + Increased cyclone intensity 0–11.1 Total >0-11.1

a – Assumes sea level rise of 0.4 meters, 7% increase to 10% decrease in rainfall, and reduced island width. + Likely to have significant economic costs but impact could not be quantified. Note: The range given reflects a best guess and a worst case scenario. Source: Background studies to Worldbank (2000).

Coastal Effectsof

Climate ChangeMean Rainfall

Increased DroughtFrequency &Magnitude

ImprovedWater

Resources

Increase Decrease

ReducedQuantity

ReducedQuality

IncreasedInundation

Groundwater

DecreasedRainWater

Collectionand

Storage

Loss ofLand



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Impact on Agriculture

Climate change is most likely to affectagricultural production through changes inrainfall. Agricultural crops could also beaffected by rising temperatures, climatevariability – such as more intense cyclones andEl Niño/La Niña conditions – and sea level rise(figure 4).

If wetter conditions prevail in the future, water-sensitive crops such as coconut, breadfruit andcassava would likely benefit. A rainfall decline,by contrast, would hurt most crops. In a lowisland such as Tarawa, coconut production andte babai (giant taro) would be particularlyaffected given their sensitivity to reductions inrainfall and groundwater.

In Viti Levu, increases in rainfall during goodyears may offset the impacts of warmertemperatures. But a warmer – and possibly drier– climate could lead to more intense droughtsduring El Niño years. This could result in a 9percent average drop in sugarcane productionlevels from current conditions, and in lossesaveraging US$13.7 million a year by 2050. Indrought years, production of sugarcane coulddrop by half, with a shortfall of agriculturalproduction approaching US$90 million. Theseperiodic droughts could well prove to be themost disruptive to the Fijian economy oncepreferential trade agreements are phased out.

The impacts of climate change on traditionalcrops, such as yam and taro, could also affect thesubsistence economy of the Pacific Islands. InViti Levu, a declining rainfall scenario andfuture El Niño/La Niña conditions could lead toa 11–15 percent shortfall in taro, yam, andcassava yields (figure 5). Even in scenarios ofincreasing rainfall, future climate variabilitycould cost Viti Levu an average of US$68,0000a year in lost food crops (though crops such asyam would likely benefit).

In the low islands of Tarawa, sea level risewould affect agriculture crops through saltwaterintrusion – affecting te babai (giant taro)production in particular – and through loss ofcoastal land to inundation, which may reduceproduction of copra, breadfruit and pandanus.

Figure 5. Effect of El Nino—induced Droughts on Taro Cultivation Area in Viti Levu, Fiji

Figure 4. Likely Impacts of Climate Change onAgriculture in Viti Levu, Fiji

1990

Current El Nino

2050 El Nino

Note: Shaded areas show land suitable for cultivation.Source: Background studies to Worldbank (2000).

Meanrainfall

Increaseddrought

frequencyand

magnitude

Improvedproduction

of most crops(but yam

productionmay decline)

Increase Decrease

Decreasedproduction

• SugarCane

• Taro• Cassava

Increasedmagnitude

oftropical

cyclones


CHAPTER 2

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Impact on Health

Climate change could have significant impactson public health due to the higher temperatures(0.9–1.3o C by 2050), changes in water supplyand extreme events, and a decline in agricultureproduction. Likely impacts would include:

• Direct impacts on public safety, such asinjuries, illness, and loss of lives due tocyclones or droughts.

• Indirect effects, such as increased incidenceof vector-borne diseases (dengue fever andmalaria), waterborne diseases (diarrhea), andtoxic algae (ciguatera).

• Nutrition-related diseases, particularlymalnutrition and food shortages duringextreme events.

These impacts are likely to be particularly severefor the poor. Poor households – particularly intowns – will be more vulnerable to the impactsof climate change because of their greaterpropensity for infectious diseases, limited accessto medical services, substandard housing, andexposure to poor environmental conditions.Many of the urban poor may also lack access tothe safety nets that assisted them traditionally intimes of disaster.

Climate change could cause significant increasesin the frequency, severity, and distribution ofdengue fever. The higher temperatures wouldincrease the biting rate of mosquitoes anddecrease the incubation period of the dengue

virus. In Viti Levu, the number of cases couldincrease by 20–30 percent in 2050, and as muchas 100 percent by 2100 (under a worst casescenario). In countries where the malaria vectoris found, the distribution and prevalence of thedisease is also likely to expand (WHO 1996).

Diarrhea disease is likely to become morecommon in a warmer world, particularly under ascenario of decreasing rainfall. Sea level risecould also increase the incidence of diarrhea bydisrupting sanitation and water supplies.

Climate change could increase the incidence ofciguatera poisoning in some areas. Kiribatialready has one of the highest rates of ciguaterapoisoning in the Pacific (Lewis and Ruff, 1993).The rise in temperatures is expected to increasethe incidence of ciguatera poisoning from 35–70per thousand people to about 160–430 perthousand in 2050 (table 4).

More intense cyclones and droughts are likely toincrease nutrition-related deficiencies, asexperienced in Fiji during the 1997/98 drought,when US$18 million in food and water rationshad to be distributed (UNDAC 1998). Loss ofagriculture and fisheries could result inmalnutrition and deterioration in standards ofliving. And the loss of land and infrastructurecould lead to increased crowding conditions,exacerbating problems of urban management.These diffuse effects could well prove to beamong the most important impacts of climatechange on public health in the future.

Table 4. Estimated Increases in Dengue Fever Epidemic Potential and Incidence ofCiguatera Poisoning in Kiribati as a Result of Climate Change, 2025–2100

Impact Baseline1990

2025 2050 2100

Dengue fever Projected epidemic potentiala 0.18 0.20 0.22_0.24 0.25_0.36 Percentage change from 1990 — 11 22–33 39–100

Ciguatera poisoning incidence (per thousand population) 35_70 105_240 160_430 245_1,010

a – The epidemic potential index measures the efficiency of disease transmission. A value of 0.2 or above indicates a high epidemic potential.Note: Ranges indicate best-guess and worst-case scenarios. For assumptions, see World Bank (2000), annex A.Source: Background studies to this report.



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Impact on Regional Tuna Fisheries

Climate change is likely to affect tuna fisheriesof the Central and Western Pacific in two majorways: by raising average ocean temperatures tolevels currently experienced during medium-intensity El Niños and by increasing year-to-year climate variability (Timmermann andothers, 1999). The impacts are likely to bepervasive, affecting the distribution, abundance,and catchability of tuna fisheries:

• Decline in primary productivity. Primaryproductivity in the central and eastern Pacificcould decline due to the increased stratificationbetween warmer surface waters and colder,deeper water (and resulting reduction inupwelling). Primary productivity in thewestern Pacific could conversely increase.

• Decline in tuna abundance. The decrease inupwelling would lead to a decline in the bigeyeand adult yellowfin population (the speciestargeted by the longline fleet). By contrast,the abundance of purse-seine-caught skipjackand juvenile yellowfin tuna is not expected tobe affected.

• Increased pressure on longline fishing.Given the continued high demand for sashimiin Japan, it is likely that longline fishingpressure on yellowfin tuna will increase tocompensate for the decline in adult bigeyetuna, leading to unsustainable exploitation.

• Spatial redistribution of tuna resources. Thewarming of surface waters and the decline inprimary productivity in the central and easternPacific could result in spatial redistribution oftuna resources to higher latitudes (such asJapan) and towards the western equatorialPacific.

• Increase in climate variability. With thelikely rise in climate variability (Jones andothers 1999), there may be an increase in theannual fluctuations of the spatial distributionand abundance of tuna. It is possible thatmore frequent cold events (such as strong LaNiña episodes) may compensate for thedecrease in productivity under an El Niñomean state. However, a strong future ElNiño – which has no parallel in the present

climate – could lead to a dramatic decline inproductivity in the eastern Pacific (see box1).

• Higher impact on domestic fleets. Whiledistant water fishing fleets can adapt tostock fluctuations, domestic fleets would bevulnerable to fluctuations of tuna fisheries intheir exclusive economic zones. Countries inthe central Pacific, such as Kiribati, wouldlikely be more adversely affected than thosein the western Pacific.

C. Economic Costs of Climate Change

The aggregate economic costs of climate changeimpacts could be substantial. Estimates fromthis study indicate that if climate changescenarios materialize, the island of Viti Levu inFiji could suffer economic damages averaging atleast US$23-$52 million a year by 2050 (in1998 dollar value), equivalent to 2–4 percent ofFiji’s gross domestic product. Because theselosses are annual averages, they dampen theactual costs of extreme weather events, whichcould be considerably higher in a given year. Acyclone might cause damages of about US$40million, while a severe drought could cost VitiLevu some US$70 million in lost crops.

The Tarawa atoll in Kiribati could face averageannual economic damages of US$8 million toover US$16 million by 2050 (as compared witha GDP of about US$47 million). In years ofstrong storm surge, up to 54 percent of SouthTarawa could be inundated, with capital lossesof up to US$430 million (table 5).

Box 1. Likely Future Climate

Correspondence withLikely future climate present climate

Mean state Moderate El NiñoModerate El Niño event Strong El Niño eventStrong El Niño event Unknown, extremely

warm eventModerate La Niña Current mean stateStrong La Niña Moderate La Niña


CHAPTER 2

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D. Toward Adaptation: Moderating the Impacts of Climate Change

The estimated economic costs of climate changeassume no adaptation. In practice, Pacific Islandgovernments and communities could help offsetthese costs by undertaking adaptation measures.6

The question is determining which adaptation

6 Adaptation refers here to any measures that protectsthe Pacific Island countries against the impacts ofclimate change. Mitigation, by contrast, refers to thereduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

measures are best in the face of uncertain futureimpacts.

There is little Pacific Islands can do to preventclimate change. At the same time, Pacific Islandgovernments cannot afford to ignore theproblem. Adapting to climate change may soonbecome an economic and political imperative.

The Need for Immediate Action

The development choices made by Pacific Islandgovernments today will have a profound impacton the future vulnerability of the islands and onthe magnitude of climate change impacts.

Table 5. Estimated Annual Economic Impact of Climate Change, 2050 (millions of 1998 US$)

Impact Average Annual damagea Likely Cost of anExtreme Eventb

ExtremeEvent

Viti Levu Tarawa Viti Levu Tarawa

Impact on coastal areas

Loss of coastal land and infrastructure to erosion 3_6 0.1_0.3 – – –Loss of coastal land and infrastructure to inundation and storm surge

0.3_0.5 7_12 75-90 210_430 Storm Surge

Loss of coral reefs and related services 5_14 0.2_0.5 – – –Loss of nonmonetized services from coral reefs, Mangroves and seagrasses + + – – –

Impact on water resourcesIncrease in cyclone severity 0–11 – 40 – Cyclone

Increase in ENSO–related droughts + + 50-70 – Drought

Replacement of potable water supply due to change inprecipitation, sea level rise, and inundation

+ 1–3 – – –

Changes in annual rainfall(other than impacts on agriculture)

+ + – – –

Impact on agricultureLoss of sugarcane, yams, taro, and cassava due totemperature or rainfall changes and ENSO effects 14 + 70 – Drought

Loss of other crops + + – – –

Impact on public healthIncreased incidence of dengue fever 1-6 + 30 – Large epidemic

Increase in fatal dengue fever cases + + – – –Increased incidence of diarrhea 0 –1 + – – –Infant mortality due to diarrhea + + – – –Impact of cyclones and droughts on public safety + + – – –

Total estimated damages >23_52+ >8–16++ Likely to have economic costs but impact not quantified. -- Not availablea Reflects incremental average annual costs due to climate change. b Reflects the actual cost of an extreme event.Note: For assumptions, see World Bank (2000), Annex A. Ranges indicate a best guess (lower bound) and a worst case scenario (higher bound).Source: Background studies to this report.



- 24 -

One of the most compelling arguments foracting now is the growing impact of extremeweather events in the Pacific. Even those whoargue that climate change may never happencannot dispute the urgency of reducing theislands’ vulnerability against severe climateevents. The recent drought and the sequence ofcyclones which affected many Pacific Islandsduring the 1990s attest to an increasing exposurethat will, sooner or later, put mounting publicpressure on governments and politicians to act.No less compelling is the fact that under anincreasing globalized economy, those countrieswhich invest early on adaptation – and, in theprocess improve the quality of life and reduceinvestment risks – are likely to hold acompetitive advantage for foreign investment.As measures to reduce vulnerability are alsoamong the most effective in adapting to climatechange, acting now to reduce currentvulnerability will also prepare the Pacific Islandsfor the long-term effects of climate change.

Another reason for acting now is that failure todo so may result in a loss of opportunities thatmay not exist in the future. Coral reefs, forexample, may not be able to recover frombleaching events if they are weakened bypollution and mining.

Finally, adaptation strategies may requireseveral decades to be discussed andimplemented. Communities living in low-lyingareas, for example, may need to relocate furtherinland to other communities’ customary land.This will require extensive public debates onhow to place the common good of all above thegood of the clan or immediate family, a processthat cannot – and should not – be rushed.

Since it is difficult to predict far in advance howclimate change will affect a particular site,Pacific Island countries should avoid adaptationmeasures that could fail or have unanticipatedsocial or economic consequences if climatechange impacts turn out to be different thananticipated (IPCC 1998). More appropriate willbe 'no regrets' adaptation measures that would bejustified even in the absence of climate change.These include, for example, sound management

of coastal areas and water supplies, control ofpollution, and investment in preventive health.

As it will be shown, a 'no-regrets' adaptationstrategy need not involve large investments ofpublic resources – but it will require strongpolitical will, as adaptation measures may facestrong competition from other developmentactivities for scarce funds. Yet it is important tounderstand that the short-term economic gains ofa 'do nothing' strategy could be easily dissipatedby the impact of future climate events.

A development path that takes adaptation intoaccount might sacrifice some potential short-term gains in favor of more diversification and areduction in vulnerability. But it would vastlydecrease the downside costs, should climatechange scenarios materialize. The challengewill be to find an acceptable level of risk – anintermediate solution between investing in highcost solutions and doing nothing – and startadapting long before the expected impacts occur.

Guidelines for Selecting AdaptationMeasures

Pacific Island countries have a vast array ofadaptation measures at their disposal. Thefollowing criteria could help guide theirselection:

1. No regrets. Give priority to 'no regrets'measures, such as water resourcesmanagement, which would be beneficial evenin the absence of climate change. Structuralmeasures such as sea walls and groynes –which provide few benefits other thanprotection – require a high degree of certaintyabout the impact at a particular site. If climatechange impacts turn out to be different thanexpected, investments in these measures couldhave been wasted.

2. Level of implementation. Adopt general ratherthan site-specific measures, at least until thereis more certainty about localized impacts.

3. Bottom up or top-down. Use community-based (bottom-up) rather than top-downinterventions. Many traditional adaptationmeasures have been tested and adjusted over


CHAPTER 2

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the years in response to extreme events. Thesemeasures are likely to be more effective thantop-down solutions. At the same time,communities will need external help to handlethreats – such as pollution – that are beyondtheir control. A collaborative partnershipbetween the government and communitiesmay well prove to be the most effective.

4. Environmental impacts. Select adaptationmeasures based on their impact on the overallvulnerability of the islands, not only on theirimpact at a particular site (de Wet 1999). Asea wall, for example, may solve the problemsof a particular site but increase erosiondownstream (figure 6).

5. Cultural acceptability. Ensure that measuresare compatible with the socio-culturaltraditions of local communities and do notcause social disruption.

6. Timing. Time measures appropriately. Someadaptation measures – such as expansion ofrainwater collectors in Tarawa – may need tobe implemented immediately. Others couldwait while appropriate responses aredeveloped. As a general rule, the most urgentmeasures are those needed to protect againstcurrent climate events and those on which itmay no longer be possible to act in the future.

7. Cost-benefit. Chose measures where thepotential benefits of adaptation clearly exceedits costs.

Table 6 shows a range of adaptation measuresclassified according to these criteria.

Two key principles should be kept in mind whenselecting adaptation options. First, adaptation isnot necessarily limited to interventions thatreduce climate change impacts. Measures thatincrease the resilience of natural systems – bycontrolling pollution’s effects on coral reefs, forexample – should also be considered, as shouldpolicies that facilitate action on adaptation, suchas a legislation empowering communities tomanage their own reef fisheries.

Second, it is vital to consider the socioculturalconditions of the Pacific Islands. To an external

observer, it may seem appropriate to reinforcetraditional Samoan houses to protect againstcyclones. From the local communities’ point ofview, however, a 'do nothing' strategy may wellbe justified, because labor and materials couldbe readily available from within the extendedfamily and the houses might easily be rebuiltfollowing cyclones. The adaptation process thusneeds to be highly participatory and allow foradjustments as new knowledge about climatechange impacts is obtained.

Implementing Adaptation

The previous sections argued for Pacific Islandgovernments to promote 'no regrets' adaptation.But how should this strategy be implemented inpractice?

Governments cannot do it alone. Adaptationmeasures are and will continue to beimplemented primarily by communities, theprivate sector, and individuals. But the role ofPacific Island governments will be essential inmainstreaming adaptation into policy anddevelopment planning, in creating partnershipswith communities and the private sector, and indealing with problems only the government canhandle (such as disaster management).

Mainstreaming Adaptation

Adaptation goals need to be identified as a clearpriority in national policies and developmentplans. The objective would be to transformclimate change from “something that mayhappen in the future” to a priority feature ofcurrent development planning.

In the short to medium term, all major newdevelopment projects – such as coastal miningand dredging – should undergo adaptationscreening. This process should assess both thelikely impact of climate change on the project,as well as the project’s impact on the islands’vulnerability and its contribution to adaptation(de Wet 1999). Adaptation screening would notrequire extensive new legislation but rather arevision of environmental impact assessments totake adaptation into account. The CoastalHazard Mapping program in Samoa is a step inthis direction.



- 26 -

Goal Adaptation measure Noregrets?

Level of implementationBottom upor topdown

NegativeEnvironmentalimpacts?

Culturallyacceptable?

Timing Cost-benefit

Moderate impacts on coastal areas Protection of critical ecosystems Increase Public awareness Generic Both No Yes Immediate Positive

Prohibit extraction of reef and sand Yes Sector specific Both No May increasebuilding costs

Immediate Positive

Prevent mangrove removal Yes Sector specific Both No Unknown Immediate PositiveControl pollution Yes Generic Top down No Unknown Immediate UnknownControl overfishing Yes Sector specific Both No Loss of food Immediate Positive

Protection of towns and property Engineered structures (such as seawalls) No Site specific Top down Probably Unknown Unknown UnknownSet back development from shoreline No Site specific Both Unknown Land tenure? Can wait UnknownRaise structures No Site specific Both Unknown Unknown Can wait Unknown

Land use policies Coastal hazard mapping Yes Site specific Top down No Yes Immediate Unknown Control of erosion Mangrove replantation Yes Sector specific? Both No Yes Immediate Positive

Engineering works in passages No Site specific Top down Probably Unknown Can wait UnknownGroynes No Site specific Top down Probably Unknown Immediate Positive(?)

Moderate impacts on water resources Water resource management Leakage control Yes Sector specific Both No Yes Immediate Positive

Pricing policies (fees, levies, surcharges) Yes (?) Sector specific Top down No Problematic Immediate PositiveConservation plumbing Yes Sector specific Both No Unknown Immediate PositiveStricter penalties to prevent waste Yes (?) Generic Top down No Resistance? Immediate Positive

Catchment management Reforestation, soil conservation Yes Generic and site specific Both No Yes Immediate PositiveEstablishment of a Water Authority Yes Sector specific Top down No Unknown Immediate Positive

Alternative water supply Expansion of rainwater collection Yes Sector and site specific Both Unknown Maybe Immediate UnknownAlternative groundwater use Yes Sector and site specific Top down Unknown Land tenure? Can wait UnknownDesalination No (?) Sector and site specific Top down Unknown High costs Can wait UnknownImportation No (?) Sector specific Top down No High costs Can wait Negative

Flood control Diversion channels, weirs, etc. No Site specific Top down Probably Unknown Immediate UnknownLand use controls, flood proof housing No (?) Site specific Both No Land tenure? Immediate Unknown

Moderate impacts on agriculture Community sustainability programs Traditional weather-resistant practices Yes Sector specific Bottom up No Yes Immediate Positive Sustainable production systems Agroforestry, water conservation Yes Sector specific Both No Unknown Immediate Positive Research Flexible farming systems Yes Sector specific Top down No Unknown Immediate Positive(?) Land use policies Mapping of suitable cropping areas Yes Generic Top down No Unknown Immediate Positive

Avoid cultivation on marginal lands Yes Site specific Top down No Disruptive ? Positive Moderate impacts on public health Integrated adaptation strategies Poverty reduction programs Yes Generic and site specific Top down Unknown Yes Immediate Positive? and control of diarrheal disease Improved sanitation and water supply Yes Sector and site specific Both No Yes Immediate Positive

Waste management Yes Sector and site specific Both No Unknown Immediate PositiveProtection of groundwater Yes Sector and site specific Both No Unknown Immediate PositiveSquatter settlement management Yes Site specific Both Unknown Yes ? Immediate Positive

Control of dengue fever Community-based vector control Yes Sector and site specific Bottom up No Unknown Immediate PositiveImproved preparedness (monitoring) Yes Sector specific Top down No Yes Immediate PositivePrevention of exposure Yes Sector specific Bottom up Unknown Difficult? Unknown Unknown

Control of ciguatera poisoning Reduce destructive practices to coral reefs

Yes Sector specific Both No Food, income? Immediate Positive

Monitoring and public awareness Yes Sector specific Both No Yes Immediate PositiveModerate impacts on tuna fisheries Stronger regional collaboration Multilateral agreements Yes Sector specific Top down Unknown Distrust? Immediate Positive Research Better ENSO forecasting Yes Generic Top down No Yes Immediate Positive

Improved tuna management Yes Sector specific Top down No Yes Immediate Positive Fleet management Diversification of domestic fleets No Sector and site specific Top down Unknown Problematic Can wait Positive

Table 6. Selected Examples of Adaptation Measures


CHAPTER 2

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Building Partnerships

In building partnerships with communities,individuals, and the private sector, thegovernment will need to play a pivotal role inthe following areas:

Creating an enabling policy and legalframework. This may include prioritizingadaptation in national planning, harmonizingconflicting sectoral policies, and providingthe necessary legal and technical support forcommunity based adaptation measures suchas co-management of coastal areas.

Strengthening institutions. Links betweenlocal communities and the governmentshould be strengthened so that communitiesincreasingly gain a voice in planning andbudgetary decisions. Local communitiesshould also be encouraged to work acrossvillage boundaries to reach consensus on theadaptive strategies that need to be applied tolarger areas – particularly if relocation islikely to be needed.

Supporting collaborative programs.Community-based programs, such as vectorcontrol, water conservation, coastalmanagement, or mangrove replantation, willneed the support of government andnongovernmental organizations. At first,external support should focus on galvanizingcommunity action. Later, it should shift totechnical advice and assistance in areascommunities cannot handle on their own.

Mobilizing public action. Public awarenessand discussion forums involving communityrepresentatives could help conveyinformation about the impacts of climatechange and gain consensus on the adaptationoptions.

Handling disaster mitigation and providingpublic services. Some adaptation measureswill need to rely on governmentinterventions. These include early warningsystems and disaster mitigation programs,improvements in primary health care, andcoastal protection in town areas.

Funding Adaptation

Much of the costs and success of adaptation willdepend on the extent to which communities,individuals, and private sector own andimplement the strategies. This requiresgovernment support for community-basedefforts, and may require working throughtraditional decision making processes to ensure“buy-in” at the local level. By asking newdevelopment projects to follow adaptationstandards, Pacific Island governments could alsoshift part of the costs of adaptation to privateinvestors.

'No regrets' adaptation measures do not involvesignificant costs if started sufficiently early.Samoa’s environmental health program, forexample, operates with a budget of US$113,000a year. The Coastal Zone Management Projectin Majuro, financed by United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP), costUS$367,000 for four years of operation. Bycontrast, sea walls surrounding the Tarawa atollwould require capital investments of aboutUS$1.5–$1.8 million (table 7).

In this context, it is recommended that PacificIsland countries adopt urgently a 'no regrets'policy aimed at decreasing their presentvulnerability to extreme weather events (whichmay exist independently of climate change). Asa first step, Pacific Island governments shouldassess how public expenditures could beadjusted to support this strategy, and how otherpartners in the process – in particularcommunities and the private sector – may helpdefray the costs. As a second step, PacificIsland governments and donors should studyhow to reallocate or attract new development aidto fund 'no regrets' activities that cannot beadequately funded by public expenditures.Many of these interventions – such as improvedsanitation or coastal management – could bejustified as part of regular environmentalassistance.

Even though 'no regrets' measures have thedouble benefit of reducing short-term exposureto climate variability as well as long-termvulnerability to climate change, it is important



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that the two aspects be kept separatein international negotiations.Adoption of an early 'no regrets'strategy by a country should notdiminish its chances of accessingclimate change adaptation funds inthe future.

Similarly, donors should not be ledto believe that because 'no regrets'adaptation benefits the countriesindependently of climate change,the justification for incrementalfinancing of adaptation costs isweak. To do so would be to tip thescale in favor of structural solutions(such as seawalls), which are clearlyincremental. Government officialsin the Pacific Islands have oftenexpressed the view that it is easierto obtain international aid forstructural measures than for 'noregrets ' solutions. Thesedisincentives need to be addressedin future international climatechange discussions, in order tomaintain 'no regrets' strategies at theforefront of adaptation financing,and benefit, rather than penalize, the countriesmost willing to take early action.

Globally, the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)provides the umbrella agreement for mitigationof greenhouse gas emissions. The Conventionalso includes provisions to begin work onadaptation to climate change. To date, however,progress on adaptation has been slow. Theperception among many observers is that thehigh costs of adaptation have overruledenthusiasm to assist those countries most in needof support. As a consequence, funds from theGlobal Environmental Facility (GEF), the mainfinancing mechanism for climate change, havebeen available only for mitigation of greenhousegas emissions and for studies and capacitybuilding. International negotiations under theConference of Parties of the UNFCCC have notyet agreed to the financing of actual adaptation(Stage III) measures.

Pacific Island countries are understandablyconcerned about the slow pace of thesenegotiations. They view the stalling of Phase IIIas a way for emission-producing countries toavoid recognizing their responsibilities towardcountries on the receiving end of climatechange.

The findings of this report clearly show that thePacific Islands are likely to experiencesignificant incremental costs associated withglobal climate change in the future. Theresponsibility is now on the internationalcommunity to move urgently with a financingmechanism to help the coastal states defray thesecosts. The urgency of this action for small statessuch as the Pacific Islands cannot be over-emphasized.

At the same time, Pacific Island countriesshould continue to speak with one voice atinternational climate change forums. Much hasbeen done already under the support of thePacific Islands Climate Change Programme

Table 7. Indicative Adaptation Costs (US$)

Measure Cost

Annual Operational Costsa:

Land use planning 33,700Waste management 181,900Biodiversity protection and natural parks 167,000Environmental education and information 102,000National disaster council 30,700Reforestation 297,800Watershed projection and management 113,800Support to community-based fisheries management 81,400Community disease control 205,800Environmental health 112,600Nutrition 83,400

Investment Costs:Human waste management (composting toilets)b 800,000Elevating houses b 1,700,000-3,200,000Seawalls c 1,540,000-1,830,000

Coastal Zone Management Project for Majuro Atolld 367,300

a Costs reflect Samoa public expenditures for 1999-00. GDP Samoa US$205 million.b Covering North Tarawa (population 6,000, area 1,500 ha). GDP Kiribati US$47.9 million.c Covering Tarawa atoll (population 35,000, area 3,200 ha). The cost per linear meter is about US$155, excluding maintenance costs.d Costs represent allocation for four years for Majuro (population 86,110).

Sources: Legislative Assembly of Samoa 1999; Stratus 2000; UNDP 1996; background studies to World Bank (2000).


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(PICCAP). A strengthened focus on optimaladaptation strategies, and economic analysis –particularly on costs and benefits of adaptationmeasures – could strengthen their case ininternational negotiations, broaden the climatechange constituency, and mainstream climatechange into the economic and developmentplanning of the Pacific Islands.

F. Summary of Key Findingsand Recommendations

The following conclusions can be derived fromthe analysis:

o The Pacific Islands are already experiencingsevere impacts from climate events. This isevidenced by cyclone damage of more thanUS$1 billion during the 1990s and by theimpact of recent droughts in Federated Statesof Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, MarshallIslands, and Palau (SPREP 2000).

o The islands’ vulnerability to climate events isgrowing, independently of climate change.Current trends point to a continuing rise invulnerability in the future which will beexacerbated by climate change.

o Climate change is likely to impose majorincremental social and economic costs onPacific Island countries. In disaster years theimpact could be particularly high, causingsignificant economic and social problems.

o Climate change may affect all PacificIslanders, particularly the poor and mostvulnerable. Climate change may alsoexacerbate poverty by reducing coastalsettlement areas and affecting the crops andfisheries on which many communitiesdepend.

o Failure to adapt now could not only lead tomajor damages, but also result in a loss ofopportunities to act in the future. Some coralreef areas, for example, may no longer beable to recover in the future if degradationcontinues at the present rates.

o By acting now to reduce their present-dayvulnerability to extreme weather events,Pacific Island countries could go a long waytoward diminishing the effects of climatechange in the future.

Based on these conclusions, a number of keyrecommendations can be derived.

Pacific Island Governments

Adopt a ‘No Regrets’ Adaptation Policy.Pacific Island governments should put inplace an urgent policy of 'no regrets'adaptation, aimed at increasing the naturalresilience of the islands and reducing theirvulnerability to present-day weather events.'No regrets' measures could include, forexample, the management of critical coastalecosystems (such as coral reefs), control ofurban pollution, water conservation, cultureof weather-resistant crops, and disease vectorcontrol. Under such a policy, Pacific Islandgovernments would take adaptation goalsinto account in future expenditure anddevelopment planning. Insofar as adaptationmeasures helped reduce existing vulnerability(independently of climate change), PacificIsland governments would be justified inusing reallocations of public expendituresand development aid to fund the activities.

Develop a Broad Consultative Process forImplementation of Adaptation. Pacific Islandgovernments should start a process ofconsultation with community representatives,the private sector, and other civil societyinstitutions (such as churches and NGOs), ona national strategy for adaptation. Thestrategies should build upon the NationalCommunications developed by the PICCAPcountry teams. The objective would bemainstream adaptation into national policiesand development plans, to gain consensus onpriority adaptation measures, and to buildpartnerships for their implementation.

Require Adaptation Screening for MajorDevelopment Projects. To help defray futurecosts, Pacific Island governments should



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require all major infrastructure projects toundergo adaptation screening as part of anexpanded environmental impact assessment.

Strengthen Socio-Economic Analysis ofAdaptation Options. Further work on thespecific socio-economic impacts of climatechange and adaptation – such as done underthis report – could help strengthen the PacificIsland countries' position in internationaldiscussions on adaptation financing. A betterunderstanding of the physical and economicimpacts would also help mainstream climatechange into broader development planning.

Donors

Support 'No Regrets' Adaptation. Donorshave an important role to play in discussingwith Pacific Island countries how to bestorient development assistance in support ofnational adaptation strategies. This could bedone either through stand alone interventionsor as part of natural resources andenvironmental management programs.

Support Adaptation Screening. To the extentpossible, donors should adopt adaptationscreening as part of their policy requirementson environmental impact assessments.

International Community

Operationalize Adaptation Financing. Giventhe importance of taking early action onadaptation, the international communityneeds to urgently agree on the mechanismand size of adaptation financing – be it in theform of the Global Environmental Facility, atax on the Clean Development Mechanism ascurrently discussed, or others. The findingsfrom this study support the argument thatPacific Island countries will likely experiencesignificant incremental costs from climatechange, and will need access to globaladaptation funding.

Remove Incentives against Immediate Actionon ‘No Regrets’ Adaptation. Countries thathave taken early action on adaptation usingtheir own public expenditures ordevelopment aid should not be penalized

with a lower allocation of global adaptationfunds, once these become available.Similarly, the justification for internationalfinancing of ‘no regrets’ adaptation needs tobe recognized and promoted in its own right.Failure to do so could promote a ‘wait andsee’ attitude, and favor the adoption of moreexpensive (but clearly incremental) structuralsolutions such as seawalls.

Although many uncertainties remain, it nowseems clear that climate change will affect manyfacets of Pacific Island people’s lives andeconomies in ways that are just now beginningto be understood. Climate change thereforemust be considered one of the most importantchallenges of the twenty-first century and apriority for immediate action.

F. References

Campbell, J. (1999). Vulnerability and SocialImpacts of Extreme Events. In InternationalGlobal Change Institute (IGCI) and SouthPacific Regional Environment Programme(SPREP) (1999). PACCLIM WorkshopModelling Climate and Sea-level Change Effectsin Pacific Island Countries, August 23-27, 1999.International Global Change Institute. Hamilton,New Zealand.

Clark, K. M. (1997). Current and PotentialImpact of Hurricane Variability on theInsurance Industry. In H. F. Diaz and R.S.Pulwarty (editors). Hurricanes, Climate andSocioeconomics. Springer.

De Wet, Neil (1999). A Conceptual Frameworkfor Adaptation to Climate and Sea-Level Changein Pacific Island Countries. In InternationalGlobal Change Institute (IGCI) and SouthPacific Regional Environment Programme(SPREP) (1999). PACCLIM WorkshopModelling Climate and Sea-level Change Effectsin Pacific Island Countries, August 23-27, 1999.International Global Change Institute. Hamilton,New Zealand.

Holland, G. J. (1997). The Maximum Potential


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Intensity of Tropical Cyclones. Journal ofAtmospheric Science, 54 : 2519-2541.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) (1996). Climate Change 1995: TheIPPC Second Assessment Report. Watson, Rt.,M.C. Zinyowera and R.H. Moss (eds).Cambridge University Press, Cambridge andNew York.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPPC) (1998). Summary Report: IPCCWorkshop on Adaptation to Climate Variabilityand Change. March 29-April 1, 1998. San Jose,Costa Rica.

Jones, R.N., P.H. Whetton, K.J.E. Walsh, R.Suppiah and K.J. Hennessy (1999). Scenarios ofClimate Variability for the South Pacific. InInternational Global Change Institute (IGCI) andSouth Pacific Regional Environment Programme(SPREP) (1999). PACCLIM WorkshopModelling Climate and Sea-level Change Effectsin Pacific Island Countries, August 23-27, 1999.International Global Change Institute. Hamilton,New Zealand.

Kench and Cowell (1999). Impacts of Sea LevelRise and Climate Change on Pacific Coasts. InInternational Global Change Institute (IGCI) andSouth Pacific Regional Environment Programme(SPREP) (1999). PACCLIM WorkshopModelling Climate and Sea-level Change Effectsin Pacific Island Countries, August 23-27, 1999.International Global Change Institute. Hamilton,New Zealand.

Legislative Assembly of Samoa (1999).Approved Estimates of Receipts and Payment ofthe Government for the Financial Year Ending30th June 2000. Parliamentary Paper 1999, No.9. Apia, Samoa.

Lewis, R. J. and T. A. Ruff (1993). Ciguatera:Ecological, Clinical, and Socio-EconomicPerspectives. Critical Reviews in EnvironmentalScience and Technology 23: 137-156.

South Pacific Regional EnvironmentalProgramme (SPREP), 2000. Draft Pacific

Islandís Framework for Action on ClimateChange, Climate Variability and Sea Level Rise.Apia, Samoa.

Stratus Consulting (2000). E c o n o m i cImplications of Climate Change in Two PacificIsland Country Locations. Case Illustration ofTarawa, Kiribati, and Viti Levu. Prepared undersub-contract to CICERO (Oslo, Norway).Boulder, Colorado.

Timmermann, A., Oberhuber, J., Bacher, A.,esch, M., Latif, M., Roeckner, E. (1999).Increased El Niño Frequency in a ClimateModel Forced by Future Greenhouse Warming.Nature 398, 694-697.

United Nations Disaster Assessment andCoordination (UNDAC) 1998. UNDAC MissionR e p o r t s o n F i j i D r o u g h t .http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/S/A3238C8D6E14D385C12566C9004C0D9C.Accessed September 1999. In Stratus Consulting(2000). Economic Implications of ClimateChange in Two Pacific Island CountryLocations. Case Illustration of Tarawa, Kiribatiand Viti Levu. Prepared under sub-contract toCICERO (Oslo, Norway). Boulder, Colorado.

United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) (1996). Establishing a CoastalManagement Program for Majuro Atoll.Proposal of the Government of the MarshallI s l a n d s . United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, Suva, Fiji.

World Bank (2000). Cities, Sea, and Storms,Managing Change in Pacific Island Economies,Volume IV: Adapting to Climate Change. PapuaNew Guinea and Pacific Island Country Unit,the World Bank, Washington DC.

World Health Organization (WHO) (1996).Climate change and Human Health.[McMichael, A.J., Haines, A., Sloof, R., andKovats, S. (eds.)]. World Health Organization,Geneva.



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2.2 Operationalizing adaptation: the Kiribati AdaptationProject7

7 This description is based upon the Project Information Document, which can be downloaded from the World Bankwebsite (www.wordbank.org).

Background

Kiribati is a low-laying atoll country with apopulation of 93,000 spread over 33 islandscovering a landmass of only 730 sq km. It facesextreme isolation, with the nearest large markets4,000 km away (in Hawaii and Australia). Thearid climate and poor atoll soil offer littlepotential for agricultural development. At thesame time, the immense area of ocean (anexclusive economic zone of 3.6 million sq km)harbors some of the richest fishing grounds inthe world, and provides Kiribati with its mostimportant source of revenue (about 27 percent ofGNP in 1998). About one third of the populationlives in the capital, South Tarawa, a highlydense area with a population growth of 3 percenta year. At current rates, the population willdouble in 20 years, placing even greaterchallenges on the fragile atoll environment.

Kiribati is one of the most vulnerable countriesin the world to the effects of climate change,climate variability and sea level rise. Most of theland in Tarawa lies less than 3 meters above sealevel, with an average width of only 450 meters.The islands are exposed to periodic storm surgesand droughts, particularly during La Nina years.Already, Kiribati is becoming increasinglyvulnerable to climate events due to its highpopulation concentration, accelerated coastaldevelopment, shoreline erosion, and risingenvironmental degradation. Problems with solidand human waste disposal in South Tarawaremain acute.

A 2000 Climate Change Study supported by theWorld Bank indicated that under likely climatechange scenarios, up to 25-54 percent of areas ofSouth Tarawa, and 55-80 percent of areas inNorth Tarawa could be inundated by 2050. Thecombined effect of sea level rise, changes inrainfall, and changes in evapotranspiration dueto higher temperatures could result in a 19-38percent decline in the thickness of the maingroundwater lens. Agriculture productivity –particularly for taro and pandanus – coulddecline due to storm-induced saltwater intrusioninto groundwater lenses. Higher temperaturescould also increase the epidemic potential fordengue fever by about 22-33 percent, increasethe incidence of ciguatera poisoning anddegradation of coral reefs, and divert criticaltuna resources away from Kiribati waters.Finally, climate change could exacerbateovercrowding and poverty. In the absence ofadaptation, these impacts are estimated to resultin economic damages averaging US$8–$16million a year, equivalent to 17 to 34 percent ofthe 1998 GDP. This reflects the potential highcosts of a 'do nothing' strategy. The above studysupported the Vulnerability and Adaptationcomponent of Kiribati's First NationalCommunication to the United NationsConvention Framework on Climate Change(UNFCCC). In the context of this work, itidentified potential adaptation options in fivesectors: coastal infrastructure, water resources,agriculture, health and fisheries. It alsorecommended that adaptation be mainstreamedinto national economic planning.

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