Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1960

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1960

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UGUST196

UBRARY USAARUf RUCI ER, ALA

RMY EROMEDIC LSYMPOSIUM


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lI,u,teJ gt tu J4m fVI TION IGEST

EDITORIAL STAFFCAPT JOSEPH H POOLEFRED M MONTGOMERYRICHARD K TIERNEYDIANA G WILL IAMSSYLVIA N DAY

AUGUST 196VOLUME 6NUMBER 8

RTICLES

PANACEA, Lt Col James B Gregorie Jr., Arty 1FIRST ARMY-WIDE AEROMEDICAL SYMPOSIUM Pierce L. Wiggin 6HAZARDS OF THE WAKE 10INSTRUMENT FLIGHT IN COMBAT Capt John P. Johnson Inf 14FIELD ARMY MOBILE AIRSTRIP, Maj Eugene R Lucas Arty 17TWX 20CRASH SENSE 32SPECTROMETER INSIDE BACK COVER

The expansion of the Army Aviation Program and theincreasing complexity of the aircraft and related equipmentplaces a greater demand on both aviators and maintenancepersonnel.As a result, the role of the flight surgeon within theArmy Aviation Program assumes ever increasing importance. More technical equipment places greater physicaland mental stress on all concerned. The expansion in totalnumbers of aircraft, aviators, and maintenance personnelwith emphasis on their integration within the frontline elements, further accents the need for a more intensive effortwithin this vital field.The First U. S. Army Aeromedical Symposium as reported in this issue is another first to be added to thegrowing list within our expanding program. The exchangeof aeromedical knowledge will do much towards a better allaround aviation medicine program.The interservice exchange of aeromedical informationplays an important role in ensuring that Army Aviationpersonnel are capable and ready to carry out our vitalmission.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMaj Gen Ernest F. EasterbrookCommandantCol Delk M OdenAssistant Commandant

SCHOOL STAFFCol Robert H. SchulzDirector of InstructionLt Col Jack BlohmCO, USAAVNS RegimentLt Col John W. OswaltCombat Development OfficeMaj Mark F. FowserActing Secretary

DEPARTMENTSLt Col Ritchie GarrisonTacticsLt Col Oliver J. HelmuthRotary WingLt Col James B Gregorie Jr.Advanced Fixed WingLt Col Harry J. KernMaintenanceLt Col Thomas J. SabistonPublications andNon Resident InstructionLt Col G Wilfred JaubertP rimary Fixed Wing

The U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST isan official pUblication of the Department ofthe Army published monthly under thesupervision of the Commandant, U. S. ArmyAviation School.The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information ofan operational or functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention,training, maintenance, operations, researchand development, aviation medicine andother related data.Manuscripts, photographs, and other illustrations pertaining to the above subjects ofinterest to personnel concerned with ArmyAvia tioll are invited. Direct commllnica tionis authorized to: Editor-in-Chief U. S.ARMY AVIATION DIGEST, U. S. Army

Aviation School, Fort Rucker, Alabama.Unless otherwise indicated, material inthe U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST maybe reprinted provided credit is given to theU. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST and tothe author.The printing of this publication has beenapproved by the Director of the Bureau ofthe Budget. 22 December 1958.Views expressed in this magazine are notnecessarily those of the Department of theArmy or of the U. S. Army Aviation School.Unless specified otherwise, all photographsare U. S. Army.Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance withrequiremilnts stated in DA Form 12.


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Lieutenant Colonel James B Gregorie Jr. rtyThe Army is not interested in the airplane per se Its inte1 est lies in how aviation can help the

Army accomplish its mission. If we lose sight of this objective, and become fascinated by flying from apurely pilot s viewpoint, we are in dmnger of failing our basic purpose. We must consta.ntly picture theaircraft and pilot in the environment of the soldier, for the mission of Army Amation S based on themission of the Army.With this mission it seems ridiculous to limit ourselves to some one branch of the Army - to an

Army Air Corps. We would be selling ourselves and the Army short There certainly may be arequirement for personnel who devote their entire careers to aviation matters.In the longer view, however, just as we now argue that the Air Force has no monopoly on l y ~ n gmachines because they fly, similarly no one branch in the Army should have a monopoly.

N THE FALL of 1957 the Officer Fixed WingAviator Course conducted by the Army Aviation School was lengthened eight weeks to include instrument flight qualification training.Since then this instruction has been known asPhase e of that course. All OFWAC studentsreceive it even though they are rated as ArmyAviators prior to its beginning.Many opinions have been expressed concerning the advantages and justifications of thisportion of the Army Aviation Program. As anobjective which determined the need for thistraining the instrument qualification of allArmy Aviators has been postponed repeatedly.After having worked towards this goal for several years we now know that it requires a majoreffort within every command to renew the everincreasing number of expired tickets and toconduct refresher courses for aviators who areeither unable or unmotivated to maintain their

Brig Gen Clifton F. von Kann, USADirector of Army Aviationinstrument proficiency.Experience t date apparently establishesthe fact that any future rescheduling of thisobjective must be predicated upon a foreseeableinventory of Army aircraft adequately equippedto support it. The Army would then be requiredto have as great a majority of aircraft fullyadaptable to instrument flight as are nowcounted not suitable for instrument trainingor instrument flight on Federal airways. Suchan inventory is far in the future.The light observation aircraft programmedfor the 1970 Army does not include a radiopackage which will permit its operation in theCONUS under instrument conditions. In this

Colonel Gregorie is Director, Dept of AdvancedFixed TVing Tn l.1ning . An amator since 1942 heis dual and twin-engine l ated and instrumentqualified.

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AUGUST 1960light, further efforts to achieve the instrumentqualification of all Army Aviators would appear to be indefensible. Reports from fieldunits indicate that a canvass of an OFWACclass which completed its C phase two yearsago would reveal that only a small number ofits members still in service have maintainedtheir instrument ratings continuously and arenow assigned to units where they are requiredor even able to participate in reasonably frequent instrument flights.The point is sometimes advanced by ardentproponents of the current OFWAC C phaseprogram that students who complete this training will, in any event, be better contact pilots.This mayor may not be true. Such a contentionis no more plausible than another consideration,i.e., that an unused and neglected instrumentqualification when and if put to the hard testof actual performance, may be an extremelydangerous thing.The future of Phase C of the OFWACmay be dealt with as a singular matter; however, other pressing problem areas within theoverall Army Aviation Program suggest a composite solution as a best course of action. Theseadditional problem areas are discussed below.

The Director of th e, Department of Maintenance,USAAVNS, r e c e n t l ystated: I f we don't dosomething about aircraftmaintenance within t h ecombat arms during thenext three or four years,we're going to be out ofbusiness. Such a conviction is shared by manyothers. Since the Army as

sumed responsibility for third and fourth echelon aircraft maintenance, the extent and volumeof productive first and second echelon maintenance accomplished by field units have progressively diminished.This cannot be explained entirely by the introduction of more complex aircraft. Furthermore, blame wherein the Transportation Corpsis accused of a grasping attitude or the combatarms are accused of default will not mitigate aprogressively w0 rsening situation. Low aircraft availability rates, records of in0 rdinateuses of emergency parts requisitioning procedures, and repeated examples 0 f dangerous andwasteful maintenance practices are too prevalent today in Army Aviation.2

It is paradoxical that throughout the hlSGOryof Army Aviation, despite the adoption of morecomplex aircraft, the percentage of groundschool time allotted to aircraft and engine maintenance within what is now the Officer FixedWing Aviator Course has steadily decreasedfrom nearly 100 percent to less than 25 percent. Today over 80 percent of the latter is conducted at the Army Aviation School within theDepartment of Primary Fixed Wing TrainingThe result of this-and the real heart of thisproblem area-is poor maintenance supervisionor, more accurately, the near lack of any of itAt one time the Army Aviati0 n, School conducted an Organizati0 nal Maintenance OfficeCourse. That course was first conducted ovea 10-week period, then reduced to 5 weeks, andfinally eliminated because of little or n0 supporfrom field units. A new approach must be foundwhich will provide adequately trained officesupervision of 0 rganizational aircraft maintenance. This is not a problem onumbers but of trainingA full discussion of a division aviation company

c n n 0 t be undertakenhere; h0 wever, a brieconsideration of an AeriaSurveillance Platoon issufficient to illustrate aserious problem area. Noestablished provision ora;..............-........ i responsibility exists within the entire Army school system today fothe training of Army Aviators to be assigned

to these units in the characteristics, capabilities, limitations, and approved doctrine pertaining to the ph0 tographic, electronic anddrone equipment found therein. The amounand the cost of this equipment is impressivebut its potential, dependent upon the efficacioutraining of the officer Army Aviators in command, is of f0 remost importance. Combat surveillance and target acquisition will inevitablybe a prime, day-to-day mission of Army Aviation if and when our modern divisions maximizetheir abilities on atomic or conventional battlefields-their areas of influence.We have for some time spoken in glowingterms of an all-weather operation. Withinthat concept where is the training being provided for those who must decide when and whyto use an L-19, an H-13, a Mohawk, a droneSLAR, infrared devices, or conventional photog


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raphy? As an illustration I will use only theaerial surveillance platoon of the aviation company with its visual and photo surveillance section, aerial radar section, drone section (a formidable unit in itself), and its radar trackingand plotting teams. The operations platoonwith its air traffic control section and its approach control section (not to mention the remainder of the company) will present requirements and problems of similar complexity thatcan be resolved only by additional training ofkey personnel-Army Aviators In view ofwhat must be done as contrasted to what isbeing done, one might realistically observe, WEONLY TEACH THEM TO FLYApparently there is nodeterminable pattern tothe training of fixed wingArmy Aviators in heli

copters. Some student officers com p ie t i n g theOFWAC s "C" phase atthe Army Aviation Schoolhave been ordered directly to the Army PrimaryHelicopter School at CampWolters for rotary wingtraining. Other Army Aviators, after yearsof experience and repeated requests for heli

copter training, continue to be reassignedwithout it. The helicopter training of fixedwing Army Aviators should be programmedideally between their third and sixth yearwithin the Army Aviation Program - forthose who demonstrate a high potential to theprogram. Similarly, officers who have beeninitially rated as rotary wing Army Aviators,and who can be expected to progress in theArmy Aviation Program to supervisory assignments involving both fixed and rotary wing operations, should be scheduled for cross trainingand fixed wing qualification.

The Aviation Staff Officers Course (ASOC) ascon d u c t ed within theArmy Aviation School isan excellent course. Unfortunately, it appears tohave little appeal to fieldunits or it suffers the severe competition for TDYfunds felt by all othershort courses within th eArmy school system.

PANACEAt is often said that the ASOC is presentedon the Command and General Staff Collegelevel. This is bad in itself, but it does giverise to the observation that a vast amount oflearning necessary must presumably be accomplished by Army Aviators n the hard andunstandardized school of field experience between the OFW C and the ASOC courses. TheArmy Aviation Program would definitely benefit if a portion of the current ASOC Program ofInstruction (or a similar course emphasizingoperations on the divisional and lower levels)were presented as an adj unct to an establishedPCS course having a greater attendance thanthe present ASOC.

This question has beendebated by more peoplemore ardently than anyother facet of Army A viation. The obvious lackof an agreement amongrm y Aviators themselves, without consider

ing the myriad opinionsfound Army-wide, is sufficient to establish the factthat neither of these ideasis satisfactory per se at present or holds anygreat prom.ise for the orderly development ofArmy Aviation. Unfortunately the majority ofopinions in this area represent either one extreme or the other. Most often they are asimpassioned as they are parochial.

Some views reflect visions of Army Aviationwhich include numbers of zero ground-pressurevehicles scurrying over battlefields like theubiquitous jeep of today, piloted by privates.Others are dominated by the Artillery pilot asan Artillery officer adj usting artillery fire froman Artillery aircraft. In a third imaginative picture of Army Aviation ten years hence, aircraftof a complexity yet to be devised are crammedwith electronic systems which, in conjunctionwith equipment of the ground of equal complexity, provide control and effect the reporting of data to super UNIVACs that will for allintents and purposes supersede the G2 estimate and the FSCC.Can Army Aviation present a different faceand provide a peculiar service to all who demanda specialized mission? It can be done if a realistic appraisal is made of three basic conceptsnow involved and a plan is formulated to reckonwith the parts of each in turn. However, neither3


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AUGUST 1960an aviatiQn branch nDr insistence upDn a singular branch prDficiency fQr aviatQrs will permitthis. These cDncepts are prime facets Qf theArmy A viatiDn prDgram which, because Qf theirinnate inflexibilities, are nQt CQngruDUS. Theygenerate waste and preclude satisfactQry solu-tiDns to' their Dwn requirements.

The first concept is the universal instrumentq ualificatiDn f all Army A viato.rs as an unmitigated objective. The second includes a mandatDry branch prDficiency fDr all Army A via-tDrs that must be equal to' that achieved bytheir nQnflying cDntemporaries. The third con-cept is a policy wherein existing branch identities are so sacrO'sanct that a multitude Qf whatshould O'bviO'usly be branch immaterial assignments are reserved to TransPO'rtation CO'rpsaviators,. This same PQlicy tends to' divide ArmyAviatO'rs into twO campsl with IQyalties and Qb-jectives sO diverse they cQnstitute a real deterrent tQ the Army A viatiQn PrQgram.

NO OVERL P NECESS RYThis unnecessary Dverlap Qf concepts has, ledto' our real prQblems. NO overlap is necessary to'meet the true fundamental require'ments O'f anArmy Aviation prDgram that can best help theArmy accQmplish its missiQn.The instrument qualificatiQn Qf all ArmyAviatDrs as an O'bjective and the training prQ-gram which supPQrts that aim have already

been cDnsidered. NO real need exists fQr thisDbjective. The requirements fQr an Army Instrument rating are such that it is awarded Dnlyto thDse whO' have demO'nstrated a knDwledge

f flight planning, air traffic cQntrQI, and enrDute and apprO'ach flying techniques nO' lessexacting than the requirements placed UPQncDmmercial airline pilQts. Once awarded, theright to' retain the rating must be demQnstratedby the successful cO'mpletiQn Qf annual writtenand flight examinatiQns. If these are nQt passed,the aviatQr faces the PQssibility Qf eliminatiO'nfrQm flying status NO branch prQficiency is sOseverely mQnitQred.The paradDx here is that the vast majQrityQf Army aircraft dO' nQt require advanced pilQtqualification and were prQcured to accomplishmissiDns which are limited to fair weather QP-eratiDns. In shO'rt, we are pushing all ArmyAviatDrs toward an instrument proficiencywhich permits their pilO'tage Qf instrument aircraft into the New YQrk Qr Washington areasas a routine IFR operatiQn, while we persist ina cDncept f tactical QperatiQns that includes a4

prepQnderance Qf VFR cQmmand liaisQn flights,aerial artillery adjustments, visual rQute reCQn-naissances, etc.

FUND MENT L TENETSThe mDst fundamental tenet o.f Army A via-tiDn is that the Army A viatQr is a part Qf anArmy unit, cQmpletely familiar with that unit'scharacteristics, resPQnsive to its requirements,and dedicated to the accO'mplishment O'f its mis-siDn. Army Aviators sO clDsely assQciated witha unit are required to' be branch qualified as aunit member if it is a combat arms unit. Anartillery cDmmander can Io.gically expect maximum efficiency frQm the pilO't Qf an aircraftwO'rking with his unit if he is a cO'mpetent Artillery O'fficer capable f making a target ap-praisal, fire adjustment r assisting an artilleryDbserver in these functiQns.Similarly, a branch qualified Engineer avia-tO'r's observations are nO' doubt betteI i receivedthan if the pilDt were of anQther branch. CQn-versely, an Engineel1 Qfficer whO' is vastly mQrefamiliar with ILS approach prQcedures thancDnsiderations which determine bridge sitesWQuld be of less value. NDte that these pilQtsrDles are visual in nature and by and large pe-culiar to' the branch missiO'ns illustrated. Insuch a rDle, an Army AviatQr can maintain abranch prO'ficiency tantamO'unt to' that Qf hisfellO'w Qfficers in the unit to' which he is as-signed or supporting-and the o.PPO'rtunity fQr

him to' dO SO s o u l ~ be provided On the o.therhand, when an aviator is required to be fullyinstrument qualified it must be recO'gnized thatthe new requirement is cQmpletely fQreign tothe task f continuing his branch prO'ficiency, isQf equal or even greater difficulty, and affordslittle Qr nO advantage to' the latter. Any attemptQn the part O'f an Army Aviator to. maintain aninstrument and a branch prQficiency must (anddemonstratively has) result in the mediocrity QfQne Qr the other. As a result Qf th el stringentrequirements of the annual instrument andflight examinatiQns, branch proficiency is themore CQmmQn sufferer.I do not advance this argument to pose thequestion f Why do we have instrument pilotsand instrument aircraft. An all-weather capa-bility is essential if that portion Qf Army A via-tion needed for such foreseeable operatiQns is tocDntribute its full share towards the aCCQm-plishment Qf the Army's mission. The PQintto be established is that missions which mustbe flown withQut visual references to the grQund


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rarely, if ever, will require a particular pilotbranch proficiency. These missions will demand,however, an instrument flying skill of the firstorder.A preplanned Mohawk sortie employingSLAR during instrument weather, with ground

track determined by radar vectQrs, can be flownjust as well by a pilot from TransportatiQnCorps as from Infantry.Promotion into higher command and staffechelons, not only requires an appreciation ofground operations beyond the purview of anyQne branch, but a clQser familiarity with the

more complex aviatiQn matters and proceduresbecomes essential. Their abilities to plan andparticipate in bQth instrument and fair weatheroperations must be firmly established. An insistence upon their cQntinued singular branchproficiency will no IQnger serve an advantage.SOLUT ON

An answer to these problems, Qne whichwould also pave the way for a reconciliation ofthe inflexibilities that have been cQnsidered,can be developed arQund a logical expansiQn ofthe Army Aviation School s curriculum, the establishment of an Army Aviation AdvancedCourse, as the first and most fundamental step.The current HC phase of the Officer Fixed

Wing Aviator Course should be shortened tothree weeks. OFWAC graduates would not beinstrument rated upon cQmpletion of thatcourse. They would, hQwever, have a basicknowledge of instrument flying sufficient fortheir foreseeable needs as branch proficientaviators. They would be capable of making acourse reversal and a grQund controlled approach if cQnfrQnted with adverse weather CQn-ditions. They CQuid be expected not to panicif visual reference to the ground were temporarily lost. They could be counted upon tomaintain that level of instrument proficiency,along with branch prQficiency fully equal tothat of their nQnrated contemporaries.

The Army AviatiQn Advanced Course wouldinclude in its flight POI extensive instrumentqualification training, twin-engine training, andcross training for both fixed and rQtary wingaviators. AAAC students WQuid also receiveinstruction in supervisory maintenance sufficient to qualify them for assignment to ArmyAviation positions where such knowledge is essential.Furthermore, the Advanced Course at the

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Army Aviation SchoQl would be comparable inSCQpe to. other advanced courses, such as thoseconducted at the Infantry, ArmQr, Artillery,and Missile schools. t would be scheduled overa similar period and divided into. three equalphases.

Although academic instruction would be presented throughout the course, the first phasewould include cross training in either fixed wingaircraft or recQnnaissance helicopters; the second, instrument and multiengine training; andthe third would be devQted entirely to. grQundsubjects. Communications, cQmbat surveillanceand target acquisition, the employment Qf infantry, armor, and artillery, Air Force and amphibiQUS operations, special weapons, and othergeneral subjects WQuid be integrated into theAAAC.This advanced CQurse would be designed toserve as a prerequisite to the CQmmand andGeneral Staff CQllege for Army Aviators in lieuof existing advanced branch coursesThe number of officers selected to attend theArmy Aviation Advanced Course should begeared to the Army's need fQr aviators with theskills they would acquire in that course-instrument and multiengine pilots, aviation staff officers, and aviation commanders. Upon comple-

ntinued on p ge 95


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IRST

SYMPOS UMierce L iggin

W H T PROBLEMS do Army Aviators facewhich do not apply to their counterpartsin the other services? What contribution canflight surgeons make to the aircraft accidentprevention program? What should the flightsurgeon-aviator relationship be? What are thepsychological problems of modern aviation?What pretraining tests would eliminate all butthe most qualified candidates from aviationtraining? What impact forces can the humanbody withstand, and what is the flight surgeon'srole in crash inj ury prevention?These are some of the questions discussedat the first Army-wide Aeromedical SymposiumPensacola Fla. June 8-9. Sponsored by theUnited States Army Board for Aviation Accident Research the symposium was held toorient surgeons hospital commanders and staffaviators with aeromedical factors in aircraftaccidents. Representatives from all majorArmy commands heard the answers to thesequestions from leaders in the field of aviationmedicine.Col James F. Wells Director USABAARand symposium moderator, set the tone for thesymposium by expressing this aircraft accidentprevention philosophy: We can improve aviation through accident research. We must learn6

the human, material, and operational factorswhich result in accidental loss and correct thesein future aviation. Crashed aircraft o notaccomplish their missions-dead crews o notfly again.Colonel Wells introduced Vice Admiral Robert Goldthwaite Chief Naval Air TrainingPensacola Naval Air Station, and Rear AdmiralJ. B. Holland Commanding Officer PensacolaNaval Aviation Medical Center who welcomedArmy doctors and aviators to the Naval AirStation and Pensacola area.Maj Gen Ernest F. Easterbrook, Commanding General U. S. Army Aviation Center andCommandant U. S. Army Aviation School emphasized the important role Army flight surgeons and psychologists must play to keep aviators at their most efficient level. Aviation,said General Easterbrook, is composed of manmachine and environment. This symposium isconcerned with man and the problems he faces

Mr. Wiggin, Chief, Diterature Division, USA-BAAR was a fightel' pilot during World Wa l II.A USAFRes majm and a former USAF andUSAAVNS flight instructor, he has logged morethan 7,500 flight hours.


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in the complex aircraft of today and an everwidening range of missions. Speed and altitude,long considered essential for safe flight, are notalways available to the Army Aviator who mustlearn to fly his aircraft at slow speeds in the napof the earth.While all of the data recorded at the Aero-

SYMPOSIUM

medical Symposium is important, the entirecontext is extremely long. For this reason, withthe help of Captain Quitman W. Jones, Armyflight surgeon, and Chief, Human Factors Section, USABAAR, we have extracted what webelieve to be those portions of greatest generalinterest.

Personnel SelectionFor Flight Training

Lt Col Rollie M Harrison, Army flight sur-geon and Aviation Medical Advisor to the U. S.Army Aviation Center, said: Th e initial stepin the care of the flier should be in the selectionof personnel for training. Recognizing the needfor high standards of physical fitness in theselection of trainees, only those who can meetthese standards should be entered into thetraining program. Since vision is consideredthe most important single sense used in flying,those selected for this training should be possessed of keen visual acuity, normal ocularmuscle balance, and have normal color visionto be able to properly interpret signal lights andto differentiate terrain features.Auditory and equilibratory a p p r t usshould be of high standard in the trainee inorder that he can properly interpret radio communications and react normally to the forcesexperienced in flying which will stimulate theequilibratory portions of the ear. The individualwho already has a notable hearing loss is nota good candidate for flying duty.Normal respiratory, circulatory and digestive systems are a must for the fledgling pilot,for upon these depend his maintenance of anadequate physical s,tate of well being.

"Emotionally, he should be above average,able to withstand harrowing experiences whichwill beset him while operating in an abnormalenvironment, without distracting from his capability to think, plan and make the proper decisions that will enable him to fly his equipmentsafely and to complete his mission successfully.

The problems related to flight abnormali-ties and medical conditions which may affectability to fly will require application of thefinest diagnostic abilities and the best of medical judgment. A condition may be acutely orchronically induced by the stress of flying, orit may have some other cause. In any event,such a condition must be diagnosed, properlytreated and thoroughly evaluated with respectto the individual's flying s,tatus. In the man-agement of such cases the flight surgeon mustbe certain to maintain adequate administrativecontrol of the flier t prevent the 'pndesirablehappenings which may occur when the unfit fly.Good medical care, close observation, and theproper execution and recording of the periodicmedical examination will meet the many problems arising in this category.

NNU L PHYSIC LColonel Harrison described the various aspects of the annual physical, emphasizing theneed for detecting incipient conditions, dIsqualifying defects, or any neuroses which mightdevelop from nervous strain. He discussed theimportance of thorough medical investigationsin aircraft accidents and emphasized clos:e coordination between the flight surgeon and "safe-ty officer. The flight surgeon must have asincere interest in the subject andan active interest in aviation and flying. He must havea practical understanding of the emotionalstresses met and the phYSIological difficultiesencountered in flying."


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AUGUST 1960

M'edical Aspects of

Aircraft Accident PreventionDoctor Charles 1 Barron, Medical Director,

California Division, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and Lecturer, Aviation Safety Division,University of Southern California, said theaverage person is apt to depreciate the significance of small aircraft and helicopter accidentsbecause of the more spectacular, headline-attracting crashes which result in mass deathsand losses of millions of dollars in property.Yet according to Doctor Barron, the accidentr a t ~ for small aircraft and helicopters is thehighest in aviation and in direct contrast to thedeclining rate of all other military and civilianaircraft.

In reviewing accident statistics of smallaircraft :accidents in military and civilian aviat ion said Doctor Barron, one is impressedby the lack of definitive causes of accidents re lating to human or operator failure. In man?cases the type of accident or final maneuver ISlisted as the cause factor; thus collision withthe ground, ground loop, stall, failure t? maintain airspeed, or misuse of controls are lIstedaccident causes. These conditions, are not baSICcauses of accidents, but simply the maneuversthat resulted from an improper action on thepart of the pilot. Only occasionally is an attempt made to determine why the pilot lostcontrol of his aircraft, and very infrequently in deed in these accidents, is a medical factor suchas f ~ t i g u e vertigo, i n ~ p a c i t a t i o n hypoxia orii:oxiQus fumes listed as the basic cause of the

p ' l I o t ~ ~ ~ o (judgment la.ck of f l y i ~ g s k i ~ l .A c < f ~ d e R f investigatI


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surgeQns and flight safety O'fficers. A majQrQbjective O f this training is to instill a betterunderstanding O f the rO le O f these key persO'nnel in the general aviatiQn safety pictureand to enCQurage the cO O peratiO n and sUPPO rtQf thQse in PQsitiO'ns O f cO'mmand. Once thepilot is convinced that the physician is basicallyinterested in helping him maintain his healthand prolong his career rather than to merelydetermine his ability to pass physical standards,he becomes more receptive to accepting a preventive medical program.CCIDENT C USES

Assuming statistics fQr accident causatiO'nto be essentially similar in all branches O f themilitary services fQr identical types O f aircraftand flying QperatiO'ns, Dr. BarrO'n cQntinued,we must assume that the mO'st cO mmO n pri

mary medical causes O f aircraft accidents in theArmy are as fO IIO ws: vertigO'/disorientatiO'n, re stricted O r hampered visiO'n, fatigue, and temPO'rary incapacitatiO'n. SecO'ndary cO'ntributingfactO'rs are smO ke and nO xiO us fumes, carbQnmO nO xide, nO ise and vibratiO'n, poor nutritiO'n,illness and self-medication.

DISORI ENT TIONIn military jet aircraft, an increasing number O f accidents are being attributed to vertigO'O r disO'rientation, he said. It has been errO'neously assumed that disO'rientatiO'n is limited

to such aircraft; hO'wever, a recent study O f AirFO'rce helicopter pilots has revealed an extremely high incidence O f disO'rientatiQn, despite itslack O f identification as the actual cause O f helicO'pter accidents. The helicopter is basically anunstable vehicle and difficult to fly; it is easyto understand hO W spatial disO'rientatiQn mayO ccur.Among the skilled instructQr/pilots interviewed in this study, each indicated Qne Qr moreepisodes of disO'rientatiO'n, sO me classified assevere. The largest number O f episO'des O'ccurredwhile flying Qver unpO'Pulated areas Qn mO'onlessnights. The lighting of the helicopters, as wellas reflectiQn of grQund lights inside the CO ckpit,causes conside rable confusiQn. In several cases,the lO SS O f visual reference at night, assO'ciatedwith misinterpretatiO'n O f gravitatiO'nal fQrcesand erroneous sensations of rotatiO'n, resulted inconsiderable disQrientatiO'n. Among other conditiO'ns conducive to disQrientatiQn in helicO'pters,as well as in small aircraft, are night fO'rmationflying, sudden transitiQn from visual to instru-

SYMPOSIUM

ment flight regulatiQns, flight in instrumentweather, and simulated instrument flightsunder a hood.

VERTIGOOne Qf the mQre CQmmon conditiO'ns O fvertigo in fixed wing aircraft results frO m sudden movements of the head O ut O f the plane O fwhole-bO'dy rotatiO'n with simultaneous stimulatiQn of two sets of semi-circular canals. Thissituation is likely to O'ccur when pilQts orbitingaround an airpQrt O r landing area, suddenlyturn their heads to change radiO' channels. ThisphenomenO'n in high perfO'rmance aircraft is

extremely dangerQus, as it usually occurs at lO Waltitudes, and pilQts cO'rrecting fO r the apparentmovement O f the aircraft may compromise cO ntrol of the plane while clO se to the grQund andat relatively slow speed. The pilO'ts in this.studymade a number O f suggestiO'ns for preventiO'n QfdisQrientatiO'n, such as better instrumentatiO'nof the CO ckpit and increased training with emphasis on night instrument flying. They furtherrecommended that all pilots experience disorientation under controlled conditions.

FLI KER VERTIGOThe interesting condition of flicker vertigO'results when the rays Qf the setting (O r rising)sun passing thrO'ugh slO'wly revolving rotors orprO'peller blades prO'duce phO'tic stimulatiO'n at10 to 14 flickers per secO'nd in hypersensitivepersO'ns. [See AVIATION DIGEST, November1959, page 26.] In a few cases, cerebral excitatiO n, seizures, and uncQnsciousness have oc

curred.RESTRI TED VISION

Restricted O r hampered visiQn occurs underweather cO'nditiQns such as fO g, rain, cloudsand snQW, O r when O il sprays O n the canQPY O rsmQke is in the CO ckpit. Visual impairment as; acause O f aircraft accidents and midair cQllisiO'nsin high perfO'rmance aircraft has become extremely impO'rtant. There is even a case O n re cO rd Qf a midair, head-on cO'llision of twO helicopters which O'ccurred during daylight hO'urs inclear weather. It is anticipated that withQutprO'per traffic control and adequate training O fflight persO'nnel, midair cO'llisions will be O f increasing impO'rtance in Army A viatiQn as thenumber of aircraft and their speed increaseduring the cQming years.

ontinued on p ge9


12/40

Theoretical Analysis of Light Plane Landing and Takeoff AccidentsDue to Encountering the Wakes of Large Airplanes

With Rough Rules-of-Thumb for Safe SeparationReport No. SM-18647, Santa Monica Division

by Zegmond O. BlevissDouglas Aircraft Company, Inc.nd

A Preliminary Study of the Effect of Jet Blast

From the Douglas Aircraft Co.Report:ANY ACCIDENTS ANDnear accidents have beencaused by light planes encountering the wakes of large airplanes during landing and takeoff even though normal separa

tion times were observed. Thetwo typical difficulties generally reported by the pilots of thelight planes were: a sudden violent roll (in either direction)accompanied or unaccompaniedby a sudden large apparentloss of lift characterized byrapid loss of altitude. These accidents have been generally attributed in some obscure wayt the prop wash or t the tur-10

or Wake on Other AircraftBy Beech Aircraft Corporationbulence created by the largeairplane.TR ILING VORTEX SYSTEMS

t is shown that the accidents are caused by the rotational field of air associatedwith the rolled-up trailing vortex system from the wing ofthe large airplane. The suddenness of the onset of the difficulties is due to the unexpected entry of the light planeinto this vortex system.

Detailed numerical resultsare presented for a typical example consisting of a DC-6B asthe large airplane and a 40-footspan light plane whose othercharacteristics r e unspeci-

fied). The presentation permitsthe calculation of similar results for any other combinationof large airplane and lightplane. The roll rate and theaverage down-wash (rate ofloss of altitude) which are induced on the light plane wingare investigated, as well as thetime variations of these quantities as viscosity, small-scaleturbulence, gustiness, wind andground effects exert their influences.The magnitudes of the rollrate and apparent loss-of-lifteffect that the light plane canRepriJnted from a FLIGHTS FETY FOUND TION report

of January 1956


13/40

experience depend principallyUPO n twO things. These are theintensity of the velocity fieldcreated by the rO lled-up trailingvO rtices and the position of thelight plane relative to the vO rtices. A number of factorswhich affect the velocity fieldand the positiO ns O f the vortices are investigated.The initial velocity field andPO sitiO ns of the vO rtices (Le.just aft O f the large airplane)depend upon the wing span,speed, weight, and spanwiselift distribution of the largeairplane. The velocity field ofthe vO rtices will vary withtime. The positions of the vO rtices will change with time, thevO rtices moving under the influences of their mutual interactiO ns, ground effects, andwinds.

RULES-OF-THUMBBecause O f the many factorsinvO lved and because much O fthe required data would not beknO wn in any typicaL situatiO n,

nO detailed rules can be set upwhich will allow pilots of lightplanes to avoid difficulties under all conditions. However,certain rO ugh rules - of - th umbcO ncerning separation t im e snecessary to assure safe conditiO ns are formulated for combinations of large airplanes andlight planes of the class considered in the example. For1 a r g e airplanes which differgreatly from the DC-6B, corresponding rules-of-thumb canbe rapidly estimated.CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENTS

The large airplane in passingthrO ugh the air leaves behind awake of disturbances. Thesedisturbances arise from numerous sources on the airplane.To determine which O f themany disturbances cause theaccidents it is necessary to cO n-

dense from the accident reportsthe significant characteristicsof these accidents and then tdeduce from them the properties w h i c h the disturbancemust have. t wiH be seen thatthese characteristics are suchthat the accident - provokingdisturbance can be readily identified.A study O f the accident rePO rts reveals:

1. The disturbance must beable to induce large rO ll rates(in either direction) and largeapparent losses of lift (characterized by rapid loss of altitude) on smaller aircraft varying in size frO m the smallestlight planes to at least thosewith wing sp n s somewhatgreater than the wing semispanof the large airplane.

2. The induced effects on alight plane are about the samewhether the large airplane islanding or taking off.3. The disturbance can persist fO r several minutes.4. The disturbance is not random.The disturbance velocity fieldmust be approximately independent of whether the largeairplane is landing O r takingoff. The steady rotational character O f the disturbance fieldreduces the possible sources ofthe disturbance to either theprO pellers (i.e. the rotation inthe propeller slipstreams) orthe trailing vO rtex system fromthe wing of the large airplane.

The fact that the intensity ofthe rotation in the propellerslipstreams differs greatly fO rlanding and take-off and thesmall lateral extent of each propeller disturbance field (of theorder O f magnitude of the propeller diameter) eliminate theprO pellers as possible sources ofthe disturbance. Then the tentative cO nclusion is that the

HAZARDS OF THE WAKE

disturbance is caused by thetrailing vortex system from thewing of the large airplane.The proof of this conclusion,O f course, will be to show thatthe trailing vO rtex system caninduce large roll rates and apparent lift losses on a lightplane and that the disturbancecan persist for several minutes.

t shO uld be noted that theabrupt O nset O f the difficultieswhich the light plane experiences is nO t a characteristic ofthe disturbance, but is due tothe fact that the light planeflies into the disturbance unexpectedly.OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

NO simple operational prO cedures can be devised to assure normal separatiO n timesfor the landing O r take-off O f alight plane following the takeoff of a large airplane exceptfor the limiting case of zerOparallel wind compO nent, fO rwhich condition the landing andtake-off procedures should beclear from the fO regoing discussiO n. However, some suggestions can be made for increasing the chances of recO very shO uld the vO rtices be encountered.

The basic idea is that thelight plane shO uld always havesufficient air speed for effectivemaneuvering. In landing, reasonable air speed should bemaintained until contact (Le.PO wer landings). The followingO peratiO nal prO cedure is suggested -for take-off:FO llowing lift-off, the lightplane s h 0 u d fly near theground, picking up air speed befO re climbing. This procedureis suggested by the fact thatmost O f the vortex system ismore than about 40 feet off thegrO und. Thus any chance encO unter with the vO rtex system


14/40

AUGUST 1960is delayed until better maneuvering air speed has been obtained.From the Beech Aircraft Corp.

Report:(Based on extensive studiesof published data and inquiries

among representative Government agencies, aircraft manufacturers, pilots, engineers, andother leading authOorities.)The disturbance created bythe trailing vortices of an airplane, the jet wake, and thesonic shock wave can have detrimental and, u n d e r certainconditions, a destructive effecton another airplane.Structural loads of 9 G's havebee n recorded in a transitt h r 0 ugh a jet wake withfigh ter - type aircraft; and alight plane traveling at 100mph about 1 mile aft of a jet

bomber recorded positive Ooadsof 2.5 G's and negative loads of3.5 G's when intercepting avortex wake at about 90 degrees.The turbulence created bysome types of aircraft and under certain weather conditionscan be violent to severe as faras four miles aft of the planecausing the wake.The sonic shock wave hasbeen known to knock out windows and do other damage andappears to be a possible hazardunder certain combinations ofconditions.The flight practices which allow or cause close maneuveringof either jet or propeller-drivenaircraft of high speeds, highwing loadings and/ or large size,and smaller aircraft can causea safety hazard.Listed below are two of themany conditions that could produce structural failures:1. If a small plane, flying atcruise speed, observes a jet air-12

craft and executes an evasivemaneuver which increases theload factor to approximately itsdesign value, then the penetration of the wake area could produce load factors in excess ofthe design values, with structural failures resulting.2. If two or more aircraftare flying in formatiOon, or closeproximity, the combined effectof the wakes could producestructural failures in the smallaircraft.ROUGH RULES-OF-THUMBFOR SAFE SEPARATIONTIMES FOR THE LANDINGOR TAKE-OFF OF A LIGHTP L A N E FOLLOWING THE

,,

LANDING OR TAKE-OFF OFA LARGE AIRPLANE(Reference: Douglas ReportSM-18647, Dec., 1954)Example: With a large airplane landing under any wind

condition normal separationtime for light aircraft wouldbe about 30 seconds if it operates as shown in sketches below.Example: With a large airplane taking off in a directcrosswind, the normal separation time for a light aircraftwould be about 30 seconds if itoperates as s how n in thesketches below.Example: With a large air-

, LIGHT PL NE'\,.J,~ @ ~ L : A J . G AII AN' ' '

- - - - - - - ~

7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7Light Plane Landing: Light plane should stay well above theflight path of the large airplane and should contact the runway well forward of the contact position of the large airplane.

L RGE IRPL NE////J

///

LIGHT PL NE / /7//

/

7777777777777777777777Light Plane Taking Off: Light plane should delay lift-offuntil well forward of the contact position of the large plane.


15/40

LIGHT PLANE. ''', ,,,,, LARGE IRPL NE_-------- 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Light Plane Landing: Light plane should contact the runwaywell to the rear of the lift-off position of the large airplane.plane taking off or landing in ageneral crosswind (excludingthe direct c r 0 s sw i n d) the

safe separation time for a1 i g h t aircraft now dependsmainly upon the wind compo-

/777777777777777Light Plane Taking Off: Light plane shou,ld lift off well tothe rear of the lift-off position of the large airplane and shouldstay well above the takeoff flight path of the large plane.

DEFINITION OF WIND COMPONENTS:

nent across the runway seedefinition table below) and thecharacteristics of the 1 a r g eplane.The following rules apply tolarger airplanes of the DC-3,DC-6, and C-124 classes (lightplane taking off or landing).

Example: With wind component across runway greaterthan 10 mph, safe separationtime would be about 30 seconds.Example: With wind component across runway between2.5 and 7 mph, safe separationtime would be between 5 and 10minutes.Example: With zero windcomponent a c r 0 s s runway(wind directly along runway)safe separation time would be2 minutes.**NOTE: I t should be emphasized that these are approximate separation times whichare necessary in order thatthere be very little chance ofencountering difficulties. Forshorter separation times difficulties will not necessarily beencountered but the chance ofrunning into trouble is muchgreater.

A WIND COMPONENT CORRESPONDS TO AACROSS THE RUNWAY 10-DEGREE 20-DEGREE lO-DEGREE

OF CROSSWIND OF CROSSWIND OF CROSSWIND OF2.5 MPH 14.5 MPH 7.5 MPH 5 MPH

7 MPH 40 MPH 20.5 MPH 14 MPH10 MPH 57.5 MPH 29 MPH 20 MPH

RUNWAY PL N VIEW

DIRECTION OF FLIGHT

WIND COMPONENT X-DEGREESACROSS RUNWAY X-DEGREE CROSSWIND


16/40

HE FUTURE CONCEPT ofall- weather or l im i t edweather capability for ArmyAviation is the topic of manyarticles and conferences. Notall Army aircraft are equippedwith anti-icing or deicing equipment. Severe thunderstorms inthe area of operation and heavyor extended rain affect or limitour flight capability. Theseproblems are being studied anda solution will probably be advanced in the near future.At times we have been calledupon to fly in adverse weather;it is a tribute to the Army Aviators' proficiency in instrumentflying that those missions were,to a great extent, successfullycompleted. We will have to carry this high degree of proficiency over into combat, but inall probability we won't haveall of the exotic equipmentfound aU most airfields today.Equipment such as VOR/ DME,permanent or semi-permanentGCA, high intensity approachlights, bright runway lights, rotating beacons, and preparedapproach lanes will not be available to us under combat condi- 4

Captain John P Johnson Inf

tions. I cannot imagine a commander allowing these in hiszone, even if time were available to install them. I'm afraidthat the only equipment available will be a homer beacon,quadradar, and some sort ofportable or homemade lightingequipment for night operations,(see Once Upon A Flashlight, Jan '60, DIGEST) plususual radio communications.In future combat operationswe will need an: IFR capability.The day of picking any old fieldfor operations, at least a division base airfield, is fast disappearing. Our considerationsmust now include not only VFRbut all the details of operationfrom that field under all conditions of day, night, and IFR.In the combat zone we willcamouflage our airfield. Wecannot afford t make an obstacle-free approach path t thefield. V 0 i e communicationsmust be kept t a minimum tokeep the enemy from fixing ourairfield location. For thesesame reasons, elaborate lighting systems will not be available. The homing beacon should

be emplaced away from the airfield also; yet, it must be located so that our own peoplecan find the field under IFRconditions.

If we are going to have thisIFR capability, we must be ableand willing to operate it. Training must commence now so thatthe operation will work smoothly u n d e r combat conditions.Once we move into the field, itwill be too late to discover ourequipment or personnel is inoperative.

We have well trained operations personnel in our presentunits, as attested by the lown u m b e r of violations filedagainst them by Military FlightService and the FAA. Thisrecord is based on civil type airoperations, and this is onlyright, because that is where the

Captain J ohnson is with theI nstrument Division of the Deptof A.dvanced Fixed 1Ving Train-ing. H e is dual rated and instru-ment qualiied with pproxi-mately 2 500 light ours .


17/40

main emphasis On their training has been centered.The basic fundamentals Ofthe Air Traffic Regulating Planfoll Ow closely the pr Oceduresdevel Oped by ATC and the FAAafter many years experience inc Ontr Olling air traffic. Diligentuse Of this plan can make flyinga little safer f Or uS in the c Om-bat area.The entire c Ombat z One IFRsystem depends On timely andaccurate informati On c Oncerning r Outes and letd Owns, starting at the divisi On base airfield.A unit selects its field, emplaces the equipment, flightchecks the facilities, and thendisseminates the inf Ormati On t OOther using units in the system.Higher headquarters will designate the routes between theunits.

t will be evident fr Om thebeginning that such a systemcann Ot be Operated with Out anexcellent communicati Ons system. The air-gr Ound link will

INSTRUMENT FLIGHT IN COMBATbe pr Ovided by the aircraft ra dins and the gr Ound radi Os issued t O the aviati On units.Gr Ound communicati Ons seemt O present the biggest pr Oblemt O Overc Ome. Teleph One circuits must be made availableas a primary means Of gr Oundc Ommunicati Ons, backed up byteletypewriters. We m i h teven need electr Onic data c Om-puting machines t O keep usabreast Of the mach I-speedsOf present day missiles and aircraft that will be Operating inthe area.

ADP requirements f Or rapidtransfer Of informati On between Flight Operati On Centers and Air Defense C OmmandP Osts is being studied in an ef f Ort t O reduce manual handlingOf flight inf Ormati On.The placement of aids to navigati On in any c Ommander sarea will be influenced by hisattitude toward and his needf Or aircraft supp Ort. H Owever,Operati On Of present l Ow fre-

here is a difference

quency aids at their l Owest Out-puts sh Ould be c Onsidered ifmissi Ons can be acc Omplished.An Other p Oint Of view is thatOne m Ore radiating device willmean little Or n Othing to theaverage situati On.The Operati Ons secti On mustmaintain an accurate and up-t Odate file On the flight r Outesand letd Own pr Ocedures. Yesterday s flight inf Ormati On isn Ot necessarily valid today. Amistake in transmitting, c Om-piling, and rec Ording inf Ormati On, Or an err Or in flying ther Oute Or making the letd Owncan easily be a fatal One.

H Ow many Operati Ons secti Ons know h Ow t O emplacec Orrectly and Operate the hOlning beac On? H Ow many canmake up a c Orrect and usableappr Oach plate Or plates and select a pr Oper air c Orrid Or f Oruse in IFR c Onditi Ons? H Owmany instrument rated pil OtsOr instrument examiners canaccurately flight check and rec-


18/40

AUGUST 1960ommend headings, altitudes,missed approach procedures tooperate the home field underIFR? Those with this abilityare the lucky ones because thisparticular course of instructionis not taught in all of our A viat on courses. I received all ofmy information on the subjectat the Aviation Staff OfficersCourse (See ASOC, April '60,DIGEST). The details of IFRoperation in combat did notstrike me as any big problembefore.VFR and IFR capability isnot necessarily compatible inone field. We have all be'en intoshort fields during the daywhen we would not risk thatsame field at night or make anIFR approach there.I think some difference existsin making an IFR approach toa place like Cairns AAF andmaking a minimum ceiling andvisibility approach to a stripsimilar to Road Strip 16 orStrip 114 at Fort Rucker. Thebasic technique will remain thesame. You win be coming in alittle slower, a little steeper,and a little lower tol a strip notas easily identified. The mentalhazard will probably be muchgreater when breaking out at

300 feet over trees than whenbreaking out at 400 feet withhigh intensity lights pointingyou to the centerline of therunway.The only way it is going toget any easier is through practice and then more practice. Inthe best interests of training,the altitude and visibility mini

mums will have to be loweredduring this training. I feel thatmore emphasis should be placedon simulated combat zone instrument techniques. T h i straining should stress use ofTOE equipment which permitsADF and GCA approaches to ashort, unprepared strip and thehoming capabilities of theARC-44 homer.

The use of the ARC-44 radiofor homing is presently beingtaught by the Department ofTactics at Fort Rucker. Eachstudent is required to performa minimum of 3 homing problems during the course of instruction, one of them at night.

Another item of equipmentunder development is the TRN-9 marker beacon. This is asmall item of equipment of onecubic foot dimension and weighing 50 pounds. t has a con-

REMIN ER

trollable signal pattern and canbe used as a Z marker, outermarker, or middle marker. Thebiggest drawback to this itemis the 110-115 volt, 150 watt input. The generators of this capacity are rather noisy and require no little amount of maintenance.

The number of IFR days inany particular area of the worldis generally very small over theperiod of a year. Aviation FMs,TMs, Circulars, and other publications say we have an IFRcapability. We must all strivet maintain and improve ourcombat IFR system. Diligentuse of this system can makeflying a little safer for us inthe combat area.In this article I have covered,very briefly, some of the problems we will encounter in operating a combat IFR system.I would like very much to seeor read some of the solutionsthat have been advanced tosolve these problems.(E D ITO R S N O T E : FM1-( ) ARMY AVIATION AIRT R A F F I C OPERATIONSTACTICAL has been preparedby the U. S. Army AviationSchool. t is p r e s en t I y atUSCONARC for review.)

Recently we had a mechanic report thatwhen removing an earplug he 'felt a loud plop'accompanied by intense pain. Examinationshowed a perforated eardrum and an infectionof the ear. The mechanic states that it was hiscustom t wet the plugs with saliva before inserting them. He had experienced the poppingsound when removing them before, but had nothad any aftereffects.

The Medical Department advises. that wetting earplugs or the presence of an excessiveamount of wax in an ear can cause such a tightfit that sudden removal can cause a vacuum,with results similar to those described.

6

Slow and gentle removal of the plug fromthe ear canal at all times is recommended. Easydoes it.-AVIATION MECHANICS BULLETIN


19/40

ield ArmyMobile

THE FLIGHT WAS MADEdeep into enemy territory.Twice, missiles with c t i v ehoming devices came near theplane, missing it by the thick-ness of the camouflage paint,which the engineers insistedwould conceal the aircraft fromground detection. The targetarea was teeming with activity,protected by surface-to-air mis-siles mounted on vehicles, smallcal. MGs, and other weapons

Major Eugene R. Lucas Arty

that seemed to extend theirbarrels up to my fuselage.I had been on the deck mostof the flight to escape radar de-tection, but now I had to getsome altitude to photograph anarea suspected by G2 to be anactive and troublesome ballis-tic missile launching site. Ituned my electronic countermeasure set to fully automaticand began my run on the target. No sooner had I taken my

5 t ~ ~ ~ ~ ----- \.\ 1 5 Ft

irstrippictures by both conventionalphotographic and electromagnetic means than tumult brokeloose, or so it seemed anyway.Several bursts appeared above

Major Lucas is Chief, DoctrineDivisz on, Combat DevelopmentsOffice H e is a Senior rmy

viator with approximately 3,600flight hours in fixed and rotarywing aircraft and is instrumentfJual1:fied

__ .... 33 Ft

7


20/40

AUGUST 1960

me and to my left tha Ithought surely would cause metrouble. But somehow my planeremained in one piece. Although I had kicked rudder andspilled aileron to head the aircraft straight for the ground,I couldn't seem to get down fastenough.Things quieted down somewhat after I got down into thenap of the earth. Now I couldconcentrate on getting back tomy unit. The 5th Aerial Combat Surveillance Co said theywould wait for me to return before they displaced the airstrip.I hoped so as not too much daylight remained, and I wasn t tookeen on landing on this newmobile airstrip idea, and instrange surroundings to boot.Come to think of it, why did Iever agree to t ryout this mobile airstrip idea anyway? Iguess the old man did it for me,but I wish I had put up a; moreconvincing argument against it.Oh, well Good night, why amI worrying about that? I ve stillgot another 150 miles, to go toreach our lines, and another 20to reach my unitIt s pretty smooth down herein the nap. At my 100 knots(lAS) it will take me 1 hourand 30 min. to reach FEBA. If8

I climb up to 400 feet above thetrees I will be able to increasemy speed t 600 knots. This willenable me to return t our linesin about 15 minutes . But I don tknow-at that altitude thesehoods with their redeye typeweapons will pick me off like aclay pigeon. If I remain downhere in the nap I'll stand a goodchance of getting back in onepiece. But on the other hand Iwon t make very good time.Well, let s see, if I climbanother 20 feet above the trees,I can increase my speedanother 60 knots and still beclose enough t the trees to berelatively safe from attack.Not bad, that will give meabout 160 knots groundspeed.At this rate I should reach ourlines in comparative safety inabout, in about . . . wait until Iget around these high trees . . .now let me see, 160 knots perhour and from checkpoint 19dead ahead of me, I must haveabout 142 nautical miles to go.That would be oh, 53 minutes, I guess,.I have enough fuel for 1 hourand 30 minutes. That leaves meabout 30 minutes t mill aroundin case my homer and radiogear are damaged or fail tfunction or I get lost. Get lost

me? How would I ever liveit down? Can t let that happen.After contacting the flightcontrol center (FCC) of one ofthe forward area divisions withmy automatic digital communi

cator, I was cleared inbound.The FCC transmitted my position t FOC who advised the5th Aerial Combat SurveillanceCo terminal control and I wasvectored to my unit. They haddisplaced due to heavy ballisticmissile attacks in the area.

N ow I am in a tough spot. Iwonder whether the airstrip iscompletely operational. Controlsaid that the strip had displaced shortly after I had departed.That was 2 2 hours ago. According to the map, they onlymoved 20 miles laterally andhad good roads all the way.The mobile airstrip is capableof being readied for movementin 20 minutes and emplaced ina fairly decent area with a welltrained crew in about 30 minutes. The tractors can travel onthe roads in this area at about25 mph, so the elapsed time forall this should not exceed anhour and 45 minutes - timeenough.This is fantastic, and simple:an airstrip that provides an allweather surface in any terrain.


21/40

All the developers have reallydone is line up in tandem aseries of trailers with bedsstrong enough to withstandcontinued aircraft operatinns.Extensinns provide extrawidth. An arresting cable, similar to that used by the U. S.Navy, is attached at the approach end to catch landing aircraft. On the other end you almost always find an ArmyAviation Transportation Maintenance and Supply Unit. Youdon't suppose - no, theywouldn't be located there forthat reason. don't see any atthe present, though.Well, here goes, the mobile

terminal control unit hascleared me number one forlanding. I set up my approachas make my turn from baseto final; and as look at theshort strip ahead, it's only 800feet long and 20 feet wide, Iwonder. This aircraft I'm flyingis really in the high performance class and is nnt as forgiving as the old Cub, Bird Dog,or Mohawk. My final approachis made half by the seat of mypants and half by the glideslope meter provided for suchoccasions. I've got to choppower no higher than 3 feetabove the third dot on the strip,just before I reach the large

MOBILE AIRSTRIP

crossbar. By doing this I'm assured of being caught by thearresting cable and hauled toan abrupt stop.All goes well. After being unhooked, Sergeant Jones wavesme toward the parking area.After shutting down, SergeantJones informs me that I hadlost almost all my fuel fromseveral punctures and could notpossibly have made it muchfarther to the rear. Lucky forme, as there are no airfieldswithin 75 miles in that direction capable of handling thistype aircraft. As fill out my781-2, I suddenly realize whata wonderful airstrip this reallyis

ontinue from page 5tion of the Army Aviation Advanced Course, itsgraduates should be detailed to Army Aviation.No longer should they be expected to maintaina singular branch proficiency; rather, theywould be capable of serving in multibranchroles as a division aviation officer, an aviationcompany or battalion commander, or a surveillance platoon pilot.This would not lessen the need nor the; supply of OFWAC graduates who would serve inbranch material assignments as branch proficient officers. t would, however, eliminate thegreat expense the Army now incurs in providing the current full C phase for all OFWACstudents.

In essence, this advanced course-and thenew policies suggested-would solve the enigmaof instrument and branch proficiencies, provideArmy Aviators qualified to conduct that program, avoid the stigma and disadvantages of anAviation Branch, provide an orderly method ofmanaging the careers of all Army Aviators,eliminate fruitless t r a i n i n g , eliminate theschism between the Transportation Corps andthe combat arms-and save mOoney It couldbe a PANACEA.

Do you agree with the author? Commentspro or con are welcomed on this article. Addresscomments to the Editor.

19


22/40

THE U S ARMY

. BoARDFOR

AVIATION. ACCIDENT ,RESEARCH

L-20A ENGINE was heard running rough andcraft started 1800 turn, dived into canal during turn. Pilot and 4 passengers killed . Onepassenger missing . Aircraft destroyed .H-13G ENGINE FAILED during hovering f l ight .Aircraft landed with no damage. No. 3 cylinder ruptured at base; piston disintegrated.Cause undetermined pending analysis.L-19A TIRE BLEW during landing . Aircraftdestroyed . No injuries. Suspect deterioratedinner tube .H-21C TAXIED beside another parked H-21 .Forward rotor blades of taxiing aircraft struckaft rotor blades of parked aircaft. Both setsof rotor blades destroyed .L-19A ENGINE FAILED during flight. Landinggear washed ut during forced landing. Twopistons failed and broke through crank case.Cause undetermined pending analysis.-H-21C CONTROL LOST during test f l ight aftermaintenance Aircraft settled in nose high,causing major damage to landing gear andfuselage . No injuries. Aft control l ink PIN22R3068-4) had been removed and not replaced .U-1A OIL PRESSURE ROP PE to zero whilef lying at 8,000 feet . Engine seized. Aircraftlanded with no damage. No significant rise inoil or cylinder head temperature prior to oil pressure loss. Tube assembly PIN C3E3-11, FSN15160-589-0997, oil delivery line from firewallto top of sump) failed under sleeve.20

H-21C AFT ROTOR BLADE struck wire duringlanding approach to confined area. Incidentdamage.L-20A VEERE into direct 20-knot crosswindduring takeoff . Major damage to left wing, leftgear and stabilizer. No injuries.H-34A FLARED too steeply during power recovery from practice autorotation . Tail wheel struckground. Tail wheel broken; tire blown; skindamage to under side of tail pylon; and ADFantenna broken .H-13G ENGINE FAILED at approximately 275feet MSL over forest area . ircraft autorotatedinto trees. Major damage. No injuries. Suspectfuel starvation .H-13 H LOST AI RSPEE and rotor rpm followingdownwind turn at low altitude. Aircraft crashed.Passenger suffered leg fracture, contusions andabrasions; pi lot received minor contusions andabrasions. Aircraft destroyed .H-19D ENGINE LOST POWER. Aircraft autorotated to forced landing with no damage . Suspect impeller failure .H-34C ENGINE FAILED shortly after switchingon center transfer pump . Aircraft landed withno damage . Excess water found in fuel and fuelmixture control linkage improperly rigged .H-13E ENGINE FAILED in flight. Aircraft com pleted forced landing with no damage. Hosefrom carburetor diffuser box to intake manifoldbecame disconnected at diffuser box .

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iune and iulyH-21C TOUCHED DOWN in tail-low attitudeduring practice autorotation . Aft keel longeroninstallation and fiberglas of lower tail faringdamaged.H 34A HYDRAULIC leak noted in f l ight . Air craft completed normal landing. Ruptured hy draulic line found in primary servo system.H-34C CLAMSHELL DOOR opened in f l ight .Clamshell door and radio antenna damaged .H-21C AFT ROTOR BL DES struck small treein confined area . Incident damage to rotorblades.H-23C ENGINE FAILED to respond during at tempted power recovery from practice autorota tion . Aircraft landed hard . Main rotor bladesflexed down and severed tail boom . Suspect en gine failure .YAC l LANDED HARD short of runway . Fuselage buckled and twisted; left wing buckled. Noinjuries .H-34C ENGINE RPM increased with throttleclosed and pitch decrease during confined areaapproach . Ai rcraft was autorotated to road land ing with no damage. Throttle box bolt (PINS1630-8026) missing .L-19A STRUCK SMALL TREE turned andcrashed into field during simulated forced land ing. Aircraft burned . Instructor pilot sufferedminor head lacerations.H-21 C AFT ROTOR BL DES damaged duringconfined area approaches . Three-inch hole ineach blade not found until after f l ight .

H-34C ENGINE FAILED at SOO - foot altitude .Tailwheel fork bent during autorotation touchdown. Suspect fuel contamination.U 1A TAILWHEEL struck culvert at approachend of runway during landing. Skin damage tofuselage and tailwheel hydraulic strut damaged .L-19A STALLED AND SPUN IN during turn tobase for landing on tactical strip . Pilot killed .Aircraft destroyed.H-19C MADE TAIL LOW power recovery fromautorotation . Tail rotor blade tips struck ground .Incident damage .H-13G CRASHED during simulated backwardsabort from confined area takeoff. Instructorpilot killed. Degree of pilot s injuries : severe tounknown .L-19E ENGINE ran rough and lost power infl ight . Forced landing completed with no dam age to the aircraft. Rough engine and power losscaused by malfunction (more than 200 rpm dropeach) of magnetos .L-19E GROUND-LOOPED to left during takeoff.Right wing buckled; right gear severed. Noinjuries .L-19 WHEEL DROPPED in hole while taxiing .Incident damage to propeller .L-19A WING STRUCK tree during approach toroad strip landing . Incident damage to left wing .H-13E COMPLETED forced landing with no dam age after partial engine failure in flight. Fouledspark plugs found .

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AUGUST 1960Continu cd f rom page

SYMPOS UM

F TIGUEI t is extremely difficult to evaluate the roleof fatigue in aircraft accidents. The manifesta

tions of fatigue are diffuse and frequently soinsidious to the functioning of almost any bodysystem as to be unrecognizable t the subject.Fatigue is characterized in all cases by decrements in skill reduced functional reserves andacceptance of IDwered performance standards.Subjectively, fatigue induces a sensation oftiredness and lassitude.

Fatigue may be caused by a number of factors, both internal and external .to the subject.Physical fatigue occurs as a result of excessiveusage of body tissues and organs. This type offatigue is rarely seen in aviation. Skill fatigueresults from the prolonged application at askilled task in the presence of exposure tostresses of many kinds and is most often seen inthe operation of high performance aircraft,where multiple and persistent demands aremade requiring constant attentiDn from therecipient. Fatigue in these cases may be relatedto the performance of a single or very limitednumber of body functions, and its onset may bequite insidious. Finally static fatigue is mostoften seen during long flights where the subjectis restricted in movement, frequently placed inrelatively cramped positions and exposed totemperature extremes, noise vibration, accelerations, and other environmental stresses.In evaluating fatigue, the subject's activities for the period preceding as well as during.the actual flight should be reviewed. Poor personal habits, late hours, inadequate rest, domestic prDblems anxieties, and irritations preceding a flight may easily cause fatigue during re latively short flight exposures. Noise and vibration are extremely important secondary contributants in helicopters especially SD since thesubjects are exposed to acoustio and vibratoryenergy in the mDre annoying frequency ranges.Vibration f body organs and overstimulationof tha inner ear are especially disturbing. Fatigue in pilots is especially hazardous in that itis most apt t occur during the landing phase ofthe flight-an extremely critical time, since hisworkload is the heaviest and most demanding ofthe entire flight. Prolonged flight time, in-

creased number of landings and takeoffs increased vigilance in low altitude flying use ofinstruments, and formation flying all contributeheavily to fatigue. Preventive measures foravoidance of fatigue include appropriate aircraft design t eliminate extrinsic stimuli, proper duty cycling development of good personalhealth habits, and careful monitoring of theaircrewmen by the flight safety officer andflight surgeon.

DISE SEIncapacitation resulting from disease processes while not statistically important in accident causation, is being detected with increasing frequency now that more autopsies arebeing performed. Of greatest concern are coronary heart attacks, which are occurring withsudden and catastrophic results in relatively

young pilots. Other disorders, such as ruptureof congenital cerebral aneurysms, pneumothorax and convulsive seizures, have occurred during flight in presumably healthy subjects.Prevention requires more sophisticatedtechniques and procedures for detection or prediction of these conditions. Temporary incapacitation has been reported at fairly frequent intervals in aircrewmen, but because of itsusual physiological causation, has seldom beendetected in investigations of fatal accidents.One of the most common conditions is syncoperesulting from cardiac arrhythmias induced bythe pulmonary stretch reflex or carotid sinusstimulation, head movements, recent illnessand painful stimuli.

ENVIRONMENT L STR SSA number of environmental stress conditions have been incriminated as secondary contributing factors in aircraft accidents. Thesestresses may act singly or in combination to

seriously reduce the pilot's capacity by adversely affecting his judgment, skill or reactiontime. Occasionally the answer to the 'why' apilot committed an unsafe act may be foundwithin this category of conditions. Cabin contamination by smoke fumes, or carbon monoxide [see CRASH SENSE ] is mDst apt t l occurin small aircraft with single in-line enginesshort exhaust stacks, unsealed cabins and exhaust-fed cabin heaters. In most cases cabincontaminants are present in concentrations wellbelow the lethal level and produce mainly irritating effects. While annDying and disturbing


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to the flight crew they seldom cause incapacitation. There have, however, been several caseswhere accidents have been caused by contaminants such as carbon dioxide gasolinevapors, and other narcotizing agents.

NOISE VIBRATIONSNoise is not a major problem in small reciprocating engine aircraft; it is however, tre

mendously important in helicopters. Internalnoise levels in the cockpit and cabin of milihryhelicopters especially when flying with doorsand windows open are higher than that of anyother service aircraft. Fortunately, the totalexposure time is sufficiently short to avoid permanent damage of the acoustic nerve. Temporary deafness and tinnitus may occur andmany pilots have complained of interference incommunication, after 30 to 60 minutes of noiseexposure. The use of ear defenders or specialsound-attenuating helmets will greatly relievethis situation.Much of the vibratory energy produced bythe rotors, engine, and transmissions in helicopters is in the low frequency range and, consequently, extremely annoying to the recipients.These vibrations, when associated with buffeting and accelerations, will overstimulate theinner ear and sensitive body tissues, thushastening the onset of fatigue and vertigo.

NUTR T ONPoor nutrition has occasionally been listedas an accident cause factor. Great emphasis isbeing given to proper nutrition for aircrewmen,especially with reference to overeating, missing

of meals inadequate diet and poor mastication.The reasons for the emphasis on obesity arequite apparent. Flight stresses, especially thoseassociated with high altitude exposure andaeroembolism are more apt to involve the obesepilot. As an interesting sidelight to this problem of weight control, some pilots have resortedto self-instituted dietary regimens and appetitedepressing medication in the hope of avoidingcensure by the flight surgeon. In their zeal tocontrol obesity, pilots may be creating an evenmore serious health problem.Statistics reveal that a disproportionatelyhigh percentage of accidents occur two to fourhours after ingestion of food and that, in a number of accidents, pilots have either missed ameal or have gone long periods of time withouteating. Despite these observations, it has beenextremely difficult to prove by laboratory tests

SYMPOSIUM

that hypoglycemia is a major factor in accident causation. To the contrary, studies haveindicated a marked constancy of blood sugarlevel regardless of the extent of food intakeover periods of several days. Perhaps more important than hypoglycemia is the discomfortresulting from missing a meal and breaking awell-established eating pattern. t would appearthat hypoglycemia, if combined with otherstress-inducing factors such as mild hypoxia,hyperventilation, excessive heat or accelerativeforces may affect a pilot's stress tolerance.

TEMPORARY ILLNESSTemporary illnesses such as colds intesti

nal disturbances, and other related disorders donot constitute a major cause of accidents. Suchconditions can however, cause discomfort anddistract a pilot's attention from his primaryduties. Upper respiratory infections may resultin aerotitis or aerosinusitis and, in addition tocausing discomfort, can reduce a pilot's tolerance to vertigo and other allied stresses. Thereare a number of recorded instances in whichpilots attempting to blow their noses or cleartheir ears have suddenly experienced markedvertigo due to the sudden increase in middle earpressure, and presumably, inner ear stimulation.

Intestinal disorders are the most commoncause of incapacitation in airline pilots andoccur in flight to almost every pilot sometimeduring his career. Inflammations of the intestinal tract due to dietary indiscretions, excessivedrinking, or infectious disorders leave the tractextremely reactive to internal gas pressurechanges. Severe cramps and diarrhea have occurred at altitudes as low as 5 000 to 8 000 feet.Peptic ulcers have, on very rare occasions ruptured during flights below 10 000 feet.

A tempting to fly before full recovery froman illness renders one susceptible to fatigue,vertigo, and hypoxia. Perhaps even more important is the problem of the pilot who without consulting the flight surgeon, takes medication to treat his disorder. Any of the commonlyused drugs such as the antihistamines, antispasmodics, stimulants, sedatives, and antibiotics could adversely affect a pilot's performance. Education, plus confidence in one's flightsurgeon, should remove the necessity and desirefor self-medication; however, many pilots stillrefuse to visit the flight surgeon when sufferingfrom an illness for fear of being grounded.

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AUGUST 1960LCOHOL

Alco.ho.I has definitely co.ntributed to a number o.f aircraft accidents, including tho.se' invo.lving small planes. Alco.ho.l has a narco.tizingactio.n, and through its cerebral effects, repro.duces the symptoms of altitude hypoxia withdefective judgment, slo.wing of reactio.n time,poor discriminatio.n, and visual disturbances.Unfo.rtunately, pilo.ts seldo.m realize the pro.lo.nged aftereffects o.f alco.ho.I, especially uponthe vestibular system. Educatio.n and self-co.ntro.l are o.bvio.usly indicated.

HE TPilo.ts in aircraft flying at relatively lo.waltitudes and slo.W speeds may be subjected to.intense heat. The ensuing fluid and mineral lo.sshastens fatigue and induces increased stressUPo.n the circulatory system. When o.perating

in no.rtherly climates, pilo.ts may be subject to.intense co.ld if the cabin heating system is inadequate o.r defective. Slo.wing o.f reaction timeand disco.mfo.rt may result.HYPOXI

Hypoxia is 8 majo.r pro.blem in high perfo.rmance aircraft; ho.wever, it is rarely enco.untered at altitudes belo.w 10,000 feet. So.me deterio.ratio.n in night visio.n is no.ted at altitudes asIo.W as 5,000 feet. In aircraft flights abo.ve 10,-000 feet, hypoxia will be enco.untered if expo.sure times are sufficiently lo.ng. Unco.nscio.usness first occurs between 18,000 and 22,000 feetafter an exposure o.f 10 to. 15 minutes. Some ofthe more serious manifestations of hypoxia, involving the judgment and skill of the pilot, mayoccur as low as 15,000 feet. The early onset o.ffatigue is characteristic o.f Io.w-grade hypoxia.Smo.king, carbo.n mo.no.xide, metabo.lic diso.rders, and physical activity may enhance theeffects o.f altitude hypoxia. Education in theeffects of hypoxia and training in the use ofoxygen equipment must be given pilots flyingabove 10,000 feet. A pro.per respect fo.r hYPo.xiasho.uld be instilled in all pilo.ts prio.r to. their firstPo.ssible expo.sure.

STU ENT QU STIONSArmy o.fficers attending the flight safetyo.fficers co.urse at the University o.f So.uthernCalifo.rnia are asked to. co.ntribute questio.nsl tothe instructor in physio.logy indicating theareas o.f greatest co.ncern to them. Since theseo.fficers are the o.nes mo.st clo.sely asso.ciated

24

with o.peratio.nal aviatio.n safety, it is interesting to no.te the medical areas o.f greatestinterest to. them. The majo.rity o.f o.fficersindicate a greater need fo.r educatio.n co.ncerning the effects and reco.gnitio.n o.f fatigue, andin so.me cases asked fo.r o.n-the-spo.t tests todetermine the presence o.f fatigue immediatelybefore a flight.

They indicated that fatigue is a muchgreater pro.blem in actual o.perations than isapparent fro.m a curso.ry examinatio.n o.f accident reports. Several o.fficers admitted flyingas much as 13 ho.urs daily, frequently at lowaltitudes and in poor weather. Others indicated multiple daily flights o.f two. to. threeho.urs each, with to.tal mo.nthly flight time inexcess of 150 ho.urs.

Special reference was made to. co.nditionssurro.unding field exercises and the combinedeffects o.f inadequate diet, po.o.r housing, andIo.ng flight ho.urs. Examples were cited o.f pilotswho. flew with less than fo.ur o.r five ho.urs ofrest in the previo.us 48 hours. In the majo.rityof the cases, officers felt that they, rather thantheir flight surgeons, were in the best po.sitionsto detect fatigue amo.ng their pilo.ts.Co.nsiderable interest was also. expressedco.ncerning the personal health o.f pilo.ts withrespect to heart disease, o.besity, self-medicatio.n, and physical fitness. One o.fficer cited alarge number of co.ro.nary heart attacks amonghis perso.nal friends which occurred within ashort period o.f time. n a few cases, criticismwas leveled at the flight surgeon, indicatingthat contact with their doctors was limited toa yearly physical examination and an occasionallecture.The officers recommended more thoro.ughphysical examinatio.ns w t h co.mprehensive,post-examination discussio.n o.f their healthproblems with the flight surgeon, identificationof reaso.ns for gro.unding after repo.rting illness,and the establishment of regulated physicaltraining pro.grams. I t was the co.nsensus thatmany pilots flew with physical diso.rders ratherthan seek medical he lp fo.r the reasons previo.usly given.

Several pilots in superviso.ry and commandpositions requested more intensive physiological indoctrinatio.n, indicating that many ArmyAviato.rs, and especially no.nco.mmissio.ned flightpersonnel, were given no. formalized physio.logical training. They indicated that info.rmationconcerning vertigo., hypo.xia, and visio.n was


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most urgently needed. A surprisingly largenumber of pilots had made frequent flightsabove 10,000 feet, and some had used oxygenequipment. Almost all expressed concern re garding the effects of hypoxia should aircraftwith higher capabilities be introduced intoArmy Aviation. A few wanted more information concerning the effects of temperature ex-

SYMPOSIUM

tremes. Finally, many asked questions concerning the effects of alcohol on pilot performance,especially when coupled with late hours andpoor nutrition.I t would appear on the basis of these questions that this indeed represents one of themost fertile areas for the application of aeromedical principles to accident prevention.

Aviation PsychologyIf man and machine are to achieve more in

combination than either could alone, the bestqualities of each must be used, said Dr. NeilD. Warren, Head, Department of Psychology,University of Southern California, and Lecturer, Aviation Safety Division, USC.

The integrative function of the humancomponent of the system is obviously highlycomplex. In addition to the perceptual andmotor functions of the central nervous system,it serves for storage and memory, and for thedecision-making aspect of behavior, commonlycalled judgment. Judgment is a matter of making choices among alternate actions. Adequacyof the decision depends on a variety of factors:perception-identification and appraisal ofthe situation;information--choice of pertinent facts frommemory storage;

reasoning-ability to think clearly;motivation - biological and social needswhich influence decisions.

MOTIV TIONMotivation is a uniquely human characteristic, said Dr. Warren. No other component inthe control loop derives satisfaction from flying, or suffers from fear and anxiety. Even the

best trained, most intelligent pilot cannot exertgood judgment unless he is properly motivatedand can handle the anxieties he will encounter.Flying holds both positive and negative at tractions for; men. Dr. Warren. explained howevery aviator has experienced the feeling of exhilaration which comes from flying and also theunavoidable danger, discomfort and fear of flying from the same source. He quoted a surgeon:'The reality behind the stress which brings onanxiety associated with the risks of militaryaviation is the fact that one can be killed whileflying.' Dr. Warren defined these positive andnegative attractions as an approach-avoidance

conflict. The strength of the conflict normallyis reduced by effective pilots, who are able tode-emphasize its negative side. Nevertheless, itis an inescapable conflict in flying. Every aviator has to come to his own terms with it.Another dilemma encountered in aviation,and in other occupations as well, is the conflictbetween professional and personal motivation.The member of any profession knows that thereare times when he must choose between thedemands of his profession and his personal desires. He must choose between work and rest;between professional ethics and financial reward; between the course of action dictated byreason and the one that will enable him toachieve some immediate personal satisfaction.

The aviator faces these major dilemmasand numerous others related to the accomplishment of his duties. The term homeward-bounditis describes only one of the many situationswhere motives can, sometimes fatally, modifyjudgment.

IN DEQU TE MOTIV TIONThe answer to the question 'Why do menfly?' does not always lie entirely in the general

satisfactions, said Dr. Warren. Indeed, wecan find almost as many answers to this question as there are fliers. Human motives arecomplicated in their origins and in their effects.Some are learned, some are produced by inherent physiological processes. Some are consciously experienced, others operate subconsciously. Some are temporary, others exerttheir effects throughout life. All are interrelated, first one and then another dominates behavior at anyone time, depending upon the physiological and psychological deprivation of themoment, and the social and situational contextsin which the behavior is occuring.

According to Dr. Warren, an aviator maystart his flying career with good motivation,2i


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AUGUST 1960then gradually shift to an unhealthy patternbecause of changing circumstances in his per-sonal life. Still ano.ther aviator may have neverhad good motivation and be on the ragged edgeof performance all during his flying career. Theaviato.r who experiences a narrow escape fromdeath may change his attitude toward flying.The young aviator who decides on a flyingcareer because of its glamour and to impresshis girl friend may lose all motivation whenhe finds flying to be hard work and loses hisromantic illusions.Explaining biological drives, Dr. Warren described how felt needs may motivate a personto activity, but do not always guide this activity into satisfactory responses.

LE RNED BEH VIORThe newborn infant kicks and screams

when hungry. These responses alone would notavert starvation. The hungry adult ordinarilydoes not walk into a supermarket, open cans,and satisfy his hunger on the spot. This response might satisfy his need, but it would bepunished by society. People learn the needsatisfying responses that are socially permittedor approved.

B SIC CONFLICTSDr. Warren explained how the use' o f otherterms help in understanding other unhealthypatterns of motivation and lead to ways inwhich individuals may be helped.Approach-approach conflict: Here the individual is torn between two. equally attractive,but mutually exclusive goals. Dr. Warren illustrated with a joke about a jackass that starvedto death between two haystacks because hecould not decide which one to go to first. Heexplained that the jackass was really not muchmore stupid than his,human counterparts whenfaced with a similar conflict.A voidance-avoidance conflict: In this case,the victim is caught between the devil and the

deep blue sea. ~ faces two equally unattrac-tive alternatives and often has little time tochoose between them. He can avoid one butnot both. An example is the aviator who experiences engine failure over doubtful terrain.Should he

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Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1960

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