Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1984

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1984

1/48

9 5 .8 .-- . ~ l t Of U.S A ~ h . )UBRAR f US RL: nPT l t r ='"P \

' IllTEAMSPIRIT84


2/48


3/48

T IS MONTH it is my pleasure to welcomeBrigadier General P) Ellis D. Parker to the ArmyAviation Center as the assistant commandant.BG P) Parker comes from the 101st AirborneDivision (Air Assault) where he was assistant division commander (operations). His Army Aviationexperience includes an assignment at HQDA,ODCSOPS as the Army Aviation Officer. His experience will be invaluable as we go about thebusiness of developing Aviation training anddoctrine.The August lead article begins a series that ex-ami nes the Team Spirit 84 exercises conductedin the Republic of Korea. Team Spirit 84: AnArmy Aviation Overview by Major General Kenneth C. Leuer gives an interesting account of theefforts of the Republic of Korea/United StatesCombined Forces Command, and of the successful role Army Aviation played in theseexercises.

Profiles of Army Aviation in Korea identifiesthe key Army Aviation personnel and organizations active in the Republic of Korea. Moreover,it discusses the tremendous weather andgeographic challenges posed to aviators flyingin Korea.

Also in this issue's Team Spirit 84 series isView From the Eagle's Nest. Colonel WilliamC. Page Jr. discusses the problems encounteredand successes realized by the combined Aviation

forces in the Republic of Korea exercisescenario.The Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization Report To The Field looks at the importanceof an effective crewrest standing operating procedure (SOP). This topic is so important that anexample of how one Aviation unit gives morethan just lip service to its crewrest program isgiven.

Another informative article is MaintenanceTest Flight Evaluators. The author, CaptainSteven L. Ochsner, describes the critical roleplayed by locally designated maintenance testflight evaluators in the Maintenance Test FlightStandardization Program. He further explains

AUGUST 1984

how the program is incorporated into the overallAviation Standardization Program.Major Dale Radtke, in Threat: 6ig Sky-Little

Helicopter? s n t s a seemingly real -life, butficti fi ous scenario that places us in a ossiblesituation in which Soviet artillery is present. Theunderlying theme is that pre-mission planningshould take into consideration the possib i lity ofencountering enemy artillery.The brigade airspace management series concludes in this issue by examining several waysairspace management training can be accomplished for brigades and battalions . It alsoprovides a checklist to assist in developing theairspace management section of the unit 's SOP.Views such as these expressed in this series arestrongly encouraged. It is from innovative ideasthat workable policy and procedure can bederived.

Major General Bobby J MaddoxCommander U. S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker AL

1


4/48

TE MSPIRIT

N RMYVI TIONOVERVIWMajor General Kenneth C Leuer

MY AVIATION lived up to its finest roleas a team player in this year s major fieldtraining exercise in the Republic of KoreaROK). Its performance again demon-

strated that Aviation s far beyond just a means oftransportation. It is an essential combat multiplier, arole that in joint, combined exercise Team Spirit 84was highlighted by merging U.S. Army and ROKArmy Aviation assets into a single organization, the

2

Combined Aviation Force CAF). t was the secondtime that the ROK/U S Combined Forces CommandCFC), the headquarters responsible for planning the

ROK s defense and for command and control ofoperational forces, had employed the CAF in an ex-tended exercise scenario similar to the way it wouldoperate in combat. The successful accomplishment ofexercise missions proved the viability of this neworganization. That s very significant because the CAF,

u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


5/48

perhaps more than any other element in the CFC,represents the ideal of interoperability: the key toROK/U S combat readiness.The CAF, both in wartime and for exercises,malgamates the majority of the assets of Eighth U.S.17th Aviation Group (Combat) and the ROK1st Aviation Brigade. The concept was refinedprobated in a series of short-term air assault exises during a 6-month period preceding this year s

A jeep mounted 106 mmrecoilless rifle rolls off a CH47during the regimental airlift onD 6. The Combined AviationForce that day carried out itslargest airmobile* operation ofTeam Spirit 84, moving nearly2,000 Blue Force soldiers andartillery in a crossFLOT operation north of Wonju.

* Although the term airmobileIs used In the Team Spirit 84articles, the rmy AviationBranch has moved toward fulluse of the term air assault.Because of the uniqueness ofjoint operations with Republicof Korea Army Aviation unitsthis year, the term airmobile isretained.

Team Spirit field training exercise (FTX). The CAFwas then fully employed in the FTX, which was undoubtedly the most rigorous trial possible, short of actual combat. t brought the forces together in fieldoperations over an extended time and the CAF wasemployed as a key element of the AirLand Battle inKorea. This year s Team Spirit, held from 1 Februaryto mid-April, was the largest joint, combined exercisein the free world. t also was designed as the most

3


6/48

TEAM84SPIRIT

realistic and sophisticated FTX ever staged by thecFc There is good reason for this: a very real militarythreat from Communist North Korea.The ROK has lived on the edge of tension for morethan three decades. It went from hot war to today'shanging sword. The 1953 Armistice Agreementsuspended the shooting, but there is still no final condition of peace. Nearly one million highly armed forcesguard either side of a lSI-mile long demilitarized zone(DMZ) that cuts the Korean peninsula at its waist. TheDMZ has a history of violent acts perpetrated by NorthKorea. Tension there remains high, the fuse uncomfortably short. In 1983, North Korea escalated its infIltration efforts. Several members of its l00 CXX>-strongcommando forces-the largest in the world-tried toassassinate the ROK president.The ROK fields strong forces to counter NorthKorean infiltration, but there is a weapons imbalancebetween the two sides. For more than a decade NorthKorea has spent an amount estimated to exceed 25 percent of its gross national product on its military. TheUnited States remains the ROK's major ally. Theircombined military strength has deterred the north fromrenewing all-out war, but has not ended its randomand deliberate acts of violence that keep the situationon the peninsula highly volatile.The American involvement in ROK security derivesfrom moral as well as legal bases. Since 1954, the commitment has been institutionalized in a binationalsecurity treaty. Its foremost manifestation is the incountry presence of nearly 40,000 U.S. forces: about28,000 grollnd, with nearly one-half in the fit-to-fight2d Infantry Division; more than 10,000 Air Force, including two tactical fighter wings; and several hundredNavy and Marine personnel.The shadow of potential violence that continues tolie across the Republic's otherwise bright horizon haspropelled the relatively small American militarypresence increasingly into combined operations withthe 600,000 strong ROK armed forces. This structureprovides both greater overall strength and, from the

4

United States standpoint, an economy of force thais important to American-ROK treaty responsibilitiesand to global peace and security.Combined operations of a complexity far beyondthose of the 1950 to 1953 war have become possiblebecause of the tremendous development of the ROKmilitary forces. They have become a highly professional and efficient force that is today sustained andsupported almost entirely by the ROK's own means.Much credit is due to the vast economic growth thathas made the ROK one of the world's great successstories. In turn, the ROK forces, with their Americanally, have forged the protective shield that has madepeaceful attainment of these national objectivespossible.Concepts for a combined force were studied morethan a decade; however, it was not until 1978 that thetwo governments established a binational headquartersto ... deter hostile acts of external aggression againstthe Republic of Korea by a combined military effortof the United States of America and the Republic ofKorea and in the event deterrence fails, to defeat anexternal armed attack against the Republic. The CFCis the only combined American/allied command outside of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)and it is truly a combined organization.To create an effective binational force is not a simple task. Almost by definition, it bespeaks a long-termrelationship between the merging partners. That, ofcourse, exists. It requires a lot of give-and-take andhard work by both sides, to make two into one. Additional time is needed just to look at the issues in twolanguages and through the prism of differing cultures.That means early identification of requirements andskillful followup planning, coordination and negotiations are needed. Perhaps the greatest lesson learnedin the combined force is not to play trifling irritationswith the same intensity as major crises. That ensuresthe probability that disagreements, when inevitablythey do arise, will be on matters of substance and notresult from misunderstandings or faulty assumptions.



7/48


8/48

TEAM8SPIRIT

Language differences are overcome by cross-learningas well as by adoption of commonly understood terminology. Concept words such as interoperabilityand force complementarity become bridges. Theyhelp the CFC to avoid a we-they situation thatwould only highlight differences in structure and procedures which our mutual experience has proven notto be terminal obstacles.American and Korean planners, who 6 years agocrossed the threshold into the combined arena, musthave had tremendous faith in the dynamics of thestructure they had built to preserve peace or to win

at war. The negotiated concept was extensively testedduring a major command post exercise (CPX) in thesummer of 1978. With the lessons learned there andthe gathering momentum and enthusia$m that the experience generated, both nations pushed ahead. Theychristened the CFC on 7 November 978 and turnedover to it the responsibility to pull together an effective ROK/U S. team.Both fighting forces were demonstrably good at thattime. The real question was whether they could bereally effective as a combined team. The best combatdoctrine, the finest weapons systems, the most professionalleadership still required proof on the training field where the forces would be brought together.Team Spirit was already established as the major annual FTX for ROK and U.S. forces. Up to that time,the exercise had been fairly modest in size and scope.

t was event oriented and lacked the realistic give andtake of combat. Under the CFC's guidance, the exercise changed considerably. t became more challenging and thus a better barometer of how well the combined forces would do in reacting to a North Koreanattack.The exercise's increasing value in promoting combat readiness since 978 is corroborating evidence thatthe ROK/U S alliance has greatly matured. The performance of all forces in Team Spirit 84 was, in thewords of General Robert E. Sennewald, the formercommander in chief, CFC, ... he culmination of

6

ROK/U S. cooperation over the nearly 6 years thatthe CFC has been in existence ....We are really coming of age in a very rapid manner.Team Spirit 84 was a major training plus, not somuch for its impressive size-although more than200,000 ROK and U.S. forces took part-but for theeffective integration of the air and land battle. Thatis the combat doctrine on which the CFC rests itsdefense. Team Spirit 84 was really the first time thatplanners were able to integrate all major combatelements available in the ROK and U.S. camps andpull them together in large-scale field maneuvers. Thathad a synergistic effect in the terms of combat power.From the tactical standpoint, it was by far the mostsophisticated and realistic exercise in this annual series.Like its predecessors, the purpose of Team Spirit 84was to train forces in how they might have to fight,should North Korea attack. t helped measure the attainment of essential goals, such as the ability to deployand redeploy augmentation forces; how to validatedoctrine, including air ground operations; and howto exercise our capabilities in electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, tactical deception, basic tacticalformations and interoperability of the U.S. and ROKforces.The American security commitment in NortheastAsia is not limited to the forward deployed forces inKorea. In a contingency, many others could becomeinvolved, some very quickly. That aspect is played upin Team Spirit and should become even more important as the U.S. Army progresses with its readilydeployable light divisions. One of our yearly exercise participants, the 7th Infantry Division from Ft.Ord, CA, is identified for reorganization as a lightdivision. Hopefully, in some future Team Spirit, it willplay the exercise in that mode.Team Spirit 84 brought pieces and parts togetherfrom around the world. t involved major nationalagencies, such as the Military Transportation Management Command, and all services to carry out the typesof activities that likely would be associated with



9/48

renewed conflict on the peninsula and with the V.S.response to honor its security commitment. TeamSpirit was conducted under all conditions of weather,in daylight and darkness. The initial judgment is thatwe fully or substantially accomplishecl the major exercise goals. That enhances our deterrent against NorthKorea.

The tactical highlights of the exercise were varied:force interoperability, the combined Aviation operations across the forward line of own troops (FLOT),and the major headway in ground troop employmentof our AirLand Battle doctrine, whiCh previously hadbeen practiced just in the CPX mode. There were anumber of fir sts : Three Army corps fought-the war.Two, including for the first time as an FTX participant, the V.S. I Corps from Ft. Lewis,-WA, were onthe Blue side; the other commanded the Orange forces.There were a total of nine ground divisions, includingtwo from the ROK Ready Reserves that were activatedfor the exercise, and elements of the V.S. 2d, 7th and25th Infantry Divisions. In addition, four division

ield headquarters of RO Army Aviation unit

AUGUST 984

headquarters operated in the corps rear to set up secondand third echelon images.Team Spirit 8 also witnessed the greatest V.S.Marine Corps involvement ever. The numbers weregreater, but even more significant was the linking ofV.S. Marines under Army operational control. In thelatter half of the exercise, a Marine light battalion wasdeployed under the CFC, further chopped to BlueForce and inserted into the battle by the CAF The .ground fighting elements demonstrated classic examples of interoperability because with two corps onthe Blue side, the divisions were constantly beingchanged from one corps to the other as the tacticalsituation dictated. The divisions themselves were madeup of a mix of ROK Army, V.S. Army, ROK Marinesand V.S. Marines. The same was true for close air support , which was provided by the V.S. Air Force, ROKAir Force, V.S. Navy and V.S. Marine Corps.We put considerable effort into planning how totransfer from the CFC level to the rifleman, theseaman, the Marine and the Air Force pilot, a valid

7


10/48

TEAM84PIRITu n d e r s ~ n d i n g and feeling for what was going on inthe exercise. The participants were stimulated by thechallenges, tactical and terrain, and the realism. Theexercise was hinged to the ground war, and w injectedrealistic tactical maneuvers, including closing thedistance between the opposing troops. The air supportand everything else also were more realistically applied.Commanders at all levels did not just wait to be forcefed. They looked for opportunities within their oper-tions to do things.I believe that, in Team Spirit 84, w had everybody shead in the ballgame: They were thinking ahead andworking with what they had. The result was a much

different atmosphere, an enthusiasm far beyond anyprevious exercise experience. Even as the concludingbattle rolled up route Orange with the Blue armor andinfantry pressing the attack, troops on both sides con-tinued to respond to the tactical situation with con-fidence, discipline and pride.Team Spirit is a training event. There is never a vic-tor between the Blue and Orange forces, which alter-nate in the offensive and defensive roles. But there areindeed winners: the participants, the F plannersand, in the long run, the people of the Republic ofKorea who see this annual exercise as a reality of theAmerican commitment to meaningful peace and

A UH60A Black Hawk (right) from the d InfantryDivision's d Aviation Battalion lifts supplies for transport toa forward area during an aerial resupply training exercise.

8

A CH47 (below) brings in fuel bladders to Task Force52's base support Goose Egg.

photo by Geary McSpadden

U.S. RMY VI TION DIGEST


11/48

security on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. nmy opinion our forces were given the warmest welcomeexperienced by V S service people anywhere.Team Spirit serves the interests of both nations. tis highly essential training that, in the long run, is farless expensive than the all-too-potential alternative: thepossibility that North Korea could again unleash itspowerful, offensively armed and forward positionedmilitary forces for another attempt at unification ofthe peninsula by force. So we see Team Spirit as anessential element of the war deterrent. The exercise isa lesson also in how allies can grow beyond their different languages and cultures, their separate militarystructural and technological capabilities, and trulylearn to interoperate toward achievement of commongoals.

n that vein, nowhere among the Team Spirit 84 exercise forces were both the spirit and practical resultsof Korean/American teamwork better evidenced thanin the Combined Aviation Force. One of the most important lessons demonstrated this year was thatV S lROK Aviation under a single headquarters cansupport everyone s combat requirements much moreefficiently and effectively than if they remain apart tosupport only their own national forces. There arestrengths and weaknesses on both sides. With assetsheld separately, we d be even further away from theideal doctrinal situation of having a large lift capabilityat the army or corps level. Every military commanderknows that a strategy whose objectives far exceedresources available to implement them is a recipe fordefeat. n consideration of our respective strengths andlimitations, we had to look for a way to maximizeAviation capabilities. The CAF, as a solution, is agood marriage. t is a formidable combat multiplierwith the synergistic effect of providing a greater combined strength than just the sum of its American andKorean parts. n our present situation it is the perfectmix. Certainly, down the road, we should continue toincrease our capabilities as the ROK Army adds moreaircraft to its inventory and the V S Army completesthe change to the VH 60 Black Hawk and improvesattack assets.The CAF means a lot to successful employment ofAir Land Battle doctrine. t provides access to the fourkey parts of that doctrine: initiative depth agility andsynchronization. Initially, the CAF gives us the agilityto go somewhere very fast, as we saw in the manycross-FLOT air assaults in Team Spirit. Being agile andable to go deep very quickly gives us the capability tosecure battle initiative. By doing this and synchroniz-

AUGUST 1984

ing Aviation with ongoing ground and air operations,we can turn from the defense to capitalize on our initiative and go on the offense which is where warsare won. We were able, in Team Spirit 84, to exerciseexactly as we would have to fight which is to maximize the key elements of the AirLand Battle alongwith the ground force effort and the air effort. Aviation s planning for this, the coordination, the skilledexecution .. . all measured very high up the scale ofprofessionalism.American and Korean FTX units assigned to theCAF flew more hours in a shorter period of time thanany Aviation unit of a similar size since the VietnamWar. The CAF alone flew more than 5 separate airassault missions to move more than 5,300 troops alongwith howitzers and other weapons and cargo. Theseflights were made in a crowded sky over a clutteredbattlefield, but the commitment to a meaningful exercise did not escape unscathed. The tragic crash ofa V S Marine Corps CH-53 helicopter which occurred in foul weather during nighttime operations claimedthe lives of 9 ROK and V S Marines. Except for thisTeam Spirit 84 was as safe as its eight predecessors.The CAF as well as the V S 2d and 25th InfantryDivision Aviation units came through the exercisewithout major incident. That is clear evidence of whatthe aviators of both the ROK and V S forces can dowhen provided with professional, safety-conscious,

A CH47 brings in fuel bladders along the upper Han Rivernear Chunchon


12/48

TEAM84SPIRITquality leadership at all levels of the chain ofcommand from the individual aviator in charge ofthe aircraft he is flying all the way up to the CAF com-mander. In the training mode of course we do nottake all of the risks that would be unavoidable in theheat of battle. But we do fly the same type of challeng-ing missions. Realism is essential if the training is tohave real value to our mission. It enforces thedisciplines and procedures that ensure that the com-bined forces including the ROK/U S CAF will neverhave to enter the combat arena as an d hoc fightingteam.

10

ABOUT THE AUTHORMajor General Kenneth C. Leuer, U.S.Army, is the assistant chief of staff C3United Nations Command/ROK/U.S.Combined Forces Command; ACofS J3,U.S. Forces Korea; and ACofS G3 EighthU.S. Army. A veteran Infantry officer , hehas served a number of airborne andcombat assignments in his nearly 28years of active service. MG Leuer wasassigned to Korea in August 1983.

Profile of Army Aviationin KOREAus ARMY Aviation in the RepublicKorea (ROK) includes both nondivisional and dsional assets: combat support, helicopter med

evacuation, intelligence collection, air traffic ctrol and intermediate maintenance support.The Man UpstairsColonel William C. Page Jr., is the senior U.S.my Aviation officer in Korea. Which of sevehats he wears depends not on Korea's higvariable weather or the many sports activities tthe command offers, but on which function of Ation business he is into at a particular momePage is the Eighth U.S. Army Aviation officer on G3 staff, under the assistant chief of staf f for options and training, J3, U.S. Forces Korea. He is ccurrently the Aviation officer on the staff ofACofS C3, HQ, ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Comand. This really is his fighting cap, since ndivisional Aviation assets of both Eighth Army athe ROK Army are wedded under a single combinheadquarters for the purpose of contingency opetions or major field training exercises. The Cobined Aviation Force is designed to provide hanced command and control and optimbattlefield responsiveness.Finally, Page also commands the 17th AviatGroup (Combat), which was activated onDecember 1965 for the war in Vietnam. During tconflict, the Freedom's Eagles, as the group wknown, conducted operations in Military RegI I-some 85,000 square kilometers, or about 45 pcent of South Vietnam's total land area. Deactivain March 1973, the group was reactivated on 1 Ju1975. Freedom's Eagles were flying once again, ttime in defense of the Republic of Korea.The 17th Aviation Group (Combat) currently htwo battalions assigned-the 19th Aviation Battalcommanded by Lieutenant Colonel John M. Rigand the 52d Aviation Battalion, commanded by L

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


13/48


14/48

TEAM8SP R T

from th

Colonel William C Page Jr.Commander

17th Aviation Group (Combat)

he control towat Eagle s Nest, fiheadquarters for tCombined AviationForce, located neathe ROKJU SCombined ForcesCommand s maincommand post soof Seoul.


15/48

O RYEARS, the shortage ofAviation resources has severelylimited the magnitude and scope oftactical Aviation planning andoperations n Korea. In the past, theRepublic of Korea Army (ROKA)possessed a very limited Aviationcapability of its own and the U.S.Army was not much better off.However, over the past decadethings progressively changed. Eventhough U.S. resources remained essen-tially stable, the ROKA developedconsiderable Aviation combatpower through increased numbersof UH-1H equipped lift units and500MD Hughes helicopter scout/attack units. But still, until recently,something was missing. Even withthe increases in the number of tactical helicopters, each of the armiesconsistently found themselves shortof the necessary resources requiredfor major Aviation-related operations. Beginning as early as 1979, attempts to muster sufficientresources through combined operations had been tried but with varying degrees of success. The problems always seemed to be the same:Unity of command, responsiveness,logistics and training; good, consis-tent, com ined trainingIn 1983, Eighth U.S. Army s 17thAviation Group (Combat), FREEDOM'S EAGLES, in conjunctionwith the 1st ROKA AviationBrigade, began an extensive refinement of combined air assault andairmobile exercises to overcome thisproblem. Though combined operations had been conducted in thepast, no set procedures for consistent training events had beenestablished. In September 1983, asystematic procedure for ensuringthat virtually all nondivisional airmobile training was conducted in acombined mode was introduced. Atfirst, one, and sometimes two, suchmissions were conducted eachmonth. But by December 1983, allof the scheduled nondivisional air-

AUGUST 984

mobile training exercises were acombination of ROK and U.S.Aviation elements. Some missionswent very well; others reflected thedifficulties involved in combiningoperations of helicopter units withdifferent assets and crews with different languages. The overall improvement, however, held greatpromise for the future.This exercise had one goal inmind and that was to refine procedures for full development of aCombined Aviation Force (CAF); aCombined Aviation Force of sufficient size to provide the commanderin chief, ROK U .S. CombinedForces Command (CFC), withenough resources to conduct meaningful airmobile tactical operat ionsunder the AirLand Battle doctrine.I t was recognized that a renewal ofwar by North Korea would force theCFC to fight on a come-as-you-arebasis. Assigned units would have tofight the critical early battles.

CFC required an Aviation forcethat would support normal peacetime operations yet could be easilytransitioned, when necessary, to awar footing. Past practice was nota useful guide in this case, except toemphasize that the urgency of thesituation required a solution moresuited to the times. The existingsystem spread the nondivisionalresources too thin by attempting toparcel a piece of the Aviation pie toeach friendly unit guarding thedemilitarized zone. That was not effective force management and, in afuture war arena, probably wouldmean a very short life for such scattered Aviation assets. What wasneeded was a pile big enough to beboth effective and survivable. Withthe limited assets, the only feasiblesolution was to bring together aconsiderable slice of nondivisionalAviation from both the ROK andU.S Armies to form a combinedunit with the capability to supportCFC missions.

The Combined viationForce ConceptThe 17th Aviation Group (Combat) is organized with a mediumtransport helicopter battalion, consisting of two CH-47 Chinook companies, an assault helicopter battalion, with two UH-60 Black Hawkcompanies, and an Army supportAviation company. Neither battalion has organic attack helicopters, and no scout or observation aircraft.

On the other hand, ROKA Aviation has a considerable number ofattack helicopters-mostly theHughes 500MD. As previouslymentioned, they also have a strongassault helicopter lift capability.These assets are at least equal to the17th Aviation Group's and will increase as ROKA's lift units arerounded out through purchase ofsome of the UH-1s made excess toU.S. Army requirements by thechange to UH-60s. As can be seen,ROKA Aviation has some realstrengths, but also shortfalls. Theyhave nothing like the Chinook orBlack Hawk that will haul any kindof heavy load. Also, logistics at theorganizational level is limited, as are

staffing, communications, andcommand and control assets. The17th Aviation Group on the otherhand, has a fair amount of organiclogistics and command and control(C2) staffing, plus the means tocommunicate effectively. n eventual marriage was inevitable.

To form this marriage, we tookthe 17th Aviation Group andelements of the 1st ROK ArmyAviation Brigade, laid them one ontop of the other, and came up witha total that is greater than just thesum of its Korean and Americanparts. Per agreement with the ROKArmy-at a predesignated, responsive time during contingency operations and for all field trainingexercises-a ROKA Aviation groupheadquarters is linked with the 17th

3


16/48

Aviation Group headquarters toform Headquarters, CombinedAviation Force. t is a cameo, aminiature of HQ, CFC, with alternate ROK and u.s. staffing. Preidentified Aviation elements of boththe U.S. and ROK Armies automatically go into an asset bag formission employment by the CAF(see figure below). At all othertimes-when there is no combinedtraining, or a serious contingencysituation-the helicopter assets remain with their respective U.S. andROK Army organizations. In peacetime, the CAF then is an arkdivested of animals, although command and control personnel whoconstitute the CAF headquarters,myself included, seldom go througha day without thought, and oftenaction, on combined forceactivities.Team Spirit 84The essential key that makesAviation in its combined modeoperative is the o r ~ n i z t i o n ofbattalion-size task forces to whichthe U.S. and ROK Aviation unitsthat come under the CAF s operational control are further taskorganized. For Team Spirit 84, the17th Group s 19th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was reorganized asTask Force (TF) 9 and the 52dAviation Battalion (Combat)became Task Force 52. Both werebase task organized, with TF 52having a slightly larger organization. TF 52 was given a Black Hawkcompany (which actually flew UH-lHueys, as the transition to UH-60swas ongoing during the field training exercise (FTX; a ROKA500MD attack/scout unit; a CH 47

4

TEAM84SP R Tcompany; and a ROKA U ~ l liftunit. TF 9 got a Black Hawk company, a Chinook company that hassome special operations CH-47s anda ROKA 500MD unit. A UH-IHplatoon from the 55th AviationCompany (Army) remained underthe CAF headquarters control tosupport its C2 requirements andthose of the commander in chief,CFC. (These were not the totalassets of the now established CAF,but were a strong representativeslice.)On 5 March 1984, that s the waythe CAF went to the field for themaneuver phase of Team Spirit 84.In the combined mode, we had puttogether an attack capability as wellas the assault helicopter assets topick up about 300 plus soldiers inone airlift, plus move artillery,cargo, etc., by CH-47 helicopters.In all, for the exercise, we broughttogether a flying force of 5 UH-60Black Hawks, 33 UH-IH Hueys, 3CH-47 Chinooks and 24 500MDs.

Admittedly, the CAF was largelystill experimental, because ROKArmy Aviation and the 17th A viation Group had never beforewor ked together over an extendedperiod of time in this degree ofdetail. Not one of the many interoperability exercises we hadflown since Team Spirit 83 hadlasted longer than a day or two. On5 March, the factor most at stakefor the U S lROK CAF was confidence: Confidence in each otherand confidence in the carefullyplanned and negotiated, yet basically untested, combined command

and control structure that we hadcobbled together. As with any training exercise, Team Spirit 84 was alearning experience. However, inthe case of the CAF, it was also aproving experience.Weare all very pleased thatobservers at every level all concurredthat the activities and training of theCombined Aviation Force were atremendous success. The ROKA

Combined Aviation Force Assets

U S RMY AVIATION DIGEST


17/48

and u s Aviation units operated asa single unit, without accident or incident, for more than 2 weeks tosupport this major trainingexercise-the largest in the freeworld-and they did so quite impressively: The CAF was indeed aformidable combat multiplier.In the exercise, the CAF supported both the Blue and OrangeForces, the opposing forces for themaneuver, based on missionsassigned by the ROK U S. CFC. Ineffect, CFC was both the notionalArmy headquarters for each forceas well as the senior command andcontrol headquarters. The respective ground commanders forwardedAviation mission requests to theCFC to be approved and tasked tothe CAF. This was not unrealisticsince, in Team Spirit, there areneither friendly forces nor enemy.As a CFC asset, the CAF could beprioritized to support either of thetwo forces-just as it would supportCFC's multiple corps on line inwartime.In order to have the flexibility tosupport both forces, the CAF's twobase task organizations were tactically located in two, widelyseparated, 4x7 kilometer GooseEggs just outside the maneuverarea. Since the CAF was taking missions from both Orange and BlueForces, these neutral resources

AUGUST 1984

were Icept out of the maneuver boxto avoid causing confusion in theFTX area. The organizational support activities, in general, remainedin place in the Goose Eggs and everyunit that was base task -organizedto the two task forces remained withits respective organization for suchactivities as maintenance, messing,and administration.Typical of the support problemsthat had to be solved was petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL)supply. The ROK Army functionson an area support basis while theU.S. Army distributes POL downto the unit level. Thus, none of theROKA Aviation units had verymuch mobile organic POL capability whereas the U.S. units all hadtheir own. To overcome this problem, virtually all of the POL assetsof the task forces were cOQsolidated'under the control of the Task ForceS4 for employment: Minimum POLresources were left with the individual units. This accomplishedtwo objectives: First, it overcamethe shortage of organic resources inthe ROKA units, and second, itplaced the tremendous logisticresponsibility of POL supply on theshoulders of the task force commander, thereby leaving the unitcommanders free to worry primarilyabout the tactical execution of ourmissions. Each task force estab-

orflexibility,camouflaged 5,000galiontankers and FAREsystems were establishedat two locations insidethe maneuver area duringTeam Spirit 84Gun jeeps (left) for theBlue Force regimentalsize airmobile on D + 6are brought in by aCH47.

lished a major POL supply point inits base support area consisting of3,000 gallon bladders, 5,000 gallontankers and a supply of 500 gallonblivets. From this consolidatedpool, the task force commanderswere able to rapidly relocate largequantities of POL (usually viaCH-47) to support the major airmobile activities.However, the execution of thetactical missions was handled differently. Mission task organizedfighting resources, basically aircraftand crews, were retask-organized asnecessary to accomplish missions inthe areas called for by the maneuvercommander. As an example, afterthe maneuver phase of the TeamSpirit 84 kicked off on 20 March(D-Day) with Orange Force movingin mass onto the Blue's turf, thefirst cross-forward line of owntroops (FLOT) air assault wasscheduled for D + 1 in support ofthe invaders. The CAF assigned this

mission to TF 52 which, in additionto its base organization, gainedoperational control (OPCON) of aROKA lift unit and the fightingelements of the U.S. air assaultcompany from TF 19As the TF 52 commander relocatedhis Jump tactical operationscenter (TOC) forward to the supported unit's location, the TaskForce S4 began relocating the

15


18/48

necessary POL resources to supportthe mission. In the meantime, theAviation unit commanders repositioned their flying assets intopredetermined laager areas in thevicinity of the infantry units to beused in the air assault, and beddedthem down for the evening. Thedecision to move to the laager theevening before was a good one, forthe many flying hazards in Koreainclude rapid changes in theweather; heavy snow fell the nightof 20 March. However, by 0600, onthe morning of D 1 the weatherhad improved to VFR (visual flightrules) and the first of many crossFLOT air assaults was underway.Even as TF 52 was carrying outits morning lift on 21 March, TF 19was completing the planning for asecond cross-FLOT air assault thatafternoon. The TF 19 commanderused his remaining CH-47s from theU.S. assault support helicoptercompany in his base organization tomove the necessary support requirements for the afternoon mission. As soon as the morning liftwas completed by TF 52, the majority of the CAF Aviation assetswere shifted to OPCON of TF 19.The ROKA and U.S. units that werereleased by TF 52, including mostof its assigned lift capability,reported to a secure laager site forbriefings and final planning for TF19's afternoon air assault. Meanwhile, TF 52 began to plan for yetanother air assault for the morningof D+2.At the same time, the attack unitsof the task forces were normallyplaced OPCON to a ground commander for a given period of timeto conduct combat operations. As

6

TEAM84SPIRITwith the air assault missions, thetask force commanders werecharged with supporting their attackunits by establishing forward arming and refueling points well forward in the battle area.

That's the way the first 4 days ofTeam Spirit 84 flew by. First one,then the other, task force headquarters planned and conductedbattalion-level air assaults. Theassault and heavylift units weremoved back and forth from onetask force to the other, with theircrews living in the field, sleepingnear or in their aircraft and eatingMREs (meals, ready to eat), and the500MD units were doing the same.Additionally, at night, speciallyselected and trained elements fromTF 19 supported the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force.This type of mission taskorganizing enabled us to maximizeflying resources, and the flyingelements were going all of the time.At the conclusion of one mission,a new task organization went intoeffect which would take in virtually all of the assets used on the othertask force's lift. The released unitswent to predesignated laager sitesthat the hot task force commander had established, got themission brief, ate, pulled thenecessary aircraft maintenance, gotin some sleep ... and flew the nextmission. The planning bouncedback and forth between the two taskforces for command and control ofthe flying resources, and thefighting elements followed on cue.As far as I know, this is unique. Idon't know of anyone else in ArmyAviation who plays it this way. Asyou can imagine, it stresses the

flight crews to the maximum and tomonitor fatigue levels was the constant concern and responsibility ofthe commanders and aviators alike.Regardless of the task organization, should major maintenance berequired, the helicopter would goback to its base organization. Maintenance contact teams were, ofcourse, used but the vast majorityof the Aviation unit levelmaintenance support was accomplished right in the Task ForceGoose Egg. In the combined mode,U.S. maintenance personnel oftenassist the ROKA soldiers in working on their aircraft, mainly from atechnical inspector (TI) standpoint.Like us, ROKA Aviation requires aTI after they fix an aircraft and,through mutual agreement, anAmerican TI can sign off work forROKA maintenance personnel andvice versa. During Team Spirit 84,the cooperation and coordinationbetween the ROK and U.S. Aviation units were super. As a matterof fact, it was the best I have everobserved.For more flexibility, we put a5 OOO-gallon tanker and a forwardarea refueling equipment (FARE)system at two strategic areas withinthe maneuver zone. These servicestations gave us a tremendous increase in flexibility. f an aviator ranshort of fuel, he could hot refuel100 gallons or so, in order to getsafely back to his main POL source.t was a single ship operation, notsupport for major employments,although we did use them on occasion to refuel the independentlyoperating ROKA 500MDs becauseof their relatively small fuelrequirement.

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


19/48

So that was how we set up, outside as well as inside, the maneuverbox. The CAF task organizationwas practical and mission responsive. With the exception of a couple of weather cancellations, weflew every mission that was deemedflyable by our tasking headquarters,CFC. The determination ofpriorities on who would be supported was CFC's prerogative, justas it would be in a real contingency.That will never be an easy decisionand the combined structure undoubtedly makes it even tougher.Every unit online has a legitimatecall for Aviation support. Makingthe decision during the exercise,however, was facilitated by thestructure of Team Spirit 84. Becausethe CAF supported both Blue andOrange Forces, we establishedpriorities that maximized ArmyAviation in its finest roles to get themaximum training benefit. Attackassets were prioritized to thedefending force, because that iswhere attack aircraft are most efficient and best employed. We gavemost of the assault helicopters (airmobility) to the force on the offense. Thus, when the Orange Forcekicked off the FTX in an offensiverole, it had top priority for airassault units, while Blue had priority on most attack assets. Thepriorities were switched as the battle changed around and Bluebecame the attacker, Orange thedefender.That came on D +4 which proveda welcome day of rest for the CAP sfighting elements. The Blue Corpshad stalled the Orange attack, buthad not yet mounted its own offensive and no major air assaults wereconducted. I t was, however, onlyanother busy day of planning forthe command and control elements.On D + 5, Blue Force, which included I Corps V.S.), counterattacked.Plans had already been made byboth TFs to conduct battalion-levelcross-FLOT missions in support ofthe Blue Force on D + 5 and D +6.The majority of the attack units

AUGUST 984

(less a few scouts to support airassaults) were placed OPCON toOrange Force as it fell back, and theair assault units began operatingwith the advancing Blue Force.The morning mission on D + 5was a TF 52-supported air assaultby the V S Marine Corps' AirContingency Force-a light(readily deployable) battalion thatis based with the III Marine Amphibious Force on Okinawa. Nearly 700 Marines were deployed by aV S Air National Guard unit intoK-16, near Seoul, receipted for andcertified combat ready by the CFC,placed OPCON to I Corps and, further, chopped to the V S 2d Infantry Division. After insertion by apre-dawn air assault through the

Wire is an always presenthazard to pilots duringTeam Spirit and otherexercises for the CombinedAviation Force. The BlackHawks above) dropped offBlue Force troops during theo + 6 regimental airmobileas Orange defenders moveup to try to block thecrossFLOT operation.

A UH60A lack Hawkhelicopter right) slings two

mountains into Orange Force s reararea, the Marines took up blockingpositions to protect the Blue sground forces as they pushed acrossthe Namhan-Gang (South HanRiver) to open the counteroffensive.High winds, and the resulting turbulence in the mountains, cancelledTF 19 s afternoon mission; however,the CAF was already puttingtogether the largest air assault of theexercise, a regimental cross-FLOTmission scheduled for D + 6.Operation Big LiftOn D + 4, the CAF had receiveda warning order from CFC directingus to be prepared to support BlueForce with every available asset onMonday, 26 March (D + 6 . f possi-

3,500 pound fuel bladders en route to a forward area refueling site. TheBlack Hawk is capable of lifting an external load of 8,000 pounds.

7


20/48

Black Hawks at rest. The UHlIUH60 swapout in Korea will be completed this year when the 377thMedical Company (Air Ambulance) receives its new birds. All elements of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat)and the 2d Infantry Division s Aviation battalion and air cavalry have completed the transition most in timefor the Black Hawk to participate in Team Spirit 84.

ble, Blue Force desired to conducta major air assault, deep into theOrange Force rear, to seal off themajor avenue of retreat through thecenter of the exercise area. In brief,the mission was to insert a ROKAregimental headquarters and itsthree infantry battalions, includingmortars and jeep-mounted 106 mmrecoilless rifles, plus a battalion of1 5 mm field artillery, into multiple landing zones in the mountainsnorthwest of Wonju. In all, nearly2,000 ROK soldiers would be liftedby the Combined Aviation Force.The CAF commander was designated the air mission commanderfor this Blue Force lift because itwas obviously going to takeeverything the CAF had to pull itoff. The TF 52 commander wasgiven responsibility for the assaultitself, while TF 19 provided thelogistical and pickup zone support.

8

The CAF used three Jump TOCsduring Team Spirit 84, one for theCAF headquarters and one for eachTF headquarters. ThroughoutTeam Spirit 84, the Jump TOCswere normally displaced to the supported unit s headquarters to ensureclose coordination and missionplanning. Accordingly, just as soonas the regimental mission wasreceived, one of the task forcejumps was immediately movedto Headquarters, I Corps (U.S.),the requesting unit. By the late evening hours of D + 5, both task forceJump TOCs had been shifted to ICorps to assist with the planning,and all of the mission helicoptersand logistic support had beenlocated in laager sites in preparationfor the lift.The I Corps lift was very logisticintensive and required distributionof some 60,000 gallons of JP-4 to

three refueling sites. Some of thefuel was delivered by U.S. Air ForceC-130s to a nearby assault airstripon a sandy expanse along theNamhan-Gang that had been constructed for Team Spirit 84 by U.S.Army engineers. This fuel waspumped directly into SOO gallonblivets and moved to FARE sites byCH-47.On this particular mission, all ofthe bases were touched and planning accomplished. Fire support forSEAD (suppression of enemy airdefense) was planned by the groundcommander in great detail. Also,CFC s Air Component Commandapproved sufficient close air support by A-I0 Thunderbolt II aircraft and ROK Air Force F-Ss tosupport the operation from beginning to end. ROKA SOOMD helicopters were employed by the CAFfor both scout and attack purposes,

u s RMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/48

screening the area around the LZS(landing zones) against enemymovement. Even EW (electronicwarfare) was planned and allocatedto support the mission.The Air Movement Table wasorganized to take maximum advantage of the UH-60 s greater speedand maneuverability compared tothe UH-IH. Also, since the operation would be crossing into OrangeForce s territory, six different entryand exit routes were selectedthrough the mountains to ensurethat the FLOT was never crossedtwice in the same place. All in all,the operation went off without ahitch. This success can primarily beattributed to the close coordinationthat existed between the supportedground force and the Aviationelements. Time and time again, thevalue of the Aviation commanderjumping to the ground commander s location was verified. Tothe astonishment of everyone, tactical surprise was attained despitehaving an entire bus load of Koreanand international news mediarepresentatives-radio, television,newspaper and magazines-coverthe lift at touchdown. The mediawere transported well in advance inan unmarked civilian bus andvoluntarily stayed out of sight undertrees until the first wave of UH-60ssnaked in through a narrow valleyat the initial LZ.The regimental lift in support ofI Corps U .S.) proved to be the lastmajor tactical mission of the CAFduring Team Spirit 84. Of course,much work remained to recover allof the people and equipment thatwere scattered ll over the 150 by 80km Team Spirit maneuver area.But, in comparison to the previous7 days of activity, this was a pieceof cake.ummaryThat was our Team Spirit 84 and,on every count, the Aviation rolewas credited a huge success. Thefirst success is the confidence factor that I mentioned. It was impor-

AUGUST 984

tant that ground commanders seethat U.S.lROK Aviation not onlycould operate as a team but, in thecombined mode, could better support everyone than was possiblewhen they flew piecemeal in theirown separate ways.The bottom line is that the CAFenables the CINC, CFC, to useArmy Aviation in sufficientnumbers to influence the entire battle area as needed. That is whatArmy Aviation today must be allabout-to influence the battle as acombat multiplier. Team Spirit 84demonstrated that in Korea we cando that best in a combined mode.However, we are still looking at theproblems, and we will continue tofind the solutions until we can be assuccessful in combat as we know weare in training.Take maintenance, for example.The ROKA has its own logisticsystem, and its maintenance systemfor Aviation differs from ours. Itsrations and supply systems also differ from the U.S. Army s approach.That s understandable because it istheir country and that is where theyplan to fight their war. We, ofcourse, use the U.S. Army doctrinalapproach which is designed to giveus the capability to fight anywhere,anytime. It s more economical forthe ROKA to go the way it hasarea support-but it is almost impossible for us to do that becauseof the way we are structured.What we re doing in the CAF isto work very hard to learn bothsystems, so that we will have a trueCombined Aviation Force that canuse whichever system is at hand toget us the day s bullets, beans andgas. H ~ p e f u l l y by the time wefinish wrestling with it, we ll havethe best of both worlds.There is no question in anyone smind here in Korea that Army Aviation support would be highly effective in actual combat. We could, ofcourse, do it even better with moreassets: Attack units to put moreheat on the major armor threat, andmore air assault assets ... Black

Hawks that could support a fullregimental size lift without havingto cross the enemy s territory two orthree times.Those feasibilites remain to beseen as U.S. Army doctrinedevelops and the new force structures are approved. Certainly, theemphasis on the AirLand Battlebodes well for Aviation, whichunder that doctrine carries atremendous share of responsibilityfor the success or failure of theground commander s tactical plans.One last point that was proven,again and again, during Team Spirit84: Our new Army Aviation Branchmust remain an integral part of theground maneuver element. No onequestions the fact that the branchgives us more centralized controlover Aviation officer personnel.Also, the centralization of doctrineformation will be a tremendoushelp. These changes obviously willhelp with the complicated systemscurrently coming onboard. Flyingthe helicopter is the easiest part, butit is not a simple business to learnthe extensive resource management,doctrine and everything else thatgoes with Army Aviation. Fromthat standpoint, the branch will begood for Army Aviation. But, onthe other hand, we in Army Aviation have a tremendous challengeright now. We must ensure thatthese very good young leaders andaviators we currently have, obtainthe experience and appreciation forground combat operations thatcame almost automatically in thepre-branch days.Living in your helicopter in somelaager site next to an Infantryassembly area is a good start to thateducation. Also, operating out ofJump TOCs colocated well forwardwith the ground element brings additionallessons home. However weaccomplish it, one thing is certain:Army aviators, more than everbefore, have got to be wearing

muddy boots. During TeamSpirit 84, the aviator boots weremuddy. -...nt

9


22/48

PEARI SPersonal Equipment nd Rescue/survival Lowdovvn

Cathy Fancher photo by Reflections Studio

Address Listing for QDRs and ROIDsHere s a chance for you ALSE Aviation life sup-port equipment) users to give us a helping hand. Thelarge quantity of repeats of Quality Deficiency Reportsand Report of Item Deficiencies on long resolvedALSE problems has been inundating our engineeringresources and s creating a heavy workload for this of-fice. It would be a big help to us if you would pleaseconsult your technical bulletins, technical manuals,messages, PE RL articles, etc., prior to submittinga suspected discrepancy. If, after reasonable research,however, you are still in doubt, by all means, reportthe problem using the appropriate form. The follow-ing s a list of reporting addresses for the majorassemblies:

20

o Chemical Clothing and Accessorieso M24 Protective MaskCommanderAMCCOM A)ATTN: DRSAR-ASNAberdeen Proving Ground MD 21010

0 Restraint Equipment0 Survival Kits/Vests and Components0 Ejection Seats0 SPH4 Helmet AH64 Helmet0 Oxygen Equipment0 Emergency Parachutes and Accessories0 Flotation Equipment0 Flight Clothing ircrew Boots

CommanderHQ AVSCOMATTN: DRSAV-MPSD4300 Goodfellow BlvdSt. Louis MO 63120

0 AN/PRC Survival Radio0 RT10 Survival Radio0 TS24 Radio Tester and Other Testers0 Radio Inspection Equipment

CommanderCommunications Electronics CommandATTN: DRSEL-ME-MQFt. Monmouth NJ 07703

0 Pyrotechnics0 Forest Penetrating Flares0 Smoke Flares0 Survival Weapons mmunition

CommanderAMMCOM R)ATTN: DRSMC-QASRock Island IL 61299

u.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/48

o Night Vision Goggles EquipmentCommanderNight Vision LaboratoriesATTN: DELNV-SEFt. Belvoir, VA 22060

Information copies of QDRs, ROIDs and Equipment Improvement Reports (EIRs) should befurnished to the following addresses:

DARCOM Project Officer for ALSEAnN: DRCPO-ALSE4300 Goodfellow Blvd.st Louis, MO 63120AUTOVON 693-1218

CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterATTN: A TZQ-D-M SMr. Birringer)Ft. Rucker, AL 36362AUTOVON 558-5272FTS 539-5272

CommandantU.S. Army Aviation Logistics SchoolATTN: ATSQ-TDS-M ALSE-CW3 Miskimon)Ft. Eustis, VA 23604AUTOVON 927 4462/2476

CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterATTN: PESC-TE CW4 Kilborn)Ft. Rucker, AL 36362AUTOVON 558-2091FTS 539-2091

DARCOM/Fifth Army ALSE SchoolDARCOM , in conjunction with HQ Fifth Army,

recently completed its second annual ALSE TrainingSchool. More than 100 people attended from 26 states.They represented the U.S. Army Reserves, the U.S.Army ~ t i o n l Guard, U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, U.S. Army ForcesCommand, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Aeromedical ResearchLaboratory. The U.S. Army Aviation LogisticsSchool s ALSE chief, CW3 Arthur Miskimonobserved all courses of instruction to ensure standardization of the training program. New classes were alsoadded this year and included oxygen systems, the NBCensemble, night vision goggles, supply support requirements, and mission oriented protective posture(MOPP). The school was considered a complete success. Colonel Michael J. Pepe, deputy commander forreadiness, United States Army Aviation Systems Command, opened the school with the importance ofALSE; LTC P) Don Merritt, director of systemsmanagement observed several of the sessions; ColonelW. Bruce Wilder, DARCOM Aviation officer, gavea thought provoking closing address covering areas ofALSE which enabled aircrew personnel to return forfollow-on missions. Honorary Associate MembershipCertificates in the Aviation Life Support EquipmentSystem Association were presented to all participantsand the instructors. We consider the school a completesuccess and would like to express our sincere thanksto those who assisted in this tremendous effort. Specialappreciation goes to Captain Greta L. Weaver, for allthe coordination effort and preparation of trainingdata and handouts.

Helmet, Flying, Protective, SPH-4The following s a reprint from USAA VSCOMMateriel Readiness Information Bulletin, 2d quarter,

fiscal year 1984:To increase the materiel readiness posture for the

helmet, flying, protective, SPH-4, NSN 8415-00-144-4981, Regular; and NSN 8415-00-144-4985, Extra Large; the time between inspections s changedfrom 90 days to 120 days. TM 10-8465-206-13 s being revised to reflect this change. ii>-+

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, AMC Project Officer, ATTN: DRCPOALSE; 4300 Goodfellow Blvd . St. Louis, MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 6931218/9 or Commercial 3142631218/9.

AUGUST 1984 2


24/48

US ARMY

Directorate of Evaluation StandardizationJ

R PORT TO THE FIELD AVIATIONSTANDARDIIAT ION

Crewrest

T hat is just something for the standing operating procedure (SOP) which we use forinspections.

We have one on paper but never use. it. We do away with it when we go to the field. No way we can accomplish our mission within

the requirements.Sound familiar?A crewrest SOP can be only as effective as the

commander desires it to be. AR 95-1, Army Aviation: General Provisions and Flight Regulations,requires that a commander design a crew rest program tailored to the unit mission and that it beincluded in the unit SOP. t also states that the commander should consider the advice of the flightsurgeon and Aviation safety officer in setting limitsfor specific operations or time periods. As theDirectorate of Evaluation and Standardization mission takes the DES team around the world we seemany types of crewrest SOPs which are tailored todifferent type units. We have also heard many comments like those listed above in this article.

However, on a visit last fall the SOP of A Company, 25th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) waslooked at and found to be well written, practicaland apparent ly was being adhered to. The following crewrest SOP is published as an example of howone unit gives something other than lip serviceto the crewrest program.

Tab L (Crewrest) to Appendix 1 to Annex H1. Reference: R 95-1

2. Generala. Purpose:

1) To establish the maximum allowable flying duty hours and theimum allowable flight time.

2) To establish the maximum allowable duty periods for Aviation-repersonnel.3) To provide minimum rest periods.4) The primary purpose of this SOP is to prevent aircraft mishap

the judicious scheduling of duties so that fatigue does not cerrors in judgment or deterioration of motor skills while operamaintaining or servicing aircraft.b. Scope:

1) This appendix applies to all aircrewmembers, aircraft maintenpersonnel, aircraft refuelers, staff aviators and any other individassociated with the safe operation of unit aircraft.

2) If at any time an individual feels that he has exceeded his capabto perform safely, due to fatigue or other adverse factors, heinform his platoon leader who will in turn inform the commaor his deSignated representative. An alternate individual walerted.

3. Responsibilities:a. Commander: Has the overall responsibility for the implementatiothis SOP.b. Operations officer: Will monitor the program, ensure that the limita

are not exceeded, and ensure that the training/experience levelcrewmembers is commensurate with the mission. Will track dutyflight hours.

c. Platoon leaders: Will assign one officer within the platoon to trackand flight hours and relay this data to operations personnel.

d. Safety officer: Will monitor the program and report violations and plem areas to the commander.

e. All personnel: Are responsible for reporting for duty in a healthy, restate. It is the moral and military responsibility of each individuato engage in off-duty activities which prevent him from reportinduty fully rested.

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


25/48

Company A, 25th CAB Garrison SOP4. Standards: These standards are based on the guidelines outlined in AR95-1. It is emphasized that the figures indicated are maximums allowable

in the interest of safe and efficient operations. t is further emphasized-that these limits cannot be safely exceeded. As these limits are approached ,time available for ground duties should be curtailed to allow for rest. Suchsituations must be anticipated and accepted during periods of heavy training.Where circumstances dictate, low priority missions may have to be refusedor deferred.

5. Scheduling Standards: Garrison/Tactical.1 2 3 4Time Period Maximum Duty Maximum EnvironmentDays Period Flight Time Relative Factor (ERF)1 14 ( 14) 8 (8) Day 1.02 11 ( 25) 7 (15) Day Terrain Contour 1.33 10 ( 35) 7 (22) Day Rappel 1.34 10 ( 45) 5 (27) Day Sling Load 1.35 10 ( 55) 4 (31) Night 1.46 9 ( 64) 3 (34) Instrument 1.47 8 (72) 3 (37) Day NOE 1.6

14 ( 86) 2 (39) Night Rappel 1.69 11 ( 97) 1 (40) Night Sling Load 1.6

10 10 (107) 1 (41) Day EPT 2.111 10 (117) 1 (42) Night Terrain 2.112 10 (127) 1 (43) Night EPT 2.313 9 (136) 1 (44) Night Vision Devices 2.314 8 (144) 1 (45) Chemical MOPP-4 3.115 0 (144) 0 (45)16 14 (158) (53)17 11 (169) 7 (60)18 10 (179) 7 (67)19 10 (189) 5 (72)20 10 (199) 4 (76)

AUGUST 1984

1 3 3 4Time Period Maximum Duty Maximum EnvironmentDays Period Flight Time Relative Factor (ERF)2 9 (208) 3 (79)22 (216) 3 (82)23 14 (230) 2 (84)24 11 (241) 1 (85)25 10 (251) 1 (86)26 10 (261) 1 (87)27 10 (271) 1 (88)28 9 (280) 1 (89)29 8 (288) 1 (90)30 0 (288) 0 (90)

(Peace)3 0 (288J 0 (90)

(Mobiization)3 (360) (140)

a. Numbers in parenthesis are cumulative hours.b. Duty days will be planned so that maximum duty period hours will not

be exceeded .c. Aircrewmembers participating in EPT, night or NVG flights will rE port

for duty not more than 8 hours before estimated release from duty.d. Rest period will be a minimum of 10 hours between duty days .e. Rest period will be a minimum of 12 hours if duty day extends past

normal duty hours.f. Personnel exceeding 7 day limits will be released from duty for a

minimum of 24 hours.g. Personnel exceeding 30 day limits will be released from duty for aminimum of 72 hours.h. Rest period will be a minimum of 3 hours following PT or PT test prior

to being released for flight.

6. Waiver Authority: Commander, Co A, 25th CAB, is the waiver authorityfor extension of flight time and duty period limits outlined in this SOP .

3


26/48

REPORT To THE FIELD

Crewrest Tracking Form Crewrest Tracking FormNAME RANK SSN NAME RANK SSNCREW REST MONITOR MONTH CREW REST MONITOR RANK MONTH

DATE 20 2 a.2 24 2 U 27 2.8 DATE 29 30 I 2 3 4- 5 b 7DUTY DUTYDAY I 2 3 4 & 7 S , DAY 10 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18MAX I ~ ~ 7-, ' ~ . ~ ~ ~ '% ;UTY MAX '7 i 'r 0/ S/ 1J1 ,V 'r rUTYMAX 8h % ~ ~ ~ ~ 7' 0 rLIGHT MAX r ~ y ; 'l' 0/ ~ Y ~LIGHT

START STARTDUTY ~ OiH ~ Q DUTYTIME TIMEMAX END 1. 00 3 f J 1 > I ~ D ~ . f # ( ) 13 1> OTt MAX ENDEND ENDDUTY ~ o o ~ 151 J ~ 200, J ~ DUTYTOTAL ZZ ~ ~ L Z ~DUTY HRS ,0 ~ 7 ' TOTALDUTY HRSFLT 1 ~ ~ : t rH.... :8 U FLT 1..., 1.0FLT 2 K L C ~~ t , FLT 2TOTAL 0 ~ TOTAL

Examples of a locally developed tracking form Duty days are numbered. Top half of max duty day line is what limit would normally be. Bottom half of max duty day is adjusted times (if you are over the cumulative limit, time left is computed). Flight time computed the same way-normal limits on top half and adjusted flight limits on bottom half. Time max end is adjusted max duty time added to start duty time. Total duty hours are daily and cumulative. Flights are time multiplied by ERF. Flight time totals are also daily and cumulative.

While the tracking sheet may be used in both thefield and garrison, it normally is only needed whileoperating away from garrison. With today's im-proved reliability of aircraft and systems, togetherwith the high dollar cost of manpower, training andequipment, commanders are going to have to proper-@

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attentionon an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: A TZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL

24

ly manage their people and equipment so as to bemost capable, flexible and responsive on theAirLand Battlefield of the future. .(A special thanks to CW3 Brian R. Mohr, Avia-tion safety officer, Co A, 25th CAB, Schofield Bar-racks, HI.)36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504, FTS 539-3504 or CommerciaI205-255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hotline,AUTO VON 558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message.



27/48

HangarTalk is a quiz containing questions based onpublications applicable to Anny Aviation. The answers are atthe bottom of the page. If you did not do well, perhaps youshould get out the publication and look it over.

FM 12 4Night Flight Techniquesand ProceduresCW3 Gary R Weiland

Department of Combined rms TacticsU S rmy Aviation Center

Fort Rucker, L1. The smoker effectively loses percent of

his night vision at sea level.a. 5 c. 15b 10 d 20

2. During the moon s third quarter phase, illumination is besta . just after dark c. just after midnightb. just before midnight d . just before dawn

3. The approach angle for a night approach toeither a fixed or tactical landing site should bea day approach .a. slightly shallower thanb. the same asc. slightly steeper than

18 o ed :J 01L L o ed :J 6L o6ed :p S

AUGUST 984

8-S o ed :J L6-S o ed :J 97 - 7 o ed :e s

4. A flashlight with a red lens should be usedwhen conducting an aircraft preflight inspection at night.a. True b. False

5. When making a night approach to a lighted Twhere should you plan to terminate theapproach?

bc

d6. Aviators planning night terrain flights should

avoid selecting night vision goggles routesegments that require heading changes ofmore than degrees.a. 30 c. 60b 45 d 90

7. The cale map is the primary map forplanning and flying en route portions of nightterrain flight missions.a 1:25,000 c. 1:250,000b 1:50,000 d 1:500,000

8. For effective viewing with night vision goggles a minute dark-adaptation period isnecessary .a. 15b 30

c. 45d . dark-adaptation is

not required.9. Firing the while wearing night vision gog

gles causes no vision impairment.a. 2 .75 inch folding fin aerial rocketb. TOW missilec. 20 mm cannond. 7.62 mm machinegun

10. The Mk 45 drop flare is capable of producing2 million candlepower of illumination for aperiod of minutes.a. 2 c . 3lj2b 2lj2 d 5

S- 7 o5ed :q .11 - 7 o51?d :J .Z-Z o5l?d :p Z SH3MSNV

25


28/48

F BEAUTY IS IN the eyeof the beholder, then whatconstitutes noise can also bein the ear of the person whohears the sound. Webster s ThirdNew International Dictionarydefines noise as Sound thatlacks agreeable musical quality oris noticeably loud, harsh ordiscordant. ... The samehelicopter mechanic who findsthe whine of a finely-tunedengine music to his hearing mayclap both hands over his earswhen a chamber music quartetplays a Bartok composition. Aflight instructor whose jobdepends on the flap-flap-flap ofthe helicopter overhead and thechicken farmer who hears thesame aircraft and visualizeshundreds of his birds suffocatingeach other as they huddletogether in fright, aren't reallyhearing the same sound at all.Effects of noise on theenvironmentIn a modern, technologicalworld we are besieged by sounds.Some we can control but thereare many that we can't. Smallclaims courts in California foundthemselves swamped by residentsnear airports as homeownerssought relief from the whine ofjet transports and expansion ofthe huge airports such aircraftrequire. The increased case loadled the state legislature to pass abill which will require such noiseactions to go into municipal orsuperior courts. The importanceof relief from such levels of

6

noise was demonstrated recentlywhen FAA provided some$880,000 to soundproof 100homes and 2 schools near SanFrancisco's International Airport.Is this kind of noise simply anannoyance or is there somethingfar more serious involved?William Meecham, anengineering professor at UCLAhas been studying the effects ofaircraft noise at Los AngelesInternational Airport on nearbyresidents for years. He believesthat airplane noise is responsiblefor heart attacks, strokes andsuicides. Professor Meechamreported to the AcousticalSociety of America that deathsdue to cardiovascular diseaseamong people over 75 were 8percent higher for those who livein the LAX landing pattern thanfor a comparable group in anadjacent area outside the noisefootprint. Meecham attributesthe deaths directly to the highlevel of jet noise which is inexcess of 90 decibels. He alsofound the suicide rate amongmiddle-aged people in the noiseimpacted area was twice the rateof those living further away.In a study conducted usingmonkeys, University of Miamiresearchers led by E.A. Petersonfound that noise raises bloodpressure. Animals exposed to a9-month daily diet of recordednoise including television,bulldozers and motorcycles,developed blood pressure 27percent higher than a group not

exposed to the noise. The levelof noise the monkeys enduredwas not even high enough tocause impaired hearing-but amonth after the sound exposureceased, the blood pressure remained the same.

Peterson's findings that thereis a correlation between noiseand blood pressure will come asno great surprise to the parentsof teenagers whose amplifiedrock music can make wallsappear to distend. But it doesappear that the effects on themiddle-aged parents may be asbad as the hearing loss they fearfor their progeny.While the intensity of noisefrom rotorcraft is not as high asthat from jet aircraft (figure 1),their increasing numbers and lowlevel of operations do impact onsurrounding communities. Adramatic increase in use ofhelicopters in the private sectoras well as military use meansnoise from these aircraft willbecome a greater concern in thefuture. FAA is attempting to setrealistic noise standards,however, Jerold M. Chavkin,Director of Rotorcraft ProgramOffice, FAA, admits the effortshave been thwarted by a lack ofnoise-reduction technology thatwill permit such aircraft tooperate without unacceptableperformance and productivitypenalties. A cooperative efforthas been launched by FAA,NASA, and industry to developthe needed technology.



29/48

Hughe.5000QH

Hughe.300CHughes5000 Diese. Truck Nearest Anny equivalent aircraft - Bell 206L OH-58);

eN 212 UH-1H); and Be. 47G H-13). Turbofan airtinerlanding/ takeoff)Source: Hughes Helicopters, Inc.Figure : Comparative Decibel Ratings

The NASA Rotorcraft NoiseReduction program began inearnest in 983 and the fourmajor U.S. helicoptermanufacturers are now undercontract with NASA to beginnoise reduction documentationand research. This is really thefirst time there has been a jointeffort by the U.S. helicopterindustry to join a governmentagency and pool their resourcesto address a major technicalchallenge. The accomplishmentsand plans addressed in the firstreview of the program indicatethat it is well on track and willplay a major role in solving thisproblem.

That doesn't mean the problemwill be solved soon. Even whensuch technology becomesavailable it will probably notpresent rapid improvementbecause helicopters in use nowwill be around for a long time.Chavkin urges operators andpilots of the helicoptercommunity to do their part insupporting the Fly Neighborlyprogram by flying more quietly

AUGUST 984

and considerately. MeantimeFAA will be working with NASAand the rotorcraft industry tomake the helicopter itself a lessnoisy and more acceptableneighbor and toward adoption ofmeaningful noise guidelines.In the past some militaryaviators have had a laissez-faireattitude toward civil complaintsabout military air operations. I fthey don't want to hear myhelicopter, then they can listen toRussian tanks, may be a catchyline for the macho, toughcommander in a Hollywoodproduction, but that kind ofattitude can only further alienatea public which is increasingly .questioning the rights ofgovernment and industry over therights of the individual. Thatdoes not mean that militarytraining and defense missionsmust be sacrificed toaccommodate every specialinterest group. The public goodover the individual's rights wasestablished long ago in theconcept of imminent domain;without it such things as a

system of nationwide highwayswould have been impossible. Butthat does not relieve government,at all levels, as well as industry,of the responsibility to conductair operations in such a mannerto minimize as much as possiblethe danger and discomfort tosurrounding communities. Thereis a concomitant responsibility tothe populace to reduce noiseintrusion into their private livesto the extent possible in keepingwith mission and safetyrequirements.While a slogan like the onequoted above can do greatdamage, the Fly Neighborlyinitiative borrowed by theHelicopter AssociationInternational from BellHelicopter can be used in theeducation of the public. Thateffort, however, must alsoinclude a people-to-peopleapproach. An active speakers'bureau is a valuable avenuewhereby aviators cooperate withcivic organizations, schools andother community activities toincrease understanding of thereasons for terrain and nap-ofthe-earth (NOE) flying. Thecitizen who witnesses increasingnumbers of low-flying helicopterscan accept an explanation that inorder to survive in a high threatenvironment helicopters must flyclose to the ground. But if noexplanation is forthcoming, suchoperations may be perceived asunnecessarily harassing anddangerous.The efforts of government andindustry to achieve sound controlthrough technology, publicrelations emphasizing the benefitsfrom helicopter operations andexplanation of reasons for certaintypes of air operations, togetherwith personal responsibilityexercised by all aviators can avertconfrontations which result inbad publicity and put the Armyand the public into adversaryroles. Mission planners in noise

7


30/48

sensitive areas should select themost compatible route, altitudeand operating technique possiblein keeping with mission demands.

f such efforts are not giventhe importance they deserve,legislation further limitinghelicopter operations couldresult. That came close tohappening in 1981 when FAApublished a Notice of ProposedRule Making (NPRM) to reducenoise from helicopters. Industryresponse and extensive lobbyingresulted in FAA withdrawing theNPRM in favor of industry selfregulation. The AeronauticalServices Office (DA POC for FlyNeighborly) is drafting guidancefor inclusion in Change 2 to AR95-1. It is incumbent upon allusers of airspace to support thespirit as well as the letter of suchregulations.Effects of noise on the individualAs helicopters are adopted as ameans of transportation formore businessmen, moreattention is being given todecreasing the noise which mustbe endured by crew andpassengers. Anything in ahelicopter (and there is a lot)that undergoes constant orsporadic movements contributesto the high noise level in cockpitsand cabins. Edwin E. Cohen,manager of light helicopterengineering for HughesHelicopters Inc., likens thesituation of helicopter cabinoccupants to sitting inside aloudspeaker. The transmissionprovides the driving force for theairframe and the airframeradiates noise into the cabin.While work is already being doneto reduce noise at thetransmission, it's still at the earlyresearch and development stage.

Efforts are being made tosoundproof cabins of existingaircraft by various means, butwhile they may be applicable tocorporate-owned helicopters theydo not at this point have

8

practical application tooperational military aircraft.Soundproofing is not onlyexpensive, it adds weight. Untilchanges in design can reducevibration and noise at the sourcewithout affecting performance,efforts to make life in thecockpit and cabin of militaryaircraft more endurable will haveto concentrate on protectiveequipment.In a paper presented at aPsychology in the Department ofDefense Symposium at the AirForce Academy researchers saidthat helicopter pilots under 36years old had the highest numberof hospitalizations for hearingloss and ear problems of allmilitary aviators.In addition to the cost to theindividual who suffers a noiseinduced hearing loss, there is ahefty amount of taxpayer moneyinvolved in compensation claims.In fact, the most significantportion of the goverment'sannual disability compensationcosts can be attributed to claimsfor noise-induced hearing loss.

In federal agencies during FY1983 $24,472,260 were paid inhearing loss compensation tocivilians alone. Department ofDefense accounted for 83 percentof the cost, Army 15 percent,Navy 45 percent, Air Force 23percent; with Justice, NASA,Treasury, Transportation, PostalService and other agenciesmaking up the remaining 17percent of claim costs. Duringthe last 1 years, hearingdisability costs have increasedalmost 300 percent. In 1982, theVeterans Administration paid out$145,350,856 in such claims.Aside from the personalsuffering to people whose hearingis affected and the cost to thetaxpayer in compensation claims,there is another consideration ofeven greater potential impactthe same potential for disasterwhich exists whenever safety fails

to be a primary considerationcombat readiness. The verypeople who are in high riskhearing loss categories-gunners,aviators, soldiers who workaround electronic equipment-arethe same soldiers we can illafford to lose. Their kind ofskills will make the difference inwhether the battle is won or lost.The worst of it is the waste, itneedn't happen at all. Unlikesome accidents caused by amachine breaking or a materielfailure, hearing loss is almostcompletely preventable.

AR 40-5 and TB MED 5 1provide information on theArmy's hearing conservationprogram. Some of the thingscommanders and supervisorsshould do include: Make wearing of hearingprotective devices mandatory. Ensure hearing protectorsare well maintained, includingplugs, muffs and helmets withbuilt-in protection. Ensure that all soldiers andcivilians who are exposed tonoise hazards receive periodichearing evaluation. (Figure 2shows a sharp increase innumbers of hearing conservationforms sent to the U.S. ArmyEnvironmental Hygiene Agency(USAEHA). Nearly 200,000forms were submitted in CY 82and 83.) Require officers andnoncommissioned officers to setthe example for their units.

Many aviators have discoveredthat they can hear better whenwearing earplugs under theirhelmets. Aircraft noise and radiostatic are attenuated andcommunications are enhanced bywearing the plugs.The USAEHA has found thatthe triple-flange earplug, withinsertion device, achieves thehighest overall noise reductionrating (NRR) (figure 3). Underlaboratory conditions this plugachieved an NRR of 31 dB.



31/48

Without the insertion device theplug achieved 26dB in thelaboratory and only 7dB in theworkplace. Workers apparentlyweren't inserting the plug farenough into the ear to beeffective. The earplug seatingdevice, which is a part of the lid,grips the stem of the earplug,making it easier to insert. Usedproperly, the seating device canhelp close the gap between theNRR achieved in the laboratoryand the workplace.The new earplug has an olivedrab carrying case which mayhelp overcome objections ofsome commanders about theunsoldierly appearance causedby wearing the old case on theuniform. The new case costs lessthan half the cost of the oldclear plastic, cylindrical casecurrently in the supply system. Itis non-reflective and insensitiveto infrared detection. The caseand earplug inserter, olive drab,translucent, can be ordered usingNSN 6515-01-100-1674. The costis $2.34 for a package of 20.Questions on the hearingprotective device should bedirected to Cdr, U.S. ArmyEnvironmental Hygiene Agency,ATTN: HSHB-O (Dr. Ohlin)Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD21010, AV 584-3797.The most effective safetyefforts in hearing conservationand noise control are the same asfor all other types of safetyprevention. Military training andmissions must go on but effectson the public and personnelengaged in flying activities can bediminished. The means to ensurethat it is done already exist-thekey is with the individual. inalmost any group of oldsoldiers you will quickly spottwo or three with hearingproblems-maybe they weren't asfortunate as you are in theequipment available to protectyour hearing. Whether you willfind yourself one of them severalyears hence is really up to you.

AUGUST 1984

1983

198FOLLOWUP AUDIOGRAMS MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE) 0

INITIAL AUDIOGRAMS BASELINE)BOTH

o 2 4 6 8 1 12 14 16 18 2Thousand

Figure 2: Hearing Conservation Fonns Received at U.S. AnnyEnvironmental Hygiene Agency

Protective Device Noise Reduction Rating NRR)Laboratory Conditions As Used in WorkplaceTriple -f lange plug with inserter 31dBTriple-flange plug without inserter 26dB 7dBSingle -f lange V-51R) 23dB 2dBFoam plug 29dB 11dB

Figure 3: Comparison of Noise Reduction Ratings Achieved by HearingProtective Devices

ReferencesAeromedical Bulletin,A viation Safety Oct 1 1983 andJan 1 1984.Airport Traffic Mixtures,FAA General A viation NewsSep-Oct 1983.ATC Action Line, U.S. ArmyCommunications Command,Fly Neighborly, AviationDigest Mar 1984.Barber, J. J ., Designing theQuiet Cabin: Noise Needn't RideInside, Rotor and WingInternational Oct 1983.California Seeks to CurbAirport Noise Lawsuits,A viation Week and SpaceTechnology Sep 19 1983.Chavkin, Jerold M., Why an

FAA Rotorcraft ProgramOffice? Vertiflite May-Jun1983.Elmore, John H., Capt, USAF,For Your Ears Only, NavyLifeline Mar-Apr 1984.Hearing Costs Rise Sharply,CARNOTES Sep-Oct 1983.Maze, Rick, Study LinksMilitary Pilot Ills to AircraftType, Army Times May 7,1984.Sounds of Silence, FAAGeneral Aviation News Jan-Feb1984.Zugschwert, John, 1983:Building a Foundation For theFuture of the HelicopterIndustry, Vertiflite Jan-Feb1984.

29


32/48

RS eport

Canada

Federal Republicof Germany

Greece

l . 1 1 ~celand

Italy

30

Aviat ion units that may be required tooperate as a jOint national force should beaware that the U.S. Army has ratified a NATOstandardization agreement (STANAG 2087,Medical Employment of Air Transport in theForward Area) that directs the procedures formedical evactJation. As a signatory to thisagreement it is incumbent upon Army Aviationunits to abide by the terms of the STANAG.Units are encouraged to use this document asa guide for development of their standingoperating procedures (SOPs).

Units which are subject to this agreement areencouraged to validate the content of theSTANAG. If it is determined that there areterms of the agreement which should be considered for changes, a standard DA Form 2028should be submitted .

STANAG 2087 - Medical Employmentof Air Transport in the Forward AreaAim1. The aim of this agreement is to standardize for the NATO forces the general principlesgoverning evacuation by air transport of the

sick and the wounded from the battle area.Agreement2. Participating nations agree that theNATO forces are to follow the principles outlined

herein in planning and organizing the employment of air transport in medical missionswhich fall within the purview of the Armyregardless of which force operates the airtransport. Details of the Agreement

3. Control of operations is to be in accordance with local directives and the organizationof the force concerned.4. Emergency air evacuation is concernedwith the prompt movement of the sick andwounded where rapid, atraumatic evacuation ortreatment will reduce mortality. Such sick andwounded should be picked up as soon after therequest for air evacuation as possible andevacuated directly to designated treatmentfacilities.

5. Routine Rir evacuation is used when surface means are either nonexistent or inadequate or where air evacuation is more effective.In these cases, time is not of the same essenceas in the emergency category. If properly prepared prior to evacuation, routine air evacuees

will require only minimal in-flight care.6. Air evacuation is to be used as far oward as the tactical situation will permit. necessary this may apply to evacuation froenemy territory.7. Request for air evacuationa. The unit initiates medical missionsdirect contact with the command echelon cocerned, e.g. the battle group/regiment, the dision , the corps or the army. Requests for themissions may be processed through medictechnical channels or command channels acording to local directives, and the organizatioof the force concerned.b. In order that the unit and the controing agency may be able to evaluate properand establish priorities for air evacuation, threquest should contain the following informatio1) Number, diagnosis and priori ty of siand wounded .

a) PRIORITY lIURGENT-Emergenccases which should be evacuated asoon as possible and in any event nlater than 2 hours in order to save lifb) PRIORITY 2/PRIORITY The sicand wounded requiring prompmedical care. This precedence is usewhen the sick and wounded should bevacuated within 4 hours or themedical condition could deteriorate such a degree that they will becompriority 1 patients.c) PRIORITY 3/ROUTlNE The sicand wounded requiring evacuation bwhose condition is not expecteddeteriorate significantly. The sick anwounded in this category should bevacuated within 24 hoursNote: 1) Priority assessments are to be iitiated and readjusted on medical grounds onl

Inability to respond to requests for air evacution of the sick and wounded within the avisory time quoted above does not , in itseconstitute a reason for alteration of prioritie2) Identification should specify wheththe sick and wounded are fit for external stretcer, internal stretcher or sitting evacuation.

3) Exact location by grid coordinatesother method as directed by the tactical fieSOP.

4) Specific identification of landing sit5) Time the sick and wounded will bready for evacuation .



33/48

Medical Employment of Air Transport in the Forward Area

6) Special requirements/arrangementsand their availability from local resources for:a) Special items of medical supplies.b) Whole blood.c) Medical personnel to act as escort.7) Radio frequency and call sign of the

coordinating unit at the landing site or in contact with personnel at the landing site.8) Tactical considerations at the landing site, to include friendly and enemy artilleryor other weapons firing, recommended approach paths e.g. direction altitude), andfriendly and en

Date post:	03-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	aviationspace-history-library
View:	231 times
Download:	0 times

Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1984

Documents