Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1970

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1970

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UNITE saTES RMY VI TION

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION, ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MG Allen M. Burdett Jr.

COMMANDANT, U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMG Delk M. Oden

ASST COMDT, U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCOL Bill G. Smith

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFFLTC Robert E. Luckenbill, ChiefRichard K. Tierney, EditorWilliam H. SmithJoe LewelsLinda McGowan

GRAPHIC ARTS SUPPORTHarry A. PickelDorothy l. CrowleyAngela A. Akin

DIRECTOR, U. S. ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATIONACCIDENT RESEARCH

COL Eugene B. Conrad

USABAAR PUBLICATIONS AND GRAPHICS DIVPierce l. Wiggin, ChiefWilliam E. CarterJack DeLoneyTed KontosCharles MabiusMary W. Windham

ABOUT THE COVERLast year Army aviation providedinvaluable assistance in the wakeof two devastating hu rricanesCamille and Francelia see pages2, 12, 18 and 21). Army aviationwas there just as it has beenthis year in Peru, and in so manyareas before (page 32

JULY 1970 VOLUME 16 NUMVI EWS FROM READERS OPERATION CAMILLE, CPT John W. GriffinAEROMEDIC-ARMY AIR CREWMEN AND JEEP DRIVERS'DISEASE, MAJ William T. StubenbordHURRICANE FRANCELlA, CPT Benny J. ArchuletaATTACK HELICOPTER UTILIZATION, LT Daniel J. BlaneyHURRICANE CAMILLE 4TH ARMY OPERATIONSMAJ Jimmie S. FordVIRGINIA DISASTER RELIEF, MAJ D. T. Irby Jr. CHARLIE AND DANNY'S WRITEINCRASH RESISTANT FUEL SYSTEM, CPT William T. KoehlerUTTAS MOCKUPHERE'S PROOF, CPT John W. RockomARMY AVIATION-TO THE RESCUECREW EVALUATION-CORNERSTONE OF STANDARDIZATICPT John H. SchleimerCONCERTINA, FRIEND OR FOE. MAJ Carl F. MittagACCIDENT OR SHIPPING DAMAGE? CW4 James A. BartleyIS IT A SAFETY HAZARD OR NOT? MAJ Gary W. Munroe Sr.COMMAND SUPERVISION PLUS TEAM EFFORTCOL Eugene B. ConradTHIS SAFETY BUSINESS-CAN AN OVERDOSE HURT US?CW2 Jose A. SuarezINADVERTENT IFRVIOLATIONSPEARL'SMAJOR ACCIDENT? YOU'RE OUT OF YOUR MINDJohn E. Halpin

USAASO SEZANNUAL WRITING AWARDS Insi

The minion of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of .n operationor functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention, training, maintenancoperations, research and development, aviation medicine, and other related data.The DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly onder thsupervision of the Commandant, U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed herein are nnecessarily those of Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School. Photos rU. S. Army unless otherwise specified . Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to thDIGEST and to the author, unless otherwise indicated .Articles , photos, and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communicationauthorized to : Editor, U. S. Army Aviation Digest, Fort Rucker, Ala . 36360.Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Headquarters, Departmeof the Army, 3 November 1967.Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlinedAR 3101. Complete DA Form 12-4 and send directly to CO , AG Publications Center, 28Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Md. 21220 . For any change in distributioll requirements, initiaterevised DA Form 124.National Guard and Army Reserve units submit requiremEnts through their State adjutangeneral and U. S. Army Corps commanders respectively.For those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copIes of the DIGESpaid subscriptions, 4 .S domestIc and 5.50 overseas, are available from the Superintendent Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402.


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R

JEWSROE DERS

Sir:I am writing in regard to the articleFunctional Te t light of the U H-1 " in

the AVIATIO DIG T, Janu ary 1970.I would like to compliment MajorVolk on a very fine article, but afterhaving taught thi very course for 21 2years with the Maintenance Test FlightBranch, U . S. Army TransportationSchool, Ft. Eustis, Va., I feel there areseveral points which should be clarified.

The statement about checking for atorquemeter reading of 10 to 15 psi at6600 rpm should further include atflat pitch" and pertains to the L-5, L-9,L-9A and all of the L-l1 engine models.The L-13 engi ne torque range is 8 to 12p i. Emphasis should be placed on thefact that a variation of this m y indicate a high or low rpm setting, but astraight-in autorotation must be conducted to verify actual autorotative rpm.The torquemeter reading ust never beused in lieu of actual performance ofthe autorotation. The rea on for verification by performance is because theaccuracy of the torquemetering systemhas not yet been verified at this pointin the test flight.When rapidly moving the cyclic control forward and backward severaltimes (the pylon rock check) , the rateindicated is correct [one or two movement Ed. ] but you should not exceedthree complete cycles; otherwise, youwill have difficulty beginning your countof the dampening cycles.While performing the hydraulicpower cylinder check, the aircrafthould be brought to a 5 to 10 foothover in order to provide a safety margin in which to recycle the hydraulic

control in the event the power cylindershould lock up. Some test pilots mayprefer 60 knots forward speed in levelflight. Feedback is always greater during maneuvering. For this reason pilotsshould be content with gradual or evenluggish maneuvers combined with unpreciseness during boost-off. This is theJULY 1970

same as saying, Don't expect to see ahippopotamus doing a ballet dance.

The air peed for the straight-in autorotation should be 60 to 70 knot, depending on the model flown (check theapplicable dash 10). The reason for thedifferent air speeds is the location ofthe pitot tube. Autorotational rotor rpmcheck hould be made using the da h10 recommended air speed with collective all the way down and throttleat flight idle. Vary the rate of descentto control the air speed. The importantidea here i that the check should bemade con i tently; i.e., do it the sameway every time for each UH-1 model.A large variation of results will occurotherwi e.

While conducting the stabilizer barcheck you must maintain a given altitude and a constant air speed. The aircraft hould be flown smoothly butpo itively into a bank of 20 to 30 degrees, then tabilized with the ball centered . Shortl y thereafter (4 to 6 seconds)a tendency for the bank to increa eshould be evident. No continual 0 cillalion or unusual vibration should occur.

Sir:

CW4 Edward A Gilmore Jr.AWOAC 70-2Ft. Rucker, Ala. 36360

Having read your M arch issue, I amnow thoroughly convinced that yoursis an informative periodical of the highe t caliber. I have been a reader of theu. s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST for sometime, along with other ervice magazines, and in comparison I believe thatyours tands superior.

Although I am a member of anotherervice, I can assure you that I canappreciate the fine quality of this magazine. t is an extremely well-edited pieceof work.Being a member of Helicopter AntiSubmarine Squadron Eight at the NavalAir Station, Imperial Beach, Calif. , I

am clo ely as ociated with the Generallectric T58-10 engine; therefore, Iwa particularly interested in the articleentitled Project FOD by Ted Kontos.It is thi type of light comedy in anarticle which is of great importance asit draws readers who otherwise are uninterested in the subject matter. As Iam working in a quality as urance capacity, this article was of added interest; however , this is only one out of anumber of well-constructed is ues.

To you and your taff I extend mysincere congratulations and appreciationfor your excellent work.

Sir:

AE2 Thomas AlmirallHS-8 Naval Air StationImperial Beach, Calif. 92032

Hooray for Captain Wahl Unfortunately , his well-defined point involving e tabli hment of search and rescue(SA R) teams is not a new problem butone which has fallen on deaf ears[ Where's The First Team? March1970 DIGEST]'

The very minimum of equipment thatwould be con idered essential inUSAF / USMC / USN SAR aircraft iscon idered a luxury item in Army helicopters, i.e., ADF homing on UHF.Any Army aviator that has served inRVN undoubtedly has heard beeps onguard channel without being able torespond. Isn't it a great feeling to say,1 hear ya buddy but just can't reachyou-due to the lack of equipment.

Another angle: Wonder why the otherservices have SA R crews trained andready and the U. S. Army stand bywith the large t number of aircraft ina single ervices inventory and not asingle SAR team on alert?

MAJ James R Hughe Jr.U. S. Army Bell Plant ActivityP. O. Box 1605Fort Worth, Tex. 76101


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We will never know the maximum velocity of the winds in Hurricane amlillebut in the face of my and observations I would conservatively estimate that they ranged at about 200 mph. This is the threshold of tornado intensity.-Dr. Robert H Simpson chief of the National Hurricane Center Miami Fla.

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A ON C MILD ISASTER This word, evenwith the help of many others,cannot describe Hurricane Camille's destruction. The devastationleft by Camille tended to make aperson feel that his senses werebetraying him. The area it strucklooked as if it had been under anuclear attack.Camille first was reported as atropical storm in the Caribbeannear Grand Cayman Island onThursday, 14 August 1969. Moving northwest at about 10 milesper hour, the storm reached hurricane intensity the next morningand passed over the western tip ofCuba into the Gulf of Mexico Friday night.Camille headed north during thenight toward the Florida panhandleeast of Fort Walton Beach. Residents of this area were warned ofthe intensity of Camille and toldto take precautionary measures.Military installations, including Ft.Rucker, Ala., moved aircraft outof reach of the raging storm andtook other measures to minimizedamage.

On Saturday afternoon the hurricane stalled and its winds intensified to about 150 mph. Afterdark Camille resumed forwardmovement, but this time in anorth-northwestwardly directiontoward the mainland just west ofBiloxi, Miss.

Early Sunday an Air Force aircraft flew into the eye of the hurricane and found the central barometric pressure to be 26.61 inches,JULY 1970

Capta in John W Griffin

the lowest ever recorded by an aircraft in the Western Hemisphere.Camille was near the mouth ofthe Mississippi River Sunday evening moving at about 15 mph withwinds near 200 mph. Her eyepassed over the coast near Waveland, Miss. , at about 2200 hours,bringing with it 20-foot tides. Camille slashed inland and roarednorth across Mississippi and intoTennessee before turning eastwardand aiming its diminishing, butstill dangerous, potency at Virginia.

Freed of the necessity of movingaircraft out of the path of thestorm, Ft. Rucker officials madeplans to send help into the strickenarea. Lieutenant Colonel Dudley J.Carver, a native of Ocean Springs,Miss. , and thoroughly familiar withthe area, volunteered and wasselected to direct Third Army unitssent into the area.Communications with the GulfCoast were cut off completely.Telephone and power lines weredown and the use of ground vehicles was limited and dangerous in the storm-stricken area. Itwas impossible to determine exactly what assistance was needed;however, the intensity of the stormand the almost flat and in somecases marshy) nature of the terrain indicated that helicopterswould be the best mode of transport.

After consulting with Headquarters, Third U. S Army, Atlanta, Ga., Ft. Rucker officials de-

cided to send an initial exploratoryunit of two UH-IDs into the area.f more aircraft were needed LTC

Carver was authorized to requestthem. The two Hueys were to leaveFt. Rucker as soon as the weathercleared.

The weather in the area continued to be bad all day Mondaybut by Tuesday there were signsthat the high winds and heavy rainswere subsiding. Early in the afternoon the advance unit left Ft.Rucker for the area where theworst hurricane in recorded historyhad hit the United States.

LTC Carver was in the left seatof the lead aircraft. Accompanyinghim were Captain John Diggs inthe right seat and Staff SergeantRichard Thomas, the crew chief.Wing position was flown by ChiefWarrant Officer Tony Adams andmyself with Private First ClassMark Herring as crew chief.

Our orders were to report toMajor General Wolter G. Johnson,commanding general of the Mississippi National Guard, and establisha base of operations at Gulfport,Miss. We were to assist NationalGuard and regular troops in thearea and render what aid we couldto the civilian population.We chose a route to Gulfport directly over the stricken area tomake an enroute reconnaissance ofthe eastern end of the damagedarea. Flying over Fort WaltonBeach we saw little storm damage,however, near Mobile, Ala., thepicture changed significantly. Along

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SSSSIPPI

GULF OF MEXICO7 ~ . ~1.-0

the causeway U. S. 90 just eastof Mobile, automobile traffic waslimited to one lane . We could seethat business places along thecauseway were badly damaged.Later we learned that Mobile hadsuffered heavy damage from flooding and downed trees and powerlines. Electric current was still offwhen we flew over the city.

We flew west over 1-10 andU. S. 90. At one point 90 was partially closed, but other than that

there was little evidence of stormdamage.In the Pascagoula, Miss. , areathe storm had sunk a number ofboats along the Pascagoula River[16 boats, 12 to 30 feet long-Ed .].

We noted a steamship, the ormarSun aground on the west bank ofthe river and three barges beachednorth of Highway 90. Nearby, theLouisville and Nashville Railroadwas washed out.Early in the evening we passedover Ocean Springs and enteredobile suffered very heavy damage from flooding and

downed trees Most power lines w r down and elec-tric current was still off when we flew over the city

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the area of major storm damageFor the first time we saw destroyehouses. We did not try to estimathow many there were in the littltown but learned later there werabout 75. We also saw 18 fishinboats sunk or beached in the citharbor.Between Ocean Springs anBiloxi, Camille ripped into a foulane highway bridge built to resisdamage from hurricanes. The hugslabs of concrete that make up throadbed face the path usualltaken by hurricanes in this areaHowever, the 200 mph winds an20-foot tides were more than thbridge could stand. Some of the bislabs were pushed off their foundations and others were stacked onon top of the other like slices obread.All along the beach area oBiloxi and Gulfport and extendinback several blocks there was amost total destruction. Huge treewere uprooted, modern motesmashed into small pieces of rubb

Some of the big slabs w rpushed off their foundations


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and older hotels and homes werelying flat on the ground, theirvenerable sides in splinters. Hang-ing on iron fences that had beenbent like copper wire were clotheswashed from homes and left hang-ing when the water receded.Flying over the East Point sec-tion of Biloxi we noticed a strangephenomenon. Among all the rubbleand ruin an occasional building orhouse was left standing with onlyminor damage. We saw a magnifi-cent church standing with only awindow or two broken while every-thing around it had been destroyed.

It was s if God had said to thedevil in the hurricane, Thou shaltot touch y church

A few of the fine old homes andhotels that have withstood manyhurricanes were still standing-The Edgewater Gulf, The WhiteHouse, Beauvoir (the home of Jef-ferson Davis) and some otherswere undisturbed. Even the oldLight House at Biloxi was stillstanding, straight and tall.

We were convinced that the twohelicopters we had wouldn t beenough. It was also clear that anynight operations would be extreme-ly dangerous since the warninglights on top of towers and otherobstructions were not operating.

As darkness closed in, we landedat Gulfport Municipal and weremet by Lieutenant Colonel LeonardG. Tingle, the Mississippi Nation-al Guard aviation officer. His brief-ing that night confirmed our esti-mation s to the intensity of thedisaster. By this time over a hun-dred deaths had been reported withmore to come.The next morning we flew west-ward to complete our reconnais-sance and saw even greater de-struction along the Mississippicoast. The west end of Gulfportwas about 3 percent destroyed,Long Beach suffered about 60 per-cent destruction and from thewestern limits of Long Beach toPass Christian everything was gone.

JULY 1970

Above all along the beach and extending back several blocks there wasalmost total destruction Below at Pass Christian the storm sheared thefront section of a church leaving the back section containing the altar intact

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Above although the destruction at Biloxi was bad t was even worsewest of Gulfport Bay St Louis was more than 80 percent destroyed andWaveland almost completely wiped off the map. Below huge ships hadbeen washed aground in the Gulfport area. The port was heavily damaged

Roads were washed out or blocked by fallen t

Above boats of all sizes were left several blofrom water Below a barge broke its moorinand was on the highway running along the coast

U S RMY VI TION DIGEST


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Army search and rescue missions flown over the Bay St. Louis arearevealed extensive destruction and many people in need of assistanceBay St. Louis was about 80 per-cent destroyed and Waveland wascompletely wiped off the map.Just about every road we ob-served was blocked by fallen treesand washed out bridges. Hugeships had been washed aground inthe Gulfport harbor which wasdamaged extensively. Boats of allsizes were left high and dry someblocks away from the water. Ahuge barge had broken its moor-ings and was left on the highway.The bridge across Bay St. Louissuffered the same kind of damageits sister bridge had at Biloxi. naddition it had some of its con-crete pilings damaged.

Our reconnaissance showed thathelicopters would playa major rolein the rescue operations; they werethe only means of getting food water and other help to many

stranded people. Also transporta-tion was needed by officials engi-neers and other rescue workers toproperly monitor the flow of aidand organize the rebuilding of thearea.Somehow we were able to ~ t i s f ythe most urgent needs of theofficials and civilians. Red Crossfacilities were being set up andthey also required help to bring insupplies.On Wedriesday morning oursearch and rescue mission was con-centrated on the Bay St. Louisarea. Despite being hampered bylow clouds and fog we conducteda diligent search and soon locatedpeople in need of assistance. Weflew directly over one couple whoseemed to be in distress. We wereable to land several blocks awayand after wading through the mud

Army helicopters evacuated thousandsof homeless victims in wake of Camilleand water found that the lady hada broken arm; also neither hadeaten since Sunday.We knew that there had to beothers in the area needing imme-diate care so the man volunteeredto have those he could find gatherat a better landing spot for evacua-tion. Those who were not ambula-tory would be made as comfortables possible until we could fly inmedical assistance and evacuatethem. n each case we left Crations and water and reported thelocation of the victims to authori-ties at GuJfport. Fortunately theweather allowed evacuation to be-gin early Wednesday afternoon andthe Red Cross was able to set upan emergency hospital in Bay St.Louis.Soon more Army helicopters be-gan arriving. Elements of the 177th

In each case the locations of the victims were reported andthen C rations, water and other supplies were distributed

Word of Army aviation s rescue operations spread and re-quests for assistance soon poured in from civilian agencies


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Impassable roads took many days to clear, a fact thataccented the need for Army helicopter transportation

and 197th Aviation Companiesfrom Ft. Benning, Ga., arrivedWednesday, complete with operations and maintenance personneland equipment. LTC Carver organized a provisional unit and des-ignated Major George S Crawford

197th Aviation Company) as itscommander.Civil agencies in the area learnedof Army aviation s operations andtheir requests for assistance poured

rmy maintenance personnel did out-standing jobs during Operation Camille

in. Direct coordination with theRed Cross and other civil agencieswas established. This greatly facili-tated the disposition of the injuredand refugees.With more helicopters available,we were able to intensify oursearch and rescue mission. One ofthe problems we encountered waspersuading some of the peoplewithout children to take the foodand water. They felt that someoneelse might need the supplies morethan they did. Only after we ex-plained that we had plenty and itwould be best for them to take thefood and eat regularly did theyaccept.We also found many who re-fused to be evacuated, some still ina state of shock. This created aproblem in that we had to keepthem supplied and furnish medicalaid until they agreed to be moved.

About this time a body recoveryteam was set up. All bodies dis-covered were reported by radioand most of the recovery was doneby the U. S Navy, Coast Guardand National Guard. A system wasestablished and a highly effectivejob was accomplished in this area.

Work in the coastal area wascontinued Thursday and consistedmainly of aiding the Red Cross.

Supplies were flown to Wiggins, Miss.,in CH 47s and then loaded in UH-ls

We carried doctors, nurses, supplies, evacuees and furnished helpin any other way possible. By lateThursday the emergency requirements of the coastal area had beenmet. Ground vehicles again movedwith relative ease. Elements of theArmy Engineers from Ft. Benningand Ft. Rucker had arrived anddid an excellent job of road clearing, which lessened the helicoptetransportation requirements.Friday morning we were joinedby OH-6A observation helicopterfrom Ft. Rucker and we begansearch operations to the north othe coast. The OH-6s were a bighelp in that they could be landedin areas too small for the UH-l sWe had assumed that only thecoast was damaged; however, wesoon learned that extensive damageexisted inland. In the Jordon Riveestates area near Bay St. Louis wefound 25 families completely isolated, homeless, without food owater and needing medical aid.By the number of downed treesand buildings we could see thaliterally thousands of tornadoeshad touched down as far north a70 miles and across the entirsouthwest end of Mississippi.

Landing at several homes wedetermined that many people were8 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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in the same status as those wefound in the Jordon River area.Every road was cut by fallen treespower was still out bridge abutments had been washed out homesdestroyed and dead animals wereeverywhere.I t was obvious that a differenttype of operation was now needed.Saturday morning we set up a forward base at the small airport atWiggins Miss. We used air cavalryreconnaissance techniques similarto those employed in the Republicof Vietnam. The difference wasthat here the OH-6s would locatepeople in need of aid and call inthe UH-ls with the required assistance. In Vietnam the OH-6slocate the enemy and call in UH-1gunships to attack.A team of two OH-6s and oneUH-l was assigned to each sector.

The UH-1 was the team lead. Instead of weapons it carried acivilian doctor a Red Cross representative and a load of medicalsupplies food water bedding andclothing. When the scouts foundan area in need the Huey landed.While the supplies were unloadedand the doctors were working thescouts would continue their search.This proved to be a very effectivetechnique and allowed us to covera large area in only a few minutes.Resupply was made more easilyavailable by the movement of supplies from Gulfport to Wiggins byCH-47s. These Hooks also wereused to ferry supplies to the RedCross centers in other towns in thearea and to evacuate large numbersof people.Eventually the work at Wigginswas absorbed by the Red Crossand engineers. Our mission nowbecame one of ferrying governmentofficials and VIPs. Some of theaircraft returned to their homebases and by Sunday all had been

The hurricane left many bridges badlydamaged nd stymied ground transportat ion but not the Army s helicoptersJULY 1970

Air c v reconnaissance methods like those used in Vietnam were employed. OH-6slocated people in distress nd called in UH ls with medical aid, food and water

released except the first two UH-l sand two OH-6s from Ft. Rucker.These helicopters were used to aidthe engineers power companiesetc. and to ill miscellaneous utilitymissions for an additional 3 weeks.The fact that there were no accidents involving Army aircraft orpersonnel and the magnitude of thejob accomplished in so short a timespeaks well of the training and experience of Army aviators andtheir crews.Though all pilots concerned inthe mission were Vietnam veterans

this was a different type job withwhich we were confronted. A greatdeal was learned about organizingand conducting operations in thewake of a natural disaster.Camille a vicious unwantedkiller left much sorrow. But thegrief surely would have been greater had it not been for the quickresponse of Army aviation units.And the invaluable experienceArmy aviators gained during Operation Camille will lessen the impact even more when an arousedMother Nature strikes a g a i n ~

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ARmy AIR CREwmEnAnD

JEEP DRIUERS DISEASEaior William T Stubenbord

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


13/68

ONE OF THE TIDNGS thatyour flight surgeon checks forduring a physical examination isthe presence of a pilonidal sinus.To the public this is both a poorlyunderstood and dreaded condition.In the military service it is of greatconcern because of the much higher incidence in young men. Inaviators, particularly, it poses special problems since they often sitfor prolonged periods of time in aconfined and sometimes vibratoryposition.

In the usual sense, pilonidalsinus refers to the presence at thebase of the spine of a skin-linedopening (sinus) which extendsdeep into the underskin and sometimes down to the bones of thelower back. When the sinus becomes closed or plugged with hairand skin secretions, a cyst isformed and this often becomes infected from the bacteria present.This infected cyst becomes swollen, red and extremely painful. Asa result the cyst will either ruptureon its own or, more commonly, thepatient will consult a doctor because of the pain and swelling. Theinfected cyst will then have to belanced after using local anesthesia.

People who sit a great deal andat the same time are subjected torepeated skin irritation, such asaviators, get into more difficultywith this condition. This accountsfor the term jeep drivers' diseasethat was used in World War II toidentify pilonidal disease n military jargon. Patricularly then theuse of an aircraft's hard seats thatare hot and vibrate a great dealwill be poorly tolerated by thosewith a pilonidal sinus or cyst and(as will be noted later) may actually cause them to develop.The origin of a pilonidal sinusis still a matter of considerable dispute among physicians. There aretwo widely held theories describing how the sinus originates. Oneschool of thought is based on theidea that the condition is a con-JULY 1970

genital one (we are born with it).There is, however, considerableevidence against this thought,especially in view of the fact thatit is extremely rare to see such asinus in infants and children. Theother, and now more widely accepted concept of pilonidal disease,is that t is an acquired conditionresulting from ingrown hair. Thisis supported by the fact that pilonidal sinuses are more common inmen (2: 1) and especially in hairyindividuals. The condition usuallyappears in adolescence and mostcommonly becomes symptomaticin the age group 20 to 30.

eople who sit a great dealnd also suffer repeated

skin irritation are likely tocontact pilonidal disease apainfu nd dreaded condition

What is the treatment for thiscondition? As noted previously, inthe presence of active inflammation and a swollen, sore, infectedcyst, simple incision and drainageare performed just as would bedone for any other boil. This doesnot solve the problem because asthe wound heals remnants of hairand skin remain in the wound andusually infection and drainage offluid will recur in the future. Oftenthe wo und will never completelyheal and drainage will persist indefinitely. Active infection of apilonidal sinus or cyst, or persistent

drainage of fluid from the cyst orsinus, are conditions requiring amedical restriction from flying according to the Medical Standardsfor Flying AR 40-501, chapter4).

For the individual who has slow,persistent drainage and the individual with previous attacks ofinfection which have cleared up,the usual recommendation is thatremoval of the entire involved areabe performed as a surgical procedure. This requires hospitalizationand anesthesia. There are severaldifferent operations that have beenrecommended to cure this condi-tion and this simply reflects the factthat no perfect method exists forcuring the disease. Total removalof the involved area, with surgicalclosure of the wound, would be thefastest way to attempt this but,unfortunately, high rates of infection in the wound as well as recurrences of the disease occur withthis treatment. By far the lowestrecurrence rate results by simplyremoving the area of pilonidal disease and allowing the,open woundto heal on its own. However, therecovery time involved here is long,averaging at least 6 weeks andoften up to 3 or 4 months. Duringthat time the individual can function well but is required to takefrequent showers or baths to keepthe wound clean and, because ofthe open wound, finds sitting somewhat uncomfortable. For aviatorsthis, of course, precludes flying andit, therefore, means a medical restriction for several months. Oncehealed, however, it is rare that apilonidal sinus or cyst removed inthis fashion will reoccur.

It is interesting to note that thisis a condition seen rarely in majormedical centers and in the usualpractice of medicine, yet in military hospitals and dispensaries it isa matter of routine. For aviatorsit is a frustrating process to awaitthe complete healing and therebythe restoration to flight status .. .e.

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tudes could be expected due to thetropical climate and should be considered when carrying loads.One U. S Air Force C-133Awould carry our UH-1H Hueys,crews and equipment. Liftoff timewas 2300 hours 19 September withan estimated time en route of

06+ 00. The disassembly and loading of the Hueys would be my responsibility. The proper shots andrecords to include orders wereitems of priority. Navigationalcharts , maps and supplements inlimited quantity were available inthe S-2 shop. The briefing endedwith a reminder that we would beguests of the Guatemalan government and that we should conductourselves accordingly.As I left the briefing room, Istarted thinking of flight manifests,spare parts, special tools, facilitiesavailable at our destination, disassembly, the language barrier andwater that probably wasn t potable.After selecting the helicopters tobe used, I tackled the problem ofloading them into the aircraft. Ifelt confident that someone in ourbattalion had done this before, butdecided it would be quicker andeasier to enlist the help of RedRiver Army Depot personnel whooften are called upon to performsuch a feat.In spite of my fears, it went offwithout a hitch. By 1800 hours theC-133A was loaded with theHueys and equipment. Three ofour UH IHs were stripped of theirmain rotor blades, main rotor hub ,mast, tail rotor assemblies and tailbooms. The tail booms werestacked on top of the helicoptercabins using piggyback kits. The

rest of the items were placed underneath and alongside the Hueys.The fourth Huey was similarly disassembled except that the tailboom was left intact. Twenty-onepassenger type seats were mountedin the ramp area. The remainingpassengers would ride up front inthe crew compartment.JULY 1970

At 2330 hours we were on ourway. After a three-hour layover atKelly AFB, Tex. , we touched downin Guatemala City at 0922 localtime.A strange feeling came over usas the giant ramp was lowered andwe sat there still buckled in looking at the Guatemalan people whilethey looked back at us. Approximately 100 curious people hadgathered around the C-133A togreet us.We were met by the President ofGuatemala along with the U. SMilitary Group commander andthe operations officer for theGuatemalan Air Force.While the crew chiefs and maintenance personnel unloaded thehelicopters, the pilots were givena briefing by the operations officer.He said that the hardest hit areawas an area of about 30 by 100miles along the lowlands of thesouthern coast (Pacific).Hurricane Francelia had pushedthe waters of the Pacific Oceanover the coastline and created severe flooding. Roads, bridges, railroads and homes had been washedaway. There were many villagescut off from the rest of the world.Food and water were at a premiumand not available at some places.Many of the people were sick andneeded medical aid.With the situation looking prettygrim, we went about the task ofgetting the Hueys offioaded andflyable. I estimated it would benoon the next day before the firstbird would be ready and possiblylate evening for the others.

The lack of ramp extensionswas a minor problem which delayed offloading. However, we improvised with half a dozen 2 x 6inch pieces of lumber to make afairly good ramp.As soon as the helicopters wereoffloaded, we started reassemblyoperations. As usual some boltsand parts were installed easily andothers were not. Our good topnotch technical inspector and acomplete set of TMs were a greathelp.The U. S Military Group inGuatemala had made prior reservations at a local motel for us sowe were able to work well into thenight without having to worryabout sleeping accommodations.The inevitable human factor of fatigue had been present since ourentire trip was performed at night.Working the rest of the day andnight certainly didn t help.Nevertheless, we were busy trying to weave our Hueys into flyingmachines early the next morning.I got so carried away getting themflyable that I almost forgot wherewe were and why we were there.By midday the first helicopterwas ready and the Guatemalan AirForce operations officer, myselfand the other aircraft commandersmade an area orientation ride viahelicopter. The active volcanoesand magnificent countryside provided a breath-taking view. Not sobreath taking was the area whereHurricane Francelia had hit.Minus the artillery craters andViet Cong, it looked like the Republic of Vietnam all over again.

Hungry villagers greeted food laden rmy helicopters


16/68

Approximately 80 percent of thebridges were washed away and themajority of the roads could not betraveled by motor vehicles. I estimated that 65 percent of the cropswere destroyed or unuseable. Manyof the grass hooch-type homeswere strewed about the countryside as if somebody had flown overthe country and dropped grassroofs at random.

The natives at a village calledLa Esperanza (meaning hope orbeing hopeful) told us that some ofthe villagers either had not eatenor had just barely enough to eat inthe last four or five days. The onlyclothes some had were those theywere wearing and they were badlyworn and patched.

One Guatemalan cowboy reported seeing groups of live cattlefloating downriver toward theocean. He managed to lasso andpull five cows out of the rushingwaters.

Upon return to Guatemala City,I found that two of our birds wereready to fly They were dispatchedimmediately. By noon of the following day we were 100 percentoperational.The area was broken down intosectors so that we could systematically cover the entire area. Centersof operation, supply depots andrefueling points were located atSan Jose and Retalhuleu. A subrefueling point was located at Santa Gara to give us more time onstation.Initially, emphasis was placed oncarrying foods such as corn, beans,rice, coffee, salt, sugar and Crations to individual homes andisolated villages. As one villager

put it, We were a sight for hungryeyes." A sense of satisfaction andof being able to help my fellowman in time of need was indeedworth every second of flight time.Damage assessment crews fromthe Corps of Engineers in the Panama Canal Zone arrived on 1 7September and began to assist the14

Guatemalan government in damageasse sment operations from the airand on the ground. Local medicalteams were transported to thestricken areas to render medicalaid. The need for medical aid anddamage assessment was determined by the reports rendered bythe helicopter crews during debriefing periods. The GuatemalanArmy furnished a trained pathfinder who was familiar with thearea. Since only five members ofthe team could speak Spanish, hewas a great help in communicatingwith the local populace.

In many in tances the local villagers were able to direct us toplaces where relief was badlyneeded. On one of our first sortieswe were met by four naked, hungrychildren and an elderly gentlemanclad in a loincloth. They reluctantly accepted the C rations wegave them, but told us they didn'tknow what to do with the canopener and all the little packages.Since I could speak Spanish, I conducted a class in accordance withTM C rations, page 38, from theproper method of opening Cration cans to chewing gum. Itwas necessary to repeat this instruction at almost every stop wemade.Shortly after we arrived, ourhelicopter armada was reinforcedwith two other UH-IH helicoptersand one UH-19 from the Guatemalan Air Force. This welcomedaddition to our little fleet didn'tlast long, however. Maintenance.problems knocked out one UH-IHand the UH-19. The other UH-IHstayed with us until we terminatedthe mission.

Due to high density altitudes Irestricted our aircraft to 2,000pounds internal load, pilot, copilot,crew chief, pathfinder and one observer per sortie. This restrictionseemed reasonable and got the jobdone nicely.

At the end of each day we leftour helicopters at a small airfield

located near San Jose and thGuatemalan Air Force furnished C-47 to ferry us back and forth tGuaemala City. The FAG (FUEZA Aera de Guatemala), or Guatemalan Air Force, also transporte55-gallon drums of JP-4 to ourefueling points.

Everything was going goodwe were getting plenty of flightime and the mission was goinwell. Then, CRASH FOD tooits toll of one Huey.A hasty examination showethat the fir t and second stage compressors were badly damaged. Howit happened is stili a mystery to usWe transported the FOD-strickebird via U. S Air Force C-130 tGuatemala City (La Aurora Aiport).Sand and grit from having thover and fly around the coascoupled with salt water spray othe ocean, created an urgent neefor helicopter hygiene. t was necessary to fly the helicopters bacto Guatemala City every other daso the maintenance crew coulwash and clean the entire aircrafAnd so it went for 11 days. Whauled 217,475 pounds of cargo520 passengers and 14 medevacin 379 sorties. Our total flyintime was 136:25 hours.To get us back to the States, thU. S Air Force furnished us twC-124s. We had little difficultgetting the helicopters loaded intthe two aircraft except for the extreme ramp angle and the widtof the UH-l ground handlinwheels. TM l-UH-ls gave us somhelpful hints that could makthings a lot easier. However, wdidn't have the ground handlinwheel modification kit (FSN 1730760-3368) that it called for. Localy fabricated ramp extensions provided the answer.With all four UH-IHs, equipment and personnel loaded aboarthe two C-124s, we left Guatemalwith thoughts of friends we hamade during our stay.

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGES


17/68

ttackHelicopter UtilizationNot enough has been done to teach nonrated commanders howto properly ,se attack helicopters in combat Thus chopperstoo often have been employed when a mission could have beenmore effectively and efficiently accomplished by other means

Lieutenant Daniel J. Blaney

T S ABOUT TIME a good hard look was taken atutilization and employment of attack helicopters.To insure that the prope r use is made of these expen-sive machines, all commanders should ask them-selves: Am I employing attack helicopters to the maxi-mum degree without overcommitting all availableforces? Am I assigning attack helicopters to missionsrightfully belonging to other support elements suchas mechanized infantry, artillery or scout units, bothair and ground?When I do deploy attack helicopters to perform amission other than escort or direct aerial fire sup-port, have I ensured that no other means is available tomeet the commitment? checked with all sources to find out if a re-connaissance was performed recently and if so, hasthat intelligence information been made available? ensured that combat units are available in case

JULY 1970

the mission develops into a fight?There are numerous other questions that requireanswering but I believe these are sufficient to stir upinterest among aviation and ground unit commandersto insure that their subordinates (and especially theiroperations officers) understand the principles of utili-zation and employment of attack helicopters. Thisneed has been recognized by all branches of theArmy but not met.There is a general officers aviation course con-ducted at the U. S Army Aviation School, Ft. Ruck-

er , Ala., and in some branches, from advanced courselevel up, classes have been implemented to cover em-ployment of attack helicopters. But not enough hasbeen done to educate the nonrated company gradeofficers and junior noncommissioned officers on at-tack helicopter techniques.

Answer this question: Who employs attack heli-copters in the role of direct aerial fire support themost? That s right, it s the nonra ted junior officers15


18/68

and enlisted men. Certainly more effective classesfor the junior company grade and noncommissionedofficer should be established to help ensure thatattack helicopters are used in the proper manner.Let's consider a few e..xamples of misuse.Reconnaissance by fire: Can you imagine thestaggering number of flight hours misused accomplishing reconnaissance-by-fire missions? I domean misused not overused for almost every reconby fire performed by attack helicopters could be performed by a direct support 105 or 155 artillery battery adjusted by a reconnaissance aircraft. Let's lookat this from a cost reduction aspect. Which aircraftcost less to fly-an 0-1, OH-6A, OH-58A or a fullyarmed UH I C or AH-IG? What can fire moreexplosives and effective rounds at a less overall costa 105 battery or a light fire team? The 105 is mypick and probably yours.Another question and probably the biggie ofthem all: Using the above facts just how should youconduct a recon-by-fire to ensure less cost plus bestresults with less exposure? Right again, most all reconnaissances should be conducted by scout aircraftwith supporting artillery thus leaving the attack helicopters to function in their organic roles.That s the general overall cost reduction picture.Now let's consider the utilization of aircraft. Let'ssay you do send out your one mission-ready fire team

on a recon and a fight develops. That would meanthe attack helicopters probably will perform a targetattack before disengaging. About 50 percent of theordnance would be expended and half the fuel loadused.After the disengagement the fire team leader willnotify his unit , or whatever unit is on standby, toinitiate a combat assault. This would then present theproblem of who is to escort the slicks from the landing zone (LZ) to the pickup zone (PZ). Who willperform the LZ prep and hot escort and who will remain on station giving the friendlies air cover anddirect fire support, if necessary? Only a prearrangedstandby fire team could perform the mission. A morepressing question would be who is going to stay onstation to determine the direction of enemy movement after the disengagement? f scout aircraft wereused in the first place this would not be a problem.Just to throw a little something into the gamewhat happens if one of those two mission-readyattack helicopters was crippled or shot down duringthe engagement? Your unit better be very fast incoordinating or else your decision to employ attackhelicopters in a recon role will have caused a target ofopportunity to be missed plus unnecessarily exposinga .fire team. This should lead to the general rule: fthe recon can be performed by a scout unit, ensure

16

that it is performed by that type unit and leave thattack helicopters to perform their primary missionsOverprotection: Yes, there is such a thing and I'give two typical examples.How often have you seen a heavy fire team antwo UH 1 DI Hs supporting one UH 1 carrying VIPsThat's six aircraft involved in transporting a fewVIPs. Certainly, it is necessary to supply our VIPwith enough firepower to silence any enemy contacthat they may encounter, but please notice that used the word silence not destroy. Certainly, a lighfire team could support this mission as well withouoverutilizing aircraft and still provide adequate coveThe same applies to the two UH-l chaseshipOnly one should be utilized. This would allow thaviation unit assigned the mission to distribute itworkload in a more reasonable manner, thus maintaining the same level of support but with an increasin overall efficiency.Target attacks: I m not going to speak about thattack helicopter's role in providing direct aerial firsupport, but rather about the numerous times thathese ships have been committed to action as flyininfantry helicopters in support of no one but themselves.You say that's never happened? Then explain thiin any other terminology other than the catchaphrase combat necessity . A report is relayed froman aerial scout ship that a squad of North VietnamesArmy troops has been spotted just outside of artillerrange. The troops are heading south along a diknear numerous wooded areas. Most commanderwould immediately deploy a fire team with the as

sumption that it would be capable of handling thsituation.Are they really? What if the enemy either becomesuspicious of reconnaissance aircraft or hears approaching helicopters and withdraws into the treline? Then, just how useful is the normal armamensubsystem and munitions in such a case? Hardly anat all.Face the facts-if the fire team is outstanding, thtree line is sparse and the enemy stays in one generaarea, perhaps half of his number will either be killeor wounded (KBA or WBA) by air or artillery. Anyway, by the next day no evidence of the encounte

will remain other than a few broken tree limbs annumerous bullet holes.Now, let's take the same situation but instead oemploying the attack helicopters alone we'll deploenough troops to cut off the main escape routes, theattack the target. By the end of the battle, if aforces are brought together in the proper sequenceall the enemy should either be KW A, WBA oprisoners.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGES


19/68

Don t send six helicopters to do the job of three be they slicks or gunships

Although the above stated situation is simpleand the rule most evident, it is in itself the biggestsin committed both for, by and against aviation units.Just think, you old-timer gunship drivers, about thenumber of times you performed this mission withoutsupporting infantry units? f you don't run out offingers you were in an above average unit.Escort This is truly a sore spot. On numerous occasions I was detailed to cover convoys from QuinNhon to Bong Son in the Republic of Vietnam.Covering a convoy didn 't mind one bit, for that'sone of the missions of both aviation and mechanizedunits. Some people have the opinion that air coveris the more warranted of the two and that it is usedfor immediate, explosive and violent response. However, sooner or later the aircraft must run out of fuelor ammunition and then it's up to organic firepowerto take over. But, what if provisions were not madeto have another fire team available on five-minutealert? What if the unit assigned the mission to provide cover for the convoy has its standby crew godown for maintenance or called out on another mission just before the convoy gets attacked? What ifone ship from both of the fire teams gets shot downor suffers a mechanical malfunction during theirrespective attacks?These situations are not just dreamed up ; theyhappenea to me on numerous occasions and probably many of you have requested just one fire teamto provide support and received the immediate reply, Sorry, no gunships available at this time. Then you think to yourself, don't those aviatorsever fly? never stopping to realize that the unit youare calling may have truly overcommitted its available forces without having provided for other unitsJULY 1970

to take over some of its missions if necessary.oo much available firepower This situation canand does exist. Let's assume that infantry units areto be lifted into prearranged encircling positions.During the initial assault all LZs will be preppedby heavy fire teams. There will be five initial LZswith simultaneous touchdowns planned, plus an additional three sorties for each LZ.

The initial assault goes as planned and then threeof the five heavy teams return to rearm and refuel.Then they are placed on standby until the two heavyteams on station need relief. This is a mistake in myestimation, for it is seldom that the fire teams couldbe employed until after the ground troops have deployed. This takes time which could be used to reorganize the heavy fire teams into six light fire teams.This would maintain the some degree of aerial coverbut reduce the overall flight time on the aircraft andpilots. Some of the attack helicopters could even bereleased to conduct attacks on predetermined targetswithin the encirclement operation or return to homebase. f this attitude was adopted an all around increase in direct fire support capability, with a definitedecrease in total flight time per ship and turn-aroundtime, would be felt.Although many misuses of attack helicopters areevident, there is no other field of Army aviation thatperforms assigned tasks in a more professional oroutstanding manner. But, there is always room forimprovement. Commanders must take the time toreevaluate their mission assignments. By readingFM-I-IOO and FM 1 40 they can obtain definite information , data and priorities on employment, maintenance and developments in the attack helicopterfield.17


20/68

HURRICANE CAMILLEHad Seen What n Ordinary Hurricane Can 0..

ALL DAY SUNDAY, 17August 1969, I followed thepath of Hurricane Camille as itmoved steadily northward in theGulf of Mexico toward Mississippiand Louisiana. I had seen what anordinary hurricane can do and thisone was particularly vicious. I wasworried about the destruction itwould cause and was concernedfor the people living in its path.Silently I thanked heaven that myfamily and I were hundreds ofmiles away and that I was not personally involved.

But my thankfulness was shortlived. Late that afternoon my telephone rang and I was no longerjust a sympathetic bystander. Theduty officer at Ft. Hood, Tex., wascalling with a mission for me. TheU.S. Army engineers at New Orleans were going to need helicopters to assist in the cleanup and rebuilding operation after Camillehad passed and I had been appointed officer in charge.

The Army aviation support mission was divided among the 1stArmored Division, 2nd ArmoredDivision and the 55th Aviation

Battalion. Each was to supply oneaircraft and crews.Besides myself, the crew members were CPT Richard Bares,CW2 Paul S Fitch, CW2 RichardWeiss, CW2 John D. Reed, CW2Robert Chison, CW2 JamesDaugharty, CW2 Peter T. Hollman, CW2 Charles R. Normand,CW2 Robert L. Cowell, SP6 Kenneth N. Testa, SP5 Michael SJaworski, SP5 Mitchell Morrow,SP5 Mike A. Pinkalla and SP5Johnny Cash.All pilots and crew memberswere alerted at approximately2100 hours. This was about thesame time Camille was sweepinginland, leaving a wake of destruction.

At a late night planning sessionit was decided to take off at 0600the following morning. We wereworried about the weather at ourdestination because following ahurricane the weather can be verynasty for several days. However,Camille s eye had passed inland atWaveland, Miss., east of New Orleans. Even though Camille was avery intense hurricane it did notspread out over a wide area as

some do. Consequently, we fthat by the time we reached NeOrleans the weather would clear.After a 4 1/ 2 -hour flight and twrefueling stops, two of our UH arrived at Collander Field NavAir Station, La. The third helicoter had minor mechanical trouband arrived 2 hours later.As soon as I set down I cotacted MAJ Steve West, depuengineer of the New Orleans Dtrict. We had just finished a cof coffee when he arrived withfist full of sorties for us to fly

At a short briefing session MAWest explained the situation.the 4th Army area the hurricahad hit Plaquemines, St BernarWashington, St. Tammany andportion of Lafourche parish(counties are called parishes Louisiana). He said that a larportion of the land in this areaat about sea level or even beloand that water in the MississipRiver and the numerous bayoare contained by levees. The leveare designed to withstand hurcanes and he felt that for the mopart they had held. Sometim


21/68

h rmy Operations~ a i o r J i m m i e S . F o r a

there are two levees--one in frontalong the body of water and aback levee designed to keep outwater from the low land behindthe built-up area.Unfortunately, when there is asmuch rain as accompanied thishurricane water builds up betweenthe levees. The only way to get itout quickly is by pumping.M l West felt that surface

transportation would be quicklyrestored where it had beenknocked out. Being a marshy sec -tion of the country, many roadshave extremely high roadbeds thatkeep them above flood waters.Also, the strong, high levees nextto the rivers and bayous can beused for roads in emergencies. Hefurther explained that in theaffected area most of the inhabitants have boats and pirogues[canoe-shaped boats]. He was surethese would be quickly pressed intoservice where road transportationwas impossible.We would not be the only aircraft flying in the area. CoastGuard aircraft would fly survivaland rescue missions over thelarge bodies of water, extending 40

miles into the gulf. The CoastGuard had 14 aircraft availableand also would use two 210-footcutters in the Southwest Pass area.National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration aircraft wouldphotograph the disaster area andmake detailed mosaics for bothimmediate and future use. Emergency rations of food and waterwere to be flown in by the U.S.Air Force.t did not seem that we wouldneed to fly rescue missions forthe civilian population. The coastal region of Louisiana has a longhistory of hurricanes and the people have learned to get out of theirway. Most vividly recall HurricaneBetsy s recent sweep through thisvery same area and the extensivedamage she inflicted.

In some areas--especially thehard hit Plaquemines Parish theevacuation prior to the hurricanewas almost complete. The RedCross estimated that nearly 42,000persons were being sheltered, 10,-000 of these were from Plaquemines alone.

Our first sorties were flowndown the Mississippi River to look

for damage to the levees and placeswhere leaks must be plugged. Wepaid particular attention to thearea between Port Sulphur andVenice, La . Then we spread outover the entire area of Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes.After this we flew northward tocheck Washington and St. Tammany parishes.The reconnaisance convinced usthat Plaquemines was by far thehardest hit and would require considerable aid. The parish had suffered from heavy rains and extremely high winds and tides. Toadd to the problem there was anelectric power failure over the entire parish affecting sanitation facilities, water supplies and hospitalneeds.Flooding was the main cause ofdamage in St. Bernard Parish.Washington and St. Tammanywere mostly affected by the highwinds and their biggest problemwas the litter that seemed to beeverywhere.

In UT flights over the lowerreaches of the Mississippi Riverwe spotted nine seagoing shipsgrounded near the Head of Passes.


22/68

Aerial surveys conducted with Army helicopters provided Armyengineers with the information required to conduct the m ssiverebuilding operation needed in the w ke o Hurricane Camille

We also noted 65 crewboats,barges and tugs lying completelyout of the water and on top of, oron the slopes of, the west bankMississippi River levee just aboveFort Jackson. An additional 15pieces of floating equipment werebeached on the riverbanks and onthe foreshore protection levee below New Orleans. Five sunkenbarges were noted along the riverbanks.As a result of these and othersurveys, the engineers were ableto make their plans. The key to theoperation was to dry up the areaso that it would be possible to clearout the debris, restore telephonecommunication, get electric poweroperating again and take othernecessary rebuilding steps.

There were some stationarypumps in the area but most wereout of action; emergency pumpshad to be brought in from NewOrleans and St. Louis, Mo. Twohuge hydraulic dredges that wereworking near New Orleans werepressed into service. They proceeded full speed down the Barataria Bay waterway after our reconnaissance ensured that thisroute was clear. The dredges arrived Friday morning (22 August

and began pumping over the backlevee in the Empire and Burasarea.One barge had a 20-inch suction line and was capable of pumping 1,200,000 gallons of water anhour, while the other had a 24-inchline and could pump 1,800,000gallons an hour.In addition to these dredges,eight II-inch emergency pumps

and one 16-inch pump from St.Louis were ordered into the area.In Plaquemines, a 12-inch pumpalready was in operation. In all,they pumped out more than 5.5million gallons of water per hour.

When the area around Empire(the upstream limit of the flooding was dried out, pumps weremoved south to remove flood waters from areas with lower elevations.Besides the Corps of Engineers,Army aircraft also were flown forthe Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the Office ofEmergency Planning; the SmallBusiness Administration; local andnational civilian authorities; andthe Red Cross.

Two flights were made to BatonRouge so engineers could conferwith the governor of the state and

one flight was made to GulfpoMiss., with a load of medical suplies.For the most part we hadweight problem; the cargos wewell within our limits. At one timhowever, a 2,500-pound reductio

gear had to be airlifted to a puming plant in Venice. A CH-47 hecopter working out of Gulfpoflew the special mission for us.During the first week we fleall three of our Hueys from abo

0800 to 1800 each day. The seond and third week, however, wwere able to get by with only twaircraft. Two of our UH-l s rturned to Ft. Hood on 11 September, with the third continuing fly the mission until 27 SeptembeOur flying time for the entire mision was 222.1 hours.

We had no fuel problems sinwe were based at Collander FielHowever, there would have bea problem if we had needed torescue missions in areas as faway as Plaquemine.A minor problem was encounered communicating with the unwe were supporting. They did nhave radios that would net wiours. Faster coordination of add

tional missions could have beaccomplished had a good radio sytem been available.Also, it is strongly recommend

that an air liaison officer who ccoordinate with other units woring in the area be available to aas advisor to the supported unThis would eliminate duplicamissions and result in better uof the aircraft. f the liaison offichas radios, it also would eliminathe communication problem.Crews going to a disaster arshould be prepared to stay for extended period of time. In ocase we did not think- we would in New Orleans as long as wwere, so we did not bring sufficiclothes and other supplies. But

didn t find time to visit the FrenQuarter anyway. .;;i

20 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGES


23/68

VIRGINI DIS STER RELIEFHURRICANE Camille, afterslashing through the southcentral United States last year,existed with a flood-producingdownpour across the state of Virginia. Rivers and streams swelledto many times their normal sizeand, along with a sea of mud androck, slammed into whole townsand villages. Where a quiet villagehad stood undisturbed since Lee sArmy straggled through on its wayto Appomattox and destiny, therewas now nothing but engorgedmountain streams and the scatteredrubble of homes, churches, schoolsand stores.

It was in this area that Army aviators flew more than 800 missionsof mercy in helicopters from Ft.

Major D. T. rby Jr.

Eustis, Va. They found that despitecertain unique aspects of the overall mission the flight requirementsand operational procedures werenot difficult, nor beyond equipmentcapabilities.

The nature of the rescue andresupply mission in Virginia wassuch that the Army aviator wasable to apply his training-it wasjust packaged a little differentlythan most assignments he normallyreceives.

The operation required the pooling of a large number of the aviation and support elements availableto the First U. S. Army and theContinental Army Command student training program. Althoughinitially pooled, the assets were

subsequently deployed in smallunits to adequately support themany disaster stricken communities in Rockbridge and Nelsoncounties , Virginia.This deployment principal wasfamiliar to the Army aviator because, except for major lift effortsin the Republic of Vietnam, hefrequently operates in small unittype operations of 5 to 1 0 aircraft.

Effective deployment of the aircraft presented problems and considerations which had to be facedby the major command, the unitcommander and the aircraft commanders.

The major commander Army)had to deploy his assets in a man-

During the operation Army aviators flew more than 800 mercy flights They found th t despite certain unique aspectsof the mission the flight requirements nd operational procedures were not difficult nor beyond equipment capabilities


24/68

TL NTICOCE N

P TH OF HURRIC NE C MILLEner that would accomplish the disaster relief mission and still allowhim to meet his other requirements. Coordination had to be effected at the highest level of command and with the state government to establish a base of operations for the relief support requirement. The operations base wasneeded to coordinate the efforts ofthe entire relief support role, inform the civilian leaders of thecapabilities of equipment availableto the state s relief effort, serve asa collection point for data and coordinate with the Red Cross Salvation Army, state police andother state and federal governmentagencies. Fuel and maintenancesupport for equipment, plus foodand quarters for the aircraft crews,had to be coordinated with theArmy area installations and stateagencies. The major command alsohad the responsibility of acceptingthe initial support request, arranging funding, determining the extentof the support to be offered andassigning the mission to an Armyinstallation.

The unit commander had tomake certain basic plans. He decided upon the aircraft to be used,then prepared all the support requirements. He had aircraft records checked to- determine when22

scheduled maintenance inspectionswere due and, if necessary, hadthem performed early. Sufficientlubricants, aircraft log forms andother support items were readiedfor the mission with care beingtaken not to oversupply and thusburden the effort.The unit commander also determined that the aircraft were to beflown by maintenance personnel(assistant maintenance officer andother officers with maintenance experience) and assisted by a crewchief and technical inspector. Eachaircraft was equipped with a set ofcargo straps and current state roadmaps were supplied by the Virginiastate police.

Individual aircraft commandersi n addition to normal aircraftpreparation and inspection-conducted a thorough map reconnaissance of the area to be supported.

In the case of the mission discussed in this article, prior studyof the area maps by all the aviatorsresulted in immediate response tomany mission assignments.)Once the mission order was received and the preliminary coordination was achieved, Army aviation personnel from Ft. Eustisquickly went to work. Their areaof operations included a 30-milestretch along the James River,south to Glasgow, Va., and alongthe North River past Vesuvius, 20miles north of Buena Vista, Va.Buena Vista became the focalpoint of the Ft. Eustis support effort. The Lexington, Va., airport (5miles west of Buena Vista) wasdesignated as the logistics supportbase and included a refueling

capability from 5,000-gallon tankers supplied by Ft. Lee, Va. It alsoserved as the base for an ArmyT -41 B aircraft which made shuttleruns to Ft. Eustis. The UH-ls wereparked at the Buena Vista airfieldovernight and security was provided by the Virginia state policeand the Rockbridge sheriff s department.

Soon after operations began thfirst problem developed. The mision was staffed for flight suppoonly and a dire need for a grounoperations officer became evidenSomeone who knew the operatincharacteristics and limitations the equipment was needed to ensua more rapid turn-around of aicraft and thus take maximum avantage of the military supporThe problem was alleviated somwhat by thoroughly briefing one the sheriff s deputies on the genercapabilities of the aircraft and asigning him as the central colletion agency for all missions. Wihis knowledge of the county, i.eterrain, roads, homes, names local inhabitants, access to a communications net and an undestanding of the general overall rquirements of the area, he proveto be a valuable asset. As missiorequests came in he was able efficiently separate those that coube handled by wheeled vehiclefrom those that required an aicraft. His knowledge of the location of homes and people enablethe unit to combine several misions on each flight.

Because roads were washed oand rivers had changed channeit was necessary to place loccivilians aboard the aircraft to aas guides. They were a great aid tnavigation and also helped influence certain families to forget pridand accept food and clothing.

After the immediate problems oresupply and rescue were solvedand as the flood waters recededefforts were directed toward preventing an epidemic and searchinfor the missing. There were manmiles of river and swamp to bsearched and at first the tasseemed monumental. But, after conference with the pilots it wadecided to use a method that habeen successfully employed iVietnam to find Charlie: lonrange reconnaissance patrols.Then squads of 10 men--eac



25/68

led by a local official-were inserted into an assigned area, thenpicked up at prescribed points andreinserted elsewhere. With thismethod large areas were effectivelyand rapidly searched.During insertion and recoveryof these squads another hazard wasnoticed. Telephone wires andpower lines had been carried awayby the floods and now werestretched across trees and throughfields. It became a fulltime job forone of the crew members to lookfor wires during low level flights.As the operation drew to a conclusion there were several pointswhich stood out as lessons learned:

There should be some program to provide selected civilianauthorities with the knowledge andtraining to effectively use Armyaviation support. Perhaps selectedstate police officials could attendArmy sponsored seminars, or theArmy could prepare an information packet for issue to all civiliandisaster relief agencies. Misconceptions concerning helicopter capabilities caused some amount ofconfusion when selecting missionsto be flown.

The opposite side of that samecoin would be for the Army toassign disaster relief officers andtrain them in the operation andstructure of state and federal government disaster relief agencies.Perhaps one officer at each postcould be assigned this duty.

Ensure that the disaster reliefofficer is either aviatjon oriented(preferably rated or has someoneon his staff who is if a major portion of the relief effort is to be supplied by Army aviation.

For the aviation element itselfone officer and one NCO, in addition to flight crew requirements,should be taken along to serve as aground liaison or operations officer. One additional helicoptershould be assigned to provide support for governors, federal government agents and various VIPs who

JULY 1970

must be flown on damage assessment and other administrativeflights. Some study should be givento providing a method for enteringinto a communications net withother supporting agencies. Thestate police, the sheriff s department and other state and federalagencies were not able to communicate directly with Army aircraft because of their inability tomatch radio frequencies. This lackof communication was a handicap. Plan to use local civilians asguides and be aware of terrainchanges as a result of the naturaldisaster; i.e., river bed changes,landslides over roads , dislocatedwires and transplanted buildingsand structures. Frequent landings in unfami-

liar areas can tax an aviator s abilities. Landing on pinnacles abovefast moving water can be moretreacherous than one might suspect.Approaches to tight, confined areason mountain tops and mountainsides at high gross weight can beextremely hazardous. All personnel should continually strive to effect close coordination with state and local officialsand maintain an attitude of compassion and understanding for theneeds of the disaster victims.

That the operation in Virginiawas successful is attested to by themany letters, both official and private, that were received by themembers of the relief detachment.It was another chapter in the longchronicle of U. S Army assistanceto the needs of people in distress.

any civilians were evacuated by rmy helicopters

23


26/68

Dear Danny: I'm assigned to a UH-IH outfit anddoing quite a bit of cargo hauling. In using the TMon range, fuel, etc., I cant obtain certain information.On a flight at 2,000 feet at a load of 9,000 poundsand at an lAS of 70 knots (which I find most comfortable), what will my range and fuel flow be? Howdid you figure it out? CW2 J. A. L.Danny s answer: I ll need one more bit of information and that is your outside air temperature at thataltitude. From your location as stated in your letterand the time of the year you wrote, I'm assumingyour average temperature is 32 C. Your range willbe 177 nautical miles with a 30-minute reserve andyour fuel flow will be 470 pounds per hour. How Idid it will remain a secret for the time being. Justkeep on watching the column. The magic method ofsolVing these problems will be explained and displayed within the next few months. By the way, thetorque required to get that air speed is 22 psi.

ear Charlie: In the CL of the CH-54A there is noground inverter check during the runup procedure.How come?LT T. W. B

Charlie s answer: Change 5 to the 217 CL andchange 4 to the 217-10 will include tbis ground inverter check. This was an oversight on our part.

Dear Charlie: The CH-54A CL requires that theAPP will be started with both generators and transformer rectifiers on. Is this necessary?

CPT I. M. T.Charlie s answer: We have some real sharp peoplechecking these CLs and dash lOs. You caught anerror-both generators and transformer rectifiersshould be OFF on starting the APP. This new procedure will be in change 4 to the 217-CL and change5 to the 217-10. Thanks for catching this, captain,and keep up the good work.

ear Danny: When starting a CH-47B helicopter doyou start No.1 engine with the crossfeed open andthe left boost pumps on, or do you start it like theCH-47A? Our unit does it both ways and we wouldlike to standardize the procedure.CW2 C. L. B.

24

BEFORE YOU ALL START WRITING INABOUT ERRORS IN THE DASH 10AND POSSIBLY THE DASH 205

ON THE FUEL QUANTITY CAPAC ITY OFTHE UH-1 SERIES, LET ME CLARIFY

THIS POINT. THE CORRECT

TM 5 5 - ~ l \ ~ ~ - 1 _ 0,..--

( ) 0

OPERATOR S MANUALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Danny s answer: The procedure outlined in chapt3 of TM 55-1520-227-10 is correct. The left matank fuel booster pump switches are turned ONand the cross feed switch moved to OPEN prior starting No.1 engine to purge the fuel crossfeed linof trapped air.U S ARMY AVIATION DIGES


27/68

Charlie and DonnY s

Write-InDear Danny: I need to know if we can fly the CH-47in icing conditions. As an instrument examiner I amcontinually asked that question. CW4 R. J. F.Danny's answer: Paragraph 3-5c, AR 95-1 says inpart, I f flight is to be made intO knGwn Gr fGrecastlight Gr mGderate icing cGnditiGns, the aircraft mustbe eouipped with adequate deicing and/Gr anti-icingequipment. Chapter 10 Gf the CH-47 GperatGr'smanual states, The helicGpter is equipped with adequate engine anti-icing, pitot tube and SAS yaw pGrtheating and windshield anti-icing systems to cnableJULY 1970

safe flight in li ht icing cGnditiGns. A publicationwritten by the DirectGrate Gf Test Flight OperatiGns,Air FGrce Systems CGmmand in OctGber 1965 titledAdverse Weather Tests of the CH-47A HelicGpter(ASD-TR-65-11) summarizes a 1964-1965 test bysaying that the CH-47 A can be safely flGwn in lighticing fGr extended periGds. The subject was discussedat the last CH-47 Gperator's manual cGnference andit was agreed that flight intO light king cGnditiGns sauthGrized and safe i the anti-icing equipment isfunctiGning and is turned Gn priGr to encGunteringicing.

25


28/68

rash Resistantuel ystem

Controlled tests below) have shown that aircraft equippedwith the new crash resistant fuel system can take substantialpunishment with little chance of fire. Flexible fuel lines and ' thestrohger puncture resistant f u ~ tanks help make this possible

Captain William T Koehler


29/68

H-1D and H model helicoptersare now coming off the assembly lines equipped with a new Armydeveloped crash resistant fuel system. The system also is approvedfor use in the AH 1 G and theUH-1B and C model helicoptersand by 1975 ll selected Army aircraft are expected to be convertedto the new system.In F1 1967, 1968 and 1969there were 424 aircraft accidentswith postcrash fires. Of these 268were potentially survivable. Therewere 123 fatalities due to burns

and an additional 204 burn injuries. Approximately 106 millionin materiel losses occurred fromthese fires.Army safety experts are confi-'dent that the new fuel system willgreatly reduce the number ofdeaths due to postcrash fires. Inaddition, materiel savings shouldultimately amount to millions ofdollars.Initially, the Goodyear Tire andRubber Company and the DynamicSciences Division of Marshall Industries, Phoenix, Ariz., were

granted 2 milli0n by the Army forresearch and development of theconcept. The contract was monitored by the U. S. Army AviationMateriel Laboratories AVLABS)at Ft. Eustis, Va.Investigations of crashes hadshown that almost all fires arecaused by ruptured fuel cells andfuel lines. The main failures arefitting pull-outs, seam failures,punctures, tears and sheared fuellines.To closely define these problemsthe civilian contractors staged a


30/68

MG Allen M. Burdett Jr., Director of Army Aviation, inspects a newcrash resistant fuel cell as Bell Helicopter President E J Ducayetleft> and Project Engineer E D Jergens describe its operation

series of helicopter crashes atPhoenix. t was found that thegreatest pressure and stress on thefuel cell was in a forward and sideward direction. This caused thefuel cell to rupture at the corners.Fuel line failures usually werecaused by the dislocation of onebulkhead in relation to another.

During the staged crashes fittingpull-outs occurred repeatedly. Itwas common to find a fitting completely torn out of a fuel cell; butstill attached by bolts to the aircraft skin.With this information in mind,the development of a tougher, morecrashworthy fuel system was initiated. n this development programtanks of increasing strength weresubjected to crashes until, aftermany tests, a tank construction wasfound which had the ability to resist bursting upon impact, resistpuncture by blunt objects and, ifpierced by sharp objects, the tearing would be negligible.

Controlled physical tests wereperformed on the new cell beforeit was finally approved. One of themany severe tests included a 65-foot freefall drop of an aircraftconfigured cell filled with water.Another test was for tearing. Asample of the material used in thecell was placed in an Instrom tensile test machine to measure itsstrength against tearing. It required400 foot pounds to completelyseparate the material.A bonus advantage that comeswith the new fuel cell is that itsincreased self-sealing ability offersgreater protection against enemygunfire. The tanks previously hada .30 caliber hole-sealing capability. The new fuel cells seal holesproduced by both .30 and .50 caliber machine gun slugs.

The new tanks with the breakaway fittings and flexible tubes increase the weight in the UH-l D/ Hby 160 pounds and reduce flighttime from 6 to 7 minutes.

While the fuel cell constructiowas being developed, the fittinpull-out problem was being studieA normal fuel cell fitting consisof a metal insert and two flangmolded as a unit. The fuel cematerial is built into the flangeThis method of attachment is madto withstand 190 pounds per incof circumference when pulled tension. A new fitting attachmeof increased strength was deveoped to withstand 1 500 pounper inch of circumference whepulled in tension.

The system also includes fleible fuel lines instead of rigid lineThis will permit a degree of movment between system componenunder crash conditions.

Breakaway self-sealing) valvare also included in the systemThey are installed at strategic loctions to permit complete separatioof component parts without loss fuel.

Drain valves contain guardsprevent them from opening duecrash loads. The fuel filter is rlocated on the cabin bulkhead. Thbasic airframe requires some minmodification at the points whethe system is attached. A new fillcap and adapter also is requireThe new cap and adapter allowthe cell to separate, self-seal anmove freely in relation to the aicraft upon impact.

The new system is being servievaluated by the U. S Army A vition Test Board at Ft. Rucker AlThis is an operational test to deteany problems that may develowithin the new system. The teboard received its helicopter withe new system installed last Octber and completed over 800 houof flight test without any significaproblems.

Aircraft deliveries with the necrashworthy fuel system beganApril 1970 with UH-1 H 69- 1529All subsequent UH-IHs delivereto the U. S Army will be equippewith the new crash resistant system

28 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGES


31/68

UTT Sockup

AMOCKUP COCKPIT displayof the proposed Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft Systems

UTTAS) was recently demonstrated by a team from theU. S Army Electronics CommandUSAECOM) , Ft. Monmouth,N. J., to Combat Developments

Command personnel at Ft. Rucker,Ala.The mockup, looking somewhatlike a UH-l cockpit, featured realistic panel lighting, movable flightcontrols and audio-visual displays.Built by Litton Industries for

USAECOM, the mockup is theresult of an analytical study andwill lead to the development of theUTTAS cockpit. Mockup instrumentation consists of vertical scaleinstruments, a headup display

Above a closeup of the UTTASmockup instrument panel. -low Mr. Bud Dworzak ArmyElectronics Command engi-neer demonstrates the mock-u on a vis it to Ft. Rucker Ala.

sllared by both pilot and copilot,an audio-visual warning panel,combined engine and rotor rpmdisplay and individual engine andtotal to rque displays.

Two vertical situation displayswhich utilize cathode ray tubesmuch like a television screenpresent flight information to thepilots in a consolidated form, eliminating the necessity of scanning

various instruments. The reducedscanning would be made possibleby a central digital computeraboard the aircraft which consolidates information from variousflight instruments. The system,when used in other modes, couldprovide terrain avoidance information, IFR approach data and IFRformation flight information. Theterrain avoidance mode would becoupled to forward-looking radarand would allow nap-of-the-earthflight during instrument conditions.While it is not anticipated thatall of the equipment mentionedabove will be used in early UTTASmodels, Army engineers have madeprovisions for it all in the mockup.This gives the Army an opportunity to try various configurations ofthe latest equipment.

29


32/68

THE DOOR GUNNER Training Branch, Aviation Armament Division of the Departmentof Tactics has been extolling theexcellence of the helicopter doorgunners produced at the U. SArmy Aviation School, Ft. Rucker,Ala. Now this can be proven,thanks to private industry whichhas developed a new scoring devicebeing used while training helicopter door gunners.The Del Mar scoring devicefrom Del Mar Engineering Laboratories Inc., Los Angeles, Calif.,employs an acoustical method ofregistering target hits within a pre-determined radius. This is accomplished with a device similar to amicrophone installed in the targetarea.As a projectile passes throughthe target area, accompanyingshock waves are sensed and trans-30

mitted through underground cablesto a signal conditioning unit. Target hits are read out on a mastercontrol panel which is capable ofrecording up to 6,000 shots perminute. By altering control settings on the master panel, the operator can electronically vary thesize of the scoring zone by increasing or decreasing the sensitivity ofthe microphone, and thereby itshearing radius.

On the aerial range student doorgunners fire the M-23 weaponssubsystem composed of an M-60Dmachine gun mounted on eachdoor of the UH ID helicopter.Since the M -60 was designed asan area fire type weapon, a scoring radius of 10 meters was established with a Vietnamese hootchtype target located in the centerof the scoring zone. This zone canbest be described as an imaginary

dome, bisected in the middle. Projectiles impacting in front of thmicrophone will not register evethough they richochet through thscoring zone. The velocity of a ricochet is considerably slower thanormal, and the device measurevelocity; therefore, it will not bsensed.Before the installation of thisystem, scoring was accomplisheby the instructor's visual approximation. This technique was considered adequate but the degreof unreliability was not knownThe new device quickly established that this method was almototally unreliable.The ballistic characteristics oa round fired from a moving aircraft makes visual approximatioof the bullet strike inaccurate ansubject to a number of variablesThe use of the acoustic scoring sys



33/68

tern has eliminated all the guesswork. Trying to estimate scoresforced the instructor to devote allof his attention to the target areathroughout each of the 100-roundfiring exercises. Using the new device the instructor in the aircraftis able to concentrate his attentionon instructional procedures andsafety. This has resulted in asubstantial upgrading of studenttraining.Accurate records have beenmaintained since the device wasintroduced and their utility in otherareas has been significant. Thenumber of hits by each student oneach target is recorded on everytraining day. Other factors suchas sky condition wind and turbulence are noted. Additionally thetype of ammunition whether solidtracer or the standard four-andone is indicated. This informationJULY 1970

is used to determine a K factoron which the scoring table is completed. Based on these records it~ e c m e necessary to establish twoseparate scoring curves: one forsolid tracer and the other for fourand-one tracer. It was found thatthe average scores obtained usingsolid tracer were nearly twice ashigh as those from four-and-oneammunition. Other variables suchas turbulence wind and sky condition were found to have onlyslight significance and therefore little effort was required to adjustscores for these conditions.By continuous evaluation ofthese records instructor effectiveness and student progress can bemonitored through a comparisonof scores from consecutive training days with those of qualificationday. The system has become an

effective quality control device-the manifestations of which havebeen used to significantly improvethe quality of instruction.

The electronic scoring devicehas modernized the door gunnertraining program and brought anew look to instructor evaluationand student progress. Its use eliminates the possibility of humanerror in judgment and guaranteesthe student an exact numerical indication of his proficiency.The ramifications of this deviceare only partially realized. In theshort period in which it has beenin use it has established the superiority of solid tracer ammunition as a training device It hasmeasured the effect of atmosphericconditions on aerial gunnery andhas provided a basis for upgradingstudent training.3


34/68

N 1956 TWO civilian airlinerscollided over the Grand Canyonand fell into the hole at an almost inaccessible spot near theintersection of the Colorado andLittle Colorado rivers. One hundred and twenty-six people werekilled. Under dangerous wind conditions, Army helicopters transported Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) investigators to thewreckage and evacuated the bodiesof the victims. The exact cause ofthe crash might never have beendetermined if the CAA officialshad not been able to reach thecrash site.

The annals of Army aviationare full of similar examples of support, disaster relief and rescue operations, both at home and abroad.Whether an act of God, such as a32

ar ,yIN IR N

over the years arnay aviationhurricane, when Army aviationprovided needed food, medicinesand relief personnel; or a manmade disaster, as above, Armyaviation has been there.

One of the earliest uses of rmyaircraft in support of civilian agencies occurred during a volcaniceruption in Hawaii in 1955. Armyaircraft were used to make a damage survey and to transport reliefpersonnel.Army aircraft flew in supportof rescue operations during a tidalwave in Hawaii in the spring of1957. The aircraft were used inmaking a rapid survey of thestricken areas for damage assessment and emergency relief.Following Hurricane Audrey in1957 in the vicinity of Cameronand Lake Charles, La., Army air-

craft were used in support of

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