Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1959

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1959

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EDITORIAL STAFFCapt Theodore E. WaskoWilliam E. VanceFred M Montgomery

The U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST s anofficial publication of the Department of theArmy published monthly under the superviaionof the Commandant. U. S. Army AviationSchool.The minion of the U. S. ARMY AVIATIONDIGEST is to provide information of an operational or functional nature concerning safetyand aircraft accident prevention trainingmaintenance operations research and develop-ment. aviation medicine and other related data.Manuscripts. photosrraphs and other illustra

tions pertaining to the above subjeeta ofinterest to personnel coneemed with ArmyAviation are invited. Direct communication fsauthorized to: Editor-fn-Chlef U. S. ARMYAVIATION DIGEST U. S. Army Aviation

U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLBrig Gen Ernest F. EasterbrookComnnandantCol John J. TolsonABsistant Commandant

SCHOOL STAFFCol Robert H. SchulzDirector of InstructionCol Jay D VanderpoolCombat Development OfficeCol Edward N. Dahlstrom

SecretaryLt Col Rollie M HarrisonA viation Medical AdvisorLt Col James L. TownsendCO, US AVNS Regi l lUmt

DEPARTMENTSCol Russell E. WhetstoneTacticsLt Col Raymond E. JohnsonRotary WingLt Col Harry J. KernMaintenanceLt Col Howard I. LukensFi:l:ed WingLt Col Thomas J. SabistonPublicaticms andNon-Resident Instruction

School Fort Rucker Alabama.Unleu otherwise indicated material In theU. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST may be re-printed provided credit is given to the U. 8.ARMY AVIATION DIGEST and to the author.The printing of this publication haa been ap proved by the Director of the Bureau of theBudget. 22 December 1958.Views expreaaed in this magazine are botnecessarily thoee of the Department of theArmy or of the U. S. Army Aviation School.Un eu specified otherwise all photosrrapba are

U. S. Army.Distribution:To be distributed In accordance with re quirements stated in DA Form 12.


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UNITED STATESARMY AVIATION

DIGESTVolume 5 March, 1959

ARTICLES

Perfect Pilot .Brigadier General Carl I Hutton USA

Getting the Most from the Otter .Bob FowlerFlying ProficiencyCaptain E H Edmonds InfMP With Wings.Beware the 1,000-Foot ForecastStop

DEPARTMENTSPuzzler.Memo from Flight Surgeon.Gray Hair Department

COVER

Number 3

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5

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Our Perfect Pilot page 2) should have no trouble making this landing, andthe author, Brig Gen Carl I. Hutton, needs no introduction to igest readers. Astrong advocate of Army Aviation and a frequent contributor to our magazine,he was recently assigned to the U. S. Army element of the new Federal AviationAgency. A pioneer Army Aviator, it was under his guidance and leadership thatthe U. S. Army Aviation School transitioned into a separate establishment. Hewas its first Commandant and the first Commanding General of the U S. ArmyAviation Center. His original thinking and support provided the basis for thepresent armed helicopter concept. Artwork by Bill Carter, USABAAR.)


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Brigadier General Carl I Hutton US

H VE YOU MET the gentlemandescribed in the title above?Although I have never met him,there is indirect evidence whichsuggests his existence. Afteryears of reading the reports ofaccident investigation boards, Ihave come to the conclusion thatPerfect Pilot is the modelagainst whom is contrasted anyArmy Aviator involved in anaircraft accident. If the pilothad done thus and so - i.e., ifhe had been perfect - the accident would not have happened.Perfect Pilot is the idol of secondguessers.All of us aspire to perfectionand are proud when we approachit, but since none of us haveeither met Perfect Pilot or haveseen him in action, there is noth-ing for us to model our conductafter. Suppose a young aviatorwith about 200 hours of flyingtime ground-loops a Bird Dog ina good crosswind. The accidentboard says that the accidentwas caused by pilot error, because Perfect Pilot would nothave ground-looped under thesame conditions.The young aviator in this caseis a standard product of ourwhole system of selection and

training. He is probably neitherbetter nor worse than otheraviators of the same level of experience. If, instead of comparing him with Perfect Pilot, wematch his performance againstthat of other aviators of thesame experience, we find thatthe Bird Dog has been ground-looped hundreds of times. Whilethe student of an individual accident case is not alerted when afinding of pilot error is made,the cumulative effect of readingthe same conclusion over andover is to realize that it is notlogical to say so many timesthat the accident would not havehappened if Perfect Pilot hadbeen in the cockpit. We do nothave that many Perfect Pilots.t seems patently that something else must be wrong inthese L-19 accidents. E i th rthere is something wrong withour s e I e c t ion and training

namely, we do not turn out Per-fect Pilots ) or there is something wrong with the Bird Dog.Although improvements perhapscould be made in training. it ishighly doubtful that we will everproduce at 200 hours anythingbut a 200-hour aviator. There-fore, let us take another look at


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the L-:1.9 s ground-looping characteristics. It is the theory of Doctor August Raspet of MississippiState College that the groundlooping tendencies of the L-19come from a combination ofwingtip stall, the spring gear,and the conventional gear configuration. This would appear tobe well worth inquiring into, forif we continue merely to attri-bute ground loops to pilot error,we shall continue to have groundloops ad infinitum.Let s apply this same type ofreasoning to another type of accident which in recent monthshas claimed a number of lives.This is the helicopter collisionwith power transmission lines.Superficially, these are pilot error accidents because no onewas involved but the pilot, andit was his responsibility to avoidthe wire. Presumably PerfectPilot would not have hit thewire. Here a g a i n repetitionbrings home the point that thepilots involved in these accidentswere standard Army A via ors,just like the rest of us. Whathappened to them can happento any of us under the sameconditions.

nd e1 the same conditions isthe nub of the matter. The aviators involved in these accidentswere trying to do wl)at was expected of them. If what was expected was inherently hazard-ous, it does not add to our understanding of the hazard to saythat Perfect Pilot would nothave collided with the powerlines.

These aviators were operatingat low altitude and possibly lowvisibility \ because this is thepart of the air and of atmospheric conditions which we like

PERFECT PILOT

to think belong to Army A viation. Nevertheless, the accidentsproved that we are not yetequipped for this type of operation. Until the helicopter has adevice which will allow the a viator to see obstacles in his flightpath, regardless of the visibility,these accidents will continue aslong as we continue the type ofoperation.

This does not suggest thatlow altitude operations shouldbe discontinued, for this woulddecrease the effectiveness ofArmy Aviation. Two facets ofthe problem are obvious. First,we need a research and development project aimed to producean instrument for helicopterswhich will show objects aheadon the flight path. Second, it isimportant for every aviator. torealize that he is flying a machInewhich is inadequately equippedfor low altitude, low visibilityflight. Consequently, enthusiasmto complete the mission must betempered with caution until theproper equipment be com e savailable.

The Perfect Pilot complex ofaccident investigation bo r d shas led to the ineffective corrective measures used in dealingwith another type of accidentwhich has resulted in fatalitiesover the years, as well as inrecent months. These accidentsinvolve inadvertent flight intoinstrument conditions. The causeof these accidents is closely related to the cause of the helicopter-powerline collisions. Theyhappen because Army Aviatorsare attempting to exploit thefull capabilities of Army Aviation under conditions w h i c hcould and should be favorable.Unfortunately, they are making


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MARCH 1959

the attempt in machines whichare not properly equipped. Wewill continue to have these accidents as long as we continue totry to exploit low visibility withpresent equipment.Certainly all of our aviatorsare well instructed in the dangersof instrument flight for noninstrument pilots or for any pilotin aircraft not equipped withproper instruments. There is notone among us who does notvehemently want to avoid suchconditions. t does not help tosay that Perfect Pilot wouldhave done better for he wouldbe killed too if he were caughtin the same situation. The key isthe word inadvertent. In attempting to exploit the full possibilities of Army Aviation it iscertain that pilots will occasionally fly inadvertently into instrument conditions. When theydo the accidents will be immediate inevitable and fatal unlesssomething is done about equipment. It is a fortunate coincidence that the long range solution of this hazard to ArmyAviation appears likely to beidentical with the solution of thehelicopter-powerline collisions.What is needed is an instrumentwhich will make low altitude instrument flight possible. If wehad one instrument which wouldshow obstacles ahead and at thesame time give the necessary attitude indications. an ArmyAviator could safely risk inadvertent instrument flight. Hecould alwavs escape into instrument conditions when obstacles

appeared. Airborne radar maywell hold the solution for both ofthese hazards.Until s u c h n instrumentcomes along what does the aviator o to stay alive and at thesame time make the maximumpossible effort to exploit thecapabilities of Army Aviation?He must realize that the hazardsare so real and so imperativethat they would trap even Per

fect Pilot under the conditionsin which we are trying to operate. Each individual m u s trealize that he is only a moreor less standard product of oursystem-say 75 percent as goodas Perfect Pilot-and this is themargin which he must allow inall of his plans and decisions.Above all each Army Aviatormust fully understand that thosewho inadvertently flew into instrument conditions were just aseager to stay out of instrumentconditions as those of us whoare still alive. Each must try toavoid being caught in the sametrap.

As for accident investigatingboards whose accumulated findings have raised this fantasy ofthe Perfect Pilot let them understand that the finding of piloterror is only the beginning ofthe investigation. If the pilotmade an error there must be areason. Until the board finds thereason it has not accomplishedits mission. And until the boardsfind the reason for pilot errorsaccidents will continue at thepresent rate.


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ettingthe Most from the Otterob Fowler

THINK IT IS SAFE to say thatthe human mechanism has awonderful and often commonsense capacity for making anytask as easy to perform as possible. While making things easyto perform there is a strongtendency to try to make the experience generally seem as comfortable as possible . While oftenuseful these traits particularly

as a result of past experiencecan sometimes cause great difficulty. This can occur when weintroduce a pilot to an airplanelike the Otter which is designedto fly slowly.The Otter at a weight of 4tons will leave the ground atsome 50-odd mph without thepilot having to employ any specialized techniques whatever.This I realize seems rather apa t statement. We should consider the experiences which mayseem odd to the new Otter pilotand then prescribe a means bywhich they can be overcome.Some STOL aircraft flyingtoday have performance capabilities which are spectacular. fstriking takeoff and landing performance is to be achieved. itmust be achieved at very lowspeeds. Leaving aside such sophisticated control measures asblown surfaces etc. it is obviousthat at the low speeds of thepresent-day STOL aircraft positive control can be realized only

through the use of large controlsurfaces moved through largeangles. Almost any STOL aircraft using orthodox controlsmust have these controls movedthrough rather large portions oftheir range when the aircraft isbeing flown in the lower speedranges. This can be better appreciated when one considersthe turbulence encountered inthe normal operation of thistype of aircraft.One of the first things withwhich the pilot of an STOL aircraft must become familiar islarge control movements whichmight be required during anysegment of the low-speed regime . During takeoff and landing in many older aircraft thiswas often required as normalpractice; however in many instances large control movements pr0duced very little actual response. Today mostSTOL aircraft have controlswhich if freely used producevery high degrees of response.A great deal of the controlcapabilities of modern STOLaircraft is partly due to ratheroutsized control surfaces. Whileit is very desirable to producehigh degrees of controllabilitya t low speeds side effects arebound to creep in which are not

l l Fow ler is a test pilot for D eHav illand Ai1 aft of Canada, t td


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lownas conventional aircraft STOl quality sacrificed

good. One of these common tomost present-day STOL aircraftis control feedback. Where gustvelocities reach a high fractionof the indicated airspeed of anSTOL aircraft the control surfaces, being movable and of necessity large, are bound to transmit some of these gust loads tothe pilot s hands or feet via thecontrol system. This feedbackof gust forces is, at least initially, a little disturbing to pilotsnew to high performance STOLaircraft. Sometimes this tendsto give him the feeling that theaircraft is close to stalling; however, as soon as the force causing the disturbance is removed,the control affected will immediately return to the trimmed position.All this verbiage simplymeans that when we fly STOLaircraft of any size, we mustadmit that certain differencesin handling techniques must bedealt with at speeds which, untilnow, seem uncommonly slow foraircraft of this size and weight.To apply this general reasoning to the Otter I think theeasiest approach is to runthroug-h the complete flightcapability and deal with eachitem as it comes up.Since the takeoff is going to

be short any tendency to wander must be corrected as quicklyas possible; also, since the airspeed prior to lift-off is ratherlow, the aircraft cannot be expected to respond to subtle gestures made with the rudderpedals. This means big angleson the surface to produce therequired correction.A lot of pilots place their heelson the rudder pedals, with theirtoes well up on the brakes. Inthis position, the pilot can produce only as much rudder deflection as straightening i sknee joint will permit; also, itis very difficult to avoid applying some brake while making directional corrections. Full rudderis much easier to apply if theheels are on the floor. Then,under extreme crosswind conditions, where full rudder will notproduce the required correction,enough brake can be applied byjust slipping the foot up untilthe heel catches on the bottomof the pedal.While the Otter can be liftedoff the deck on three points, thisis a technique which we franklyo not recommend. If the tail israised just a couple of feet, thelift-off speed is then usually wellpast the power-on stalling speedfor the weight and flap condi-


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tion. Under u s t y conditionswith the machine heavily loaded,this makes control much morepositive.Most pilots get into the threepoint takeoff habit as the resultof experiences under miserablecrosswind conditions. As a general rule, a good method is toleave the tailwheel on theground until the tail will riseeasily, with only slight pressureon the wheel. By this time, rudder control is sufficiently positive. Avoid any tendency to raisethe tail while the forward speedis still very low.

Wherever possible, full takeoff power as indicated in thedash-l should be used. The firstpower reduction should not bemade until the aircraft is established in the climb. There is astrong tendency among pilots touse takeoff power merely to getthe beast off the ground, afterwhich they sometimes reducepower to the economical climbsetting so quickly that the poorairplane has a tough time evenstaying in the air.

I t is permissible to use takeoff power for 1 minute. If it isleft on even half of this time,in the case of a heavily loadedOtter, it will usually do much forsafely establishing the aircraftin the initial climb.We have always recommendedthat the first power reduction beto max continuous, until the

flaps are fully retracted, atwhich time power can be furtherreduced to the economical climbsetting.There is an old rule whichsays that w h i e progressingfrom takeoff to cruise, to usepower for the s nt condi-

Three point takeoff not recommendedtion of flight to establish you inyour n xt condition of flight.Use takeoff power not only toget the aircraft airborne, butalso to get established in theclimb; use climb power to establish the aircraft at cruise before reducing the power to thecruise setting.

Whenever flaps are retractedafter takeoff or following a goaround, the nose of the aircraftmust be raised so that the effective angle of attack is keptsomewhat constant. If the attitude remains unchanged duringflap retraction, it is very easyfor the aircraft to sink untilenough airspeed is gained toclimb at that angle of attack.This sinking takes all the funout of a takeoff, particularly forthe passengers. During n i g h ttakeoffs, this becomes even moreimportant for obvious reasons.

The only segment of cruiseflight which we need deal withhere i the slow-speed phase, asapplied to paratroop operations,supply dropping, etc.Any time a pilot wishes tocruise an aircraft for any periodof time at rather low speeds, itis advisable, in the STOL aircraft, to use greater amounts offlap as the speed that it is intended to maintain be com e slower. For one thing, this pushesthe indicated s t a I l i n g speedfurther away from the speed atwhich the aircraft is to be flown;also lateral and pitching controlis very much improved. The air-

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heOtter can be flown with easeat speeds down to knotscraft is then maintained in abetter attitude; the higher tailhelps any dropping operations;also visibil ity for the pilot is improved with the nose being loweron the horizon. Using a littleless than takeoff flap the Ottercan be flown with ease at speedsdown to 55 and 60 knots providing proper control and power areused as required. At these speedsit is natural that all turns bewell co-ordinated. Even at cruiseit is natural to expect smalllosses of airspeed during any sustained turn; however t h e s elosses are not normally greatenough to be of much concern.But, when flying at 55 knots a5-knot loss in airspeed during aturn is much more important.Therefore the pilot should beready to apply wha ever poweris required to prevent any air-s pee d loss during low-speedturns. I o not think that muchneed be said about stalling speedincreasing as the angle of bankis increased. Since fairly shallowangles of bank will produce highrates of turn at these speedssteeply banked low-speed turnsare very seldom required; in fact,under almost any conditionsthey could spoil your whole day.During any sustained period oflow-speed flight rpm should beincreased so that, should powerbe required quickly the throttlecan be opened without fear of8

overboosting.With any STOL a i r c r af tstalls under all flap and loadconditions both power-on andpower-off are a subject withwhich the pilot should be thor-oughly familiar. Stalls should bepracticed from time to timeusing normal rated power i.e.33 Hg , 2 200 rpm flaps at take-off and aircraft trimmed fortakeoff. Under these conditionsthe stall should be approachedby losing speed at approximately1 mph per second. This ensurestha the stall is not an accelerated one and also gives a morevalid indication of the true at-titude and behavior of the air-craft during the power-on stall.The ball should be trimmed tothe center and maintained therethroughout, with wings k e p tlevel with ailerons as required.A t any time prior to the stall orbefore the buffet range is encountered full aileron either waycan be used to maintain the at-titude laterally. At the stallwith power as mentioned thenose-down pitch will normallybe quite shallow since any slightincrease in speed here with thestick held back will bring thenose up again.Familiarity with the indicatedstalling speed and control available under these conditions shouldnormally give the pilot muchgreater confidence in the air-craft during the takeoff phase.Power-off stalls s h u I d bepracticed using landing flap andthe aircraft trimmed for thenormal approach speed. He r eagain the control available canbe noted; full opposite aileroncan be used up to and duringthe stall to prevent any wingdropping tendencies. Full aileron


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GETTING THE MOST FROM THE OTTER

a t any time prio.r t o the stallwill pro.duce Po.sitive reSPo.nse.The no.se-do.wn pitch wi t hPo.wer-o.ff is much mo.re Po.sitiveand reco.very can be effected bya slight relaxatio.n o.f the pullfo.rce at the wheel. A Po.sitivefo.rward push is no.t necessary to.cause reco.very; indeed this canadd t o the natural pitchingmo.tio.n at the stall to. such a degree that the no.se-do.wn pitch ismade steeper than necessary.Here again the indicated stalling speed sho.uld be no.ted. Inthe 8TOL aircraft, adding 5 mphfo.r every member o.f a largefamily can make its who.le sho.rtfield missiOon Io.o.k very differentfro.m what it really is.

PPRO CH ND L NDINGIt is a well-kno.wn fact thathalf the battle in perfo.rming ago.o.d landing in any aircraft isacco.mplished by first perfo.rming a go.o.d appro.ach. In theOtter this is particularly true.Once the aircraft is turned o.nto.final the flaps sho.uld be at thesetting intended to. be used fo.rlanding and the i r c r f t

trimmed to. the pro.per appro.achspeed as reco.mmended in thedash-I.Fro.m here o.n in these two.co.ntro.ls need never be to.uchedagain. This leaves the right handfree to. adjust power as necessary to. make the airplane describe a straight line to. a SPo.tjust sho.rt o.f the intended to.uchdo.wn Po.int.We have never enco.uraged theIo.ng flat drag appro.ach technique. Under gusty conditio.nsthe reaso.ns fo.r this are o.bvio.us.The type o.f appro.ach where theappro.ach speed is o.nly partiallydependent o.n Po.wer is safer,

particularly when landing o.vero.bstacles. W hen appro.achingwith a heavily Io.aded Otterunder these co.nditio.ns there iso.ften a great deal o.f co.ntro.versy as to. the Po.int at whichthe Po.wer is cut. A smallamo.unt o.f Po.wer present duringthe initial part o.f the flare prevents the aircraft mushing into.the gro.und during this changeo.f attitude. By the time the aircraft is co.mpletely level Po.weris no.t required; fro.m here o.nit o.nly remains for the pilo.t to.keep co.ming back o.n the wheelprio.r to. the aircraft to.uchingdo.wn on all three Po.ints.

PREDICT BLE TOUCHDOWNAt this Po.int it is very imPo.rtant that the wheel be held

fully back. There seems to. be agreat tendency amo.ng pilo.ts to.release the full fo.rce o.n thewheel o.r at times to. even pushit slightly fo.rward once co.ntacthas been made with the gro.und.This particularly under gustyco.nditio.ns usually tends to. enco.urage the aircraft to. beco.meairbo.rne again. The mo.st predictable to.uchdo.wn is where theOtter is abo.ut o.ne fo.o.t o.ff thegro.und fully stalled with thepilo.t ho.lding the stick fully back.Ano.ther tendency amo.ng pilo.tsis to. try to. grease the thing o.nthree Po.ints while carrying justa to.uch o.f Po.wer. This usuallysquanders sizable amo.unts o.favailable runway; in additio.nany premature co.ntact with thegro.und o.r o.nce again that sudden gust, really puts the aircraft back into. the air.I realize that this who.le bito.n landings is strictly fro.m ap 0. we r ed appro.ach view. Thereaso.n is that the Army s sto.ck

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in trade in STOL performance isshort takeoffs and landings. Withthis in mind I think it is truethat the precision type of shortlanding must be performed froma powered approach conditionat an airspeed which rules outany large amount of float oncethe power is cut.

GLIDE PPRO CHGlide approaches particularly

as outlined in the forced landingprocedure in the dash-I shouldbe well practiced.Wheel landings are so m ething which we would just assoon never see performed withthe Otter. It is a fallacy to thinkthat an aircraft with a lockabletailwheel can be kept straighterby means of rudder with thetail up in the air than with thistailwheel he I d firmly on theground by up-elevator.A lot of people tell us thatthey use wheel landings to avoidtaxiing the full length of a particularly long runway. t is farmore expeditious to land as closeto the turn-off point as possiblethan to gallop a Ion g a fewthousand feet with the tail inthe air. Wheel landings sincethey make the landing itselfeasier for the pilot can easilybecome a habit which is veryhard to break and does not helphis proficiency at all when he iscarrying a full load and is confronted by a strip of I OOO-footlength or less.

Another strong tendency is.for pilots to get into the habitof using little or no flap at all.This applies equally to takeoffsand landings. The reason forthis is once again the tendencyto make an airplane feel morecomfortable in addition to mak-1

ing the speeds at which it isflown appear more familiar bybeing higher. The only hitchhere is that the stalling speedis also higher which makes theground roll both on takeoff andlanding longer.

When this airplane is to beused for any low-speed job andparticularly the takeoff ndlanding phase the pilot tailorsthe airplane into a tool whichwill better do this job by lowering the recommended quantityof flap for the job in hand. Asin all aircraft extreme crosswinds dictate less flap which ismainly to allow for more effective use of rudder. Howeverrudder must then be used fora greater length of time sincethe ground roll and the touchdown speed will both be greater.Therefore it behooves the pilotto use as much flap as his ownproficiency and existing conditions will allow. His performance in the short-landing phasewill vary directly wi t h theamount of familiarity he haswith landing using full flap.GRE TER STOL FOREC STn the years to come I feelsure that we are going to seemore and more fixed wing aircraft possessing ever-increasingSTOL and low-speed performance capabilities achieved bymany ingenious aerodynamic devices now being developed.More demands are going to bemade on the pilot who flies theseaircraft to make him fly them asprescribed-and not as he wouldlike to fly them to make themseem more orthodox. When thisis done performance too becomes orthodox and we have notprogressed at all.


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GETTING THE MOST FROM THE OTTER

I think that the U. S. Armywill continue to be the pioneersin the utilization of this type ofperformance. At th presenttime their pilots possess a ver-

satility difficult to find in military aviators anywhere. As a result these are among the mostinteresting individuals in theflying business.

you ARE A PILOT newly checked out in the L-23D Seminole. Onyour first administrative cross-country flight, you are flyingon an IFR flight plan VFR conditions on top at 10,000 feet. Outside air is 3 C Approximately 15 minutes prior to your ETA overAtlanta omni, you suddenly notice that the cylinder head temperature gauge for the right engine has risen 30 above the reading for the left engine and is continuing to rise, with all temperatures at or near the upper extremes. All other instruments arereading normal. You immediately diagnose the trouble as:Indicate y a V the solution or solutions which you think wouldbest fit the situationo Number 5 cylinder on theright engine misfiring.o Mixture control at full richposition on the right engine.o Carburetor icing on rightengine.

o Continue flight until reeeiving further indication of malfunction.N ext you should:

o Automaticinoperativegine.

Make a normal approach toAtlant.a airport and h a v eig nitinn system checked onmixture control right engine.on the right en- Request an emergency singleYour immediate corrective -tion is:

o Feather right engine.

engine approach t o the nearest appropriate airfield.

o Manually enrich rightgin-e.o Continue flight until detonation results then feather theengine.en- Continue flight to destinationas this is normal fluctuationo Decrease manifold pressure in cylinder head temperatureon right engine. between engines.

The recommended solution to the PUZZLER may be found onpage 21.


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Flying r o f i ~ i e n c yaptain E H. Edmonds In

NOW, IF THIS HASN'T HAPPENEDto you, don't feel left ou t -sooner or later, you ll receive aset of orders that ends something like this: "rotation toground duty for the purpose ofbranch qualification. Flying proficiency will be maintained." Soyou bid adieu to operational flying and assume or resume thisrole thrust upon you with agreat deal of negative enthusiasm. You start to command acompany or battery, serve on abattalion or regimental staff, oryou may even pull a slot at thePentagon or the U. S ArmyAviation School. n a short time,as any well-rounded officershould, you become acclimated,engrossed, and even enthusiasticin your new job.WEIGHED IN THE BALANCEYou are completely adjustedwhen one day, while checkingthrough the filing cabinet, youcome across your Flight 201 file.You pull it out and decide tocheck the entries to see if yourCombat Readiness time is up todate. As you read the record,your smile becomes a scowl, forit informs you that you areshort of your required mini-Captain Edmonds wrote this articlewhile at Fort Rucker. He is present-ly stationed in Formosa

12

mums by quite a few hours. Youthink back, trying to find whereyou forgot to enter some CRtime in your records, but youdecide that the record is correctafter all.N ow this revelation is reallynot "earth-shaking" until yousteal a peek at the calendar, andit silently screams back at youthat the end of the fiscal year isalmost here. It seems hard tobelieve that you need "x" hoursof night cross-country, "y" hoursof instrument time, and "z"hours of helicopter time, especially since you ve a way sflown enough to collect flightpay After all, only 80 hours peryear of this proficiency time arerequired.A meticulous check of therecords indicates no mistake hasbeen made. Well, it's virtuallyimpossible to accomplish t h i sflying time now. The outfitleaves for spring maneuvers intwo weeks. t was impossibleanyway. Look at all the jobs youhad to do during the past yearDidn't your shrewd leadershipguide A Company to the topslot in the battalion? Wasn't ityour master coup of staff planning on the last CPX t ha tbrought a commendation to theentire regimental staff? ndwhat about those last four staff


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s t u ie s you "ramroded" enroute to DA? Furthermore, is itto be considered lightly that youcompleted four college extensioncourses at night in the past yearand satisfied the DA prescribededucatiol1allevel requirement forall officers? Then, too, think ofthe many times you called andcould not get an aircraft. Whatabout the times you were forcedto cancel your flight because ahigh priority "crash" projectwas thrust on you. And after alla man does need a little time toget acquainted with his wife andkids, right?

TH W KENINGArmed with all these "20-carat" reasons, you'll have notrouble explaining the sad state

FLYING PROFICIENCY

of your proficiency flying to DAand your CO In fact, you always did maintain that a mancouldn't remain proficient if hewere rotated to ground duty.And, by golly, this proves itTwo hours scribbling and two"draft" tablets later you realizethe "old man" is not going tobuy these explanations - nopeYou have heard him say totoo many other officers, who at-tempted to explain their failureto produce, that he firmly believed "the degree of effort putout to accomplish a task is inversely proportional to the effort needed to rationalize failure." Thus the most elaborateexcuse for failure usually indicates the least effort for successful accomplishment.

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Boy, this fits your case perfectly Here and now you realizethere's only one thing to do:tear up this realm of excusesand do the impossible You tieyourself to an airplane everyminute you can and, with abroadminded operations officerand a good watch that puts theminutes in your favor, you ac-complish your annual flying pro-ficiency minimums "JeepersI'll never do that again " youvow. But will you? How do youstand right now??Who is this officer depicted?Recognize him? He may be anyArmy A viator now on groundduty directed to maintain flyingproficiency, EXCEPT you andme-and I'm not too sure aboutyou.

WH T IS PROFICIENCY TIMEWhen the Army rotates anaviator to ground duty and di-rects him to maintain flyingproficiency, such orders indicatethat he has definite potentialvalue to Army Aviation in somefuture flying assignment. Theauthorization to maintain flightproficiency was not for "easingthe pain" of leaving operationalflying nor "because somebodyup there liked you." In thesedays of tight money, balancingthe budget, and austerity drives,you were directed to maintainflying proficiency only becauseit was intended that you returnto operational flying after thisstint of ground duty.The Army is certainly awarethat the 80 hours per year ofproficiency time required by reg-ulation will not keep you on parwith your buddies who are as-signed regular flight jobs. How-ever, if the time is utilized in

4

the true spirit of the directive,you will r em a i n proficientenough to return (with mini-mum difficulty) to normal op-erational flying at the end ofyour ground duty.The degree of proficiency theArmy expects of you while onground duty can be attainedonly by some sacrifice and dili-gent effort on your part. Someaviators seem to think that it isunnecessary to retain "needle-sharp" flight techniques, sincetheir duties on return to opera-tional flying will probably bep nn i n g and commanding.While this seems logical, itdoesn't show the whole picture.The attitude with which youmaintain flying proficiency dur-ing your tour of ground dutymay indicate the exact calibre ofcommander you will be on re-turn to operational flying.IF TH SHOE FITS

Will you be the commanderwho is compelled to listen tojunior officers expound becauseyou realize you are slightly be-hind the times? Or will you beable to join the conversationwith confidence, fully capable ofleading parts of the discussion?Will you be the commanderwho has to find a tactful way toassign Lieutenant Brown or Cap-tain Smith the mission of flyingthe Commanding General into aconfined area because you aredubious of your proficiency?Will you be the commanderwho has to grab the right seaton a flight to pick up the Sena-tor because of an unfavorableweather report? As the chief"honcho," your subordinates willnaturally expect you to grabthese jobs. Your juniors may


17/36

outwardly indicate that theyunderstand you're really a rightguy for not grabbing th s e"glory" flights, while smilingknowingly at each other with alook that says, "The 'Old Man'can't fly instruments, huh ?Or while riding along in thecopilot' s seat under instrumentconditions, your junior first pilotis in a bind because of a changein flight plan received over abusy intersection. Must you pretend to be dozing, engrossedin your ARMY AVIATION DIGEST, or assume a severe facialexpression to create the impression you're going to s ~ back andsee how well the poor fellowcopes with this situation? ORwill you speak up confidently,"Relax son; I'll handle theradios; no sweat," and proceedto give a good assist?These are some of the thingsthat only you can know initially,but they remain hidden only ashort time. Junior officers areseemingly born with a knack ofspotting these weaknesses.Yet, these are the very thingstha help to determine the degree of confidence placed in youby your subordinates. Whetheryou are the commander whoseopinions and advice are soughtbecause you are a sharp, up-todate commander, or whether

FLYING PROFICIENCY

you are the last one to know because everyone realizes you'rejust a little behind times, can bedetermined by the impressionsyour subordinates and superiorsreceive on your initial return tooperational flying duty.

t is a fact that the capabilityand efficiency of a unit is directlyproportional to the confidenceand loyalty given the commanderby his subordinates.TH T STBefore reading any fur therstop Look to your right; lookto your left; make sure no oneis around. Now, ask yourselfthis: How long has it been sinceyou shot an autorotation orwor ked a confined area? In fact,how long has it been since you'vebeen in a Sioux or a link trainer?When did you last bother to puton that "troublesome" h 0 0 dwhen flying instrument proficiency? Fortunately, only youcan answer t h s e questions.When you do, you may feel theheat of an embarrassing flushcreeping out from under yourcollar.The officer we've discussedcould be any Army Aviatorchained to a desk or doing atour of ground duty-except youand me. And frankly, I'm stillnot convinced about you.

The many Army Aviation friends of Major Vernon R. Stutts,USAF, will be saddened to learn of his death in an aircraft accidentnear Dayton, Ohio, 14 February 1959. Major Stutts was editor ofthe Air Force FLYING SAFETY magazine.

5


18/36

N 1629 Charles the First ofEngland issued the initial instructions concerning the officeof the provost marshal and military police in an armed forceand directed that the provostmarshal be provided with ahorse. From that time militarypolice have always required mobility in the performance oftheir assigned missions. Military police duties were once confined to policing the militaryforces and preventing looting;however the development andemployment of modern militaryforces have placed many added

This article was submitted by theU S. rmy Military Police BoardFort Gordon Ga.16

responsibilities upon their shoulders.The Military Police Corps hasalways been in the forefront toadopt new modes of transporta-tion which yield greater mobility. t has progressed from thehorse to the motorcycle to thejeep and finally to the airplanewhich frees the Corps from being roadbound. Each new meansof transportation not only increased the mobility of theCorps but also added to its responsibilities; as the over-allmobility of the Army increasedadditional control measures became mandatoryDuring World War II militarypolice utilized Army aircraft inall theaters of operations. With


19/36

fixed wing aircraft they estab-lished the first known control ofmilitary traffic from the air.When aircraft were used by military police in conjunction withground traffic control posts, traf-fic jams became a rarity. If traf-fic congestion did occur, its solution was expedited throughaerial reconnaissance.During the Korean conflictthe helicopter was found to beadmirably suited to military police requirements. The complexities of modern warfare demandthat military police employ sucha vehicle in the control of groundtraffic, particularly in the control of movements of combat organizations within the combatzone.Military police employment ofArmy Aviation reached a newpeak during this period. Theversatile helicopter was used for

MP WITH WINGS

~ e r i l control of ground traffic,to establish and relieve trafficcontrol posts in remote, criticalareas to reconnoiter and patrolcritical routes, to aid in the control of disturbances in POWcamps, and for other missions.Helicopters were employed farlnore than fixed wing aircraft;the latter were used primarily tocoordinate large-scale militarypolice operations.A march of the 7th Divisionduring the winter of 1952 carried the division through some ofthe most rugged terrain in Koi ea and over substandard roadswhich required the maximumcontrol of traffic. The route re-connaissance was made by military police using helicopters;during the march traffic controlof the columns was performedby helicopter-borne military police. On one occasion, when the

7


20/36

MARCH 1959

l7th Infantry Regiment was rerouted onto a road of unknowncondition the entire length ofthe road was reconnoitered fronla height of approximately 6 feetin a matter of minutes by thedivision provost marshal in ahelicopter. This operation wasindicative of the additional support possible when aircraft areused by military police.

The Military Police Corps realizes that the use of Army Aviation during recent wars wasmerely the beginning of a newera one which promises evenmore effective performance ofmissions. The Provost MarshalGeneral Major General HaydonL. Boatner has intensified studyin this field and is leading theway in developing new uses forArmy Aviation vehicles in support of military police activities.EMPLOYMENT Y P

The U. S Army Military Police Board located at Fort Gordon Georgia is studying theemployment of Army Aviationn combat operations and in support of peacetime activities.There new ideas and conceptswhich are developed throughoutthe world are evaluated for useby military police. An exampleof a new use of aerial vehiclesstudied by the Board is thephotographing of traffic accidentscenes from helicopters. Thesephotographs show clearly in oneview the complete scene of anaccident and simplify investigative analysis.Experience indicates that ascombat operations become moreflexible dispersed and isolatedthe capabilities of the Corpsmust increase. Present conceptsindicate that future combat op-

18

erations will consist of rapid individual actions of relatively isolated combat units rather thancontact of massed forces. Unitswill cover far grea er frontsthan before and the number ofhostile forces bypassed withinthe battle area will be increased.Military police of combat elements will be required to operatewithin larger areas and at thesame time contend with largerhostile forces. Within these concepts the Military Police Corpsand Army A via ion find greatchallenges: Army Aviation inthe movement of personnel supplies and equipment and theMilitary Police Corps in controlling the movement of personneland vehicles within the combatzone.

DDED RESPONSIBILITYThe employment of atomicweapons will add the responsibility for control of devastatedand contaminated areas. Thiswill also make necessary the useof multiple routes of supply andadvance rather than the use ofa minimum of such routes as inthe past. These complicationswill exist not only in the combatzone but also throughout thecombat area.The rapid movement of combat elements will require thatmilitary police assigned to eachelement relieve the combattroops of the responsibility for

the custody of prisoners of warother than those in intelligenceand medical channels. This samecondition demands that prisoner-of-war evacuation from thecapturing unit be accomplishedexpeditiously. In such circumstances air evacuation of POWsmay become mandatory partic-


21/36

ularly if the capturing unit isisolated by hostile forces. Airevacuation of POWs would aidthe military police in maintain-ing their custody and relieve thecapturing unit of their burden.Refugees have always presented a serious problem in thecombat zone. In many instances,they have hindered effectivecombat and supply operations byblocking routes of transporta-tion. Because of the necessityfor rapid movement of combatelements, this cannot be per-mitted in the future. Aircraftwill be used by military policeto locate groups of refugees andto channel their movement intoavenues which will not impedecombat operations. This will bepossible through use of theherding technique and the dissemination of information anddirections by means of loudspeakers mounted on aircraft orby dropping leaflets. Here also,the versatility of the helicopterwill be necessary to place military police at critical points toexpedite the control of refugeemovements.Control of stragglers will normally be performed concurrentlywith other missions when air-craft are employed by militarypolice. Because of the superiorobservation of terrain afforded,aircraft will be needed for the

MP WITH WINGS

prompt location and return ofstragglers who might otherwisefall prey to hostile forces operating between combat elements.As noted before, route reconnaissance can be performedmuch faster and more efficientlywith aviation vehicles than withsurface transportation. Thoughmany future combat operationswill utilize air-dropped or air-lifted units, surface routes willbe required for certain combatand logistical operations. Whensurface routes are used, convoyescort will have to be performedby aircraft, both to conservemanpower (by reducing the losttime of escort personnel) andto provide observational securityfor the convoy s flanks and routeof advance.The future of the Military Police Corps with Army Aviationsupport presents a promisingpicture. When equipped withArmy Aviation, military policewill be capable of maintainingthe effective support of combatunits under the Pentomic andother concepts of future combatoperations. Provisions for theestablishment of direct aviationsupport of military police activities and new concepts for theemployment of this support arenow in the planning stage andcan be expected to be implemented in the future.

9


22/36

Beware the 1 000-Foot Forecast"I can make it ""I've got to get through "I know this route like the palmof my hand "

"No sweat; it's still VFR "Familiar phrases? Probablyyou have used one or more atsome time in you r aviationcareer. While you were able tosurvive a marginal weather VFRflight, many others were not.Investigation of aircraft accidents that occur as a result of

weather generally reveals a lackof understanding, or disregardof the importance of weatherbriefings and advisories.The science of meteorologyhas advanced rapidly since theinvention of the aircraft. Greaterknowledge, better instruments,improved techniques, and a vastnetwork of observation po s t sprovide an ever-increasing reliability for weather services.Properly used, these services area tremendous asset to flightplanning.An aviator departed his sta-tion for a 100-mile f i g h t.Weather at point of departureand destination was reportedand forecast to remain) 1,000overcast, 6 m l e s visibility.Weather reports and forecastproved accurate; yet, the BirdDog crashed near the top of a1,200 peak. This aviator ignored

This article was prepared hy theUnited States Army Board for Avia-tion Accident Research.2

the rising terrain along his flightpath. Why he failed to turn backwhen he found the terrain risinginto the overcast will never beknown.An instructor pilot departedfor a routine night cross-countrywith two other pilots and twopassengers aboard. Rain andthunderstorms were encountereden route to the second refuelingstop. During this stop, the pilotwas given a weather briefingconcerning heavy thunderstormsand the likely formation of lowstratus along the flight route.The pilot elected to continue theflight, and the Shawnee crashedin a misting fog, 15 miles fromdestination, killing all aboard.These are but two of manyaccidents that can be directly at-tributed to a lack of understand-ing or disregard of weather.Army Aviators are thoroughlytrained in the fundamentals ofweather while attending flightschool. However, this trainingmust be supplemented by additional individual study and usebefore an aviator can developmature weather judgment. Anewly graduated aviator cannotbe considered proficient in allphases of Army Aviation. Hemust continue to train and practice to acquire proficiency. t isno less important that he learnto understand weather.As in learning the other factsabout flying, acquiring weatherknowledge takes time and ap-


23/36

BEWARE THE 1 OOO-FOOT FORECAST

plication on the part of the aviator during his whole flyingcareer. Weather elements cannotbe read on a dial. Such things ascloud forms temperature, andturbulence have the same relation to weather as instrumentreadings have to aircraft equipment. An aviator who does notunderstand how to use the information gained from t h e s eweather instruments is inabout the same predicament asone who does not know themeaning of the informationgiven by the aircraft instruments.Some steps that will help develop good weather judgmentare:FLIGHT PLANNING. Alwaysget a complete picture of theweather that is reported andforecast for the whole area thatmay be covered during the flight.This does not mean just theweather along one line at a certain altitude, but the weatherover the whole area at all operating altitudes. Determine whataction will be taken if unexpected weather is encountered.IN FLIGHT. Constantly make

visual observations to determinethe accuracy of forecast. A goodaviator acquires the habit ofbeing constantly alert to theweather around him; on t h eground or in the air he subconsciously notes c h n g e s inweather e e m e n t s. By thismethod he can quickly determine when a forecast hasgone wrong. He is able to recognize marginal weather quicklyand understands the situationwell enough to make an intelligent and accurate decision. Hedoes not permit over-confidenceor hopeful guesses to delay thisdecision.AFTER FLIGHT. Make accurate and intelligent reports ofthe weather encountered duringflight. These reports are valuableto forecasters and other aviatorsoperating in the same area.In time of peace an accidentthat results in injury to personnel or damage to equipment isregrettable. In combat loss oftrained personnel and irreplaceable equipment may represent amajor tragedy.N ow is the time to developweather judgment.

~ PUZZL ROn the basis of the factual information contained in the PUZZLER on page 11 the recommended solutions are as follows:

Automatic mixture control inoperative on the right engine.(May cause eitber excessively rich or excessively lean mixture; however problem indicates excessively lean mixture.)Feather right engine. (To prevent detonation and resultingdamage to the engine.)Request an emergency single-engine approach to the near-est appropriate airfield.

NOTE: You are encouraged to submit comments to the Editor in-Chief of the U S. RMY VI TION DIGEST on the contents ofthe problem or on any of the material appearing in the magazine.21


24/36

SOME 48 YEARS AGO Lt John P.Kelly was assigned to CollegePark Army School and therebybecame the Army's first air medical officer. In those 48 years theair medical advisors and flightsurgeons have made themselvesvaluable helpers for human factor problems in flight. As theNavy's safety magazine APPROACH put it: I f there everwas a man made to order as ateammate of the safety officerthe flight surgeon is it. Saywhat you will about strategy,tactics combat procedures flighttechniques checklists S P s -cranked into every plan is thaturge to prolong our own worldlyexistence as long as possible.And that is right down the flightsurgeon's alley.Most of us are all too proneto get wrapped up in our ownlittle ball of paperwork andnever know what is going onelsewhere. How many commanding officers or aviation safety officers regularly enlist the flightsurgeon's services in solvingv a r io u s problems concerningtheir aviators? Not many. Yethere is a man whose trainingwas designed to make the humanmachine operate better and last

longer.One good way to get the flightsurgeon into the act is to stuffhim into an airplane and shovethe throttles forward. Let himsee and feel for himself justwhat your particular problemsare. There have been c a s e swherein pi l o t s suffered eyestrain, excessive fatigue, orheadaches from flying certainaircraft. I t might have been thecockpit lighting or ventilationor maybe carbon monoxide wasgetting in somehow. The flightsurgeon is just the man to helpyou with such cases. Give him achance.Call in the flight surgeon occasionally and let him tell thetroops just how and why thebody needs the proper amountof food sleep and maintenance.Many times a person will resistinstruction or education until hethoroughly understands t h ewhys and wherefores. Let theflight surgeon tell ' em-it 's hisjob.It is a recognized fact thatrepeated flights take somethingout of a man. Yet it seems thatsometimes crew rest and scheduling policies just don't come foran ambitious commander or op-


25/36

erations officer who tends topush his crews just a little tomeet programmed commitments.The flight surgeon can be agreat help and a sobering influence if he is given a chanceto work with the flying safetyofficer in recommending safe andadequate crew-rest policies.

DIS STER W ITSPsychogenic influences whichoccur in normal people with

ground jobs can be disastrous inflying. These failures include:passive - aggressiveness (tryingto get in the pattern before theother fellow, failing to give waywhen I'm on my side of theroad and meeting another carhead-on), forgetting (gear notdow n), psychomotor reversalmoving a control the wrongway), perceptual reversal reading the attitude g y r 0 backwards), and impulsiveness noflight plan or alternate plan ofaction). Although occurring innormal people, the frequency ofthese failures is aggravated byemotional disturbances. rm yAviation, by its very high conflicting demands, is an emotionaldisturbance factory. This is another area of the flight surgeon'susefulness. Given the 0 p po rtunity to be in constant closecontact with pilots, he may beable to assist greatly in correcting such tendencies. A word tothe wise should be sufficient:Don't let your emotions ruleyou; keep them under control,and let off steam in some formof nhysical activity. Regularlyperformed and supervised physi-

MEMO FROM FLIGHT SURGEON

cal training for pilots, preferably at the end of the day, willdo more to relieve tensions thatare built up during the day thanany other means that mightreadily be employed.

C SE FOR HE LTHY LIVINThere is a fallacy in assuming that a pilot does not want tokill himself. A person may havethe desire to survive yet lackthe motivation to do the things

necessary for survival. For thepilot, these include constantpractice, gaining experience, andmaintenance of physical andmental health. To remain professionally qualified, an aviatormust have the initiative to do allthese things. In some assignments, especially in r em t eareas, motivation becomes moredifficult, and so demands specialattention to such little things asregular habits and healthy living. In any case, command supervision is indicated in the case ofan exuberant you n g aviatorwhose limited experience mayimpel him to extreme action.Supervision is an admittednecessity, and if wisely usedthose being supervised are noteven aware of it - until theythemselves reach an experiencelevel where they can see andappreciate the need for oversee-, ing those with less experience.The good supervisor is ateacher as well as a policeman.He's there to help and advise aswell as deter and admonish. Agood supervisor means less workfor the flight surgeon-and theaccident investigation board.

3


26/36

procrastination is said to e thethief of time Equally tritebut no less true is the old adagehaste makes waste Initiativeand studious application to dutyare traits greatly desired andencouraged-but not at the ex-pense of personal welfare. Eithershould be tempered with morethan a dash of prudence andsound judgment. OtherwiseAnxious to return to his homestation to complete some sched-uled official business the follow-ing day the pilot took off aboutdusk in marginal weather. Ashort time later the Shawneeencountered heavy misty rains.The pilot decided to continuehoping to maintain VFR at analtitude of 150 feet but thisproved impossible. He then madea 180 and continued meeting .low ceilings poor visibility andrain. Coming in over a house at50 feet the pilot made an ap-proach to a large field butaborted the landing because ofexcessive speed and poor visibil-ity. The aircraft climbed up overtrees on the edge of the field anddisappeared into the c l ou d s.Emerging from the clouds ashort time later the pilot wasconfronted with a tall tree bar-24

rier to his front. He appliedabrupt rear cyclic stick resulting in a nose-high attitude andthe aft rotor blades struck atree. The aircraft began a nose-high climb. The aft rotor systemstruck a second tree while athird tree sheared the horizontalstabilizer. The shock of strikingthe trees plus the unbalancedcondition of the aft rotor system dislodged the aft transmission and it was thrown from theaircraft. Still climbing thShawnee began a roll to theright and the front rotor bladeshit some trees and began to dis-integrate. t then rolled 90 thecockpit broke open and the yel-low blade of the front rotorstruck the ground. Bouncingand sliding the 8hawnee finallycame to rest on its side com-pletely demolished. The pilot isassumed to have died instantlyupon impact. The copilot andcrew chief received serious in-juries and were trapped in thewreckage until their rescue thefollowing morning.The Gray Hair Department is pre-pared by the U S. rmy Board forA viation ccident Research with in-formation from its files


27/36

In his anxiety to return to hishome station, this pilot operatedthe aircraft at night under conditions that made it impossibleto maintain visual referencewith the ground. There was alsosupervisory neglect in not enforcing an existing directive onnight flying plus lack of clearlydefined regulations for nightVFR weather minimums operation during nontactical and administrative flights.The next day an operationsoffice received a call requestingassistance in evacuating casualties of a car-train collision. Priorto takeoff crew members of aChickasaw were briefed on theterrain hazards and the existence of overhead wires unmarked on the aeronautica1

charts. Nearing but unable toidentify his destination point thepilot entered a valley at a fairlylow altitude. Landing Ii g h t swere on with searchlight extended and sweeping from sideto side. Suddenly a bright lightilluminated the skies as theChicka aw struck a seven-strandelectrical transmission line. The

GRAY HAIR DEPARTMENT

forward momentum of the aircraft forced the blade-plane totilt to the rear, and a bladesevered the tail boom. The aircraft struck more wires somersaulted and dropped verticallyto the ground. Rescue personnelfound the aircraft demolished.Three crew members perished.Even with advance warning andthe best available lighting wiresremain the most formidable foeof low-level operations.CR CK TH W IP GENTLYEven though constant advances are made in improvedaircraft design and operatingease an aviator s job is a seriousone to say the least. His profession places him in daily combat with forces of nature that

were not intended for him. He isprovided the machine and thebest available know-how forovercoming these forces but hisis the responsibility for efficientoperation.Exceeding limitations imposedby existing conditions and allowing the desire to finish a jobinfluence his judgment can be

IIhope to maintain VFRII ended in this wreckage


28/36

anding on rock formation fatalan expressway to destruction.The terrain was rocky ndmountainous. Surrounding peaksreached upward to 5,000 feet.Winds in the area were variable;their direction was unpredictable. As on several previous missions the Raven s pilot and surveyo;-passenger were makingan aerial reconnaissance of aridge to determine how to oc-cupy it. An eyewitness reportedseeing the Raven circle the areawhere the fatal accident oc-curred. As the aircraft came inclose to the ridge, it disappearedmomentarily but appeared lateras it turned away f r o m themountainside. The aircraft repeated this maneuver t h r e etimes. Then, disappearing fromview, a change in sound wasnoted which is believed to havebeen ~ u s e d by a collective pitchchange. Immediately followingthe change in sound, a crashwas heard. During the next 5minutes, observers on surrounding mountain tops saw smokerising from a gorge.Reconstructing the eve n t s,based on known facts, aircraftaccident investigators concludedthat the rock formation onwhich the pilot attempted toland gave way under the .leftskid, causing the Raven to pItchto the left and forward down the6

steep slope of the ridge. The aircraft rolled 250 feet down the almost vertical slope and crashedin an upright position in a narrow wash, bursting into flames.The two occupants crawled fromthe wreckage and down the ravine for 20 feet; both sufferedburns and injuries that laterproved fatal. Though consciouswhen rescuers arrived, neithermade any reference to the accident. Later, when asked if Iehad experienced any materIalfailure, the pilot answered thathe had not.Like charity, accident prevention begins at home. Your b o ~ ytoo, has limitations beyond whIchit will not respond to natural -flexes. Crossing a mount:unrange at 3,200 feet, t ~ e pIlot

simulated a forced landIng andglided in. After refuelin" ~ e andhis passenger were agaIn In theair. Climbing out with 30 flaps,he turned out over a river andmade a descending turn to theleft. At this point it is assumedthat he intended to level off andproceed up the valley. Due tocalm wind conditions, the surface of the river was extremelysmooth. As the pilot continuedhis descent, he apparently failedto note land marks and los tdepth perception. The aircrafthit the water at a high rate ofspeed remained near the surface 'momentarily, then sank.The passenger managed to freehimself from the wreckage asthe Bird Dog sank to the riverbottom. The pilot's body was notrecovered until the aircraft wassalvaged.

When you exceed the limitsof either your aircraft or yourself, you reduce ~ ~ e margin between pilot-capabIhty and work-


29/36

load; an accident is usually theend result. Get to know theselimits and don't push past them.EASIEST COURSE

Just let the boss go out of theoffice-ostensibly to keep a business appointment but actually toget in a few rounds on the greenand he is no sooner out thedoor than Susie digs through theA file and comes up with

"Amorous Lady." She pops astick of gum in her mouth andsits back. The switchboard operator says, "Might as well callLucy and yak awhile. ElmerTipples breathes a sigh of reliefand riffles through his desk foran aspirin. "Boy Shouldn't havetaken those last three for theroad last night. Hmmm . . . theremight even be time to sliparound to Joe's for a quickie before old Simon Legree getsback.The tendency of some individuals to follow the easiestcourse, barely sliding by in theirwork, is the bane of businesseverywhere. Of course, the majority of people don't follow thislackadaisical manner in performing their job. The small percentage who do, however, arecause for grave concern.A stock joke around the lineshack is kick the tire and lightthe fire If you stop and look atthe number of accidents that areprecipitated by aviators who dojust that, the joke ceases to befunny. All of you have heardabout the aviator who hoppedinto his whirlybird and attempted to take off with the skids tieddown. Another thought his chopper would fly with its main rotorblades tied. And how about themechanic who installed a Sioux'

GRAY HAIR DEPARTMENT

rear rotor blades in reverse?This act was followed by ahurrying test pilot, with obviousresults.

Have you heard this one?While demonstrating a properlyexecuted takeoff, the instructorand student were no sooner inthe air than the aircraft begana turn to the left. Immediatelythe instructor began yelling,"You've got it. My stick is out."The student in front managed tolevel off and parallel the stripas a wing struck a tree on theedge of the strip, causing theBird Dog to become uncontrollable. The aircraft continued forward as the wing struck severalmore trees, turned farther to theleft and assumed an extremebanking attitude. t then pivotedto the left, nosed down, andcrashed into the ground, a totalloss. The IP escaped withoutharm, and the student sustainedminor injuries. Accident investigators found a bent rear controlstick retaining pin which prevented it from locking in placeand securing the stick. Bo t hmaintenance personnel and pilotshad overlooked it.And another: On a -cross-country flight, the Bird Dog instructor pilot and pilot neared theirdestination and noted that theweather was clear. The pilotelected to land at a field otherthan that originally filed to andfailed to notify FAA of thechange in destination. Af t e rcircling the airfield twice, thepilot saw the runway lights comeon. (They were turned on by anight mechanic who was unaware that the runway was under repair.) Lights on, the pilotassumed he was cleared to land.A normal touchdown was per-

7


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mech nic f iled to tighten a locknutformed with landing lights on.During the landing roll, the pilotswitched off the landing lights.About this time, he saw an obstruction in front reachingacross the entire width of therunway. Too close to avoid it,the aircraft s t r u c k head-on,shearing both m a i n landinggears . t slid down the runwayon its belly and stopped. Luckily, the instructor and studentwere uninjured.Aviation accident investigators don t always find cause factors as clear-cut as the above,but the following is a good example of dereliction of duty onsomeone s part. On a solo training mission, the Bird Dog failedto respond to an application ofthrottle by the pilot. The tachometer indicated 1,000 rpm. Dueto a fairly strong prevailingwind, the pilot estimated hisglide path to an open area wouldbe short. He immediately selected the only field available: alarge clearing in a wooded section. The pilot performed allemergency procedures, and setup his approach. During final, hediscovered that the field wasbeing freshly cleared and wasfilled with logs stacked in piles.He applied 45 flaps, locked hisshoulder harness, and went in.The right wing struck a tree;8

immediately following, the leftmain gear was shorn by astump. The right gear was thenext to go, and the aircraft wentup on its nose. The pilot was,fortunately, uninjured. While installing a new carburetor, somemechanic failed to tighten thelock nut which fastens thethrottle control rod end to thecarburetor arm. This allowed thelock nut to become unfastenedand the rod to separate from thearm. Apparently no inspectionhad been made after the work.Susie s stealing a few minutesof the boss time and aviationpersonnel s inattention to dutymay seem an incongruous analogy. Each, however, representsinefficient service to their respective organizations. The onlydifference is that Susie s actionis not going to cost her bossnearly so much as the laxness ofaviation personnel.

fiLL IER UPReluctantly tooling his jalopy

toward the city lights, WillieMcOut wondered disconsolatelywhy every time, just as he wasrounding second base, FlossieMae would call time and remindhim that mama had saido clock. Suddenly his troubledthoughts were broken by thesputter of a fuel-starved motor.


31/36

The car rolled into a side roadand stopped. He cautioned thecutie that it might be some timebefore anyone came along. In themeantimeThis backseat casanova probably made out okay experiencingno worse than a dressing downby Flossie Mae Sr. On the otherhandVVarned beforehand that theSioux was low on fuel the aviator landed but found the tanktrailer had been moved to another field. Estimating that hehad sufficient fuel to reach hisdestination the pilot was againon his way but not for long.One mile after takeoff theengine stopped. The pilot selected the best landing siteavailable and went into autorota ion. Everything was progressing satisfactorily until a fewfeet above touchdown point agroup of children ran onto thelanding area. Fearing he wouldhit them the pilot applied collective pitch and tried to land ona nearby road but the rotorrpm had dropped to such an extent that the controls were nolonger effective. The Sioux settled rapidly in a nose-down attitude inclined to the right andcrashed on the road turningover on its side. t was damagedbeyond repair.

The Bird Dog climbed to 3 500feet and the aviator performeda cockpit check noting that themain tank indicated less than

G RAY HAIR DEPARTMENT

full. After switching to theauxiliary tank the gauge of themain tank continued to registerless while the auxiliary remained on full. Cross checkingthe pilot determined that something was definitely wrong butdecided to continue his flight. Ashort time later the engine began to cut out. The pilot selecteda corn field for his forced landingand went in. The aircraft struckthe ground bounced 30 feet slidforward and nosed over inverted.A total loss.

Another Bird Dog on a flighttraining mission coughed onceand stopped. Unbuckling safetybelt and shoulder harness thepilot prepared to abandon theaircraft only to discover that hehad insufficient altitude. The aircraft was completely demolishedin the ensuing crash. The aviator and copilot fortunately received only minor cu t s andbruises.A cool cat may be able tomake the most of the situationif his gas buggy runs short ofpetrol. On the other hand anaviator has the darndest timefinding a suitable parking spot.

LIGHTLY SPE KINGA hefty aroma of snack barcoffee seems to permeate thecockpit as familiar b j e c t saround home base loom on thehorizon. t has been a long dayand you mentally relax as youenter the downwind leg and perform prelanding checks. Relaxcarefully-your biggest chore ofthe day is still ahead: settingher down in one piece lightly.Entering the traffic patternthe pilot completed his prelanding check while on his downwindleg. After turning final flaps

Fau lty fue l est im te caused this


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~ e r e applied to the takeoff positIon. Alrspeed was 70-75 milesper hour. Twenty feet above therunway, the aircraft began anabrupt descent. The pilot applied full throttle and the engine responded normally, butthe Beaver continued its accelerated descent. Even thoughthe pilot managed to bring theaircraft in to a three-point attitude, it made an extremely~ r d landing. Winds were gustlng 20-40 knots at the time ofthis landing.An Otter made the final approach with an airspeed of 65knots and flaps lowered to climbsetting. At 1,500 feet and 2miles from touchdown, a slightcrosswind was noticed. The landing lights were turned on, andthe throttle was held at a sufficient power setting until theaircraft was 15 feet above and300 feet past the approach endof the runway. The transitionstudent was warned by his instructor to round out but interpreted from the tone of thevoice that he was too near theground. He pulled back abruptlyon the stick. This sudden changein attitude resulted in a quickloss of airspeed and a gain in3

Result of hard landing

altitude. Corrective action takenby the instructor came too lateand the Otter struck the ground.Damages amounted to 8,000.00.Old hands at the flying gamelike to place most hard landingsat the feet of students and inexperienced pilots. This doesn talways jibe with accident statistics.JOT I M OWNAfter turning final, the approach was set up to clear aterrace on the end of the strip.The approach was slightly below normal glide path and thelanding gear struck the terrace.With addition of power, a goaround was executed, and another landing attempt was successful. The two occupants ofthe aircraft got out and conducted a visual inspection, butfound no visible damage. Theyre-entered the Bird Dog andcontinued n o r m l operations,rna k i n g several power approaches and landings prior toreturning to the home field andparking the aircraft. No entry

was made in Form 781, Part II,other than this flight okay, because no apparent damage hadbeen seen. When the aircraft waslater postflighted, several rivetswere found missing from theunderside of the fuselage between the main gear. Furtherinspection revealed the skinwrinkled in the vicinity of theleft gear box, and the left gearretaining bolt w s partiallysheared.This pilot oversight was luckilv caught and remedied in time.How many have not been andresulted in accidents, is a matterfor speculation.


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StopI T IS A WISE Sunday night sofapilot who knows just how farhe can go with his girl friendbefore coming to . a halt, espe-cially if mama happens to belurking around in the back-ground. The same applies to theArmy Aviator making a shortstrip landing. If you go too farin either case, you are apt to endup behind the eightball.Many factors affect the braking of your aircraft. Some ofthem can be changed by you;some cannot. The first factor isthe coefficient of friction, whichmay be defined as the measureof the relationship of frictionalforce between an object and thesurface upon which it moves.This coefficient of friction varieswith the type and condition ofthe runway, the speed of theaircraft, tire tread pa tem andmaterial, inflation pressure, tem-perature, and the presence orlack of ice, snow, and rain.Generally, the cheapest materials obtainable are used in mak-ing runways. Consequently, thernaterial used will vary from oneinstallation to another. To further complicate matters, youcannot say that a particulartype of material has a definitecoefficient of friction. Thoughmade of the same materialthroughout, runways may varyin coefficient of friction from onesection to another. You can,however. expect dry concreteand asohalt to run from about0.5 to 0.85 coefficient of friction,

using a scale of 1.0 as a whole.As a pilot, you have little con-trol over the tread material andpattern of your tires, but youcan check before takeoff to seehow much tread you have. On anicy or wet runway, a smoothtire will not give the same braking action as a tire with a goodtread. Tread design of your aircraft tire is a compromise be-tween the best design and onethat will best stand up undernecessary landing speeds.Inflation pressure will va r ywith the different types of aircraft. Generally, lighter aircraftrequire lower pressure. Lowerpressure usually g e n e r t e sgreater friction between the run-

o 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160TIRE PRESSURE DRY co N RETEI

Figure

way and the aircraft see fig.1 . An exception is a runwaywith water on it. Water on arunway can cause an almostcomplete loss of friction whenThis artic le was pre pared by theUnit ed S tates A nny oard of A via-tion A cciden t R ese ch

3


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MARCH 1959

z 1 0oi=u .8it

L Lo 6. 4

U.2ou

40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320TIRE TEMPERATURE FO)

igure

the cushion of water causestires to act as hydroskis. On awet runway, the high pressuretire tends to give better braking as there is less contact areato cut through to contact therunway surface see fig. 3).Higher temperature producesweaker braking action see fig.2). Wide variations in coefficientof friction are also caused bysnow and ice.Ice, surprisingly enough, provides a good coefficient of friction, almost equal to dry concrete or asphalt. Trouble develops when ice is heated to a

thawing point, as by tire friction. The thawing effect produces a thin layer of water on

5 45..... .40Z .35.... .30z .25g 20OU~

~i o .10>


35/36


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Dubbed the Yo Yo by US Army Aviation Board pilots, the Hughes 269 5presently undergoing evaluation Designed with an eye to low initial cost andlow maintenance, the two-place helicopter is powered by an 0-360 Lycomingengine developing 180 h.p. It cruises at 75 mph and has operated t 1750 poundsgross weight.

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Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1959

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