Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1983

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1983

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1983 VOLUME 29 NUMBER 11

* ajor General Bobby J Maddox Brigadier General Charles E. TeeDeputy Commander2

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CommanderU.S. Army Aviation Centerfort Rucker, Alabama

Tech Light Division AirJ. Frederic Squadron,Operations During the

LTC David W.A. Swan

Weather MAJ James M. NielsenTalk: AR 385-95 Army Aviation AccidentPre venUon." MAJ John J.ViewsDES To The Field: ASTS FollowupAviation Personnel Notes: ORB: The Army Officer'sLTC John C. Eberle

COlmDlat Search and Mr.Threat: Controlled Sulbstanc::es That Can Kill SSG

Janet GarofaloAPACHE Assessment in aMichael S. McCormackHemical Fnvir l l l lnlmAnt\and MAJ E.E. WhiteheadS Manual, Mr.and Mr. Carroll G. McCoshATC Action Line: Controllers'r. Robert C. Cole

,.. ..... heII. nIBUC:ODlter as used in tests thatto Air Squadron in' I . . I I J , , , ' . The article begins on page 2. Photo by

This310-1.

U.S. Army Aviation Center

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page

Richard K. TierneyEditor

Fort Rucker, Alabama

Honorable John O. MaSecretary of the A

General He:adQuartehe mission of the U.S. rmy Aviation Digest USPS 415-350) is to provideinformation of an operational. functional nature concerning safety and aircraftaccident prevention, training, maintenance, operations. research and development,aviation medicine and other related data,DelParltmenl of the Army period cal published monthlysupervision Commanding General. U,S, Army Aviation CenterViews expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army

nor the U.S. Army Aviati on Center, Photos are U.S. Army unless. otherwi se specified. Use of masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unlessotherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digestand to the author unless otherwise indicated.

Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution systeas outlined in AR 310-1. Complete DA Form 125 and send directly 10 CDR, APublications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220, For achange in distribution reQuirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.

Articles, photos. and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited, Directcommunication is authorized to Editor, U.S. ArmyAvfation Di l8st, PO Drawer p,Fort Rucker, Al38362, Manuscripts returned upon request.

National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distributic also shosubmit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests throutheir state adiutant general,

Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of tDigest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, UGovernment Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription ratare $26,00 domestic ard $32.50 overseas.


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I NRDER TO inform you about a conceptor employment of Army Aviation that has evolv

to reality, the lead article by MAJ WilliamFrederic describes the Air Cavalry Squadron ofhe High Technology Light Division of the 9th Infantry Division, Ft. Lewis, WA. The squadron'smission is to provide real time tactical informatactical concept

to give an excellent picture of this unithich has been favorably field tested.LTC David W.A. Swan continues with his inforative article about British Light Helicopters

aign. This in-depth account reveals howhelicopters were successfully employed and why

be used in some situations. LTCtribute to the helicopters and crews:

...hel icopter established its unchallengeablelace on the batt lefield ..crews gave magnificient

support.Bring 'em Back Alive cautions us to learn in

or survival on the terrain over which we fly. Trueurvival experiences are cited-successful and

with and consider these as peronal experiences you ve had; and, learn by

for your sake, you family's and the Army.n loss of life thating and preparation.MAJ James Nielson informs us about the

Cold Weather Survival SchooL This is a timely article from which we can learn specifics for

climate operations. Aviators must berepared to survive indefinitely across the en

, if not rescued early.Mr. Raymond Birringer's article Combat

tells us of concepts andto the immediate recovery ofwithin the framework of

Batt le doctrine. The proposed CSAR efort encompasses rescue in areas uncontested,

our forward line of owninto the enemy's rear area.

In this month's Threat article, Controllednces That Can Kill You, SSG Janet

1983

Garofalo warns us of Soviet chemical warfareCW) capabilities. She discusses their organization, chemical agents, delivery equipment andself-protection systems already in the Sovietcombat and combat support vehicles. Considering the extent of Soviet preparation for CW, wemust also be prepared in this area.Aviation Performance In A Chemical Environment, APACHE, by LTC Michael McCormackand MAJ E.E. Whitehead reviews our efforts toensure CW survivability and continued capac ityto fight for our aircrews and support personnel.The author's report measures to improve ourMOPP gear and the subjective appraisals madeby those aviators who took part in the test.

I invite constructive comments about subjectsin this month's Digest as well as your conceptsconcerning any area of Army Aviation that youbelieve will improve our Branch's capability forthe AirLand Battle.

Major General Bobby J MaddoxCommander, U. S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

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FIGURE 1: Division 86 Armored Cavalry Squadron

THE BL CK KNIGHTS of the 3d Squadron.5th U.S.) Cavalry. Ft. Lewis. WA. have undergone two major reorganizations during the past2 years. Organized as an air cavalry squadronTOE 1 7 -205H) in the 9th Infantry Division. thesquadron began its transition to a Division .86armored cavalry squadron TOE17-305 TEST)when it was assigned to the 9th Cavalry Brigadein April 1981.

Equipped as illustrated in figure 1. thesquadron underwent testing in the spring of1982 at Yakima Firing Center. WA.

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t must be understood that the mission wachanged drastically along with the organization. Designed as a reconnaissance unit andused over broad frontages and in large areasthe weapons sytems and organization facilitated self-protection only. The ability to strithe enemy recon forces and cause the mainbody to deploy was lost. The removal of thground scouts from the air cavalry troopseverely limited their employment, stayinpower and security. The High Technology LighDivision HTLD) squadron figure 2) was buil

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overcome the recognized shortcomings andreturn the fighting capability to the squa

yet further reduce the airlift requirementsthe squadron and, in particular, to berapidly deploy an air cavalry troop on

aircraft.The squadron underwent another reorganiza

in October 1982. The ability of the LACTLight Air Cavalry Troop) to accomplish its miswas tested during the spring of 1983. The

discussion of missions, organizationcapabilities has been executed and field

Major William J FredericAssistant Division Aviation Officer

9th Infantry DivisionFort Lewis WA

9 CBHIGHTECHLIGHTDIVISIONIR C V

SOIJ IJRONtested with favorable and desirable results.

The mission of the HTLD Air CavalrySquadron is to provide real time information tothe front, flank, rear and within the divisionarea to the division commander, or CavalryBrigade Air Attack) CBAA) commander as appropriate. The squadron can initiate a fight todetermine enemy strengths and intentions andcan maintain contact without becomingdecisively engaged. t can perform rear areacombat operations RACO) and maintain thedivision s lines of communications.

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rganization

The is ase:agrlea to theCBAA and contains: Head- One Three light air cavalry troops.The squadron headquarters con

sists of the squadron commanderand principal staff for com-

lli J mand, control and administration ofH T the squadron. At the h e d q ~ r t e r stroop the who IS a ma-jor, directs all staff sections

IM INTI

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and provides administrative,and maintenance of weapons fortroop and squadron headquarterspersonnel, and decontamination apparatus and cadre for nuclear,

chemical (NBC) decontamination for the squadron. Thecommunications VH1Wlon n > :I1.,,'the squadron wire communications

with a two-net retransmis-sion and performsorganizational maintenance on the

equipment to theand air cavalry

support platoon requests,secures and issues t alsotransports the squadron's basic loadof ground use class and V, and

three mess teams for thesquadron. The medical platoonoperates the squadron aid stationand provides a medical aid andevacuation team to the cavalrytroop. One additional team can beprovided to an air troopwhen detached. The maintenanceplatoon organizationalmaintenance, and evacuationof all vehicles and weapons; while

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the aviation unit maintenancA VUM) platoon performstional maintenance on all aircraft ithe t requests, receiveissues, stores and maintains aviation supplies/petroleum, oils anlubricants (POL) and ammunition

The mortar platoon uses siheavy mortars to deliver smoke anlimited indirect suppressive fire textract the scout platoons. t iorganized with a platoon leader. twfire direction centers and two sections of three mortars. Thecan provide echeloned fire ..... 11-'1- - '4to the and to other brigadelements in sector \ ............... 'u.battalions); can give direct ' .....1-'1- . . ,to each platoon on extende

V ' J . l - u ' j : ; ; , ' ~ ' through task r ~ ~ a n i z a t i o l t 1The reconnaissance provides a limited air assault an

ground reconnaissance capabilityMounted on 14 motorcycles. the platoon is immediately responsive tthe squadron commander. t is bessuited for reconnaissance betwee

in friendly lines and lines ocommunication missions. The command aviat ion tactical mobility for the scout sectionfrom each of the air cavalry troopand the reconnaissance platoonThe section provides a commanand control aircraft (LCH) tsquadron headquarters and performs functions to includforward arming and poin(FARP) displacement andand maintenance recovery.

The ground cavalry troop iorganized with three scout 1-' ........ - ' ' - ' ..

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in HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles), and aheadquarters section which includes organizational maintenance.The troop commander is provided ascout vehicle to command from forward pOSitions while not providinga battlefield Signature different fromthe scouts. The troop executive officer, in a command post vehicle,operates the troop headquarters andis responsible for collating andreporting information generatedwithin the troop. The troop has thecapability to receive and employsurveillance sensors such as groundsurveillance radars and remotelyemplaced and monitored sensors.The cavalry troop is employed undersquadron control as a tactical entity.

The three scout pl toons of thecavalry troop are a standardizedseven vehicle, four-man, scout-crewconfiguration. Each four-man,scout-crew can establish an observation post, dismount scouts, use nightvision or radar sensing devices, conduct recomlaissance by fire with thevehicle s MK-19 grenade launcher,emplace and employ sensors, andreport information n a timely manner. Three vehicles have tubelaunched, optically-tracked, wireguided TOW) missile systems. Thescout crews can operate individually,as a member of their squad or as aplatoon. The mission, enemy terrainand frontage to e covered will dictatethe employment techniques.

The three ir c v lry troops areorganized with a troop headquarters, operations section, scout

NOVEMBER 983

section and two aeroscout platoons.Troop headquarters provides administration and command control.The operations section performsliaison and coordination for tacticalrequirements and monitors combatoperations of the troop. The scoutsection provides a limited air assaultand ground reconnaissance capability. Two eroscout pl toons areeach organized with six light combat helicopters (LCH) and providethe primary reconnaissance, surveillance and light attack capabilities.The light combat helicopters arearmed with bolt on/off' weaponssystems, to allow commanders totailor their weapons to the factors ofmission, enemy, troops, terrain +time (METT +T). Weapons systemsinclude antitank missiles, folding raerial rockets, air-to-air missiles,machineguns and mine dispensers.Sighting systems and weaponscapabilities provide for maximumstand-off for both observation andweapons firing. Night vision equipment permits 24 hours operation;however, observation beyond 500meters at night is limited and mustbe considered in mission planning.Note: There is not an approved requirements document for a lightcombat helicopter with the mentioned weapons systems. The concepthas undergone testing at Ft. Lewisand Yakima Firing Center, usingJOH-58C surrogate aircraft withweapons systems. The organizationand ernployment of the squadron isbased on the desired HTLD cavalrysquadron of the future.

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Organization for ombatThe squadron may be reinforced with

maneuver companylteams, Air Defense Artillery, Field Artillery, Engineer, Military Intelligence, Army Aviation and combat servicesupport units. t normally maintains unity ofcommand and organizational integrity of thetroops, and attached or supporting units by centralized planning and decentralized execution.The squadron operates under both CBAA anddivision control and the squadron or one of itstroops may be temporarily attached to or placedunder the control of a brigade. Headquartersand Headquarters troop is used tactically in twoechelons: command posts CPs) and trains.

The squadron commander controls and coordinates operations using a tactical CP and a tactical operations center TOC). The tactical CPconsists of the commander, S3, fire support of-ficer, the air liaison officer, in their fightingvehicles, forward of the TOC to enable the commander to get on-the-spot knowledge and exercise personal leadership and control. Thecommander s LCH is used for this function overextended frontages.

The TOC normally includes the executive of-ficer, the S2 and S3 sections, the fire supportelement FSE) and liaison personnel from attached and supporting units. The TOC is leanand moves frequently for passive self-defense.Communication and coordination with higher,subordinate, adjacent and supporting units isaccomplished by the TOC. The TOC is a currentoperations and planning center.Trains The squadron uses two echelons oftrains: combat and field The combat trainsnormally include the S4 officer in charge OIC)),the S I, the aid station, and a groundmaintenance contact team, ground POL,prisoner of war POW) collection point, and iswhere the attached units (engineers, NBC platoon, etc.) laager while in reserve .Field Trains The HHTcommander OIC), airtroops (when not deployed forward), commandaviation, flight operations, maintenance, communications platoon, A VUM, support platoonand mess teams are located in the field trainsThe command aviation section leader directsthe positioning and operation of the FARPsbased on guidance from the S3.

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The cavalry troop normally maintains platoon integrity and task organization is accomplished at the troop level. The mortar platoon colocates and provides direct support tothe troop with either three or six heavy mortars.On extended frontages, mortar squads can beattached to the cavalry platoons. Additionalmaneuver and combat support units may beplaced under operational control or attachedair cavalry platoon or engineer squad).

Command control is exercised by the troopcommander from his fighting vehicle, and heis normally accompanied by the fire supportteam FIST) chief. The troop CP locates behindthe platoons with the executive officer. Thetroop first sergeant leads the unit trains whichhas the maintenance section, mess team, classIII, V and vehicles from the support platoon.The cavalry platoon leader may form two orthree teams depending on METT+T. The platoon normally will organize into two teams.Team A consists of the platoon leader, two scoutsquads and an antitank squad. Team B consistsof the platoon sergeant, one scout squad andone antitank squad.

ir cavalry troop The troop normally maintains platoon integrity, and task organization isaccomplished at the troop level. A UH-60 BlackHawk helicopter nonnally is operational controlOPCON) to the troop, and an appropriatepackage of support personnel and equipmentwill be attached when the troop is placed underoperational control or attached to a brigade. TheII-man scout section, moved by the UH-60, has4 motorcycles, 2 machineguns, 3 PPS-I5ground surveillance radars, and night visionand communication equipment to accommodate 24 hours surveillance and securitymissions.

The air cavalry platoon, equipped with sixLCHs, each with a complete set of bolt-on,bolt-off weapons, canbe task organized inmany different ways.Each LCH is flown bytwo pilots. and one conFIGURE 3: Air Cavalry Platoon figuration is shown inwith six command and controlaircraft figure 3.

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onceptof Tactical OperationsOffense Cavalry is used by the division com

mander during offensive operations to retainthe initiative. Before joining the main battle thecavalry identifies enemy locations andstrengths. The cavalry then continues reconnaissance to find the enemy flanks, unit boundaries and weaknesses. When weaknesses arefound, the division commander can concentrateforces rapidly, exploit the weakness and fightin the enemy s rear area. The cavalry has standoff firepower to initiate a fight without becoming decisively engaged, and can conduct a hastyattack to determine the strength of an enemyforce, seize a limited objective, be augmentedwith additional combat power, or conduct afeint to confuse and surprise the enemy.Movement to Contact The squadron acts aspart of an advance covering force when the

larger unit is moving to contact. Route and zonereconnaissance are moves to contact. Thesquadron attempts to make contact with thesmallest unit. Once contact is made, some otheroperation is required. An air troop conducts ahasty reconnaissance forward of the groundtroop, by-passing enemy outposts and smallrecon units in an effort to identify the mainbody s locations and dispositions. The groundtroop conducts a detailed route or zone reconnaissance, but more rapidly than if doneindependently.Attack A hasty attack is initiated rapidly by

the troop commander using fire and maneuverand maximum standoff of the weaponssystems. f an enemy force is not quicklyeliminated, the squadron commander willemploy attack helicopters, field artillery and/orjoint air attack team JAAT) to neutralize theenemy.

When contact is established by an aeroscout,the team immediately returns fire, deploys,reports and develops the situation. Contact withthe enemy is maintained. and the size andposture of the enemy is determined. The troopcommander determines whether the troop candestroy it or if additional forces are necessary.The troop commander normally has one pla-toon onstation in the area of operation AO) atall times and one platoon at the FARP. The pla-toon onstation maneuvers one team to the flank

NOVEMBER 983

Route and zone recon moves to contact

or rear of the enemy to destroy him. When ef-fectively neutralized, one team continues thereconnaissance while the other turns over thebattle site to the ground troop commander whowill gather detailed enemy information , capturePOWs and confirm neutralization of the enemyforce.

f the enemy force is more than what the aircavalry platoon can dispatch, the squadroncommander requests attack helicopters and/orJ AA T. If an attack helicopter unit is employed,the air cavalry platoon hands over the battle tothe attack commander. Should close air supportbecome available simultaneously, the attackcommander controls it. The cavalry maintainsenemy contact throughout the emploment ofthe attack units unless ordered to bypass. Whenfeasible, the ground cavalry mops up the battle.

I f the ground cavalry establishes contactwithout air cavalry, the troop commanderassesses the situation and either maintains con-tact without becoming engaged or maneuversto gain the tactical advantage. All appropriateand available combat support elements areused against the enemy force.Exploitation and Pursuit The squadron, act-

ing as part of a larger force, conducts theseoperations. During an exploitation, the squadron operates the same way it moves to contactbut with a higher likelihood of direct combat.Therefore, the weapons systems on the LCHcarry full loads, and fuel is reduced, ifnecessary. An air troop frontage or less wouldbe assigned to the squadron, and air troopswould relieve air troops onstation using the one-third rule one troop on the mission, one troopen route and one troop at the FARP).

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During a pursuit, the squadron is in the encircling force. Employment considerations, asstated in the exploitation, are used.

Defense The squadron is not assigned anarea to defend. t conducts reconnaissance,screens, acts as a rapid reaction force and participates in rear area protection operations. tscreens stationary and moving forces duringdelays, counterattacks, withdrawals and reliefs.The screening force is normally task organizedwith one ground platoon attached to each aircavalry troop, and each air cavalry troop isassigned a sector. Actual task organization isdependent on the factors of METT T.

As a rapid reaction force, the squadron provides the division commander the flexibility togain time and reduce or slow the enemy sfollow-on forces. The wide mix of weapons available on the LCH allows the commander to armfor the threat. For example, the division isdefending against an armored threat, and theenemy has used air assault operations. Onetroop is armed with all TOW missiles, one withStingers and machineguns, and one with a mixof Stinger/7.62 mm machineguns, 2.75 inchrockets and TOWs. The LCH is not as protectedas an attack helicopter and should not be usedwhere deployed enemy troops can place effective ground-to-air fire. The air troop can be effective against units moving up to reinforce orpass through engaged units.

During rear area protection RAP) operations,the squadron can maintain lines of communications, provide a rapid reaction force and performlimited RACO missions. Troop integrity ismaintained during RAP missions.

Role In Deep Attack An air cavalry troop normally is OPCON to a brigade for deep attack.The troop provides reconnaissance and air

Troop sets up 3 to 6 km circular screen around the groun force.

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defense protection for the air assault force intothe objective and to the ground force. The troopestablishes a 3 to 6 km circular screen aroundthe ground force until extraction or relief. Thetroops conduct a reconnaissance out to thescreen line to determine actual enemy dispositions in the AO. When the unit is extracted, thetroop provides air defense coverage for the aiassault force. The squadron, as a whole, doesnot normally participate in a deep attack.

Role in Lodgement An air cavalry troop isaugmented with an aviation support packageto include a FARP and AVUM contact teamsThe troop is attached to the lead brigade on thelodgement. Deploying on C-130 or larger aircraft, one to two teams land with the leadelements of the brigade. They are airbornewithin 15 minutes and begin an area recon othe airhead site. The remainder of the troopcloses on the lodgement site within 6 hours.

The troop s initial mission is to establish a 36,9, 12 and 20 km circle around the airheadA screen is established at each circle then expanded as assets become available. The troop sscouts are used as much as possible to conserveaviation assets. A troop F ARP area is establishedin a geographically secure area away from theairhead but close enough for an immediatesecurity response. The troop deploys with itscomplete comple ment of armament to allow thetroop commander to change weapons as thesituation develops. Initial weapons mixes wilbe Stinger, 7.62 mm machineguns and TOWs.

The squadron (minus) closes on the airheadwithin 36 hours and either relieves the troop,augments it or begins the movement to the objective. On the squadron s arrival, the detached air troop reverts to OPCON status to the supported brigade or returns to squadron control.



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ombatSupportFire support is provided to the squadron

through normal established channels. Divisionartillery provides both FSE and FIST for thesquadron and the ground troop. All scouts andaeroscouts can call for fire support.

Mortars can be used for both squadron support and for use by the CBAA. The basic loadis weighted in illumination and smoke relyingon field artillery for most destruction missions.

Field artillery is used whenever possible. Atie-in with tactical frre T ACFIRE) is establishedby the SE FIST and each LCH. The electronicson the LCH allow aeroscouts to deSignate orpick a target automatically determine its location and pass the fire mission to the field artillery battery through T ACFIRE in secondswithout verbal communications.

Close air support is most frequently accomplished using JAAT techniques. Thesimultaneous engagement of enemy forces provides mutual security rapid target identification and increased target effectiveness; may seeburning enemy vehicles in target area.Air Defense The use of Stinger air-to-airmissiles on the LCH has given the squadron ameasure of security not normally expected.When an air threat exists each team will havea minimum number of Stinger missilesmounted.This degree of security can be expanded to abrigade or the division for periods when tacticalair superiority has been lost. For example during an exploitation an air cavalry troop couldbe OPCON to the lead brigade for air-to-air combat and flank screen missions. The small sizeof the LCH makes it difficult to be seen andtracked by other air platforms. The air defensebattalion may provide Chaparral Vulcan andStinger on a mission basis. The squadron hasno dedicated air defense support.

Engineers The squadron gets its engineersupport from the general support engineer company and additional assets on a mission basis.Engineers are normally in direct support whenthe squadron is conducting a movement to contact. Traveling with the ground troop theengineers improve mobility and break obstaclesin sector. Engineers are used whenever possible, to slow the enemy while other combat support elements are employed.

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ombat Service SupportThe S4 working from the combat trains

plans for and coordinates the logistical supportof the squadron. He locates the combat trainsabout 20 minutes by ground from the groundtroop if forward) command post. The fieldtrains are located 1 hour by ground from thecombat trains. Logistical support for allassigned and attached ground units is forwarded through the field trains. The field trainsreceive all logistical support from the CBAAForward Support Battalion FSB). Downed aircraft recovery is effected by the FSB upon request. Bulk class III, V will be drawn from theclosest FSB.

Aviation Class III/V The squadron canoperate two FARPs simultaneously and havetrucks on the road for resupply. To increasemobility and decrease vulnerability the FARPswill reposition every 3 to 6 hours. The S3 instructs the HHT commander as to where whenand how large the FARPs should be. He,through the command aviation section executes the F ARP repositioning and replenishment. Each F ARP has a position locating andreporting system station PLRS) and reports itsstatus through the PLRS bulletin board. Also.the AVUM armament section works at theF ARP sites conducting simultaneous rearmingwhile refueling is in progress. Ground use III/Vis pushed forward to the units from the field andcombat trains to logistics release points and airresupply is accomplished when the situation iscritical.

With two major exercises successfully completed in the last 2 years the Black Knights ofthe 3d Squadron 5th Cavalry are ready to meetthe challenges of the 1990s. .

LCH Stingers for security

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1{

British Light HelicopterOperations during th

FalklandIslands CampaignP RT II : The BattleLieutenant Colonel David W A Swan AAC

British Liaison fficerU S Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker AL

TURNING THIS MONTH tothe landing over the beaches at SaCarlos and the subsequent advancto Port Stanley, I will quicklremind you of the overall pattern oevents and then discuss the tasks othe helicopters. 3rd CommandBrigade 3 Cdo Bde came ashore aSan Carlos in the early hours of 21May and secured the beachhead andthe high ground surrounding itDuring the following 5 days thposition was consolidated, and thbuildup of men and materiecontinued notwithstanding repeated air attacks by theArgentinian Air Force.The breakout from the beachhead started on 26/2/ May with 2ndBattalion, The Parachute Regimen

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(2 Para) moving south to GooseGreen and Darwin where it successfully defeated an Argentinianforce three times its own size. TheArgentinian position posed a threatto the beachhead and to the flankof the advance to Port Stanley. Inthe meantime 45 Commando RoyalMarines 45 Cdo) and 3rd Battalion,The Parachute Regiment 3 Para)started to advance along the northern route, east toward DouglasSettlement and Teal Inlet (figure 1).The 50-mile march, the celebratedyomp, over difficult terrain andin appalling weather was completedin 3 days with both objectivessecured. 42 Cdo was then leapfrogged forward by such helicopterlift as could be made available andsecured Mount Challenger andMount Kent on the western approaches to Port Stanley.5 Bde came ashore on 1 June andMajor General Jeremy Moore,having assumed command of allland operations, committed thebrigade to the south.

The brigade was moved toFitzroy which had been secured by2 Para after a rapid advance whenit was discovered that theArgentinians had evacuated thesettlement. The loss of three HEIChinooks in the Atlantic Conveyorwas one of the factors whichprevented the bulk of the brigadebeing moved by air (the bad weatherbeing another) and it was during thesea move that our heaviestcasualties were sustained when theArgentinian Air Force attacked thelanding ships, the Royal FleetAuxiliaries (RFAs) Sir Galahad andSir Tristam in Bluff Cove. Bothships had to be abandoned.The final battle for Port Stanleywas to be in three phases and 3 CdoBde began Phase I during the nightsof 11/12 June (see figure 2). Phase2, with 5 Bde, took place during thenights of 13/14 June. Fighting wasstiff and the two brigades had toovercome fierce resistance from theregular elements of the Argentinianand forces. The third phase was

NOVEMBER 1983

never launched as the Argentiniandefence collapsed and twobattalions were launched in pursuitand closed up to the outskirts ofPort Stanley. General Mooreaccepted the Argentine surrenderduring the night of 14 June 1982.

With that quick review of theoverall campaign, let me nowdescribe in more detail the tasks thehelicopters under took in support ofthe operations. The tasks given tothe Cdo Bde Air Sqn during theinitial landing were, from first light,to provide reconnaissance andobservation and/or armed aircraftto support the assaulting units, theartillery, the Naval Air Squadronsand the Commander 3 Cdo Bde.The squadron had to be preparedfor airborne Forward Air Control(FAC) and Aerial Observation Post(AOP) tasks, or Field ArtilleryAerial Observation (FAAO) in U.S.terms, and to establish forwardarming and refueling points(FARPs) and individual FlightForward Operating Bases ashorewhen ordered. Finally it had to beready to mount Close Air Support(CAS) missions with the 68 mmSNEB rocket-armed Gazelle, ifno other CAS was available.These tasks were allocated to thevarious flights of the Cdo Bde Air

FIGURE 2: The final assault

:::;;:> I ARAEST NCI HOUSE

Sqn of which C Flight had the mostdifficult. The proposed Rapier ADsites were on the hills surroundingthe beachhead and the Rapiersthemselves were to be airlifted in bySea King helicopter. However in thetime available after the landing itwould not be possible for theinfantry to clear all the AD sitesbefore daylight. The question waswhether to wait for the infantry toget up the hills to secure the sites inthe daylight before moving the ADweapons ashore, or would the threatof Argentine air attacks during the2 or 3 hours delay after daybreakjustify using other ways of checkingto see if the sites were clear. The airthreat was such that it was decidedto use the Gazelle to prove thesecurity of the fly-in routes aheadof the FLOT (forward line of owntroops), to confirm that the siteswere clear and then to escort the SeaKings as best they could.Confirmation that the sites wereclear was carried out successfullybut on one of the escort missionstwo Gazelle were shot down and athird hit when they were fired on bya group of undetected Argentinianinfantry retreating from Port SanCarlos. One crew was killed in theair and the crewmembers of theother Gazelle came under fire as


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they swam away after successfullyditching the aircraft. The pilot diedin the arms of his aircrewman justafter they got ashore.These were the only casualties ofthe landing force on D Day but theyserved to underline the fact that thiswas going to be a real war. Thelessons from this incident were thatthe aircraft were operating in a rolefor which they were not designed,i.e. as quasi gunships, and, secondly, if they had been fitted with anobservation sight, ideally withthermal imaging, they could havestood back and observed the enemyinstead of having to seek them outat close quarters at considerable riskto themselves.The next phase, the battle forGoose Green and Darwin, was toset the pattern for subsequent lighthelicopter operations in support ofthe troops on the ground. The opennature of the Falklands' terrain,which was devoid of any naturalcover, would have exposed thelarger support helicopters tounacceptable risk from enemy firein the forward area. They were alsoheavily committed to the movementand ammunition resupply of theartillery batteries as well as to otherlogistic support. All helicoptersupport of the forward unitstherefore became the responsibilityof the light helicopters.Two Scouts and two Gazellefrom the Cdo Bde Air Sqn wereplaced under command of 2 Parafor this operation and a liaisonofficer put into the battalionheadquarters to control them.During the 3 days of the battle theseaircraft flew in all the ammunitionand rations that were used by thebattalion and flew out all thecasualties, including the Argentines,often from forward positions underfire, by day and by night. t wasduring this operation that wesuffered our third casualty.The two Scouts were flyingforward to collect casualties whenthey were attacked by two Pucara

12

Falklandsampaign

fixed wing aircraft which appearedout of the overcast. The Pucara isa small twin engined, two seataircraft designed for counterinsurgency duties in Argentina. t isarmed with two 20 mm or 30 mmcannon and four 7.62 mmmachineguns and is capable ofcarrying 3,300 lbs of stores on threepylons. t is a relatively slow flyingaircraft with good manoeuvrability,ideal for anti-helicopter combat.One Scout was able to twist andturn and get back to the cover of anAD area but the other was caughtby a burst of cannon andmachinegun fire which killed thepilot. The aircrewman was thrownclear when the aircraft hit theground but he survived, althoughwith major injuries. The incidentw s watched by the crewsof he twoGazelle who were flying only 1 500meters away ut they were unableto assist s their aircraft did notcarry an air-to-air self-defenceweapon.The need for an air-to-air weaponis the obvious conclusion to bedrawn from this incident but thereare others which emerged. Whenthe pilot, who escaped theattentions of the Pucara, wasdebriefed he made two points.Without the help of his aircrewmangiving directions, who on thisoccasion happened to be in the backof the aircraft preparing to receivecasualties, he would not have beenable to take the appropriate evasiveaction when the Pucara were behindhim. The second point the pilotmade is that in taking evasive actionat low level his concentration wastotally on flying the aircraft( standing it on its ear" ) and hewould have been in no position tomake use of any self-defenceweapon on board his aircraft. Thissuggests that aircraft, particularlyScouts, should operate as pairs bothbeing equipped with air-to-airweapons for mutual support.As the ground troops movedrapidly forward to Port Stanley, it

became necessary to install radiorebroadcast stations to maintain theradio link between them and SanCarlos. These were inserted by thehelicopters of 656 Sqn Army AiCorps (AAC). The rapid advancealso made it inevitable that smalpockets of enemy would bebypassed and helicopter pilotsaccordingly varied their routes whenin transit to avoid establishing apattern. Nevertheless a Gazellebecame the prey of one of these bypassed enemy groups when it wasbrought down by a missile at nighwhilst carrying a repair team to oneof the rebroadcast stations. All onboard were killed.Although no armoured threamaterialised, good use was made othe SS 11 missile systems on boardthe Scouts in knocking out enemybunkers and even gun positions onthe outskirts of Port Stanley. Ontwo occasions they were used indirect support of infantry assaultswhen no artillery support wasavailable. Although the SS-l1missile is an old first generationsystem, it nevertheless proved to bequite reliable. Out of 17 occasionswhen the weapon was used therewere three missile systemmalfunctions and two roguemissiles.There was one amusing incidenwhen a small airmobile group oone Gazelle armed with SNEBrockets, one Scout armed withSS 11 and two Scouts carryingGurkha troops, was involved inclearing small groups of enemythought to have moved south intothe Lafonia Plain. The groupapproached an isolated farmhousewhereupon some 10 infantrymenwere seen to rush outside and takecover in a nearby gully. There wasa pause-and then the Scout firedan SS 11 missile into the gully toflush out the enemy. They came ouwith their hands in the air wavinga white flag-and the AAC isclaiming it to be the first timeinfantrymen have surrendered to a

u s RMY AVIATION DIGEST


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helicopter in flight in the Corps'short historyThe final battle for Port Stanleyrepeated the pattern set at Darwinand Goose Green. Light helicopterslifted out all the casualties and 85were moved in this manner on 12June alone; this included some bynight. One aircraft using nightvision goggles was guided in by asingle torch [flashlight] to lift out 3casualties from a raiding party onthe outskirts of Port Stanley, whichwas still occupied by the enemyforward of our own troops.Before I leave the battle itself anddiscuss some of the other aspects,I must make further mention of thework of the support helicopters.During the voyage south they wereused extensively in transferringstores from one ship to another, orcross decking as it was called. Over300 cross decking movements werecarried out at sea, often in frightfulweather. Once the beachhead hadbeen established they were constantly ferrying stores from ship toshore. As the troops moved forwardthe support helicopters moved upthe supporting artillery andammunition. They lifted in some18,000 rounds of 105 mmammunition during the pre-parations for the final battle aroundPort Stanley.The single RAF Chinook, whichwas being air tested when theA tlantic Conveyor was sunk withthe 3 other Chinooks, did sterlingservice. t carried some 8 men inone lift during 2 Para s rapid advance to Fitzroy. t flew 1 9 hoursin combat conditions without sparesor group support, all of which hadbeen lost on the A tlantic Conveyort was an impressive peformance.The attack on the two RF As atBluff Cove epitomised thecourageous efforts of the supporthelicopter crews as they took theirhelicopters close in to the burningships amongst the smoke andflames to rescue the survivors andprevent greater loss of life.

NOVEMBER 1983

LESSONS LE RNEDI am not sure whether this sectionshould be titled "Lessons Learned"or "Lessons Re-Iearned and Reemphasised." In many ways verylittle that was actually new came outof our experiences of OperationCorporate but we were sharplyreminded of some old andtraditional lessons, and thecampaign also emphasised some ofthe theories on the use of aviationwhich had not been put to the test.l t certainly gave further support toour current proposals to improveour aircraft and equipment.A ircraft MaintenanceThe two aviation squadronsconstantly achieved more than 90percent availability of aircraftduring the operation. Theymanaged this because of a numberof factors: High peacetime standards ofmaintenance. The aircraft themselves wererelatively simple to service undervery primitive conditions. The sensible delegation ofpowers to senior NCOs to extendservicing intervals and the highdegree of effort, skill and resourcefulness of the techniciansthemselves. The imaginative application ofnew learned skills in Battle DamageRepair (BDR). Servicing at night using torchesunder makeshift covers so as not toreveal locations to the enemy. Inthis respect there is a pressing needfor a portable, light proof servicingshelter. All aircraft were cleared ofmajor assembly changes for 200hours.The aircraft on occasions flew, outof necessity, above their maximumall up weight (AUW). A number ofScout tail rotors were changed dueto cracking at the roots, possibly asa result of overloading. t is vitalthat the dangers of operating abovemaximum AUW are understoodand reported and that technicians

A Sea King lifting supplies

are fully aware of the symptoms onthe aircraft which may result. Thediligence of our techniciansprevented what may have beensubsequent disaster.A ircraft Manning and Flying RatesThe two squadrons flew some2183.4 flying hours, of which theGazelle's share was 1218.3 and theScout's was 965.1. Pilots were in theair for 6 to 8 hours in every 24 hoursby day and night.The Cdo Bde Air Sqn was able toachieve a manning ratio of 2 pilotsper Gazelle and just over one pilotper Scout. 656 Sqn' s manning ratiowas just over one pilot per aircraftthroughout. In both squadronsthere was one aircrewrnan peraircraft. The difference in ratioswas accounted for in that the CdoBde Air Sqn was unable to take allits Gazelle due to lack of shippingspace, as I mentioned earlier.Both squadrons were able tomaintain 24 hour support for mostof their operational periods.

13


16/48

However in the case of 656 Sqn thiswas only possible through verycareful monitoring of aircrewfatigue. For longer operationalperiods a ratio of 3 pilots to 2aircraft is considered essential. Theaircrewman to aircraft ratio of oneto one proved acceptable.RefuelingDue to the impossibility ofmoving fuel by vehicle on the boggyground, resupply was also totallycarried out by air. Stocks ofaviation fuel in 5 gallon drums,with small aircraft poweredportable pumps, were positioned asfar forward as possible. These wereflown in by the support helicopterswhenever possible but the supplywas intermittent due to limitedaircraft availability. On occasionsthe squadrons uplifted their ownfuel but they had only a limitedcapability and as the units movedfarther inland this no longer becamefeasible. Use was made of capturedArgentinian fuel, both in 5 gallondrums and in a pillow tank with itsown pump, at Goose Green.A refueling base was eventallyestablished at San Carlos andFitzroy and use was also made ofreadily available fuel on boardships. In the latter case, however,this caused some problems as shipstended to move without warningwhich caused one or two pilots atemporary moment of panic whenfaced with a near empty tank and

Falklandsampaigna patch of open sea where last wasseen a ship showing no signs ofpreparing to move.eromedical EvacuationThe movement of casualties fromforward units to the Field DressingStation (FDS) was almost entirelyby light helicopter. After initialtreatment and some cases, surgery,they were then flown back to thehospital ship by Sea King. Anestimated 200 casualties wererapidly extracted from forwardareas by the light helicopters andthis contributed significantly to themorale of the combat troops.There was some concern initiallyabout quickly loading seriouslywounded soldiers, usually withoutstretchers, into the back of smallhelicopters. Medical advice howeverwas that whatever additionaldamage was done during the movewas far outweighed by the boost tomorale that a fast evacuation wouldgive. This, in fact, turned out to becorrect and only one casualty didnot make it back to the FDS, andof those who did only two failed tosurvive.The aircrewmen in the helicoptershelped considerably by giving comfort to the injured, administering IVdrips and in some instances mouthto mouth resuscitation. Our ex-perience in this area pointed out theneed to give aircrewmen more training in first aid than the basic training they normally receive. It is

Refueling Scout helicopters from 45gallon drums

4

therefore planned to widen thescope of this training during the aircrewman's course.The ir ThreatI mentioned the need for an airto-air weapon and the tactics ofscout aircraft being mutually supporting earlier in this article. Localair superiority was difficult toachieve and heavy reliance wasplaced on land and ship based ADweapon systems. Light helicoptersoperated at nap-of-the-earth levelswhich made their detection by fastjets very difficult. There was onlyone incident of a helicopter receiving the attention of an enemy fastjet and he successfully evaded thejet by using the well known tacticswhich are taught to both British andU.S. helicopter pilots. The situationis different, however, if slow flyingfixed wing aircraft are the attackersas it also would be if engaged byother helicopters.Inevitably helicopters were caughtin areas which were subject to unexpected concentrated air attacks butby "going to ground and usingevery scrap of cover (such as it was)and undulation in the ground theysurvived. Unfortunately threehelicopters were heavily damagedwhen parked near a tactical headquarters which came under bombattack-the lesson learned isobviousLight helicopters were instructedto switch off their identification,friend or foe (IFF) during air attacks to avoid the late identificationof a friendly helicopter confusingthe AD tracking equipment. Thiswas possible because there was noperceived enemy helicopter threat.Additionally the need to change IFFcodes at short intervals proved difficult and sometimes impractical;consequently crews tended to turnit off altogether. Future conflictsmay not allow this luxury and muchgreater attention will need to bepaid to IFF procedures and the command and control of AD weaponsystems and light helicopters.

u s RMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Night FlyingNight flying was a routine taskand was only prevented by badweather. Night vision goggles(NVG) allowed aircraft to operatefarther forward and lower, including the casualty evacuation forward of our own troops that I mentioned earlier in the article, but therewere insufficient goggles for all thecrews and only the Cdo Bde Air Sqnused them operationally.Night operations without NVGwere flown in support of all the actions, including casualty evacuation. Whenever possible crews weretasked for night operations over thesame ground, where they hadoperated during the day. Standardnight approach aids were used butthere were also some non-standardones rigged with torches.Role quipmentThe SNEB 8 mm rocket systemand waist mounted machine gunswere not used, primarily due to lackof suitable targets and lack of cover.The attack profile for the SNEB, adiving attack, would have exposedthe Gazelle to undue risk to enemysmall arms and missile attack.However, it may be possible to usethe SNEB smoke rockets as a meansof delivering smoke.The flotation equipment was notused. On the Gazelle it was proneto undemanded activation and inthe case of the Scout it was renderedunserviceable by corrosion in transit. Nevertheless flotation gear isessential for single engined helicopters when ship-borne operationsare anticipated for long periods.

Radar altimeters and SASs(stability augmentation systems)made a major contribution to thesafe operation of the aircraft atnight and in bad weather when aircrew workload and fatigue were attheir height. Likewise NVG are alsoessential. Radar altimeters are to befitted to all our aircraft and an extensive purchase of NVG has beenauthorised.

NOVEMBER 983

Floor armour was fitted to all aircraft but there was the inevitableweight penalty. t could be arguedthat NOE flight rarely exposes theunderside of a helicopter whereasthe front, rear and sides are muchmore vulnerable. As an absoluteminimum, without imposing undueweight penalties, helicopters shouldbe fitted with armoured seats andthe crew should wear body armourin load carrying jerkins (similar toa survival vest).

ON LUSIONIn this article I have tried tohighlight the main features of theFalklands campaign as they affectedthe use of helicopters but there aremany other points I could havecovered. There is always a dangerof trying to translate the lessonslearned in one theatre to anotherand of drawing the wrong conclusions. Operation Corporate wasfought some 8,000 miles from theUnited Kingdom in a hostileweather and terrain environmentwhich required basic infantrytechniques and extremely fit, highlyprofessional troops. t was a simplecampaign against a relatively unsophisticated enemy, although theypossessed some excellent equipmentwhich they did not put to the bestuse.The long supply chain and thedifficulty of off loading equipmentand spares from the ships taxed theingenuity of the maintenance crews.Although they worked under themost appalling weather conditions,the light helicopters they had undertheir care were relatively unsophisticated machines which were wellproven in service. But that is not byany means to undervalue thebrilliant work of these technicianswho produced an unexpectedly highrate of serviceability.This high degree of serviceabilityand the intensive rates of flyingstretched the pilots to the limit oftheir fatigue, and sometimes

beyond, to the extent that aircraftlosses to other than enemy actioncould have become unacceptable.The argument that the aircraftunserviceability rate would permitadequate crew rest was proven to bewrong, therefore pilot to helicopteraircrew manning ratios must be adequate to give full operationalcoverage.The enemy air threat was a newexperience and does have implications as far as other theatres areconcerned. No new lessons werelearned and current tactics do work,but the need for a self-defenceweapon against slow aircraft andhelicopters and the tactics ofoperating scout aircraft in mutuallysupporting pairs has received added emphasis. The continuing problem of forward airspace and ADweapon control has not beensatisfactorily answered and stillneeds a great deal of study.The vulnerability of scouthelicopters operating well forwardwithout the benefit of a long rangesighting system was brought sharplyhome in the first day of the landoperation. The acquisition of a sightis top priority for the AAC and hasbeen for some time, and we shouldbe seeing one in service in the verynear future.

Undoubtedly the helicopterestablished its unchallengeable placeon the battlefield during this campaign. The Navy, the Marines, theAAC and the RAF helicopter crewsgave magnificent and courageoussupport throughout, and the proportion of the overall total ofmedals and honours they wereawarded testifies to their efforts.I would finish on a quote fromMajor Andrew Eames' presentationto the U.S. Army Aviation Centerwhich came from one of thereporters who went with the BritishForces to the Falkland Islands: Nowar is to be desired, but if they areinevitable, then this was a better onethan most to be in.

5


18/48

Bring EmBack Alive

N SPITE of survivaltrai?ing and l i ~ supporteqUIpment, aVIatorsexpect to fly-not crash.According to Dr. Robert Keller,Associate Director of the TraumaCenter at Carmel (California)Community Hospital, a pilot inthe familiar environment of thecockpit is abstracted from thereality of the ground below. fhe crashes and survives he mayneed a period of adjustmentbefore he can accept the realityof his environment. He may reject it emotionally, as one rejectsbad news. Preparation and planning what to do if you crash willlessen the effects of the shock onyour ability to survive.The more you learn in advanceabout the ground environment,the better your chances will be.Find out what edible plants growin the area and what kinds ofwildlife you may encounter.Know how to make a basicshelter such as a snow cave,igloo or fighter trench. Properlyconstructed such a shelter,occupied by one person with acandle as a source of heat, willbe as much as 8 degrees warmerthan the fuselage of the downedaircraft. In wooded areas, learnhow to make a wicki upshelter using a long pole between

6

the crotch of two trees with deadlimbs for walls. Branches, largeleaves or parts of the aircraft canbe used for shingles.Survival gearYour aviation life supportequipment (ALSE) is designed tosustain you in an emergency orsurvival situation until you arerescued. The survival vestcontains a compass; tourniquet;pocket knife; strike anywherematches and plastic, waterproofcontainer; gill fishing net; waterbag; revolver and ammunition. thas a radio receiver Itransmit ter,signaling mirror, foliagepenetrating signaling kit, signalflares, distress marker light andflash guard. The lightweight,foil, space blanket for elementexposure control is either orangeor olive drab on one side andsilver on the other. t can beused as a distress marker. Thesurvival vest, worn by allaviators (except OV-I pilots whowear a vest designed for use withthe rigid seat survival kit), islightweight, adaptable to hot orcold climates and fits over bodyarmor.It is important that a unit'ssurvival vests be configureduniformly. Items of equipmentshould always be located in thesame places in the vest. There

are two important reasons forthis. When vests are inspectedany missing item will be noticedimmediately and replaced.Students in ALSE classes will betrained to locate the items inexactly the same place in thevest. f a survivor is injured orsemiconscious, his hand will goautomatically to the spot wherethe item he needs is located-andit will be there.The 28-pound individualsurvival kit contains a magneticcompass; saw-knife-shovelassembly; first aid kit; woodmatches and plastic, waterproofcontainer; insect headnet;poncho; smoke and illuminationsignals; illuminating candle; foodpackets; water bag; plasticspoon; Trioxane compressed fuel;signaling mirror; frying pan;sleeping bag; snare wire; fishingkit; pocket knife; survival andoperator's manuals. Theindividual hot climate kitincludes sunburn preventive,additional drinking water and apaulin instead of the sleepingbag. One kit should be on boardfor each person on the aircraft.The individual survival kit wasdeveloped and tested atconsiderable cost for onepurpose-to increase yourchances of survival if your

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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aircraft crashes. But how muchwill it increase your chances if itis back at your home base whenyou need it?That is exactly what happened

to the crew of a UH-IH whichwas itself on a type of rescuemission. An early snowfall hadstranded herds of sheep and thisaircraft, along with two others,was engaged in dropping hay tothe hapless animals. On boardwere a crew of three and acivilian observer who wasfamiliar with the terrain andlocation of the sheep. The pilothad failed to prepare aperformance planning card andhe was unaware of powerrequirements versus poweravailable. As he began anapproach into the mouth of abox canyon where a group ofsheep huddled among the trees,his engine and rotor rpm beganto decay and the rpm audio andwarning light activated. He was7 feet above the ground with anairspeed of 20 knots. The pilotwas unable to gain engine androtor rpm, the aircraft began adescending turn to the right andcrashed in a clearing in 3 feet ofsnow, coming to rest upright.Only the crew chief wasinjured slightly when bales ofhay shifted and pinned him inthe wreckage. He was freed andthe crew and passenger exited theaircraft. They found themselvesat 9,550 feet MSL, at 1834 hourson an October day, with the sunjust going down. There were nosurvival radios on board andonly one survival kit This meantone sleeping bag for four people.The crew used pen flares andthe aircraft radios to directsearch aircraft which located thecrash at 2030. Sleeping bags weredropped and they were rescuedby helicopter the next morning.This crew was lucky-therewere no serious injuries, theaircraft radios were operable andthey were in a clearing. Although

NOVEMBER 983

the aircraft doors were jammedopen, the fuselage with hay piledaround it provided some shelter.f the crew had received propersurvival training prior to theaccident, they could havepossibly survived the night with

minor cold injuries. By utilizingemergency survival techniquessuch as sharing the one sleepingbag using it for cover, and eachplacing his feet against the chestof another they might haveavoided frostbite. The frying panfrom the one survival kit, filledwith dirt, could have been usedas a stove, using JP4 from theaircraft as fuel. A windbreakbuilt with bales of hay and a fireusing hay and whatever woodthey could find would have givensome additional protection fromthe cold. The fire would havemarked their location for searchaircraft. Survival training andknowing all of the possible usesof equipment is of equalimportance to having the survivalgear on the aircraft.Flying in mountainous terrainwithout cold weather survival kitswas a serious error. Laterinvestigation revealed the supportfacility had a little more thanhalf of the authorized survivalradios on hand. Some pilots wereunaware the radios were availablefor signout although the unitSOP which they were requiredto read) stated that they wereavailable. The pilot of theUH-IH had initialed that he hadread the SOP-but there were noradios on his aircraft.

Not so fortunate as this crewwas the pilot of another aircraftwhich autorotated into trees. Themain rotor blades hit the treescausing the mast andtransmission to separate. Theobserver suffered fatal injuriesthe pilot, cut, bruised andsuffering with a broken ankle,pulled himself over to the baseof a tree. Some of the items inhis survival vest were worn, had

been lost or damaged and thebatteries in the survival radioneeded replacing. Night wasfalling and an approaching coldfront would bring snow, strongwinds and rapidly decreasingtemperatures. There was no coldclimate individual survival kiton board What would youimagine this aviator s chances ofsurvival would be?The Army Safety Centerrecommends that three briefingsbe given on life supportequipment; one to unitaircrewmembers, one tononcrewmember and nonflyingunit personnel and another tosupported unit personnel, e.g.,infantry or artillery personnelwho would be transported in unitaircraft. The briefing should betargeted to the area in whichflying operations are conducted;hot climate, cold climate, oroverwater, and the relatedsurvival equipment componentsand operation. f that had beendone, the outcome of thefollowing accident could havebeen quite different.

n OH-58A was engaged inproviding convoy cover and routereconnaissance for a tank tacticalroad march. The aircraft carrieda crew of two as well as the tankunit commander and firstsergeant. They were flying 20 to40 feet above 80- to 90-foot-talltrees at an airspeed beloweffective translational lift. Duringa turn, the aircraft beganspinning to the right. It hit thetops of the trees, the main rotorblades separated and the fuselagefell approximately 70 feet strikingthe ground in a nose downattitude. The tail-boom separatedfrom the aircraft while it wasfalling through the trees and thecockpit and intermediate fuselagesections were totally destroyedupon impact with the ground.The company commander hadboth thighs broken and ableeding wound on his left arm

7


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which was also broken. Hefound a piece of foam pad in thewreckage and bound his arm,using a pair of long underwearfrom a flight bag. He could feelfuel leaking from the aircraft.The other passenger was hangingby his waist and was unable toreach his belt to free himself.The captain cut him loose withhis knife and he crawled out ofthe aircraft.The passengers had beenbriefed on how to enter and exitthe aircraft, the use of seat beltsand how to use theintercommunication controlsystem (lCS) radio box. Theywere not briefed on the locationand operation of survivalequipment. The passenger didnot know where the first aid kitswere located nor did he knowthat the pilots, who had bothbeen killed in the impact, werecarrying radios in their survivalvests. The aircraft was notequipped with an emergencylocator transmitter.The aircraft crashed atapproximately 1630 on a summerafternoon. The survivor couldhear the other passenger movingbut was unable to reach him. Helocated some pen flares and astrobe light in the pilot's flightpack and attempted to signalwith flares when he heard avehicle or helicopter. He put thestrobe light up as far as he couldreach and used a flashlight hehad found to signal whenever ahelicopter came near after it gotdark. During a rainstorm, 7hours and 15 minutes after thecrash, searchers saw a red lightand heard him banging with hispistol grip on the aircraftfuselage. He was the onlysurvivor.Search and rescueEmergency locator transmitter(ELT) Since the early 1970s,when Congress enacted a lawrequiring emergency locatortransmitters on general aviation

18

aircraft, ELTs have been asource of constant problemsbecause of inadvertent activationsand failure to activate in anactual crash. During a conferenceat the National Aeronautics andSpace Administration's GoddardSpace Flight Center, problemswith ELTs were discussed. t wasevident that in a large percentageof malfunctions the problemsstemmed from improper userprocedures, impropermounting/installation and lackof quality control for someELTs.Numerous misconceptionsabout ELTs have produced somenegative reaction for theirinstallation in Army aircraft. Thedata does not differentiatebetween specific ELTs, but refersto ELTs as a whole. t is evidentthat only a few manufacturershave produced a high quality,reliable product. In one instance,the Federal AviationAdministration is quoted assaying that only about 1 in 10downed aircraft were located bymeans of an ELT: Flight planinformation, plus groundsignalling and good survivaltactics, are still the predominantlifesaving factors, the articlecontinues. The RescueCoordination Center at Scott AirForce Base, Illinois, reportsELTs were instrumental inlocating 29 crashes in 1980. The35 survivors would, no doubt,have a quite favorable point ofview about ELTs.

ELTs are now approved forselected Army aircraft wherethere is a legitimate requirementbecause of areas or type ofoperation and owning units haverequested them. Requests for theELT should be submittedthrough your MACOM to theDARCOM Project Office forAviation Life SupportEquipment, ATTN: DRCPOALSE, 4300 GoodfellowBoulevard, St. Louis, Missouri

63120. Point of contact for theELT is Mr. Ed Daughety,AUTO VON 693-3307.Search and rescue satelliteaided tracking (COSP ASSARSAT) Since the mid-1970sthe United States, Canada,France and Norway have beenexploring the feasibility of usingsatellites to detect and locateemergency transmissions fromaircraft and ships in distress.Technical testing of the searchand rescue satellite-aided tracking(SARSAT and the SovietUnion's COS PAS-equippedsatellites began on September 1,1982, and ended December 31,1982, at which time a IS-monthdemonstration and evaluationphase began. COSPAS-SARSATwill operate in two modes;regional and global. In theregional mode, detectioncoverage is provided on 121.5,243.0 and 406 megahertz but islimited to those areas within a1,250-mile radius of a local userterminal. In the global mode(operating only on 406), fullearth coverage is provided bystoring data in the spacecrafttelemetry subsystem until it istransmitted to a ground station.This enables coverage of areas ofthe globe which are out of rangeof the ground terminals. In fulloperation, a series of satelliteswill orbit the earth and pick upwhatever distress signals arebroadcast. An Army PRC-90radio set on 243.0 megahertz willtransmit a beep which theCOSP AS-SARSAT will pick upand retransmit.

In the United States, the AirForce, National Aeronautics andSpace Administration, CoastGuard and National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration havecooperated to equip a TIROS-Nweather satellite with specialcomponents to receive andretransmit distress signals. Theground system consists of a U.S.Mission Control Center



21/48

(USMCC) manned by the AirForce at Scott Air Force Base,Illinois, and three satellitereceiver stations or local userterminals. One is located at theUSMCC and two are operated bythe Coast Guard at SanFrancisco, California, andKodiak, Alaska. A Canadianterminal at Ottawa, Ontario,extends coverage into theAtlantic Ocean. Thus, fourNorth American terminalsprovide coverage over thecontinental United States,Alaska, Mexico, denselypopulated areas of Canada, andthe maritime regions. Additionalterminals in France, Norway andthe Soviet Union providecoverage of Europe and parts ofAsia. The United Kingdom hasrecently joined the program andJapan has expressed interest inCOSPAS-SARSAT. The list ofparticipants can be expected togrow.Bernard J. Trudell, NASA's

;::0IDI...Jc(0t:enex:0>:;ex::;:)en0waenwa:II0ex:w

340enex:o>:;ex::;:)enow:;:)Uenwex:IIozwuex: 2

SARSAT mission managercredits the COSPAS-SARSA Twith saving 60 lives in 23incidents since the programbegan on June 30, 1982. Asingle satellite equipped withsearch and rescue instrumentscan cover the entire earth every12 hours, Trudell said. Aconstellation of four suchsatellites cuts this time to amaximum of 3 hours. Both theU.S. and the Soviet Union planto equip future satellites withSARSAT and COSPASequipment so that coverage canbe provided for the rest of thedecade, to insure an orderlytransition from the presentdemonstration system to aneffective, internationally fundedoperational system," he added.Senator Slade Gorton R -Wash.), chairman of the SenateCommerce Science, Technologyand Space Subcommittee opposesproposed cutbacks in the nation'sweather services and significant

RECOVERY DURING FIRST 24 HOURS

RECOVERY DURING FIRST 12 HOURSSCALE ABOVE THIS POINT ONEHALF VALUE

D=e IMMEDIATE RECOVERY:;:)z

o . . 16 144 112 240 288 336:M 72 120 118 21 254 312 360 408

TIME IN 12 HOUR PERIODS

Figure 1

528 578562

SURVIVOR RECOVERY TIME. Rapid response in a SAR effort is essential. Aninjured person's survival changes are reduced by 800/0 in the first 24 hours after anaccident. As the figure shows, even for the uninjured, survival chances after the first 3days rapidly diminish.

NOVEMBER 983

changes in their structure-particularly the proposed sale ofweather satellites to the privatesector. Senator Gorton cites theeffect on SARSAT as one of thereasons for his opposition.An injured person's survivalchances are reduced by 80percent in the first 24 hours afterthe accident (Figure 1 . Survivalchances for the uninjured rapidlydiminish after the first 3 days. I fall goes well, COSPAS-SARSA Twill significantly reduce the timefrom when distress occurs untilthe site is reached by rescuers.By reducing this time, chancesfor survival following an aircraftcrash can be enhanced five-fold.

REFERENCESAh, Wilderness ", SeptemberOctober 1982, FAA GeneralAviation NewsEdgar, H .T., TSGT, USAF, I tHappened, February 1983,Flying SafetyO'Lone, R.G., "Users OpposeWeather Service Cuts,September 5, 1983 , AviationWeek and Space TechnologySmith, Cecil, Major, USA,"Emergency LocatorTransmitters ... Why Wait? ,August 1981, U.S. ArmyA viation DigestSuggs, Clarence, III, LieutenantColonel, ARNG, ALSE orElse, March 1982, U.S. ArmyA viation DigestTC 1-62, "Aviation Life SupportEquipment (ALSE)"TM 55-8465-212-10, Operator'sManual: Survival Kit, ColdClimate, Individual"TM 55-8465-213-10, Operator'sManual: Survival Kit, HotClimate, Individual"TM 55-8465-215-10, Operator'sManual for Vest, Survival,SRU-21/P Hot Climate"Warn, P.W., Colonel, USAF,"Search and Rescue SatelliteAided Tracking COSP ASSARSAT, July 1983, FlyingSafety

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PEARI. SPersonal Equipment nd Rescue/survival Lowdown

Vivian Goshea photo by NoelKenya tkinsFlight Clothing

Reference July 983 PEARL article, subject: NomexFlight Clothing. Until the Army adoption of the AirForce CWU-45/P Nomex winter flight jacket the N-2Bwinter parka is still the only Army jacket of its typeauthorized.Inertia Reel Assembly

Back in December 1982 TSARCOM publishedSupply Letter 33-82 dtd 7 December. This letter advised all users that the inertia reel assembly, nationalstock number (NSN) 1680-00-775-4182, supply, maintenance and recover ability code had been changed torepair at depot level.

20

This information also appeared in the TSARCOMMateriel Readiness Information Bulletin for both firstand second quarters of fiscal year 1983.

Please send all your unserviceables to Sharpe ArmyDepot (SHAD), Lathrop, CA (Routine Identifier CodeA05, Supplementary Address WG2G2T). TSARCOMwill establish and maintain an overhaul line, but it isup to you the field users to keep the pipeline filled.Check for unserviceables now. Appropriate stock fundcredit for repairables will be given.Magnesium Fire Starter

There is a new fire starter for your survival vest. Theold butane lighter, due to its many problems, has beenremoved and replaced by the magnesium fire starter,NSN 1680-01-160-5618.

However, this is only an interim solution. We areattempting to find another butane lighter that will meetthe requirements needed for your survival vest.Sunglasses

Defense Personnel Support Center RIC-S9M doesnot stock nonprescription replacement lens for thestandard FG 58 military aviator sunglasses, NSN6540-01-099-2321 (Bayonett) and NSN 6540-01-096-4496 (Cable). Lenses may be local purchasedhowever, by pair only not individual lens at a cost of$3.75 from:

American OpticalATTN: Judi MacLaren

4 Mechanic StreetSouthbridge, MA 01550(617) 765-9711 X-2995

Special Measurement ClothingTo preclude delays in processing orders for special

measurement clothing be sure to include correct height,weight and dimensional data The nearest stock sizeand deficiency data are also required. Fill in all blankson the DD Form 358 or DD Form correctly andforward with your requisition.



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The completed forms should be mailed to : Commander Defense Personnel Support Center ATTN:DPSC-MC 2800 South 20th Street Philadelphia P

19101. The above information w hope will precludenumerous telephone calls to obtain the necessaryinformation.

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue survival gear write PEARL DARCOM ATTN DRCPO-ALSE4300 Goodfellow Blvd. St. Louis MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 314-263-3307

~ I E I PERIENCEA Great ay to Learn

The Army Training Extension Course (TEC) isa great way to train soldiers. There are TEClessons for common subjects that all soldiersneed to know, such as Land Navigation, theM16A 1 Rifle, Leadership, Intelligence, etc., asprescribed in the Soldier s Manual of CommonTasks. There are also TEC lessons for more than

NOVEMBER 1983

100 MOS and CMF. TEC lessons help soldiers toprepare for SOT and everyday tasks. Manytrainers use TEC to prepare themselves to trainother soldiers. TEC is not the only way to teachcritical tasks, but it is one of the best. Ask yourcommander, training NCOIC or discover TEC atthe nearest Education Center or Learning Center.

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COLDWEATHERSURVIVALSCHOOLMajor James M Nielsen

Did you know that i you build ashelter using snow as insulation itcan warm the inside temperature toabove 30 degrees even though theoutside temperature is afrigid -25degrees? Surprised? You c n f indout about this and other coldweather survival matters by readingthe following article about a 4-dayARCOM Aircrew Cold WeatherSurvival Course that is offeredfourtimes each winter. Unit commandersinterested in sending their peopleshould contact Major Mike Hayes,88th U S Army Reserve ommandAviation Support Facility, St PaulDowntown Airport, St Paul, MN55107, AUTOVON 825-5110 and askfor offnet Commercial 612)291-0218.

TH PILOT SLAMS the cargo doors shut andclimbs into the cockpit. It's going to be an easy flight.Pick up a senior officer in International Falls, MN,and fly him back to the airfield in Duluth, MN."A good time today, John; practice a little deadreckoning and maybe do a little hood work on the wayback.Preflight completed, the UH-l Huey lifts off andgains altitude. A beautiful day, clear, bright, 50-milevisibility and cold.The rugged Superior National Forest passes beneaththem. Its frozen lakes and snowy pines stretch to thehorizon.Lulled by the sound of the engine and the beautyof the forest, the crewchief gazes out the window anddaydreams of past summers. The canoe trip, a pikefillet sizzling in butter, the smell of wood smoke, thepiercing yodels from a family of loons echoing in theevening.Suddenly the aircraft yaws left; the chief catcheshimself and looks to the cockpit.

"Low rpm " the pilot says as he lowers the collectiveto the bottom stop.

"Airspeed 9 knots and climbing. We've got sometrouble, guys."The pilot applies some aft cyclic bringing theairspeed to 80 knots, and turns the chopper into thewind.



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LEFT: CW2 Doug Maresh of Minneapolis, a pilot withDet 1, 185th Transportation Company, Ft. Snelling, buildsa shelter of tim er and pine boughs. When covered with12 to 15 inches of snow the shelter serves as anexcellent insulator against the coldest of temperatures.TOP: With a fire uilt beneath a parachute canopy, thestudents gather together for coffee the morning aftertheir first night in the forest.ABOVE: The use of smoke, flares and otherpyrotechnics will aid in n aircrews rescue. The studentsshoveled a signal triangle on the lake ice, and addedpine boughs to increase visibility.

Make the call. Damn, we re going down.The copilot turns on the emergency transponder andkeys the mike.Mayday. Mayday. Army Copter 278, approximately 93 miles from Duluth, heading three-two-zerois going down.All indications show an engine failure. No time toinitiate an engine start. With the aircraft quickly losingaltitude the pilot maneuvers toward a lightly woodedarea. The crew briefs for landing and locks shoulderharnesses.Fuel off. Battery off. Hang on guys.The tail and main rotor blades slap at the trees,jerking the aircraft to the right. The chopper hits.Snow and debris engulf the ---ruSelage as thecrewmembers slam into their harnesses from impact,then again as a tree crashes into the tail assembly.

Stunned, the crew pulls the emergency handles andthe warmth of the interior vanishes as the frigid coldknifes inside.Their exit is slowed by deep snow, and the chiefneeds help. Stumbling, they seek safety by distancingthemselves from the aircraft. They fall together,turning their heads back to look at the wreckage.It was quiet. ****Army Major Mike Hayes, instructor pilot for the88th U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARCOM)NOVEM ER 1983

Flight Support Facility, turned the Army carryall downthe steep hill past the Moose Lake public access,toward the Charles L. Sommers High Adventure Base,5 miles northeast of Ely, MN. The base is a year

'round camp operated by the Boy Scouts of America,and each winter hosts the ARCOM's Aircrew ColdWeather Survival School.Inside the carryall are seven students from acrossthe nation-Army Reservists, Air Force Reservists andAir Guardsmen, about to begin 4 days of training toprepare for the unlikely yet real possibility of beingforced down in a hostile, winter environment.The ride through Ely and into the Boundary WatersCanoe Area is stunningly beautiful. Eight inches ofpowder had fallen the night before, and the branchesof the pine trees hung low from the weightof the snow.A slight wind rustled the treetops, freeing a featherof snow that fell on the branches beneath, beginninga silent cascade that brushed to a small avalanche asit hit the forest floor.The carryall was met at the camp lodge by Mr. JerryChapman, another instructor pilot for the 88th, andother coordinators of the survival school.Carrying their gear, the students walked into theheated messhall, met the rest of the students and satdown. They waited for the confirmation that yes,indeed, they were going to spend 2 nights in theforest-at 20 degrees below zero.

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COLD WEATHERSURVIV L SCHOOL

The Aircrew Cold Weather Survival School,sponsored by the 88th USARCOM, is conducted fourtimes each winter. Through the efforts of Mr.Chapman and M l Hayes, the school has earned thedesignation of a Fifth Army Area School. It'ssupported in part by the Army, Air Force and Navyaviation life support equipment programs, andbenefits, to some degree, as a cold weather test facility.

Primary instructors for the course are twoexperienced Air Force survival instructors-TechnicalSergeants Allan L. Bobst and Thomas Lutyens- froma combat crew training wing at Fairchild Air ForceBase, Spokane, WA. The Scout Base director, Mr.Sandy Bridges, provides support for the program usingthe full resources of the Sommers High AdventureBase.The course stresses realism in every respect. Survivalis taught using only those tools, articles of clothingand equipment that would be available to a downedaircrew.The first afternoon, evening and morning of the nextday, the classes are conducted inside. The instructioncovers treatment and prevention of cold weatherinjuries, clothing, pyrotechnics and signaling.Particularly stressed are perhaps the most importantaspects of cold weather survival: proper shelter andsecuring water and food.Ten to 20 students participate in each class, andfollowing 1 day s instruction by Bobst and Lutyens it stime to load up the backpacks and move into theforest. y now most of the students have lost thefeeling that, for certain, they re going to die.

CPT Winn Noyes, a student and a pilot with ArmyReadiness and Mobilization Region Five at Ft.Sheridan, IL, describes the training:One of the first things you notice when you stepoutside is how cold it really is. Take a good, deepbreath and your nostrils stick together. But the sceneryof the lakes and forest deep in winter is incomparable.The hike out with your backpack gives a graphiclesson on working in the cold. You quickly realize howoverdressed you are, and unless you stop and remove

a layer or two of clothing, you start to sweat. And aswe were told back in the classroom, wet clothing is oneof the greatest dangers.The day and evening are spent building a collectiveshelter with the other members of the group. And itwas surprising how warm and comfortable the shelterreally was.The survival food is as revolting as it is intendedto be, but that ensures you don't eat it all at once.Swapping war stories around the campfire during theevening is fun, and it is a real chance to meet and talk

4

to pilots from other units who share many of the sameproblems and concerns as you do. You sleepsurprisingly well that night, considering you re packedlike sardines inside the community thermal shelter,while temperatures outside drop to -30 degreesFahrenheit.

The third day begins when the guy with the weakestbladder is the first one to crawl out of the sack, overhis buddies and out the door to get a fire going.The day is devoted to individual survival skills, andends with each student building his own individualshelter with the opportunity to use salvaged pieces ofa crashed UH-l. And while you do all this, you startto realize the importance of all the little details theinstructors have been emphasizing.Such things like the importance of drinking 4 to6 quarts of water a day, but not drinking it until you ve

Air Force TS Allan Bobst a survival instructor from SpokaneWA discusses individual survival techniques includinguilding snares and the art of opening a can of compressedcorn flake bars. The students lived on survival rations during

their 3 days in the field.

U.S. RMY VI TION DIGEST


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warmed it up to body temperature. And the constantneed to keep 'nibbling' on your food.That night you have the opportunity to critiqueyour own abilities as a shelter builder, and I think mostof us were amazed to find out how good 12 inches ofsnow is as insulation. The shelters warmed up to over30 degrees above, which is toasty compared to theoutside temperature of -25 degrees.

The last day was spent working with the signaldevices in our survival equipment, and learning othermethods that might help speed rescue.Although the course is tough, it's also a lot of fun.Mr. Bridges goes all out to see that while at the campthe students are not only well trained but well fed.Although out in the forest where the diet consists ofcompressed corn flake bars and other such survivalrations, the meals at the beginning and end of thecourse are hot, delicious and best of all, all you can eat.

The three crewmembers watched their downedchopper for signs of sparking or fire.The chief was cut and bleeding; his forearm broken.The pilot and copilot, though bruised and shaken,appeared to have no serious injuries.The temperature was 5 degrees below zero.I think we may have lucked out, the pilot said,I don't think she'll burn. But let's salvage what wecan while we have the chance.The injured man was in the most danger from thecold. He was the crews' first concern.Quickly, but with caution, the two men returned tothe aircraft for the survival kit. They had to get thechief warm and give him first aid.

Every pilot in the Army wears a survival vest whileflying. The reason is obvious; if an aircraft goes down,they must escape as quickly as possible. The aircraftcould explode or burn in a matter of seconds.The aviators carry a two-way radio for voicecommunication and an automatic locator beacon.They have no food, only a small first aid kit, acompass, flashlight, flares and other signaling devices.Each aircraft in the 88th ARCOM is also suppliedwith a winter survival kit consisting of a mountainsleeping bag, poncho/tarp, an insect headnet, watercontainers, flares, smoke, first aid kit, shovel, saw,candles, knife, frying pan and a limited quantity ofsurvival rations.Hooks, line and sinkers that one might expect tofind are supplemented with a gill net which, for an

NOVEM ER 1983

Air Force TS Thomas Lutyens, survival instru tor fromFairchi ld Ai r Force Base, Spokane, WA, stresses the dangerof hypothermia, the major cause of death in cold weather.He emphasizes COLO ; keep your clothing Clean, avoidOverheating, dress Loose in Layers and keep Dry.

injured flier or anyone in a survival situation, is lesstime consuming and more effective.

After removing the cargo door from the chopper,they pulled off the soundproofing and removed theseatbelts, harnesses and tiedowns. The door wouldserve as a roof for their shelter or, if necessary, it couldwork as a sled or litter should the chief have to bemoved.After treating his injuries, they placed him in thesleeping bag, and wrapped him in the soundproofing,an excellent insulator.The copilot prepared the signaling devices andhelped the pilot gather wood for a fire.

The fire would serve as a signal, provide warmthand make drinking water.

Starting the fire was no problem. Their greatestfear-a highly combustible aircraft-could now workto help them.Oil from the engine would burn in a thick blackcloud for signaling.The fuel, JP4, would simplify getting damp woodstarted. In addition, they could use maps and charts

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COLD WE THERSURVIV L SCHOOL

to kindle the fire, or if necessary drain the alcohol fromthe compass or burn various plastic components.f their matches were wet, they could pull thechopper battery and spark the JP4. And the horizontal

stabilizer, made of magnesium, would burn.After the fire, water would become their chiefconcern. Surprisingly, dehydration is a major dangerfor anyone working in an arctic environment. Anorthern forest in midwinter is as dryas a desert, withvirtually no humidity. Dehydration occurs quicklyfrom work, and from increased metabolism needed tokeep your body warm.Dehydration is dangerous because it occurs in coldweather as quickly as in the desert, yet it may not benoticed. A person who becomes dehydrated does notthink clearly, and cle r thinking is vital to survival.The cold weather survival kit includes an insectheadnet, not by mistake, but by design. With a firegoing, and the headnet filled with snow and suspendedover the fire, it serves as a superior water machinewith the heat melting the snow rapidly, and the watercaught beneath it in a container.

****The copilot shoveled an area of snow to expose thebare ground, while the pilot sawed logs to serve as aframework for the shelter. They covered theframework with salvaged material from the chopper

and balsam boughs, then covered the shelter with 2to 5 inches of snow.Since the earth stores a great deal of heat, exposingthe bare ground releases that heat, and warms theshelter. Coupled with body heat, the shelter willquickly reach + 32 degrees or warmer-far morecomfortable than the subzero temperatures outside.With the chief warm inside the shelter, a fire burningand their water machine in operation, the three wereprepared to survive, and they could survive for daysif necessary.

At present, the 88th USARCOM Aircrew ColdWeather Survival School is the only such school runby the Army. Its purpose is to provide formal training in the use of survival equipment, build confidenceand train aviators in techniques needed for survivalin arctic conditions.In peacetime, as was the case during the VietnamWar, most fliers are picked up within a half-hour,either by a buddy flying on their wing or by efficientcivilian or government rescue operations.

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But doctrine and tactics have changed in recent yearsand they have increased the likelihood that a pilot willoperate solo in a free-flowing combat situation. Hemay not have the luxury of being picked up by his buddy and must be prepared to survive for days, ifnecessary.The Aircrew Cold Weather Survival School trainsfor that situation. The course is offered again thiswinter, with four classes to be conducted duringJanuary and February 1984.The course is open to all aircrewmembers and otherselected individuals may be authorized

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