The Ukrainian Crisis and Security in the Black Sea Dr. Igor Delano examines the Ukrainian crisis from a security perspective. He elaborates on the role that NATO has played, as well as reasons behind the Rus-sian annexation of Crimea. Dr. Delano explains ways in which international actors can improve the regional security by placing emphasis on their naval fleets. The Transnistrian Conflict Today & Tomorrow: How Should Europe Act? Ms. Daria Goncearova shifts the attention from Ukraine and analyzes how the referendum in Crimea pressing concerns about Transnitria. She examines the conflict’s historical background and the role that NATO and the EU could take in order to avoid situations like the one in Ukraine.
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 1 Edited by: Genaro Aguilera-Reza While Russia is taking full control of the Crimean Peninsula, Western powers didn't avoided major involvement during the crisis to hinder Russia’s annexation, raising significant concerns for the Black Sea region. The main question for NATO and the in- ternational community is how to avoid similar situations from occurring in the future as na- tions such as Russia and China increase their military strength. This issue of Atlantic Voices offers insights that give fresh points of view to the matter of security in the Black Sea region while at the same time emphasizing the need for a different approach by international actors like NATO and the EU. The articles also analyze the particular fac- tors that might lead to an improvement in Black Sea regional security, especially up- grades to partner military and naval forces and the challenge of finding alternative energy sup- plies to diminish dependency on Russian gas. BlackSeaFor exercises strengthen security on the Black Sea (Photo: Rianovosti) The Current Status Of Black Sea Regional Security Volume 4 - Issue 4 April 2014 Contents: The Ukrainian Crisis and Security in the Black Sea Dr. Igor Delanoë examines the Ukrainian crisis from a security perspective. He elaborates on the role that NATO has played, as well as reasons behind the Russian annexation of Crimea. Dr. Delano explains ways in which international actors can improve the regional security by placing emphasis on their naval fleets. The Transnistrian Conflict Today & Tomorrow: How Should Europe Act? Ms. Daria Goncearova shifts the attention from Ukraine and analyzes how the referendum in Crimea pressing concerns about Transnitria. She examines the conflict’s historical background and the role that NATO and the EU could take in order to avoid situations like the one in Ukraine.
Transcript
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 1
Edited by: Genaro Aguilera-Reza
While Russia is taking full control of the
Crimean Peninsula, Western powers didn't
avoided major involvement during the crisis to
hinder Russia’s annexation, raising significant
concerns for the Black Sea region.
The main question for NATO and the in-
ternational community is how to avoid similar
situations from occurring in the future as na-
tions such as Russia and China increase their
military strength.
This issue of Atlantic Voices offers insights
that give fresh points of view to the matter of
security in the Black Sea region while at the
same time emphasizing the need for a different
approach by international actors like NATO
and the EU.
The articles also analyze the particular fac-
tors that might lead to an improvement in
Black Sea regional security, especially up-
grades to partner military and naval forces and
the challenge of finding alternative energy sup-
plies to diminish dependency on Russian gas.
BlackSeaFor exercises strengthen security on the Black Sea (Photo: Rianovosti)
The Current Status Of Black Sea
Regional Security
Volume 4 - Issue 4 April 2014
Contents:
The Ukrainian Crisis and Security in the Black Sea Dr. Igor Delanoë examines the Ukrainian crisis from a security perspective.
He elaborates on the role that NATO has played, as well as reasons behind the
Russian annexation of Crimea. Dr. Delano explains ways in which international
actors can improve the regional security by placing emphasis on their naval
fleets.
The Transnistrian Conflict Today & Tomorrow: How Should Europe Act? Ms. Daria Goncearova shifts the attention from Ukraine and analyzes how
the referendum in Crimea pressing concerns about Transnitria. She examines
the conflict’s historical background and the role that NATO and the EU could
take in order to avoid situations like the one in Ukraine.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 2
The Ukrainian Crisis and Security in the Black Sea
By Dr. Igor Delanoë
W hile the Ukrainian crisis is far from being
solved, it has already brought to light
some persisting patterns in the Black Sea
security stage. The Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent
absorption of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 has high-
lighted the double challenge the Black Sea poses to the
Euro-Atlantic community. From a security perspective,
Russia has demonstrated once again its ability to gradu-
ally use its hard power to promote and protect its inter-
ests in its so-called ‘sphere of influence’. Moscow has
stepped up its maritime power in
the Black Sea, and the full sover-
eignty over Crimea which gives a
major impetus to Russian naval
plans in the pontus euxinus. From
a political perspective, the crisis
illustrates the limit of the European
attractiveness as well as the retrenchment of US influ-
ence from the Black Sea area. Ukraine is today on the
verge of both political and economic collapse since the
economic crisis that existed under former president
Yanukovith is dubbed by a deep political crisis, that has
been escalating since November 2013. The integration
of Crimea to the Russia Federation therefore questions
three main areas of the Black Sea security architecture:
maritime security, energy security, and the ability of the
main stakeholders, namely Brussels, Moscow, Ankara,
Washington and NATO, to contribute to the stability of
the region.
Toward An Enhanced Russian Maritime Power In The Black Sea
The poor conditions in which Russia's Black Sea Fleet finds itself, remain the same even after Crimea
returned to Russia, despite the seizure of a consequent number of Ukrainian vessels. However, due to Russia’s integration of the peninsula, the Black Sea maritime
landscape has been reshaped, and Russia’s Black Sea
maritime power and naval potential are set to increase. First, it must be said that Russia’s strategic objective in
the Black Sea has been and still is to lock the basin. Con-sequently, the Russian Black Sea fleet, which is current-ly under modernization, must act as a ‘fortress fleet’ to protect the southern flank of the Federation, and in the
case of a Georgian-type conflict, to deny access to the Caucasian coasts. Although it is primarily a ‘green water navy’, the Russian Black Sea fleet still maintains limited
in high seas as it has been observed by the units provid-ing support to Syria. What do we call ‘maritime power’? Maritime
power can be defined as the ability of an actor to use the maritime domain to achieve a polit-ical goal. In late 19th century, theo-rists such as the American historian
and strategist Alfred T. Mahan tended to mainly focus on naval power rather than on maritime
power, and to primarily consider the navy as the prime vector of in-
fluence from or at the sea. However, today, the concept
of maritime power has been broadened to include the merchant navy, naval diplomacy and the ability for a fleet to perform a wide array of routine maritime mis-sions. Combined to the naval power, all these factors
define the maritime power of an actor. Civil and mili-tary infrastructures as well as qualitative factors such as the experience and morale of the service personnel mat-
ter to assess accurately the ability of a State to use the sea to achieve political goals. After the March 18 annex-ation of Crimea to the Russian Federation, Moscow has
enhanced its status as a maritime power for at least four reasons: First, the integration of Crimea has provided Russia with a greater coastline in the Azov and the Black
Seas. Before March 2014, Russia had approximately 570 kilometers of coasts in the shallow Sea of Azov, nearly 400 kilometers of hostile shores, with no deep ports to
dock a fleet, between the Kerch straight and the Geor-gian border, and an additional 300 kilometers which correspond to the Abkhazian coastline under Moscow’s
military control since August 2008. Crimea provides
From a security perspective, Russia has demonstrated once again its ability to
gradually use its hard power to promote and protect its interests in its so-called
‘sphere of influence’.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 3
Russia with a greater coastline and the best Black Sea port, Sevastopol, as well as other Crimean ports.
Second, in the context of the ambitious moderniza-tion of the Black Sea fleet, the accession of the sovereignty on Sevastopol overthrew the situation. Beyond the fact that Sevastopol is the best port of the Black Sea, since its creation
by Russia in 1783 as a naval base, Moscow is now fully able to commission new vessels and dispatch new military hard-ware, including coastal artillery and land-based forces and
aircraft. Russia has been upgrading the port of Novorossiysk to turn it into a naval base, but it cannot be compared in quality to Sevastopol and its eight deep-water bays. By inte-
grating Crimea, Russia has solved at no cost the main issues that hampered the enhancement of its maritime power in the Black Sea. Moscow was prevented to freely upgrade or increase its military presence in Crimea by both the 1997
and 2010 Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the Black Sea fleet. The Putin-Yanukovitch agreement of December 17 on the Russian $15 billion loan to Ukraine called to speed up
these negotiations as well as to enhance naval cooperation. Today, Moscow is no more constrained by the conditions imposed by Kiev on its Black
Sea fleet deployment, and no longer has to share anymore Sevastopol with the Ukrainian Navy. This game changer is
likely to give a major impetus to Russian naval plans in the short term not only in the Black
Sea, but by extension, in the Mediterranean. Third, the integration of
Crimea has solved a second strategic issue for Russia, relat-ed to the demarcation of maritime borders in the Kerch straight and the Sea of Azov. Kiev advocated in favor of the
internationalization of the Sea of Azov and controlled the channel in the Kerch straight defined by the Soviet demarca-tion line. On the other hand, Russia argued to turn the Sea
of Azov into shared domestic waters, and called for a shared use of the Kerch straight. For Russia, the perspective of for-eign vessels sailing just a few miles away from the Don
mouth was a matter of national security. Today, the Kerch straight is Russian, and the Sea of Azov has virtually been turned into a Russian sea despite the fact that Ukraine still controls less than 350 km of shores located between Dzan-
koi and Novoazovsk. However, Kiev does not have the abil-ity to protect this shore, and will have to rely on Russia’s naval forces based in Temryuk to carry out routine maritime
security tasks.
Finally, Russia has expanded its continental shelf in the Azov and the Black Seas, and has noticeably gained
sovereignty over the Pallas gas and oil fields located not far from the Kerch straight. This field is believed to hold an estimated 120 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas and 12 million tons of oil. In early February 2014,
and according to the December 17 agreement, Russia and Ukraine were holding talks through Gazprom and Naftogaz to develop jointly the Pallas field. Whereas it
cannot be excluded that Ukraine would still be involved in that project, the agreement signed in August 2013 be-tween Kiev, Exxon Mobil and Shell about prospections
off the Western coasts of Crimea is jeopardized. The ab-sorption of Crimea furthermore raises the question of the demarcation of new maritime borders between Russia and Ukraine, while Russian and Romanian EEZ are now
adjacent.
Energy & Ukraine’s Bailout
The loss of Crimea and Sevastopol has a dramatic consequence for Ukraine,
not only in term of territo-rial integrity, but also with regard to its energy securi-
ty, and by extension, to European energy security. The lease of Sevas-topol to Russia has addict-
ed Ukraine to cheap Rus-sian gas from 1997 to the second half of the 2000s.
Then, the 2009 agreement worsened the situation for Ukraine, a situation slight-
ly enhanced by the 2010 Kharkov agreement. Indeed, in 2009, then Prime Minister Yulia Timochenko signed with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin a 10 year agreement ac-cording to which Ukraine must buy 52 bcm of Russian
gas annually with a rate of $500 for 1 000 cubic meters. The agreement includes the ‘take it or pay for it anyway’ clause: Kiev must pay for the volume contracted and not
for the volume effectively consumed. The 2010 Kharkov agreement amended the 2009 document: Ukraine ob-tained a rebate of $100 for 1 000 cubic meters in return of the extension of the lease of the Sevastopol naval base
to Russian until 2042. Despite the Kharkov agreement, the gas bill had tremendously increased for Kiev, and today, Ukraine still owes a $1,7 billion debt to Gazprom.
Map of Crimea and Sevastopol (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 4
On April 2, 2014, President Putin canceled the 1997 and 2010 Russian-Ukrainian agreements
on the Black Sea fleet, which consequently terminat-ed the ‘Sevastopol rebate’, but has not cancelled both the 2009 and the 2013 agreements. Conse-quently, Alexey Miller, the chairman of the manage-
ment committee of Gazprom, stated that, “starting from the second quarter of 2014, the gas price for Ukraine would increase by nearly 44%.” Despite the
fact that Kiev has sought to diversify its gas imports over the past years, Russia still provides 60% of its natural gas to Ukraine, and in 2013, Kiev imported
21,6 bcm of natural gas from Russia. Moreover, 50% of the Russian gas exported to the European Union (EU) transits through Ukraine, and
Moscow has supplied nearly 32% of the gas consumed in Europe in
2010. According to the 2 0 0 9 a g r e e m e n t , Ukraine still has to pay
annually, until 2019, the price of at least 41,6 bcm a year, which is far more than its 2013 domestic
consumption. At the post ‘April 2’ rate, it means Kiev would have to pay a minimum of $16 billion a
year.
In the context of the contraction of the GDP
in Ukraine (-3% forecast for 2014 according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy), the end of the rebate is likely to worsen the Ukrainian economic situation, and to complicate the political stabiliza-
tion of the country. Only a cooperation between Russia, the EU and the US may improve the situa-tion.
Cooperation In The Black Sea: Toward A Greater Russian-Turkish Security Condo-
minium? First, it should be noticed that today, there is no Black Sea security architecture, and that the use of the hard power remains an option to achieve po-
litical goals in the region. The main stakeholders shaping today Black Sea security dynamics (are both local) – Russia, Turkey, NATO and the EU- and
external, like the United States (US). NATO has
become an actor of the Black Sea stage due to the inte-gration of Greece and Turkey (1952), and later bol-
stered by the Bulgarian and Romanian accession to membership (2004). However, during the Cold War the Black Sea used to be a ‘Soviet Lake’, today, it is far from being a NATO lake. The latest developments in
Ukraine have confirmed the failure of the EU Eastern Partnership on the one hand, and the inability to expand NATO eastward, by integrating neither Ukraine, nor
Georgia, for the foreseeable future. However, NATO’s role as a protector of its members in Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea is increasing. After its proactive role in
the Black Sea during most of the 2000s, the US has deprioritized the Black Sea since the election of Presi-
dent Barack Obama. Today, the main drivers of Washing-
ton’s involvement in the re-gion remain energy security, and NATO ballistic missile
defense (BMD) with compo-nents located in Turkey and Romania.
Beyond the so-called ‘Pivot to Asia’, Washington needs Moscow’s active coop-eration on international issues
such as arms control, in Iran or Afghanistan. Washington is
thus unlikely to challenge Russia in its ‘sphere of privi-
leged interests’, and as a result, the US influence has retrenched from the Black Sea stage during the past years. Instead, the US is pushing the EU to take the lead
in the region and is trying to engage Turkey to solve a set of conflicts plaguing the area (Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus). Given the inability of the EU to manage its Black
Sea environment, the coming NATO retrenchment on the protection and the reinsurance of its Eastern Euro-pean members, and the waning influence of the US in
the area, the Black Sea is likely to see in the short term an enhanced Russian-Turkish security condominium over the region.
Since 1991, Turkey has reinvested in its Black Sea strategic stage by playing an active role in the maritime realm. According to the 1936 Montreux Convention, Ankara is the master of the Straights (Bosporus and Dar-
danelles), and today, the Turkish fleet remains the most effective and powerful navy in the region. Ankara has been very cautious in involving all the littoral states in
any maritime security arrangement, including Russia,
Russian Black Sea Fleet (Photo: BBC)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 5
since it aims at maintaining the status quo in the Black Sea military balance. In order to build up regional confi-
dence and increase security cooperation, Turkey launched BlackSeaFor naval taskforce in 2001. The task force gathers ships from all the Black Sea states and per-forms twice a year a wide array of exercises: search and
rescue, environment protection, anti-mines warfare. The first initiative was extended in 2004 when Ankara launched Black Sea Harmony the purpose of which was
to prevent and fight piracy and terrorism. When Wash-ington suggested in 2006 to extend Operation Active Endeavour to the Black Sea, both Moscow and Ankara
strongly opposed. Whereas the former argued that litto-ral states were fully able to enforce maritime security on the Black Sea stage, the latter raised serious concerns about the implementation of the Montreux Convention
in the context of a growing naval activity. Although An-kara has always emphasized the need to involve Moscow in the realm of maritime security, other littoral coun-
tries have been invited to contribute to both BlackSeaFor and Black Sea Harmony. Despite a growing cooperative competition between Russia and Turkey in
the realm of security in the Black Sea, both stakeholders continue to consider the Black Sea as their backyard. However, Russia’s coming naval rise in the Black Sea will question this status quo and reshape Ankara and
Moscow’s naval cooperation in the years to come.
Igor Delanoë holds a PhD in modern and contempo-rary history from the University of Nice Sophia Antipo-
lis in Nice (France). During his post-doctoral fellowship at Harvard University, he expanded his field of study to include US interests and security issues in the wider Black Sea region.
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About the author
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 6
which did not give the expected results, a different ap-proach is required from all the participants of the negotia-
tions’ process. This paper analyses the current state of play and suggests some policy recommendations for both the EU and the Moldovan Government. These include, for the EU: a) maintaining diplomatic pressure on Russia
to withdraw its troops and remove military checkpoints; b) anchor Moldova firmly in its European project by sign-
ing the Association Agree-
ment, c) implementing the liberalized visa re-gime d) implementing
free trade provisions smoothly and e) expand the EU’s and the Moldo-van government’s interac-
tion with the Transnistri-an authorities, through joint projects, trade and
people-to-people con-tacts. For the Moldovan
government: a) to work more actively with the public, in order to explain the benefits of moving
closer to the EU and the urgency to ensure nation-al security and b) to con-
sider dropping the neu-trality status and start negotiations with NATO.
Background Infor-mation
Moldova’s turn towards independence at the break of the Soviet Union provoked serious tensions with its Eastern region of Transnistria, which preferred to remain
part of the USSR. In 1992 a separatist war broke out, splitting the Republic of Moldova in a self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic and Moldova proper,
with the border along the Dniester River. Some 2600
The Transnistrian Conflict Today & Tomorrow: How Should Europe Act?
By Daria Goncearova
T he frozen conflict in Transnistria was for a long time considered a “low-hanging fruit”, as its
causes are rooted much more in the political sphere rather than in ethnic dissensions, as is the case in many other territorial disputes around the world. It was
also a conflict oftentimes overlooked by the EU and NATO against the background of other burning issues, because of its prolonged status-quo and apparent no
threat of immediate burst of violence. For the last several
years and especially recent months, it has become ap-parent that the resolution
of the conflict is far from simple, even when an agreement seemed to have been reached with one key
player – Russia, as it hap-pened for instance in 2010, when Chancellor Angela
Merkel engaged with the issue as part of Germany’s security dialogue with Rus-
sia. As the Eastern Part-
nership initiative gained in speed and importance, and
especially in light of the recent events in Ukraine, Transnistria finally came
back into the spotlight of EU’s attention. It should be understood by anyone who is dealing with the region,
that an unresolved conflicts on the left bank of Dniester River is posing a constant security threat not only to Moldova, but to the region as a whole, and is also ob-structing Moldova’s path towards European integration.
As the hitherto applied measures and negotiation tactics
The map of the breakaway Transnistrian region
(Photo: The Economist)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 7
troops of the Russian 14th Army were initially stationed on the separatist territory, supported by a substantial stock of
Soviet weaponry. Both are still stationed in the region, de-spite the repeated demands by the Moldovan government to withdraw. Although not recognized by any international player, not even the Russian Federation, Transnistria re-
mains a source of instability, smuggling, and most im-portantly, a traditional tool of maintaining Russian geopolit-ical influence in Moldova (and partly Ukraine).
EU Involvement In The Settlement Process
Throughout the ‘90s, com-plex mechanisms had been created to settle the conflict: trilateral peacekeeping operation (Russian,
Transnistrian and Moldovan troops) under the supervision of a Joint Control Commission, as well as a
negotiation format comprising the conflicting parties with Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators. The EU did not participate in this conflict reso-
lution process, leaving it to the OSCE. Nevertheless, the EU member states supported a political agreement conclud-ed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999 according to which Russia agreed to the unconditional withdrawal of
troops and weapons from Moldova within a few years, while US and EU member states agreed to adapt the arms-reduction Conventional Forces in the European Treaty.
Russia however failed to respect its commitments and has maintained its military presence in Moldova. The approach of the EU towards Transnistria changed in 2002, when after
a period of tighter cooperation between Moldova and Russia in 2001 – 2003, the relations cooled drastically after the failure to sign the “Kozak Memorandum” on Transnistria (a federalization plan proposed by Russia that effectively en-
hanced Transnistrian, and hence, Russian influence on Chis-inau). The new thinking was to take the opportunities of-fered by the EU, which, after the launch of the discussions
on a new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2002, seemed to be taking a more concrete shape than before. After several negotiation rounds, in 2005 Moldova signed a
three-year Action Plan under the ENP. The same year saw another very important development, when the EU and US joined the negotiation process on Transnistria with observer status. From this moment onwards, EU’s involvement in
the Transnistrian conflict resolution became more and more sound. The EU appointed a Special Representative on Mol-dova and launched the EU Border Assistance Mission to
Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM).
Russia also continues to play a pivotal role in the Transnistrian issue, expressed not only through its mili-
tary presence in the region, but also through economic assistance, natural gas subsidies and political support for the Tiraspol administration.
The Difficulties Of Formulating A Common Eu-ropean Message
The weak response to the Transnistrian issue from the side of the EU is a reflection of a larger problem – the complex way the EU common foreign policy is coagulat-
ed. A common EU stance on a foreign policy issue is formulated with great institutional difficul-ties. There are two major ap-
proaches that explain how deci-sions are taken within the EU. From an intergovernmentalist
perspective, EU institutions play a very limited role in EU foreign policy. In the field of foreign policy – an inter-governmental domain – the in-
stitutions reflect the interests of the more powerful member states or the lowest denominator agreements between various interests of the member states. From this perspective, the policy-drivers of EU involvement in
post-Soviet countries are the new EU member states: the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, which con-sume their political energy with other more urgent issues
(joining the Schengen agreement and entering the Euro zone) and are also small countries (except Poland) with limited bargaining power within the EU. Germany is in-
terested in a stable eastern neighborhood, which happens to be also Russia’s most important economic partner. The Nordic countries and the UK generally follow a poli-cy of moderate involvement. Taking into account these
ambivalences, it is clear that the EU’s real interests in Moldova have been relatively low.
From an institutionalist point of view, EU institu-
tions do play an independent role in foreign policy for-mulation and implementation, but still prefer low-profile politics and do not intervene into the zone of high-level
foreign policy – the domain of the member states. As Nicu Popescu argues in his “EU Foreign Policy and Post-soviet Conflicts”, the EU institutions enjoy greater auton-omy in low-politics of foreign policy, in mostly uncon-
troversial and low-risk measures, like confidence build-ing, strengthening cultural ties, development assistance, people-to-people contacts. When EU institutions engage
in Track II diplomacy without a mandate from the mem-
Transnistria remains a source of instability, smuggling, and most importantly, a traditional tool of maintaining Russian geopolitical influ-
ence in Moldova (and partly Ukraine).
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 8
ber states, the latter roll back this institutional activ-ism. This was the case of the EU Special Representa-
tive on Moldova in 2005-2007 who was promoting the idea of an EU peacekeeping operation in Trans-nistria against the wish of several member states, and had to resign in the end. An important conclusion to
be drawn from these arguments is that an external actor can affect EU decision making by raising the political weight and controversiality of the issue, as
well as by lobby-i n g m e m b e r states. Raising the
political profile of an international issue makes the EU-decision mak-
ing process more intergovernmen-tal, which leads to
a probable block-age or at least con-strains on actions
of the EU institu-tions. There are plenty of examples of this strategy
being applied in the EU neighbourhood by Russia, the relations with which can be rightly called one of the greatest im-
pediments of pursuing the EU’s interest in the EaP countries.
EU Relations With Russia Russia consistently opposes the enlargement
of EU influence in Moldova and constantly introduc-
es the issue of Customs Union, gas prices and Trans-nistrian conflict in the public debate, forcing EU member states to treat these issues through the prism
of their relations with Russia. It is important to keep in mind that the demanders for EU involvement – Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan – are all small
states, whose problems are not very important to most EU countries. At the same time, unique geo-politics of the region include Russia as a major player and thus a serious factor in EU foreign policy. Russia
has common borders with all the EaP countries and is apprehensive of EU’s increasing involvement in post-Soviet affairs. The relations between Russia and the
EU on the playfield of post-Soviet affairs are ambiva-
lent, alternating between competition and cooperation, containing some mistrust. Russia is an important con-
straining factor of EU policies in the region. As EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson has once put it: "No other country reveals our differences as does Rus-sia". The recent events that led to the de-facto annexa-
tion of Crimea by Russia have shed a new light on EU-Russia relations and have consolidated the EU Member States in their views on how these relations should pro-
gress. The Changing Inter-
national Context – A Glimpse of Hope? The unpredictabil-
ity of the Russian move in Crimea made it clear to all European leaders that
there is a real security threat right at the borders of the EU, which might
spill over to the adjacent territories. The Transnis-trian conflict today has evolved especially in the
public opinion. If several years ago only experts and those few dealing with the conflict realized fully its significance for the regional
security setup and for EU-Russia relations, today the meaning of the Russian army and munitions on this patch of land became clear for the general public as
well. There are both positive and negative consequences of this shift of the European public and official percep-tion. On the one hand, this awareness raising damages the image of Moldova as a reliable partner striving for
democracy and change. It also puts the whole problem into the media spotlight and thus limits the space for diplomatic maneuver on all sides. On the other hand,
the sense of danger and urgency might increase the pub-lic expectations from the European Common Foreign and Defence Policy and that will allow their respective
governments to take a stronger stance on Transnistrian issue, pushing an assertive common message from both institutionalist and intergovernmentalist prisms men-tioned above. Indeed, from both perspectives, the
changed, more reserved position Germany has adopted towards Russia, and raised awareness of a tangible secu-rity threat felt among Western member states, form a
promising basis for a substantial change in a EU position
Military parade on the occasion of 23rd anniversary of the Republic Day
in Transnistria (Photo: www.kommersant.md)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 9
on the Transnistrian issue. It means that the govern-ments of the most influential member states are starting
to share the view of the Eastern European policy-drivers and EU involvement in the post-Soviet space. Creating a higher common denominator of national interests it is also creating a space for the Transnistrian issue to be
tackled in the higher levels of foreign policy, where the EU institutions might finally receive from the member states a clear mandate to act. Today, the usual re-
strictions to a firmer EU stance in Eastern Partnership counties seem to be gradually fading away.
What Does The Future Hold?
Every single political analyst was wrong about the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis and the situation in
Crimea. It is a difficult, if not an impossible task to pre-dict Russia’s next move over other territories. Still, for the moment, Moscow gave a clear signal that it was not
going to support another referendum in Transnistria and accept it as another subject into the Russian Federation just now. The request by the “parliamentary assembly” in Tiraspol on this issue addressed to the Russian Duma
in mid-March was not put on the agenda for discussion and hence ignored for the time being. It is clear, though, that the Russian Federation has the tools to “heat up” the
frozen conflict at any point in the future. Despite some similarities between Transnistria
and Crimea, such as stationing of Russian troops, lin-
guistic and mental affiliation with Russian values, refer-enda that confirm this affiliation and wish to actually join the Russian Federation, there are also important differ-ences. Namely, the historical and cultural symbolism of
Transnistrian region is far of a lesser scale than the one of the Crimean peninsula, it is geographically separated from Russia and has a reduced strategic importance
compared to the military potential of Crimean warm water ports.
To actually integrate Transnistria successfully,
Russia would have to take over even a larger portion of south Ukraine leaving it without access to the Black Sea, which is highly unlikely.
The real danger stems today from the “heating” of
the conflict without actually separating Transnistria from Moldova and thus destabilizing the whole country and – as a bonus – the region as well. The possible Rus-
sia-provoked “thawing” will have an immediate destruc-
tive impact on Moldova’s European prospects as well. Moreover, because of the crisis in Crimea, it be-
came clear that Moldova doesn’t, in fact, have any secu-rity guaranties, and that the much praised neutrality status assured by the Constitution will not protect Mol-dova’s legitimate borders, just as the Budapest Memo-
randum did not protect Ukrainian territorial integrity. The illusion of usefulness of a neutrality status is rapidly approaching to its end as it becomes obvious that radi-
calization of Transnistria is possible at any time and this will leave Chisinau with no viable solution.
Conclusions & Policy Recommendations
A) Given Russia's re-cent behaviour, the EU
should make clear to Moscow that it will not allow fur-
ther escalation in the region and the trampling of inter-national norms. B) The EU has already offered Moldova a visa-
free regime, and the attention should be shifted now to its efficient implementation and to the raising of the EU visibility in the country. Though Moldova is among the highest recipients of EU funds per capita among the
ENP countries, the EU is not very visible on the ground, partially because it channels its funds through interna-tional institutions such as UNDP.
C) Moreover, EU Member States should go be-yond their 'constructive ambiguity' formulas and offer a clear European perspective for both Moldova and
Ukraine. Such a perspective could potentially change the dynamic of the Transnistrian conflict and offer a clear goal to the citizens and the political leaders of this re-gion.
D) The quick signature of the Association Agreement that would help Moldova stay at its chosen European path is a much awaited action as well
(expected to happen in June). The Moldovan govern-ment should try to maintain dialogue with Tiraspol but also continue on its European path, while trying to re-
form and improve the lives of Moldovan citizens, on both banks of the Dniester. E) Because of the crisis in Crimea, it has become clear that Russian troops will not be withdrawn from
Transnistria. On the contrary, Russia will maintain its military presence in the region with greater than ever insistence. The Moldovan government must think ahead
of the decisions it will have to take later on, when ap-proaching the question of an eventual EU membership.
Every single political analyst was wrong about the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis and the situation in Crimea, thus it is a difficult, if not impossible
task to predict Russia’s next move in other territo-ries .
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 10
Probably, there will be only two options that would guarantee absence of foreign troops on Moldovan terri-
tory: either a very broad federalization under which Russian troops would agree to withdraw, or an actual, de jure, separation of the break-away region. Both op-tions are very short of an apocalyptic scenario, that eve-
ry government in Moldova has been trying to avoid by pushing these difficult decisions further into the future. F) A bold and somewhat unexpected action, that
might bring tangible posi-tive results, would be to follow the conclusive ad-
vice of New York City Bar Association and to de-nounce the neutrality status in order to en-
gage in negotiations with NATO. Further temporization and “the
small steps” policy con-fined to the 5 plus 2 format will protract the status-quo
and cement Russia’s influence. Although 19% of the population do generally support the idea of joining NATO, the topic is still a taboo for public discussion. It seems to be a wrong and counterproductive strategy, as
Moldovan officials are deprived of a very important ar-gument in their negotiations with Russia and are also short of security policy options, the importance of
which today is primordial.
Ms. Daria Goncearova is a career diplomat for Mol-dovan ministry of Foreign Affairs for the past 9 years, Daria is now based in Brussels, where she has obtained a
(second) Master degree in Communications at VUB and is pursuing a traineeship at the European Parliament. Daria is also starting a PhD research on EU image
abroad. Her areas of expertise include EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, EU role in frozen conflicts' resolution, Eastern Partnership and EU-Russia relations. Bibliography Korosteleva, E. (2012), The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours. Towards a More Ambitious Partnership? London a n d New York: Routledge
Popescu, N. (2011) EU Foreign Policy and Post -Soviet Con flicts. Stealth intervention, London and New York: Routledge “Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova: A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York”, New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 2006
“Unsustainability of negotiations on Transnis trian conflict settle ment or why secure ty mat
ters”,Mol dova’s Foreign Poli c y S t a t e watch, I s s u e 4 8 , No vember 2012 (www.viitorul.org) Popescu, Nicu and Wilson, Andrew (2009) "The limits of enlargement- lite: European and Russian power in the troubled neighbour hood", report for the European Coun
cil of Foreign Rela tions, June 2009 Chirilă, V. (2013), “Este Transnistria Reinte grabilă?”,http://www.ape.md/libview.php l=ro&idc=152&id=1926Ciurea, C., Ghinea, C., Popescu, N., Rodkiewicz, W., Sieg., H. M. (2012) Popescu, N. and Litra, L. (2012) “Transnistria: A Bottom- Up Solution”, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Briefs Nr 63 (http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ ECFR63_TRANSNISTRIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf) Mandelson, P (2007), “The EU and Russia: our joint political challenge”, Bologna, 20 April 2007
IPP, Barometer of Public Opinion, Institute for Public Policy, Chisinau, Moldova; www.ipp.md/lib.php?I=en&idc=156
About the author
Russian peacekeepers at the administrative border between
Transnistrian region and Moldova (Photo: www.moldova.org)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 11
(Photos: NATO)
Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, together with the ATA Secretariat will launch a YATA Photo
Competition! This competition will ask participants – YATA and non-YATA – to capture in their own
way, in one photo frame, what they consider to be the essence of security, NATO and defense, and the
connection between the three points. Your pictures should reflect your own views on what security is!
The first call for pictures, followed by a selection by a committee, will be announced on Sunday
and the official opening of the competition will be Monday the 21st of April. The prize for the best
picture, decided by the committee, will be a free admission to the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar
this July!
We will have smaller prizes for pictures of the week, that will become the cover page on our
Facebook page and the picture of the month that will be posted in Atlantic Voices. Do not miss this
unique opportunity to get your message across our network!
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“A Picture Is Worth A Thousand Words” Join or YATA Photo Competition!
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International Symposium ”European Defense, NATO &
EU: The Challenges Ahead” took place on 11 April, 2014 at the
Ministry of Press and Mass Media in Kallithea, Greece. The main
topic of Eurodefense was to contemplate the concept of European
Security and Defense Systems and to create opportunities in this
field to analyze the vulnerabilities, threats and risks that Europe is
now facing, as well as those that it will face in the future.
From April 24-27,
YATA Norway will host 40
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participate in their annual
NORSEC conference.
This years conference deals
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challenges this poses to the cohesiveness of the alliance.
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will take place May 28th– 29th in Budva, Montenegro in lead up
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Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
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