Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative...

Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative Approach to the Study of CoerciveDiplomacyAuthor(s): Maria SperandeiReviewed work(s):Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jun., 2006), pp. 253-280Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3880225 .Accessed: 27/08/2012 09:46

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Wiley-Blackwell and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to International Studies Review.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=blackhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=isahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3880225?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

International Studies Review (2006) 8, 253-280

Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative Approach to the

Study of Coercive Diplomacy

MARIA SPERANDEI

Department of Government, Cornell University

Despite decades of research on coercive diplomacy, the linkage between deterrence and compellence still remains unexplored. The present essay provides both a theoretical and empirical analysis of why studying their linked relationship is desirable. After overviewing the literature, it investigates the interplay between US strategies of deterrence and compellence in the First Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), suggesting that the deterrence-compellence linkage is stronger when the two strategies coexist or after they have coexisted. In particular, such a linkage was absent at the beginning of the First Gulf Crisis but very much present from the mid- dle of the crisis until its end. Although this essay represents only a preliminary foray into exploring the potential linkage between deterrence and compellence, it appears that a better grasp of this relationship could provide us with the tools to counteract as well as reduce the negative effects of miscalculation and misperception, practices that are partially responsible for unpredicted and unwanted outcomes in international politics.

In a system of states, the use of force generally discriminates between peace and war. Yet, international politics often takes place in a gray region involving no-peace and no-war, wherein the threat of violence-more than its mere application-is the critical variable for an understanding of interstate relations and crises. Most con- flicts are, in fact, reciprocal bargaining situations wherein the desired outcome hinges on the participants' skillful exploitation of potential force (Schelling 1963:5; Snyder and Diesing 1977:22; Lauren 1979:186). After decades of investigations into the threat of the use of force as a distinctive practice in international politics, one area still remains largely unexplored: the linkage between the two best-known types of threat-one intended to dissuade an adversary from doing something (deterrence) and the other intended to persuade an adversary to do something (compellence). An overriding focus on deterrence characterized scholarship during the Cold War. After the bipolar system's collapse, however, researchers and policymakers became interested in rediscovering the meaning and practice of compellence.1 Today, analyzing the relationship between deterrence and compellence is a neglected but important task.

The purpose of this essay is to explore this dark corner in the literature on coercive diplomacy. Three scholarly traditions, or rather approaches, seem to have

'This statement is not intended to suggest that research on compellence did not exist during the Cold War or that strategies of compellence did not come into play. Rather, the heavy focus and reliance on deterrence jeop- ardized the significance of any comparative analysis linking deterrence to compellence.

O 2006 International Studies Review. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

254 Bridging Deterrence and Compellence

characterized the study of deterrence and compellence after World War II. By discussing some of the extensive research on coercive diplomacy, the first section of the essay will illustrate the similarities and differences among these approaches. From them, this author will derive an overlooked alternative that offers interesting possibilities. According to this view, deterrence and compellence are distinctive- and-linked events because every international actor A who aims at deterring another actor B should have an idea about how to react if B acts contrarily to A's wishes. This first section also clarifies the reasons why research on the missing approach is desirable and explains the ways in which the study of the deterrence-compellence relationship will unfold in the following sections.

The second section of the essay provides an overview of the defining features of deterrence and compellence in order to establish an eventual connection between the two strategies of coercion. This section suggests that even though some elements are peculiar to the study of deterrence and some others better suited to the analysis of compellence, and although the two strategies have received different emphases at different times, a wide range of points of contact exist. This assessment does not make the development of a theoretical deterrence-compellence bridge any easier. On the contrary, it demonstrates that, with the current state of knowl- edge, the theory of deterrence and the theory of compellence remain unbridgeable or mutually exclusive.

The deterrence-compellence divide confirms that the theoretical study of the two strategies has never encompassed their sequential, empirical application. In- terestingly, if deterrence and compellence are regarded as sequentially applied policies, studying their connection or disconnection is an important research end- eavor. For this purpose, section three of the essay analyzes the interplay of US deterrence and compellence in the First Gulf Crisis (1990-1991). Whereas the literature on US coercive diplomacy during this crisis would advocate either the impossibility of distinguishing between deterrence and compellence or the lack of any relationship between them (given the weakness of the US deterrent attempt and the seriousness of the coalition's compellent effort), this essay will argue that inferences about the empirical deterrence-compellence linkage are less immediate and straightforward than it would seem. The US policymakers who implemented the weak policies of deterrence before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait neither had, nor sought to have, a prior notion of compellence in mind. However, a certain degree of deterrence-compellence coordination is evident in the US strategy toward Iraq when the two policies were concurrently pursued after August 2, 1990.

Despite the fact that this essay represents the first investigation into a new area of inquiry within the study of coercive diplomacy and, thus, its findings should be viewed cautiously as well as attentively, the deterrence-compellence relationship could serve as a valuable instrument for planning and assessing the strategy of coercion in dealing with crises. Ultimately, well-focused and coherent deterrence- compellence management is a highly desirable asset in dealing with interstate crises wherein systemic misperceptions and misunderstandings often lie in wait. Policy- makers, as a result, should regard a careful and constant appraisal of the deterrence-compellence linkage as a major objective.

Approaches to the Study of Deterrence and Compellence Deterrence and compellence have been researched extensively. Valuable theoretical and empirical contributions, both old and new, have undoubtedly advanced our understanding of the nature of bargaining in international politics. Several aspects of each policy have undergone wide and recurrent scrutiny. The conceptual definition and refinement of the two strategies, the conditions that favor or inhibit their success, the classification of case studies as examples of deterrence or compellence, the political and behavioral limits underpinning their rational

MARIA SPERANDEI 255

assumptions, and the role of the military and nonmilitary to enhance their cred-

ibility figure among the most investigated areas. However, research regarding the threat to use force is noticeably characterized by an "inward-looking" perspective. Deterrence and compellence are readily thought of as two separate halves of the same coin and analysis proceeds within each half rather than between the two. Because of the complex theoretical and empirical nature of both concepts and because the

study of coercive diplomacy has been mostly accompanied by a strong emphasis on deterrence, a relatively small number of studies tackle deterrence and compellence jointly rather than individually.2 Moreover, most of these studies do not consider deterrence and compellence as distinctive and interrelated events on a continuum. In other words, no effort is made to bridge the gap between the two halves of coercive diplomacy. As will be further specified later, there is reason to believe that such an effort is desirable and that the time is ripe for such development.

To substantiate this assessment, let us first examine the research strategy that lies behind the study of deterrence and compellence. By adopting a holistic stance, this section gives an account of several ways in which deterrence and compellence have been dealt with, while also tracing the evolution of the literature on coercion. The

argument is developed along two dimensions. One (horizontal) concentrates on how the interest in coercive diplomacy has changed over time. The other (vertical) identifies comparable approaches across time. Providing an exhaustive overview of the available literature is beyond the remit of this study. Rather, the purpose is to touch thematically upon major contributions within the field in an attempt to offer a new angle from which to examine the diplomacy of violence. The boundaries that

separate the discussed approaches are not impermeable. Several scholars have

adopted more than one approach across their studies or even different approaches at the same time. As a result, the proposed classification is best understood dy- namically, bearing in mind that the focus is not on the authors but on the approaches that were selected in general and on the one that is missing in particular.

'Joint-But-Opposite": The First Approach Not surprisingly, the theoretical development of coercive diplomacy is framed by the rise, succession, and demise of the Cold War. Although the policy of containment formulated at the end of the 1940s legitimized a special interest in deterrence for four subsequent decades, the fall of the "iron curtain" encouraged greater attention to compellence. Arguably, the primary and most comprehensive discussion of the two major exercises of coercive diplomacy-deterrence and compellence-was offered by Thomas Schelling in the 1960s. As his key works clearly illustrate, Schelling (1963, 1966) focused mainly on the features that distinguished between the two policies-a stance that would prove to be extremely resilient in the years to come. Drawing on J. David Singer's distinction between "persuasion" and "dissuasion," Schelling (1966:69) distinguished between "a threat intended to make an adversary do something" and "a threat intended to keep him from starting something." The major dissimilarities, to a great extent paralleling the ones existing between statics and dynamics, were identified "in the timing ... in who has to make the first move and in whose initiative is put to a test" (Schelling 1966:69). Deterrence is indefinite in timing and tactically static; it involves setting the stage by demanding inaction and, potentially, waiting forever for the opponent to act. The compellent threat, in contrast, cannot wait forever to be effective. A demand has to be formulated, a deadline fixed, and some punitive action--to be ceased if the

2From the end of the Second World War until the demise of the Soviet Union, US official foreign policy was

widely reminiscent of President Harry Truman's policy of containment and was aimed at deterring the adversary rather than "rolling it back." The Cuban Missile Crisis and President Reagan's mandate regarding Communism are

exceptions.


adversary yields-has to be put in motion. Thus, whereas the issuing of a threat is sufficient for deterrence, both the threat and the exemplary use of force are required for compellence. Moreover, because the alteration rather than the preser- vation of the adversary's behavior is the general objective of a compellent policy, such threats are deemed to be more complex than deterrent ones because they involve a degree of positive activity on the part of the target (Schelling 1966:100; Petersen 1986; Freedman 1998:54). Ultimately, the West's focus on deterrence is reflected in Schelling's terminological effort to create an adequate counterpart to deterrence, referring to a more active kind of threat. The term "compellence," as he states (Schelling 1966:71), is the best he could think of.

A viewpoint similar to Schelling's, namely an interest in the distinction between the threat to dissuade and the threat to persuade an adversary to change the status quo, is observable in several other studies published in the ensuing decades. At the end of the 1970s, Paul Lauren (1979:187) presented a brief historical narrative of several theories of bargaining by distinguishing between those that concentrated on the official 'jewel in the crown" of US foreign policy, deterrence, and those that emphasized the more dangerous compellence.3 Some commonalities were recognized. For instance, both deterrence and compellence use threats, not to harm the adversary physically, but to affect his will. Namely, both the deterrer and the compeller must convince the adversary that they have "the will and the capability to inflict considerable damage upon something that the opponent values more than the object of dispute" (Lauren 1979:193). Clearly, therefore, both the theories of deterrence and those of compellence are rooted in assumptions that are a rough approximation of a more multifaceted and dynamic reality. Importantly, however, for Lauren as well as Gordon Craig and Alexander George (1990), deterrence and compellence remain two sets of theories with some common attributes.

The joint-but-opposite approach is also present in the debate between Paul Huth and Bruce Russett (1984, 1990) on the one side and Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1989) on the other concerning the coding of cases as examples of successful or failed deterrence or compellence. Their disagreement centers on a group of ambiguous cases. Whereas Lebow and Stein, who adopt narrower criteria for inclusion, regard the spurious cases as "false positives" and therefore exclude them from the analysis, Huth and Russett view the group as "false negatives" and take account of them on the basis that some cases could be genuine examples of deterrence and compellence. Regardless of the validity of their positions, for Huth, Russett, Lebow, and Stein, the essential task was one of matching the theoretical distinction between deterrence and compellence with the empirical evidence.

A similar perspective is adopted by Walter Petersen (1986) in his assessment of some hypothesized dissimilarities between deterrence and compellence. Common key propositions stemming from deterrence theory hold that (1) compellent threats are more likely to result in violent conflict, (2) it is easier to compel than to deter, (3) compellence is a reckless activity, and (4) the targets of compellent threats have a bargaining advantage over the initiators. Petersen's findings suggest that the first statement is true if compellent threats are issued under specific structural conditions, that the applicability of the second proposition is limited, and that the third and the fourth ones are invalid. Notwithstanding that his primary intent was to demonstrate that these conventional assumptions are faulty in some significant respect, Petersen's preference for examining what distinguishes each policy from the other is, once again, unquestioned.4

3It is worth noting that Lauren considered the terms "compellence" and "coercive diplomacy" as equivalent. In the present essay, both compellence and deterrence (and not exclusively compellence) comprise coercive diplomacy.

4Petersen's research is based on questionable coding decisions and definitions of deterrence and compellence that shift the focus away from Schelling's conceptual framework. However, for the purposes of the present essay, Petersen's approach to the investigation of coercive diplomacy is very similar to Schelling's.

MARIA SPERANDEI 257

Likewise, in his appraisal of the most significant factors responsible for international crisis outcomes, Eric Herring (1995:14) takes into account the deterrence- compellence distinction--along with the military balance, the interests at stake, and other psychological and cultural variables. But he admits, as a final remark, that this distinction can be eroded as a result of crisis tactics. His case in point is the Chinese reaction to the planned US invasion of Korea (September 1950). After President Harry Truman had decided to invade North Korea but before the operations had begun, the Chinese use of deterrence shaded into compellence in an effort to change Truman's mind. For Herring (1995:231), however, the blurring was pro- visional because "once US forces entered North Korea, the Chinese abandoned deterrence in favor of luring US forces to their destruction."

The Deterrence-Compellence Divide: The Second Approach and Its Two Expressions Besides dealing with deterrence and compellence as joint-but-opposite components of coercive diplomacy, scholars have chosen to treat them separately and unequally, favoring the former over the latter or vice versa. The awesome increase in destruc- tive power brought about by nuclear and thermonuclear weapons soon after the rise of the "iron curtain" marked the "golden age" of deterrence. Despite the fact that their works differ significantly in scope, content, and conclusions, deterrence theorists are generally grouped into three succeeding waves of thought (Jervis 1979; Buzan 1987; Schaub 1998). What unites them is an unquestioned preference for deterrence as the prime (if not the only) expression of coercive diplomacy. Writing at the dawn of the nuclear era, when no major nuclear deployment had yet occurred, "first-wave" thinkers such as Bernard Brodie (1946) and Arnold Wolfers (1962:147- 165) formulated some theoretical forecasts regarding the implications of nuclear weapons. In the late 1950s, with the emergence of bipolarity and the undermining of the United States' credibility in meeting Soviet aggression with nuclear retaliation, "second-wave" scholars such as Schelling (1963, 1966) and Glenn Snyder (1960; also Snyder and Diesing 1977) signaled the heyday of rational deterrence theory. The logical assumptions at the core of this theory were subjected to vigorous criticism during the 1970s and the 1980s by subsequent "third-wave" studies (George and Smoke 1974; Jervis 1979). Using a case-study approach and drawing on the recent breakthroughs in social psychology, these works emphasized the behavioral and or- ganizational deviations of decision makers from established patterns of rationality.

Even though the theory and practice of deterrence thrived, a conceptual and empirical vacuum surrounded the policy of compellence until the end of the 1980s, with the noteworthy exceptions of studies by George, Hall, and Simons (1971) and Lauren (1972). Awareness of the unequal treatment of compellence vis-a-vis deterrence along with a willingness to remedy the unbalanced state of the literature developed since the second half of the 1990s (George and Simons 1994; Freedman 1998; Art and Cronin 2003). Significantly, after the end of the Cold War, US policymakers rediscovered the utility of compellence in a number of instances (Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Libya, Laos, Cuba, Haiti). In the new international context, clas- sical deterrence could no longer be the keystone of US strategy; its conceptual- ization needed rethinking and updating. Compellence, on the other hand, seemed to offer practical and analytic promise, and the unequal treatment of the two branches of coercion began to be redressed. What is relevant to a discussion of the topic of this section--the deterrence-compellence divide--is that the new scholarship on compellence ultimately reflected a perspective on the study of coercion that recalled the one adopted by the three waves of literature on deterrence just considered. Deterrence and compellence were retained as distinct concepts to be analyzed separately.

Scholarly research into the forgotten half of coercion (George and Simons 1994; Freedman 1998; Art and Cronin 2003) has confirmed the complexity of the


phenomenon as the research on deterrence had already suggested. Nevertheless, although the study of deterrence has generally relied on an axiomatic system of deductive logic, induction appears to be the principal methodology chosen for the

study of compellence.5 In particular, a comparative case-study approach aimed at

determining the correlates of the success and failure of compellence has been the favored technique. Whereas there is some agreement on these correlates of com-

pellence, variations in the terminology used are customary. The expression "compellence" itself has generated disagreement, being referred to as "coercion," "coercive diplomacy," or, in George's (1991) favored wording, "forceful persuasion." Reminiscent of Schelling's theoretical skeleton, a broad group of analysts considered the various forms of compellence (and deterrence) as a subset of the

"diplomacy of violence" or "coercive diplomacy" (George, Hall, and Simons 1971; Huth and Russet 1984; Stein 1992; Herring 1995; Freedman 1998; Art and Cronin 2003). According to Schelling's (1966:3) definition, coercion is the "power to hurt," which best succeeds when it is "held in reserve" rather than when it is used as "brute force." Therefore, the full-scale use of force (war-fighting) should not be

interpreted as the most extreme execution of a purposeful threat; rather, it should translate into the failure of coercion and ex hypothesi of compellence. Another branch of the literature (Lauren 1979; Treverton 2000) includes only compellence in the category of coercive diplomacy and excludes deterrence as too weak a policy tool to coerce effectively. Contrary to subsuming compellence under coercive di-

plomacy or claiming their equivalence, George (1991) looks at compellence as a more wide-ranging instrument of violence than coercion. Compellence, as George intends it, involves the offensive as well as the defensive use of threat, whereas coercive diplomacy would refer exclusively to the latter, being the demonstrative (or limited) use of force. By making coercive diplomacy a subcategory of compellence, George visibly reverses Schelling's framework while also blurring the distinction between compellence and brute force. Elsewhere, Robert Art and Patrick Cronin (2003) introduce a further division, that between "coercive diplomacy" and

"coercive attempts," the former comprising and the latter excluding the threat of the limited use of force.

Some observations are called for after this brief theoretical tour. Terminological disagreement about compellence is acute. Although classifications are normal practice in international relations theory and conceptual analysis is a necessary first step toward clear thinking, an unwarranted emphasis on definitions surrounds the

theory of coercion. Schelling's categorization of deterrence and compellence as the

major expressions of coercive diplomacy seems to not only remain the most log- ically appealing theoretical framework on the subject but to be perfectly capable of

containing all the variants in the study of threat and use of force that have been

contemplated to date. Ultimately, no variant seems to offer more than just additional conceptual distinctions on an already conceptually and empirically complex issue.

In conclusion, the present essay recognizes that the coercive policies of deterrence as well as of compellence rely on the threat of future military force to influence adversarial decision makers and that the limited use of actual force may be required for compellence to work. In addition, this essay endorses Schelling's grouping of compellence and deterrence as both being indicative of coercive diplomacy, a choice also made, quite recently, by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman (2000).

"Induction and deduction are best viewed as complementary in explaining both deterrence and compellence. The latter policy, however, benefits from a lower level of abstraction (that the success of deterrence is harder to assess as there are no visible changes that can confirm it); the success and failure of compellance are easier to measure

empirically.

MARIA SPERANDEI 259

"Blurring the Boundaries": The Third Approach An alternative perspective on the study of deterrence and compellence questions the viability of distinguishing between the two along semantic or empirical lines. In this respect, David Baldwin (1979:188) holds that the differentiation between the two policies of coercion is deficient because "from a purely semantic standpoint any deterrent threat can be stated in compellent terms and any compellent threat can be stated in deterrent terms." Notably, this stance is not antithetical to the former approaches. Schelling himself has acknowledged the possibility that the boundaries between deterrence and compellence may blur in certain instances. Take, for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis. The successful US compellent policy following the failure of deterrence in 1962 had, in Schelling's (1966:80-82) words, "some static qualities of the deterrent threat." Along these lines, Freedman (2004:111) observes that the United States was simultaneously conveying two warnings to the Soviet Union: one (compellent) aimed at stopping Soviet missile installations in Cuba, the other (deterrent) aimed at stopping any additional missiles from passing through the US blockade. Elsewhere, Art and Cronin (2003:4) maintain that the two policies likely intermingle when the opposing parties disagree on the legitimacy of the status quo. Thus, the deterrer's attempt to defend the status quo will be viewed by the target as a compellent action benefitting the deterrer, whereas the target's would-be active response might be defined as both a failure of deterrence and a compellent reaction.

More recently, Byman and Waxman (2000:5-12) have further portrayed the empirical haziness between deterrence and compellence by describing the US-Iraq standoff during the first Persian Gulf Crisis. According to these authors, US in- junctions that can be classified as "deterrence" or "compellence"--such as "don't invade Kuwait" or "withdraw from Kuwait"-overlapped considerably in practice. Even though a compellent threat plays an inherent role in deterrence (that is, issuing the threat "don't invade Kuwait" contains the warning that an action will be stopped in the case of invasion), a deterrent intimidation plays an implicit role in compellence (that is, the demand for withdrawal implies the implicit request of not engaging in the offense).

Coercion is therefore a dynamic process and coercive threats should be seen as lying along a continuum rather than as discrete events. Standard frameworks based on the deterrence-compellence distinction do not provide for a full understanding of coercion if a crisis is viewed as a process of constant interaction wherein actors' moves are measured against the adversary's countermoves. Consider the novelty of this idea. The coexistence of deterrence and compellence is not a special circumstance in a crisis, as Schelling has proposed and as Freedman as well as Art and Cronin have reiterated. Rather, an entire crisis is seen as a continuous interplay between the two policies of coercion. Although Byman and Waxman are aware of the constant difficulty of distinguishing in practice between deterrence and compellence and, as a result, take both strategies into account, these authors' overriding interest is in compellence. Overall, though, Byman and Waxman's position is more consistent than Baldwin's (1979:192), who, in the same article in which he ac- knowledges the possibility of a deterrence-compellence merger, retreats from his position by affirming that "students of international relations should be wary of the distinction between compellence and deterrence."

Table 1 summarizes the discussion thus far. It indicates the three main trends that have dominated the rich panorama of studies that exist on deterrence and compellence. Analysts have been eager to (1) deal with the two policies jointly by ac- centuating their differences over their possible interactions or points of contact (first approach), (2) tackle them separately by restricting attention to only one of the two (second approach), or (3) identify their semantic or empirical inseparability and difficult partition (third approach). The complexity of the concepts as well as their

ItI

It

cl?

(7t

TABLE 1. Three Orthodox Approaches to Deterrence and Compellence

APPROACHES TO DETERRENCE (D) AND COMPELLENCE (C)

A) First Approach B) Second Approach C) Third Approach

JOINT-BUT-OPPOSITE SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL BLURRED

(SEMANTICALLY OR EMPIRICALLY)

D * C

B1) Emphasis on D B2) Emphasis on C

Schelling First-wave theorists George, Hall, and Baldwin (1979) (1963, 1966)* (1940-1950s) Simons (1971, 1994) Byman and Waxman Lauren Second-wave theorists Lauren (1972) (2000) (1979) (1960s) Freedman (1998) Huth and Russett Third-wave theorists Schaub (1998) With minor emphasis: (1984, 1990) (1970-1980s) Art and Cronin Schelling (1963, 1966) Petersen (1986) Lebow and Stein (2003)* Herring (1995) Lebow and Stein (1994) Freedman (1998) (1989) Freedman Art and Cronin (2003) Craig and George (2004) (1990) Stein (1992) Herring (1995)*

*Recognition that the distinction may be eroded in certain instances.

MARIA SPERANDEI 261

potential coexistence help explain the frequency with which analysts shift from one approach to the other. For instance, understanding deterrence and compellence as two opposite sides of coercion (first approach) is compatible with an exclusive con- centration on one of them (second approach). Similarly, as highlighted by Schel- ling's previous insight on the Cuban Missile Crisis, the first and third approaches do not exclude one another, while Byman and Waxman's study ultimately shows the compatibility of the third and the second approaches.

"Distinctive-and-Linked": A Forgotten Approach An additional option exists besides the approaches summarized in Table 1. Rather than putting deterrence and compellence at odds with one another and addressing them either in concert or independently (first and second approaches) or stretching their terminological or empirical boundaries until they overlap (third approach), there is reason to think that deterrence and compellence can be effectively linked and that studying their relationship could promote a better understanding and execution of them both. Although their semantic difference is viable, as Herring (1995:15-16) has demonstrated, their rigid separation is unproductive not merely because the two policies may empirically fuse or blur in the particular case under study but, more importantly, because they can be formulated and applied at sequential stages in the management of a crisis.

Several case studies-the Berlin crises in 1948-1949 and 1958-1962, the Jap- anese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954-1955, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border crisis in 1969, the Falklands War in 1982, and the Gulf War in 1990-1991--have involved a mixture of deterrent and compellent policies. In the Berlin crisis, the airlift (compellence) by which the United States responded to the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June 1948 resulted from the failure of US deterrence. Also, by the time the blockade was lifted, the United States had set up its most successful deterrent device: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With regard to Japan (1941), the United States had used the threat of an oil embargo (deterrence) for months before actually imposing it in July 1941 (compellence). Even though the US nuclear arsenal played a significant deterrent role against a Chinese invasion during the Taiwan Straits Crisis, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in defense of the island (compellence) had also been considered. In 1961, the implementation of the US naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis was preceded and accompanied by ominous build-ups of US military forces.

Reasonably, after a deterrent threat has failed and the stakes of deterrence have remained unaltered, a more compellent action has to be initiated. By contrast, once a compellence policy has succeeded, there may be an advantage in preserving the status quo through a deterrent policy (see, for example, Schelling 1963; George 1991). In short, either the failure of deterrence is followed by a compellent threat or the success of compellence is followed by a deterrent policy. Obviously, the success of deterrence or the failure of compellence are not interesting instances, given that the former would not require any following compellent threat, and the latter would result in war rather than deterrence. The possible combinations have been illustrated in Figure 1.

The distinctive-and-linked approach derives from a synthesis of the first and third approaches discussed above. First, deterrence and compellence are distinctive policies and the analytic categories that maintain this distinction are valuable. Sec- ond, a linkage between compellence and deterrence exists even though there are, as Byman and Waxman have noted, difficulties in distinguishing empirically between them. Accordingly, a description of compellence has to incorporate insights and examples of deterrence. In this fourth approach, the analysts' focus is on the dynamic process leading from the failure of deterrence to the issuing of a final


Deterrence followed by compellence Compellence followed by deterrence

1) DSpeace

(no need for C) CS ---- DS

CS

------.

DF

2)* DF CS

DF * - CF 2) CF war (no need for D)

*Legend: DS = deterrence success; DF = deterrence failure; CS = compellence success; CF = compellence failure

FIG. 1. Acceptable Patterns for the Study of the Deterrence-Compellence Relationship.

compellent threat. But rather than focusing on the two-player interaction, the distinctive-and-linked approach proposed in this essay considers the discrete events and policies of deterrence and compellence that one player outlines and executes during the crisis. The intent is not a denial of the relevance of reciprocity in the understanding of coercive diplomacy. The suggestion, instead, is that deterrence and compellence can be meaningfully treated as discrete events even if they are codependent for the duration of the crisis.

When deterrence and compellence are regarded as discrete and juxtaposed events, investigating the relationship between them becomes viable. Although some interesting works in the early 1990s (Stein 1992; Cimbala 1994) have dealt with the sequential incidence of deterrence and compellence in a crisis, the development of a theoretical and empirical bridge linking one strategy to the other has not yet been considered. The occurrence of both deterrence and compellence serves to support the conclusions that these policies cannot be kept rigidly separated (Freedman 1998:20) and that their outcomes may be similar (Stein 1992). More specifically, in her assessment of the reasons behind the failure of coercive diplomacy in the First Gulf Crisis, Stein (1992) places side by side the US inability to mount a convincing strategy of deterrence in the period preceding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the US orchestration of compellence in response to the Iraqi reluctance to fulfill the UN resolutions. Here, Stein treats deterrence and compellence as separate and distinguishable policies. Despite the significant difference in the way they were crafted and executed, both policies were unsuccessful. According to Stein, had the United States manifested a stronger commitment to deterrence, coercive diplomacy would still have stood little chance of success due to Saddam's systematic miscal- culations and misjudgments of US intentions. Like Byman and Waxman (2000), Stein remains interested in the two players' interactions, and Hussein's stubborn and deceptive behavior is depicted as a major variable in accounting for the failure of both US deterrence and compellence. Ultimately, although deterrence and compellence are dealt with jointly (first approach) and sequentially, no effort is made at bridging them in the way the fourth approach proposes.

A hypothetical example clarifies how and why an investigation of the deterrence- compellence interplay along the lines of the fourth approach is desirable. Specif- ically, when actor A is warning actor B not to do X

(=-A is deterring B), A has (or

should have) an idea about how to react if B decides to do X (a compellence strategy). If A's deterrent threat fails (= B decides to do X), A puts in motion its compellent policy, which, on the one hand, will involve elements of the compellence strategy considered earlier and, on the other, will certainly contain some novel aspects due to structural changes, new information, and the presence of other contingent factors. Some features of the deterrent policy that actor A carries out may be important for the follow-on compellent plan. Indeed, the initial policy of

MARIA SPERANDEI 263

deterrence could even purposely present some characteristics particularly perti- nent to compellence in order to make the road to compellence easier. On the contrary, significant compellent aspects may be missing (and later regretted) in the deterrence design. An analysis of the deterrence-compellence linkage will therefore address the following set of questions. To what extent are a preceding policy of deterrence and a succeeding compellent strategy similar? Does compellence re- semble or contrast with a previous deterrent policy? Up to what point did an initial deterrent policy favor, or at least not obstruct, a subsequent attempt at compellence? And which aspects of one policy set are incompatible with the other? These issues can be discussed both theoretically and empirically. A theoretical description of the deterrence-compellence relationship is offered in the next section of this essay. The last section examines the deterrence-compellence interplay.

Even though the above questions provide insight into how the linkage can be scrutinized, several observations will help the reader understand why this scrutiny is significant today. First, the presence of a large theoretical and empirical foun- dation regarding how deterrence and compellence function makes the effort fea- sible. Second, and more importantly, use of both policies appears to have become an essential element in contemporary US foreign policy, given that, following the end of the Cold War, the United States has more overtly resorted to the exercise of compellence while depending, despite some speculation about its effective- ness, on the old practice of deterrence. Moreover, whereas theoretical interest in compellence has thrived since the early 1990s, recent publications of experts in the field such as Colin Gray (2003) and Patrick Morgan (2003) have signaled a renewed interest in deterrence notwithstanding that the first George W. Bush (2002) Administration had stressed its marginal importance for the twenty-first century. Third, the academic investigation of the deterrence-compellence linkage could provide policymakers with relevant advice on the management of coercive diplomacy.

Defining the Deterrence-Compellence Interplay Theoretically The fourth approach described above made the case for looking at deterrence and compellence as distinctive, juxtaposed, and interrelated policies that one of the two sides involved in the coercive process adopts at different stages in a crisis. From this perspective, it has been argued that tracing the bridge connecting or disconnecting deterrence to compellence and compellence to deterrence is meaningful. Despite the comment that the diplomacy of coercion is a duel rather than a game of solitaire, as Gray (2003:21) has recently reiterated, examining ex post the coercive strategy of one player by focusing on the interplay between sequentially implemented policies during a crisis could help promote their better understanding and execution. Such an approach is compatible with those studies (Byman, Waxman, and Larson 1999; Byman and Waxman 2000; Treverton 2000) that specifically emphasize the reciprocal and dynamic nature of coercion. However, rather than exclusively and constantly viewing deterrence and compellence as intermingling events along a continuum, this essay favors singling them out on the continuum to observe their transversal rather than their concomitant interaction. Some reasons have been advanced as to why this alternative approach to the investigation of coercive diplomacy is desirable. This section is concerned with how to advance such an investigation theoretically. Owing to the presence of a well-established research literature regarding deterrence and compellence, this section attempts to survey and reflect on what is already extant while looking for potential connections. Crit- ically, given that the sequential planning and execution of a deterrent and a compellent threat may always present empirical aspects that the extant theoretical literature has not yet observed, any theoretical framework is necessarily incomplete unless it is tailored to the relevant case study. Nonetheless, evidence from a number


of case studies can increase the power of a model of the deterrence-compellence linkage.

Discovering Some Essential Features of Deterrence

Although the study of deterrence might be as old as politics, only after the onset of the Cold War did it grow into the relatively complex set of ideas that have inspired US foreign policy. Ensuring that deterrence works is a far more complicated task than examining the principles behind its logic. However, a rational understanding of these principles, along with an awareness of their strengths and limitations, is perhaps the only guide for an actor eager to execute a deterrent and possibly a compellent threat.

Numerous but fairly consistent definitions of deterrence (Schelling 1966:69; George and Smoke 1974:11; Lauren 1979:188; Buzan 1987:163; Herring 1995:14; Morgan 2003:1; Freedman 2004:27) assume that its major objective is obtaining a specific inaction on the part of an adversary. This goal is pursued by threatening to harm the opponent seriously were he to carry out the unwanted action. In Lauren's (1979:188) view, "deterrence attempts to persuade an opponent to refrain from initiating certain action, such as an armed attack, that is viewed as highly dangerous by making him fear the consequences of such behavior." Saying the same but in other words, "deterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits" (George and Smoke 1974:11). Statements of this kind already contain some fundamental aspects of deterrence. First, deterrence implies the existence of two parties-previously referred to in this essay as actors A and B-and a special stress falls on the party that intends to execute the threat. Obviously, deterrence is more the deterrer's policy than the challenger's. The challenger, in fact, would better define its reaction as surrender at worst and resistance or endurance at best. This asymmetry leads to a second aspect thought to be characteristic of deterrence. The interaction between A and B is depicted in purely conflictual terms, as a zero-sum game with- out chances for bargaining and cooperation-a depiction that the reader will shortly see has been shown to be false in practice.

As a third point, maintaining a specific status quo (= persuading the opponent to be inactive) is the major goal of a deterrent threat. Schelling's (1966:32) portrayal of deterrence as "setting the stage and, potentially, waiting forever for the opponent to act" is symptomatic in this regard. Fourth, the adversary's fear of the consequences deriving from initiating the unwanted action has to be greater than his intention to undertake that action. For the deterrent policy that A is implementing to be effective, therefore, the deterrence measures need to be substantial enough to lower the challenger's motivation and will to attack. That is, the deterrer has to possess the right military capabilities and commitment to convey credibility to his threat. Finally, a further and vital assumption is implicit: the opponent is expected to calculate rationally the utility of his alternative courses of action on the basis of available information.

Rationality has been the cornerstone of deterrence theory since its origins. Given that both players were supposed to be rational, the major task of any deterrence theory became discerning the requirements of a credible policy of deterrence. These conditions were clearly set out by William Kaufmann in early 1954. Accord- ing to Kaufmann, actor A must convince actor B that (1) he has an effective military capability, (2) he, therefore, could impose unacceptable costs on B, and (3) he would use his military capabilities if attacked. Eventually, the implicit message that A communicates to B is that he will behave rationally. Moreover, by threatening unacceptable damage on B, A is expected to influence B's cost-benefit calculations so that B's final best choice will rationally be not to attack.

The assumption of rational, utility-maximizing decision makers is strongly con- tested by the supporters of psychological (Jervis 1979) and case-study approaches

MARIA SPERANDEI 265

(George and Smoke 1974) to deterrence. The objective of these latter approaches is to unmask the gap separating the idealized principles of deterrence theory from empirical evidence. For instance, by reviewing a set of cases involving the failure of deterrence, Lebow and Stein (1989) infer that, even though leaders calculate in accordance with rational deterrence theory's predictions, they often end up acting against them. Factors alien to rational-utilitarian calculations are eventually crucial in determining the challenger's response to deterrent threats. Seemingly, the ex-

pected domestic political consequences of the use of force are a relevant intervening variable. More radically, in his review on the inadequacies of rational deterrence

theory, Robert Jervis (1989:186) highlighted the practical importance of the individual level of analysis. Different actors have different views about what constitutes rational behavior. Because each person is rational, but his or her rationality is

grounded in specific values and means-end beliefs, the resulting behavior will nat-

urally be idiosyncratic. Notwithstanding an apparent clash between the assumptions of rational deter-

rence theory and the criticisms resulting from more empirical approaches to deterrence, the different schools are complementary rather than incompatible. Behavioral and case-study approaches promote a broader formulation of rational deterrence theory by incorporating into the old framework some important factors that depart from standard conceptions of rationality, such as domestic and political concerns--including the need to maintain power and the desire to maintain national security. Because deviations from rationality are common, some proponents of psychological approaches to deterrence also recommend accompanying the deterrent threat with policies of reassurance and incentives that forestall and contain the adversary's deviant behavior. As Paul Stern and his colleagues (1989:296) and Patrick Morgan (2003:151) acknowledge, the risk that a challenger interprets the rewards as weaknesses of the opponent, to be exploited, is hardly avoidable. How- ever, because the challenger's response is a function of particular beliefs and at- titudes, a possible countermove for the deterrer is to study the opponent's thinking in order to better anticipate its likely behavior. In short, a culturally empathetic understanding of the adversary along with a grasp of the psychology of key policymakers and decision-making processes are all helpful devices.

Rational deterrence theory also stipulates that the deterrer must carefully define the unacceptable behavior, possess the military capability to punish the adversary, demonstrate the resolve to carry through on this threat, and make an attempt to communicate this resolve (Stern et al. 1989:30). Among these requirements, first- and second-wave deterrence theorists and the US national security establish- ment have tended to emphasize the importance of military capability in terms of

military balance. Given that military superiority is assumed to convey credibility to threats, the ownership of nuclear weapons and the possibility of causing unac-

ceptable damage confer a particular appeal to deterrence via retaliation (Herring 1995). Third-wave theorists such as Lebow and Stein (1994) have questioned the absolute relevance of military balance and surmised instead that the balance of interests is as important a predictor of crisis outcome as the balance of capabilities. Even though the perspective of military balance would suggest that the side that is

militarily inferior will back down first in a crisis, from the perspective of balance of interests, the side with less at stake will do so. That is, the more the deterrer has at stake, the deterrer's interests are, the more advantageous his position will be in the process of bargaining.

The relevance of military balance as a critical component of successful deterrence is also diminished by the consideration that, in some instances, usable military options may play a more determinant role than overall military capability (Snyder 1960; Mearsheimer 1983; Byers 1985; Herring 1995). For example, the retaliatory effect provoked by the possession of impressive nuclear and conventional forces may be judged by the deterrer as excessively dangerous and hence not usable. The


US retreat from a nuclear first-use position and the endorsement of a strategy of decoupling in the 1970s is one such illustration. In effect, coupling conventional defense with nuclear weapons was judged to be too risky a strategy by US policymakers. Likewise, successful deterrence does not necessarily have to depend on the threat and capacity to impose punishment; it may also be achieved via denying the opponent any gains from the action that is to be deterred. When the goal is to stop the enemy's military forces from making territorial gains, deterring via the promise of a protracted and costly war of attrition might be a more appropriate strategy than threatening the nuclear annihilation of the adversary (Mearsheimer 1983).

A second, related aspect of rational deterrence theory that third-wave critics disputed was disinterest in those limited threats that do not involve the strategic threat of an all-out thermonuclear war. George and Smoke (1974) were the first to make this point while pressing for major consideration of limited threats. Writing in the 1970s, these authors were concerned with how the United States could suc- cessfully protect a third nation or group of nations from Soviet influence (the three- nation problem). Although the set of policy directions encompassed in George and Smoke's model are strongly reminiscent of the Cold War context and the abstract nature of rational deterrence theory, the stress these authors put on deterrence involving limited threats as opposed to strategic deterrence has relevance today in the so-called war on terrorism.

In conclusion, no author or study has offered a general formula for a successful deterrent policy. Ultimately, as Gray (2003:17) has rather convincingly argued, deterrence is unreliable because, "although it is conceived and executed as a coercive strategy intended to control unfriendly behavior, such a control has to rest upon the voluntary consent of the deterree."

Unravelling Some Essential Features of Compellence

Despite the fact that a serious and collective academic interest in the theory and practice of compellence did not emerge until the 1990s and despite the subsequent lack of terminological agreement, compellence is a more systematically explored policy than deterrence. In effect, the conceptual formulation of this theory has been accompanied by the observation and description of a number of empirical cases of compellence. Not only did the execution of compellent policies since the 1990s favor the theoretical study of this half of coercive diplomacy, but compellence itself entails a less problematic relation with the empirical world than deterrence. Al- though the success of deterrence leaves no footprints in the sand, the success of a compellent policy is clearer and more tangible. As in the case of deterrence, however, compellence is hardly a high-confidence strategy, and the variables presented in this section are, as George (1991:7) has termed them, "empty boxes" that policymakers have to fill in each specific situation in which an execution of compellence is being considered. It is also worth noting that, only a few years ago, research on compellence was still lacking despite the salience of compellence as an instrument of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War international order.

Schelling was the first theorist to analyze the concept of compellence in great detail. His major interest was in those elements that distinguish compellence--a threat intended to make an adversary do something (action)--from deterrence--a threat intended to keep an adversary from starting something (inaction). Like deterrence, compellence relies on the use of threat to influence the adversary's strategic choices, and major emphasis is placed on the side issuing the threat: the compeller. Nevertheless, compellence is much more definite and explicit than deterrence. Compellence demands a modification in the adversary's current behavior (rather than the adversary's inaction), and it usually involves initiating an action (rather than setting the stage and waiting). Moreover, that action can cease,

MARIA SPERANDEI 267

or become harmless, only if the opponent responds. As Schelling (1966:70) has observed, "the threat that compel[s] ... often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if it acts." In contrast to the blunt use of force to repel an adversary, compellence stresses the threat of punishment if the adversary does not comply with what is demanded. Also, a time limit for compliance must be set because "compellence, to be effective, can't wait forever" (Schelling 1966:72). These three conditions-(1) a demand, (2) a threat of punishment for failure to comply, and (3) a time limit for the response-are the essential features of a classic ultimatum and, in Schelling's pioneering work, they constituted the necessary elements of a compellent threat.

Additional variables that provide us with a better understanding of compellence have been identified by George and Simons (1994) in The Limits of Coercive Diplo- macy. This volume presents a detailed account of seven case studies and the conditions that determined the success or failure of compellence in each case. The most relevant conditions were the type of provocation, the clarity of the demand, the image of war (more or less cruel) that was present, the strength of motivation or balance of interests at stake between the initiator and the target (that is, the relationship between the magnitude of the demands made to the opponent and the magnitude of the opponent's motivation not to comply), the type of positive in- ducement offered by the initiator as a bargaining card, the presence or absence of coalitional support to back the initiator's demand, and the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation. From the various combinations of these variables, four variants regarding the sense of urgency of the threat were identified (George and Simons 1994:18): the classic ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the try-and-see approach, and the gradual turning of the screw.

Despite their greater descriptive accuracy, models of compellence (as well as their counterparts on deterrence) are highly context dependent and can enlighten and guide policymaking only to a limited extent. For instance, the nature of the US com- petition with the Soviet Union strongly influenced the exercise of compellence in most regional crises during the Cold War years, and what we know about compellence did not prove useful. Although structural constraints have lessened today, the state that engages in compellence can rarely have complete or reliable control over the outcome, and the adversary's appraisal of the situation is ultimately a decisive element.

Theoretical Distinctions and Similarities: Toward a Potential Theoretical Bridge

Building a theoretical bridge linking deterrence to compellence is a daunting task. Although their policies share some central features, the theoretical portrayal of deterrence has developed along lines that are alien to the discussions of the theory of compellence. As the first section of this essay anticipated and the previous par- agraphs have confirmed, deterrence and compellence are generally thought of as substantially detached strategies even though both are based on a process of interaction among the deterrer (compeller) and his adversary.

Deterrence and compellence differ in a number of respects, most of which mirror the differences between statics and dynamics. Deterrence involves setting the stage and waiting. By contrast, compellence usually involves initiating an action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease or become harmless only if the opponent responds. The overt act (the first move) is up to the side that makes the compellent threat. Moreover, deterrence tends to be indefinite in its timing. Com- pellence has to be definite. There has to be a deadline or the adversary will systematically refuse to comply. Too little time and compliance becomes impossible; too much time and compliance becomes unnecessary. Thus, compellence involves timing in a way that deterrence typically does not.

Not only have deterrence and compellence proceeded as separate policies, but their theoretical development has followed a different historical pattern. For


instance, whereas the study of deterrence reached its apex during the golden age of the Cold War, interest in compellence mostly developed after the demise of the Soviet Union. As a result of this temporal divide, the categories of deterrence are apt to explain a struggle between actors of similar capability, thus leaving underestimated and unappreciated cases of limited and asymmetric warfare and pre- ventive diplomacy. Conversely, the categories of compellence are a better expression of the clashes between powers of asymmetrical strength and with di- verse interests at stake (George and Smoke 1974:55-56).

Furthermore, as has been previously observed, the requirements for deterrence are considerably more indeterminate than those of compellence. The theory of deterrence has relied upon the soundness of certain assumptions such as rationality and the military interest. By contrast, the analysis of compellence in the 1990s has maintained a more empirical stance by essentially becoming a systematic survey of the variables associated with the success or failure of compellence. In effect, the analysis of the two strategies has progressed on differing tracks.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned variations, numerous points of contact exist between deterrence and compellence. Both deterrence and compellence are a function of a multitude of variables that fluctuate over time (that is, according to the systemic context, balance of military capability, balance of interests, actors' intentions and perceptions). Contemporary theories of deterrence and compellence also embody a number of significant behavioral and political simplifications that have revealed themselves as being fallacious to some extent (for example, the unitary actor assumption, the zero-sum game assumption, the rationality assumption, the emphasis on military threats). Additionally, as Herring (1995:2) has recognized, both deterrence and compellence should be combined with measures of reassurance or they may either provoke the very attack they are designed to deter or impede the move they are designed to compel.

As this discussion hopefully suggests, the development of a theory regarding how deterrence and compellence can be linked is not automatic. Nevertheless, some positive inferences can be drawn if deterrence and compellence are viewed in practical rather than abstract terms. A theoretical bridge is currently unattainable but an empirical bridge founded on the variables highlighted above is possible. Consider the following example. When sequentially executed policies of deterrence and compellence are observed, the effects of the preceding deterrent "inaction" on the subsequent compellent "action" may be analyzed. In this respect, the existence of an ideational plan for future compellence at the earlier stage of deterrence creates a significant connection between the deterrence in progress and an imminent policy of compellence. Similarly, usable military options that confer credibility to the deterrent threat may be functional for compellent purposes. Thus, an examination of the relationship between deterrence and compellence becomes fea- sible in support of George's (1991:4) conviction that a more empirical grasp of coercive diplomacy is needed.

Relationship Between Deterrence and Compellence in First Gulf Crisis (1990-1991)

A reading of the literature on coercive diplomacy in general and the First Gulf Crisis in particular suggests that often such crises hinge on the misperceptions of the major actors (Lauren 1972; Jervis 1989; Stein 1992; George and Simons 1994:230, 288; Lebow 1998). From this perspective, the reasons why President Saddam Hussein of Iraq ordered the invasion of Kuwait--thus marking the failure of deterrence--were the result of a rational decision-making process wherein he assumed different stakes were involved and held perspectives different from those extant in the United States. Given that misperceptions and other socio-political

MARIA SPERANDEI 269

impediments may easily hamper the success of a rationally sound policy, rationality is rarely consistent with the optimal political choice.

Saddam Hussein's major misperception consisted of his underestimation of the threat of US intervention. By way of contrast, the US government experienced, with regard to the national security interests at hand, a serious split between those civilians in the White House and the Department of State who were interested in

peace planning with Iraq and those in the Department of Defense who were interested in war planning. As a result, the signals from US foreign policymakers were mixed (Stein 1992), and Hussein wrongly perceived the accomodationist part as the stronger.6 In addition to seriously questioning whether the United States could afford to use its force at all, Hussein overestimated the effect that intolerance of heavy casualties would produce on the US public's support of a military intervention in Iraq.7 Conversely, the United States miscalculated the highly attractive

expected utility for the Iraqi regime of using force, thus underestimating Hussein's resolve.8

Such a reading of the First Gulf Crisis originates from the idea that a conflict derives from a process of interaction among multiple (at least two) actors. In this section, however, the focus will be on the consistency and the logical soundness of the main policies undertaken sequentially by one of the crisis participants via an exclusive reliance on that actor's information, perceptions, intentions, and plans at the time of the crisis. This maneuver is possible only ex post, namely once the crisis has reached a peaceful or warlike conclusion (= counterfactual reasoning), and it

implies a shift from a top-down approach, in which decisions and events are tackled

chronologically, to a bottom-up approach, in which the temporal dimension is an

important but not the only variable in comparing and contrasting decisions and events.9 Specifically, the rest of this section has as its purpose to investigate in detail the potential relationship between US policies of deterrence and compellence dur-

ing the First Gulf Crisis. Both policies were pursued by the United States between

July 1990 and January 1991. oThe United States tried to protect Kuwait from being invaded by Iraq (deterrence), and it immediately threatened to use its own force in the face of a military attack by Iraq (compellence). Analyzing the Gulf Crisis from this point of view clearly means dissecting it and determining when the two courses of action were put into place. Furthermore, for the sake of consistency, the focus is limited to only one actor in the dispute (the United States), Iraqi priorities and positions appearing only to the extent that they were filtered and understood by the United States. This methodology is motivated by the empirical consideration that Iraqi perceptions of the US deterrent stance were far from US expectations

6Consensus on national security interests was reached by US policymakers immediately before the Gulf War

began, and from mid-January 1991 onward, the US government was able to pursue a unitary view.

7This reaction is referred to as the "Vietnam-syndrome." Notwithstanding US sensitivity to heavy casualties, Hussein underestimated the extent to which US public opinion supported the use of military force in the Gulf

region. He also misperceived his own military capabilities and the Arab states' willingness to support the Iraqi cause.

Still, Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait could appear very rational and plausible, given that the expected utility of

using force might have been estimated as greater than not resorting to it (see Stein 1992).

8Through an invasion of Kuwait, Hussein expected to have access to Kuwaiti oil fields, production levels, and

OPEC prices while also compelling Kuwait to cancel debts and pressuring Saudi Arabia to change its oil production

levels. Last, but not the least, the Iraqi President aimed at reinforcing his political position as the benefits of invading

Kuwait seemed to outweigh the costs.

9Analysts such as George and Smoke (1974), Byman and Waxman (2000), and Art and Cronin (2003) have

adopted a similar approach by restricting their attention to one side of the crisis. However, whereas these authors

mostly examined the decision-making process that took place within the leadership circles, this essay explores the

policies that resulted from the leadership circles and compares them in order to see whether there was any linkage

between actions involving deterrence and those involving compellence.

10On the presence of a US deterrent policy before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there may be some disagree-

ment. In consonance with Stein's (1992) analysis of the Gulf Crisis, this essay recognizes that, although weak, badly

orchestrated, and scarcely convincing, a US attempt at deterrence was in place before August 2, 1990.


and beliefs and could even invalidate the significance of any distinction between deterrence and compellence. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, deterrence and compellence will herein refer to the US strategies used against Iraq.

Generally, deterrence is successful when no force is used and a course of action is stopped before its pursuit is attempted. According to John Mearsheimer (1983: 13-133), for deterrence to succeed and in order to deny a blitzkrieg-style victory to the adversary, the defender needs a strong, immediate, and short-term balance of forces. Compellence, instead, succeeds when a compellent threat is made and the attacker stops using his force. The compellent threat obviously fails if the defender has to use more than limited force to stop an attacker from engaging in its ag- gressive acts. In conventional terms, deterrence and compellence succeed when the deterrer or compeller has the military capability and resolve to deny the potential attacker's objectives quickly. Both strategies failed in the First Gulf Crisis. However, we are not interested here in US deterrent and compellent failures as such (see, for example, Stein 1992) nor are we interested in the reasons that pushed Hussein to invade (Stein 1992; George and Simons 1994), although these questions are legitimate. Instead, our attention will be devoted to evaluating the eventual connection between an initial strategy of deterrence and a later strategy of compellence independent of the success or failure of either. It is clear, nonetheless, that the outcome of sequentially applied policies is in some measure a function of their overall planning and potential connection.

Recall a crucial proposition made at the beginning of this essay. It was previously proposed that a credible deterrent strategy must involve some connection (or disconnection) with the possibility of performing a compellent policy in the near future. This hypothesis will be examined in the First Gulf Crisis. In what follows, the focus will be on the US effort to deter Iraq from the invasion of Kuwait and the US attempt to compel an Iraqi retreat from Kuwait. The purpose of the examination is to observe the shift from an initial policy of deterrence to a consequent policy of compellence and whether and how some aspects of the earlier deterrence are consonant or discordant with the following compellence. The smoother the linkage and the less abrupt the passage from a deterrent to a compellent posture, the more desirable it will be for the side that is planning and executing them.

Unconvincing Deterrence

Soon after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the US government regarded Iran as a primary threat to stability and Iraq as a close ally of the West that opposed the Iranian revolutionary regime. Starting in 1990, however, things started to change. Notwithstanding a more bellicose Iraqi stance early in 1990 (Stein 1992:149), the United States continued to adopt an attitude of conciliation rather than confrontation. The preferred policy of the George H. W. Bush Administration was to maintain and rely on diplomatic contacts with Baghdad to demonstrate the United States' good intentions and desire to see Iraq adopt a moderate and pro-Western course (Gordon and Sciolino 1990). When US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John Kelly, went to Baghdad in February 1990, he praised Hussein for being a force for moderation in the region. On April 16, Robert Dole and four other senators met with Hussein and presented to the White House their assessment that the Iraqi President would continue to be moderate (Wood- ward 1991:199-204). Evidence that a confrontation was brewing in the Gulf became apparent, though, at the end of May 1990 when, during an Arab summit meeting convened in Baghdad, President Hussein privately denounced the Arabs of the Gulf for engaging in economic sabotage with Iraq by keeping the price of oil artificially low (Stein 1992:149). The impasse deepened when, during a meeting between the oil ministers of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates on July 10 and at an OPEC meeting a few days later, Kuwait refused to

MARIA SPERANDEI 271

agree to limit indefinitely their oil production. On July 21 the US Central Intel- ligence Agency (CIA) reported the first Iraqi troop movements near the border with Kuwait (Gordon 1990).

Although the crisis was intensifying and Hussein continued to escalate his threats against the Gulf States, the signals from Washington were confusing. On

July 24, Pentagon spokesperson Pete Williams declared to the New York Times that the United States remained "strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense" of the Gulf states-as the future sending of two aerial tankers and a cargo transport to the Gulf for joint exercises with the United Arab Emirates would prove. But when he was bluntly asked whether the United States would provide help if Kuwait were attacked, he declined to answer. An

implicit response was provided later that day by senior State Department spokesperson, Margaret Tutwiler, who reiterated the US commitment to individual and collective self-defense in the Gulf region and called attention to the absence of defense treaties or security commitments linking Kuwait to the United States (Gordon 1990).

These ambiguous warnings preceded the famous meeting of US Ambassador to

Iraq, April Glaspie, with Saddam Hussein on July 25, an occasion in which Glaspie failed to warn Saddam of the full consequences that an aggression against Kuwait would produce (Friedman 1991). Although the US Ambassador's performance has been severely criticized, Glaspie was ultimately following the policy of the US State

Department and was trapped by the need to stress US friendship toward Iraq, on the one hand, and US determination to ensure the free flow of oil and the sov-

ereignty of all Gulf States, on the other. Consistent with this "straddle the fence"

policy, on July 28, President Bush cabled Saddam that "differences are best re- solved by peaceful means and not by threats involving military force or conflict" (Hoffman and Dewar 1991), but no reference was made to the 100,000 Iraqi troops stationed on Kuwait's border. More seriously, the United States disregarded intel-

ligence evidence on the substantial increases in Iraqi military preparations, and no additional attempt at deterrence was made. Only when the CIA warned that Iraq would attack within 24 hours did Assistant Secretary of State Kelly summon the

Iraqi ambassador in Washington to inform him that the situation was "extremely serious" (Obendorfer 1991:40).

The strongest and least ambiguous US warning to Iraq is enshrined in the above- mentioned allegations regarding the US commitment to individual and collective self-defense. The vagueness of this commitment led Stein (1992:155) to infer that "the diplomacy of deterrence was inconsistent, incoherent, confusing, and unfo- cused in the critical two weeks preceding the invasion." Had Saddam Hussein been deterrable, it is very unlikely he would have been stopped, given Washington's confusing signals.

The same uncertainty was reflected in the split among the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. According to interviews conducted in August 1990 (Stein 1992:160), members were divided about the likely US response to an Iraqi attack. In particular, even when an imminent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was certain, the

general expectation in Washington was that Hussein would occupy the disputed oil fields and the strategic islands. Remarkably, the crucial factor in determining the US response was not the reality but rather the extent of the invasion. That is to say, to paraphrase Stein, a deterrent commitment could not be defined before it was massively violated. As long as the United States was uncertain about the extent of Saddam's intentions and as long as they seemed to discount the likelihood that Iraq would use its force in a large-scale attack, no efficacious policy of deterrence could be put into place because the precise policy was a function of those intentions. Was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait preventable? Very likely not; the Iraq-US relationship was sufficiently ambiguous to make accurate interpretation of signals on both sides almost impossible.


Technically Sound Compellence Like the end of the Cold War some months earlier, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, caught the West completely by surprise. Hussein himself was convinced that he had performed an irresistible fait accompli. However, even though Iraq's invasion significantly surprised both the United States and Western Europe, plans for countering such a challenge had been in preparation ever since the Ira- nian revolution (1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980). Massive military resources had already been directed toward the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980, which later became the Central Command (Clementson 1983).

In contrast to the exercise of deterrence, compellence was well orchestrated."1 A few days after the invasion, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney convinced King Fahd that the Iraqi challenge required a joint and swift military response while President Bush promptly announced that US forces were being sent to defend Saudi Arabia under the code name of Operation Desert Shield. The building of a military coalition (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, Egypt, and Syria) and the consolidation of the economic embargo were further elements in the strategy to contain Iraq. Four core principles guiding US policy during the crisis were spelled out by President Bush (1990): (1) the immediate, complete, and un- conditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (2) the restoration of Ku- wait's legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq; (3) a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; and (4) the protection of the lives of US citizens abroad. To meet these principles, the United States intensified diplomatic measures as well as strategic military movements. Diplomatic measures included the promotion of bilateral cooperation between the United States and the United Nations to find a peaceful solution to end the Iraqi occu- pation of Kuwait and restore Kuwait's legitimate government. Military movements involved deployment of US military forces for the dual purpose of (1) deterring Iraq and defending Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the region from further Iraqi aggression, and (2) enforcing the UN-mandated economic sanctions (= compellence). From the beginning of September 1990, the coalition forces on the Arabian Peninsula engaged in fairly effective deterrence against further Iraqi aggression. Moreover, through the auspices of the United Nations, the United States had legitimated a comprehensive blockade of Iraq with naval forces in the Gulf having the legal authority to challenge and intercept shipping.

Both deterrent and compellent missions were, thus, in action by the end of August. The military forces in Saudi Arabia were aimed at deterring an Iraqi attack on the Kingdom or any other target in the Gulf beyond Kuwait; their presence was described as "wholly defensive" (Danchev and Keohane 1994). The embargo of exports and imports, however, aimed at compelling Iraq's retreat. During the month of Sep- tember, the Bush Administration began to think more actively about how a peaceful solution to the crisis might be enforced. Bush's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, stated (Robinson 1990) that war was not inevitable and that Iraq's uncon- ditional withdrawal would show the success of collective action. The Bush Admin- istration was clearly trying to send the message that sanctions backed by the international coalition now formed against Iraq would work and that no secret agen- da for a military solution or for the forcible overthrow of Saddam Hussein existed.

By the end of October, however, outward signs of a disintegrating coalition (in particular from France and Russia) convinced the US administration to undertake

"It is worth noting that this positive opinion of the US compellent policy is independent of its ultimate effects. Eventually, compellence failed, and it is widely held that even though Hussein misperceived most of the US signals, the US government equally misperceived most of the Iraqi responses. Thus, notwithstanding the one-sided perspective privileged here--in a context of uncertain information about the adversary's intentions and given the long- lasting US hope for a compromise--the compellent effort was technically skillfully orchestrated.

MARIA SPERANDEI 273

further unilateral moves. The US forces in Saudi Arabia were doubled, and a

generally defensive posture aimed at protecting Saudi Arabia gave way to an offensive position with the purpose of liberating Kuwait. On November 8, the New York Times reported that President Bush ordered an additional 150,000 US ground, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf to prepare an adequate "offensive military option." At the end of that same month, a compellent threat was finally issued. Either Iraq complied by January 15, 1991 or Security Council Resolution 678 would authorize "all necessary means" to affect Iraqi compliance.

Although deterrence and compellence can be regarded as intertwined during most of the crisis, the measures undertaken by the United States after the invasion had a primarily compellent purpose. They were, in fact, dynamic rather than static

strategic decisions and in some way implied an alteration in the status quo to intimidate Hussein and force his retreat. Once an act of aggression had been executed, the United States had to adopt a compellent stance and use threats to

persuade Hussein to do something he would otherwise not be inclined to do. From what has been discussed thus far, compellence is best depicted as a series of

incremental steps rather than as an immediately well-thought-through strategy. Along this line, Ken Matthews (1993:102) splits the US compellent effort into four

escalating phases. In the first phase, compellence was a low-pressure strategy based on the imposition of sanctions. This policy lacked credibility because neither a time- table nor the consequences that would occur if Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait had been specified. Unspecified deadlines are not sufficient for compellence to work.

Despite its weakness, this policy was the necessary political precursor to making acceptable the assembling of a credible military force for use if necessary. The next two phases were devoted to establishing the three major elements of the coercive threat, namely (1) the required action (withdrawal from Kuwait), (2) the date by which that action had to be completed, and (3) the military consequences that would follow in the case of noncompliance. By early November (phase 2), following a massive reinforcement of US military forces in Saudi Arabia, the United States announced that force would be used to eject the Iraqi military from Kuwait and, by the end of November, UN sanction for the ultimate use of force was ensured.

The critical elements of the US strategy of compellence against Iraq were, thus, in

place. The credibility of the compellent threat was also reinforced by a continued

build-up of the coalition's military capabilities in the region (phase 3)-a build-up that was, in turn, creating pressure for some face-to-face negotiations. In Matthew's (1993:106) words , the talks (phase 4) were the last necessary precursor to the actual resort to force once the UN deadline had passed. The failure of the talks in Geneva

(January 9, 1991) between Tareq Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, and James Baker, the US Secretary of State, represented the last chance for a negotiated settlement and a deescalation of the crisis. The crossing of the final threshold-the war threshold--signaled the failure of compellence. Had the deadline been de-

layed and war not been declared, the credibility of any following threat would have been fatally undermined.

In the implementation of its compellent effort, the United States, backed by the United Nations, imposed a stringent embargo and economic sanctions against Iraq, set up an impressive international coalition, deployed a massive number of troops as well as the latest generation of aircraft furnished with precision-guided muni- tions to Saudi Arabia, set a deadline for Iraq's withdrawal, and threatened the use of force were Iraq to decline a voluntary withdrawal from Kuwait. According to George and Simons' (1994:106) model of coercive diplomacy, the US strategy of compellence in the Gulf became more effective by progressively moving from the use of economic sanctions to the threat of the use of force. The "gradual turning of the screw" variant of coercive diplomacy exercised through the increasing use of economic sanctions was replaced as November went by with a classic ultimatum backed by a deadline and the threat of war.


As the failure of the US policy of compellence shows, a well-executed and potentially flawless policy does not always succeed. Misperceptions are probably the major reason for such failures. For instance, notwithstanding that the United States did not intend to trap Saddam into a war (Stein 1992:171), the Iraqi leadership believed in the existence of a US plot against Iraq, while Hussein cultivated the image of the United States as a conspiring force against the Arab people. As a result, the US attempts to reassure were unpersuasive and ineffective. However, consid- ering the available information and the protracted US preference for a compromise, the US leadership executed a technically sound compellent policy.

Analysis of a Potential Linkage A few observations herald the analysis of the deterrence-compellence linkage found in this case. First, the majority of the existing research that focuses on deterrence and compellence in the First Gulf Crisis appears to have objectives different from the ones that animate the present investigation. Most of the literature dealing with deterrence and compellence in relation to the Gulf Crisis either addresses the elements responsible for, respectively, the failure or the potential success of coercive diplomacy (for example, Cimbala 1994; Byman and Waxman 2000; Art and Cronin, 2003) or investigates the rationale behind Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the US response (for example, Dannreuther 1991; Stein 1992).

The approach adopted by Stein (1992) is perhaps the closest to the one this essay presents. There is, however, a fundamental difference. Stein ponders the legitimate and interesting issue of whether, if the United States had seriously tried to d

Date post:	28-Jan-2021
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	5 times
Download:	0 times

Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative...

Documents