Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 91260 July 25, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. EDWIN BELIBET, MANNY BANOY and RONNIE ROSERO, accused- appellants. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants. REGALADO, J.:p Accused-appellants, having been convicted of murder by Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate for the killing. of one Gracito Hatulan, have come to us on appeal, seeking a second chance to prove their professed innocence which they claim should have been declared by the court a quo . In contra , the trial court in its decision dated September 14, 1989 held that the guilt of said appellants was duly established by the prosecution with the requisite quantum of evidence showing that they committed the felony "employing superior strength qualified by treachery in the process, which aggravating circumstance is not offset by any mitigating circumstance." Consequently, it rendered judgment sentencing each of the appellants "to the extreme penalty of reclusion perpetua ; to indemnify the heirs of Gracito Hatulan in the sum of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to proportionately pay the costs." Appellants were credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the period of their preventive imprisonment. 1 The transcript of the stenographic notes taken at the trial of this case and the findings of the court below sustain the following summary submitted by the People of the factual antecedents of this case: Manny Banoy, Ronnie Rosero, Edwin Belibet, Erusto Cos. and Gracito Hatulan were among those who attended a dance at Sitio Nipa, Barangay Bolo, Municipality of Masbate, on June 3, 1987. As the dance progressed, Gracito Hatulan confronted Manny Banoy about the former's pair of pants which he lost claiming that it was stolen by the latter. Manny Banoy got mad at Gracito Hatulan stating that he had nothing to do with it. Later, on the dance floor, Erusto Cos heard Edwin Belibet, Manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero hatch a plan to kill Gracito Hatulan (pp. 3-5, tsn, May 24, 1988). At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 4, 1987, Erusto Cos, Edwin Belibet, Manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero left the dancing hall and passing through the seashore, they saw Gracito Hatulan sleeping in a banca. Erusto Cos tried to waken him but was prevented from doing so by his companions. Thereafter, Edwin Belibet stabbed Gracito Hatulan with a "machete", hitting him in his left upper nipple. Gracito made stir but Ronnie Rosero took his turn in stabbing Gracito Hatulan in the breast with the same weapon while Manny Banoy held Gracito's hands. Erusto Cos pleaded to his companions not to harm Gracito Hatulan but his plea fell on deaf ears. Engulfed by fear, he ran away (pp. 5-7, tsn, Ibid ). Thereafter, on that same morning of June 4, 1987, Erusto Cos informed the mother of Gracito Hatulan about the death of her son (p. 8, tsn, Ibid ). The postmortem report (Exh. "A") of Dr. Emilio C. Quemi shows that the victim sustained (1) stab wound, measuring about an inch, located at the left aspect of the middle, of the sternum, and (2) stab wound, measuring about 3/4 inch located at the right aspect of the middle third of the sternum (pp. 36-42, tsn, Dec. 7, 1988). 2
Transcript
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 91260 July 25, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelleevs.EDWIN BELIBET, MANNY BANOY and RONNIE ROSERO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:p
Accused-appellants, having been convicted of murder by Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate for the killing. of one Gracito Hatulan, have come to us on appeal, seeking a second chance to prove their professed innocence which they claim should have been declared by the court a quo.
In contra, the trial court in its decision dated September 14, 1989 held that the guilt of said appellants was duly established by the prosecution with the requisite quantum of evidence showing that they committed the felony "employing superior strength qualified by treachery in the process, which aggravating circumstance is not offset by any mitigating circumstance." Consequently, it rendered judgment sentencing each of the appellants "to the extreme penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Gracito Hatulan in the sum of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to proportionately pay the costs." Appellants were credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the period of their preventive imprisonment. 1
The transcript of the stenographic notes taken at the trial of this case and the findings of the court below sustain the following summary submitted by the People of the factual antecedents of this case:
Manny Banoy, Ronnie Rosero, Edwin Belibet, Erusto Cos. and Gracito Hatulan were among those who attended a dance at Sitio Nipa, Barangay Bolo, Municipality of Masbate, on June 3, 1987. As the dance progressed, Gracito Hatulan confronted Manny Banoy about the former's pair of pants which he lost claiming that it was stolen by the latter. Manny Banoy got mad at Gracito Hatulan stating that he had nothing to do with it. Later, on the dance floor, Erusto Cos heard Edwin Belibet, Manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero hatch a plan to kill Gracito Hatulan (pp. 3-5, tsn, May 24, 1988).
At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 4, 1987, Erusto Cos, Edwin Belibet, Manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero left the dancing hall and passing through the seashore, they saw Gracito Hatulan sleeping in a banca. Erusto Cos tried to waken him but was prevented from doing so by his companions. Thereafter, Edwin Belibet stabbed Gracito Hatulan with a "machete", hitting him in his left upper nipple. Gracito made stir but Ronnie Rosero took his turn in stabbing Gracito Hatulan in the breast with the same weapon while Manny Banoy held Gracito's hands. Erusto Cos pleaded to his companions not to harm Gracito Hatulan but his plea fell on deaf ears. Engulfed by fear, he ran away (pp. 5-7, tsn, Ibid). Thereafter, on that same morning of June 4, 1987, Erusto Cos informed the mother of Gracito Hatulan about the death of her son (p. 8, tsn, Ibid).
The postmortem report (Exh. "A") of Dr. Emilio C. Quemi shows that the victim sustained (1) stab wound, measuring about an inch, located at the left aspect of the middle, of the sternum, and (2) stab wound, measuring about 3/4 inch located at the right aspect of the middle third of the sternum (pp. 36-42, tsn, Dec. 7, 1988). 2
On August 11, 1987, an information charging appellants with the crime of murder was filed alleging that on June 4, 1987, at Sitio Nipa, Barangay Bolo, Masbate, Masbate, "the said accused confederating together, and helping one another with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superiority of strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with knife "Matchete" (sic) one Gracito Hatulan while the latter was sleeping, hitting him on the chest, thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death." 3
At the arraignment, appellants entered a plea of not guilty 4 and after trial on the merits, the appealed decision was rendered by the lower court.
Not satisfied therewith, appellants filed their present petition for review on certiorari faulting the court a quo as having allegedly committed grave errors of law (1) in relying on the testimony of prosecution star witness Erusto Cos which, aside from being insufficient to convict appellants was indubitably fabricated; (2) in convicting appellants by capitalizing on the infirmity of the evidence of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution; and (3) in convicting appellants despite failure of the prosecution to establish their complicity, much less their guilt, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 5
The resolution of the foregoing assignment of errors palpably hinges on the sufficiency of evidence presented by the prosecution to establish appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On the issue of whether or not the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met, the credibility of witnesses who appeared in court becomes a foremost matter. It is doctrinally entrenched that on the question of credibility, this Court will not disturb the findings of the trial judge unless he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 6 The reason is the opportunity
available to the trial court — but not to the appellate court — to observe the witnesses on the stand and to assess their credibility not only by the nature of their testimony but also by their demeanor under questioning. 7
Expectedly, appellants vigorously assail the credibility of prosecution eyewitness Erusto Cos. They contend that the testimony of said witness should not be accepted in all respects since it appears to be caught in a snare of inconsistencies, and that the same does not jibe with the declaration of the victim's mother. They point out that when Cos allegedly overheard appellants hatching a plot to kill Hatulan, he neither tried to curb murderous plan nor premonished the victim. We have taken due note of appellant's assertions but we are constrained to reject the same.
It is of common knowledge that the complexity and intensity of interrogation and the atmosphere of the courtroom during the trial will naturally affect the capability and deportment of a layman in answering questions. This is especially true of Cos who reached only the third grade in school and had the inexperience of a simple 18-year old farmer. However, despite his lack of education and social exposure, he remained unflinching in his testimony that appellants were the ones who killed Hatulan. His testimony on how the wounds of the victim were inflicted are confirmed by the location thereof as reflected in the autopsy report and expert testimony thereon. 8
Moreover, the Court has time and again held that inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not destroy the credibility of the witness. 9 The most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility. 10 Minor inconsistencies do not affect the veracity and testimony on material points. 11 Rather than affect the credibility of the witness, they are badges of their truthfulness and candor. 12
Appellants would capitalize on the fact that Cos allegedly made an admission in open court that he was testifying out of sheer fear of being implicated in the crime. Yet, as easily gleaned from the transcripts, the defense made it a point to confuse the witness on this score by a line of questioning with repeated resort to leading questions. A leading question is one which suggests to the witness the answer desired. 13 Thus, it is correct to say that a leading question propounded to a witness may, by reacting to an inference in his mind, cause him to testify in accordance with the suggestion conveyed by the question and that his answer may be merely an echo of the question.
The evidence on record shows that Cos and appellants were together in the dance and on their way back home thereafter. While they were walking along the seashore, they saw Hatulan sleeping on a boat. It was then that appellants executed their plan and attacked the helpless victim in the presence of Cos who tried to stop them.
Undoubtedly, when Cos positively and categorically identified appellants as the killers of Hatulan, he could not possibly be mistaken as to their identities for he had personally known them since childhood. Neither is there any showing that he had any motive to testify falsely against appellants with whom he was apparently on good terms.
With respect to appellants, it has long been established that motive becomes essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailants. It becomes immaterial when the accused have been positively identified. 14 With regard to Cos, there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on his part to falsely implicate appellants, hence his identification should be given full credence. When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that be was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 15
Appellants vehemently denied the commission of the crime imputed to them. On cross-examination, Rosero averred that although he knows Belibet whom he saw at the dance, they did not talk with each other at that time.16 On the other hand, Banoy denied the testimony of Cos that while the dance was in progress, he had an altercation with the victim whose Identity was supposedly not even known to him. He further alleged that he did not have a chance to converse with Belibet. 17 Belibet, on his part, testified that he did not know the victim personally, but he said that the victim was "staring bad" at him, which fact prompted him to go home early. 18
The positive identification of appellants by the prosecution witness should prevail over the former's denials of the commission of the crime for which they are charged, since greater weight is generally accorded to the positive testimony of the prosecution witness than the accused's denial. 19 Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. 20
Furthermore, the defense of alibi was properly rejected by the court a quo. Appellants claim that Banoy and Rosero had gone together to and arrived at the dancing hall in the evening of June 3, 1987. Belibet also supposedly arrived at about the same hour but, when he discovered that he was being stared at by Hatulan, he went home alone at about 11:00 o'clock that evening, passing through a trail from the dancing hall. Banoy and Rosero allegedly also went home much later passing through a trail leading to Barangay Bolo. 21
Assuming arguendo the veracity of their foregoing avowals, still for alibi to prosper it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused were at some other place and for such a period of time as to negate their presence at the time when and the place where the crime was committed. 22 It was not denied that the seashore, the situs of the crime, is only fifty (50) meters away from the dancing hall and even from the residences of appellants, the farthest being that of Belibet which is four (4) kilometers away. The aforesaid distances could not comply with the requirement of "physical impossibility on their part to have access to the situs of the crime," thus obviating any favorable consideration of their defense. 23
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the Victim is increased to P50,000.00, 24 for which appellants shall be solidarily liable.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47411 January 18, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EUFEMIO CAPARAS y PAEZ and PATRICIO DIAMSAY y GREGORIO, defendants-appellants.
R E S O L U T I O N
DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us are two separate motions for reconsideration of Our decision dated February 20, 1980 convicting the two abovenamed appellants, one filed by their counsel of record in behalf of both of them; the other, filed by a new counsel of Caparas only in his behalf.
The motion for reconsideration, filed by appellants' counsel of record, seeks the re- examination of the decision insofar as it rejects the plea of self-defense of appellant Diamsay. As in the appellants' brief, appellant Diamsay in his present motion for reconsideration failed to prove the justifying circumstance with clear and convincing evidence. As he had himself admitted to be the actual killer, the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish all the facts necessary to prove his plea of self defense. The motion for reconsideration, insofar as Diamsay is concerned, has nothing new with which to discharge this burden, and must consequently be denied.
As regards appellant Caparas, the motions for reconsideration seek the review of the testimonies of the two principal witnesses, Laureano Salvador and Lydia Posadas, upon which said appellant was convicted, on ground of conspiracy between him and Diamsay. Caparas points out some facts and circumstances which are alleged to impair the credibility of the aforesaid witnesses and thereby leaves the fact of conspiracy unproven beyond reasonable doubt as it should be.
Thus, Caparas points out that Laureano's testimony was extracted through leading questions, and he quotes:
Q Do you know the purpose of Carlos Gregorio in coming to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was his purpose?
A Regarding the landholding I was farming and his help I requested.
Q Did you go to any place with Carlos Gregorio after that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A To his house.
Q You are referring to the house of Carlos Gregorio?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you arrived at the house of Carlos Gregorio, who were with you?
A Carlos Gregorio, sir.
Q Who were the persons, ff any, that you have seen at the house of Carlos Gregorio?
A Eufemio Caparas and Diamsay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you arrived in that house, what happened?
A We talked regarding the landholding, sir.
Q You said, 'we' to whom are you referring?
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
Q What did you talk about that landholding?
A Regarding the landholding which he said would be given to me. He said there is already one.
Q And what did you answer when this was said to you by Eufemio Caparas?
A I said, 'if there is, I give thanks', but he said that the land he was giving me had some trouble.
Q And what did you say?
A I said' that seems hard',but he said,'that is easy'.
Q What else transpired?
A I asked him what he meant by easy and he said 'it is easy under this condition', and I asked him what condition, and he said you kill him.
Q During all that time, who were present inside that house?
A Tisio Diamsay.
Q Who else?
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
Q Anybody else?
A Carting Gregorio, sir.
Q And you?
A I was present.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in the vernacular, in Tagalog Language that you have been testifying, you said, 'Patayin n'yo, means plural, do you know to whom this word 'n'yo' referred to?
A He was ordering me, Carling, and Tisio Diamsay,sir.
Q Ordering to what?
A To kill.
Q To kill Simeon Paez?
A Yes, sir.
We are constrained to agree that the testimony of Laureano on the supposed conspiracy was elicited by means of leading questions, the probative value of which, according to accepted legal authorities, is thus diminished or lessened.
The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened where it is obtained by leading questions which are so put that the witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or assertion of an examining consul put with such vocal inflection as to be question. 1
Appellant Caparas also points out several inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the two witnesses. While this Court has constantly adhered to the rule that conclusions of the trial court on the matter of evaluations of the truth of declarations of witnesses and their credibility carry great weight and command favorable considerations, 2 the instant case cannot come under this rule for, as pointed out in the motion for reconsideration, the judge who rendered the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies and observed the de or of witnesses Laureano Salvador and Lydia Posadas. 3 This being the case, and considering the gravity of the crime charged, their testimonies must be subjected to a strict scrutiny to leave no room for doubt as to the guilt of Caparas whose complicity was based only on conspiracy which, according to settled doctrine, must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. 4
After a careful and conscientious review of the evidence, We are now convinced that the testimonies of the two aforementioned petitioned witnesses were accorded more than what they deserve by way of credence and veracity. Doubts as to the truth of their testimonies assail the mind of the Court, occasioned by many improbabilities in their testimonies, and in the case of Lydia, by direct contradiction by his own sister, Priscilla Posadas.
To begin with Laureano Salvador, it is not without significance that he was not listed in the information to be among the prosecution witnesses. Only during the trial on June 2, 1973, and after more than two years after the commission of the crime, that he surfaced and testified on what he allegedly knew about the crime. From his testimony, it would appear that he did not inform the authorities nor his relatives what he knew about the crime, and that it was only to Pablo Paez that he told his story about the crime, but only after almost two years after its commission. This fact in itself is contrary to human experience because the natural reaction of one who has knowledge of the crime is to reveal it to the authorities, except only if he is the author thereof. Indeed, as held inPeople vs. Basuel, 5 the silence of the witnesses for about two years detracts from their trustworthiness.
This witness, of course, explained that his silence was due to his fear for his life, for which reason he went into hiding in Dupax Nueva Viscaya, where he allegedly worked at Diplong Sawmill. We cannot, however, give credence to this explanation, since counsel for appellant was not given the opportunity to cross examine Salvador Laureano on this matter. It appears that this witness testified that while hiding in Dupax he worked in "Diplong Sawmill." But upon investigation by counsel for appellant, it was found out that there is no Diplong Sawmill and because of this, counsel for appellant moved to cross examine further the witness. But said witness failed to appear in the hearing despite summons, until the court, after a third failure to appear, issued an order for his arrest. When the said witness finally appeared, counsel for appellant requested to postpone the cross examination on a very valid ground that he had another case which was earlier scheduled on the same date. The trial court, however, refused to postpone the cross examination. This, in Our opinion, is a prejudicial error on the part of the trial court, which should have granted the postponement. As it is, his testimony cannot but create some doubts in Our mind, specially as on his own admission, he never went to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal to inform the government prosecutors that he would be a witness in this case.
In the case of People vs. Maisug, 6 this Court held that the conduct such as shown by the witness is unnatural and contrary to ordinary experience. Lawyers do not usually present witnesses without informing themselves regarding the facts that they would prove by the testimonies they would present in court.
The other witness, Lydia Posadas, a sister-in-law of the deceased had to wait for four (4) days after the shooting, and about two (2) weeks after she allegedly overheard the supposed conspiracy, to execute a joint statement with her sister, Priscilla, before the Provincial Fiscal. It defies one's credulity that both of them, especially Lydia, who is a sister-in-law of the deceased would not immediately expose Caparas as the man behind the perpetration of the crime. This stultified silence casts grave doubts as to their veracity. 7 These doubts deepen when she testified that she did not reveal even to her husband the plot to kill his brother. The reason given by the lower court is that her father-in-law to whom she told of Caparas' plan to liquidate the deceased advised her not to inform anybody, as Atty. Pedro Paez would arrive on February 6, 1971 to settle the conflict. The explanation is not persuasive. No wife who heard of a plot to kill her brother-in-law would not tell her husband of such a dreadful plan. Her explanation why she did not tell her husband is simply preposterous. Upon being told of the plot, anyone, especially a father, would not let even a day pass before taking measures to avert the plot against his son's life. Lydia Posadas testified that she heard the plot on January 27, 1971. To wait until February 6, 1971 to reveal it to the authorities would be taking so much risk, not dictated by the gravity of the events that cried for instant action to prevent its occurrence.
Aside from the inherent incredibility, as shown above, of Lydia's testimony, it was directly contradicted by her sister, Priscilla, who denied having gone to the haystack with her sister, Lydia, on January 27, 1971. Priscilla declared that she executed the sworn statement which tended to implicate Caparas because she and her sister were instructed to do so by Pedro Paez who from all indications exerted moral ascendancy over them as they were staying with the family of Pedro Paez. And being then only 17 years old, she did not realize the serious implications of what she had done.
In Our decision subject of the present motion for reconsideration, We brushed aside Priscilla Posadas' testimony, stating:
... Lydia Posadas declared in Court on July 14, 1973 while Priscilla Posadas took the stand on March 27, 1974. Between these dates, as the cliche goes, much water has gone under the bridge. There is every possibility for overtures to have taken place by way of saving appellant Caparas at least, who is after all, closely related to the victim and the Paezes, from complicity. For if the two sisters were made to jointly execute a false affidavit by Pedro Paez, Priscilla could at least have been prevailed upon not to take the stand just so her sister Lydia would not be unmasked as a liar. If she took the stand as a defense witness, it must have been because the Paezes, realizing what a terrible fate would befall a close relative, appellant Caparas, who could have soothed their aggrieved feelings with more than just an empty supplication for pity, were induced to save Caparas from the grave punishment that he would suffer for the serious offense with which he was charged.
We realize the foregoing ratiocination goes more into the realm of conjecture than reality, upon consideration of the fact that as the records show, the prosecution through a private prosecutor, presented rebuttal evidence to disprove the evidence given by Priscilla Posadas, thus negating what this Court surmised was the reason for Priscilla's testimony so favorable to appellant Caparas. It may be because the Solicitor General made no attempt to explain the damaging testimony of Priscilia, from the prosecution standpoint, that the Court was pushed to doing it, and regrettably so, for as just stated it did so with no better than mere speculation and surmise.
Why Pedro Paez involved the two sisters at the time the joint affidavit was executed was probably because Laureano was still in hiding and Pedro Paez thought that conviction of Caparas would be more sure if two witnesses could corroborate each other.
Moreover, Pedro Paez's letter dated June 23, 1980 addressed to the President of the Philippines and forwarded to this Court by his office requesting for early resolution of this case and another letter dated June 17, 1981 praying for execution of the decision of this Court in this case show no pity on Pedro Paez's part Lo want appellant Caparas saved from punishment, contrary to this Court's mere surmise.
The trial court also inferred conspiracy from its finding that appellant Caparas, in ordering the killing of the deceased, was motivated by resentment against the deceased as a result of a conflict between them over proprietary rights involving a portion of agricultural land: and that the gun used in killing the deceased was owned by Caparas.
While conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence provided that it is competent and convincing, in the instant case, the evidence with which to link Caparas in a conspiracy with Diamsay to kill the deceased does not rest on solid ground. The records do not show that Caparas harbors intense resentment against the Paezes as to go to the extent of liquidating them. On the contrary, it was the Paezes who had all the reason to be angry
with Caparas who, according to them, was defrauding them of their rightful rights. In the case of Diamsay , he apparently acted on his own. Diamsay hated the Paezes because of the latter's "insulting attitude" toward him, as may be gleaned from the decision of the trial court when it states:
When Simeon Paez ,was about to have the same land planted, Diamsay stopped the planters. This angered the former causing him to utter slanderous remarks against Diamsay. Pedro Paez also resented the actuations of Diamsay in (sic) stopping of the land.
As regards the finding that the gun used by Diamsay in killing Simeon Paez was owned by Caparas, this is easily explained by the fact that as overseer of Caparas, Diamsay was authorized to carry the gun. Pedro Paez himself admitted that when he was still the overseer of Caparas, he also used to carry a gun given him by Caparas.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, We cannot but entertain doubts as to the veracity of the testimonies of the two witnesses which alone provided the basis for the finding of ,conspiracy against Caparas. These doubts now disturb the mind of the Court as to his culpability, and must accordingly be resolved in favor of appellant Caparas it being preferably to acquit a guilty person rather than convict all; innocent one. 8
WHEREFORE, the decision of February 20, 1980 is hereby affirmed with respect to appellant Diamsay, but reversed with respect to appellant Caparas who is hereby acquitted, on ground of reasonable doubt, of the crime charged. With costs de oficio as to appellant Caparas.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Barredo (Chairman), J., I vote to give the movant the benefit of doubt.
Aquino, J.,see dissent below.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82882 February 5, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CRISTINA DE LEON & JOHN DOE at large, accused.
CRISTINA DE LEON, defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:p
Before an accused is convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and until proved guilty, he is presumed innocent. The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and unless the State succeeds in proving his guilt, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused applies. These are the principles that guided the Court in reversing the decision of the trial court wherein the defendant-appellant was convicted of the very serious crime of kidnapping and sentenced to serve the penalty of life imprisonment.
The facts as found by the lower court which found the story of the prosecution more reliable is simply put as follows:
Delia Lacson, the complainant in this case, comes from a well-off family which owns several stores and two houses, one located at Bagong Silang, Caloocan City and the other in Novaliches, Quezon City. Defendant-appellant Cristina de Leon, on the other hand, was living with her common-law husband also at Bagong Silang. The two met and became friends in 1987 when Delia was only 15 years old and a third-year high school student.
Sometime in June 1987, Delia was introduced to Boy, the brother of defendant-appellant, who was then 19 years of age. Boy was the former live-in partner of an entertainer who left for Japan and was renting an apartment near the house of defendant-appellant Cristina. By July 1987, Boy and Delia became sweethearts and in the same month, they eloped and started a live-in relationship. During the short span of time that they stayed together, Delia learned how to smoke marijuana and take "prohibited" drugs like Corex and Colagin. Later, Boy started beating Delia. Realizing her mistake, Delia decided to leave Boy and thus she went away with her mother when the latter fetched her on July 21, 1987.
Delia testified in court that on August 18, 1987 at about 3:30 in the afternoon, she went to buy bread at a bakery which was about 150 to 200 meters away from their house at Bagong Silang. She said that on her way home, a private jeep stopped in front of her from which the
defendant-appellant alighted. Defendant-appellant, along with the driver, allegedly seized her and tied her arms from behind and gagged her mouth with a handkerchief. It is also alleged that with the assistance of two other men, they forced her into the jeep. She was allegedly brought to the house of the aunt of defendant-appellant in Novaliches and dragged into a room where Boy was having a drug session with two men. She alleged that she was also forced to take drugs, and that not long thereafter, she felt dizzy and fell asleep.
When Delia awoke about one hour later, she allegedly saw defendant-appellant Cristina and two men still inside the room. Defendant-appellant made her take a bath after which one of the men forced her to have sex with him.
After the incident, Delia was locked up in the same room for about three days. On the fourth day, defendant-appellant finally talked to her and told her that she will have her employed in a beer garden. The following day, defendant-appellant, before bringing Delia to the beer garden, forced her to take a glassful of Corex and Colagin This happened for several consecutive days. She would be forced to take drugs, brought to the beer garden and brought back to the same house at 3 o'clock in the morning to be locked up again in the same room. According to Delia, she could not escape because defendant-appellant always kept a watchful eye on her.
On August 27, 1987, narrates Delia, a man who seemed to be a familiar face from Bagong Silang went to the beer house. The man, named Marcelo Mateo Jr., testified in court that while passing his time away at the beer house, a girl whom he recognized as someone from Bagong Silang approached him and told him of her plight. She pleaded to him to help her get out of the place as she could not do it all by herself. Mateo further testified that since the girl was obviously drugged, he harbored doubts as to the truthfulness of her narration. Nonetheless, he said that he promised her that he will be back soon.
After conducting his own investigation, Mateo went back to free Delia. Without anyone noticing, Delia passed through the backdoor of the beer house while Mateo got a taxi to transport them to his parents' house.
The information charging defendant-appellant Cristina de Leon with the crime of kidnapping was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City and after due trial the court rendered a decision on February 3, 1988 with the following dispositive portion:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the herein accused CRISTINA DE LEON, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of KIDNAPPING, as defined and penalized in Article 267, paragraph (4), of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences her to reclusion perpetua. 1
Hence this appeal therefrom.
In her defense, defendant-appellant contends that at the time of the alleged kidnapping, it could not have been possible for her to be at the site of the crime because she was in a funeral parlor. In other words, her defense consists of alibi. She completely denies all the
charges imputed to her by Delia and insists that the girl ran away from home instead. Defendant-appellant's aunt testified in her favor in that there are only three rooms in her house for 21 people and that there is no such room therein with a built-in bathroom where Delia was supposed to have been detained as she had testified. She also states that the only time that Delia went to stay in her house was when she eloped with her nephew, Boy, to live together as husband and wife for a couple of days.
It is clear from a reading of the appealed decision that in choosing which version to believe, the lower court relied on the credibility of the witnesses and their respective testimonies. 2 This is because there is no concrete proof as to the fact of kidnapping and the versions of the parties are directly opposed.
We are well-aware of the numerous decisions that entrench the principle of reliability of the trial court's findings regarding the credibility of witnesses. Having had the opportunity to meet the witnesses face to face, the trial court is deemed to be in a better position to ascertain whether or not they are telling the truth.
However, after conducting a thorough study of the records of this case, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the lower court disregarded some details which, if taken into account, should change entirely the court's opinion as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, particularly that of the complainant. There are glaring inconsistencies in the said testimonies which are damaging to the cause of the prosecution. Questions and arguments presented by the appellant in her brief were left unanswered. There are uncertainties as to how the kidnapping actually took place. All these combined led this Court to the conclusion that the judgment of conviction of guilt for the crime of kidnapping in this particular case has no cogent basis.
By merely glossing over the facts, one would find it mind-boggling how the lower court arrived at the opinion that the alleged victim was a credible witness describing her as "a girl of no previous exposure to the wild and harsh ways of the world." 3 The facts clearly show otherwise. Delia was only 15 and a mere third-year high school student when she met Boy. Yet, just a few days after, she already had sexual relations with him. What is worse is that she left her home and family to have a "live-in" relationship with the 19-year old boy and later on became involved in prohibited drugs. The affidavit she executed before the barangay captain shows that she went with him freely, to wit:
Q What were you investigated about by Mrs. Liwag at the barangay?
A She asked me if I voluntarily went, sir.
Q With whom? A With Boy, sir.
Q What was your answer?
A Yes, sir.
Q By that answer of yours, you mean you voluntarily stayed with Boy?
A Yes, sir. 4
Undeniable also is the fact that she was employed in a beer garden until she voluntarily resigned.
Next, the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by Delia before the police authorities is clearly in conflict with her testimony in court. The said "Sinumpaang Salaysay" includes the following:
T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay maihatid sa Beer House, hindi ka na niya sinusundo sa pag-uwi?
S Hindi na po. Ako na lamang mag-isa ang umuuwi at pagdating ng hapon ay dumarating siya sa R.P. at kanyang kinukuha and iba kong kita mula sa Beer House (Emphasis supplied.) 5
The foregoing is a clear admission on the part of Delia that there was no actual confinement or restriction on her person. She had every opportunity to escape, yet she did not. On the contrary, she, all by herself, kept on returning to the supposed detention place. With this circumstance, the element of deprivation of liberty which is essential in kidnapping appears to be absent.
The fact that Delia later on denied that she was in her proper senses when she executed the sworn statement before the police authorities and gave a different story in court does not at all work in her favor. First of all, the Court cannot believe that at the time she gave her statement to the police she was still under the influence of the drug that was supposed to have been given to her by appellant more than 24 hours earlier. Secondly, with two conflicting stories both made under oath, the Court cannot assume one or the other as the truth.
In Mondragon v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court held that when one witness makes two sworn statements and these two statements incur in the gravest contradictions, the Court cannot accept either statement as proof. The witness by his own act of giving false testimony impeaches his own testimony and the Court should exclude it from all consideration. The above-mentioned ruling should guide this Court in this case where the witness makes a sworn statement before the police authorities that is contradictory to her testimony in court. The lower court, having been apprised of the same, should have been more circumspect in adopting said testimony. It is also apparent that this was completely disregarded by the lower court in its assessment regarding the credibility and reliability of Delia as a witness.
Going through the records very carefully, the Court finds other circumstances that work against the theory of the prosecution aside from what was previously discussed, and they are as follows:
1. The kidnapping was supposed to have been conducted in broad daylight and in a busy street where Delia's family is well-known.
2. Not even a single eyewitness was presented in court to testify that he witnessed the abduction.
3. Delia did not even attempt to shout or call for help.
4. When ordered to take a bath, Delia immediately followed without even asking why she was being asked to do so.
5. Delia did not try to escape whenever appellant brought food to her room.
6. When informed by appellant that she will be employed as a receptionist in a beer garden, Delia asked the former that she be employed as a singer instead. 7
7. Delia, who was supposed to be a kidnap victim, was made to work in a public place and ride public transportation for one whole week.
8. Delia was given the liberty to talk to strangers and customers of the beer garden from whom she could easily ask for help.
9. Delia was able to escape so easily by just passing through the back door of the beer garden. 8
10. Delia admitted that she voluntarily resigned from her job as a receptionist in the beer garden.
The version of the defendant-appellant that what actually happened is that Delia ran away from home and was scared to go back because of her brothers is bolstered by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses themselves, to wit:
TESTIMONY OF PAT. ALFREDO ANTONIO:
Q Where did you allow her to rest?
A At the house near the detachment because she could not go yet to their house inasmuch as she was in fear. It took her sometime before she could go home becauseshe was afraid of her brothers. 9
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: Where did she sleep?
A In the house near the detachment where her statement might be taken because she might leave. 10
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that Delia Lacson seems to be afraid, did you come to know why she was afraid?
A From what I gathered, Ma'am, she seemed to be afraid of her brothers. 11
TESTIMONY OF MARCELO MATEO, JR.:
Q What did Delia do when she stayed in your house during that time?
A I let her sleep with my sister and told my sister to keep watch on her because she was in the influence of drugs and she might escape, sir. 12
Indeed, it is surprising that after having rescued Delia, Mr. Mateo did not bring her immediately to her house and family and instead brought her to his parent's house. Later, the policemen who fetched her brought her to the police detachment and let her sleep in a house at the back of the said police detachment which was very near Delia's own house. If Delia was truly kidnapped, her family should have been very eager to see her again to find out if she was unharmed. The only plausible reason for Mr. Mateo's action is, as contended by appellant and testified to by the other witnesses, that she was scared to go back to her house because of her brothers who were angry at her for running away from home.
It may be true that defendant-appellant has a very weak defense which is alibi. Yet, this does not at all allow the prosecution to escape from its responsibility to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction. With all the serious doubts attendant to the case, the Court is constrained to acquit the defendant-appellant of the crime of kidnapping Delia Lacson.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and defendant-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38790 November 9, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FEDERICO RELUCIO @ "PEDRING", EDRI PINEDA, ROSENDO VELASCO @ "MANGYO", DANTE ARIOLA, MIGUEL ESPEJO PADRONES @ "EGI", PETER DOE, and RICHARD DOE, accused, ROSENDO VELASCO @ "MANGYO", accused-appellant.
J. G. Lapuz & E. F. David for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr. and Trial Attorney Windalino Y. Custodia for appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the judgment of conviction against appellant Rosendo Velasco of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fourth Judicial District dated January 4, 1974, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court, finding the accused Federico Relucio and Rosendo Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in the information, and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the herein deceased victim Gonzalo Talastas in the amount of P12,000.00 without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the nature of the sentence, and to pay the proportionate costs.
It appears that the other accused Federico Relucio withdrew his appeal upon the filing of a motion for new trial but pending the resolution of said motion, said accused broke out of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Jail together with two other inmates named Mario David and Amante Villasenor for which reason the trial court declared the decision final as to him. (Order of the trial court of June 4, 1974.)
Appellant was charged with murder in the court below, together with Federico Relucio, alias "Pedring", Edri Pineda, Dante Ariola, Miguel Espejo Padrones. alias "Egi" Peter Doe and Richard Doe, in an information dated May 29, 1972 reading as follows:
The City Fiscal accuses Federico Relucio alias "Pedring", Edri Pineda, Rosendo Velasco alias "Mangyo", Dante Ariola, Miguel Espejo Padrones
alias "Egi", Peter Doe and Richard Doe, the true Identities of the last two-named accused being presently unknown, of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23 rd day of June, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding and abetting one another, with treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Gonzalo Talastas by shooting the latter on different parts of his body with guns thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and cruelty.
Cabanatuan City, May 29, 1972.
FOR THE CITY FISCAL:
SGD.) MARIO M. DEL ROSARIO Special Counsel
The trial began on November 16, 1972 and ended on November 5, 1973, the court holding no less than twenty-four sessions. Four witnesses, Patrolman Jose E. Garcia, Crispin Angeles, Dra. Melicia C. de Guzman and Miguel Padrones, testified for the prosecution during the presentation of the direct evidence and four witnesses, Jose Serafica, Inday Tinio, Benito Custodio and again Miguel Padrones were presented as rebuttal witnesses. The defense had, aside from the accused Relucio and Velasco, the following witnesses: Eduardo Mangahas, Jose Aguilar, Ligaya Velasco, Elias Estrella, judge Alfin Vicencio, Segundino Gabriel, Pablo Padilla, Eusebio Mendiola and Dr. Emiliano Perez. Later, Velasco testified again in rebuttal. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of all the witnesses consist of over 930 pages.
Of the four witnesses in chief presented by the prosecution only two, Crispen Angeles and Miguel Padrones, can be said to have given incriminatory evidence against appellant.
- 1 -
According to Angeles, (pp. 18-115, t.s.n.), on the day in question, June 23, 1971, he met the deceased Gonzalo Talastas (Along) near the entrance to the Capital Theater in Cabanatuan City at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. He invited Talastas to see the movie. The latter said he was waiting for a woman. When the woman named Amanda arrived, she had a female companion, and the four of them went in. After a while Amanda left and did not go back anymore. So, Angeles invited Talastas to leave but the latter said he would wait for Amanda to return. A little later, however, he acceded just the same, but Angeles "left ahead of him."
As Angeles was going out, he met the accused Federico Relucio and another person unknown to him going inside the theater. After the two went in, Angeles heard shots, after which he saw Talastas going out of the theater with blood on his shoulder. (He could not say whether left or right. 'At that moment, he (Angeles) was "in the place opposite the Capital Theater near the Avenue Theater" (across Burgos Street ). He saw "someone following and shooting him" (Talastas),' somebody who was chasing him. ... He was firing shots," but he did not say clearly who fired the shots. His vague testimony on this point is as follows:
Q Where were you when you saw Gonzalo Talastas going out of the theater?
A I was there in front of the Avenue theater, sir.
Q What happened if you know when you saw Gonzalo Talastas going out the theater?
A There was somebody who was chasing him, sir.
Prosecutor
Q What was that one chasing him doing while chasing him?
A He was firing shots, sir.
Q To whom was he firing shots?
A Gonzalo Talastas, the one who died.
Q Do you know that one chasing Gonzalo Talastas?
A Yes, sir. The one chasing him I know him by face and the other one I know him by name only, sir.
Q How many were chasing Gonzalo Talastas?
A There were many but I recognized only four, sir.
Q You said that you know the name of one of them, will you please tell the Honorable Court the name of one of them whom you know by name?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is his name?
A Ige, sir.
Q If Ige is in this courtroom, can you point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Abesamis
We object to the question for it lacks basis because the witness categorically stated that he only knew the name. He did not state that he knows the person who carries the name of Ige, your Honor.
Court
But he saw the man. If he did not see, I would not insist. I would sustain you easily but he saw the face.
Atty. Abesamis
I submit, your Honor.
Court
Witness may answer.
Witness
A Yes, sir. Prosecutor
Q Please point to him?
A (witness pointing to a person wearing a white shirt when asked of his name answered that he is Miguel Padrones).
Q You said you saw four persons, besides Miguel Padrones, can you tell if any of the three is in this courtrooms.
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to them?
A (witness going down from the witness stand and pointing to somebody sitting handsome and with curly hair who, when asked of his name, answered that he is Rosendo Velasco).
Q Who else if there are still in this courtroom?
A I have already pointed three. The other one is not here, sir.
Q You said that you recognized four men among those chasing the deceased Gonzalo Talastas and you pointed to Ige who is Miguel Padrones and now you pointed to Mangyo who is Rosendo Velasco, who is the other one?
Atty. Abesamis
Already answered, he already pointed three according to him, your honor.
Court
Q You only pointed two as far as the Court remembers. You said four were there other still present in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir. This is the third one (witness pointing to somebody who is used to be Identified to be Federico Relucio), and the fourth one is not here.
Prosecutor
Q You said that they were chasing Gonzalo Talastas, what happened with that chasing?
A He was hit and he fell down, sir.
Q Where did he fall ?
A In front of the Tiwag College, sir.
Q How far is that point from the theater where Gonzalo Talastas came?
A It was quite far, sir, I cannot estimate but he came from the Capital theater, and he fell down in front of the Liwag College.
Court
Q Can the parties determine as to the distance from the Capital theater up to the Liwag College?
(Make of record that the distance approximated by the parties is more or less 150 meters).
(t.sn., pp. 37-42, hearing of November 16, 1972.)
Explaining further, he testified that Talastas was running towards the east and that "those chasing him, some were in the jeep and others running. " Among those in the jeep was appellant Rosendo Velasco, the only one he recognized, and among those on foot he recognized only Miguel Padrones. After Talastas fell, the witness went to the municipal building "looking for a policeman whom I know because I will tell him that Gonzalo Talastas was shot", but he could not find anyone he knew, so he went home.
On cross-examination, however, he identified Padrones as the only one chasing Gonzalo thus:
Atty. Pablo
Q Now, you saw Ige chasing him on foot when he was going out of the theater or when he was already running along the street?
A When he was already running in the street sir.
Q He was alone chasing him when he was proceeding along the Liwag College?
A I only saw one. He was alone Ige only, sir. (t.s.n., p. 60, hearing of November 16, 1972.)
Moreover, whatever frail indication may appear in the testimony of this, witness linking appellant to the offense charged was virtually shattered by Exhibit 17, the sworn statement of the same witness given to Detective Justiniano E. Fernandez of the Cabanatuan City Police on January 11, 1972, which the defense presented for impeachment purposes, strangely
without objection on the part of the prosecution notwithstanding that the defense failed to lay the predicate therefor. (t.s.n., p. 388.) In said statement, Angeles gave practically a different story from beginning to end - from the reference to the time place and reason how he and Talastas and Amanda came to be together that fateful afternoon up to the Identification of Ige or Egi (Miguel Padrones) as the one who shot Talastas) — from that related by him on the witness stand. Exhibit 17 reads as follows:
CCPD-Bilang 1356-71
SALAYSAY NI CRISPIN ANGELES Y SANTIAGO NA KUHA SA PAGTATANONG NI TIKTIK JUSTINIANO P. FERNANDEZ NG PANGKAT NG TAGATUGAYGAY NG HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG LUNGSOD NG KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-11 NG BUAN NG ENERO 1972, SA GANAP NA IKA-4:00 NG HAPON.
01. TANONG:-Ito'y isang pagsisiyasat, ikaw ba'y handang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay na ang iyong sasabihin dito ay pawang katotohanan lamang.?
SAGOT:-Opo.
02. T-Sabihin mo ang iyong pangalan at bagay na maaring pa sa iyong pagkatao at sabihin mo din kung saan ka kasalukuyang naninirahan?
S-CRISPIN ANGELES Y SANTIAGO po, 22 taong may asawa, magsasaka at sa kasalukuyang naninirahan sa Bo. Pamaldan, Lungsod ng Kabanatuan.
03. T-Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa Tanggapan ng Pulisya at ikaw ay nagbibigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay dito?
S-Dahilan po sa akoy nagpapatunay sa isang pangyayari na naganap.
04. T-Ano ba ang pangyayaring ito na ayon sa iyo ay naganap na nais mong patunayan dito?
S-Ganito po iyon. Nuong ika-2:00 ng hapon ng ika-23 ng buan ng Hunyo 1971, samantalang kami nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS ay nanduon sa isang bahay na aming tinutuluyan sa Bo. Aduas, dito sa Lungsod ng Kabanatuan, ay dumating itong si MANDA at ang
isang babae na sinabi niyang kanyang pinsan at kami ay kanilang inamuki na samahan sila na manood ng Cine. Amin naman pong sinamahan ang dalawang babae na ito at ang kanilang piniling pasukin na Cine ay iyong Capital sa may daang Burgos. Ng kami'y nanduon na sa loob ng sine, hindi pa gaanong nagtatagal kami sa aming pagkakaupo na magkakatabi duon sa hulihang upuan sa ibaba sa gawing kaliwa ay nagpaalam ang dalawang kasama naming ito na sila'y di umano'y pupunta sa kasilyas ng mga babae at sila'y iihi. Ng mayruon ng humigit kumulang na kahalating oras ang nakakaraan ang dalawang babae na ito ay hindi pa nagbabalik sa kanilang upuan sa tabi naming dalawa ay nainip kami at amin silang hinanap subalit hindi na namin sila nakita. Sa pangyayaring ito ay nagusap kami nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS at napagkasunduan naming dalawa na kami'y lumabas na din, ang ginawa ko ay nagpatiuna na ako sa paglabas na sumusunod itong is GONZALO TALASTAS at siya ay naghinto sa may tapat ng takilya. Ng ako'y malapit ng makarating duon sa mga bungad ng pasilyo ay napansin ko na mayruong tatlong tao na mayruong mga dalang baril ang naduon sa magkabilang gilid at sa aking palagay ay mayruong silang inaabangan. Ng ako'y makalagpas na sa mga taong ito, iyong isa sa kanilang tatlo ay humiwalay at pumasok duon sa loob. Sa napansin kong ito ang ginawa ko ay nagbalik ako at sa aking pagpasok ay bigla na lamang mayruong pumutok na baril at ng aking tingnan ang pinangalingan ng putok ay nakita ko itong si FEDERICO RELUCIO na mayruong palayaw na "PEDRING "na binabaril itong si GONZALO TALASTAS na tinamaan sa kanyang kaliwang balikat. Nakita ko din na gumanti itong si GONZALO TALASTAS at tinamaan din itong si PEDRING na hindi ko alam kung saang parte. Nakita ko din po na itong si GONZALO TALATAS ay tumakbong papalabas ng sine na naiwanan itong si PEDRING duon sa loob. Sa ginawang paglabas nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS ay sumunod na din ako at nakita ko na iyong ibang mga kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nagaabang sa labas at nakasakay duon sa jeep na di pasaheros na kasama na duon iyong dalawang kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nakita kong nakatayo sa magkabilang gilid ng pasilyo ng Cine Capital. Nakita ko na bumaba itong si PEDRING na hinabol itong si GONZALO TALASTAS na kasalukuyan nuong nagtatakbo napatungo duon sa may gawi ng Cine Broadway na binabaril naman nitong si IGE ng isang baril na
Carbine, subalit hindi tinamaan itong si GONZALO TALASTAS. Nakita ko din po na itong si EDRI ay nagbalik at kanyang kinuha ang isang jeep na army type at kanyang iminaneho ito na kasama itong dalawa na sina Mangyo Velasco at si Dante Arriola at kanilang pinulot itong si IGE Natapos na maisakay itong si IGE ay kanila ng sinundan itong is GONZALO TALASTAS at kanilang inabutan duon sa may panulukan ng daang Bonifacio at Burgos na sumasakay sa tricycle. Inihinto po nitong si EDRI ang jeep na army type at bumaba itong si IGE at kanyang binaril itong is GONZALO TALASTAS ng dala niyang Carbine. Tinamaan itong is GONZALO TALASTAS at nakita kong nabuwal at habang ito'y nabubuwal ay binabaril ito ng mga kasamahan ni EDRI na naiwanan duon sa jeep na tumatama naman sa katawan nito. Matapos ang maramihang pagpapaputok na ginawa ng mga naiwanan sa jeep, itong si IGE ay lumapit dito sa kinabuwalan nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS at kanyang itinaas ang ulo nito at pinaputukan ng kanyang baril na mahigsi sa may gawing likuran at pagkatapos ay kinuha niya ang baril na dala nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS. Pagkatapos nuon ay sumakay na itong si IGE duon sa jeep na nakahinto at sila'y tumakas na.
05. T-Ayon sa iyo ay sinundan mo itongmga taong ito at iyong sinubaybayan ang mga nagaganap na pangyayari, saan lugar ka naman lumagay nuon?
S-Duon po ako nanduon at nakakubli sa bangketa bago dumating sa Mobil Gas Station sa gawing kanan ng daang Burgos.
06. T-Ilan bang magkakasama itong mga taong ito na pumatay dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS?
S-Sa akin pong pagkakakita sila'y mayruong pito ang bilang.
07. T-Binangit mo dito sila, FEDERICO RELUCIO @ PEDRING, EDRI PINEDA, @ IGE, @ MANGYO VELASCO at DANTE ARRIOLA, lumilitaw o lumalabas na mayruon na itong lima ang bilang, iyong dalawa na hindi mo nabangit dito dahil sa ayon sa iyo ay pito ang magkakasamahan na ito. Sino pa iyong dalawa kung nakikilala mo?
S-Hindi ko po sila kilala dahilan sa nuon ko lamang sila nakita.
08. T-Ayon sa iyo dito na nuong lumabas itong si GONZALO TALASTAS sa loob ng Cine Capital na mayruon ng tama ng baril upang tumakas ay nakita mo na iyong mga kasamahan nitong si PEDRING RELUCIO na siyang pumasok dito sa loob ng sine at binaril si GONZALO TALASTAS ay nanduon sa isang jeep na di pasahero na parada sa tapat ng bowling alley, at ng tugisin nila itong si GONZALO TALASTAS ay sakay na sila ng isang jeep na army type ang ibig mo bang sabihin dito ay dalawa ang sasakyan na ginamit ng mga taong ito?
S-Opo.
09. T-Alam mo ba kung ano ang mga Plaka ng dalawang sasakyang ito na ginamit ng mga taong ito na pumatay dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS?
S-Hindi dahil sa hindi ko na napagruonan ng pansin ito at ang hinahabol ko ay iyong nagaganap na pangyayari tungkol sa pagkapatay dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS.
10. T-Ito bang mga taong binangit mo dito liban dito sa dalawa na hindi mo kilala, ay dati mo ng kilala?
S-Opo iyong tatlo na sina, FEDERICO RELUCIO PEDRING, @ EDRI PINEDA at @ IGE na pawang mga taga Bo. Talipapa, dito sa Lungsod ng Kabanatuan, at itong dalawang sina MANGYO VELASCO at DANTE ARRIOLA ay hindi pa gaanong nagtatagal.
11. T-Ano ba naman ang relasyon ninyong dalawa dito sa dalawang babae na sumundo sa inyo duon sa inyong tinuluyang bahay sa Bo. Aduas, na humimok sa inyo na sumama sa kanila na manood ng Cine?
S-Wala po kaming relasyon, subalit hindi katagalang magkakilala.
12. T-Sino sa dalawang ito ang kakilala ninyo?
S-Iyon pong MANDA.
13. T-Saan ba naman nagtitira itong si MANDA at ang kanyang kasama na isang babae din?
S-Sa Bo. Dalampang po.
14. T-Hindi mo ba alam kung ano ang kanilang mga apilyedo?
S-Hindi ko na po maalala ang kanilang mga apilyedo subalit sila ay maituturo ko kung sila'y aking makitang muli.
15. T-Simula ng pangyayaring iyon, nagkita ba kayong mull ng dalawang babae na ito?
S-Hindi na po napakita sila sa akin.
16. T-Sa iyong pagaaral o pagkakaalam ano ang motibo ng ginawang pagpatay dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS ng mga taong binangit mo dito?
S-Ang pagkakaalam ko po ay dahilan sa ginawang pagbaril nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS dito kay VITO RELUCIO na kapatid nitong si PEDRING RELUCIO na pamangkin naman nitong si EDRI PINEDA.
17. T-Alam mo din ba kung bakit binaril nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS itong si VITO RELUCIO?
S-Opo.
18. T-Ano naman ang pagkakaalam mo?
S-Dahil sa nasabi po sa akin ng personal nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS na iyon daw pong kanyang asawa ay siniraang purl nitong si VITO RELUCIO at ito'y nagsumbong dito.
19. T-Ayon saiyo dito na ng mangyari ang pagpatay dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS ay nuong ika-23 ng buan ng Hunyo 1971 ng bandang hapon, bakit ngayon ka lamang nagbigay ng isang malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay dito bilang pagpapatunay na pangyayari naiyon na paganap?
S-Dahil po sa ako'y natatakot sapagkat panahon nila ng panunugis.
20. T-Ito ba lang ang dahilan kung kaya ngayon ka lamang nagkaruon ng lakas ng loob upang magpatunay sa naganap na patayan naito na ang naging biktima dito ay si GONZALO TALASTAS?
S-Mayroon pa po, wala namang nagpunta sa akin na investigador upang ako'y tanungin tungkol sa naganap na pangyayaring ito.
21. T-Dito ba sa pagbibigay mo ng isang malaya at kusangloob na salaysay dito sa Himpilang ito ay walang tumakot saiyoo kaya nangakong ikaw ay bibigyan ng pabuya upang sabihin mo dito ang lahat ng mga binangit mo na salaysay mong ito?
S-Wala po ang lahat ng mga sinabi ko dito sa harap ninyo ay kusang-loob ko at walang pumilit sa akin o tumakot dili kaya ay nangako na ako'y bibigyan ng ano mang pabuya, bagkus ito ay aking karapatan bilang isang mamamayang Pilipino at tungkulin ko din pong makipagtulungan sa mga ahensya ng batas lalo na sa ganitong uri ng krimen ginanap na nagdamay pa ng iba.
22. T-Nasabi mong nagdamay pa ng iba, bukod dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS, mayroon pa bang ibang mga taong naging biktima ng pangyayaring ito?
S-Mayroon po.
23. T-Sino naman ang mga taong ito kung mayroon kang nalalaman?
S-Sa akin pong pagkakaalam ay iyong mayari ng dating tindahan na isang babae na asawa ng manager ng isang bangko dito sa Lungsod ng Kabanatuan na napagalaman ko ang pangalan na GINANG LUISA MONDELO.
24. T-Ano naman ang naging pinsala nito kung nalalaman mo?
S-Ayon po sa aking pagkakaalam ay tinamaan ito ng ligaw na bala sa kanyang baraso hindi ko po malaman kung kaliwa o kanan.
25. T-Tutuo bang lahat ang mga sinabi mong ito at handa mong panumpaan sa harap ng Hukuman kung sakaling ikaw ay kailanganin na magpatutuo sa pagpapatunay sa pangyayaring iyon nasaksihan ng ayon sa iyo?
S-Opo.
(Lumagda) CRISPIN S. ANGELES (Pp. 369-372, Record of Lower Court.)
As may be seen, the material discrepancies between the contents of the above-quoted statement, on the one hand, and the testimony of Angeles in open court, on the other, are so irreconcilable that even if the proper predicate had been laid upon proper objection of the fiscal it is doubtful, if any believable reconciliation could have been given by him. In open court, he testified that in the afternoon of June 23, 1971, it was at the entrance of the Capital Theater that he met Talastas and invited him to see the movie but the latter said that he was waiting for Amanda. It turned out, according to Exhibit 17, that he and Talastas were still in Barrio Aduas, where they were staying, when Manda arrived with a woman companion and invited them to go to the "cine". In his testimony, he said that it was Amanda who left and did not go back anymore, while in the above statement, he declared that both of their two female companions told them they would only go to the comfort room but eventually disappeared. In court, he said that when Manda did not return, he invited Talastas to leave but the latter answered he would wait for Manda's return. In Exhibit 17, it appears that he and Talastas agreed to follow and look for their lady companions and that he went ahead and Talastas stopped by the ticket booth. Whereas in court, he testified that he was already in the middle or across Burgos Street near the Avenue Theater when he heard shots inside the Capital Theater where Talastas had returned, as they met Federico Relucio with a companion, unknown to him, who were going inside, hence, he did not see who fired the shots, in the above sworn statement, he categorically stated that upon seeing Relucio, who had separated from his two armed companions and gone inside, he (Angeles) went back inside the theater and actually saw Relucio firing at Gonzalo and the latter retaliating with his own gun. In court, he said that when Talastas came out of the theater already wounded and running towards the east, the two companions of Relucio, referring to Velasco and Padrones, chased Talastas, with Relucio riding in a jeep and Padrones going on foot. In Exhibit 17-A, he said:
04. S-Nakita ko din po na itong si GONZALO TALASTAS ay tumakbong papalabas ng sine na naiwanan itong si PEDRING duon sa loob. Sa ginawang paglabas nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS ay sumunod na din ako at nakita ko na iyong ibang mga kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nagaabang sa labas at nakasakay duon sa jeep na di pasaheros na kasama na duon iyong
dalawang kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nakita kong nakatayo sa magkabilang gilid ng pasilyo ng Cine Capital. Nakita ko na bumaba itong si EDRI na ang kanyang apilyedo ay PINEDA at itong si IGE at kanilang hinabol itong si GONZALO TALASTAS na , kasalukuyan nuong nagtatakbo na patungo duon sa may gawi ng Cine Broadway na binabaril naman nitong si IGE ng isang baril na Carbine, subalit hindi tinamaan itong si GONZALO TALASTAS. Nakita ko din po na itong si EDRI ay nagbalik at kanyang kinuha ang isang jeep na army type at kanyang iminaneho ito na kasama itong dalawa na sina Mangyo Velasco at si Dante Arriola at kanilang pinulot itong si IGE Natapos na maisakay itong si IGE ay kanila ng sinundan itong si GONZALO TALASTAS at kanilang inabutan duon sa may panulukan ng daang Bonifacio at Burgos na sumasakay sa tricycle.
In court, Angeles intimated that Padrones or Egi did not fire at Talastas, leaving the inference that it was appellant Velasco who was shooting the deceased. In the above statement, he positively said:
Inihinto po nitong si EDRI ang jeep na army type at bumaba itong si IGE at kanyang binaril itong si GONZALO TALASTAS ng dala niyang Carbine. Tinamaan itong si GONZALO TALASTAS at nakita kong nabuwal at habang ito'y nabubuwal ay binabaril ito ng mga kasamahan ni EDRI na naiwanan duon sa jeep na tumatama naman sa katawan nito. Matapos ang maramihang pagpapaputok na ginawa ng mga naiwanan sa jeep, itong si IGE ay lumapit dito se kinabuwalan nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS at kanyang itinaas ang ulo nito at pinaputukan ng kanyang baril na maiksi sa may gawing likuran at pagkatapos ay kinuha niya ang baril na dala nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS. Pagkatapos nuon ay sumakay na itong si IGE duon sa jeep na nakahinto at sila'y tumakas na.
In brief, in court, Angeles' account of the participation of appellant in the shooting of Talastas was vague and inconclusive; in his statement, Exhibit 17, nothing points definitely and specifically to appellant as having fired any shot at all; importantly the one clearly and categorically referred to as having shot Talastas is Egi or Padrones
It results, therefore, that at least insofar as herein appellant Velasco is concerned, the testimony of Angeles has been completely impeached or discredited.
It is a basic postulate in the law on evidence that every witness is presumed to be truthful and perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are evinced in parts of his testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first be exerted before any adverse conclusion can be made therefrom. These considerations he at the base of the familiar rule requiring the laying of a predicate, which is essence means simply that it
is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of prior or, for that matter, subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a chance to reconcile his conflicting declarations, such that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by him that he should be deemed impeached. Thus, Section 16 of Rule 132 provides:
Section 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements if so, to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
In United States vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil 385, at pp. 406-407, the Court made a clear exposition of the universal rule of laying a predicate as follows:
In order that we may not be misunderstood, as wen as for the purpose of clarifying the practice in such matters, a few words may here be properly said in respect to the proper mode of proceeding in a case where a party wishes to get before the court contradictory statements made by a witness who is testifying for the adversary party. For instance, if the attorney for -the accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts 'laying a predicate' for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.
We wish to add that in a case of this kind, if the accused had, by affidavit or otherwise, made it appear to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses named had made statements in their declarations before the
fiscal materially at variance with their statements in court and that the production of said declarations was necessary or even desirable, in the interests of justice, the court would have had ample power to order their production.
This doctrine has been reiterated consistently in subsequent cases. (Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed., P. 92, citing People vs. Resabal, 50 Phil. 780; People vs. Quingsy, 54 Phil. 88; People vs. Lara, 75 Phil. 786; and People vs. Escusura, 82 Phil. 41.)
But it, as in the instant case of the witness Angeles, the prosecution did not object to the presentation of Exhibit 17 which was offered expressly for impeachment purposes, notwithstanding that the defense did not give the witness the opportunity to give his own explanation of the apparent contradictions in his testimony, the trial judge and the appellate courts have no alternative but to determine, if they can, possible reconciliation on the basis alone of logic and common experience. The omission to object on the ground of failure to lay the predicate is waived by the omission to interpose the same when the impeaching contradictory statement is offered. (Evidence, [Rules of Court] Vol. VII, 1973 ed. by Vicente Francisco, p. 398.) On this score, We find the inconsistencies in the two versions of Angeles utterly beyond possible rational explanation. The various discrepancies We have pointed out above - and there are still others We have not mentioned — are so disparate that there can be no other conclusion than that the witness must have lied in either of them. Accordingly, We have to reject both of them.
- 2 -
The testimony of the other witness Miguel Padrones, one of appellant's co-accused, cannot be viewed in better light.
After Patrolman Garcia and Crispen Angeles had testified, at the hearing on January 4, 1973, the prosecutor, District State Prosecutor Mariano D. Copuyoc, asked for resolution of his motion to discharge the accused Miguel Padrones in order to be utilized as a state witness, evidently by virtue of Section 9 of Rule 119, on the ground that "this representation has found absolute necessity of the testimony of said defendant because the prosecution has no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the offense committed except the testimony of said Miguel Padrones; that the said testimony of the defendant Miguel Padrones could be substantially corroborated in its material points by the testimony of the other prosecution witness Crispin Angeles; that the said accused Miguel Padrones appears to be the least guilty and that he has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." No notice was given to the defense of the motion; it turned out it was filed as early as December 14, 1972, after Angeles had already finished testifying on December 6, 1972. Counsel for Relucio and Velasco protested they had no notice of the motion and objected to it contending that from the testimony of Angeles, Padrones did not appear to be the least guilty and that the prosecution had not shown that Padrones had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, but the trial court overruled them.
Briefly, the testimony of Padrones on direct examination (pp. 427-453, t.s.n.) was as follows:
Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., June 23, 1971, while he was in the residence of Atty. Perez (in Cabanatuan City), "an information was received" ... from a person named Og that Gonzalo Talastas was inside Capital Theater also in Cabanatuan City. The "information" was addressed to the accused Federico Relucio who was then present together with Atty. Perez and two other persons not known to the witness. Then appellant Mangyo Velasco and two others unknown to the witness arrived. After these three arrived, "they (referring to "Relucio, Mangyo and the other two whom I do not know and I went to the Capital Theater". They went there "because Gonzalo Talastas was really to be killed." This, he was told by Relucio, for "according to Federico Relucio, Gonzalo Talastas was the one who killed his brother." He did not mention anything about any conversation among those present from which a conspiracy could be deduced.
Upon arriving at the Capital Theater, Pedring (Relucio) went inside, while the witness and Mangyo and the two others were in front of the bowling hall. Padrones said they were all armed, Relucio with a.45, Mangyo with a.38 caliber and a carbine, the other two with armalite and he (Padrones) with a.45, but there was no suggestion that they did so with the intent to kill anyone. Not long after Federico (Relucio) entered the theater, there were shots (he does not know how many). "Not long after, the late Gonzalo Talastas went outside of the theater with a wobbling motion (susuray-suray), and wounded . . in his chest portion (where there was) blood." Gonzalo ran going towards "hulo" (east). Not long thereafter, Federico Relucio followed also wounded.
Then, Mangyo (Velasco), the other two unknowns and Padrones "boarded a jeep and ... followed them (Talastas and Relucio) with us inside the jeep. " They followed them up to the Old Republic Telephone Company Building. Gonzalo "was running" and Relucio "boarded a tricycle, sir, following Gonzalo Talastas. " And when the witness and his companions were already in front of the Republic building, "Doon nga po pinagbabaril (si) Gonzalo Talastas. ... Mangyo and the other two whom I do not know and also Pedring, (Relucio) because Pedring arrived," were the ones who shot him, and Gonzalo died.
After the cross-examination of Padrones, the prosecution rested its case, asking for and securing at the same time, the dismissal of the case against the accused Dante Arriola as to whom the prosecutor did not unexplainedly present any evidence. At this point, it may be stated relatedly that Our review of the records of this case has revealed a number of other loose ends in the proceedings which warrant special attention. Indeed, what must have been a preconceived plan of the prosecution to save Padrones and to pin down appellant instead is quite evident. And worse, it was not without significant, if perhaps unwitting, assistance from the court.
Thus, having in view the testimony of Angeles We have discussed earlier, which had only a hazy reference to the supposed participation of appellant in the offense charged, and taking into account Exhibit 17, which the prosecution could not have been ignorant of, pointing to Padrones instead of said appellant as the one who chased and shot the deceased as the latter came out of Capital Theater, it is to be wondered how Padrones was selected as state witness. Moreover, from Padrones' own account, readily available beforehand to the prosecutor, he was with Relucio, who was the one who had the motive to do away with Gonzalo, earlier than appellant Velasco in the house of Atty. Perez, and there is no indication at all that before the group went to Capital Theater, appellant knew, unlike Padrones, that
Gonzalo was to be killed. To reiterate, there is no evidence that the killing of Talastas was ever talked about in the house of Atty. Perez.
In other words, the prosecution could easily have chosen other witnesses, even from among the other alleged participants in the affray, who appeared to have had minor parts therein, if not from the tricycle drivers who, from Padrones own account, must have seen what happened, and yet Padrones had to be the one allowed to go scot-free. Withal, the repeated references to unknown participants is unnatural. How could there be a conspiracy of the character charged in the information where four of the participants were not supposedly known to any of the witnesses who themselves are alleged to have been in the conspiracy? Why was Dante Ariola included in the information when there was absolutely no evidence against him? Why was Edri Pineda who was mentioned by Angeles in Exhibit 17 or Dante Ariola, who was also charged, not chosen instead? For that matter, why was Atty. Perez in whose house and in whose presence the plot to kill Talastas is alleged to have originated not among the accused?
All these questions and many more are intriguing, but the most mystifying circumstance extant in the record was the attitude of both the prosecution and the trial judge in regard to what appears clearly to be a statement given by Padrones to the Cabanatuan City police in the person of a certain Patrolman Corporal J. S. Viloria on October 5, 1972 immediately after he was arrested. This is the same statement, Annex A, on which the defense motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, the denial of which is the plaint in the fourth assignment of error of appellant's brief.
Counsel for accused Relucio started his cross-examination of Padrones by inquiring about the circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention which incontestably took place on October 5, 1972. The witness readily revealed that:
ATTY. ABESAMIS
q Immediately after your arrest you were placed in jail?
D.S. PROSECUTOR
Answered already, Your Honor.
COURT
Answer the question.
WITNESS
a No, sir.
ATTY. ABESAMIS
q Where were you first brought by the apprehending officers immediately after you were arrested in the afternoon of October 5, 1972?
a An investigation was made, sir, on any person.
q Who investigated you?
a Viloria, sir.
q Where?
a At the city hall, sir.
q In what part of the city hall did Viloria investigate you, please tell the Court?
a Downstairs at his table, sir.
COURT
(To witness) Speak louder.
ATTY. ABESAMIS
q This Viloria is also a member of the Cabanatuan City police force?
a Yes, sir.
q Who were present when you were investigated by Viloria?
a The two of us, sir.
q He was asking you questions?
a Yes, sir,
q And you were giving answers to the questions propounded by Viloria to you?
a Yes, sir.
q And Viloria was typing the questions propounded and the answers given by you?
a Yes, sir.
q And Viloria investigated you in connection with your anti-government activities?
a No, sir.
q In what connection were you investigated by Viloria?
a Regarding the case of Gonzalo Talastas, sir.
q Did you sign that written investigation?
a Yes. sir, I signed it.
q Also on October 5, 1972?
a I was brought before the presence of Judge Vicencio, sir.
q But you have not answered my question, Mr. Witness. My question to you was, did you sign that typewritten investigation conducted by Viloria also on October 5, 1972?
a Yes, sir, I signed it before the judge.
q On October 5, 1972?
a Yes, sir.
q You were escorted by armed policemen of Cabanatuan City when you were brought in connection with that written investigation before Judge Vicencio on October 5, 1972?
D.S. PROSECUTOR
It is very immaterial and irrelevant, Your Honor.
COURT
Answer the question.
WITNESS
a Yes, sir.
ATTY. ABESAMIS
q Who were those policemen who brought you to Judge Vicencio on October 5, 1972?
a They were two, sir.
q I am not asking you about the number; I am asking you who they were?
a One of them is Viloria and I do not know the other policemen who is old.
q Now, could you tell the Honorable Court the time when Viloria started investigating you on October 5?
a I cannot remember, sir.
q But it was night time?
a No, sir.
q But the investigation was conducted several hours after you were already apprehended by the three policemen headed by Pat. Adriano?
D.S. PROSECUTOR
It is vague, Your Honor.
ATTY. ABESAMIS
To obviate the objection, I will modify the question.
q How many hours after you were arrested were you investigated on October 5?
a The moment we arrived at the city hall I was investigated, sir. (t.s.n., pp. 66-70, hearing of January 4, 1973)
On the basis of such clear and categorical testimony about a statement signed by him before Judge Vicencio of the City Court on that date October 5, 1972, the defense counsel asked "the Honorable District State Prosecutor to produce the written investigation of this witness on October 5, 1972, if he has it in his possession." (p. 70, Id.) And to add to the basis for such request, there was the following manifestation of Atty. Pablo, counsel for Velasco:
ATTY. PABLO
May it please the Honorable Court.
Atty. Taguiam would be a witness to this statement of mine that in the first hearing of this case, Your Honor, Atty. Taguiam requested the District State Prosecutor to lend him the two affidavits executed by this witness and I reiterate that the first affidavit was dated October 5, and the second, October 20, 1972. After Atty. Taguiam has read this affidavit I was able to take hold of this affidavit and to read it. It was the District State Prosecutor who lent these two affidavits to Atty. Taguiam during the first hearing of this case.
(pp. 71-72, Id.)
Surprisingly, the reaction of the state prosecutor was negative, and the following exchange of words took place:
ATTY. ABESAMIS
Your Honor please, I would like to make it appear on record that when the recess was called by the Honorable Court in order to afford the District State Prosecutor to look over his records, he Was sorting out his records in connection with this case in order to look for the affidavit demanded of him to be produced by the defense. May we know from the Honorable District State Prosecutor what is the answer.
D.S. PROSECUTOR
I do not have any affidavit dated October 5, but with respect to the affidavit they want me to produce I want that that affidavit be described what is that.
ATTY. ABESAMIS
But Your Honor, it is already sufficiently described, the affidavit executed by this witness on October 5.
COURT
How about on October 20?
ATTY. PABLO
And December 14, Your Honor.
D.S. PROSECUTOR
I would not answer that, Your Honor, unless it is described.
ATTY. ABESAMIS
We would like to make it appear on record, Your Honor, by the actuation of the Honorable District State Prosecutor construes a suppression of the evidence, a suppression of a very vital evidence which the defense has been demanding pursuant to the rule on discovery as sanctioned under our rules of court.
We will proceed, Your Honor.
D.S. PROSECUTOR
May I state also a manifestation that it could not be suppression if it came from the mouth of this witness. The witness is present. You can ask him, so it could not (be) suppression of evidence. (pp. 73-75, Id.)
Then came the inexplicable ruling of the court:
COURT
Well those are manifestations only of counsel. You give the basis for the Court to compel the Fiscal to produce such document. Up to now there is no basis. I think, the Fiscal would want to describe that affidavit. He does not like to fish. All right, continue. (pp. 76,Id.)
Not only that, in its decision, the trial court reasoned out thus:
But it is not all rosy with the testimony of Miguel Padrones. Like all other witnesses of the same capabilities he suffers from a poor memory as regards remembering dates of events and faces of persons whom he occasionally saw and met. The records is replete of incidents showing the poor memory of the witness as regards the exact dates of events and the faces of persons he met. The following instances will show that while in the witness stand he was asked the following: 'Do you remember where were you on June 23, 1971 between the hours of four o'clock in the afternoon?' His answer was: 'I was in the residence of Atty. Perez.' It may be noted that June 23, 1971 was the date of the commission of the crime and the same date was included in the question. But when he was asked again on cross examination the date of the commission of the crime, he answered that he could not remember but if he would be allowed to refer to his affidavit he could answer the same. It was only when he was snowed to refer to his affidavit that he came to know that the crime was committed on June 23, 1971. Again, he was asked when on October 5 he was arrested, and he answered that he did not know other than that it was after lunch. There was much confusion with regard to the execution of the affidavit of Padrones on October 5. The Court believes that there was no such affidavit executed on October 5, 1971. The confusion came up only when Padrones was asked when he was arrested and he answered on October 5. In answer to the subsequent questions he answered that he was brought before Judge Alfin Vicencio, the city judge, now the Honorable Judge of the Court of First Instance of Masbate. Then the defense assumed in the following questions that the investigation took place on October 5 and that this affidavit was taken on the same date, to which the accused answered in the affirmative. Whether the accused realized the truth of his answer or not, the Court has its doubts, upon which it based its conclusion that this witness has a poor memory as to dates of events. Capitalizing on this weakness of the witness, the defense confined its cross examination on the several affidavits supposedly executed by Miguel Padrones on October 5 and 20. But Padrones denied vehemently that after that investigation of October 5 he made any affidavit except that given by him to Corporal Viloria on October 20, 1971, which the latter offered to show to the defense (referring to the affidavit of December 14, 1972). The District State Prosecutor also denied possession of the affidavit of October 5 of Miguel Padrones. The defense, to strengthen its position, manifested that the affidavit of October 5 was lost and that this could be confirmed by Atty.
Fidel Taguiam, counsel of one of the defendants; but Atty. Taguiam was never presented in court to confirm or deny the same. The Court honestly believes that there was no such affidavit ever executed on October 5, 1971 and that the witness might be referring to the affidavits executed by him on October 20, 1971 (Exhibit "2" Relucio) and on December 14, 1972 before the District State Prosecutor. To further Justify their actuations, the defense called on to the witness stand the former Cabanatuan City Judge Alfin Vicencio, now the presiding judge of one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Masbate. His Honor testified that he remembers one Miguel Padrones to have executed an affidavit before him on October 5, 1971, but that he had only a general Idea of its contents. The defense got what it wanted to get from the lips of His Honor, Judge Alfin Vicencio and i.e., that it was only accused Miguel Padrones who shot and killed the deceased victim Gonzalo Talastas when the latter caught up with him near the Retelco building. As a whole, His Honor wanted this Court to believe that only Miguel Padrones shot and killed Gonzalo Talastas and that his co-accused Federico Relucio and Rosendo Velasco were not with Padrones when he killed said deceased victim. To this testimony of His Honor, it is regrettable to state that he failed to state at least, all the substantial contents of the said affidavit, assuming that there was really an affidavit of October 5 executed by Miguel Padrones. Human as we all are, it is unavoidable for our minds to slip, particularly as regards the dates, considering the length of time and the work that confronted His Honor, the Honorable Alfin Vicencio. (Pp. 107-110, Appendix A, Appellant's Brief.)
Such ratiocination is strange, to say the least. The record shows that His Honor himself asked:
COURT
q Do you know the date when the statement was made?
a It was on the 5th, sir.
q Of October?
a Yes, sir.
COURT
Proceed. (t. t.s.n., p. 77, hearing of January 1973)
As can be seen, seemingly there was a deliberate and concerted intent to prevent the impeachment of Padrones, except that the prosecutor failed to realize that with his omission
to object to the testimony of Judge Vicencio, all his transparent moves to suppress the presentation of the statement of said witness of October 5, 1972 would come to naught. The record reveals only too plainly that several recesses were allowed by His Honor at critical stages of the cross-examination for the obvious purpose of affording the witness opportunity to adjust his testimony with the help of the prosecutor — that with his being already released after his discharge on January 4, 1972 — so much so that after the spirited skirmishes between defense counsel and the prosecutor when the session of January 4, 1972 was to end, the significance of which could not have been lost to him, at the resumption of the trial on February 12, 1972, the witness tried to sing a different tune. As to be expected, he came out with the theory that the statement given by him before Patrolman Corporal Viloria on October 5, 1972 was actually signed by him on October 19 or 20, 1972 before Fiscal del Rosario thus:
COURT:
Q Are you sure that your statement was taken on the 5th of October?
A Yes, sir.
Q So Sgt. Viloria has taken two affidavits from you?
A It was only on the 5th, sir.
Q How many times did that Sgt. Viloria taken your statement?
A It was only the time when I was apprehended, sir.
Q And when was that time when you were apprehended?
A On the 5th, sir.
Q Why is there now an affidavit subscribed and sworn to before Fiscal Del Rosario dated October 19?
A It was there at the City Court where I was made to sign my statement, sir.
Q When was that? Refer to your affidavit to refresh your memory,
A (Witness reads Exhibit" 2-A.") Maylaska question.
Q Read it all.
ATTY. PABLO:
May we make of record that the State Prosecutor is instructing the witness to read the contents of the statement before the witness could be guided by this Honorable Court that he read the said affidavit.
COURT:
Now what is your question, Mr. Padrones?
A Because, this morning I was being asked by them whether I was made to sign before Viloria, but they are not asking me whether I have signed before the Fiscal, sir.
Q What do you mean? Explain further.
A Only about that question whether I was made to sign before Viloria that is why I answered yes. But it was not asked of me whether I was made to sign before Fiscal Del Rosario, sir.
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
Q So you mean to tell the Honorable Court is that your affidavit dated October 5,1972 was signed before Police Cpl. Viloria?
A It was only before the city hall that I affixed may signature, sir.
Q Precisely that affidavit of yours dated October 5, 1972 was signed by you before Judge Vicencio, is that correct?
A Before Del Rosario, sir.
Q So the affidavit dated October 5, 1972, for purposes of clarification only, Your Honor, was signed by you before Fiscal Del Rosario?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that affidavit which you signed before Judge Vicencio and that is included in your cross examination before on January 4, 1973?
A It came from the City Court, sir.
Q That was not on October 5, 1972?
A I do not know, sir, whether it was the one.
COURT:
Q The question is what is that affidavit that you subscribed and swore to before Judge Vicencio, if you have any?
A I do not remember that affidavit, sir. What I remember I only signed before Fiscal Del Rosario, sir.
Q So you do not recall having signed any statement before Judge Vicencio?
A In the City Court I do not remember having signed any affidavit before Judge Vicencio, sir.
Q In any other place do you remember having signed any affidavit before Judge Vicencio?
A None, sir.
Q You are sure?
A I remember nothing, sir.
Q You do not remember or you do not even recall that you were presented before Judge Vicencio by Police Cpl. Viloria?
PROSECUTOR:
We request that the witness be shown any statement to that effect, if there is any.
COURT:
He is testing the credibility of the witness.
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
Q When you testified here on January 4, 1973 you said following which I am reading from the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during January 4, 1973 hearing ...
PROSECUTOR:
It seems the witness is confused about his affidavit.
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
The witness, Your Honor, is not confused; the witness is lying.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
I will read from your testimony during the trial of January 4, 1973, specifically the questions and answers found on page 68, which I quote:
In what connection were you investigated by Viloria?
A. Regarding the case of Gonzalo Talastas, sir.
Q. Did you sign that written investigation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Also on October 5, 1972?
A. I was brought before the person of Judge Vicencio, sir.
Q. But you have not answered my question. My question to you was, did you sign that typewritten of Viloria also on October 5, 1972?
A. Yes, sir, he signed it before the judge.
Q. On October 5, 1972?
A. Yes, sir.
And Your Honor, on page 76, 1 read the following questions and answers:
Q. Who was carrying the typewritten investigation when you were brought before the judge on October 5,1972?
A. Viloria, sir.
Q. After coming from the place of Judge Vicencio who was carrying that statements?
A. Viloria also, sir.
Q My question now, Mr. Witness, is will you insist that you were never brought before Judge Vicencio in order to swear, to sign and to subscribe your statement in connection with this case since the beginning?
A I do not remember, sir. What I remember is I signed it before Fiscal Del Rosario, sir.
COURT:
Q Then why did you assure counsel for the defense before the court that you were presented before Judge Vicencio, during our hearing of January 4, 1973?
A I do not remember having been asked that question, sir.
Q It was asked of you and the court also remembers that question asked of you. Will you now insist that you were never brought before Judge Vicencio in connection with this case?
A I cannot comprehend the question, sir.
Q What do you not comprehend?
A Regarding that point that I was brought before the judge, sir.
Q But when you were asked by counsel about that fact on January 4, 1973 your mind was clear then, is it not?
A I do not remember whether I was brought before Judge Vicencio, sir.
Q You know very well Judge Vicencio before that date?
A I know him to be in the City Court, sir. He was being pointed to me by the police, sir.
Q My question is do you know Judge Vicencio personally before that date'!
A Yes, sir.
Q What about Fiscal Del Rosario, you know him also personally
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Continue.
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
We request also, Your Honor, that pages 68 and 69 of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the trial dated January 4, 1973 be marked as Exhibit '3 Impeachment-Relucio' and the bracketed portion be marked as Exhibit '3-A-Impeachment-Relucio.'
COURT:
Mark it. (t.s.n., pp. 23-31, hearing of February 12, 1973)
His Honor continued asking questions as the witness was already faltering, until finally, to save him, the session was adjourned:
Q What day were you arrested?
A On a Friday, sir.
Q That was on October 5, 1972?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, that coming Monday you were brought before Fiscal Del Rosario?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you remember if you signed this affidavit before Fiscal Del Rosario?
A It was only the statement which I swore to that I remember, sir.
Q Did you see Fiscal Del Rosario sign his name?
A Yes, sir.
Q You do not remember if you signed the affidavit before Fiscal Del Rosario?
A I signed, sir.
Q What pen did you use? The pen of Fiscal Del Rosario or some other kind of pen?
A I do not remember whether I used the same pen used by the Fiscal, sir. I remember only that I borrowed a ball pen placed on the table of the Fiscal, sir.
Q But you said you signed that statement of yours before Policeman Viloria, do you recall that now?
A I do not remember whether I was able to sign that or not, sir.
Q Are you tired already?
A My head is aching, sir.
COURT:
All right, we will adjourn this hearing and continue tomorrow, as previously scheduled. At any rate it is already twelve o'clock noon. (pp. 35-36, Id.)
At this point, it must be noted that Exhibit 2-A, the statement which Padrones claimed above to have been admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but, supposedly signed by him later and not on the same day before Judge Vicencio as he had previously stated, bears the following heading:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES y ESPEJO SA PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J. S. VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-19 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA IKA 5:15 NG HAPON...
and ends with the following jurat:
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 20 ng Oktubre 1972, dito sa Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.
With the dates October 19 and 20 thus appearing in this statements, how could there be any proximity to the truth in the assertion of Padrones that his statement was first taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 and that it was signed by him before Fiscal del Rosario on October 19, 1972 and that it was the very statement he had been referring to earlier as having been signed by him before Judge Vicencio?
And then, at the session of February 13, 1972, he tried to foist upon the court another theory:
COURT:
I was the one asking questions yesterday to the witness. Let me finish my questioning of this witness.
Q So that the court understands from you that you have only executed two affidavits in connection with this case, one was taken from you by Cpl. Viloria of the Cabanatuan City police department; and the second was taken before District State Prosecutor Copuyoc, is that right?
A No, sir, it is on the 19 th; the third is on the 4th.
Q So you have three affidavits taken in connection with this case, is that it?
A The one taken by Viloria which was subscribed before Fiscal Del Rosario, sir.
Q Yes, and the other one taken is that one taken by Fiscal Copuyoc?
A Yes, sir.
Q I did not mention any dates, remember.
A Yes, sir.
Q I repeat again. Your mind is not yet confused this morning?
A Yes, sir.
Q The first affidavit was taken before Cpl. Viloria of the city police and subscribed and sworn to before Fiscal Del Rosario?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the second was the one executed before District State Prosecutor?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have not executed any other affidavit in connection with this case before any administering officer?
A None, sir.
COURT:
Continue.
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
Q In answer to a question propounded by the Honorable Court you said that your third affidavit was on the 4th, do you remember having said that?
A It was here that I swore, sir.
Q To an affidavit?
A Being a witness, sir.
Q So when you executed a third affidavit on the 4th you merely refer to your declaration made in open court on January 4, 1973?
A I cannot comprehend very well what is affidavit, sir.
Q Did you make a written statement in connection with this case on the 4th?
COURT:
Fourth of what?
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
Q On the 4th of your testimony?
COURT:
Fourth of what month? Be specific, let us be fair with the witness, especially with his kind of mentality. (t.s.n., pp. 38-41, hearing of Feb. 12, 1973.)
Only to fall back at the trial on February 19, 1973 on his original version that Viloria accompanied him before Judge Vicencio:
ATTY. ABESAMIS:
q You having stated before this Honorable Court on January 4, 1973 under oath that you were accompanied by Viloria in order to swear to one of your statements and another policeman whom you do not know, will you still insist that you were never accompanied by Viloria?
a When I signed before Fiscal del Rosario, Viloria was not with me, sir.
q When was Viloria with you?
a It was on the 5th, sir.
q Before whom?
a Before Judge Vicencio, sir.
q Where?
a In the city jail, sir. (pp. 13, 14, Id.)
We have taken pains to quote above several portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in the court below even at the risk of unduly extending this opinion — and there are actually many more of similar tenor that can be mentioned — in order to bring out in bold relief how Padrones, the state witness who was freed from prosecution by the fiscal and the trial court played fast and loose with the truth in the course of his lengthy testimony. How unfounded indeed is His Honor's laudation of Padrones in the decision under review to the following effect:
This Court has been extra careful in the analysis and appreciation of the evidence in question, particularly that of the two principal witnesses for the prosecution, namely: Crispin Angeles and Miguel Padrones. The latter having been discharged as prosecution witness he cannot escape, of course, like all accused similarly situated the imputation that he was allowed to be discharged from the information only for one basic reason, i.e., to escape criminal responsibility. The discharge of one or two accused is allowed by law in consideration of justice and truth with the injunction to the discharged accused to testify to the truth and run the risk only of being recalled and included in the information again should he refuse to live up to his commitment to the prosecution. That injunction is the consideration that compels the discharged accused to toe the line. Nevertheless, the Court has been scrupulously and judiciously wary over the conduct, behavior and testimonies of this particular witness, Miguel Padrones. Even his means of walking from the place where he was seated to the witness stand and his return to his seat
did not escape the vigilance of this court. As Padrones was called to the witness stand for several times the Court observed that he walked in a natural manner, as if he was to face nobody. He answered the questions immediately if he understood them and if he did not he asked the interpreter to repeat the same; he answered the questions without hesitation or nervousness. In fine, he took everything in his stride, and one noticeable behavior which he has shown the Court was when he answered questions the said witness looked straight to the Court and lowered his eyes only after he has answered the same. This Court went further into his educational attainment and he admitted he was only a second grader. He made no bones about his educational background. The Court believes he has acquired a very low standard of education, otherwise, he would not be a willing tool of the accused Federico Relucio who, together with him in that afternoon of June 23, 1971 purposely went to the Capital theater to kill Gonzalo Talastas. He showed his blind loyalty to Relucio as a friend, if the Court were to believe the theory of the defense. But, of course, the testimonies of Relucio and his wife on this point were of doubtful efficacy. According to the defense and this is admittedly true, Miguel Padrones was a member of the BSDU and at one time a security guard. As person belonging to a unit of the BSDU was fighting the dissidents, while being a security guard helps the police authorities to maintain peace and order in a given place, so that by the nature of the work of Miguel Padrones, he is working for, with and by the side of the law. Notwithstanding his low educational attainment there was not even a record of conviction offered by either the prosecution or defense. Under these circumstances attributed to the same witness, what more can a court of justice expect from an ignorant and sincere witness like Miguel Padrones? (Appellant's Brief, pp. 104-106.)
Such unusually elaborate but obviously unmerited encomium given a discharged state witness could have no other purpose than to induce the appellate court to reply implicitly on the findings in the decision.
There is more than meets the eye here in the actuations of the district state prosecutor who handled the case for the People, and regrettably, the trial court was apparently carried away by his antics to the point that His Honor came to seemingly join in the effort to concoct the obvious falsehood that Padrones did not swear to a statement about the incident in question before Judge Vicencio on October 5, 1972. Judge Vicencio was city judge then of Cabanatuan City and at the time of the trial was already presiding in the Court of First Instance of Masbate. He declared under oath:
Atty. Abesamis
Q Sir, you said that you are the encumbent CFI judge of Masbate, when did you assume that office?
A I assumed office on May 21, 1973 and I took my oath on May 16, sir.
Q Before that date Sir what was your occupation?
A I was the city judge of Cabanatuan City presiding over Branch 1, sir.
Q On October 5, 1972 were you still the City judge of Cabanatuan City presiding over Branch I of the said court?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as City judge of Cabanatuan City on October 5, 1972 it was your duty to administer all oaths of affiants on their respective statements is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, sir, I would like to inform you that a certain Miguel Padrones alias Ige testified before this Honorable Court as a witness for the prosecution on January 4, 1973 and among others, he said the following: that he was arrested by the Cabanatuan City Police Department on October 5, 1972 in the afternoon thereof; that he was formally investigated by the police department of Cabanatuan City and that his statement was taken by a certain Cpl. Julio S. Viloria on the same date October 5, 1972 — page 68 of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Miguel Padrones on January 4, 1973. After Padrones made that declaration before the Honorable Court, the defense asked for the production of that affidavit which he allegedly executed on October 5, 1972 but the Honorable District State Prosecutor said that he did not have it in his possession and the manifestation of the District State Prosecutor is page 71 of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the same hearing. He likewise stated that he signed his affidavit of October 5, 1972 on the same date before you. However, during the hearing of February 12, 1973 before this Honorable Court the same Padrones declared under oath that Ms affidavit dated October 5, 1972 was signed by him before Fiscal del Rosario of the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cabanatuan City pages 25-26 of the transcript of the stenographic notes, February 12, 1973, and he said categorically that he does not remember having signed any statement before Judge Vicencio in the city court nor in any other place for that matter page 26 t.s.n. February 12, 1973 which we have exerted efforts to locate that alleged statement of Miguel Padrones executed on October 5, 1972 but we failed to do so. Now, on the basis of this will you please tell us sir whether or not on October 5, 1972 a certain Miguel Padrones alias Ige had appeared before you in order to swear to a statement given by him before Cpl. Viloria on the mm date October 5, 1972?
A I remember this Miguel Padrones accompanied by policeman Viloria and del Rosario. They went to my residence at Gen. Tinio street and they sat in the terrace of my residence. It was there when I asked to administer the oath to Mr. Padrones, sir.
Q That was sir in the afternoon of October 5, 1972?
A It was late in the afternoon of that date, sir.
Q Now since that affidavit could not be retrieved and could not be found despite efforts exerted by the defense to look for the same, can you tell us sir the contents in brief of that statement of Miguel Padrones alias 'Ige'?
A I can give you a general Idea of the statement, sir.
Q Yes, sir, please state.
A Padrones stated among others that he is Ige mentioned in a warrant of arrest with respect to the death of a certain Gonzalo Talastas. I believe it was then that he stated that Gonzalo Talastas shot a certain Federico Relucio inside the Capital theater and that, he, Padrones chased this Talastas along Burgos Avenue and caught up with him in front of the former Retelco office at Burgos Avenue and then he shot this Talastas, sir.
Q What else did he state in that statement?
A Well that is the general idea that I recall that he chased Talastas and he shot him until he died, sir.
Q Did Padrones state in that affidavit where he left Federico Relucio after Relucio was shot by Talastas inside the Capital theater and after Padrones had chased Gonzalo Talastas?
A I do not remember Padrones having made any statement except that according to him, Talastas shot Federico Relucio inside the Capital theater and that on his part, he chased Talastas along Burgos Avenue caught up with him in front of the former Retelco office that is the residence of the late Judge Cecilio then he shot Talastas, sir.
Q Did Padrones as far as you could recall mention in that affidavit his companions in chasing and shooting Gonzalo Talastas?
A I do not remember any other name except him, Talastas and Relucio. Those are the names that I remember.
Q Do you remember if Padrones had ever mentioned in that statement of his the name of Rosendo Velasco alias "Mangyo"?
A No, sir, I do not remember that he ever mentioned.
Atty. Abesamis:
That is all, your honor.
Court:
Cross
Fiscal:
No cross examination, your honor.
(t.s.n., pp, 28-35, hearing. of July 25, 1973.)
For the trial court to hold in its decision under review, in the face of this solemn testimony of a fellow member of the judiciary of equal rank, as against the wavering and fast changing declarations of a discharged accused, that "it is regrettable to state that he (Judge Vicencio) failed to state at least the substantial contents of said affidavit, (the statement of Padrones before him of October 5, 1972) assuming that there was really an affidavit of October 5 executed by Miguel Padrones. Human as we all are, it is unavoidable for our minds to slip particularly as regards the dates, considering the length of time and the work that confronted His Honor, the Honorable Alfin Vicencio" is purely a slanted rationalization and an unexcusable display of uncommon naivety truly unbecoming of a judicial trier of facts. This observation is also justified by His Honor's own admission that:
But it is not all rosy with the testimony of Miguel Padrones. Like all other witnesses of the same capabilities he suffers from a poor memory as regards remembering dates of events and faces of persons whom he occasionally saw and met. The records is replete of incidents showing the poor memory of this witness as regards the exact dates of events and the faces of persons he met. The following instances will show that while in the witness stand he was asked the following: 'Do you remember where were you on June 23, 1971 between the hours of four o'clock and five o'clock in the afternoon?' His answer was: 'I was in the residence of Atty. Perez.' It may be noted that June 23, 1971 was the date of the commission of the crime and the same date was included in the question. But when he was asked again on cross-examination the date of the commission of the crane, he answered that he could not remember but if he would be allowed to refer to this affidavit he could answer the same. It was only when he was allowed to refer to this affidavit that he came to know that the crime was committed on June 23, 1971. Again, he was asked when on October 5 he was arrested, and he answered that he did not know other than that it was after lunch. (Appellant's Brief, p. 107).
In other words, His Honor could excuse the supposed lapse of memory of a discharged accused, while he would condemn a supposedly similar fault in the testimony of a judge.
We hold that, contrary to the unwarranted and incomprehensible finding of His Honor, the evidence on record conclusively establishes that Padrones did give to Patrolman Corporal Viloria of the Cabanatuan City Police on October 5, 1972 immediately after his arrest, his own account of what happened in the afternoon of June 23, 1971 at the Capital Theater and subsequently near the Old Republic Telephone Company in Cabanatuan City that led to the death of Gonzalo Talastas and that he signed and swore to said statement before Judge Alfin Vicencio, then of the City Court of Cabanatuan City, that same day to whom he was brought by the same Patrolman Corporal Viloria. We consider the attitude shown in the premises by District State Prosecutor Mariano D. Copuyoc of feigning ignorance of Annex A and attempting to foist upon the court the theory that Exhibit 2-A was the one given by Padrones on October 5, 1972, to be lacking in candor to the court and prejudicial to the interests of justice. Likewise, the circumstances under which Exhibit 2-A, the supposed statement of Padrones bearing two dates, October 19 or 20, 1972, and supposedly signed before Fiscal del Rosario, came into being need to be inquired into, there being indications from the circumstances We have found home by the record that it is not of regular origin. We further
hold that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving due course to the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the defense dated April 16, 1974, if only for the purpose of delving deeper into the execution of Annex A thereof, which appears to be the statement given by Padrones on October 5, 1972 to Patrolman Corporal Viloria and which he signed and swore to before Judge Vicencio, wherein Padrones categorically confessed that he, and not appellant Velasco, was the one who chased and shot to death Gonzalo Talastas during the incident here in question, thus:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES Y ESPEJO SA PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J S VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG KABANATUAN NGAYON IKA 5 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA IKA 5:15 NG HAPON... .
01. TANONG: Ito ay isang pagsisisyasat ipinaaalata ko saiyo ang iyong karapatan na itinatadhana ng Saligang Batas ng Bansang Pilipino na ang sino man ay hindi maaaring piliting magbigay ng ano mang pahayag at kung magbibigay man ay maaari namang gamitin ng laban saiyo sa alin mang Hukuman, ikaw ba ay handang sumagot sa mga itatanong saiyo?
SAGOT: Opo.
02. T: Ano ang iyong pangalan at iba pang pagkakailanlan saiyo?
S: MIGUEL PADRONES Y ESPEJO, 43 taon, may-asawa, manggagawa sa NIA, Talipapa, Kabanatuan.
03. T: Ano ang iyong palayaw?
S: IGI po.
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan al narito ka sa Himpilan ng Pulis?
S: Ako po ay kasalukuyang napipiit sa isang usapin.
05. T: Aling asunto ang iyong kinasasangkutan?
S: Iyon pong pagkapatay kay ALONG.
06. T: Kailan napatay si ALONG?
Buan po ng Hunyo 1971.
07. T: Saang lugar napatay si ALONG?
S: Duon po sa Burgos, Kabanatuan malapit sa dating "Republic Telephone".
08. T: Papaano napatay si ALONG?
S: Sa barilan po.
09. T: Sino ang tao o mga taong kabarilan ni ALONG?
S: Ako po.
10. T: Maliban sa iyo, wala na bang iba pang tao o mga taong kasama sa pakikipagbarilan kay ALONG?
S:. Wala na po.
11 T: Isalaysay mo nga ang buong pangyayari .
S: Si RELUCIO at saka ako ay nagpunta sa bahay ni Atty. PEREZ sa Gen. Tinio, Kabanatuan at pagdating namin duon ay nabalitaan ni RELUCIO na si ALONG ay nasa loob ng cine 'Capital'.
12 T: Sa nabalitaan ni RELUCIO na tungkol kay ALONG ano pa ang nangyari, kung mayroon man?
S: Inaya po ako ni RELUCIO at sumakay kami sa tricycle at nagpunta kami sa malapit sa cine 'Capital'.
13. T: Nuong dumating kayo sa may cine 'Capital ano ang inyong ginawa?
S: Pumasok si RELUCIO sa cine samantalang ako ay naghintay sa labas ng cine.
14. T: Nuong makapasok si RELUCIO sa loob ng cine Capital ano ang nangyari?
S: Hindi po nagtagal ay nagkaroon ng mga putok sa loob ng cine.
15 T: Matapos kang makarinig ng mga putok ano ang iyong nakita?
S: Lumabas po si ALONG.
16. T: Saan nagtuloy si ALONG?
S: Nagtatakbo po siyang patungong hulo.
17. T: Ano pa ang nangyari nuong tumakbo si ALONG?
S: Sinundan ko po si ALONG sa pamamagitan ng paghabol sa kanya.
18. T: Inabutan mo ba si ALONG?
S: Inabutan ko po sa malapit sa dating Tanggapan ng 'Republic Telephone'.
19 T: Ano ang nangyari ng abutan mo si ALONG?
S: Nagbarilan po kami.
20. T: Ano ang baril ni ALONG ?
S: 45 calibre po.
21. T: Matapos ang putukan saan ka nagtuloy?
S: Umuwi na po ako sa amin.
22. T: Si ALONG ano ang ayos ng iyong iwan?
S: Patay na po.
23. T: Ano ba ang nagudyok sa iyo upang ipahayag sa akin ang iyong salaysay na ito?
S: Gusto ko pong maliwanagan ninyo ang pangyayari sa pagkamatay ni ALONG.
24. T: Ano ang ipinamaril mo kay ALONG?
S: Carbine at calibre 45 po.
24. T: Wala na akong itatanong mayroon ka pang nais sabihin?
S: Wala na po.
25. T: Lalagdaan mo at panunumpaan ang inyong salaysay na ito patotoo at pagpapatibay sa iyong sinabi?
S: Opo.
(Nilagdaan) MIGUEL PADRONES
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 5th ng Oktubre, 1972, sa Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.
(Nilagdaan) ALFIN VICENIO City Judge (Pp. 509-610, Record.)
Indeed, in the light of all the foregoing, We can safely say that with the testimony of Judge Vicencio, the evidence against appellant Velasco coming from the lips of Padrones is not entitled to any credit at all. And there is even no need for the new trial prayed for by the defense. In the premises, such a proceeding would obviously be superfluous.
- 3-
With the disgusting character of the prosecution's evidence against herein appellant Velasco We have disclosed above, and Our ineludible conclusions against the evidentiary value of the testimonies of Crispin Angeles and the discharged defendant Miguel Padrones, it goes without saying that the charge of murder against said appellant has no leg to stand on. Accordingly, We find no need to elucidate on the other evidence on record, which, to be sure, based on Our careful study thereof could absolve him just the same, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment of conviction of the trial court, for lack of any evidence to support the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court under review is hereby reversed and the appellant Rosendo Velasco is acquitted and ordered immediately released from custody unless there is any reason for his further detention other than this case, with the corresponding portion of the costs de officio. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija, for their information and guidance relative to the actuations of Special District Prosecutor Copuyoc and Fiscal del Rosario discussed in the above opinion.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44680 January 11, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.DOMINADOR MOLO, defendant-appellant.
Pedro Q. Quadra (Counsel de Oficio) for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Reynato & Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Automatic review of the death sentence with accessory penalties imposed on September 3, 1976 upon accused-appellant Dominador Molo by Hon. Job B. Mandayag of the Court of First Instance of Romblon, 11th Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. 571 for the murder of Venancio Gapisa on 9 April 1976 at Sitio Dacotan, Barrio Tambac, Romblon, Romblon.
The above-named accused was charged with murder in an Information filed by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Cesar M. Solis, on May 31,1976, as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon accuses DOMINADOR MOLO of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of April 1976, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, at sitio Dacotan, barrio of Tambac municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault one Venancio Gapisa, with the use of a bolo as a consequence of which he sustained mortal injuries that resulted in his death thereafter.
That the killing was attended with the following aggravating circumstances:
(A) Dwelling, for the crime was committed in the house of the offended party who has not given any provocation at all.
(B) Recidivism in view of the fact that the accused has been charged for (1) Frustrated Murder before the Court of First instance of Mindoro in Criminal Case V-542 entitled People va. Dominador Molo and convicted thereof on September 2, 1950; and (2) Murder, before the Court of First Instance of Romblon in Criminal Case No. 862 entitled People vs. Dominador Molo and convicted thereof on July 27, 1961.
(C) Reiteration, since he has been charged and convicted before different courts in the following criminal cases:
(1) Grave Slander, before the Court of First Instance of Romblon in Criminal Case No. V-669 and convicted on June 5, 1957.
(2) Less Serious Physical Injuries, before the Municipal Court of Romblon, Romblon in Criminal Case No. 839 and convicted on October 9, 1959.
(3) Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, before the Municipal Court of Romblon, Romblon in Criminal Case No. 845 and convicted on February 25, 1960.
(4) Robbery, before the Court of First Instance of Davao in Criminal Case No. 9982 and convicted on March 1, 1967.
That as a consequence of the aforementioned act committed by the accused. the heirs of the deceased are entitled to recover civil damages pursuant to the provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Romblon, Romblon, May 31,1976.
(SGD.) CESAR M. SOLISAssistant Provincial Fiscal
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of — (1) the victim's wife, Simeona Gapisa, an eye-witness to the alleged murder; (2) Alejandro Gapisa, a son of the victim who went to the rescue of his father after he was stabbed by accuse-appellant and was able to talk with him before he succumbed to several bolo wounds; (3) Roman man a neighbor of Alejandro; and (4) Dr. Victorio Benedicto, who performed the autopsy and accomplished the Autopsy Report, Exhibits "A" and "A.1 The accused, who offered alibi as a defense, presented his testimony and that of his wife. Barbara Mingo, and Police Patrolman Rodolfo Manunggay and Exhibits 1, a bolo and 1-a, scabbard.
The operative facts of the case and the circumstances surrounding the apprehension and investigation of the accused now appellant established by the evidence on record are as follow.
In the evening of April 9, 1976 at about 8:00 p.m. at Sitio Dacotan, Barrio Tambac, Municipality of Romblon, Venancio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa, husband and wife, retired to sleep. The couple lived in a typical hut made of bamboo flooring and dilapidated burl walling surrounded by fruit. bearing banana plants. Venancio Gapisa immediately fell asleep because he was tired from clearing the fields, and besides, had drunk tuba on that day. He slept near the door lying on his right side. 1
Not long after the couple had retired, Simeona, who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing of teeth. Although she was seized by fear, she managed to peep through the dilapidated buri wall and saw accused Dominador Molo attired only in short pants. He was alone. Trembling, she immediately lighted a kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk nearby. She tried to awaken her husband, but the latter did not respond. 2
Meanwhile, the accused had already climbed up the house which was only a flight of two steps. The accused forcibly pushed the sliding door and barged into the house. He inquired from Simeona where Venancio was and she replied that he was asleep. Finding Venancio sleeping near the door, he immediately grabbed his left wrist and started hacking at the sleeping old man. Rudely awakened, Venancio quickly stood up and with his right hand reached for his bolo which was atop the table nearby; but he was not able to retaliate in as much as Dominador Molo was quick to hack at him again. Fearing for her own life, Simeona rushed out of the house through the door of the unfinished kitchen to summon help from her son, Alejandro Gapisa, who was at Roman Mangaring's house some 100 meters away. Trembling, she told him that his father was boloed by Boslo, the name by which accused-appellant was known in their locality. 3
Upon being informed, Alejandro and Roman ran towards the house of Venancio, followed by Simeona. Upon arrival, they saw Venancio bleeding profusely and in weakened condition. He was sitting on the floor of the kitchen, defecating in his pants. When Alejandro took him in his arms, Venancio told him that he was boloed by Boslo. Roman Mangaring who was present also inquired from Venancio who his assailant was and elicited the answer, "Boslo". 4 Venancio was then rushed to the hospital and arrived there at about 1:50 a.m. He expired a few minutes after. 5
An autopsy of the victim disclosed that he died of hemorrhage from multiple incised wounds. The wounds sustained were:
1. Incised wound, 10 cms. in length, gaping about 4 cms., slanting in position with the lower portion located anteriorly, penetrating the bone, at the anterolateral aspect of the distal 3rd of the left arm.
2. Incised wound, about 10 cms. in length, gaping, slanting in position, with the lower and located anteriorly, penetrating the bone, located 3 cms. below the wound mentioned above.
3. Incised wound, about 10 cms. in length, gaping slightly at the anterolateral aspect of the neck, left side, slanting, with the lower and located anteriorly penetrating the muscle layer.
4. Incised wound, about 10 cms. gaping, slightly slanting with the lower end located anteriorly, located 3 cms. below the 3rd wound, fracturing the clavicle, the costo-chondral portion of the 2nd rib and the lateral portion of the sternum, left side.
5. Incised wound, 8 cms. in length, gaping about 4 cms., slanting with the lower end located anteriorly, penetrating the bone, located at the lower end of the distal 3rd of the right arm, anterolateral portion.
6. Incised wound, 5 cms. in length, gaping slightly, slanting with the lower end located anteriorly, penetrating the bone, at the; upper 3rd of the right forearm, anterolateral aspect.
7. Incised wound, 4 cms., superficial, at the anterior portion of the neck,
8. Incised wound 4 cms., superficial, right medial aspect, upper 3rd, right forearm.
Internal Findings:
Wound No. 4 penetrated the apex of the left lung inflicting a small wound, about 2-3 cms. causing minimal bleeding.
The Cause of Death: Hemorrhage from multiple incised wounds. 6
The following morning an investigation of the fatal incident was conducted. Pat. Manuel Marino in the presence of Patrolmen Montojo and Antonio Madali took the statement of Simeona Gapisa, who Identified Dominador Molo as the assailant of her deceased husband. 7 Thereafter, PC soldiers and policemen were dispatched to the house of Dominador Molo some one and a half (1-1/2) kilometers away from the scene of the killing. Dominador Molo was placed under arrest and brought by the arresting officers to the poblacion. Investigated at the PC barracks, Molo denied having committed any wrong and having gone to the place of Venancio Gapisa. 8
On April 23, 1976, after additional statements of Alejandro Gapisa, Roman Mangaring and Florencio Guarte were secured, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Romblon. 9 The preliminary examination was conducted by Mayor Peter M. Montojo, for and in the absence of the municipal judge. Thereafter, he issued an order confirming the
detention of accused who was then detained in the Municipal jail of Romblon, there being "... reasonable ground to believe that the offense was committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 10 The accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. 11 On May 31, 1976, an information, as adverted to above, was filed against Molo accusing him of the crime of murder. 12
After trial, the court a quo — relying on the testimony of Simeona Gapisa who was an eye- and ear-witness to the incident and the corroborating testimonies of Alejandro Gapisa and Roman Mangaring, who testified on the antemortem statements of the victim Identifying accused as the assailant; discounting the defense of alibi put forth by the accused and his wife; appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, recidivism and reiteration alleged in the Information, and a mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, sentenced the accused on September 3, 1976, as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment finding accused Dominador Molo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, charged in the information and, since after off-setting the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender with the aggravating circumstance of either dwelling, recidivism or reiteration there remains two aggravating circumstances, sentencing him to suffer the supreme Penalty of death. He is further adjudged to pay the heirs of the deceased Venancio Gapisa, the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P 12,000), and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 13
Accused-appellant thru Atty. Pedro Q. Quadra, counsel de oficio now seeks acquittal on the basis of two assigned erors, to wit -
1. Appellant was convicted upon proof not beyond reasonable doubt;
2. Identification of the appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 14
1. In support of the first, he argues that while proof of motive is unnecessary if the evidence of Identification is convincing — citing People vs. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769; People vs. Portugueza, 20 SCRA 901; People vs. Jamero, 24 SCRA 206; and People vs. Guardo, 24 SCRA 851 — there is, he claims, a total want of motive on appellant's part, as admitted by the victim's wife, Simeona Gapisa, and son, Alejandro Gapisa. 15
2. In support of the second assigned error, appellant contents that his Identity as the assailant was not established beyond reasonable doubt, because of — (a) alleged inconsistencies and incredible assertions in Simeona's testimony; (b) physical conditions which rendered it impossible for her to recognized accused-appellant; (c) her alleged admission that she pointed to accuse-appellant as the assailant because he was a hated
criminal in their locality; and (d) that the so-called dying declarations should not have been accorded credence, because the victim could not have Identified his assailant. 16
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza - who was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato Puno and Solicitors Romeo S. dela Cruz - after refuting the foregoing assignment of errors submits the following conclusions as to the nature of the offense committed, the qualifying and aggravating circumstances that attended the commission thereof, and, that the accused is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, thus —
xxx xxx xxx
Since the attack was commenced while Venancio Gapisa was asleep and therefore he could not make a defense, the killing was attended with treachery. Treachery qualifies the killing into murder. (Article 248, Revised Penal Code).
Dwelling is an aggravating circumstance because the killing was done in the house of Venancio Gapisa who had not given provocation. (Art. 14 (3), Revised Penal Code).
Other aggravating circumstances are recidivism and reiteration. (Article 14, paragraphs 9 and 19, Revised Penal Code). Accused-appellant had been previously convicted of murder, frustrated murder, grave slander, less serious physical injuries, qualified trespass to dwelling and robbery. (pp. 10-12, tsn., July 12, 1976).
Accused-appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He did not surrender to the authorities. As admitted by him, he was arrested by a combined force of policemen and Philippine Constabulary agents at his residence the day after the killing. (p, 6, tsn., July 29,1976).
Since there are three aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty properly imposable upon accused-appellant is death. 17
and recommends that the finding of guilt for the offense of murder and the death sentence imposed upon appellant be affirmed in toto. 18
Now, to consider the merits of the alleged errors.
1. Re the claim that there is no proof of motive on appellant's part. This error may be subsumed under and/or discussed together with the second, since it admits that motive need not be shown where there is positive Identification, which, as We shall explain later, happened in this case. However, by way of traverse, We find the following observations of the Solicitor General well-taken, and therefore well worth adopting.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellee concedes that it has failed to show any motive of accused- appellant in killing Venancio Gapisa.
Both Simeona Gapisa and Alejandro Gapisa ventured robbery as the motive of accused-appellant (pp. 34, 44, tsn., July 12, 1976). They could not, however, state how much money was taken, from whom it was taken and how it was taken (pp. 34-38, 44-45, tsn., July 12,1976).
Lest it be thought that Simeona Gapisa and Alejandro Gapisa gave false testimony, thus rendering themselves untrustworthy witnesses, it should be pointed out that when they mentioned robbery as the possible motive of accused-appellant, Alejandro Gapisa made it clear that was only his "surmise" (p. 34, tsn., July 12, 1976) while Simeona Gapisa qualified her assertion with the word "maybe" (p. 44, tsn., July 12, 1976). They were not committal or categorical about the matter.
Aside from robbery, there was no other possible motive of accused-appellant. Both Simeona Gapisa and Alejandro Gapisa admitted that accused-appellant had no grudge against Venancio Gapisa and his family and vice-versa (pp. 33-34, 53-54, tsn., July 12, 1976).
But even in the absence of proof of motive, the conviction of accused- appellant can stand inasmuch as he had been positively Identified by Simeona Gapisa and by the deceased himself through his dying declaration. Motive need not be shown when there is positive Identification. (People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172). 19
xxx xxx xxx
2. Re the contention that his Identity as assailant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
(a) That there are inconsistencies and incredible assertions in Simeona's testimony.Simeona Gapisa — who was present when accused-appellant attacked her husband Venancio with a bolo — testified on direct and re-direct examinations by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Cesar M. Solis and on cross and recross examinations by Atty. Alexander Mortel, counsel de oficio of accused, thus —
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Solis:
Q — By the way, when you first heard the unusual sound since you were still awake, what did you do?
A — I lighted a lamp, I first looked at him by peeping thru the wall of our house and once I had recognized his face as that of Dominador Molo I lighted a lamp.
Q — Was it only the face of Dominador Molo that you recognized outside?
A — Yes, and he was alone.
Q — What about his body, did you recognize that body belong to Dominador Molo?
A — I could see and that was the very body of his including his face because it was bright.
Q — What provides the brightness that allowed you to recognize him outside the house?
A — The moon was bright.
Q — Now, aside from the unusual murmuring sound, did you hear the sound of grinding teeth?
A — In fact that was what he had done he was murmuring and at the same time sounding like grinding teeth.
Q — Now, after you lighted a lamp what else did you do inside?
A — I stood up and stepped back because he had come up into the house.
Q — Did you not wake up your husband?
A — I had but he did not notice.
Q — Now, what did you do with the lamp after you lighted it?
A — I placed it on top of our trunk which was towards our head.
Q — Now, how did you know that Dominador had gone up the house?
A — Because I saw him going up into our house.
Q — When he went up the house, what did he do?
A — Once up the house he held my husband by the arm and suddenly pulled out his bolo from his back and hacked him. 20
xxx xxx xxx
Q — How long have you known him?
A — Since he was a boy and until he grew up.
Q — By the way, by what affiliation (sic, should be appelation or name) is he known in your locality?
A — Boslo.
Q — If that Dominador Molo the accused in this case known as Boslo is present in the court room, will you be able to point him out in the court?
A — He is here he is the one sitting.
Q — Could you not be mistaken?
A — That is true, it was his very appearance who is looking up in the ceiling. 21
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Mortel:
Q — Nevertheless, because the moon was a quarter moon only that night April 9 the illumination any object that could be seen is quite pale not so bright as if there was an alladin lamp, correct?
A — Yes.
Q — And as a matter of fact when this person whom you said was making murmuring sounds when you peeped through your window he was being illuminated by the beam of the light of the moon and his face seems to be a yellowish and as clear as if there is an alladin lamp, correct?
A — But I know that he was the very one I recognized his face and he is far from the banana plantation and the Moon lights very well on him.
Q — When the moon lighted very well on him his color was yellowish was it not?
A — It was indeed his appearance that I saw and that is exactly how he looked.
Q — And When you looked at him the first time that night he looked lie Dominador Molo?
A — It was his very own appearance, his appearance never changed.
Q — And when you saw him you lighted a lamp, is that right?
A — I lighted a lamp because he was already there and I was afraid of what he had done to us.
Q — You mean from the very first time that you saw him he was making murmuring sounds you were already afraid that he would do something bad against you and your husband?
A — Yes, I was already afraid and my skin seemed to shiver. 22
xxx xxx xxx
Q — And so when your husband was or rather when your house that night of April 19 was entered into by a person making murmuring sounds outside and boloed to death your husband there was no other conclusion that you made but that it must be Boslo the killer?
A — Yes, in fact he was the very one it was his very looks. 23
Fiscal Solis:
Q — And who pushed open that door of yours, was it Dominador Molo or a witch?
A — He was Dominador Molo, it was his very looks of the same person who pushed the shutter of the door.
Q — What made you sure that the looks of that person was the one who pushed open the door and went inside and hacked your husband?
A — He was the one it was his very looks and I saw that it is his looks.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — Now, what is this basis for positively telling us that is Dominador Molo who killed your husband was it because of rumor circulating in the locality of Cogon and that the assailant as to be Dominador Molo because he has killed or because you saw then Dominador Molo committing the act against your husband?
A — Not only what was given to me by way of information from other people but because of what I actually saw with my eyes. 24
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Mortel:
Q — Now, according to you when the door was pushed open the person entered and he has the looks of that fellow whom you are pointing to as Dominador Molo, is that correct?
A — He is the very one.
Q — And not only that person who entered the looks of that Dominador Molo the accused in this case but
he also has the height that looks like the height of Dominador Molo, is that correct?
A — Yes and he had his shirt off and shorts on.
Q — And he has that looks and built of Dominador Molo, is that correct?
A — Yes, that is his very appearance and could not be altered anymore. 25
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant contents that inconsistencies exist between Simeona's statement given to the police and her foregoing testimony in court, relative to — 1) the precise moment when Simeona recognized the accused, 26 and 2) whether there was a conversation between Simeona and the accused. 27
The records show, however, that the alleged statement given to the police was neither offered as evidence nor shown to witness in order to enable her to explain the discrepancies if any in accordance to Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The proper bast was, therefore, not laid to impeach Simeona's testimony on the basis of alleged inconsistent statements which she allegedly made before the police. 28
At any rate, We find the alleged inconsistencies inconsequential. Inconsistencies on minor details or on matters that are not of material consequence as to affect the guilt or the innocence of the accused do not detract from the credibility of the witnesses. 29 The discordance in their testimonies on collateral matters heightens their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed. 30 Far from being evidence of falsehood, they could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of good faith. 31
It is also contended that the testimony of Simeona contains inconsistent averments. According to accused-appellant Simeona claimed that she was able to Identify him because of the lamp which was then lighted but that she also declared that the light was put out when the door was opened because of the sudden gust of wind. 32 To support this contention, he quoted Simeona's testimony:
Q — And when the door was pushed open there was a sudden gust of wind that entered the house, correct?
A — There was a consequence of the sudden entry.
Q — And with that sudden entry and gust of wind carried by this fellow the light was snuffed out, correct?
A — Yes. (P. 51, tsn., July 12,1976).
A review of the transcript of the testimony shows that the foregoing is an inaccurate representation of Simeona's testimony. For she clarified that her husband was already boloed before the light was snuffed out. Thus, she testified on cross-examination:
Atty. Mortel:
Q — And with that sudden entry and gust of wind carried by that fellow the light was snuffed out, correct?
A — Yes.
Q — And in the darkness inside this fellow who entered the house began stabbing and boloing your husband, correct?
A — My husband was already boloed when the light was put out because upon entrance he instantly took hold of my husband's arm and started hacking him all over. 33
xxx xxx xxx
On re-direct examination, she declared —
Fiscal Solis:
Q — Now, you admitted on cross examination that the lamp was put out now how were you able to know that your husband had attempted to hold his bolo with his right hand and while in that position he was hacked twice by a bolo by the accused Dominador Molo?
A — That stage occurred when the light was still on so it was still bright. 34
Appellant also alleges that her testimony contains incredible assertions, i.e. that it was very unusual that she remained silent while witnessing the attack on her husband. 35
But the transcripts show that appellant's own counsel below, Atty. Alexander Mortel, during the cross-examination, provided the answer to this misgiving :
xxx xxx xxx
Q — When the door was pushed open did you not shout?
A — No, because I was afraid.
Q — Afraid of what?
A — I was afraid because I did not shout for fear that he might bolo me.
Q — You were tongue-tied?
A — Yes.
Q — Because of fear?
A — Yes.
Q — Terrible fear?
A — Yes, it was terrible fear because my body trembled .
Q — To such extent that you were shocked?
A — Yes. 36
Appellant also argues that Simeona's account is contrary to physical facts. He claims that if, as she testified, the victim was lying down when attacked, he would sustain stab, not incised wounds. He explains that the natural tendency of a person attacking another who is lying down with a bolo would be to thrust the bolo towards the body and not hack him. 37 This claim is without merit. The Solicitor General's explanation on this point is well-taken. To simply thrust a bolo at a lying person is not as forceful as to hack him with it. The first is an awkward if not difficult movement, but the second is natural and can be done with facility. 38
(b) That conditions rendered it impossible for Simeona to recognize accused-appellant. It is contended that Simeona could not have recognized accused-appellant while he was at the foot of the stairs because the banana plants obstructed the light cast by the moon. 39
This, again, is without merit. Simeona testified that the banana plants did not obstruct the light cast by the moon and the defense did not disprove this fact:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Mortel:
Q — And because of the banana plantation that is covering your yard this quarter moon, the illumination thereof is obstructing a little by this banana plantation?
A — But the bananas are not directly obstructing the door of our house because they are standing towards the footpath the part of our house was not obstructed of the light cast by the moon .
Q — Except by the footpath and the surrounding premises of the east side of the house is shaded because the banana plantation are there to obstruct the illumination of the moon, correct?
A — No, the light coming from the moon could not be obstructed anymore by that plantation because the main door of our house is fronting a yard.
Q — Nevertheless, because the moon was a quarter moon only that night April 9 the illumination to any object that could be seen is quite pale not so bright as if there was an alladin lamp, correct ?
A — Yes.
Q — And as a matter of fact when this person whom you said was making murmuring sounds when you peeped through your window he was being illuminated by the beam of the light of the moon and his face seems to be a yellowish and as clear as if there is an alladin lamp, correct?
A — But I know that he was the very one I recognized his face and he is far from the banana plantation and the moon lights very well on him.
Q — When the moon lighted very well on him his color was yellowish was it not?
A — It was indeed his appearance that I saw and that is exactly how he looked.
Q — And when you looked at him the first time that night he looked like Dominador Molo?
A — It was his very own appearance his appearance never changed. 40
Indeed, Simeona had no difficulty in recognizing the accused, considering that their house was only elevated by two steps and at the time she saw him through the dilapidated burl wall he was already at the foot of the stairs. 41
(c) That Simeona pointed to the accused as the killer because he was a hated criminal in the locality. 42 Appellant contends that Simeona pointed to him as the assailant because he was a hated criminal in the locality - not because he was properly Identified as the one who attacked the victim. This claim has no basis in the records. For the testimony of Simeona shows that she was certain of accused-appellant's Identity as assailant and that at one point accused-appellant even inquired from her where her husband was, thus —
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Solis:
Q — And who pushed open that door of yours, was it Dominador Molo or a witch?
A — He was Dominador Molo, it was his very looks of the same person who pushed the shutter of the door.
Q — What made you sure that the looks of that person was the one who pushed open the door and went inside and hacked your husband?
A — He was the one it was his very looks and I saw that it is his looks.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — Now, what is this basis for positively telling us that it is Dominador Molo who killed your husband was it because of rumor circulating in the locality of Cogon and that the assailant as to be Dominador Molo because he has killed or because you saw then Dominador Molo committing the act against your husband?
A — Not only what was given to me by way of information from other people but because of what I actually saw with my eyes.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Mortel:
Q — Now, according to you when the door was pushed open the person entered and he has the looks of that fellow whom you are pointing to as Dominador Molo, is that correct.
A — He is the very one.
Q — And not only that person who entered has the looks of Dominador Molo the accused in this case but he also has the height that looks like the height of Dominador Molo, is that correct?
A — Yes and he had his shirt off and shorts on.
Q — And he has that looks and built of Dominador Molo, is that correct?
A — Yes, that is his very appearance and could not be altered anymore.
xxx xxx xxx
Court: In your entire testimony you did not mention of any conversation of Dominador Molo as soon as he went up the house, did you not talk to him, did you not converse with him?
A — No, because he suddenly rushed our house.
Q — And did he not ask you where is your husband and answered there he is?
A — That was it he was also asking as he entered.
Q — So it is clear that you had a conversation with him?
A — Yes.
Q — And that is what you stated in the police?
A — Yes, sir. 43
(d) Re the dying declarations. Appellant claims that the same should not be accorded credence because the victim could not have recognized his assailant, since as testified by Simeona he was asleep when attacked. 44 Again this is inaccurate. It was only at the initial stage of the attack when the victim was asleep, because he was awakened by the first blows and stood up to defend himself Simeona declared:
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Solis:
Q — How many times did you see Dominador bolo your husband on the left arm?
A — I saw him boloed my husband twice on the left arm and when my husband noticed that he was being hacked he reached for his bolo with his right arm to which instance Dominador Molo noticing that he was going to use a bolo Dominador hacked him again on the right arm.
Q — Was your husband able to take hold of his bolo?
A — He was able to take hold of the handle only because at this instance he was hacked by Dominador and so the bolo fell from his hands.
Q — What hand did your husband use in taking hold of his bolo?
A — Right arm (sic: should be hand).
xxx xxx xxx
Q — But was your husband able to rise from where he was lying to get that bolo?
A — He was able to rise but he was already weak because his left arm was already wounded. 45
The statements of Venancio Identifying Dominador Molo as his assailant to Alejandro, his son, and Roman, his neighbor are dying declarations. Alejandro Gapisa testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q — What was the position when you found him there?
A — He was sitting.
Q — What else if any did you observe of your father?
A — When I came up he said, "Ando I have wounds because I was boloed by Boslo. "
Q — What was his actual physical situation when he uttered these words?
A — He was already weak, his body was weak.
Q — How did you observe that he was already very weak, that he was already weak physically?
A — Because his wounds are big and many.
Q — Was it bleeding?
A — It was bleeding but the flow of the blood had declined since they had been drained of blood.
Q — In your observation was he dying or not?
A — He was about to die.
Q — Now, since he had wounds what did you do with these injuries?
A — Upon arrival I tied his wounds.
Q — Which injuries did you bind, what did you tie?
A — The wounds in the arm because it was dangling.
Q — Which arm the left or the right?
A — The left.
Q — What about the right arm?
A — It had also many wounds.
Q — What was your father doing there, in that kitchen?
A — He was sitting.
Q — Was he doing anything else from sitting ?
A — I think he was defecating as a result of the pain.
Q — Did he have his pants on?
A — Yes. 46
Ad Roman Mangaring declared:
xxx xxx xxx
A — I was talking to him as to who boloed him.
Q — And his answer to you was Boslo?
A — Yes.
Q — He called his assailant as Boslo?
A — Yes. 47
Considering the nature and extent of the wounds, eight in all, Venancio must have realized the seriousness of his condition and it can therefore be inferred that he made the incrimination under the conciousness of impending death, 48 which, in fact, supervened barely 4-1/2 hours after he was boloed.
In resume then the credible and unimpeached testimonies of the victim's widow, Simeona Gapisa, who was an eye-witness to the fatal incident, and that of Alejandro Gapisa, the victim's son, and Roman Mangaring, a neighbor, who both testified on the ante-mortem statements of the victim, establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery, and aggravated by circumstances of dwelling, recidivism and reiteration, it appearing that accused has been convicted by final
judgment of murder, frustrated murder, grave slander, less serious physical injuries, qualified trespass to dwelling and robbery, and, had served sentences for said crimes.
We agree with the Solicitor General that appellant is not entitled the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For in order that the same may be properly appreciated in favor of the accused, it must appear that — a) he had not been actually arrested; b) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent; and c) his surrender is voluntary, which circumstances are not present in this case. 49 For appellant admitted that on the day after the killing, police authorities surrounded his house and arrested him. The fact that he did not try to escape or did not resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities, does not amount to voluntary surrender. 50
A word about the penalty. It appears that accused-appellant is an incorrigible criminal with clearly anti-social proclivities against which the community has the need if not the right, to defend itself. Where, as in this case, the reformative end of punishment seems to have failed in amending his criminal tendencies — he was convicted for frustrated murder in Criminal Case V-542, Mindoro on September 2, 1950; murder in Criminal Case No. 862, Romblon on July 27, 1961; grave slander in Criminal Case No. V-669, Romblon, on June 5, 1957; less serious physical injuries, before the Municipal Court of Romblon, Romblon in Criminal Case No. 839 on October 9, 1959; qualified by trespass to dwelling, before the Municipal Court of Romblon, Romblon in - Criminal Case No. 845 on February 25, 1960 and robbery, before the Court of First Instance of Davao in Criminal Case No. 9982 on March 1, 1967 — the imposition of the supreme penalty, is not only justified by the facts of this case, but is required as a measure of social defense. Society had given accused-appellant several chances. It would seem that compassion had not reformed him but had instead made him a hardened criminal and a menace to his fellow men. To spare his life is to endanger the lives and properties of others.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby affirmed IN TOTO, without pronouncement as to costs.
Castro, C.J., Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., in the result.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139070 May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98), which sentenced accused-appellant Noel Lee to death for the murder of Joseph Marquez.
On May 27, 1998, an Information was filed against accused-appellant charging him with the crime of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of September 1996, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one JOSEPH MARQUEZ y LAGANDI, with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which ultimately caused the victim’s death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr. Darwin Corpuz, a resident doctor at the Manila Caloocan University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a police officer who examined the crime scene; and (d) Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
The prosecution established the following facts: At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez, 46 years of age and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in the living room of their house located at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was an alley leading to General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling with people and activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and on the other was a store catering to customers. In their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on television. Herminia was seated on an armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their house and the television was to his right. Herminia looked away from the game and
casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more— two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted for help. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later died.1âwphi1.nêt
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about the shooting incident. Herminia told them that her son was shot by Noel Lee. From the hospital, Herminia went to the St. Martin Funeral Homes where Joseph’s body was brought. Thereafter, she proceeded to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters where she gave her sworn statement about the shooting.2
Upon request of the Caloocan City police, a post-mortem examination was made on Joseph’s body. Dr. Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service made the following findings:
"FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctiva are pale, Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic. A needle puncture mark was noted at the dorsum of the right hand.
HEAD:
(1) Gunshot wound, frontal region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, just right of the anterior midline, 161 cm from heel, with an upbraded collar, measuring 0.2 cm superiorly and laterally, 0.1 cm medially and inferiorly directed posteriorwards, downwards and to the left fracturing the frontal bone, lacerating the brain. A deformed slug was recovered embedded at the left cerebral hemisphere of the brain.
(2) Gunshot wound, occipital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, 2 cm left of the posterior midline, 162 cm from heel, with a uniform 0.2 cm upbraded collar, directed slightly anteriorwards, downwards and lateralwards, fracturing the occipital bone and lacerating the brain. A deformed slug was recovered at the left auricular region.
(3) Contusion, right eyebrow, measuring 3 x 2 cm, 3 cm from the anterior midline.
There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages.
Stomach is ¼ full of partially digested food particles and positive for alcoholic odor.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of gunshot wounds. Head."3
At the time of his death, Joseph was employed as driver by the Santos Enterprises Freight Services earning P250.00 a day.4 He left behind two children by his live-in partner who are now under his mother’s care and support. Herminia spent approximately P90,000.00 for the funeral and burial expenses of her deceased son. The expenses were supported by receipts5 and admitted by the defense.6
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant. The complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 96-3246, was however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence in a Resolution dated December 4, 1996 by Prosecutor Dionisio C. Sison with the approval of Caloocan City Prosecutor Rosauro J. Silverio.7 Herminia appealed the order of dismissal to the Secretary of Justice. In a letter dated March 16, 1998, Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III reversed and set aside the appealed Resolution and ordered the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City to file an information for murder against the accused-appellant.8 Accordingly, the Information was filed and a warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant on June 8, 1998. On October 16, 1998, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989.9
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor; and (b) himself. He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00 to 10:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, he was in his house located at 317 M. de Castro St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He was having some drinks with his neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver, Nelson Columba. They were enjoying themselves, drinking and singing with the videoke. Also in the house were his wife, children and household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando and Nelson went home and accused-appellant went to sleep. He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of the following day and learned that Joseph Marquez, a neighbor, was shot to death. To appellant’s surprise, he was tagged as Joseph’s killer.10
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victim’s bad reputation, appellant presented a letter handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter, Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation
because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit.11
The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victim’s desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his crime.12
In a decision dated June 22, 1999, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to the penalty of death. The court also ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P90,000.00, moral damages of P60,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Thus:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the prosecution having established beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of accused NOEL LEE of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, this court, in view of the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling and without any mitigating circumstance to offset it, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased civil indemnity of P50,000.00; to pay the private complainant actual damages of P90,000.00 plus moral and exemplary damages of P60,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively; and to pay the costs.
Consistent with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, let the entire records hereof including the complete transcripts of stenographic notes be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within the reglementary period set forth in said section.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, this appeal. Before us, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE SELF-SERVING AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY OF THE MOTHER OF THE VICTIM, HERMINIA MARQUEZ, WHOSE NARRATION OF THE CHAIN OF OCCURRENCE THAT LED TO THE DEATH OF JOSEPH MARQUEZ WAS BEYOND BELIEF.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HASTILY TAGGING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, NOEL LEE, AS THE ASSAILANT BASED MERELY ON THE BIASED DECLARATION OF THE
MOTHER WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE SHADY CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM AGAINST WHOM OTHERS MIGHT HAVE AN AXE TO GRIND.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION OF FINDING GUILT ON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT EVEN RAISING A FINGER IN SATISFYING ITSELF THAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBTAINING IN 1996 ARE STILL PREVAILING IN 1999 WHEN THE CASE WAS TRIED ON THE MERITS SO AS TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANT BEYOND DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING WITH LENIENCY HERMINIA MARQUEZ’S VACILLATION WITH RESPECT TO THE "BUTAS NG BINTANA" AS CONTAINED IN HER SWORN STATEMENT AND THE "BUKAS NA BINTANA" AS PER HER REPAIRED TESTIMONY—A SERIOUS PROCEDURAL ANOMALY THAT ASSAULTED THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE OBVIOUS REASONABLE DOUBT."14
The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the credibility of Herminia Marquez, the lone prosecution eyewitness. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court should not have accepted Herminia’s testimony because it is biased, incredible and inconsistent.
Herminia’s testimony on direct examination is as follows:
"x x x
ATTY. OPENA: Now who was your companion, if any, at that time?
WITNESS: Me and my son, Joseph Marquez, and the wife upstairs putting the baby to sleep.
Q: What were you and your son, Joseph, doing then?
A: Watching TV.
Q: Will you please tell us your position, I am referring to you and your son in relation to the television set where you are watching the show.
A: We were facing each other while watching television which is on the left side.
Q: Will you please tell us where exactly was your son, Joseph, seated while watching television?
A: At the end most of the sofa.
Q: The sofa you are referring to is the one near the window.
A: Yes, sir. Dikit lang po.
Q: Will you give us an idea or describe to us that window which you mentioned awhile ago?
A: Transparent glass.
Q: How high is it from the ground?
COURT: Which one?
ATTY. OPENA: The window glass?
WITNESS: About three feet from the ground.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: You said three feet. What do you mean by that? Is that window elevated from the ground?
A: The same height as this court window which is about three feet from the ground, and from one another about four by four window [sic], three feet by the ground.
Q: Now, you demonstrated by showing a portion, you mean to tell us that window was mounted on a concrete or hollow block?
A: Hollow block, po.
Q: How high is that hollow block that you were referring to?
COURT: She said three feet.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: Which is higher, that sofa which is posted near the window or the hollow block?
A: Hollow block.
Q: By how many inches or feet?
A: About half a foot.
Q: You said the sofa was long. Will you please tell us in what portion of your sofa your son Joseph was seated?
ATTY. VARGAS: Already answered, your Honor. She said dulo, end of the sofa.
COURT: Sustained.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: When you said end of sofa which portion, the left side or the right side?
A: The right.
Q: Now, while you and your son were watching television, was there anything unusual that transpired?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us what was that all about.
A: Mayroon po akong napansin na kamay na nakatutok sa anak ko. Nakita ko po si Noel Lee na nakatayo sa may bintana.
Q: What do you mean by the word "kamay?"
A: Hawak hawak po niya iyong baril, nakatutok po sa anak ko.
Q: What did you do with what you saw?
A: Nakita ko pong gumanoon siya, sumilip na ganoon, sabay putok ng baril. Tumingin po siya sa may bintana, ganoon po, sabay putok ng baril.
COURT: You said he turned the head. Who turned the head? Sino ang gumanyan sa sinabi mo?
A: (Witness demonstrating that the victim peeped through the window).
Q: And then?
A: At the same time the firing of the gun [sic] and I saw my son slumped.
ATTY. OPENA TO THE WITNESS:
Q: And after your son was slumped, what did you do?
A: I went to my son and carried him to take him to the hospital.
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Five shots.
Q: That was prior to helping your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many times was your son hit?
ATTY. VARGAS:
Q: Objection, your honor. It was already answered. Because according to her it was five shots.
COURT: It does not follow that the victim was hit. So, the witness may answer.
WITNESS: Twice, Two shots hit my son, two shots on the sofa and one shot on the cement.
COURT: How about the other one?
A: Doon po sa semento.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: And who fired these shots?
A: Noel Lee.
Q: That Noel Lee that you are referring to, will you please point at him if he is around?
A: (Witness going down the witness stand and pointing to accused Noel Lee).
Q: How do you know that it was Noel Lee who shot your son?
A: Kitang kita ko po. Magkatapat po kami.
Q: Will you please describe to us?
A: Maliwanag po kasi ang ilaw. Maliwanag din po sa labas, may nananahi doon. Nandoon po kaming dalawa ng anak ko nanonood ng television. (Witness sobbing in tears). Napakasakit sa akin. Hindi ko man lang naipagtanggol and anak ko.
COURT: She was emotionally upset.
ATTY. OPENA: I’ll just make it on record that the witness was emotionally upset. May I ask if she can still testify?
x x x x x x x x x
WITNESS: Masakit lang po sa loob ko ang pagkawala ng anak ko.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: You saw that the light was bright. Where were those lights coming from?
A: Maliwanag po sa loob ng bahay namin dahil may fluorescent na bilog. Saka sa labas may nananahi po doon sa alley katapat ng bahay namin. At saka po doon sa kabila, tindahan po tapat po namin, kaya maliwanag ang ilaw.
Q: After trying to help your son, what happened?
A: I was able to hold on to my son up to the door. Upon reaching the door, I asked the help of my kumpare.
Q: Meanwhile, what did the accused do after shooting five times?
A: He ran to the alley to go home.
Q: Now you said he ran to an alley towards the direction of their house. Do you know where his house is located?
A: Yes, sir. 142 M. de Castro Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
Q: How far is that from your residence?
A: More or less 150 to 200 meters.
Q: Where did you finally bring your son?
A: MCU.
Q: When you say MCU, are you referring to MCU Hospital?
A: Yes, sir. MCU Hospital.
Q: At MCU, life-saving devices were attached to my son. Later, after reaching 11:00, he died.
COURT: 11:00 P.M.?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Same day?
A: Yes, ma’am.
x x x x x x x x x."15
Herminia’s testimony is positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in her narration of the shooting incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her son’s death. She was subjected by defense counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet she stuck to her testimony given in the direct examination. She readily gave specific details of the crime scene, e.g., the physical arrangement of the sofa and the television set, the height of the sofa, the wall and the window, because the crime happened right in her own living room. She explained that she was unable to warn Joseph because she was shocked by the sight of accused-appellant aiming a gun at her son. The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the time she took hold of herself, her son had been shot dead.
A son’s death in his mother’s house and in her presence is a painful and agonizing experience that is not easy for a mother to forget, even with the passing of time. Herminia’s testimony shows that she was living with a conscience that haunted and blamed her own self for failing to protect her son or, at least, save him from death.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the eyewitness’ testimony. In her affidavit of September 30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, Herminia declared that while she and Joseph were watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at her son. The hand and the gun came out of a hole in the window, i.e., "butas ng bintana." On cross-examination, Herminia stated that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window, i.e., "bukas na bintana." According to accused-appellant, this inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be repaired by her statement on the witness stand.
The inconsistency between her affidavit and her testimony was satisfactorily explained by Herminia on cross-examination:
"x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. VARGAS
Q: You said that you saw a hand from a hole in the window with a gun, is that correct?
A: Bukas na bintana. Not from a hole but from an open window.
Q: Madam witness, do you recall having executed a sworn statement before the police, right after the shooting of your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I will read to you paragraph 8 of your statement which is already marked as your Exhibit "A" in which is stated as follows: "Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang buong pangyayari? Answer: Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996 habang ang aking anak ay nanonood ng palabas sa TV ng basketball malapit sa kanyang bintana sa labas at ako naman ay nakaupo sa sopa katapat ko siya subalit medyo malayo ng konti sa kanya, mayroon akong napansin na kamay na may hawak ng baril at nakaumang sa aking anak sa may butas ng bintana," do you recall that?
A: Opo.
Q: What you saw from that butas is a hand with a gun, is that correct?
A: Opo.
Q: Madam witness, your window is just like the window of this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your testimony, you did not mention what part of the window was that hand holding a gun that you saw? Is that correct?
A: Hindi naman po butas, kundi bukas na bintana. Nakabukas iyong bintana namin.
Q: So in your sinumpaang salaysay in the statement that you said butas na bintana is not correct?
A: Mali ho kasi, hindi ko na napansin iyan, kasi ito napansin ko, kinorect ko.
COURT: You show to the witness. There, butas na bintana.
WITNESS: Mali po ang letra, Bukas hindi butas.
x x x x x x x x x."16
Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court that she saw the hand and the gun coming out of the open window, not from a hole in the window. In her direct testimony, Herminia presented a photograph of her living room just the way it looked from her side on the night of the shooting.17 The sofa on which Joseph was seated is against the wall, with the window a few inches above the wall. The window is made of transparent glass with six (6) vertical glass panes pushing outwards. The entire window is enclosed by iron grills with big spaces in between the grills. The living room is well-lit and the area outside the house is also lit by a fluorescent lamp.
Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency therein does not necessarily discredit the witness.18 Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.19 Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that transpired.20 They are usually not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who suggests words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own language in taking the affiant’s statements.21
Accused-appellant argues that since Herminia declared in her affidavit that she saw a hand coming from the window, she did not see the person holding the gun, let alone who fired it.22 A complete reading of the pertinent portion of Herminia’s affidavit will refute appellant’s arguments, viz:
"x x x x x x x x x
T - Isalaysay mo nga sa akin and buong pangyayari?
S – Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi, petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996, habang ang aking anak ay nanonood ng palabas sa T.V. ng basketball malapit sa aming bintanan [sic] sa labas, at ako naman ay nakaupo sa sopa katapat ko siya subalit medyo malayo ng kaunti sa kanya, mayroon akong napansin akong [sic] kamay na hawak-hawak na baril na nakaumang sa aking anak sa butas na bintana na nakaawang, maya-maya ng kaunti ay nakarinig na ako ng putok at ang unang putok ay tumama sa ulo ng aking anak kaya napayuko siya, pagkatapos noon ay sunod-sunod na ang putok na narinig ko, mga limang beses, kaya kitang kita ko siya ng lapitan ko ang aking anak at nakita ko itong si NOEL LEE, pagkatapos noon ay tumakbo na ito papalabas ng iskinita papunta sa kanila.
x x x x x x x x x."23
It is thus clear that when Herminia approached her son, she saw that the person firing the gun was accused-appellant. Appellant continued firing and then ran away towards the direction of his house. This account is not inconsistent with the witness’ testimony in open court.
Herminia’s declarations are based on her actual account of the commission of the crime. She had no ill motive to accuse appellant of killing her son, or at least, testify falsely against appellant. Accused-appellant himself admitted that he and Herminia have been neighbors for years and have known each other for a long time. Appellant is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap plastic and Herminia used to work for him as an agent.24 She would not have pointed to appellant if not for the fact that it was him whom she saw shoot her son.1âwphi1.nêt
Indeed, the Solicitor General points out that it was appellant himself who had strong motive to harm or kill Joseph.25 Appellant revealed that six days before the shooting, he caught Joseph inside his car attempting to steal the stereo. The alibi that appellant was drinking with his friends that fateful night of September 29, 1996 does not rule out the possibility that he could have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The victim’s house is merely two blocks away from appellant’s house and could be reached in several minutes.26
The lone eyewitness’ account of the killing finds support in the medico-legal report. Dr. Rosalie Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two gunshot wounds—one to the right of the forehead, and the other, to the left side of the back of the victim’s head.27 Two slugs were recovered from the victim’s head. Judging from the location and number of wounds sustained, Dr. Cosidon theorized that the assailant could have been more than two feet away from the victim.28 Both gunshot wounds were serious and fatal.29
Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad reputation in their community. He alleges that the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen.30 As proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented Herminia’s letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her son’s thievery.31
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:--
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
x x x x x x x x x."
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation.32 "Good moral character" includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.33
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause.34 There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against him.35 Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character.36 The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence.37 Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.38
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the accused.39 And this evidence must be "pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged," meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged,40 e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity.41 Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of theoffended party.42 Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged." Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.43
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with frequency in sex offenses and homicide.44 In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the woman’s character as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to the man’s act.45 The exception to this is when the woman’s consent is immaterial such as in statutory rape46 or rape with violence or intimidation.47 In the crimes of qualified seduction48 or consented abduction,49 the offended party must be a "virgin," which is "presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation,"50 or a "virtuous woman of good reputation."51 The crime of simple seduction involves "the seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x." 52 The burden of proof that the complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad reputation.53
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.54 The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor.55 When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.56
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman,57 a murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:
"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),58 such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder."59
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victim’s bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, this cannot be appreciated to increase the penalty in the absence of direct evidence showing that accused-appellant deliberately planned and prepared the killing of the victim.60
Neither can the aggravating circumstance of dwelling found by the trial court be applied in the instant case. The Information alleges only treachery and evident premeditation, not dwelling. Under Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint or Information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the offense.61 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, and Section 8, Rule 110 is favorable to the accused. It may be applied retroactively to the instant case.
Accordingly, without the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty of death was erroneously imposed by the trial court. There being no aggravating circumstance, there is no basis for the award of exemplary damages.62
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated June 22, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98) is affirmed insofar as accused-appellant Noel Lee is found guilty of murder for the death of Joseph Marquez. The death sentence imposed by the trial court is however reduced to reclusion perpetua, there having been no aggravating circumstance in the commission of said crime. Except for the award of exemplary damages, the award of civil indemnity, other damages and costs are likewise affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31342 April 7, 1976
JUAN T. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, ALMA AZNAR and JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
G.R. No. L-31740 April 7, 1976
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, ALMA AZNAR and JOSE B. AZNAR, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Matias H. Aznar, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN T. BORROMEO, As Special Administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos,respondents.
Vicente J. Francisco for Juan T. Borromeo.
Ciriaco Lopez, Jr. & Associates for Emmanuel B. Aznar, et al.
BARREDO, J.:
Cross-petitions for the review of the per curiam resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 30092-R, Juan T. Borromeo etc. vs. Emmanuel B. Aznar, et al, dated November 19, 1969 which review entirely its previous decision of January 30, 1968 thereby ultimately holding that the transactions in question are equitable mortgages instead of absolute sales of real properties and granting the heirs of the deceased Simeon Rallos a period of one year from the finality of the resolution within which to effect a redemption of said properties, without prejudice to the right of the opposing party to foreclose the declared mortgages if no such redemption takes place and the amounts stated in the documents are not fully paid, arid ordering furthermore the Aznars to pay said heirs P10,000 for and as attorney's fees and the costs. In G.R. No. L-31342, petitioner Juan T. Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of the deceased Simeon Rallos, prays for the modification of the per curiam resolution in order to include an award of moral and exemplary damages of P200,000 and P50,000, respectively, and to increase the award of attorney's fees to not less than P75,000, whereas in G.R. No. L-31740, the Aznars are asking that said resolution be set aside and that the decision of January 30, 1968 be reinstated and affirmed.
There are three preliminary questions We have to resolve. First, Borromeo contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Aznars in G.R. No. L-31740 because the latter failed to file said petition within fifteen days from December 20, 1969, the date they were notified of the resolution now under review. Borromeo's theory is that upon the
filing of his own petition in G.R. No. L-31342 on December 20, 1969, by way of appeal from the aforesaid resolution in so far as it failed to grant him the awards referred to in said petition, the Court of Appeals was divested of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration which the Aznars filed on the same date, December 22, 1969, in the Court of Appeals praying for the reversal of the same resolution, copy of which had been received by them only on December 20, 1969. According to Borromeo, what the Aznars should have done upon being notified of the filing of the petition in G.R. No. L-31342 should have been to file already their petition for review with this Court instead of filing or continuing with their motion for reconsideration in the Appellate Court, and that since the latter court had lost its jurisdiction over the case by reason of his (Borromeo's appeal), citing in this respect the resolution of this Court of September 3, 1965 in G.R. No. L-24762 (Manila Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission et al.), the Aznars' motion for reconsideration did not suspend their period for appeal to this Court which they made only on February 27, 1970 (erroneously alleged as March 11, 1970 by Borromeo).
Obviously, Borromeo's. contention has absolutely no merit. To start with, when We issued Our resolution of January 13, 1970, granting the Aznars an extension of fifteen (15) days from the time they were to be notified of the resolution of the Court of Appeals of its action on their motion for reconsideration then still pending therein. We already knew that the petition of Borromeo against the same resolution of the Court of Appeals had already been filed with Us. In other words, in that resolution, the Court already recognized the right of the Aznars to file their own separate appeal from the resolution of the Court of Appeals after the reconsideration thereof was to be denied by the Court of Appeals notwithstanding Borromeo's appeal was already with Us. Besides, to sustain Borromeo's theory would lead to the absurd proposition that one party may be deprived of the right to appeal from the portion of a decision against him just because the other party who had been notified of the decision ahead had already perfected his appeal in so far as the said decision adversely affects him. Indeed, We have already virtually ruled against such pose of Borromeo in Timoteo Simsim vs. The Hon. Judge Feliciano Belmonte etc. et al., 34 SCRA 536 and People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252. The Meralco resolution invoked by Borromeo is not in point.
Borromeo secondly tries to make capital of the fact that while it is true that the brief of the Aznars was filed on time, on August 31, 1970, the last day therefor, it did not contain a digest of the arguments nor the text of the resolution sought to be reviewed, which are required by the rules (Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 56 read together with Section 16 of Rule 46) and that these requirements were complied with only on September 19, 1970, for which reason, he prays that their appeal should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule 50. We are not impressed. The digest of arguments and the copy of the appealed resolution are not in strict sense parts of the brief so as to justify the charge that the Aznars filed their brief in two parts. No conceivsble prejudice could have been caused to anyone concerned by their late filing nineteen days after the reglementary period had expired, the brief itself, with the assignments of error and the arguments supporting them, having been filed already within said period. Of course, it would be Ideal if all the requirements of the rules were complied with on time, but there is nothing in principle or in the precedents relied upon by Borromeo that makes it imperative for Us to dismiss an appeal upon no more ground than such obviously unintentional and harmless technicality as the omission of the requirements herein complained of.
The third preliminary issue raised by Borromeo is that the appeal of the Aznars in G.R. No. L-31342 involves purely questions of fact. It is argued that the reversal by the Court of Appeals of its original conclusion, upholding the trial court, that the transactions in question were absolute sales, by holding in its per curiam resolution that they were actually equitable mortgages, does not constitute an error of law but a mere reappraisal or reweighing of the evidence which it has the power to do. Borromeo insists that a ruling as to whether a transaction is a sale or a mortgage involves no more than evaluation of the evidence and is consequently a factual matter beyond the Supreme Court's authority to review except under peculiar circumstances that do not obtain here.
To be sure, this is not the first instance that a reversal by the Court of Appeals of its own original decision has been brought to Our attention. And indeed, where the reversal was the result exclusively of a reevaluation or reweighing of the evidence, this Court has refrained from interfering. No doubt, it would be inimical to the interests of justice and would not be conducive to the fair and just resolution of judicial controversies to deprive a court of the power to reconsider possible errors committed by it in any of its actuations. It is in fact one of the inherent powers of courts "to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." (Section 5 (g), Rule 135) And the Court of Appeals is certainly included in the contemplation of such rule. The only limitation to this power is that it cannot be exercised anymore after the action or judgment concerned has already become final and executory by the expiration of the corresponding reglementary period for the purpose, this as a matter of public policy requiring that litigations should from the very nature of things have a definite conclusion at a given time even at the risk of occasional errors or unintended injustice.
We perceive however that the instant case does not fall under the foregoing principles. While the main impugned resolution does relate ultimately to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals, We see that in reversing its previous findings of fact, which it arrived at after excluding on grounds of legal incompetency the corresponding evidence presented by Borromeo, the Appellate Court first reversed those rulings on the admissibility of said evidence and declared them competent, and then predicated its new factual conclusions on these subsequently admitted evidence it had rejected in its original decision. And so, it is safe to presume that had not the Appellate Court reversed its legal rulings on the admissibility or competency of the evidence referred to, it would not have reversed its actual conclusion as to the nature of the transactions in controversy. Accordingly, and on the theory that if this Court should hold that the later rulings of the Court of Appeals on the admissibility of evidence are erroneous in law, the inevitable result would be that the factual conclusions of said court in its original decision, which were favorable to the Aznars, would be revived, it is now the position of the Aznars that their attack against said later rulings constitute legal issues over which this Court has jurisdiction. After carefully studying all the points respectively raised by the parties, We are convinced that this contention is well taken and We shall now proceed to resolve the legal issues on admissibility of evidence which are extensively, exhaustively and very well discussed by both counsel in their briefs and other papers filed with the Court and for which they are both worthily deserving of commendation for unusual diligence and expertise in the work of advocacy, thereby lightening considerably the work of the Court. We refer equally to the late Senator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel for Borromeo, and Atty. Ciriaco Lopez Jr., who is appearing for the Aznars.
As already stated, the main controversy here centers on the true nature of the three documents, Exhibits A, B and C, which on their faces are unquestionably deeds of absolute sale of the real properties therein described executed by the deceased Simeon Rallos on various dates in favor of Emmanuel Aznar, in Exhibits A and C, and his sister, Alma Aznar, in Exhibit B. In his complaint in the court below, Juan T. Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of Simeon Rallos, alleged that these documents were in fact equitable mortgages to secure loans granted to Rallos by Matias Aznar, deceased father of Emmanuel and Alma, and prayed for their reformation. The trial court dismissed the said complaint and on appeal, said dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original decision of January 30, 1968 penned by Justice Ramon NOLASCO and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francisco B. Capistrano and Justice Antonio Cañizares The pertinent portions of said decision read thus:
We have examined Exhibits A, B and C carefully, and we find them clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. (Article 1370, Civil Code.) The intention of the parties is to be deduced from the language employed by them, and the terms of the contract, where unambiguous, are conclusive, in the absence of averment and proof of mistake, the question being, not what intention existed in the minds of the parties, but what intention is expressed by the language used. When a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone; and a meaning' cannot be given it other than that expressed. (City of Manila vs. Rizal Park C., 53 Phil. 515; 17 C.J.S. 700.).
According to the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara, who claimed to have been present when the transactions took place, her deceased father merely borrowed money from the late Matias Aznar in the sums of P6,000.00 and P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment thereof mortgaged to the latter the properties described in Exhibits A, B and C. She testified that the transactions were disguised as absolute sales and Rallos was assured by Matias Aznar that he could exercise the right to repurchase the lots and would deliver to him the corresponding options in writing.
We find the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara in this respect unreliable and insufficient to justify the reformation of the instruments in question. While it is true that relationship does not disqualify a witness, it calls for a close scrutiny of his testimony. For obvious reasons, the testimony of close relatives by affinity or consanguinity to corroborate a claim is not given much credence. (People vs. Guzman, 70 Phil. 23.) As correctly observed by the trial court, her testimony cannot be considered as absolutely unbiased or impartial, as she was naturally interested in an outcome of the case favorable to the plaintiff. More than this, however, the record shows that Rallos was even cautioned by his daughter Crispina and her husband before signing Exhibit A. The fact remains that Exhibits A, B and C were signed by Rallos himself as a party thereto. His successors-in-interest cannot now be heard to complain that the parties
to said exhibits intended the same to be loans with mortgages contrary to what are clearly expressed therein. The natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself or its contents, and that presumption acquires greater force where, as in the case at bar, not only one but several documents, executed at different times, were signed by Rallos. (Javier vs. Javier, 7 Phil. 261.) It is the duty of every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a contract before he signs and delivers it. He owes this duty to the other party to the contract, because the latter may, and probably will pay his money and shape his action in reliance upon the agreement. To permit a party, when sued on a written contract, to admit that he signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made, or to allow him to admit that he signed it but did not read it, or know its stipulations, would absolutely destroy the value of all contracts. (Tan Tun Sia vs. Yu Bino Sentua, 56 Phil. 711; Moran, Idem pp. 123-124.).
The appellant urges that Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5, which, according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara, were her notations allegedly representing the deductions made by Matias Aznar for advance interest, attorney's fees and miscellanous expenses are corroborative of her testimony that the transactions in controversy were really loans with mortgages. We, likewise, find the said exhibits weak and unsatisfactor as evidence of the facts asserted. They are clearly self-serving, as they were admittedly prepared by the declarant herself (2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 690; 2 Jones on Evidence, 2d., Ed., Sec. 895), who was a daughter of the deceased Rallos and who cannot, therefore, be said to be disinterested witness. With respect to Exhibit J, the option to repurchae Lots Nos. 462 and 7032, also relied upon by the appellant as allegedly corroborative of the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara that all the transactions in question were loans secured by mortgages, it is to be noted that said exhibit his to do with the two lots mentioned therein and none other. Certainly, it is no proof that Rallos was similarly given a written option to redeem any of the lots covered by Exhibits B and C, which, according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara, was taken back by Matias Aznar but never renewed. The evidence shows that the period fixed in Exhibit J expired without the lots involved being redeemed.
To show, too, that Matias Aznar had agreed to the repurchase of the lots in question by Rallos, the plaintiff presented at the trial of the case Exhibit L, which appears to be a copy of a draft of deed of absolute sale. This exhibit deserves but the scantest consideration, it being undated, unsigned and unsubscribed by any purported party thereto. Besides, even granting arguendo that the same was prepared by a lawyer of the Aznars, as alleged by Crispina Rallos Alcantara, we fail to see its materiality to the resolution of the main issue involved in this case of whether or not reformation is proper or justified, as the draft appears to have been drawn in favor of Crispina RalloE Alcantara who was not a party to the instruments sought to be reformed, and there is nothing in
said exhibit to indicate that the contested transactions were really loans secure by mortgages.
As to Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2 Q-3, R and R-1, which, according to the appellant, were erroneously ignored by the court below, the same invariably refer to an alleged indebtedness of Rallos to Matias Aznar and not to the defendants, Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, to whom the properties in question appear to have been sold (Exhibits A, B and C). The said exhibits fail to show clearly and satisfactorily that the transactions mentioned therein relate to the same transactions and the same parcels of land involved in the case at bar.
The appellant further contends that the considerations paid for the lots in dispute were very inadequate or unusually low which would justify reformation under the provisions of Articles 1602, paragraph 1, and 1604, of the Civil Code. This contention is untenable.
The evidence shows that Lot No. 7032 was sold to the defendant Emmanuel for P6,000.00 (Exhibit A), which was higher than its assessed value of P4,447.25 in 1954 when the transaction took place (Exhibit A-1). The price paid for Lots Nos. 519-B, 519-C, 467 and 490 is P40,000.00 also in lump sum (Exhibit C). The total consideration for said six lots is P45,000.00, which was more than one-half, or approximately 60%, of their total assessed value of P74,647.00 at the time of transaction in 1954 (Exhibits B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, C-3 and C4). It is to be noted that at the time of the sale, there was a mortgage encumbrance of P5,000.00 on Lots Nos. 2713 and 7728 in favor of the Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, while Lots Nos. 519-B, 519-C, 467 and 490 had a mortgage encumbrance of P20,000.00 in favor of the Philippine National Bank, which obligations were assumed by the defendants-vendees (Exhibits 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33 and 34). In fact, when Exhibit C was executed, the indebtedness to the bank was already due and demands for the payment thereof had been made upon Rallos (Exhibits H and H-1).
On this question of the vsluation of the subject lots, the plaintiff presented HIPOLITO S. Ricardo, at one time Deputy City Assessor in Cebu City, who testified that the assessment of a real estate property was only about 40% of its fair market value, but the same was not the basis for determining the fair market value of a real estate property; that the factors considered by their office in appraising the fair market value of a real estate property were the transactions of the parties and the prices appearing in the deeds of sale of the adjacent or neighboring lots, but in the absence thereof, the capitalization system was used, based upon the investment in the property, its income, plus 6% interest annually after deductions for taxes paid, insurance premiums, repairs, losses and other miscellaneous expenses; and that in the assessment of real properties their office had a schedule of values to be followed, and a partial revision of the assessments was made yearly. According to him, however, their
scheal of was not applied in the assessment of Lots Nos. 2713 and 7728, covered by tax declarations, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and subject matter of Exhibit B, and of Lots Nos. 519-C, 619-B, 46'7 and 490, covered by tax declarations, Exhibits C-1, C-2, C-3 and C4 and subject matter of Exhibit C. As to the assessment of Lot No. 7032, covered by tax declaration, Exhibit A-1, and subject matter of Exhibit A, the said schedule was used. At any rate, taking the assessment of the seven lots involved in this case as a reasonable basis for determining their actual valuation at the time of the transactions, and considering the encumbrances existing on six of the lots and their purchase by the defendants, Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, at one time and in lump sums, this Court is not prepared to conclude that under the attendant circumstances, the considerations paid for the lots in question were unusually inadequate or shockingly low to warrant the application of the provisions of paragraph No. I of Article 1602 of the Civil Code on equitable mortgage. (Manalo vs. Gueco, 42 Phil. 925; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 844.)
The appellant points out that, according to the bank records, Exhibits T, T-1, U U-1, V, V-1, W and W-1, the appraised values of the lots mortgaged with the bank were considerably higher than the prices paid for them. The fact remains, however, that the mortgage obligation of Rallos secured by the same six lots was only P20,000.00, which was assumed by the defendants-vendees. Besides, no bank appraiser or representative was presented by the plaintiff at the trial to testify as to how the appraised values appearing in said exhibits were arrive at.
On the other hand, the testimony of Vicente Kyamko also relied upon by the appellant to prove the alleged fair market values of the subject lots, deserves but scant consideration. The said witness admitted that he was not a licensed appraiser, and that he did not know what the assessed values of the lots in question were in 1954, although, according to him, the assessed value of a real property was the basis for computing or estimating its fair market value. However, even granting arguendo that there were differences in value or some inadequacy of consideration here, nevertheless; the same cannot be said to be controlling when viewed in the light of the entire evidence Page 341 adduced in this case. A difference in value is not always a decisive factor for determining whether the contract is one of sale with right to repurchase or a mere loan with guaranty. (Ocuma vs. Olandesca [CL] 47 O.G. 1902.) Mere inadequacy is not a sufficient ground for the rescission or resolution of a contract when both parties, as in the instant case, were in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the transaction. (Askay vs. Coselan 46 Phil. 179.)
In its tenth assignment of error, the appellant assails the trial court's finding that the defendant vendees were in possession of the lots in question after the execution of the deeds of absolute sale, Exhibits A, B,
and C. It contends that the defendants never possessed the contested lots. We see no merit in this contention.
The records show that after the execution of the documents in question, the defendants, Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, transferred in their names the tax declarations covering the properties sold to them, paid the taxes thereon and caused the issuance of new certificates of title accordingly (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40). They demanded for the payment to them of the rentals due from the tenants of the lots, and began to collect the rentals from them after the maturity of the promissory note of Rallos for P1,800.00, Exhibit I, which, according to the defendant, Emmanuel, represented the rentals for one year collected in advance by Rallos from the lessees. Thereafter, defendants Emmanuel and Alma Aznar filed detainer suits against those occupants who failed to pay their rents to them (Exhibits D to D-21, inclusive, 41, 41-A, 41-B, 41-C and 41-D). Certainly, those facts belie the appellant's claim that the defendant vendees were never in possession of the lots in dispute.
From the evidence adduced, we are satisfied that after the execution of the deeds of absolute sale, Exhibits A, B and C, the defendants vendees took possession of the subject lots, and they were in possession thereof and collected the rentals due until the plaintiff's administrator was authorized by the court a quo to collect the rents and deposit them in a bank, subject to the court's disposition.
The appellant capitalizes, too, on the statement, Exhibit K, which allegedly shows that Matias Aznar charged Rallos with the payment of the taxes due on the contested lots. According to Crispina Rallos Alcantara, the said exhibit was prepared by an employee of Matias Aznar upon the latter's orders, when she went to see him concerning the repurchase of the lots. This, however, was denied by the defendant, Emmanuel Aznar, who claimed that after the sale, neither Rallos nor his daughter Crispina went to see any of the Aznars in their office for the redemption of the lots. The exhibit in question, allegedly a statement of account of Rallos to Matias Aznar involving the disputed transactions is neither dated nor signed. much less by the party sought to be charged. The alleged writer thereof was not presented at the trial of the case, and we have only the biased testimony of Crispina as to its authenticity or preparation. Even if it were true, however, that the writing was made, as alleged by Crispina, we cannot consider the name as proof of what was said or transacted then. The mere making of written -memorandum immediately after the interview does not make the memorandum affirmative intrinsic proof of the things said or transacted. (32 CJS 948.) Knowledge on the part of the person who made the memorandum, at the time it was made, that the statements or entries therein were correct must be shown (32 OJS 947), and this the plaintiff failed to do. On the other hand, the record indubitably shows that after the execution of the
questioned instruments, the taxes on the lots subject matter thereof were paid by the defendants vendees. Consequently, we hold that Exhibit K has no evidentiary value, and the lower court was correct in disregarding it ( Pp 82- 95, Record of L-31740.)
However, in its per curiam resolution of November 19, 1969, wherein Presiding Justice Capistrano who had by then been elevated to this Court was substituted by his successor Presiding Justice Julio Villamor, this rather strong position taken by the appellate court was completely reversed by itself as follows:
While it is true that in our decision rendered in this case, we held that the notations or memoranda of Crispina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B3 and C5 were self-serving and unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted (Decision, p. 24), the same, however, as now correctly contended by the plaintiff-appellant in his motion for reconsideration, may be considered as constituting part of the res gestae, and as such, are admissible in evidence to show the nature of the contracts in question and the relation of the parties involved.
Statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main ion as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate qualify, or the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae. Accordingly, the attendant circumstances and the statements then made by the pudes are admissible as part of the res gestae to show the execution of a contract, and, where relevant, matters said and done which are parts of the res gestae of the negotiation and execution of a contract are admissible to show the existence and nature of the contract and the relation of the parties. Matters attendant upon a sale or conveyance may also be admissible m part of the res gestae. (32 CJS 30-32.)
Coversations occurring during the negotiation of a loan or other transaction, as well as the instrument given or received, being part of the res gestae, are competent evidence to show the Page 343 nature of the transaction and the parties for whose benefit it was made, where that fact is material. (National Bank vs Kennedy, 17 Wall. [U.S.] 19, 21 L. Ed. 554, cited in 20 Am. Jur. 57.)
... The character of the transaction is precisely what the intention of the parties at the time made it. It will therefore be discovered that the testimony of those who were present at the time the instrument was
made, and especially of those who participated in the transaction, becomes most important. (Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil. 100, 114-115.)
Thus, while the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara may nor, be free from bias, she being the daughter of the deceased, Simeon Rallos, the same should not, however, be totally rejected on the ground of bias alone (U.S. vs. Mante, 27 Phil. 124; People vs. Pagaduan 37 Phil. 90), considering that it appears to be clearly and sufficiently supported by memoranda which, as already stated, are admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae (Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5) and by the ledgers of the Philippine National 7 Bank .(Exhibits X and Y). Besides, mere relationship of a witness to a party does not discredit his testimony in court, (U.S. vs. Mante, supra.)
In this connection, the appellant has pointed out in his motion under consideration that on of this Court's decision, there was an erroneous citation of C.J.S., i.e., Vol. 32 pp. 947-948 thereof. The said citation, however, appears and may be found in the 1964 edition of the Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 32, pages 947-948.
In the case at bar, there is another factor why the transactions in question should be considered as equitable mortgages. This factor consists of the unusual inadequacy of the prices of the sale of the properties involved. For purposes of comparison, the prices paid for the properties mentioned in Exhibits A, B and C and the asses values thereof are hereunder tabulated:
Lot No.
Purchase Price
Assessment as per Tax declaration
7032
P6,000.00 (Exh. A)
P4.447.25 (Exh. A-1)
2713)
4,679.00 (Exh. B-1)
7728)
5,000.00 (Exh, B,
9,308.00 (Exh. B- 2)
519-C)
150.00 (Exh. C-1)
519-B)
31.300.00 (Exh. C-2)
467 )
17,760.00 (Exh. C-3)
490 )
40,000.00 (Exh. C)
11,440.00 (Exh. C-4)
P51,000.00
P79,084.25
From the foregoing tabulation, it can be seen that the total amount paid to Simeon Rallos for all the properties involved is only P51,000.00 as against the total assessed values thereof which amounted to P79,084.25, or a difference of P28,084.25. In short, the total sum paid as purchase price for the subject lots represents only 64% of their total assessed valuation. To our mind, this constitutes a strong indication that the transactions in question were really loans with mortgages and not absolute sale.
Moreover, it appears that Lots Nos. 519-C, 519-B, 467 and 490 covered by the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) were previously mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, which obligation was assumed by the supposed vendee in the transaction under consideration. As appraised by the Philippine National Bank and as shown in its inspection and appraisal report, marked as Exhibits T, U and V in this case, the market values, respectively, of said properties are as follows:
TCT No. 1096 - Lot No. 490
Market value - Land
572 sq. m. at P25/sq. m. ...................P14,300.00
TCT No. 10915 - Lot No. 467
Market value - land
888 sq. m. at P25/sq. m. ...................P22,200.00
TCT No. 10832 - Lots Nos.
519-B and 519-C
Market value - land
14,242 sq. m. at P10/sq. m. ................142,420.00
Total. . . . . . . . . . P178,920.00.
There is, therefore, a difference of P138,920.00 between the purchase price of the same properties stated at P40,000.00 in the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) and the total market value as appraised by the Philippine National Bank amounting to P178,920.00.
Under Republic Act 357, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, a bank may grant loans against a real estate security and improvements thereon on the basis of the appraised value of the real estate made by the bank itself. Section 78 of said Act provides that "loans against real estate security shall not exceed 70% of the appraised value of the improvement." Inasmuch as the appraisal of the mortgage values of the lots in question were made by competent officers of the Philippine National Bank in the performance of their assigned duties and who are presumed to have regularly performed such duties, the same are not only admissible in evidence but are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, areprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (Section 38, Rule 130, Rules of Court.)
If a prima facie, case exists, it sustains the quantum of evidence on the point which it covers, shifting the burden of proof to the other party. It relieves a party of the burden of proving the fact presumed. The same result is effected by any substitute for evidence, such as statutory regulations prescribingprima facie evidence of specified facts. (1 Jones on, Evidence 2 Ed., Sec. 369.)
It results, therefore, as previously stated, that the appraisal of the lots in question made by the officials of the Philippine National Bank in the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law is not only admissible in evidence, but is a prima facie evidence of the specified facts stated therein. The defendants, however, presented no evidence to rebut the same. We have here, therefore, a case where four of the seven lots involved appear to have been sold for the total sum of P40,000.00 (Exhibit C), which is equivalent to only 22% of their market values as
appraised by the Philippine National Bank. Certainly, this fact clearly bolsters the plaintiff's claim that the transactions in controversy were really loans secured by mortgages and not absolute sales, as there is gross unusual inadequacy of the prices paid for the same. The fact that the properties were mortgaged and a notice of lis pendens was annotated on the corresponding certificate of title at the time of the sale does not lessen nor affect the values of the lands.
It has been held that in determining the amount of compensation, or the market value of the property taken, no account should be given ... to the fact that the property is mortgaged. (City of Detroit vs. Fidelity Realty Co., 182 N. W. 140, 213 Mich., cited in 29 C.J.S. 972-973.)
As regards the lis pendens annotation on the certificates of title of the subject lots, the facts show that the same arose from the action for support filed by Lourdes Rallos against her husband, Simeon Rallos. Such annotation appears to be improper as an action for support is one in personam and a notice of lis pendens is available only in real actions, that is, actions affecting the title to or the right of possession of real property and not in any other action. (Saavedra vs. Martinez, 58 Phil. 767; Garchitorena vs. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. L-9731, May 11, 1957; Somes vs. Government of the Phil., 62 Phil. 432; and Geronimo vs. Navs, G.R. No. L-12111, January 31, 1969.)
On the question of possession of the properties in litigation, however, which was likewise raised by the appellant in his motion under consideration, we are not disposed to disturb our findings on this point. At least, the records show that after the execution of the documents in question (Exhibits A, B and C), the defendants exercise over the litigated properties acts constitutive of dominion and possession for sometime prior to the appointment of the plaintiff-appellant as the administrator thereof in 1957. The transferred in then names the tax declarations of the properties described therein, cause the issuance of new certificates of title thereto accordingly in July, August and November, 1954, and paid the corresponding taxes therein (Exhibits 7 to 12, 21 to 26 and 36 to 40). Prior to the institution of the present action, the defendants, too, appeared to have demanded for the payment to them of the rentals due from the lands in dispute, and in 1956, they filed detainer suits against the occupants thereof who failed or refused to pay the rents to them (Exhibits D to D-21, inclusive, and 41, 41-A to 41-D, inclusive).
It appears, to that after the death of Simeon Rallos in 1956, the plaintiff who was appointed special administrator of the decedents estate was authorized by the court a quo to collect the rentals due from subject premises in an order issued on August 8, 1957 and had since then been in possession of the lots in question up to the present (printed Record on
Appeal, pp. 34-38). Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 1602 of the Civil Code is not applicable in the present case.( Pp. 117-124. Id.)
Thus, as may be seen, in overturning its own previous conclusion that the deeds in question are really absolute sales by subsequently finding that they are equitable mortgages, the Court of Appeals did not do it by just committing a turnabout in its appreciation or evaluation of the evidence. Rather, it reversed first its rulings on the admissibility of the relevant evidence by admitting those it had rejected in its original decision and then premised the reversal of its conclusions therein on these newly admitted evidence. Indeed, it appears to Us from the above ratiocination of the Court of Appeals in its per curiam resolution, considered together with the arguments adduced by it relative to the same matters in its original decision, that had that court found no reason to admit and take into account said evidence, it would not have reversed its previous finding that the subject deeds are absolute sales. In the final analysis, therefore, the specific question of law raised by the Aznars in this appeal is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a legal error in admitting the evidence it had originally held to be incompetent. To reiterate, it is evidently their position that in the affirmative, no alternative is left to Us except to grant the prayer of their petition.
The thrust of the per curiam resolution is that the plaintiff Borromeo was able to prove that the defendants Aznars "retained part of the purchase price" stipulated in deeds in question and that there was unusual inadequacy of said purchase price thereby justifying the use in this case of the presumption created by Article 1602 of the Civil Code whenever said circumstances are shown (Paragraphs 1 and 4 of said article). According to the Court of Appeals, these circumstances were proven through, among other evidence, the testimony of plaintiff Crispina Rallos, Alcantara, the daughter of the deceased Simeon Rallos, who declared that she was present on all occasions when the three transactions in dispute took place between her father and Matias Aznar and that while thus listening to their conversations she took down notes of the various amounts mentioned by them and the respective purposes thereof such as interest, attorney's fees, other obligations to be paid out of the money being borrowed by her father, etc., which notes were Identified at the trial as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5. More specifically, the Court of Appeals held that because the testimony of the witness Alcantara was corroborated by these notes, it should be believed, from which it can be gathered that it was only because said notes were considered by it as inadmissible that in its original decision, said testimony and notes were deemed to be without evidentiary value for being self-serving. "While it is true," says the appealed resolution, "that in our decision rendered in this case, we held that the notations or memoranda of Cristina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5. More specifically, the Court of Appeals held that because the testimony and notes were deemed to be without evidentiary value for being self-serving. "While it is true," says the appealed resolution, "that in our decision rendered in this case, we held hat the notations or memoranda of Cristina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibit A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 were self-serving and unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted (Decision, p. 24), the same, however, as nor correctly contended by plaintiff-appellant in his motion for reconsideration, may be considered as constituting part of the res gestae, and as such are admissible in evidence to show the nature of the contracts in question and the relation of the parties involved." (p. 18, Annex C of the petition.) It is the ruling upholding the admissibility of said notes and memoranda as parts of the res gestae that the Aznars contend to be a legal error committed by the Court of Appeals.
We cannot see how the disputed notes and memoranda can be considered in any sense as part of the res gestaeas this matter is known in the law of evidence. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that Crispina was not a party to the transaction in question. Only Simeon Rallos, on the one hand, and Matias Aznar, if she is to be believed, or Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, as the documents show, on the other, were the parties thereto. The record does not reveal why Crispina was with her father and the time, hence, there can be no basis for holding that she actually took part in the transaction. That she allegedly took notes thereof while there present made her at best only a witness not a party. It cannot be said, therefore, that her taking down of her alleged notes, absent any showing that she was requested or directed by the parties to do so or that the parties, more particularly the Aznars, who are being sought to be bound by then, knew what she was doing, constitute part of the transaction, the res gestae itself. If such alleged taking of notes by Crispina has to be given any legal significance at all, the most that it can be is that it is one circumstance at all, the most that it can be is that it is one circumstance relevant to the main fact in dispute. In other words it could at the most be only circumstantial evidence.
The trouble however is that the admission of said notes and memoranda suffers from a fatal defect. No witness other than Crispina has testified as to the veracity of her testimony relative to her alleged notes and memoranda. Not even her husband who, according to her, was present on one of the occasions in issue, was called to testify. It cannot be denied that Crispina is interested in the outcome of this case. In the words of the Court of Appeals itself in its original decision, "her testimony cannot be considered as absolutely unbiased or impartial", hence, "unreliable and insufficient to justify the reformation of the instruments in question." Such being the case, how can the notes and memoranda in dispute add any weight to her testimony, when she herself created them? Surely, they cannot have anymore credibility than her own declarations given under oath in open court.
The extensive and repeated arguments of the parties relative to the issue of whether or not self-serving statements may be admitted in evidence as parts of the res gestae are very interesting and illuminating, but We fee they are rather very interesting and illuminating, but We feel they are rather off tangent. The notes supposedly prepared by witness Alcantara during the transaction between her father and the Aznars do not partake at all of the nature of hearsay evidence. If anything, they constitute memoranda contemplated in Section 10 or Rule 132 which provides:
SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.
As may be observed, this provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that there is need to refresh the memory of the witness, which is not the case here. Nowhere in the record is there any indication that Alcantara needed during her testimony the aid of any memorandum in respect to the matters contained in the notes in dispute. Besides, under the above witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he support his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence, which is exactly the case of Crispina Alcantara.
The other pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals in its original decision but which it subsequently admitted upon motion for reconsideration of Borromeo, thereby causing the appellate court to reverse its own affirmatory conclusion as to the nature of the transactions in dispute as absolute sales, are the following:
1. Exhibit J, the document giving Simeon Rallos the option to "repurchase" the lots sold under Exhibit A, which however expired without Rallos excercising the same.
2. Exhibits X and Y, alleged ledgers of the Philippine National Bank apparently showing the items in the current account of Southwestern Colleges, Inc. purportedly corresponding to the checks allegedly issued by Matias Aznar to Simeon Rallos in the course of the controversial transactions herein invoked and which, it is contended, proves that the amounts actually received by Rallos were less than the stipulated prices, because corresponding interests for the alleged loan had already been deducted.
3. Exhibit K, supposedly a statement of the account of Rallos with Matias Aznar allegedly by Crispina Alcantara to have been prepared by an employee of Aznar who, however, was not called to testify.
4. Exhibits T, U and V, purported inspection and appraisal reports allegedly submitted by investigators of the Philippine National Bank to whom the property described in Exhibit C covering four lots, Nos. 467, 490, 519-B and 519-C had been mortgaged indicating therein the market value thereof as appraised by said investigators and on the basis of which Borromeo now maintains that there was inadequacy of the purchase price in said deed of sale Exhibit C for the purposes of the presumption in
Article 1602 of the Civil Code that the disputed transactions are equitable mortgages.
As regards Exhibit J, the contention of the Aznars is that in its per curiam resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed itself as to the evidentiary value of this exhibit without giving any reason at all. What is worse, whereas in its original decision, the Appellate Court pointedly held that since Exhibit J was an option to repurchase that had expired without being exercised, it could not alter the true nature of Exhibit A, the deed of absolute sale of the properties to which said options refers, in its resolution, this exhibit was used as basis for the further inference that there were also similar options relative to the other two sales in question, Exhibits B and C, merely because Crispina Alcantara testified that Aznar, hence the same could not be produced.
Again, We find the position of the Aznars to be well taken. True it is that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of question of fact and as such has the inherent power to reverse its findings. For it, however, to alter its factual findings without any adequate basis borders on being whimsical and capricious. At the very least, to do is such a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. (Section 4 (b), Rule 45.) In this case of Exhibit J here, nowhere in the appealed resolution is there any explanation for the Court's turnabout. The casual reference in the said resolution of Exhibit J as being corroborative of the testimony of Crispina Alcantara together with her notes, Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5, is certainly an unwarranted conclusion, considering specially that We have already ruled above that there was no legal basis for the Appellate Court's reversal of its original position as to said notes themselves. In this connection, the same notes constitute the main support of Crispina's testimony, hence the corroborative force of Exhibit J must necessarily dissipate without them. Indeed, under the circumstances, with the notes of Crispina being inadmissible, and absent any other pertinent document to back up her work, the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals regarding options to repurchase the properties covered by Exhibits B and C appear hollow and baseless.
The appealed resolution also reversed the Appellate Court's original pose anent the admissibility of Exhibits X and Y by attributing to it corroborative evidentiary value of the testimony of Crispina, although it did not even mention said exhibits in its earlier decision. As in the case of the exhibits previously discussed, We are of the considered opinion that it was legal error for the Court of Appeals to have thus ruled in favor of the admission of these exhibits, X and Y merely by implication. It is true that their contents were discussed in the resolution, but no reason is given therein why they have suddenly become admissible.
These exhibits purport to be ledgers of the Philippine National Bank corresponding to the current account of the Southwestern Colleges owned by the Aznars. Now, it is undisputed that these exhibits were offered only in rebuttal and that no witness testified on them, not even for purposes of Identification. How the Appellate Court came to take them into account is surprising, considering that the appealed resolution does not contain the slightest discussion relative to these exhibits. Obviously, such a procedure cannot deserve Our sanction. We reject it as unjudicial.
The same observation may be made with respect to Exhibits T, U and V. No one testified as to their controversial contents. Nobody even Identified them. They were just marked and shoved in as part of the documentary evidence of Borromeo in rebuttal. In an effort to give them a semblance of admissibility, counsel now contends that they are public documents appearing to have been prepared by employees of the Philippine National Bank. But although this bank is a government bank, it is not wholly owned by the government, there being private persons owning shares thereof. This is a matter of judicial notice. Officials and employees of the Philippine National Bank are not, therefore, public officers within the contemplation of Section 38 of Rule 130. Moreover, assuming otherwise or that these exhibits could have any standing as public or official records, under Section 35 of Rule 132, they do not prove themselves, as certain requisites must be complied with before they can be admitted, none of which appears to have been established in connection with the exhibits in question. Worse, it is clear in the record that these exhibits relate to only one of the three transactions herein involved. Accordingly, We do not see any justification at all for their admission as evidence to prove the true nature of the said transactions.
Very little needs be said of Exhibit K. In its original decision, the Appellate Court rejected this exhibit holding: "The exhibit in question, allegedly a statement of account of Rallos to Matias Aznar involving the disputed transaction is neither dated nor signed, much less by the party sought to be charged. The alleged writer thereof was not presented at the trial of the case, and we have only the biased testimony of Crispina as to its authenticity or preparation. Even if it were true, however, that the writing was made, as alleged by Crispina, we cannot consider the same as proof of what was said or transacted then. The mere making of written memorandum immediately after the interview does not make the memorandum affirmative intrinsic proof of the things said or transacted. (32 C.J.S. 948.) Knowledge on the part of the person who made the memorandum, at the time it was made, that the statements or entries therein were correct must be shown (32 C.J.S. 947), and this the plaintiff failed to do. On the other hand, the record indubitably shows that after the execution of the questioned instruments, the taxes on the lots subject matter thereof were paid by the defendants vendees. Consequently, we hold that Exhibit K has no evidentiary value, and the lower court was correct in disregarding it." (Pages 94-95, Record of L-31740.) On the other hand, in the impugned resolution, the only mention made of Exhibit K is but casual thus: "Crispina Rallos Alcantara went to Matias Aznar to know the total indebtedness of her father, which, according to Aznar had accumulated to P55,428.00 (Exhibit K)."
We are not prepared to give Our assent to such a mode of treating a factual issue. If anything, the subsequent treatment thus given to the document in question reflects lack of serious consideration of the material points in dispute. That is not the way to decide judicial controversies. While courts do not have to so rationalize their decisions as to meet all the arguments of counsel to the satisfaction of the latter, it is imperative for the credibility of the judiciary and the maintenance of the people's faith therein that pivotal contentions be not treated in cavalier fashion that leaves the motive or grounds for the court's ruling to pure speculation and imagination. The attempt of counsel to classify this exhibit as some kind of admission by Matias Aznar is without merit, if only because it was not to Crispina, the witness, to whom the alleged admission was made and it is not explained why the supposed employee of Aznar, a certain Baltazar, who imputedly prepared it was not called to testify and be cross-examined.
In the final analysis, therefore, it is evident that the Court of Appeals has sought to support its reversing per curiam resolution with props that are legally untenable. True it is that the reversal involves factual findings, but as already explained earlier, a careful review of the appealed resolution reveals unmistakably that the reversal was induced by the reconsideration by the Court of its previous rulings on the admissibility of the relevant evidence, such that its original conclusions of fact would not have been altered had the Court not been convinced by the motion for reconsideration of Borromeo that the exhibits it had rejected or refused to consider are admissible under the law. In these premises, and it being Our considered view that the rulings in the appealed resolution as to the admissibility of the exhibits concerned are legally erroneous, the irresistible conclusion is hat the original decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court must stand. Indeed, We have gone over both decisions and We are satisfied that they were studied and are in accord with law and justice.
We are not overlooking the point by counsel that some of the exhibits in question (Exhibits X and Y and T, U and V) were not specifically objected to on the grounds We have discussed above. The truth is that counsel's proposition is not entirely accurate. These exhibits are supposed to be records of the Philippine National Bank, but nobody testified to even Identify them as genuine. And they were introduced only in rebuttal. True it is that the technical objections mentioned by Aznars' counsel when they were offered were general — for being immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent, but the explanation accompanying these general grounds included the point that defendants were being deprived of the right to cross-examine the ones who prepared the exhibits. In fact, the objecting counsel is quoted to have expressly argued that "It appears that these exhibits are hearsay." (referring to Exhibits T U and V (Page 241, Brief for Respondents.) Furthermore, inasmuch as the Court of Appeals failed to give any reason for overturning its previous conclusions, without explaining why it considered these evidence admissible, after ruling against them in the original decision, We deem it superfluous to rule squarely on counsel's contention.
That somehow the Court of Appeals has been overly swayed by the masterly presentation of Borromeo's case by his notably brilliant counsel is, of course, understandable in the course of the administration of human justice but it is the ever existing responsibility of judges to guard themselves against being awed by the professional proficiency and fame of the lawyers appearing before them and to be doubly careful in studying and resolving the issues they raise. And in this respect, there is no substitute for well grounded preparation, up-to-dateness in the development of the law and legal principles and an adequate sense of logic and proportion inspired solely by probity of the highest order. The assertion made in some quarters about alleged inherent inequality before the courts resulting from the disparity of the abilities of respective counsels of the parties cannot have real ground for being, if only the judges remain conscious of the inevitable fact that they are supposed to possess the levelling factor their own knowledge pitted against those of the most learned advocates, to augment the possible inadequacy of the opposing attorney, who in most cases are of the poor who cannot afford the fees of better barristers.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the per curiam resolution of the Court of Appeals appealed in G.R. No. L-31740 is hereby reversed and the original decision of that court dated January 30, 1968 in CA-G.R. No. 30092-R is affirmed. In consequence, obviously, the prayer of the petition in G.R. No. L-31342 being to augment the reliefs granted by the appealed resolution
to Borromeo cannot be granted, hence said petition is hereby ordered dismissed. Costs against Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of Simeon Rallos.
Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs the result.
Fernando, J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs.JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1990 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, directing the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL, for short) to pay the private respondents the amounts specified therein as actual, moral and temperate damages as well as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The antecedents facts are briefly recounted by the appellate court, as follows:
Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were brought sometime in August 1985. Among the conditions included in plaintiffs tickets is the following:
1. CHECK-IN TIME — Please check in at the Airport Passenger check-in counter at least one hour before PUBLISHED departure time of your flight. We will consider your accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted passenger if you fail to check-in at least 30 minutes before PUBLISHED departure time. (Exhs. (1-A-A, 2-A-1, S-A, O-A-1, tsn. Nov 23, 1987, p. 8).
Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went tot he check-in counter of the defendant's Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the published
departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach of contract of carriage.
Defendant disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of plaintiff on the said flight was due to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is averred even if defendant is found liable to the plaintiffs such liability is confined to, and limited by, the CAB Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction with P.D. 589.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage in bumping-off the plaintiffs from its F264 flight of September 25, 1985, and ordered defendant to pay:
1) P1,250.20 — the total value of the tickets:
2) P22.50 — the total value of airport security fees and terminal fees;
3) P20,000.00 — for each of the plaintiffs for moral and temperate damages; and
4) P5,000.00 — for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 990, the appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 42)
Hence, this present petition with the following legal questions:
1. Can the Honorable Court of Appeals validity promulgate the questioned decision by the simple expedient of adopting in toto the trial court's finding that defendant-appellant is liable for damages on the sole issue of credibility of witnesses without considering the material admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on record that substantiate the defense of defendant-appellant.
2. Can the Honorable Court award legally moral and temperate damages plus attorney's fees of P5,000.00 contrary to the evidence and established jurisprudence. (Rollo, p. 9)
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove his affirmative allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party (Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83376, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 619, 625).
The case at bar presents a simple question of fact: Whether or not the private respondents were late in checking-in for their flight from Naga City to Manila on September 24. 1985. It is immediately apparent from the records of this case that the claims of the parties on this question are dramatically opposed. As a rule, the determination of a question of fact depends largely on the credibility of witnesses unless some documentary evidence is available which clearly substantiates the issue and whose genuineness and probative value is not disputed (Legarda v. Miaile, 88 Phil. 637, 642). The exception to the rule now runs true in this case.
We reverse. This case once more illustrates Our power to re-weigh the findings of lower courts when the same are not supported by the record or not based on substantial evidence (see Cruz v. Villarin, G.R. No. 75679, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 53, 61).
It is an admitted fact that the private respondents knew of the required check-in time for passengers. The time requirement is prominently printed as one of the conditions of carriage on their tickets, i.e., that the airport passenger should check-in at least one hour before published departure time of his flight and PAL shall consider his accommodation forfeited in favor of waistlisted passengers if he fails to check-in at least 30 minutes.
We note that while the aforequoted condition has always been applied strictly and without exception (TSN, December 16, 1987, p. 11), the station manager, however, may exercise his discretion to allow passengers who checked-in late to board provided the flight is not fully booked and seats are available (ibid, pp. 17-18). On September 24, 1985, flight 264 from Naga to Manila was fully booked owing to the Peñafrancia Festival (TSN, January 25, 1988, p.5). In addition, PAL morning flights 261 and 262 were canceled resulting in a big number o f waitlisted passengers. (TSN, November 23,1987, p. 6).
The private respondents claim that they were on time in checking-in for their flight; that no PAL personnel attended to them until much later which accounted for their late check-in; that PAL advanced the check-in time and the departure of their flight resulting in their non-accommodation; and that they suffered physical difficulties, anxieties and business losses.
The evidence on record does not support the above contentions. We note that there were two other confirmed passengers who came ahead of the private respondents but were refused accommodation because they were late. Edmundo Araquel, then the check-in-clerk, testified on this point, as follows:
Atty. Marcelino C. Calica, counsel for PAL
Q Before the plaintiffs arrive (sic) at the check-in counter, do you recall if there were other passengers who arrived at the counter and they were advised that they were late?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who were those persons?
A My former classmates at Ateneo, sir, Rose Capati and Go, Merly.
Q Were these two passengers also confirmed passengers on this flight?
A Yes, sir.
Q I show to you a document which is entitled "Passenger Manifest of flight 264, September 24, 1985," which we request to be marked as Exh. "5" you said earlier that aside from the plaintiffs here there were two other passengers who also checked in but they were also late and you mentioned the names of these passengers as Capati and Go, please point to us that entry which will show the names of Go and Capati?
A Here, sir, numbers 13 and 14 of the Manifest.
ATTY. CALICA: We request that passengers 13 and 14 be marked in evidence, Go for 13 and Capati for 14 as Exh. "5-A."
Q You said that these two passengers you mentioned were also similarly denied accommodations because they checked in late, did they check in before or after the plaintiffs?
A Before, sir.
Q What time did they appear at the counter?
A 4:01 p.m., sir.
Q What happened when they checked in at 4:01?
A I told them also that they were late so they cannot be accommodated and they tried to protest, but they decided later on just to refund the ticket. (TSN of November 23, 1987, pp. 11-12)
Shortly after, the private respondents followed the aforesaid two passengers at the counter. At this juncture, Araquel declared, thus:
Q Now, you said that you met the plaintiffs in this case because they were passengers of Flight 264 on September 24, 1985 and they were not accommodated because they checked in late, what time did these plaintiffs check in?
A Around 4:02 p.m., sir.
Q Who was the clerk at the check in counter who attended to them?
A I was the one, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said when you were presented the tickets of the plaintiffs in this case and noting that they were late for checking in, immediately after advising them that they were late, you said you made annotation on the tickets?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you Exhs. "A," "B," "C," and "D," which are the tickets of Mr. & Mrs. Jaime Ramos for Exh. "A," Exh. "B" ticket of Mr. & Mrs. Daniel Ilano, "C" ticket of Felipa Javalera and "D" ticket of Erlinda Ilano, will you please go over the same and point to us the notations you said you made on these tickets?
A This particular time, sir. (Witness pointing to the notation "Late" and the time "4:02" appearing at the upper righthand of the tickets Exhs. "A," "B," "C," and "D.")
Q How long did it take after the tickets were tendered to you for checking in and before you made this notation?
A It was just seconds, sir.
Q On the tickets being tendered for check-in and noting that they were late, you mean to say you immediately made annotations?
A Yes, sir. That is an S.O.P. of the office.
Q So on what time did you base that 4:02?
A At the check-in counter clock, sir.
Q At the time you placed the time, what was the time reflected at the counter clock?
A 4:02, sir. (ibid, pp. 8-11)
The private respondents submitted no controverting evidence. As clearly manifested above, the intervening time between Capati and Go and the private respondents took only a mere second. If indeed, the private respondents were at the check-in counter at 3:30 p.m., they could have been the first ones to be attended to by Araquel than Capati and Go. They cold have also protested if they were the earliest passengers at the counter but were ignored by Araquel in favor of Go and Capati. They did not.
It is likewise improbable that not a single PAL personnel was in attendance at the counter when the check-in counter was supposed to be opened at 3:25 p.m. It mist be remembered that the morning flight to Manila was canceled and hence, it is not farfetched for Us to believe that the PAL personnel then have their hands full in dealing with the passengers of the morning flight who became waitlisted passengers. Moreover, the emphatic assertions of private respondent Daniel Javalora Ilano regarding the absence of a PAL personnel lost its impact during the cross examination:
ATTY. CALICA —
Q So, you maintain therefore that for all the time that you waited for there for the whole twenty (20) minutes the check-in counter and other PAL Offices there — the whole counter was completely unmanned? I am referring to the whole area there where it is enclosed by a counter.
I will describe to you, for the benefit of the court.
When you approach the counter at Naga Airport, the counter is enclosed, I mean, you cannot just go inside the PAL office, right? there is some sort of counter where you deal with the PAL personnel and you approximate this counter to be five (5) to six (6) meters. Now, this space after the counter, did you observe what fixtures or enclosures are contained there inside the enclosed space?
A I am not sure whether there are offices or enclosures there.
Q You have been traveling and had opportunity to check-in your tickets so may times. Everytime that you check-in, how many personnel are manning the check-in counter?
A There are about three (3) or four (4), sir.
Q Everytime, there are three (3) or four (4)?
A Everytime but not that time.
Q I am referring to your previous trips, I am not referring to this incident.
On previous occasions when you took the flight with Pili Airport and you see three (3) or four (4) personnel everytime, are all these three (3) or four (4) personnel at the counter or some are standing at the counter or others are seated on the table doing something or what? Will you describe to us?
A Some are handling the baggages and some are checking-in the tickets.
Q So, on most occasions when you check-in and say, there were at least three (3) of four (4) people at the check-in counter, one would attend to the tickets, another to the check in baggage, if any. Now, do you notice if somebody evade when you check-in your ticket. This other person would receive the flight coupon which is detached from your ticket and record it on what we call passenger manifest?
A That's true.
Q Now, it is clear one would attend to the baggage, another person would receive the ticket, detach the coupon and one would record it on the passenger manifest. What about the fourth, what was he doing, if you recall?
A I think, putting the identification tags on the baggages (sic). (TSN, November 17, 1986, p. 38)
Ilano's declaration becomes even more patently unreliable in the face of the Daily Station Report of PAL dated September 24, 1985 which contained the working hours of its personnel from 0600 to 1700 and their respective assignments, as follows:
ATTY. CALICA
Q Normally upon opening of the check-in counter, how many PAL personnel are assigned to man the counter?
EDMUNDO ARAQUEL
A A total of four personnel with the assistance of others.
Q Who are these personnel are assigned to the counter and what specific duties they performed?
A Mr. Oropesa handled the cargo, Mr. Espiritu handled the ticketing, Mr. Valencia and me handled the checking in of passengers.
Q Are you referring to this particular flight 264 on September 24, 1985?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was assigned as check-in clerk that particular time?
A I was the one with Mr. Valencia, sir.
Q What was Mr. Valencia doing?
A He assisted me, sir.
Q How?
A If a group of passengers simultaneously check in, we divided the work between us. (TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 7)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the plaintiffs testified in this case particularly plaintiff Daniel Ilano and Felipa Javalera at the previous hearings said plaintiffs stated that they arrived at the check-in counter at about 3:25 or 3:30 and there was nobody in the counter, what can you say to that?
A We cannot leave the counter, sir. That was always manned from 3:25 up to the last minute. We were there assigned to handle the checking in of the passengers.
Q You mentioned earlier that aside from you there were other personnel assigned to the check-in counter and you even mentioned about a certain Valencia assisting you, do you have any evidence to show said assignment of personnel at the airport?
A Yes, sir.
Q I show to you a daily station report from 24 September 1985 covering working hours 0600 to 1700, will you please go over the same and thereafter tell us from the personnel listed in this Daily Station Report what were the name (sic) of the personnel assigned to man a check-in counter at that time?
A There (sic) persons assigned were Mr. Oropesa, Mr. Espiritu, Mr. Medevilla, myself and Mr. Valencia.
Q You mentioned about Mr. Espiritu, what was his specific task at that time?
A He was handling the ticketing, sir.
Q What about Mr. Medevilla?
A He was taking care of the ramp handling.
Q And Mr. Oropesa?
A He was handling the incoming cargo.
ATTY. CALICA: We request that this Daily Station Report be marked Exh. "6" and the portion of the Report which shows the deployment of personnel of PAL Naga Station on September 24, 1985 as "6-A."
Q Plaintiffs in this case testified that when they checked in there was nobody manning the counter and they had to wait for twenty minutes before someone came in to the counter, what can you say to that?
A It is not true because all the time we were there from the start, an hour before the flight we were there because we were assigned there.
Q Plaintiff Daniel Ilano testified that he went to the counter twice, first at 3:25 and it was only at 4:00 p.m. that somebody went to the counter and attended to him and while he expected his boarding pass he was told instead that plaintiffs could not be accommodated because they were late, what can you say to that?
A The truth is we were always there and we never left the counter from the start of the check-in time of 3:25 we were all there, we never left the counter.
Q Until what time did you remain at the check-in counter?
A At around 4:15 p.m., sir.
Q You said that the check-in counter was closed at 3:55, for what purpose were you still manning the check-in counter?
A To attend to the passenger who are late in checking in because they also need assistance in explaining to them the situation.
Q So it was for that purpose you were there?
A Yes, sir. (ibid., pp. 16-18)
It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who checked-in late after the private respondents (TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 13). In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go an the private respondents)are entries made in the regular course of business which the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p. 654). Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language (Spouses Vicente and Salome de Leon v. CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in their complaint (where they claimed that no one was at the counter until thirty (30) minutes before the published departure time and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late, Records, p. 2) and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter. TSNs of November 17, 1986, pp. 41-45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5-6). Private respondents' only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae (32 C.J.S., S. 411, 30-31). Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to believe the version of PAL. When the private respondents purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions of the contract of carriage particularly the check-in time requirement. The terms of the contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not militate against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of their own action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of their tickets by PAL is only proper.
Furthermore, We do not find anything suspicious in the fact that PAL flight 264 departed at 4:13 p.m. instead of 4:25 p.m. Apart from their verbal assertions, the private respondents did not show any evidence of irregularity. It being clear that all the passengers have already
boarded, there was no sense in keeping them waiting for the scheduled time of departure before the plane could take flight.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1990 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
