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Charla ipv6

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1 Rafa Sanchez Gómez – CISA [email protected] @r_a_ff_a_e_ll_o A little bit of IPv6 security
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Page 1: Charla ipv6

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Rafa Sanchez Gómez – CISA [email protected] @r_a_ff_a_e_ll_o

A little bit of IPv6 security

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1. Brief introduction to IPv6

2. Some security risks in IPv6

3. Research results

4. Demo

Seguridad en IPv6

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1. Brief introduction to IPv6

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Some interesting aspects of IPv6

The main driver for IPv6 is its

increased address space

IPv6 uses 128-bit addresses

There are different address types (unicast,

anycast, and multicast) and different address

scopes (link-local, global, etc.)

It’s common for a node to be using, at any given time,

several addresses, of multiple types and scopes.

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Some interesting aspects of IPv6

The “end-to-end principle” …

Each device will have a

globally-unique address.

NATs will be no longer needed.

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Hacking IPv6

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Hacking IPv6 - parasite6: icmp neighbor solitication/advertisement spoofer, puts you as

man-in-the-middle, same as ARP mitm (and parasite)

- alive6: an effective alive scanng, which will detect all systems listening to

this address

- fake_router6: announce yourself as a router on the network, with the

highest priority

- redir6: redirect traffic to you intelligently (man-in-the-middle) with a clever

icmp6 redirect spoofer

- toobig6: mtu decreaser with the same intelligence as redir6

- dos-new-ip6: detect new ip6 devices and tell them that their chosen IP

collides on the network (DOS).

- trace6: very fast traceroute6 with supports ICMP6 echo request and TCP-

SYN

- flood_router6: flood a target with random router advertisements

- flood_advertise6: flood a target with random neighbor advertisements

- exploit6: known ipv6 vulnerabilities to test against a target

- denial6: a collection of denial-of-service tests againsts a target

- fuzz_ip6: fuzzer for ipv6

- implementation6: performs various implementation checks on ipv6

- implementation6d: listen daemon for implementation6 to check behind a fw

- fake_mld6: announce yourself in a multicast group on the net

- fake_mld26: same but for MLDv2

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Hacking IPv6

IPv6(dst="2a02:9001:0:ffff:80:58:105:253")/

IPv6ExtHdrRouting(type=0,addresses=["2a02:9001:0:57::6"])/ ICMPv6EchoRequest()

#!/usr/bin/pythonfrom

scapy.all import * def aleatorio():

ff=str(RandIP6()) ff=ff[20:39]

return ff

for i in range(1,100000): packet=IPv6(src="2001:5c0:1400:a:8000:0:580c:3aa",dst="2a02:9008:3:111:"

+(aleatorio()))/ICMPv6EchoRequest() send(packet,iface="sit1")

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2. Some security risks in IPv6

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IPv4 Attack Example

Internal

Network

Victim is

attacked !!!

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IPv6 Connectivity Schema

Public Prefix

assigned 2a02:9008:3::/64

Administration

Administration

No NAT Needed with IPv6

No internal network needed

Direct connectivity

2a02:9008:3::1

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IPv6 Phishing Attack Example

Public Prefix assigned

2a02:9008:3::/64

Default Passwords

Brute Force (Hydra) Exploit Known Vulnerabilities

Victim is

attacked !!!

2a02:9008:3::1

Don’t work

too hard

No scpecial vulnerability in

the routers is needed.

No interaction from the

clients is needed

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Users also exposed

End-to-end model

2a02:9008:3::1

2a02:9008:3::a36:1

2a02:9008:3::a35:2

2a02:9008:3::a46:8

2a02:9008:3::a86:6

Vulnerable

services !!

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3. Research results

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Administration Services exposed in Internet

We made a research to check if this

was a real risk, and we discovered

that indeed it is…

We collected public information

avaliable in Internet about IPv6

prefixes asigned by LIRs

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IPv4 Connectivity

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Administration Services exposed in Internet

We Scanned some of those prefixes just

using nmap

Only some of the first IPs of each prefix…

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Administration Services exposed in Internet

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Administration Services exposed in Internet

Mail services in IPv6 SPAM nightmare is

coming…

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4. Demo …

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1. Windows 7

2. Linux (Backtrack)

3. Mac OS

Tunneling…

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NDP

Public Prefix

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:/64

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:437:af0:665:8

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:889:acb:9999:1

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:7676:bbb:9:10 2a02:9008:3:f0f0:437:af0:665:8

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:437:af0:665:8

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NDP Flooding … 2a02:9008:3:f0f0:437:af0:665:8

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:889:acb:9999:1

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:7676:bbb:9:10

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:437:af0:665:8

CAM Table

11:22:33:44:55:66 - 2a02:9008:3:f0f0:437:af0:665:8 66:55:44:33:22:11 - 2a02:9008:3:f0f0:7676:bbb:9:10

… - …

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:RAND Public Prefix

2a02:9008:3:f0f0:/64

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NDP Flooding in action…

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Questions ???

Rafa Sánchez Gómez [email protected] @R_a_ff_a_e_ll_o

es.linkedin.com/in/rafasanchezgomez


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