Cic on Lifeboat Launching Arrangements Boat

8/18/2019 Cic on Lifeboat Launching Arrangements Boat

1/18

Safety of Navigation

Section 7-7

Page S7-7-12Revision 1/2009

A clear view in all directions is preferred, but it is essential to be able to see ahead, and

especially directly ahead.

There should be no blind sector caused by cargo forward of the beam which obstructsthe view of the sea surface as seen from the navigating and manoeuvring workstationto exceed 10 degrees on each side of the bow and two ship lenghts or 500 meters fromthe stem.

Question 12:

Can the master and watch keeping officers concerned with the operation of the

steering gear demonstrate the change over procedures and operation of steering

systems?Reg. 26 applies to all ships, which proceed to sea. Regulation 26 summarizes the

requirements for:

A simple operating instructions with a block diagram showing the change overprocedures for remote steering gear control systems and steering gear power unitswhere applicable, be permanently displayed on the navigating bridge and in thesteering gear compartment.

• For testing steering gear prior to departure.

• Requirements for instructions.• Officers competence in steering gear operation / maintenance.

• Requirements for testing emergency steering gear drills.

• Recording of tests and drills

The checks and tests shall include:

• The full movement of the rudder according to the required capabilities of the

steering gear.

• A visual inspection for the steering gear and its connecting linkage; and

• The operation of the means of communication between the Navigation Bridgeand steering gear compartment.

Masters, and all watch keeping personnel must be familiar with the procedure for

changing over from automatic to manual steering as required by Regulation 26, and

must ensure that sufficient time is allowed for the operation. The changeover from

manual to automatic steering and vice-versa should be made by, or under the

supervision of, the officer of the watch or the master.

All ships' officers concerned with the operation and/or maintenance of steering gear

shall be familiar with the operation of the steering systems fitted on the ship and withthe procedures for changing from one system to another.


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Lifeboat Launching Arrangements

Section 7-8


CONCENTRATED INSPECTION CAMPAIGN ON LIFEBOAT LAUNCHING ARRANGEMENTS*

Inspection Authority:

Port of Inspection:

Date of Inspection

Ship Name:

IMO Number:

Flag of Ship:

Call Sign:

Ship Type:

Port

On-load release Manufacturer:

On-load release model:

On-load release date of manufacture:

Starboard

On-load release Manufacturer:

On-load release model:

On-load release date of manufacture:

Yes No N/A

1 Does the ship have davit-launched lifeboats?1

Maintenance and Records

2 Do records indicate that lifeboats have been launched and manoeuvred in the

water in accordance with SOLAS requirements? (2025)

3 Do records indicate that the dynamic tests of the winch brake have been carried

out? (0696)2

4* Do records indicate that the launching arrangements (falls, lifeboats, on-load

release and davits) are regularly maintained? (0696) 5* Are the means of attaching the lifeboat hook assemblies to the lifeboat in

satisfactory condition? (0696)2

Operational Safety

6 Have the hazards associated with the launching and recovery of lifeboats been

identified (ISM)? (2535)

7 Are any procedures or instructions implemented on-board relating to the

hazards identified in Q6? (2535)

* The CIC on lifeboat launching arrangements was conducted during period of September-November 2009.


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Section 7-8


Yes No N/A

8* Are all key personnel familiar with the procedures for the launch and recovery of

lifeboats? (0695)

9 Is the crew familiar with relevant IMO documentation and guidance including

MSC Circulars 1205 and 1206? (0695)

On Load Releases

10 Are on load releases fitted?3

11* Can the ships crew describe an understanding of the operation of the on-load

release, including interlocks as appropriate? (0695)

12 Are clear operating instructions for use of the on-load release, in the working

language of the ship, provided with a suitably worded warning notice? (2055)

13 Is the release mechanism designed so that crew members in the lifeboat can

clearly observe when the release mechanism is properly and completely reset

and ready for lifting? (0630)

14 Is the release control clearly marked in a colour that contrasts with its

surroundings? (0630)

15* Are the hooks and release arrangements, including any interlocks, correctly set?

(0630)

16* Are lifeboat on-load releases in satisfactory condition? (0696)

Davits and Winches

17* Are the davits in satisfactory condition? (0696)

18* Do all the sheaves and other moving parts, including limit switches, operate

correctly? (0696) 2

19* Is the centrifugal winch brake operating satisfactori ly in “freefall” mode and the

manual brake automatically reapplying upon release? (0630) 2

Drill

20* If conducted, was a drill performed satisfactorily? (2025)

(If not conducted enter N/A)

Detention

21 Was the ship detained as a result of this CIC?

If a “NO” answer is selected for questions marked with * the PSCO should use their professional judgement to

determine whether the vessel should be considered for detention.

1For free-fall lifeboats answer “NO”

For vessels without lifeboats answer “NA” and answer questions 2 – 19 “NA”

2For free-fall lifeboats answer “NA”

3If “No” questions 11-16 should be marked “NA”


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Section 7-8


Guidance Notes

Headers: On-load release Manufacturer, Model and Date of manufacture only to be

completed for on-load release equipment fitted to davit-launched lifeboats.

For free-fall lifeboats, davit launched lifeboats with conventional (off-load only)

release hooks and where the vessel has no lifeboats as allowed by SOLAS

III/31.1, the fields are to be marked “N/A”.

Question 1: Answer will be “Yes” for “conventionally” launched open or enclosed lifeboats.

Answer will be “No” for free-fall boats.

Answer will be “N/A” where the vessel has no lifeboats as allowed by SOLAS

III/31.1.3. Where the vessel carries no lifeboats, questions 2-19 are to

be marked “N/A” .

Question 2: Records should indicate that drills have been conducted in accordance with

SOLAS III/19.3 with the exception that the operating crew need not be onboard

during the lowering of the boat if the ship chooses not to do so.

Question 3: Dynamic tests of the winch brake are not required for free-fall lifeboats (Q.1marked as “No”) and should be answered “NA” if applicable.

For lifeboats where Q.1 has been marked as “Yes” look for evidence/records of

tests carried out as required by SOLAS III/20.11 and LSA Code ChVI as

detailed below;

SOLAS III/20.11

11 Periodic servicing of launching appliances and on-load release gear11.1 Launching appliances shall be:

.1 maintained in accordance with instructions for on-board

maintenance as required by regulation 36;

.2 subject to a thorough examination at the annual surveys required

by regulations I/7 or I/8, as applicable; and

.3 upon completion of the examination referred to in .2 subjected

to a dynamic test of the winch brake at maximum lowering

speed. The load to be applied shall be the mass of the survival

craft or rescue boat without persons on board, except that, atintervals not exceeding five years, the test shall be carried out


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Section 7-8


with a proof load equal to 1.1 times the weight of the survival

craft or rescue boat and its full complement of persons and

equipment.

MSC Circ.1206 also recommends that a dynamic test of the winch brake, using the

empty boat, be conducted at each annual inspection. As this is a recommendation and

the circular is not mandatory, a deficiency for this may not be warranted.

LSA Code Ch VI 6.

6.1.2.5 The winch brakes of a launching appliance shall be of sufficient strength to

withstand:

.1 a static test with a proof load of not less than 1.5 times the maximum

working load; and

.2 a dynamic test with a proof load of not less than 1.1 times the

maximum working load at maximum lowering speed.

Question 4: Maintenance to be carried out in accordance with SOLAS III/20.4 as per

Resolution MSC 216(82) from 01st July 2008;

For lifeboats where Q.1 has been marked as “Yes” look for evidence of

maintenance carried out as required by SOLAS III/20.3, 20.4, 20.6 and 20.7

and 20.11; as detailed below;

SOLAS III/20.3

3 Maintenance

3.1 Maintenance, testing and inspections of life-saving appliances shall

be carried out based on the guidelines developed by the Organization*

and in a manner having due regard to ensuring reliability of such

appliances.

* Refer to the Guidelines for periodic servicing and maintenance of lifeboats,

launching appliances and on-load release gear (MSC/Circ.1206).

3.2 Instructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances

complying with regulation 36 shall be provided and maintenance shall be

carried out accordingly.

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Section 7-8


3.3 The Administration may accept, in compliance with the requirements

of paragraph 3.2, a shipboard planned maintenance programme, which

includes the requirements of regulation 36.

SOLAS III/20.4

Falls used in launching shall be inspected periodically* with special regard for

areas passing through sheaves, and renewed when necessary due to

deterioration of the falls or at intervals of not more than 5 years, whichever is

the earlier.

* Refer to Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats (MSC.1/Circ.1206).

The PSCO may also ask the master for an indication of how such inspections

are conducted and whether there are any flag State requirements. PSCO’s

should note that the above SOLAS amendment removed the previous

regulation requiring end-for-ending of falls at no more than 30 months.

SOLAS III/20.6

6 Weekly inspection

The following tests and inspections shall be carried out weekly and a report of

the inspection shall be entered in the log-book:

.1 all survival craft, rescue boats and launching appliances shall be

visually inspected to ensure that they are ready for use. The inspection

shall include, but is not limited to, the condition of hooks, their attachment

to the lifeboat and the on-load release gear being properly and completely

reset;

.2 all engines in lifeboats and rescue boats shall be run for a total period of

not less than 3 min, provided the ambient temperature is above the

minimum temperature required for starting and running the engine. During

this period of time, it should be demonstrated that the gear box and gear

box train are engaging satisfactorily. If the special characteristics of an

outboard motor fitted to a rescue boat would not allow it to be run other

than with its propeller submerged for a period of 3 min, a suitable water

supply may be provided. In special cases, the Administration may waive

this requirement for ships constructed before 1 July 1986;

.3 lifeboats, except free-fall lifeboats, on cargo ships shall be moved from

their stowed position, without any persons on board, to the extent

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Section 7-8


necessary to demonstrate satisfactory operation of launching appliances,

if weather and sea conditions so allow;

SOLAS III/20.7

7 Monthly inspections

7.1 All lifeboats, except free-fall lifeboats, shall be turned out from their

stowed position, without any persons on board if weather and sea

conditions so allow.

7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment,

shall be carried out monthly using the checklist required by regulation 36.1

to ensure that they are complete and in good order. A report of the

inspection shall be entered in the log-book.

SOLAS III/20.11

11 Periodic servicing of launching appliances and on-load release gear

11.1 Launching appliances shall be:

.1 maintained in accordance with instructions for on-board maintenance

as required by regulation 36;

.2 subject to a thorough examination at the annual surveys required by

regulations I/7 or I/8, as applicable; and

.3 upon completion of the examination referred to in .2 subjected to a

dynamic test of the winch brake at maximum lowering speed. The load

to be applied shall be the mass of the survival craft or rescue boat

without persons on board, except that, at intervals not exceeding five

years, the test shall be carried out with a proof load equal to 1.1 times

the weight of the survival craft or rescue boat and its full complement of

persons and equipment.

11.2 Lifeboat or rescue boat on-load release gear, including free-fall lifeboat

release systems, shall be:

.1 maintained in accordance with instructions for on-board maintenance

as required by regulation 36;

.2 subject to a thorough examination and operational test during the

annual surveys required by regulations I/7 and I/8 by properly trained

personnel familiar with the system; and

.3 operationally tested under a load of 1.1 times the total mass of the boatwhen loaded with its full complement of persons and equipment


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Section 7-8


whenever the release gear is overhauled. Such over-hauling and test

shall be carried out at least once every five years.*

Refer to the Recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances, adopted by

the Organization by resolution A.689(17). For life-saving appliances installed

on board on or after 1 July 1999, refer to the Revised Recommendations on

testing of life-saving appliances, adopted by the Organization by resolution

MSC.81(70).

Question 5: For free-fall lifeboats answer “NA”

Particular attention should be given to corrosion in the keel area.

Question 6: Refer to MSC/Circ.1206 which identifies the follow hazards.

i. failure of on-load release mechanism;

ii. inadvertent operation of on-load release mechanism;

iii. inadequate maintenance of lifeboats, davits and launching equipment;

iv. communication failures;

v. lack of familiarity with lifeboats, davits, equipment and associated

controls;

vi. unsafe practices during lifeboat drills and inspections; and

vii. design faults other than on-load release mechanisms.

The PSCO may be provided with evidence of this question in fleet circulars,

memos or written procedures within the ISM SMS

If the answer to this question is “No” , then the answer to question 7 is also “No”

Question 7: Refer to MSC/Circ.1206 and guidance notes for question 6. If the answer to

question 6 was “No” , then the answer to this question is also “No”

It would be expected that any precautions implemented would be included

within the safety management system.

Question 8 & 9:Refer to MSC/Circ.1206 and any documentation given in support of question 6

and 7. Also, it should be expected that procedures should be laid down in thevessel’s SMS and manufacturers’ instructions should be available,

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Section 7-8


Personnel on board should be familiar with MSC/Circ.1205 & 1206 as

applicable. As with all the relevant circulars and in accordance with ISM 1.2.3,

applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the

Organization, Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry

organizations should be “taken into account”.

MSC/Circ.1205 is not a compulsory document, but any ship with lifeboats

should be familiar with the principles outlined within it.

MSC/Circ.1206 is not a compulsory document, but any ship with lifeboats

should be familiar with the principles outlined and maintenance arrangements

should “take account” of those principles.

Question 10: If No then answer “N/A” for questions 11-16. For free-fall lifeboats answer

"No".

Question 11: It is recommended that this be determined by questions to a crew member

before the lifeboat is lowered or launched and in a manner which DOES NOT

require the gear to be operated. A line of questioning should be taken which

focuses on how the gear prevents an accidental release during recovery of the

boat, including the principles of mechanical protection (interlock) and how the

mechanism is reset. Questioning should be primarily directed at ships staff

who are assigned duties relating to the launching and recovery of the lifeboats

and the operation of the on load release gear as they should have a very good

knowledge of the system in order to fulfil these functions.

The PSCO may also refer to the operating and resetting instructions within the

boat (see also question 12 below.)

Question 12 : For ships keel laid after 1-7-1998 until 1-7-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.2.2

states: “an on-load release capability which will release the lifeboat with a

load on the hooks. This release shall be so arranged as to release the lifeboat

under any conditions of loading from no load with the lifeboat waterborne to a

load of 1.1 times the total mass of the lifeboat when loaded with its full

complement of persons and equipment. This release capability shall beadequately protected against accidental or premature use. Adequate


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Section 7-8


protection shall include special mechanical protection not normally required for

off-load release, in addition to a danger sign. To prevent an accidental

release during recovery of the boat, the mechanical protection (interlock)

should only engage when the release mechanism is properly and completely

reset. To prevent a premature on-load release, on-load operation of the

release mechanism should require a deliberate and sustained action by the

operator. The release mechanism shall be so designed that crew members in

the lifeboat can clearly observe when the release mechanism is properly and

completely reset and ready for lifting. Clear operating instructions should

be provided with a suitably worded warning notice”

For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.2.2 states “on-load

release capability shall release the lifeboat with a load on the hooks. This

release shall be so arranged as to release the lifeboat under any conditions of

loading from no load with the lifeboat waterborne to a load of 1.1 times the total

mass of the lifeboat when loaded with its full complement of persons and

equipment. This release capability shall be adequately protected against

accidental or premature use. Adequate protection shall include special

mechanical protection not normally required for off-load release, in addition to

a danger sign. To prevent a premature on-load release, on-load operation of

the release mechanism should require a deliberate and sustained action by the

operator”

For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.3 states “to prevent an

accidental release during recovery of the boat, unless the hook is completely

reset, either the hook shall not be able to support any load, or the handle or

safety pins shall not be able to be returned to the reset (closed) position

without excessive force. Additional danger signs shall be posted at each

hook station to alert crew members to the proper method of resetting”

For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.5 states “clear

operating instructions shall be provided with a suitably worded warning

notice using colour coding, pictograms, and/or symbols as necessary for

clarity. If colour coding is used, green shall indicate a properly reset

hook and red shall indicate danger of improper or incorrect setting”

Question 13: For ships keel laid after 1-7-1998 until 1-7-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.2.2

states “an on-load release capability which will release the lifeboat with a loadon the hooks. This release shall be so arranged as to release the lifeboat


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Section 7-8


under any conditions of loading from no load with the lifeboat waterborne to a

load of 1.1 times the total mass of the lifeboat when loaded with its full

complement of persons and equipment. This release capability shall be

adequately protected against accidental or premature use. Adequate

protection shall include special mechanical protection not normally required for

off-load release, in addition to a danger sign. To prevent an accidental release

during recovery of the boat, the mechanical protection (interlock) should only

engage when the release mechanism is properly and completely reset. To

prevent a premature on-load release, on-load operation of the release

mechanism should require a deliberate and sustained action by the operator.

The release mechanism shall be so designed that crew members in the

lifeboat can clearly observe when the release mechanism is properly and

completely reset and ready for lifting. Clear operating instructions should be

provided with a suitably worded warning notice”

For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.7.6.4 states “the release

mechanism shall be so designed and installed that crew members from

inside the lifeboat can clearly determine when the system is ready for

lifting by:

.4.1 directly observing that the movable hook portion or the hook portion

that locks the movable hook portion in place is properly and completely

reset at each hook; or

.4.2 observing a non-adjustable indicator that confirms that the

mechanism that locks the movable hook portion in place is properly and

completely reset at each hook; or

.4.3 easily operating a mechanical indicator that confirms that the

mechanism that locks the movable hook in place is properly and

completely reset at each hook;

Question 14: For ships keel laid after 1-7-1998 until 1-7-08. LSA code 4.4.7.6.3 states that

“the release control shall be clearly marked in a colour that contrasts

with its surroundings”

For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.6 states that “the

release control shall be clearly marked in a colour that contrasts with its

surroundings”


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Section 7-8


Question 15: The PSCO should visually inspect the arrangements within the lifeboat to

verify the information provided, the PSCO may find it beneficial to refer to

manufacturer’s manuals and/or the Solas training manual required by SOLAS

III Reg 35. The latter should contain information relevant to the onboard

lifeboat arrangement.

Question 16: Maintenance and testing to be carried out in accordance with SOLAS III/20.11

as detailed in the Guidance Note for Question 4.

Question 17: Carry out a general visual inspection taking into account any maintenance

records and Q4 in relation to davits.

Question 18: For free-fall lifeboats answer “NA”

LSA Code 6.1.2.7 states “Where davit arms are recovered by power, safety

devices shall be fitted which will automatically cut off the power before the

davit arms reach the stops in order to prevent overstressing the falls or

davits, unless the motor is designed to prevent such overstressing.”

Question 19: For free-fall lifeboats answer “NA” or if answer to Question 1 was “No” for any

other reason.

Take into account that maximum lowering speed as determined by the

Administration in accordance with LSA Code Ch VI, 6.1.2.8, 6.1.2.9 and

6.1.2.10, is not exceeded. Section 6.1.2.11 of the LSA Code requires that the

brake is capable of stopping the descent of the survival craft or rescue boat

and holding it securely when loaded with its full complement of persons and

equipment. Brake pads shall, where necessary, be protected from water and

oil to facilitate this.

LSA Coded 6.1.2.12 requires that the manual brakes shall be so arranged that

the brake is always applied unless the operator holds the brake control in the

"off" position. In other words the brake must reapply and stop boat movement

when the control is released.


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Section 7-8


For the purpose of this CIC, witnessing effective brake operation with an

empty boat is sufficient.

When detention should be considered

Whilst an answer of “No” will not necessarily mean detention is warranted, as the particular

circumstances will need to be considered, detention should be considered specifically in

respect of the following “No” answers:

Question 4: Given SOLAS III/20.11.1 requires maintenance according to Manufacturers

instructions and a thorough examination in conjunction with the CSSE surveys,

where the maintenance required by SOLAS III/20.11.1.1 has not been carried

but the CSSE annual inspection has been completed, or where the CSSE is

invalid due to a failure to carry out the annual or renewal survey, the vessel

should be considered for detention.

Where there is little or no evidence of maintenance and the condition of the

lifeboat arrangements including hooks, releases, davits, falls etc is such that in

the PSCO’s opinion suitable maintenance has not been carried out and the

boat may be unsafe for use, detention should be considered. Examples of

conditions that may be considered unsafe are:

i. Hooks show sign of obvious damage

ii. Lifeboat damaged

iii. Davit damaged/significantly wasted

iv. Moving parts seized, or damaged in a manner that prevents correct

operation

v. broken wires, kinks, corrosion and “bird-caging” of falls.

Question 5: Where the condition of the release connection to the boat is such that in the

PSCO’s opinion the boat may be unsafe for use then detention should be

considered. PSCO’s should inspect the securing arrangement for hook on the

deck and to the keel of the lifeboat (such as keel bolts and plates) for any signs

of wastage or damaged.

Question 8: Where crew members are assigned duties related to the launching, operation

and/or recovery of life boats and are not familiar with these duties, this is anoperational control issue and detention should be considered.


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Section 7-8


Question 11: Crew members assigned duties with respect to the operation of the release

arrangements must be familiar with all aspects of the release/resetting

operation and if unable to describe this, then this is an operational control

issue and detention should be considered.

Question 15: If there is evidence that the hooks and/or the release system, including any

interlocks, are not correctly reset detention should be considered.

Examples of the release system not being reset which should be considered

for detention include:

i. Cams or interlocks not correctly aligned, including where indicators are

misaligned with each other.

ii. Hydrostatic interlock unit blocked or not operating correctly

iii. Locking mechanisms of hooks incorrectly set when boat is in the stowed

position . This can be seen visually a the hooks or release handle by

indicators etc

Question 16: Given SOLAS III requires various maintenance, examination and operational

tests as part of the required maintenance arrangements, PSCO may consider

the following as a guide in consideration for detention:

i. The maintenance required by SOLAS III has not been carried,

ii. The 5 yearly over hauling and load test required by SOLAS III/20.11.2.3

has not been carried out;

iii. Where the on load release system has been overhauled for some other

reasons outside the 5 year period and the load test required by SOLAS

III/20.11.2.3 has not been carried out;

iv. Morse cables, actuating rods and other such devices forming part of the

system are in poor condition, obviously damaged or not operating

correctly.

v. There is evidence of unauthorised repair of modification to the system.

vi. There is evidence that fittings (i.e. covers and guards) forming part of the

‘approved’ arrangement are missing.


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Section 7-8


Question 17: Where the condition of the davits is such that in the PSCO’s opinion the boat

may be unsafe for use, such as the davit structure being wasted and

weakened, detention should be considered.

Question 18: Where the condition of the sheaves, limit switches and other moving parts is

such that in the PSCO’s opinion the boat may be unsafe for use, detention

should be considered. Examples are:

i. Sheaves, rollers and other fittings seized and/or wasted or weakened

ii. Limit switches missing on non operational

iii. Winch and/or brake arrangement in poor condition

Question 19: Where the brake is not capable of stopping the boat and/or it does not

automatically reapply when released, detention should be considered.

Detentions under this CIC can be given against the individual SOLAS/LSA Code

requirement or under an element of the ISM Code such as maintenance, emergency

preparedness etc.

PSCO’s should refrain from issuing multiple detentions under different deficiency codes

for a single issue.

PSCO’s should also be aware that release arrangements should not require excessive

force to be reset and that proper operation in the future may be effected if force is used

to align indicators etc. If detention is given, the PSCO should consider whether an

external technician is required to inspect and service the system.


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Section 7-8


Extracts from IMO RES A.787(19) in regard to detention considerations in general:

4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF A SUBSTANDARD SHIP

4.1.1 In general, a ship is regarded as substandard if the hull, machinery, equipment, or

operational safety, is substantially below the standards required by the relevant

conventions or whose crew is not in conformance with the safe manning document, owing to,

inter alia:

.1 the absence of principal equipment or arrangement required by the conventions;

.2 non-compliance of equipment or arrangement with relevant specifications of the

conventions;

.3 substantial deterioration of the ship or its equipment because of, for example,

poor maintenance;

.4 insufficiency of operational proficiency, or unfamiliarity of essential operational

procedures by the

crew; and

.5 insufficiency of manning or insufficiency of certification of seafarers.

4.1.2 If these evident factors as a whole or individually make the ship unseaworthy and put atrisk the ship or the life of persons on board or present an unreasonable threat of harm to

the marine environment if it were allowed to proceed to sea, it should be regarded as a

substandard ship.

APPENDIX 1

GUIDELINES FOR THE DETENTION OF SHIPS

1.2 During inspection the PSCO should further assess whether the ship and/or crew,throughout its forthcoming voyage, is able to:

.1 navigate safely;

.2 safely handle, carry and monitor the condition of the cargo;

.3 operate the engine-room safely;

.4 maintain proper propulsion and steering;

.5 fight fires effectively in any part of the ship if necessary;

.6 abandon ship speedily and safely and effect rescue if necessary;

.7 prevent pollution of the environment;

.8 maintain adequate stability;

.9 maintain adequate watertight integrity;


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.10 communicate in distress situations if necessary; and

.11 provide safe and healthy conditions on board.

1.3 If the result of any of these assessments is negative, taking into account all deficiencies

found, the ship should be strongly considered for detention. A combination of deficiencies of a

less serious nature may also warrant the detention of the ship. Ships which are unsafe to

proceed to sea should be detained upon the first inspection irrespective of the time the ship will

stay in port.

3 Detainable deficiencies

To assist the PSCO in the use of these guidelines, there follows a list of deficiencies, grouped

under relevant conventions and/or codes, which are considered to be of such a serious nature

that they may warrant the detention of the ship involved. This list is not considered exhaustive

but is intended to give examples of relevant items.

Areas under the SOLAS Convention

5 Absence, insufficient capacity or serious deterioration of personal life-saving appliances,

survival craft and launching arrangements.


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Section 7-8


Lifeboat Launching Arrangements CIC

The purpose of this CIC is twofold – to increase awareness of lifeboat related safetyissues and to gather information. The inspections will be carried out in conjunction withregular PSC. PSCO’s should be prepared to distribute a copy of the IMO documentsreferred to in the questions.

SAFETY: PSCO’s are not to enter lifeboats unless securely stowed with gripes inposition or hanging off pennants in position, any internal inspection by the PSCOshould be conducted at this point. Pay particular attention to ensure that no crewmember inadvertently operates any release mechanism while you are in the boat.

It is not expected that a full lifeboat drill be conducted during every CIC inspection,although it will be necessary to lower at least one boat to some extent to check thedavit and brake operation.

Should a drill be conducted, refer the Master to MSC/Circ.1206 and make it clear to theMaster that any drill or operation will be conducted under his/her control. If a boat drill isto be undertaken while you are observing, ask the ship’s Master to explain the intendedapproach. If it is intended to lower the boat with the operating crew on board, ask theMaster to have the boat lowered to near the water level and raised back to theembarkation level with no person on board first. Check the operation of the davit limit

switches during this operation. During the initial lowering operation ask for the brake tobe applied at maximum lowering speed to check its operation.

If the master intends to hoist a boat fitted with on-load releases with crew on board thenask how he intends to ensure that the hooks are correctly reset and cannot accidentallyrelease during the hoisting operation (answer questions 5 & 13 affirmatively beforeallowing this operation).

Collect the manufacturer’s name and date of manufacture of enclosed lifeboats. Enterthis into the CIC comments field.

Where deficiencies are found then these should be recorded on the associated PSCform B.

Questions 13 and 14 relate to the design of an on-load release to comply with the LSACode. Questions 11 and 15 are designed to determine whether issues relating torelease arrangements are primarily operational, design or maintenance related. Thesequestions are primarily aimed at gathering information for feeding back into our work atIMO of accidents with lifeboats. In cases where there is obvious non-compliance withthe LSA Code then deficiencies should be issued under the PSC referring the issue tothe Classification Society issuing the Safety Equipment Certificate.

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Cic on Lifeboat Launching Arrangements Boat

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