Civpro Rule 36-47 Not Includin Rule 39

8/11/2019 Civpro Rule 36-47 Not Includin Rule 39

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EN BANC

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524 FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB

OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present : CABACUNGAN,

Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J. PUNO,

PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO,

- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA, CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO and GARCIA, JJ.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,

SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, PresidingJudge, Branch 43, Regional TrialCourt, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,

Respondents. Promulgated : September 14, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J .:



Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito

Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for

annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or

reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest

Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs

of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and

Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and

respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were:

(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the

Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2)

the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of

the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public

respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as

follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands



and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to

file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo

because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the

Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied

because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be

determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent

heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there

were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.[1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order

denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very

well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the

complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order [2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed

petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.

Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,

1998 and, on the 15th

day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion

for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order

dismissing the motion for reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on

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July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of

appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,

holding that it was filed eight days late.[5] This was received by petitioners

on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too

was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of

appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably

filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary

period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the

day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for

reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,

1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the

reglementary period for appeal.[7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the

petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been



















reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,

1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the

order was the ―final order‖ appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctlydismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within thereglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is

jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement isfatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned

decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,

petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate

court:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INDISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THEHON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THEPETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTALMINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE

APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II







THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED INRULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THERESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THATPETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN

PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OFTHE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF

APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKETFEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED INRULING THAT THE WORDS ―FINAL ORDER‖ IN SECTION 3,RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILLREFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGEHON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1,1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERSTHROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN

FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC.V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASETHEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS ANDCIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THESAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THEENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within

which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a

part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised







only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one

who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements

of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to

appeal.[10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural

rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in allthese cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of

the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealedfrom. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the periodfor appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of

judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be

taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgmentor final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal isrequired, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record onappeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or finalorder.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timelymotion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension oftime to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall beallowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15

days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final











judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing

more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits

which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares

categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be

an order or judgment that dismisses an action.[12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998

denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the ―final

order,‖ not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.

Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for

reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to

appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,

1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the ―final order,‖ receipt of

which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the

February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order

dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial

court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his

complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus











motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the

15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another

order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of

appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15

days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that

was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared

that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of

dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what

ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan

v. Haldeman et al .[14] where we again considered the order denying

petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which

finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view

that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for

reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.







We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the

15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice

of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of

judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the

15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not

file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration.

According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-

day appeal period.[15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the

last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day

left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their

MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to

a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the “final order” or the order

dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they

only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of

appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,[16] premised on

the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and











within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also

jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of

public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the

judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time

fixed by law.[18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964

Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken byserving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial courtwithin thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, anotice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. Thetime during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order orfor new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless suchmotion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours ofthe last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must beperfected within the day following that in which the partyappealing received notice of the denial of said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously

consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15

days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial

Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the


















amendment was to shorten the period of appeal[21] and enhance the

efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict

observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we

condoned late filing of notices of appeal,[22] and only in very exceptional

instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v.

Municipality of Libmanan,[23]

however, we declared that appeal is an

essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not

be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to

be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every

party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and

just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods

which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under

exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be

excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay

incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and

justice.


















In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to

tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the

extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those

situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not

meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But

we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not

stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the

commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have

always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement

of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full

opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all

courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish

new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy

disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of

Appeals, particularly Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows

extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties

to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.






















To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical

to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in

the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a

motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]

Henceforth, this ―fresh period rule‖ shall also apply to Rule 40

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial

Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the

Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies[31] to the

Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the

Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal

period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion

for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final

order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal

within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of

receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This

pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules

which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of













judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word ―or‖

signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It

should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily

implies.[33] Hence, the use of ―or‖ in the above provision supposes that the

notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or

within 15 days from notice of the ―final order,‖ which we already determined

to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or

reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of

BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to

hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case

March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still

applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a

party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration . In this

manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given

another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or

rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch

and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we

likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.







In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to

when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice

of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of ―final order‖

appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal

within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it

within 15 days from receipt of the order (the ―final order‖) denying his

motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-

day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the

decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal

period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five

days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on

July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal

period of 15 days, as already discussed.[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso

(Philippines), Inc. v. IAC [35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred

to it in its assailed decision.










WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed

decision of the Court of AppealsREVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of

Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.



Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 145420 September 19, 2006

A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and, in the alternative, for theReopening of the Case1 on the ground of newly discovered evidence filedby A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. (Dinglasan) who was found guilty2 ofviolating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as The BouncingChecks Law, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, inCriminal Case No. 21238.

On 17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation (Elmyra), represented byits President, Dinglasan, and Antrom, Inc. (Antrom), also represented by itsPresident, Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a Memorandum of Agreementwhereby the parties agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodationin favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn business. The latter, in turn, willissue checks to guarantee the payment of its obligations.

A few months after a number of financing transactions were made,Elmyra's indebtedness to Antrom reached the amount of P1,476,000.58.

As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a Commercial Bank (drawee bank)

Check No. HO270451 with Antrom as payee, but postdated on 3 October1985 in the amount of P515,000.00. Upon presentment for payment withthe drawee bank, however, the said check was dishonored for insufficiencyof funds.

Consequently, on 16 December 1985, an Information3 charging Dinglasanwith Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed before the RTC of

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_145420_2006.html#fnt1











Makati, Branch 62, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21238, People of thePhilippines v. A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. The Information reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of October, 1985, in the Municipality ofMakati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, well knowing that he has nosufficient funds in or credit with the bank, did there and then willfully,unlawfully and feloniously make out and issue Commercial Bank of ManilaCheck No. H0207451 dated October 3, 1985 in the amount of P515,000.00in payment of his obligation to Antrom Inc., represented by Rosanna E.Velasco, but when said check was presented to the bank for payment, thesame was dishonored and/or refused payment for reason "Drawn AgainstInsufficient Funds" and accused, despite repeated demands and lapse offive (5) banking days from notice thereof, failed and refused to make good

the said check and/or to deposit with the drawee bank the necessaryamount to cover the aforesaid check, to the damage and prejudice of theherein complainant in the aforementioned amount of P515,000.00

On 16 December 1991, the trial court convicted Dinglasan for havingcommitted the crime charged. In a Decision4promulgated on the same date,the court a quo found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating BatasPambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding accused A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, he is hereby sentenced to sufferan imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Two Hundred ThousandPesos (P200,000.00); and, to indemnify ANTROM, INC., the sum of FiveHundred Fifteen (sic) (P515,000.00) Pesos, at [the] legal rate of interestfrom October 3, 1985, until the full amount of P515,000.0 is fully paid.

Dinglasan, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration5 which was deniedby the same court for lack of merit in an Order 6 issued on 4 September1992.

On 25 September 1992, Dinglasan appealed to the Court of Appeals theadverse RTC Decision dated 16 December 1991, finding him guilty ofviolating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the RTC Order dated 4 September1992, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.7

On 26 October 1998, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, Peopleof the Philippines v. A. Rafael. C. Dinglasan, handed down a
















Decision,8 dismissing the appeal, thereby, affirming in toto the Decision ofthe RTC finding Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violatingBatas Pambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Decision now onappeal is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

Aggrieved, the accused filed before this Court a Petition for Review onCertiorar i9 questioning the 26 October 1998 Decision of the Court of

Appeals. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 137800, A. Rafael C.Dinglasan v. Court of Appeals, and was raffled to the Third Division of thisCourt. In a Resolution10 dated 28 June 1999, this Court resolved to denythe petition for failure to show that a reversible error had been committedby the appellate court.

A Motion for Reconsideration11 was then filed by Dinglasan on 26 August1999, but the same was again denied by this Court in a Resolution dated13 September 1999 for failure to raise substantial arguments that wouldwarrant reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 June 1999 with an adcautelam that such denial is final.12

Undaunted, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but thesame was merely noted without action by this Court in view of the En BancResolution dated 7 April 1987 that no motion for leave to file a second

motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the sameparty shall be entertained. In a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, thisCourt directed that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

The Resolution of this Court dated 28 June 1999 denying Dinglasan'sPetition for Review became final and executory on 14 October 1999 asevidenced by the Entry of Judgment.13

By virtue of the final and executory judgment rendered by this Court in G.R.No. 137800, the prosecution, on 19 September 2000, filed a motion14 with

the RTC for the issuance of the warrant of arrest and writ of execution inorder to satisfy the judgment. The prosecution likewise prayed that a hold-departure order be issued in order to prevent Dinglasan from leaving thecountry until he has fully served his sentence.

In an Order 15 issued on 21 September 2000, the trial court, acting on thesaid motion, issued a warrant for the arrest of Dinglasan and a writ of
































execution for the enforcement of his civil liability and, at the same time,enjoining him from leaving the country.

Alarmed, Dinglasan on 30 October 2000, filed the instant Petition for NewTrial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case16 based onnewly discovered evidence, which was docketed as G.R. No. 145420,entitled, "A. Rafael C. Dinglasan Jr. v. Court of Appeals." He urges thisCourt to uphold substantial justice, emphasizing that the newly discoveredevidence he seeks to introduce in this case is so material and of suchweight that, if, admitted would probably change the judgment, hence,suspension of procedural rules is warranted.

The alleged newly discovered evidence claimed by Dinglasan are theaffidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in her capacity as Executive Vice-

President and Treasurer of Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. DeDinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was theCashier and Liaison Officer of the same company. These affidavits,together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached toSolidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma.Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan made good ofthe check within five banking days from notice of dishonor. He could not,therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for oneof the essential elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed andrefused to make good the said check within five banking days from the

notice of dishonor, is absent.

In her affidavit,17 Ma. Elena Dinglasan attested that she was the ExecutiveVice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra for the period of 1985-1986. Assuch, she was in-charge of disbursing and sourcing of corporation fundsincluding the preparation of checks and approval of vouchers supportingthe disbursements. In the course of its business, the affiant caused theissuance of Commercial Bank Check No. 270451 on 27 September 1985 inthe amount of P515,000.00, but postdated on 3 October 1985, which was

dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds and which eventuallycaused Dinglasan's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.Upon receiving the notice of dishonor, she caused the preparation ofSolidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 in theamount of P150,000.00 intended to cover a part of the amount of thebounced check. The Solidbank check, together with its transmittal letterdated 8 October 1985, stating the purpose of the said check, was sent to










Antrom and was received by its representative as evidenced by thesignature appearing on the receiving copy thereof.

Explaining why the said transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 wasbelatedly offered as evidence on this case, Ma. Elena Dinglasan reasonedthat that she was not aware that the said letter has any significance onDinglasan's liability. She explained further that in 1993 she was diagnosedof breast cancer and had to undergo surgical operation and chemotherapy.

To corroborate the statements of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, Encarnacion Vda.De Dinglasan on her part, narrated under oath that her late husband usedto bring some of Elmyra's documents home to work on at night and afterher husband's death in 1994, such documents were kept inside a box andleft somewhere in one corner of their house. It was only when a minor

renovation was made therein several years after her husband passed awaythat she was able to chance upon the said documents again. The saiddocuments were turned over to Dinglasan on 21 October 2000. It was laterdiscovered that the said documents include the transmittal letter dated 8October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom.18

In contrast, private respondent Antrom contends that the Petition for NewTrial and/or Reopening of the Case based on newly discovered evidenceshould be dismissed on the ground that the same is procedurally andsubstantially defective.19

Elaborating, Antrom claims that under the Revised Rules of Court, theMotion for New Trial should be filed at any time after the appeal from thelower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the appellatecourt convicting the accused becomes final. The judgment of this Court inG.R. No. 137800 dated 28 June 1999 became final and executory on 14October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment. The present petition,on the other hand, was filed only on 30 October 2000 or a year after thefinality of the decision in G.R. No. 137800. The filing of the instant action,therefore, has already prescribed.20

Moreover, Antrom continues, considering for the sake of argument that theinstant action was filed within the reglementary period, still, the petitionmust fail for the requisites for newly discovered evidence as ground for newtrial were not satisfactorily complied with. Let it be noted that the transmittalletter dated 8 October 1995 was previously attached as evidence in a















Petition for Review filed by Dinglasan before the Ministry of Justice (nowthe Department of Justice) on 15 December 1986, assailing the Resolutionof the Fiscal dated 11 December 1986 recommending the filing ofInformation against him. The same letter was also introduced as evidencebefore the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 when Dinglasanassailed the RTC decision dated 16 December 1991. Hence, the claim thatthe alleged evidence was not available during the trial in the courts below,and is thus, newly discovered is erroneous, if not misleading.21

Finally, Antrom stresses that, granting for the sake of argument, that thepetition at bar was filed on time and the alleged evidence is newlydiscovered within the purview of the law, such evidence introduced andadmitted, nevertheless, would not exculpate Dinglasan from liability. Thegravamen of the offense is the act of the drawer in making or issuing a

check with the full knowledge that he does not have sufficient funds tocover the amount. Such awareness was admitted by Dinglasan when heexpressly requested Antrom not to deposit the check without his explicitconformity in anticipation that such check will be dishonored if presentedfor payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check and not thenonpayment of the obligation is punished by law because of its deleteriouseffect on public interest.

The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, on theirpart, submitted that the instant petition should be dismissed because it was

filed out of time and Dinglasan's evidence sought to be admitted is neithermaterial nor newly discovered so as to warrant new trial or reopening of thecase. The alleged evidence if introduced and admitted, would not in anyway alter the judgment. Upon perusal of the transmittal letter dated 8October 1985, it was nowhere stated therein that Solidbank Manager'sCheck No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 was intended as partial paymentof Commercial Bank Check No. 270451 dated 3 October 1985 thatbounced. The said letter was a mere proposal wherein a payment in kind ordacion en pago was offered by Elmyra. The Solicitor General likewise

noted that the letter dated 8 October 1986 was already introduced asevidence in the Petition for Review with the Ministry of Justice filed byDinglasan.22

For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:

I.











WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION WAS FILED ONTIME.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR REOPENING OF THECASE BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE

ALLOWED.

The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Rule 124 – Procedure in the Court of Appeals.

Section 14. Motion for New Trial. – At any time after the appeal fromthe lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of theCourt of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the lattermay move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidencematerial to his defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions ofsection 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis supplied.)

Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should befiled before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accusedbecomes final.

While Dinglasan agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petitionshould be filed before the finality of the judgment convicting the appellant,he, however argues that judgment attains finality only upon the receipt ofthe order or resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.

Dinglasan's argument is without merit.

Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File Second Motionfor Reconsideration was denied by this Court as the subject matter thereofis a prohibited pleading and that the Motion for Reconsideration was merely

noted without action. This order is issued pursuant to En Banc Resolutiondated 7 April 1999 which prohibits any motion for leave to file a secondmotion for reconsideration and was further emphasized by the provision ofthe Revised Rules of Court which provides that:

Rule 52. – Motion for Reconsideration.



Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. – No second motionfor reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the sameparty shall be entertained.

This prohibition is justified by public policy which demands that at therisk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final atsome definitive date fixed by law.23

To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of theresolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration wouldresult to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue ordersor resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in orderthat the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolongingthe disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to

forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing aprohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust tothe winning party.

It bears stressing further that on 14 October 1999, the Resolution of thisCourt in G.R. No. 137800 dated 28 June 1999 became final and executoryas evidenced by the Entry of Judgment according to the pertinent provisionof the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:

Rule 51. - Judgment.

"Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. – If no appeal ormotion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time providedin these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith beentered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The datewhen the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall bedeemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain thedispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signedby the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolutionhas become final and executory.

After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall be laid to rest. A decision that acquiredfinality becomes immutable and unalterable and it may no longer bemodified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correcterroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made bythe court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.24











Very clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopeningof the Case on 30 October 2000 was made way beyond the prescriptiveperiod for doing so. The claim of Dinglasan that he honestly believed thatthis Court will appreciate his defense of payment as reiterated in hisSecond Motion for Reconsideration which was why he deemed it pre-mature to file the instant petition before receiving the Court's ruling on thesaid motion, could not be given credence.

The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made todepend on the convenience of the party. To rule otherwise wouldcompletely negate the purpose of the rule on completeness of service,which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processesbeyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure.25

Dinglasan further asseverates that this petition was belatedly madebecause the evidence sought to be admitted were not available at the timethe instant petition should have been filed. Accordingly, he claims that thisevidence falls within the purview of newly discovered evidence ascontemplated by law.

The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Rule 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial . — The court shall grant a new trial onany of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantialrights of the accused have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which theaccused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered andproduced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted wouldprobably change the judgment.

The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidencewas discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have beendiscovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or







impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probablychange the judgment.26

These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the1851 case of Berry v. State of Georgia27where the Supreme Court ofGeorgia held:

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are notfavored by the Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to be apretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a partywho asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, tosatisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge sincethe trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did notcome sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different

verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only - viz;speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th.That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absenceaccounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object ofthe testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining thepropriety of motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of

showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with therequisites to justify the holding of a new trial.28

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newlydiscovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newlydiscovered evidence which could not have been discovered by duediligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has twoaspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and apredictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.29

Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma.Elena Dinglasan and Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan attest, that thetransmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was discovered recently or justbefore the time the affidavits were executed on 23 October 2000. Therecords, however, show otherwise.

















In CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, it appears that the appellate court alreadyconsidered that transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 in rendering itsDecision dated 26 October 1998. The pertinent portion of the Decisionreads:

It appears, however, that in accused-appellant's letter dated October 10,1986, (Exhibit "B") no mention was made of the two (2) manager's checks,considering that at least one of the two (2), both dated October 8, 1988 (pp.2-3, Records) was allegedly given to private complainant on the said date(pp. 69-70, Ibid.). Instead a proposal wherein payment in kind or dacion enpago was offered by accused-appellant. Also, the trial court correctly notedthat, "x x x accused is a lawyer and a businessman. He will not part of morethan one million pesos, in the form of manager's checks, as replacement ofa check that bounced, without any supporting document." (p. 8, Decision,

Criminal Case No. 21238).

We are in accord with the findings of the lower court that there is noevidence establishing that accused-appellant asked for the return of theCombank Check in the same way that the PTB Check had been returned,other than stating in his letter of October 8, 1985 that said check had beenconsidered cancelled (p. 69, Records), and after the Combank Check hadalready bounced. (p. 10, Brief for Accused-Appellant). Its quite absurd thataccused-appellant would replace the Combank Check with an amountmore than the P515,000.00, if the whole indebtedness was still subject to

final liquidation. As evidenced by the voucher (Exhibit "5") accused-appellant issued Combank Check in exchange for PTB Check. Hence, it isquite quizzical why accused-appellant did not ask for the return of theCombank check after having issued two (2) manager's check.30 (Emphasissupplied.)

Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to bepresented in this case was recently discovered is a falsity. It is a desperateattempt to mislead this Court to give due course to a cause that has long

been lost. Dinglasan appeals for the compassion of this Court but never didso in good faith. It is contrary to human experience to have overlooked anevidence which was decisively claimed to have such significance that mightprobably change the judgment.

The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 wasalready offered as evidence in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 and was even







annexed to the Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals as Annex "B." Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newlydiscovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was alreadyweighed by the appellate court. A contrary ruling may open the floodgatesto an endless review of decisions, where losing litigants, in delaying thedisposition of cases, invoke evidence already presented, whether through amotion for reconsideration or for a new trial, in guise of newly discoveredevidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.



Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

BERNARDO DE LEON,

Petitioner,

-versus-

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITYsubstituted by the CITY OF

PARAÑAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO,JR., RICARDO PENA and REYMUNDOORPILLA,

Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (nowPHILIPPINE RECLAMATIONAUTHORITY), substituted by the CITYOF PARAÑAQUE,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 181970

G.R. No. 182678

Present:



-versus-

HON. SELMA PALACIO ALARAS,in

her capacity as the Acting PresidingJudge of Branch 135, Regional TrialCourt of Makati City, and BERNARDODE LEON.

Respondents.

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,*

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 3, 2010

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J .:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions.

G.R. No. 181970 is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court filed by Bernardo de Leon seeking the reversal and

setting aside of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated

November 21, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 which dismissed his petition

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/181970.htm#_ftn1









for certiorari . De Leon also assails the CA Resolution [2] dated March 4,

2008 denying his Motion for Reconsideration.

On the other hand, G.R. No. 182678 is a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the Public Estates Authority

(PEA)[3] seeking the nullification of the Orders dated December 28, 2007

and March 4, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch

135 in Civil Case No. 93-143.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as

summarized by the CA, are as follows:

On [January 15, 1993], petitioner Bernardo De Leon (―De

Leon‖) filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary

Injunction before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Makati City,

raffled to Branch 135, against respondent Public Estates Authority

(―PEA‖), a government-owned corporation, as well as its officers,

herein private respondents Ramon Arellano, Jr., Ricardo Penaand Reymundo Orpilla. The suit for damages hinged on the

alleged unlawful destruction of De Leon’s fence and houses

constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of 11,997 square

meters, situated in San Dionisio, Parañaque, which De Leon

claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50

years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that – one, lawful possession

of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to

pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on

Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA

from committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful

possession of the subject premises.










The court a quo found merit in De Leon’s application for

writ of preliminary injunction and thus issued the Order dated 8

February 1993, pertinent portions of which read:

After a careful consideration of the evidence

presented and without going into the actual meritsof the case, this Court finds that plaintiff (De Leon)

has duly established by preponderance of evidence

that he has a legal right over the subject matter of the

instant case and is entitled to the injunctive relief

demanded for and may suffer irreparable damage or

injury if such right is not protected by Law [Rules (sic)

58, Section 3 of the Revised (Rules of Court)].

Premises considered upon plaintiff’s (De

Leon’s) filing of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00,

let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against

the defendants, their agents, representatives and

other persons (PEA and its officers) acting for and in

their behalf are hereby enjoined from disturbing the

peaceful possession of plaintiff (De Leon) and hisco-owners over Lot 5155 and further, from destroying

and/or removing whatever other improvementsthereon constructed, until further orders of this Court.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

PEA sought recourse before the Supreme Court through

a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a Restraining Order ,

ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the court a quo for

issuing injunctive relief. The Petition was later referred to this

Court for proper determination and disposition, and was docketed

as CA-G.R. SP No. 30630.

On 30 September 1993, the Ninth Division of this Court

rendered a Decision discerning that the court a quo did not act in

a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in issuing



the writ of preliminary injunction against PEA. The Ninth Division

ruled that the court a quo was precisely careful to state in

its Order that it was ―without going into the actual merits of the

case‖ and that the words ―plaintiff (De Leon) and his co-owners‖

were used by the court a quo rather ― loosely and did not intend itto be an adjudication of ownership.‖

Unfazed, PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via

a Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone

until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982. The

land was previously under water on the coastline which reached

nine to twenty meters deep. In 1989, PEA started constructing R-

1 Toll Expressway Road for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,

which project directly traversed Lot 5155. PEA argued that the

documentary evidence presented by De Leon to bolster his

fallacious claim of possession and ownership were procured only

in 1992, thus negating his very own allegation that he and his

predecessors-in-interest have been in occupation since time

immemorial.

Ruling squarely on the issue adduced before it, the

Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so thatDe Leon’s occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not

confer ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no

writ of injunction may lie to protect DeLeon’s nebulous right of

possession. Accordingly, in its Decision dated 20 November 2000,

the Supreme Court disposed of the controversy in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

30630, andDISMISSES the complaint in Civil Case

No. 93-143 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.



The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no

motion for reconsideration was filed. In due course, PEA moved

for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon and

persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate andpeaceably surrender possession of Lot5155.

Acting on PEA’s motion, the court a quo issued the first

assailed Order dated 15 September 2004, viz :

Acting on the ―Motion For Issuance Of Writ of

Execution‖ filed by defendant Public Estate[s]

Authority, and finding the same to be impressed with

merit, the same is GRANTED.

Let a Writ of Execution issue directing plaintiff,

his agents, principals, successors-in-interest and all

persons claiming rights under him to vacate and

peaceably turn over possession of Lot 5155 to

defendant Public Estate[s] Authority.

SO ORDERED.

As could well be expected, De Leon moved for

reconsideration thereof and quashal of the writ of execution. He

adamantly insisted that the court a quo’s Order for the issuance of

the writ of execution completely deviated from the dispositive

portion of the Supreme Court’s Decisiondated 20 November 2000

as it did not categorically direct him to surrender possession

of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA.

However, both motions met the same fate as these were

denied by the court a quo in the second disputed Order dated 29

April 2005.[4]







Dissatisfied, De Leon filed another Motion for Reconsideration dated

July 1, 2005, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated July

27, 2005.

De Leon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA

assailing the September 15, 2004 and April 29, 2005 Orders of the RTC of

Makati City. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90328. In the same

proceeding, De Leon filed an Urgent-Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction but

the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 24, 2006.

Subsequently, De Leon filed a second special civil action

for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul and set aside the same RTC

Orders dated September 15, 2004 and April 29, 2005, as well as the RTC

Order of July 27, 2005. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90984.

On July 26, 2006, PEA filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ

of Demolition[5] praying that the RTC issue a Special Order directing De

Leon and persons claiming under him to remove all improvements erected

inside the premises of the subject property and, in case of failure to remove

the said structures, that a Special Order and Writ of Demolition be issueddirecting the sheriff to remove and demolish the said improvements.

On October 11, 2006, the RTC issued an Order [6] holding in

abeyance the Resolution of PEA’s Motion. PEA filed a Motion for










Reconsideration,[7] but it was denied by the RTC in an Order [8] dated

January 12, 2007.

On February 27, 2007, PEA filed an Omnibus Motion[9] to dismiss or,

in the alternative, resolve the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 and CA-

G.R. SP No. 90984.

In its Decision[10] dated March 21, 2007, the CA dismissed De Leon’s

petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90984 on the ground of forum shopping.

Subsequently, on November 21, 2007, the CA also dismissed De

Leon’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 holding that an earlier decision

promulgated by the Supreme Court, finding the subject property to be

public and that De Leon has no title and no clear legal right over the

disputed lot, has already attained finality.[11] De Leon filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, but the CA denied it via its Resolution[12] dated March 4,

2008.

Thereafter, PEA filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve (Re: Very Urgent

Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition).[13]

On December 28, 2007, the RTC issued an Order [14] holding in

abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion pending receipt by the trial court

of the entry of judgment pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 90328. PEA filed a

Motion for Reconsideration.[15]



































In its Order dated March 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying

PEA’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 23, 2008, De Leon filed the present petition for review

on certiorari , docketed as G.R. No. 181970, assailing the November 21,

2007 Decision of the CA.

Subsequently, on May 15, 2008, PEA, on the other hand, filed the

instant special civil action for certiorari , docketed as G.R. No. 182678,

questioning the Orders of the RTC of Makati City, dated December 28,

2007 and March 4, 2008.

In G.R. No. 181970, De Leon questions the Decision of the CA on the

following grounds: (a) he can only be removed from the subject land

through ejectment proceedings; (b) the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.

112172 merely ordered the dismissal of De Leon’s complaint for damages

in Civil Case No. 93-143; and (c) even though petitioner is not the owner

and has no title to the subject land, mere prior possession is only required

for the establishment of his right.

In G.R. No. 182678, the sole issue raised is whether respondent

judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders

which held in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a

Writ of Demolition.

On February 25, 2009, PEA and the City of Parañaque filed a Joint

Motion for Substitution stating that PEA had transferred its ownership and



ceded its interests over the subject property to the City of Parañaque as full

payment for all of the former’s real property tax liabilities. As a

consequence, the movants prayed that PEA be substituted by the City

of Parañaque as petitioner in G.R. No. 182678 and respondent in G.R. No.

181970.[16]

In a Resolution[17] dated on October 14, 2009, this Court granted the

Motion for Substitution filed by PEA and the City ofParañaque.

The issues raised in the present petitions boil down to the question of

whether PEA is really entitled to possess the subject property and, if

answered in the affirmative, whether the RTC should proceed to hear

PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition.

The Court rules for PEA.

The question of ownership and rightful possession of the subject

property had already been settled and laid to rest in this Court’s Decision

dated November 20, 2000 in G.R. No. 112172 entitled, Public Estates

Authority v. Court of Appeals (PEA v. CA).[18] In the said case, the Court

ruled thus:

The issue raised is whether respondent and his brothers

and sisters were lawful owners and possessors of Lot 5155 by

mere claim of ownership by possession for a period of at least fifty

(50) years.

The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent Bernardo deLeon and his brothers and sisters were lawful owners and














possessors of Lot 5155 entitled to protection by injunction againstanyone disturbing their peaceful possession of said Lot.

The ruling is erroneous. An applicant seeking to establishownership of land must conclusively show that he is the owner in

fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong tothe public domain of the State, unless acquired from theGovernment either by purchase or by grant, except landspossessed by an occupant and his predecessors since timeimmemorial, for such possession would justify the presumptionthat the land had never been part of the public domain, or that ithad been private property even before the Spanish conquest.

In this case, the land in question is admittedly public.The respondent Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all.His claim of ownership is based on mere possession byhimself and his predecessors-in-interests, who claim to havebeen in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession of the land in question, under a bona f ide claimof ownership for a period of at least fifty (50) years.However,the survey plan for the land was approved only in 1992, andrespondent paid the realty taxes thereon on October 30, 1992,shortly before the filing of the suit below for damages withinjunction. Hence, respondent must be deemed to begin asserting

his adverse claim to Lot 5155 only in 1992. More, Lot 5155 wascertified as alienable and disposable on March 27, 1972, percertificate of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources. It is obvious that respondent’s possession hasnot ripened into ownership.

x x x x

Consequently, respondent De Leon has no clear legalright to the lot in question, and a writ of injunction will not lie to

protect such nebulous right of possession. x x x[19]

The Court does not subscribe to De Leon’s argument that the issues

of ownership and possession of the subject lot should not have been taken

up by the court on the ground that his complaint is only for damages.






De Leon must be aware that his action for damages is anchored on his

claim that he owns and possesses the subject property.[20] On this basis, it

would be inevitable for the court to discuss the issues of whether he, in

fact, owns the disputed property and, as such, has the right to possess the

same. Moreover, it is clear from this Court’s Decision in PEA v. CA that the

main issue resolved therein was ―whether respondent [De Leon] and his

brothers and sisters were the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 5155 by

mere claim of ownership by possession for a period of at least fifty (50)

years.‖

De Leon insists that what this Court did in PEA v. CA was to simply

dismiss his complaint for damages and nothing more, and that the RTC

erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution

placing PEA in possession of the disputed property. He insists that he can

only be removed from the disputed property through an ejectment

proceeding.

The Court is not persuaded.

As a general rule, a writ of execution

should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an

execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or

award.[21] The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must

conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment

promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to

enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be

executed.[22]















However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute

of ownership.[23] Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in

the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be

considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party’s

claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of

ownership.[24] Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the

delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to

possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was

rejected.[25]

This is precisely what happened in the present case. This Court

had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that

De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent of his

claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is

essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the

property.[26] If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the

property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should

oust him.[27] No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the

decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such

event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove

the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a

reasonable period of time.[28] The removal of the improvements on the land

under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only

to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the

improvements.[29]































It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears

upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or

necessary thereto.[30] In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to

go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to

possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon’s claims, the issuance of

the writ ofexecution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted

modification of this Court’s decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a

necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential

consequence of this Court’s ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel

of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leon’s claims of

ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit

to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect,

amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.

De Leon also contends that there ―was never any government

infrastructure project in the subject land, much less a Manila-Cavite Coastal

Road traversing it, at any time ever since, until now‖ and that ―allegations of

a government project in the subject land and of such Road traversing the

subject land have been downright falsities and lies and mere concoctions of

respondent PEA.‖[31] However, this Court has already ruled in PEA v.

CA that ―it is not disputed that there is a government infrastructure project

in progress traversing Lot 5155, which has been enjoined by the writ of

injunction issued by the trial court.‖

In any case, De Leon’s argument that there was no government

infrastructure project in the subject property begs the issue of ownership

and rightful possession. The subject lot was properly identified. There is no











dispute as to its exact location. Hence, whether or not there is a

government project existing within the premises or that which traverses it is

not relevant to the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of the disputed

lot and, therefore, has legal possession thereof.

As to whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in

holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a

Writ of Demolition, Section 7,[32] Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the

general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari

commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of

origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of

preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. It is true that there are

instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or

temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for

a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of

judicial courtesy.[33] The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to

be the exception rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go v. Abrogar ,[34] the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied

indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of

Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Indeed, in the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a

new paragraph is now added to Section 7, Rule 65, which provides as

follows:

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case withinten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court ortribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,















or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with theprincipal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.

While the above quoted amendment may not be applied in the instant

case, as A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was made effective only on December 27,

2007, the provisions of the amendatory rule clearly underscores the

urgency of proceeding with the principal case in the absence of a

temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.

This urgency is even more pronounced in the present case,

considering that this Court’s judgment in PEA v. CA, finding that De Leon

does not own the subject property and is not entitled to its possession, had

long become final and executory. As a consequence, the writ of execution,

as well as the writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter of course, in

the absence of any order restraining their issuance. In fact, the writ of

demolition is merely an ancillary process to carry out the Order previously

made by the RTC for the execution of this Court’s decision in PEA v. CA. It

is a logical consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.

Neither can De Leon argue that he stands to sustain irreparable

damage. The Court had already determined with finality that he is not the

owner of the disputed property and that he has no right to possess the

same independent of his claim of ownership.

Furthermore, the Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution

of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition also appears to be



a circumvention of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of

Court, which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders issued by the

courts. In fact, the assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more

potent than a TRO issued by the CA because, under the Rules of Court, a

TRO issued by the CA is effective only for sixty days. In the present case,

even in the absence of a TRO issued by a higher court, the RTC, in effect,

directed the maintenance of the status quo by issuing its assailed Orders.

Worse, the effectivity of the said Orders was made to last for an indefinite

period because the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of

Demolition was made to depend upon the finality of the judgment in G.R.

No. 181970. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC

committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated

December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008.

Finally, the Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the

piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to advance his case.

To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof

should be isolated and read in this context, but the same must be

considered in its entirety.[35] Read in this manner, PEA’s right to possession

of the subject property, as well as the removal of the improvements or

structures existing thereon, fully follows after considering the entirety of the

Court’s decision in PEA v. CA. This is consistent with the provisions of

Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which

provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts, to

wit:

SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. -







x x x x

(c) Delivery or restitution of real property . - The officer shalldemand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery

or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claimingrights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three(3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgmentobligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such personstherefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peaceofficers, and employing such means as may be reasonablynecessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligeein possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents orprofits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the samemanner as a judgment for money.

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject ofexecution. - When the property subject of execution containsimprovements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor orhis agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove saidimprovements, except upon special order of the court, issuedupon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and afterthe former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable timefixed by the court.

As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging

for more than 15 years and the execution of this Court’s judgment in PEA v.

CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because

De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTC’s order of execution

based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is

prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its favor. TheCourt agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention

that every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final,

executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an

appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the



correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the

execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the ―life of the

law.‖[36] To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is

to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts.[37] It is in the

interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation.

WHEREFORE, the Court disposes and orders the following:

The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 181970 is DENIED.

The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. SP No. 90328 dated November 21, 2007 and March 4, 2008,

respectively, are AFFIRMED.

The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 182678 is GRANTED. The

assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135,

dated December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008, are ANNULLED and SET

ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby DIRECTED to hear and

resolve PE A’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition with utmost

dispatch. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to remand the records of the case to the court of

origin.

SO ORDERED.













G.R. No. 178495 July 26, 2010

SPOUSES RODOLFO A. NOCEDA and ERNA T. NOCEDA, Petitioners,vs.AURORA ARBIZO-DIRECTO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals(CA), dismissing the appeal on the ground of res judicata.

On September 16, 1986, respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo filed acomplaint against her nephew, herein petitioner Rodolfo Noceda, for"Recovery of Possession and Ownership and Rescission/Annulment ofDonation" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71,docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-354-I. Respondent alleged that she andher co-heirs have extra-judicially settled the property they inherited fromtheir late father on August 19, 1981, consisting of a parcel of land,described as Lot No. 1121, situated in Bitoong, San Isidro, Cabangan,Zambales. She donated a portion of her hereditary share to her nephew,but the latter occupied a bigger area, claiming ownership thereof sinceSeptember 1985.

Judgment was rendered in favor of respondent on November 6, 1991,where the RTC (a) declared the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated

August 19, 1981 valid; (b) declared the Deed of Donation dated June 1,1981 revoked; (c) ordered defendant to vacate and reconvey that donatedportion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1,1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns; (d) ordered the defendant toremove the house built inside the donated portion at the defendant’sexpense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00 Philippine Currency; and (e)ordered the defendant to pay attorney’s fees in the amount

of P5,000.00.2 The decision was appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.CV No. 38126.

On January 5, 1995, spouses Rodolfo Dahipon and Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, andannulment of sale and damages against spouses Antonio and Dominga

Arbizo, spouses Rodolfo and Erna Noceda, and Aurora Arbizo-Directo with

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/jul2010/gr_178495_2010.html#fnt1









the RTC, Iba, Zambales, Branch 70. This was docketed as Civil Case No.RTC-1106-I. In the complaint, spouses Dahipon alleged that they were theregistered owners of a parcel of land, consisting of 127,298 square meters,situated in Barangay San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, designated as Lot1121-A. The Original Certificate of Title No. P-9036 over the land wasissued in the name of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon, pursuant to Free Patent No.548781. Spouses Dahipon claimed that the defendants therein purchasedportions of the land from them without paying the full amount. Except for

Aurora, a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties, as aresult of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed, and TCT No. T-50730 was issued in the name of spouses Noceda for their portion of theland. For her part, Aurora questioned Dahipon’s alleged ownership over thesame parcel of land by filing an adverse claim.

In the meantime, a decision was rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 38126 onMarch 31, 1995 with the following fallo:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING defendantRodolfo Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot "C" of Lot 1121 perExhibit E, which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo-Directo. Except forthis modification, the Decision dated November 6, 1991 of the RTC, Iba,Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is hereby AFFIRMEDin all other respects. Costs against defendant Rodolfo Noceda.3

Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court, which wasdocketed as G.R. No. 119730. The Court found no reversible error, muchless grave abuse of discretion, with the factual findings of the two courtsbelow, and thus denied the petition on September 2, 1999.4 The decisionbecame final and executory, and a writ of execution was duly issued by theRTC on March 6, 2001 in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I.

On December 4, 2003, petitioners instituted an action for quieting of titleagainst respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 2108-I. In the complaint,petitioners admitted that Civil Case No. RTC-354-I was decided in favor ofrespondent and a writ of execution had been issued, ordering them tovacate the property. However, petitioners claimed that the land, which wasthe subject matter of Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, was the same parcel ofland owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they purchased a portion; andthat a title (TCT No. T-37468) was, in fact, issued in their name. Petitionersprayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the











implementation of the Writ of Execution dated March 6, 2001 in Civil CaseNo. RTC-354-I, and that "a declaration be made that the property bought,occupied and now titled in the name of [petitioners] was formerly part andsubdivision of Lot No. 1121 Pls-468-D, covered by OCT No. P-9036 in thename of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon."5

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.Respondent averred that petitioners, aware of their defeat in Civil Case No.RTC-354-I, surreptitiously negotiated with Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon for thesale of the land and filed the present suit in order to subvert the executionthereof.

The trial court denied the motion, holding that there was no identity ofcauses of action.

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 25, 2006, after petitioners presentedtheir evidence, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, stating that theclaim of ownership and possession of petitioners on the basis of the titleemanating from that of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon was already raised in theprevious case (Civil Case No. RTC-354-I).

On February 22, 2006, the trial court issued a resolution granting thedemurrer to evidence.

The CA affirmed. Hence, petitioners now come to this Court, raising thefollowing issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA ORDOCTRINE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLEUNDER THE FACTS OBTAINING IN THE PRESENT CASE[;]

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER TITLE THANTHE PETITIONERS[; and]

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING ON PURCHASERS IN BAD FAITH IS APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE[.]6

Petitioners assert that res judicata7 does not apply, considering that theessential requisites as to the identity of parties, subject matter, and causesof action are not present.













The petition is bereft of merit.

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of theRules of Court, as follows:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment orfinal order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction topronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

x x x x

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to thematter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could havebeen raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties andtheir successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencementof the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing andunder the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or theirsuccessors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged ina former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to havebeen so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included thereinor necessary thereto.

The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the meritsconcludes the litigation between the parties and their privies andconstitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of actioneither before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, ormatter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in thedetermination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment ordecree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgmenttherein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privieswhether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the

two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction betweenthe principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment mayoperate as evidence.8] The first general rule above stated, and whichcorresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 ofthe Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while thesecond general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the samesection and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."9










The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City 10 explained thesecond concept which we reiterate herein, to wit:

The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact orquestion which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passedupon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusivelysettled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action andpersons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated inany future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court orany other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or differentcause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by properauthority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action canbe conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the sameparties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a

particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point orquestion, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies willbe final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was inissue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merelyidentity of issue.

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA

179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgmentwhich bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which barsthe relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between thesame parties on a different claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questionswhich were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly appliedto all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.

Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto andalthough such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and werenot actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of theformer trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered withoutdeciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled thatmatter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment






necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself .11

The foregoing disquisition finds application in the case at bar. Undeniably,the present case is closely related to the previous case (Civil Case No.RTC-354-I), where petitioners raised the issue of ownership andpossession of Lot No. 1121 and the annulment of the donation of said lot tothem. The RTC found for respondent, declaring the deed of donation sheexecuted in favor of petitioners revoked; and ordered petitioners to vacateand reconvey the donated portion to respondent. The decision of the RTCwas affirmed by the CA, and became final with the denial of the petition forreview by this Court in G.R. No. 119730. In that case, the Court noted theestablished fact "that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portiondonated to him by respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo, but he also fenced

the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus,petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondentDirecto without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act of usurpationwhich is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as anact of ingratitude of a donee against the donor."12 Clearly, therefore,petitioners have no right of ownership or possession over the land inquestion.1avvph!1

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material factbecomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has

been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, orwhen an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of thecourt, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon theparties and those in privity with them.13 Thus, petitioners can no longerquestion respondent’s owner ship over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit forquieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigationof particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same partieson a different claim or cause of action.14

Furthermore, we agree that petitioners instituted the instant action withunclean hands. Aware of their defeat in the previous case, they attemptedto thwart execution and assert their alleged ownership over the landthrough their purported purchase of a lot from Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon. Thislater transaction appears to be suspect. A perusal of G.R. No. 119730reveals that the Court was not unaware of Dahipon’s alleged claim over thesame parcel of land. It noted that Dahipon did not even bother to appear in



















court to present her free patent upon respondent’s request, or to intervenein the case, if she really had any legitimate interest over the land inquestion.15 In any event, petitioners’ assertion of alleged good title over theland cannot stand considering that they purchased the piece of land fromDahipon knowing fully well that the same was in the adverse possession ofanother.

Thus, we find no reversible error in the appellate court’s ruling thatpetitioners are in fact buyers in bad faith. We quote:

With appellants’ actual knowledge of facts that would impel a reasonableman to inquire further on [a] possible defect in the title of Obispo,considering that she was found not to have been in actual occupation of theland in CA-G.R. CV No. 38126, they cannot simply invoke protection of the

law as purchasers in good faith and for value. In a suit to quiet title,defendant may set up equitable as well as legal defenses, includingacquisition of title by adverse possession and a prior adjudication on thequestion under the rule on res judicata. Appellants’ status as holders in badfaith of a certificate of title, taken together with the preclusive effect of theright of possession and ownership over the disputed portion, which wasadjudged in favor of appellee in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, thus provideample justification for the court a quo to grant the demurrer to evidence anddismiss their suit for quieting of title filed against the said appellee.16

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.87026 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice











Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ADELAIDA INFANTE, G.R. NO. 156596

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .,

Chairperson,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ .

ARAN BUILDERS, INC., Promulgated:

Respondent.* August 24, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x







D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision [1]of the Court of

Appeals (CA) promulgated on August 12, 2002, which upheld the Order

dated September 4, 2001, issued by the Regional Trial Court

of Muntinlupa City (RTC).

The undisputed facts and issues raised in the lower courts are

accurately summarized by the CA as follows: Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (or

―Muntinlupa RTC‖; Branch 276), presided over by Hon. Norma

C. Perello (or ―respondent judge‖), was an action for revival of

judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. (or ―private

respondent‖) against AdelaidaInfante (or ―petitioner‖), docketed as

Civil Case No. 01-164.





The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by

the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (or ―Makati RTC‖; Branch

60) in an action for specific performance and damages, docketed

as Civil Case No. 15563.

The Makati RTC judgment, which became final

and executory on November 16, 1994, decreed as follows:

26. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

26.1 The defendant ADELAIDA B. INFANTE is ordered to do the

following within thirty (30) days from finality hereof:

26.1.1. To deliver to the plaintiff ARAN BUILDERS, INC. the

following: (a) the complete plans (lot plan, location map and

vicinity map); (b) Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (c ) Real Estate

Tax clearance; (d) tax receipts; (e) proof of up to date payment of

Subdivision Association dues referred to in the ―CONTRACT TO

SELL‖ dated November 10, 1986 (Exh. A or Exh. 1);

26.1.2. To execute the deed of sale of Lot No. 11, Block 9, Phase

3-A1, Ayala Alabang Subdivision covered by TCT No. 114015

forP500,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff;



26.1.3. To pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes

and other taxes which the Bureau of Internal Revenue may assess

in connection with the sale mentioned in the preceding paragraph

and to submit to the plaintiff proof of such payment;

26.1.4. To secure the written conformity of AYALA

CORPORATION to the said sale and to give such written

conformity to the plaintiff;

26.1.5. To register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds

and deliver to AYALA CORPORATION the certificate of title

issued in the name of plaintiff pursuant to such registration;

26.2 Upon the compliance of the defendant with the preceding

directives, the plaintiff must immediately pay to the defendant the

sum of P321,918.25;

26.3 The defendant is ordered to pay

plaintiff P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

26.4 The Complaint for moral and exemplary damages is

DISMISSED;

26.5 The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED; and



26.6 Cost is taxed against the defendant.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of

judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no

jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was

improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.

On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC issued an

order which reads:

The MOTION TO DISMISS is denied.

Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by

the Makati Regional Trial Court, but it must be emphasized that at

that time there was still no Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City,

then under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that

cases from this City were tried and heard at Makati City. With the

creation of the Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, matters

involving properties located in this City, and cases

involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be litigated

before these Courts.

The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which declared

the plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land located



in MuntinlupaCity. It is this judgment which is sought to be

enforced thru this action which necessarily involves the interest,

possession, title, and ownership of the parcel of land located

in Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without saying

that the complaint should be filed in the latter City where the

property is located, as there are now Regional Trial Courts hereat.

Defendant may answer the complaint within the remaining

period, but no less than five (5) days, otherwise a default

judgment might be taken against her.

It is SO ORDERED.

Her motion for reconsideration having been denied per

order dated September 28, 2001, petitioner came to this Court

[CA] via the instant special civil action for certiorari. She ascribes

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge for ―erroneously

holding that Civil Case No. 01-164 is a revival of judgment which

declared private respondent as the owner of a parcel of land

located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the judgment rendered by

the (Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 15563 sought to be enforced



necessarily involves the interest, possession, title and ownership

of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City.‖

Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific

performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal

action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is

also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the

action for revival of judgment is either MakatiCity

or Parañaque City where private respondent and petitioner

respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the

subject action for revival judgment is ―quasi in rem because it

involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property‖;

and that, consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the

property is situated.[2]

On August 12, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling in favorof herein private respondent. The CA held that since the judgment sought

to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or possession of

real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment is then

an action in rem which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the







place where the real property is located. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration of the CA Decision but the motion was denied per

Resolution datedJanuary 7, 2003.

Hence, herein petition. Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding

that the complaint for revival of judgment is an action inrem which was

correctly filed with the RTC of the place where the disputed real property is

located.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an

action in personam; therefore, the complaint should be filed with the RTC of

the place where either petitioner or private respondent resides. Petitioner

then concludes that the filing of the action for revival of judgment with the

RTC of Muntinlupa City, the place where the disputed property is located,

should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment it is seeking to

revive involves interest over real property. As such, the present action for

revival is a real action, and venue was properly laid with the court of the

place where the realty is located.

Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is the proper

venue of the present action for revival of judgment?



Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that

after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is

barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order

may be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the

action for revival of judgment should be filed.

In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,[3] the Court held that:

x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in

the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place

where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place

designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of

actions in general. (Emphasis supplied)[4]

but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix

the venue of actions in general must be considered.[5]

Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to

or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be

commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction

over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion

thereof, is situated.















x x x x

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions

may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the

principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the

principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident

defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the

present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal

action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the action for revival

of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest

therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place

where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the

category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with

the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

In support of her contention that the action for revival of judgment is a

personal action and should be filed in the court of the place where either

the plaintiff or defendant resides, petitioner cites the statements made by

the Court in Aldeguer v. Gemelo[6] andDonnelly v. Court of First Instance of

Manila[7]. Petitioner, however, seriously misunderstood the Court's rulings

in said cases.









In Aldeguer , what the Court stated was that ―[t]he action for the

execution of a judgment for damages is a personal one, and under

section 377 [of the Code of Civil Procedure], it should be brought in any

province where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the

plaintiff ‖[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioner apparently

took such statement to mean that any action for revival of judgment should

be considered as a personal one. This thinking is incorrect. The Court

specified that the judgment sought to be revived in said case was a

judgment for damages. The judgment subject of the action for revival did

not involve or affect any title to or possession of real property or any

interest therein. The complaint filed in the revival case did not fall under

the category of real actions and, thus, the action necessarily fell under the

category of personal actions.

In Donnelly , the portion of the Decision being relied upon by petitioner

stated thus:

Petitioner raises before this Court two (2) issues, namely:

(a) whether an action for revival of judgment is one quasi

in rem and, therefore, service of summons may be effected thru

publication; and (b) whether the second action for revival of

judgment (Civil Case No. 76166) has already prescribed. To our

mind, the first is not a proper and justiciable issue in the

present proceedings x x x. Nevertheless, let it be said that an







action to revive a judgment is a personal one. (Emphasis

supplied)[9]

The Court clearly pointed out that in said case, the issue on whether an

action for revival of judgment is quasi in rem was not yet proper

and justiciable. Therefore, the foregoing statement cannot be used as a

precedent, as it was merely an obiter dictum. Moreover, as in Aldeguer ,

the judgment sought to be revived in Donnelly involved judgment for a

certain sum of money. Again, no title or interest in real property was

involved. It is then understandable that the action for revival in said case

was categorized as a personal one.

Clearly, the Court's classification in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the

actions for revival of judgment as being personal in character does not

apply to the present case.

The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine

whether it is a real action or a personal action.

The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final

and executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of

sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of hereinprivate respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in connection with said sale;

register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala

Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of private

respondent. The same judgment ordered private respondent to pay







petitioner the sum of P321,918.25upon petitioner's compliance with the

aforementioned order. It is further alleged that petitioner refused to comply

with her judgment obligations despite private respondent's repeated

requests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the action

for revival of judgment. Private respondent then prayed that the judgment

be revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce said judgment.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared private

respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to

it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established

interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or interest, private

respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason

for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's

adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the

category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real

property.

The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the

complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place

where the realty is located.

Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each

branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over

which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its



authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be

the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of

determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or

actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise

appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be

exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to

the people of the different parts of the region and making the

attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as

possible. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the Regional TrialCourt shall exercise its authority only over a particular territory

defined by the Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the

territorial jurisdiction of the MakatiCourts. However, Section 4 of Republic

Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen

of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As The Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law

provided for the creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court

in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court

in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly



issue orders and processes concerning real property

within Muntinlupa City.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by

the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 when it denied

petitioner's motion to dismiss; and the CA did not commit any error in

affirming the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August

12, 2002 and Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals

are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED



G.R. No. 80892 September 29, 1989

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS of JESUSAMADO ARANETA, respondents.

Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioner.

Antonio P. Barredo for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Petitioner impugns the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November10 and December 2 and 3, 1987 which, in effect, gave due course toprivate respondents' petition for annulment of judgment.

The antecedents of this case are as follows:

On February 15,1984 Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, as mortgagors, andIslamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines (Council for brevity), asmortgagee, executed a real estate mortgage over a 4,754 sq. m. parcel ofland located in Cubao, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle (TCT) No. 30461 as security for the payment of a one million pesopromissory note in favor of the mortgagee. The mortgagors were unable topay their obligation, hence, the Council instituted foreclosure proceedingswith the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43746. OnFebruary 5, 1985 the parties submitted a compromise agreement wherein itwas stipulated that because of the Da Silvas' inability to pay their debt tothe Council, and for the additional consideration of P 500,000.00, they

jointly agree to cede, transfer and convey to the Council the land theymortgaged to the latter. On February 12, 1985, the Regional Trial Court

approved the compromise agreement. Thereafter, TCT No. 328021 wasissued in the name of the Council by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Subsequent thereto, on August 8,1985, Jesus Amado Araneta filed with theRegister of Deeds a notice of lis pendens in connection with Civil Case No.Q-47989 entitled "Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines v. Jesus

Amado Araneta" for ejectment. The complaint was converted into an action



for collection of rentals with damages but was later on withdrawn by theCouncil. On August 13, 1985 Araneta also filed with the same Register ofDeeds an affidavit of adverse claim in connection with Civil Case No. Q-43469 entitled "Marconi Da Silva, et al. v. Jesus Amado Araneta, et al." forrecovery of possession. The notice of lis pendens and adverse claim wereannotated at the back of TCT No. 328021 by the Register of Deeds.

On October 9, 1985 the Council filed in the Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession andDamages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Aranetapraying, inter alia, for the cancellation of all the annotations at the back ofTCT No. 328021. The case is docketed as Civil Case No. Q-46196.

While this case was pending, on July 6, 1987, the heirs of Jesus Amado

Araneta, private respondents herein, filed with the Court of Appeals apetition to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 for foreclosure. Insupport of their petition the heirs of Araneta narrated the following events:

(1) on December 20,1953 Jesus Amado Araneta purchased the4,754 sq.m. parcel of land located in Cubao from the SpousesGarcia and since then he and his family have always been inpossession thereof;

(2) for some reason known only to Araneta and Fred Da

Silva,an employee of the former, title to the property was placedin the latter's name as evidenced by TCT No. 30461 althoughfrom the time of its issuance the owner's duplicate copy of saidTCT has always been in the possession of Araneta,

(3) on January 31, 1963, the parties decided to terminate thetrust that had been created over the property, thus, Da Silvaexecuted a deed of sale over the same parcel of land in favor of

Araneta but no consideration was given by the latter to theformer for said sale and any recital of consideration appearingin the deed is purely fictitious;

(4) the Register of Deeds, however, refused to register thedeed of sale because the title is in the name of "Fred Da Silvamarried to Leocadia Da Silva" and is thus presumed conjugaland the conjugal partnership should first be liquidated as thewife had already died;



(5) alleging that their copy was lost and/or destroyed, onFebruary 1, 1984 Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, two of thethree surviving children of Fred Da Silva who died in 1963, fileda petition, docketed as LRC record Case No. Q-2772, for theissuance of a new copy of the owner's duplicate copy of TCTNo. 30461. The petition was granted by Judge Vera on March24,1984:

(6) Araneta learned about this and immediately filed a motion tore-open the proceedings stating that he has in his possessionthe ,- owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 30461 and explainingthe reasons for such possession;

(7) the motion was granted and on December 7,1984 the land

registration court ordered the Da Silvas to (a) return to theRegister of the second owner's duplicate copy of the title and(b) neither enter into any transaction concerning said secondowner's duplicate copy nor utilize the title for any purpose otherthan to return the same to the Register of Deeds;

(8) on November 11, 1985, the Da Silvas manifested before theland registration court that the title to the property wastransferred to the Council based on a compromise agreementin Civil Case No. Q43746 for foreclosure; and

(9) on motion of the heirs of Araneta, who substituted him uponhis death in 1985, Judge Vera consolidated Civil Cases Nos. Q-2772 and Q-43469, both of which were raffled to his sala, withCivil Case No. Q-46196 but the judge hearing the latter casewould not heed the order of consolidation.

(10) and then set out their case for annulment of judgmentalleging that the Da Silvas, with the connivance of the Council,executed a purported promissory note secured by a real estatemortgage the terms and conditions of which were made veryonerous as to pave the way for the foreclosure of the propertyby virtue of a confession of judgment; and, the Council hadalways known of the Araneta's claim of ownership over the landbecause the former's executive officer and secretary general isthe lawyer of the Da Silvas in the cases they filed against the



Araneta's. The heirs of Araneta in their petition prayed, interalia, that (1) the judgment in Civil Case No. Q- 43746 beannulled and set aside and (2) a restraining order be issued toenjoin the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-46196 [Petition,

Annex "A"].

In a resolution dated November 10, 1987 the Court of Appeals issued atemporary restraining order enjoining the trial judge from hearing Civil CaseNo. Q-46196 until further orders from the court. In the same resolution theparties were ordered to appear for a pre- trial conference. The Council fileda motion for reconsideration of this resolution. Later on the Council filed aSupplement to Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismissquestioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear the petition forannulment of a judgment that had already been fully executed. The Council

also invoked the additional grounds of lack of cause of action because the Aranetas are not valid claimants of the property; lack of legal capacity tosue because the Aranetas were not parties to the foreclosure case; litispendentia because of the pendency of the quieting of title case betweenthe same parties; and, abandonment, waiver and unenforceability underthe Statute of Frauds [Petition, Annex "H"]. On December 2, 1987 the Courtof Appeals denied the Council's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.In the hearing conducted on December 3, 1987 the Council reiterated thegrounds it raised in its Supplemental Motion and Motion to Dismiss but thesame were summarily denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petitionfor certiorari .

Petitioner contends the following: first, that the Court of Appeals should notcontinue to hear the petition for annulment of judgment since it is alreadyfully executed and the purpose for which the case for annulment was filedwill no longer be served, the parties having already complied with thedecision; second, private respondents have no right to question the validityor legality of the decision rendered foreclosing the mortgage since they areforeign to the transaction of mortgage between petitioner and Freddie and

Marconi Da Silva; lastly, petitioner claims that private respondents haveanother remedy in law and that is in Civil Case No. Q-46196 for Quieting ofTitle where the question of ownership may be passed upon.

At the outset it must be clarified that the instant petition is onefor certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the inquiry thisCourt should address itself is limited to error of jurisdiction or grave abuse



of discretion committed by the Court, of Appeals, in particular, whether ornot respondent court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion in giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment.This clarification is rendered necessary because the parties themselves, intheir pleadings, have gone beyond this issue and have discussed themerits of the annulment of judgment case now pending decision with theCourt of Appeals.

In its Petition, the Council contends that a Regional Trial Court has theauthority and jurisdiction to annul a judgment of another Regional TrialCourt, a coordinate or co-equal court Specifically, petitioner alleges that thefiling of a separate action for annulment of judgment is unnecessarybecause the Regional Trial Court hearing Civil Case No. Q-43469 forQuieting of Title can annul the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 for

Foreclosure rendered by another Regional Trial Court [Rollo, pp. 15-16). Inits Memorandum, however, the Council admitted that the Court of Appealshas the exclusive jurisdiction to annul the decision of the Regional TrialCourt [Rollo, pp. 152-1531.

Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case wherethe judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The judgment may beannulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud [Canlas v. Hon- Courtof Appeals, G.R. No. 77691, August 8,19881. Jurisdiction over actions forannulment of Regional Trial Court judgment has been clarified by Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129 (otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Actof 1980). Prior to the enactment of this law, different views had beenentertained regarding the issue of whether or not a branch of a RegionalTrial Court may annul a judgment of another branch of the samecourt. * However, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 introduced a new provision conferring on the Court of Appeals exclusive original

jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Sec. 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expressly provides that:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise: ...

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of

judgments of Regional Trial Courts; Thus, it is beyond disputethat it is only the Court of Appeals that can take cognizance ofthe annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 renderedby the Regional Trial Court.

The next issue raised in this petition deals with the question of who mayproperly institute a petition for annulment of judgment. It is petitioner's



contention that the remedy is available only to one who is a party to thecase where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. Privaterespondents, on the other hand, allege that "there are sufficient facts andcircumstances sufficient to show prima facie that [they] have a substantialinterest in the ownership of the property which had been foreclosed withouttheir knowledge and consent" [Rollo, p. 90]. In fine, the question deals withwhether or not the heirs of Araneta have a cause of action against theCouncil.

In Militante v. Edrosolano [G.R. No. L-27940, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA4731, an action for annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. 6216 betweenEdrosolano and Belosillo was filed by Militante. The petition stemmed froma complaint instituted by Militante on September 6, 1965 againstEdrosolano for damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage. On

January 18,1966 Militante obtained an order of preliminary attachment onthe property of Edrosolano. Alleging that he purchased all of Edrosolano'sTPU equipment on February 28, 1966, Belosillo filed a third-party claim. Itappears that on February 25, 1963 Belosillo obtained a judgment by defaultagainst Edrosolano in Civil Case No. 6216 for collection of amount ofP45,000.00, the value of the promissory note executed by the latter onFebruary 1, 1960. After a recital of these antecedent facts, Militante, in hispetition for annulment of judgment contended, inter alia, that (1) Civil CaseNo. 6216 "was based on a fictitious cause of action because [the]promissory note was without lawful consideration whatsoever" [at 476]; (2)Edrosolano did not file any answer to Belosillo's complaint and allowed thelatter to obtain a judgment by default which judgment attained finalitywithout the former appealing therefrom; and, (3) while judgment in CivilCase No. 6216 was promulgated iii 1963 it was "only on January 19, 1966when . . . Belosillo caused the execution thereof after [Militante] hadalready instituted his civil case for damages against ... Edrosolano and anorder for issuance of preliminary attachment issued" [at 477]. The trial courthowever dismissed Militante's action for annulment on finding that it did notstate a cause of action. Thereafter, Militante filed an appeal to this Tribunal

and in setting aside the trial court's order of dismissal', the Court, speakingthrough then Mr. Associate Justice Enrique Fernando, stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. More specifically, the view entertained by the lower court inits order of dismissal that an action for annulment of judgment



can be availed of only by those principally or secondarily boundis contrary to what had been so clearly declared by this Court inthe leading case of Anuran v. Aquino t38 Phil. 291, decided in1918. It was emphatically announced therein: "There can be noquestion as to the right of any persons adversely affected by a

judgement to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement andto have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion

practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment whensuch fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in theissues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment . x x x."[at 3233.] Such a principle was further fortified by anobservation made by this Court through Justice Ozaeta inGarchitorena v. Sotelo [74 Phil. 25 (,1942)j'. These are hiswords: "The collusive conduct of the parties in the foreclosure

suit constituted an extrinsic or collateral fraud by reason ofwhich the judgment rendered therein may be annulled in thisseparate action [citing also the case of Anuran]. Aside from the

Anuran-Aquino case, innumerable authorities from other jurisdictions may be cited 'in support of the annulment. But werethere not any precedent to guide us, reason and justice wouldcompel us to lay down such doctrine for the first time." [at 481-482-, Italics supplied.]

It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person need not be a party tothe judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can provehis allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud andcollusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to theforeclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the

judgment rendered therein. However. their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and betweenthe Da Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them. This

allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of evidence, could be thebasis for the annulment of Civil Case No. Q-43476.

Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of annulment of judgmentapplies only to final and executory judgment and not to that which hadalready been fully executed or implemented.It is the Council's contentionthat as the judgment in the foreclosure case had already been executed



evidenced by the fact that title to the property in question had beentransferred in its name the judgment can no longer be annulled. TheCouncil's contention is devoid of merit. In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, supra,the Court affirmed the trial court's annulment of the judgment onforeclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the house and lotsubject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosedthe mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to a person whobought the same and finally to another individual in whose name theTorrens certificate of title stood by the time the case reached this Tribunal.

In view of the foregoing the Court finds that the Court of Appeals neitheracted without jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion in givingdue course to the petition for annulment of judgment as would warrant theissuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the orders of theCourt of Appeals dated November 10 and December 2 and 3,1987 are

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez,Jr., Feliciano and Bidlin,JJ., concur.

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