Crafts - Industrial Revolution in England and France

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Industrial Revolution in England and France: Some Thoughts on the Question, "Why wasEngland First?"Author(s): N. F. R. CraftsReviewed work(s):Source: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug., 1977), pp. 429-441Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Economic History SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2594877 .

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IndustrialevolutionnEnglandndFrance:SomeThoughtsntheQuestion,WhywasEnglandirst?'

BY N. F. R. CRAFTSAAJOR concern feconomichistoriansince World War II has been tointerpret he processof ndustrialization n now developed countries.Oneprominent ine of approach has been to compare the experience of theEuropean economies in the eighteenth entury, nd much of the inquiry hasbeen conceptualized alongthefollowingines. "The IndustrialRevolution posestwoproblems: i) Whydid thisfirst reakthrougho a modern ndustrial ystemtakeplace in Western Europe? and (2) Why,within hisEuropean experience,did changeoccur whenandwhere t did?"2This comparative approach has been seen as a particularlyvaluable way ofyielding nsightsntothe processofeconomic growthngeneral and the causes oftheEnglish ndustrialRevolution nparticular.Thus Crouzetarguesthat "Theeconomichistorian nterestedn thekey problemofgrowth s bound to find hecomparative approach particularlyfruitful.A systematiccomparison of theeighteenth-centurynglish economywiththat ofanothercountry-and Franceas theleadingcontinentalpowerat that timeseemstheobvious choice-shouldbringout more clearlywhat factorswerepeculiar to England and mighthavedeterminedwhatis a unique phenomenon, heEnglish ndustrialRevolutionofthe eighteenth entury."3 ince Crouzetwrote,much of the literaturehas ac-ceptedtheusefulness fthequestion, "Whywas England first" and thespecificquestion, "Why did England experiencethe onset of the Industrial RevolutionbeforeFrance ?" has beenpromotedto a positionofgreat prominence.4

There is bynow an extensive iterature ffering wide variety fresponses othesequestions.The answers eem to fall nto three ypes.First, here re studieswhichsingleout a singlecrucial reason. To cite ust a couple ofexampleswe findviewsas diverse s those ofKemp ("ifone overriding eason can be givenfor heslower ransformationf he continent.. it mustbe thecontinuedprevalenceofthe traditional grarian structures")5nd Hagen ("the differencesnpersonalityrather than differential ircumstances re the central explanation of Britain's1The author would like to thankRobert Harris,Mark Harrison,Peter Law, Ned Lorenz, RobertMoeller,StephenPeck, and Gavin Wright or heir elpful omments n an earlier ersion fthispaper.Theybear no responsibilityor rrors.2 D. S. Landes, The UnboundrometheusCambridge, 969), p. i2.3F. Crouzet, England and France in the EighteenthCentury: A Comparative Analysisof TwoEconomicGrowths',nR. M. Hartwell, d. TheCauses f he ndustrialevolutionnEngland 967), p. 139.4 See, for xample,R. Davis, TheRiseof he tlanticconomiesIthaca, 1973), T. Kemp, IndustrialisationinNineteenth-CenturyuropeI 969),and W. W. Rostow,How t All Began New York,1975)5 Kemp, op. cit. p. 8.

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430 N. F. R. CRAFTSprimacy .. the IndustrialRevolution occurred firstn England and Wales ...because British eople were nwardlydifferent rom hose of thecontinent")).1In reaction againstthe singlefactor xplanation two positionshave commonlybeen adopted. One is to regardthe English ndustrialRevolution as the result fa previous period of general economic growth; thus Hartwell argues: "Do weneed anexplanationf the ndustrialrevolution?Could itnotbe the culminationof a most unspectacular process, the consequence of a long period of sloweconomic growth? . . . Cannot the industrial revolution be explained moreplausibly as the outcome of a process of balanced growth?"2 The other s to lista large number of favourable factors, s, for example, does Kranzberg: "Inshort, here was no single factorwhich can account forBritain'sleadership inthe ndustrialRevolution. nstead, twasa multiplicity ffactors-technological,social, economic, political, and cultural-which came together n the mid-eighteenth entury o providethe stimulusfor ndustrialadvance. In all thesefactors,Britain had a slight advantage over France. But the advantage wasqualitative rather hanquantitative."3None of these attemptedsolutions to the question ofwhy England and notFrance has been verysatisfactory nd in their recent book Milward and Saulattackedthemall. They arguedthat "attempts o solate singlefactorswhichcanexplain the fact hat the firstndustrial evolution ccurredwhere t did ... tendto breakdown before he enormousdiversity f thecontinental conomies.Themore theirhistory n theeighteenth entury s considered,the greaterappearsthe difficultyffinding ne single factor n the Britisheconomy not present nsome continental conomies."4They also pointed out that "most recentresearchinto the French economy n the eighteenth enturyhas demonstrated hat theincrease in industrialoutputper head in the eighteenth enturywas probablyfaster hanthat n Britain .. [so that] thisgeneral explanation no longer eemsvalid." They also maintainedthat the laundry-list pproach typified yKranz-bergis "too tautological to be of much value".5 Milward and Saul went on tosuggesta new direction for search fora solution to the puzzling question ofEngland's primacy and contended that "Previous centuries of developmentdetermined hatthe industrialrevolutionhappened not in Europe's wealthiest,mostpopulous, most powerful nd mostproductive country, rance, but in anisland off tsshores."6This articlepresents criticalreaction to the recent iteratureon the com-parative economichistory fEngland and France in theeighteenth entury. ndoing so it accepts Milward and Saul's criticisms fthe existing ttempts o ex-plain England's primacy n experiencing he onsetof the ndustrialRevolution.However, the position taken below is that the question, "Why was Englandfirst " is misconceived nd should be discarded rather hannewsolutionsbeing

1 E. E. Hagen, 'British ersonalitynd the IndustrialRevolution: The HistoricalEvidence',in T.Burns nd S. B. Saul, eds. SocialTheoryndEconomichangei967), p. 37.2 R. M. Hartwell, The Causes of the IndustrialRevolution: An Essay in Methodology',EconomicHistory eview, nd ser.xviii 1 965) repr. nHartwell, d. op. cit.p. 78.3 M. Kranzberg, Prerequisites or ndustrialisation',n M. Kranzberg and C. W. Pursell, r, eds.Technologyn Westernivilisation,(New York, i967), 229.4 A. S. Milward and S. B. Saul, TheEconomicevelopmentfContinentalurope,78o-i87o, I (I 973),32-3.5 Ibid. 3I, 33. 6 Ibid. 38.



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INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 43Isought. n particular, t is argued that thequestion, "Why was England first?"should be distinguished romthe separate question, "Why did the IndustrialRevolution occurin theeighteenth entury " and thatthefailure o do so mayhave been an important bstacleto an adequate interpretationfthe economichistory fFrance in the eighteenth entury.The underlyingview of industrialization adopted here is that economicdevelopment n generaland technologicalprogressn particular n eighteenth-century urope shouldberegarded sstochasticprocesses.The mainstagesoftheargument re as follows. n section I a definition f"industrial revolution" ntermsof decisive innovations s adopted as appropriate to the comparisonofeighteenth-century ngland and France. In section III it is maintained thatwhether deterministic r a stochasticview ofhistorys adopted the standardquestion, "Whywas Englandfirst " isunanswerable. n section V a brief eviewof theoriesof nnovations s presentedto suggestthat a consensus n favourofviewinginnovationas a stochasticprocesshas developed in the literatureontechnological progressand that accepting this view implies that, althoughEngland had thedecisive nnovationsfirst, x ante t may have been eithermoreorless ikely hanFrance to do so. In sectionv thisproposition sused tosuggestthatthe French economy oftheeighteenth enturyhas been unfairly nd pre-maturelywritten ff s inferior o theEnglish.

IITo aid our examination of the problems involved in explaining England'sprimacy, he question will be put n the more pecific orm ound n the iterature,"Why did the onset of the Industrial Revolution occur in England not inFrance?" "Industrial Revolution" willbe understood s a period ofacceleratedstructural hangein theeconomy, nvolving rapid rise n industrial utput, nthe share ofmanufacturingn national product,and in factory-based ctivity(implying differentindofeconomy),basedon major technologicalnnovations.The focus fourattentionwill be on the transformationfthe alreadyexistingindustrial ectorofthe economy,not on theoverall growth f he economyor theprocessof primitive ccumulation. t will be assumed that n the mid-eighteenthcenturyFrance and England were both growing economies with significantamountsof small-scale manufacturing ctivity.Then for our purposeswe canfollow he ead givenby Landes ingivingthecottontextiles ndustryhe eadingrole in precipitating he Industrial Revolution. Landes does so because it metthefollowing pecifications: On the one hand, industrialrevolutionrequiredmachineswhichnotonlyreplaced hand labourbut compelled the concentrationofproduction n factories-in otherwords,machines whose appetite for nergywas too large fordomesticsourcesofpower and whose mechanical superioritywas sufficientobreakdowntheresistance f he older forms fhandproduction.On the otherhand, it requireda big industry roducing a commodity f wideand elasticdemand, such that I) the mechanisation of any one of ts processesof manufacturewould createserious strainsn the others, nd (2) the impact ofimprovementsn this ndustrywould be felt hroughout he economy."'

1 Landes, op. cit. p. 8i.



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432 N. F. R. CRAFTSThe standard question can then be reformulated n the terms adopted byDavis: "The Industrial Revolution had its immediate beginning n the cottonindustry... The events hat were decisive were two n number; the nvention fthe spinning enny by Hargreaves, and of the water frame by Arkwright ..

why .. did the decisive nventions ake place in England?"1It is as well to make explicit the counterfactual nvisaged in this question,namely that if the "decisive innovations" had occurred n France rather thanEngland, France would have had the first ndustrial revolution. t should benoted now, however, hatthisformulation oes not egard industrial evolution"and the achievement of "modern economic growth" as synonymous, or is itinconsistentwith the view that, the first ndustrial Revolution having occurred,France followed different oute to industrialization, n "unobtrusive" one.2IIIThere are two important problems which can be perceived in the currentattempts o explain England's primacy: the danger of perpetrating osthoc rgopropteroc allacies nd the failure o assess the relativemagnitudes f he mpactsofthe putative causal factors. n otherwords there s a need to take nto accounttheceterisaribus nd to estimatethe partial effects f the supposed independentvariables.This suggestsone oftwo approaches. First,we mightseek to invoke a uni-versally pplicable "covering aw" of he type whenever, nd only f,A thenB",

i.e. A is a set of conditionsnecessary nd sufficientorB. Rostow's stage-theoryapproach can be thoughtof as a (bold but unsuccessful) ttemptto proceed inthisway by making uch a "lawlike statement".3However, solvingthe problemof thecauses of the first ndustrial Revolution in this way is impossible sinceitwas a unique event and the outcomeofan uncontrolled xperiment. he secondmethod would be to make inductive generalizations by looking for empiricalassociations between various features of economic life and the timingof the"decisive nnovations".This wouldbe rather imilar o Kuznets'methodologynhis examination ofmoderneconomicgrowth.A naturalway to proceedwouldbe to run a multiple regression,r a+31X1 . . . +/nXn+e, where Y, thedependent variable, would be the timingof the "decisive innovations",theXstheproposed "causal factors", nd erepresentsn error erm.This methodologywould be less ambitious than theformer, eingconcernedwithsufficiency,.e.with ttemptingosaywhatchanges nconditionsn Francewouldhave sufficed,ceterisaribus,to give France the first ndustrialrevolution.Obviously, thisapproach is also impossible because we have onlyone observation.Even ifwewereprepared to include the imitativefollower ases of thenineteenth enturywe could stillexpect insuperable problemsof nterpretation,multicollinearity,and insufficientegreesof freedom.4Davis, op. cit.pp. 3 I I-I3 (originalwordorder lightly mended,but sense ame).2 This term s due to K. E. Berrill, HistoricalExperience: The Problemof Economic "Take-Off"',in idern. conomicevelopmentith eferenceo outh ast Asia New York, 965)3W. W. Rostow, The tages fEconomicrowthCambridge, 96o).4 It isnoticeable hatKuznets has beenable to come up withremarkablyittle n the way ofpowerfulgeneralization bout the timing ftheonset fmodern conomicgrowth s iswitnessed y thevery riefremarks t the end ofhis Economic rowthfNations Cambridge,Mass. I971).



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INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 433However,it is helpful o formulate heproblem n thisway. First, t servestoremindus that some ofthePs (the partial derivatives) could be negative;t couldbe that some ofthe features f the Englisheconomycitedas favourable o indus-trializationwere actually retardative.econd itdraws attention o the error erm;

itspresence mplies that forgiven values of the Xs there re probabilitydistribu-tionsofvalues ofr.Withonly one observation, hisprecludestheuseoftheresultthat England was first o infer hefavourability fparticularconditionsoftheEnglisheconomy.There are two different aysof ookingat the error erm,based on twoquitedifferenthilosophicalpositionswithregardto the notion of"chance". One isto attribute tto thedifficultyf ccountingfor complex event, ssentially s anexpression f gnorance n a situationwhere thereexists deterministic elation-ship between the factorsX1 . . . Xn, lus a further nspecifiedgroup offactorsX,+ I ... Xq and r,which n principlewould be knowable but in practice s not.A version of thisposition appears to be held generallyby economic historians.That istosay theybelieve thattheobservedresult hatEnglandhad the"decisiveinnovations" and enjoyed the firstndustrialRevolution ustifies hecontentionthat the Englisheconomywas superiorto the others n Europe, including theFrench eventhough t present hey reunsureexactlyhow. This would seemtobe the position of Milward and Saul, for nstance,who are amongthe sternestcritics fexisting ttempts o explainEngland'sprimacy.' Unfortunately,his on-tention hat the resultdemonstrates hesuperiorityasily eads to "explanationsofBritain'sprimacy .. [which]consistmainlyofa notvery convincing ortof'retrospectivenference' 'somethingmusthave caused Britain'sprimacy ntime,so presumably heearlierconditions vertly bservabledid')".2 In otherwords,the favourability fcertainconditions n England has been inferred rom heresultwiththe ikelihoodof osthoc rgoropteroc allacies.A differentnterpretation fthe error erm s to argue that therelationshipsbetweenthe ndependentvariables and thedependentvariable weregenuinelystochastic n the sense that randomnessrather than ignorance s involvedandthatthe ndependentvariablesare relatedtothedependentvariableprobabilisti-cally in the true structure.This would implythat even with all the relevantexplanatoryvariables,X1 . . Xqpresent n theregression herewould stillbe anerror erm,representinghe "irreduciblerandom". This view seemstohave nosupporters t all intherecentdebate over the causes of he ndustrialRevolution.AsDavis, one of he few o have contemplated uch a view,remarks, It could bearguedthatno explanation s needed. The events hatwere decisive weretwo nnumber; the inventionof the spinning enny by Hargreaves,and of thewaterframebyArkwright... These two isolated eventsmayhave been fortuitous; hechance ofpersonalities nd theirgood fortunen seeking along theright ines.But the economichistorian nstinctivelyecoilsfrom uch explanations."3Perhapsthis spartlybecause at firstight he dea ofrandomnesshas connota-tionsof"lottery"and the abandonment of theidea thatthere were any causalrelationships,.e. in terms ftheregressionmodelthiswould mean that all thePswere zero and there would be only "noise". This, ofcourse, s not implied bymakingthe second interpretation ftheerror erm.All thatneed be maintained

1 See above,p. 430. 2 Hagen, loc. cit.p. 37. 3 Davis, op. cit.pp. 312-13.



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434 N. F. R. CRAFTSis that thereare probabilitydistributions fvalues ofY forgiven values of any Xand that the probabilitydistributions fY are differentordifferent alues of X.That is tosaythat thePcoefficientsould be non-zerond could be interpretedsgiving informationbout the partial effect f an independent variable on theexpected waitingtimeto the "decisiveinnovations".So this second view would maintain that it may be, but need not be, thatEngland was superiorto France in termsof the probability of achieving the"decisive innovations" in the eighteenth entury; .e. that the result does notreveal the ex anteprobabilityofEngland's winning the race, but is merely oneof a distributionwhich we can conceptualize but never observe. An analogywouldperhapsbe toask ifWalsall's 2-0 defeatofArsenal n their 932 F.A. Cuptie would ustify he nference hatWalsall was the better eam in the sense thattheywould have emergedvictoriousa majorityoftimes n a large sample ofgames.To summarize ection ii, then,we conclude that there re no "covering aws"whichexplain England'sprimacy;the bestwe can do istoformulate xplanatorygeneralizationswith an error erm.Given that the "event" is unique, the toolsofstatistical nference re inadequate to explain thetimingof decisiveinnova-tions.Thus it can be fairly laimed thatthestandard questionis unanswerable.Furthermore,f the Industrial Revolution is thoughtof as the result of astochasticprocess, hequestion, "Why was England first " is misconceived: theobserved result need not imply the superiorityof antecedent conditions inEngland. However, a differentuestion, "Why did the IndustrialRevolutionbegin n theeighteenthentury" may,within he context fthe stochastic iew,stillbe useful. t could be arguedthat theex ante robabilitydistributions. I 700ofthe "decisiveinnovations"beingmade somewhereweresuchthat thecumu-lative probabilityof theiroccurringbefore 8oo, say, was virtuallyone. Eventhentheprecise iming f hose nnovationswould be ofnovery reat ignificance.To clarifyhese rgumentsnd togain some dea oftheirpossible relevancethenext ection ooks ttheories f nventive ctivity nd innovationntheeighteenthcentury.

IVThere is, ofcourse,a wide range of hypotheses urporting o explain inventiveactivity.The "greatman" or "heroic" approach holdsthat "The novelties hatconstitute he basis of social growth nd developmentare [to be] attributed othe inspirationofgenius. . . Such avenues to truthand social change do notadmitofexplanationoranalysis."' "Social determinist" iewsseeinvention, ndparticularly nnovation, s an inevitableresultofnecessitywith"the individual... merely n instrumentrexpression f cosmic forces"2 More modestly, herearehypotheseswhich ee nnovation nd/ornvention s inducedbythe conomicenvironmentvia the profitmotive. A third "response to stimuli" school ofthought endstoaccept the mportance ofeconomicstimulibut stresses heroleoffactorswhich affect he abilityofeconomies to react to incentives, uch associological nfluences n thequality of entrepreneurship.All threeof thesepositionshave been assumed as the basis of explanationsfor

1A. P. Usher,A HistoryfMechanicalnventionsI954), p. 6o. 2 Ibid. p. 6i.



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INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 435England's primacy, although the "heroic" view has recentlyfallen out offavour.1 here are severalreasonsbut amongthemostpowerful re the demon-strationby Merton and others2 fa large numberof multiples n scientific is-coverygenerally nd thesimplicityf heparticular "decisive nnovations".Theresulthas been a widespreadabandonment of thenotion thatparticular ndi-viduals are necessary oparticular nventions.Economic inducements are strongly epresentedby thehypothesis hat the"decisive innovations" were the result of thegreater pressureof thegrowthofdemand and "factor scarcities" in England than on the Continent.3Otherauthorshave emphasized instead a superiorability to respond to stimuli; forexample,Rostow argues that "What distinguishedBritainfrom herest as theeighteenth enturywore on was thescale of theinventive ffort hatwent ntothebreakingof crucial technicalbottlenecks."4Other contributors o the viewthat the ndustrialRevolution was based on a vigorousresponse re representedby writers uch as McClelland,5 who stresssociological factors,or those likeMusson and Robinson,who emphasizethe role of science.6However, if the socio-economic theories are regarded as deterministic ndexamined as to theirabilityto cope with all the events n eighteenth-centuryinnovation, hey ppear to be farfromatisfactory. ussonhasrecentlymounteda strong ritiquefrom hisperspective.He suggestshat uchtheories completely[ignore]therealities f ndividualachievement, ustained ffort,nd themixtureofmotives nvolved",7 nd continueswithreference o a number ofeighteenth-century mprovements. If theseinventionswere simply productsofpressingeconomicandsocialforces," ewrites, whywasthere ucha longtime agbeforetheirwidespread application? Surely, f heyweresociologically reconomically'determined', inevitable' and 'necessary',theyshould have been brought ntowidespreaduse immediately558 Similarly, t is hard not to sympathizewith thepointof thefollowing uotationfromHook: "Writing n I 88o, WilliamJamesbanteringly sked HerbertSpencerwhetherhe believed that fWilliam Shake-spearehad notbeenbornatStratford-on-AvonnApril 26 I564, theconvergenceof ocial and economic forceswould have producedhimelsewhere;and whetherifShakespearehad died in infancy,nothermother n Stratford-on-Avonouldhave delivereda 'duplicate copy' ofhim?"'As far as traditional conomictheorys concerned t is in factdifficult, singneoclassical assumptions, o derivepredictions bout therate oftechnologicalprogress reventosupport he assertions fwriters uchas Crouzet,Habakkuk,and Landes as to the beneficialeffect f the "shortages" experiencedby the

1 In notablecontrastwith the writers fan earliergeneration, s seen,for xample, byreadingtheaccount oftheagricultural evolutionnLord Ernle,English armingast andPresenti 96 I edn).2 R. K. Merton, TheSociologyf cienceChicago, I973), and referencesherein.3 Crouzet, oc. cit.pp. i68-73, passim;H. J.Habakkuk, The HistoricalExperience n theBasic Con-ditions fEconomicProgress',n L. Dupriez,ed. EconomicrogressLouvain, I955), p. I 54.4 W. W. Rostow, The Beginnings f Modern EconomicGrowth n Europe: An Essayin Synthesis',Journalf conomicistory,XXiii I 973), 570.5D. C. McClelland, TheAchievingocietyPrinceton,96i), ch. 5.6 A. E. Musson and E. Robinson,SciencendTechnologyn the ndustrial evolutionManchester, 969).7 A. E. Musson, Introduction', n idem. ed. Science, echnologyndEconomic rowthnthe ighteenthCenturyI972), p. 49.8 Ibid. pp.52-3.9S. Hook, The Hero inHistory', epr. nR. H. Nash,ed. IdeasofHistory,i (NewYork, 969), 3 I



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436 N. F. R. CRAFTSBritish conomy n the first alf of the eighteenth entury.1 ndeed, an eminentauthority n the fieldhas recently ummarizedhis position in termsof "theextreme gnosticism o whichone is led onthesubject of echnological hange byrecenttheorising".2

However,ifwe look closely amongstall thisapparent chaos in theliterature,we find greement mong manyrecent uthorson a fundamental oint,namelythattechnological rogressstreated s a stochastic rocess.Writers s apparentlydiverse n their views as Musson and Merton can be interpreted s sharing avisionof nnovationsemerging rom searchprocesswhich s highlyuncertainin termsofboth the nature and the timing of ts outcome, and which is con-ditionedas to ts ntensitynd directionbysocial and economicvariables and asto its chances of making particular discoveries by scientificknowledge andexisting echnology.Thus we findMusson arguingon theonehand that "There seems ittledoubt... innovators rentrepreneurs erecertainly erymuch nfluenced y economicfactors,uchas relativefactor rices,marketpossibilities, nd profit rospects,"3and onthe otherhand that"ifone studies tfirst-handhedetailed contemporaryevidence-revealing theprolongedthought, xperiments, isappointments,ndinnumerable practical problems nvolvedin producingan invention,from hefirst riginal dea to eventual ndustrial pplication,notforgettinglso the count-lessfailuresndbankruptcies-thena theoryfinevitability' ppears udicrous."4The modern versionof the "sociological determinist"view in fact s also a

probabilistic heory,ummarized husbyMerton: "innovationsbecamevirtuallyinevitable as certainkindsofknowledgeaccumulated in the culturalheritageand as social developmentsdirected the attentionof nvestigators o particularproblems."5But Merton takespains to stress hat "I do not implythat all dis-coveriesare inevitable n thesensethat,come whatmay, theywill be made, atthe time and the place, ifnotbythe individuals who infactmade them,"6 ndcitesevidence ofa distribution f ags in discoverieswhichsubsequently urnedout tobe multiplesofCavendish's (at the timeunpublished) work.7The commontheme s takenup byRosenberg,forthe "response" school ofthought,who stresses he uncertainty fresponseto economicstimuli,"Manyimportant ategoriesofhuman wantshave long gone eitherunsatisfied r verybadly catered for n spite of a well establisheddemand . . . a greatpotentialdemand existedfor mprovementsn thehealingartsgenerally,but ... progressin medicinehad to await thedevelopmentof thescienceofbacteriology n thesecondhalfof he nineteenth entury."8 lsewherehe arguesthat "thedevelopedcountriesnever olve morethan a small fraction f heproblemswhichhappen tobe formulated nd activelypursued."9This view oftechnologicalprogresshas seldom been reflected n the effortsf

1 See theextensive eviewofthe Habakkuk debate' in P. A. David, Technicalhoice,nnovationndEconomic rowthCambridge,1975), ch. i.2N. Rosenberg, The DirectionofTechnologicalChange: InducementMechanismsand FocusingDevices',EconomicevelopmentndCulturalhange,VIII (i969), I.3 Musson,Science, echnologyndEconomicrowth,. 53. 4 Ibid. p. 49.5Merton, p. cit.p. 352.. 6 Ibid. p. 369. 7 Ibid. p. 364.8 N. Rosenberg, Science, nvention nd Economic Growth', conomicJournal,XXXIV (i974), 97.9Rosenberg,The Direction', oc. cit. i.



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INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 437economic model builders.Recently, though,Nelson and Winterhave proposeda model whichembodies an evolutionary, onditionedsearchapproach similartothatenvisagedbythewriters itedabove and whichwas successfuln "account-ing for" twentieth-century .S. economic growth. They describethe heart oftheir model as follows:"Technique changes by individual firms re governed,first f all, by a satisficingmechanism. If the firm'srate of return on capitalexceeds a target level, the firmretains it with probabilityone. Otherwise aprobabilistic earchprocessgenerates possible alternative echnique.The pro-babilitydistribution overning earchoutcomes s constructedn a mannerthatreflects he nfluence f closeness' and 'imitation' . . ifthe technique turnedupbythe searchprocess s actually esscostly, t theprevailingwage rate,thantheone thefirm urrently ses. . . the firm hanges technique."' The authorspointout thatunlikeneoclassicaltheories therewas no productionfunction-only asetofphysically ossibleactivities. . The explorationof he setwas treatedas anhistorical ncrementalprocess.'2While this particular model may not be appropriate, its general view ofinnovationas theresultofstochastic earch processes, n which both economicinducementsand scientific, upply-sideconsiderationsplay a part, appears tohave several advantages in thecontextofour historicalconcern.Such a view oftheworld,whichappears to be implicit n, or at least not nconsistentwith,thework of Merton, Musson, Rosenberg, and many others,need not be troubledby a numberofthe difficulties hich have been encountered n the putativeexplanationsofeighteenth-centurynnovativebehaviour. t could accommodatetheappearance ofinventionswhichwere notusedstraightawaynd also Merton'stheme of the "recurrent act of ong delayed discovery".3Moreover, unliketheneoclassicalmodels reviewedby David,4 a response to resource "shortages"re-flected n changed relative factor prices would be expected and presents nodifficulty ince the distinction between factor substitution nd innovationisblurred n thisvision. However, thesupply of search nputs need only be an in-creasingfunction feconomic nducements,not exclusively elated to them.Theresultsn terms f nnovativeoutputswould be generallybut by nomeansalwaysrelated to economic ncentives.We are in no positiontospecify ucha model and that s not thepresentpur-pose. What are mportant ere are not he details of uch a model butthe mplica-tions ofviewingeconomichistoryn thisway,where thepath ofthe economycould be thoughtof as the evolutionaryoutcome of a contingent equence ofprobabilistic vents.Two points n particular eem worth mphasizingnrelationto the standardquestion, "Whywas Englandfirst?"First, n the stochasticworld which this view of technological progress m-braces, an economywith a lower likelihoodex anteof achievingthe "decisiveinnovations", or withfeatureswhich tended to lessen the chance ofachievingthemfirst,maybe observedas thewinner n a two-countryace to achieve the"decisive innovations" that srun ust once. Secondly, althoughattheoutsetoneeconomy mayhave a lesser chance of success t is the nature oftheprocessen-

1 R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter, Neoclassical vs. EvolutionaryTheories of Economic Growth:Critique nd Prospectus', con.Jnl. XXXIV (I 974), 895.2 Ibid. 902. 3 Merton, p. cit.p. 369. 4 See above,p. 436, n. i.



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438 N. F. R. CRAFTSvisaged that f t s "lucky" early on it could evolve ntoa positionwithmuch thehigher chance of subsequent success; for example, makinga "decisive innova-tion"firstmay vastly aisetheprobability f ubsequent nnovationsbeingmade.It is held, then,that there s a strong ase for he argument hat the "decisiveinnovations" should be seen as the evolutionary utcome of a stochasticprocessand hence that the standard question, "'Why was England first " has been mis-conceived.This positionhas several mportant mplications.(i) The fact that Britain was "more advanced" in I790 and had a muchsuperior ikelihood of further rogress n the glamour industriesof the periodthan France does notof tself ecessarily mplythatexante in, say, 740) Britainhad the greaterprobabilityof achieving the first ndustrial Revolution or thatone should feelobliged to seek reasons forBritain's nevitable primacygoingfarback intoherhistory. his position s n stark ontrastwith hatnormally doptedby the contributors o the debate over why England was first.(ii) Since from he unique observed resultwe cannot nfer nything bout theexante robability f England's beatingFrance to the "decisive innovations", tis otiose to pose the question, "Why was England first?" with the hope, d laCrouzet,ofgaining nsights nto growthngeneral.(iii) Indeed, ifone could construct simulationmodel ofdevelopmentduringthe period embodyingstochastictechnological progress,one would expect toobservefrommanyrunsfor ach economy distributionf imesfor he"decisiveinnovations". t then eems nappropriate otry oaccount for heone observableresultof historydrawn from n unobservable distribution f possible outcomeswith a general theory.

VTwo questions mmediately rise. First, does this pointofview seem absurd inthesensethat theBritish conomywas self-evidentlyuperiorto the French n,say, the mid-eighteenth entury? Secondly, howhas the superiority nferencebeen ustifiedThe answerto thefirstfthesequestionswould seemtobe a resounding no".In fact,the theme of similarities etween the French and English economies sone which from ime to timehas found a numberof friends. or example, Nef,writingn the 940's, arguedthat"Accordingto thepopular misconception ..British ndustrialdevelopmentwas in sharp contrast o Continentalthroughouttheeighteenth entury, nd notsimply t theveryend of t. But . .. therate ofindustrialchange from bout I 735 to I 785 was no morerapid in Great Britainthan in France, a farlarger countrywith nearly three timesas many people.What is striking . . is less the contrasts han theresemblancesbetweenGreatBritainand the Continent,both n therateofeconomic development nd in thedirections hatdevelopmentwas taking."'A rathersimilarchord has been struckby Rostow in his recentwork.Hiscommenton thefigures eproduced here as Table i is that "There is . .. someambiguity bout why Britainand not France was the first ation to move intotake-off."2

iJ. U. Nef, The IndustrialRevolutionReconsidered', rournalfEconomicistory,n (I 943), 5.2 Rostow, The Beginnings',oc. cit.547.



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INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 439Table I. PopulationndOutputnFrancend ngland,700 and 78o

France Britain1700 1780 1700 1780Population (million) I9-2 25.6 6-9 9.0

Urban population million) 3-3 5-7 I *2 2'2Foreign rade (/Cmillion) 9 22 I3 23Ironoutput ooo tons) 22 I35 I5 6oCottonconsumption million b.) 0.5 I I I I 7.4Agricultural utput I700 = I 00) I00 I55 I00 I26Industrial output (I 700 = I 00) 100 454 10 I97Total production (I 700 = I 00) 100 I 69 10 I67Income/head (I700= I00) I00 I27 I00 I29Source:W. W. Rostow,How t All Began New York, 975) in whichthe deri-vationand sources f data are discussed.

Withregardto French nnovativepotential,Mathias statesunequivocallythat"The Frenchrecordof cientific rowth nd invention n the eighteenthenturywas a formidableone."' We learn fromMcCloy2 that in the first alf of theeighteenth entury here were more patentsgranted in France than England,despite a legal situationmaking t likely hatpatent statistics nderstateFrenchrelative oEnglish nventiveness.t also becomes clear from reading ofMcCloythatthe French camevery lose to pre-empting argreaves's nvention n at easttwo occasions nthe 740's and I 75o's.3 n retrospectt would hardly eem a greatshock f France had succeeded in view of thesimplicity f the "decisive innova-tions", Frenchinventive bility, and the fact that search was evidently akingplace. If so, as Rostow puts it, "the Frenchmarket,with its absolutely argerurban population, was not so poor as to rule out an ample domestic as well as aforeignmarketfor heap cotton textiles, fFrench ndustry ad produced themfirst."4The answer to the second question is predictable: it is Britain's ultimateprimacy thathas, erroneously, een held to ustify he presumption hatsome-thingor otherabout the preceding conditions was superior, although recentauthors have had difficultyn pinpointingthe area of that superiority. husDavis, having found fault with all the standard arguments, oncludes, "Thesafest hing o say, perhaps, s that althoughthe need for nnovation was strongin France as in England,French society ffered less congenial climateto inno-vation than did English."5 Likewise, Crouzet claims "the explanation forBritain's superior inventiveness . . . [is that] the conditions for nnovation seemto have been morefavourablethan n France... [There was] a 'criticalmass',apiling up of various factorsfavouringEngland's growthwhich triggered ffchainreaction-the Industrial Revolution. In France, on the otherhand, therewas no such criticalmass, whichis why France did not spontaneously tart anIndustrial Revolution."6But these"explanations" bringto mind Gerschenkron's omment n Rostow:"The questionwas what made growth tart.Rostow would answerthatit did1 P. Mathias, Who Unbound Prometheus? cience and Technical Change, i6oo-i8oo', in Mussoned. Science, echnologyndEconomic rowth,. 812 S. T. McCloy, Frenchnventionsf he ighteenthenturyLexington, 952), ch. I 2.3 Ibid. pp. 89-93. 4 Rostow, The Beginnings',oc. cit.570. 5 Davis, op. cit.p. 3I3.6 Crouzet, oc. cit.pp. I72-3.



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440 N. F. R. CRAFTSso because the preconditionswere completed. When one asked how this wasknown, he furthernswerwas that growthhad started."' Not surprisinglyn thecircumstanceswe findvigorous disagreement ver the validityof the assertionsof the superiority fparticular key features;forexample, O'Brien and Keyderwould reject Habakkuk's claim of faster growth of demand,2 Davis rejectsCrouzet's diagnosisof abour shortages,3nd Kemp dismissesLandes's claim ofgreater echnical skill nd ingenuity.4An alternative as been totake nformation rom he ate eighteenth- nd earlynineteenth-centuryrogress f the French economy to suggest hat the Frenchwereless nnovative nd slowerto adopt new methods.5 et this, oo, is farfromconvincing. irst, tcan be argued that many nnovations hen made in Englandshould be thought of as consequences of the "decisive innovations". Second,French development ookplace under the handicaps of n English ead and war-timedisruption nd does not therefore eveal reliable information oncerningthe exantepotentialof the Frencheconomy.In any case, the determinants fdiffusionre notnecessarilyhe same as thoseof nitialdevelopment, articularlywhere nternational iffusions concerned.So, aswith heapriori rguments f hepreceding ection, hisdiscussion eavesus with stronggrounds forresisting ny automatic inference f Britishex antesuperiority. t is interesting,herefore, o note thatsomewritershave recentlybegun to criticizewhat they see as an unjustified ondemnationofthe Frencheconomyof he eighteenthentury nd have arguedfor major re-interpretationofFrencheconomicperformance.6 It isthecontention fthefollowing aragraphsthattheliterature fwhichthey complain is, at leastpartly, n outcome of themisconceiveduse ofthe standard question, "Whywas Englandfirst?"It seems possible to reconstruct ne powerful current n the literatureasfollows.During theretreat rom he cataclysmic/exogenousiewof he ndustrialRevolution,7economichistorianscorrectly erceived the need to examine thelong-runbuild-up ofconditions n the economywhich could have promotedtheIndustrial Revolution. Ashton, for example, reacted against the earlier "cata-clysmic"historynd stressed he mportance fthe ongview.8

An extension fthis rgumentwas thecrucial,butmisguided, tep that, fthefirstndustrialRevolution was a distinctiveeature f heEnglish experience nditself elated to prior trends n the economy, henthe previous experienceoftheeconomy n England musthave been morefavourable.This also assumed, par-ticularlyn the absence ofquantitativework, hat thecourse ofdevelopmentupto thatpointhad been much different.his led,on theonehand,to thepresump-tionofEnglish superioritynd French nferiority,nd, on theother, oattempts1 A. Gerschenkron,Discussion', n W. W. Rostow, d. The Economicsf Take-Of nto ustained rowth(New York, 965), p. 367.2 P. K. O'Brien and C. Keyder, Economic Growthn Britain nd France from he Revolution o theFirstWorldWar' (mimeographed, xford, 975), p. 31; Habakkuk, oc. cit.p. 154.3 Davis, op. cit.p. 312; Crouzet, oc cit. p. i68. 4 Kemp, op. cit. p. I7; Landes, op. cit.p. 6i.5For example,Landes, op. cit.p. 63.6 In particular, 'Brien andKeyder, p. cit. andR. Roehl, French ndustrialisation: Reconsidera-tion', Explorationsn Economic istory,ii (I 976).7See M. W. Flinn,Originsf hendustrialevolutionI 967), ch. i, for his xpressionnd a discussion ftherelevanthistoriography.8 T. S. Ashton,The ndustrialevolution,760-1830 (I948).



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Crafts - Industrial Revolution in England and France

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