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Cryptoarchi 2012 SEPULVEDA

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    NoC-BASED DYNAMIC SECURITYIMPLEMENTATION FOR

    MULTI-APPLICATION SoC

    Johanna Seplveda Flrez ([email protected])

    Guy Gogniat ([email protected])

    Ricardo Pires ([email protected])

    Marius Strum ([email protected])

    Lab-STICCUNIVERSIT DE BRETAGNE SUD

    UNIVERSITY OF SO PAULO2012

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    1. INTRODUCTION.

    Problem.

    MPSoCs (Multiprocessor System-on-Chip)

    NoC (Network-on-chip).

    2. RELATED WORK.

    3. OUR APPROACH.

    1. Architecture.

    2. Functionality.

    4. EXPERIMENTAL WORK.

    5. RESULTS.

    6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS.

    Summary

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    Introduction

    Media players

    Game console

    Electronic banking

    Automotive electronics

    Electronic money

    Cellphones

    Aviation

    SECURITY: Critical requirement at the electronics systems design.

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    Introduction

    Digital rights management

    SoC

    Secure personal data

    Secure execution of downloaded SW

    Fraudulent transactions avoidance

    Content security

    Non-repudiation

    Intellectual property protection

    System-on-Chip (SoC) : Integrated Computing System.

    SoCscan be attacked!!

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    Cost effective: * General purpose SoC.

    * Integrate different applications on the

    same chip.

    Applications: Communication requirements, security policy

    and design constraints (Dynamic security policy).

    Introduction

    MULTI-APPLICATION SYSTEM

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    Communication Structure

    uP

    MPSoC

    Software attacks!

    Problem

    Security incidents: 80% via software.

    uP

    uP

    uP

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    Communication Structure

    uP

    MPSoC

    uP

    uP

    uP

    Problem

    Explore the SoCvulnerabilities.

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    Communication Structure

    uP

    MPSoC

    uP

    uP

    uP

    Infection: Takes advantage of the trusty components rights!!

    Problem

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    All software attacks begin with an abnormal communication.

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    Communication structure

    M1

    M3

    M2

    S1

    S3

    S2

    COMMUNICATIONSTRUCTURE

    Monitor information exchange.

    Detect attacks.

    Diagnosis Trigger recovery mechanisms.

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    NoC (Network-on-Chip)

    M S M

    S M M

    S M S

    Router

    Links

    Topology: Simple orhierarchical

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    Network protocol

    Router

    Transmission

    Packets building

    M/S

    M/S

    Reception

    Synchronization

    Separation of routing information

    NoC (Network-on-Chip)

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    Communication

    Security (S)

    QoSS

    +Quality (QoS)

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    NoC security Basic concepts

    Rights

    Security policy: Rules the relationship between the application and theresources (static/dynamic).

    Safe system: Behaves as expected and the vulnerabilities are

    minimized. Vulnerability: Weakness that may be explored in order to attack a

    system.

    Attack:Any unauthorized attempt to access or use the resources.

    Application Resources

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    1. CONFIDENTIALITY: Secrecy of information.

    2. INTEGRITY: Correctness of the information.

    3. AUTHENTICATION:Source integrity.

    4. ACESS CONTROL:Authorized use of the resources.

    5. AVAILABILITY: Resources can be used.

    6. NO REPUDIATION: Evidence of communication.

    SECURITY SERVICES

    Protect the system resources and mitigate the attacks.

    NoC security Basic concepts

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    QoSS (Quality of Security Service)

    QoSS= QoS + Security Security as a QoSdimension.

    Security level.

    Selection:

    Security requirements and resources availability.

    Operation mode and security/cost trade-off.

    Latency

    Jitter

    Throughput

    Loss rate

    Security

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    QoSS (Quality of Security Service)

    Advantages:

    Lower protection cost.

    Enhance the efficiency of the resources utilization.

    Better system control.Flexibility.

    Disadvantages:

    System complexity.

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    S

    Security services: Non repudiation, confidentiality.

    Componentes:

    SNI:Secure network interface.SNM: Secure network manager (monitor).

    SNM

    NoCM SNI

    SNI

    [EVA05, DIG07]

    Previous works - Static policy

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    S

    Security service: Access control.

    Components:

    DPU:Data protection Unit (memory access).

    NoCMD

    PU

    D

    PU

    [FIO07, FIO08]

    Previous works - Static policy

    i k i li

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    S

    Security service: Access control, availability.

    Components:

    PPS:Processor protection Unit.SPU: Stack protection unit.

    ITU: Instruction trace unit.

    DPU:Data protection Unit (memory access).

    NoCMDPU

    PPS

    [LUK10]

    Previous works - Static policy

    SPU

    ITU

    i k i li

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    Previous works - Static policy

    Limitations1. Support a static security policy.

    2. Support a single level of security.

    3. Lack of system performance evaluation.

    4. Lack of security efficacy evaluation.

    Advantage

    Show that NoCcan be a useful structure tohandle different security services.

    P i k D i li

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    Security service: Access control and authentication.

    Components:

    Configuration controlPolicy keeper

    Monitor

    [SEP11]

    Previous works - Dynamic policy

    Large link

    overhead.

    Single level

    (No QoSS).

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    To provide security for MPSoCs and guarantee thatperformance and security requirements are met.

    A t l i l t ti

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    Access control implementation

    Access control

    SV TV RV

    Level 0Level 1 X

    Level 2 X X

    Level 3 X X X

    VF: Source verification.

    VT: Type verification.

    VP: Role verification.

    FIREWALL:

    Allows or blocks a transaction.

    According to a security policy.

    Implemented at the network interface.

    At the packet arrival.

    Before the packet injection to the NoC

    Security levels.

    Control information: source, type, role.

    A th ti ti i l t ti

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    Authentication implementation Implementation: at the network interface.

    4 security levels.

    Uses the NoC characteristics.

    Authentication

    NR RP CC

    Level 0Level 1 X

    Level 2 X X

    Level 3 X X X

    NR: Number of routers.

    RP: Routers through the path.

    CC: Communication code.

    FIREWALL:

    O h

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    Our approach Layered security implementation (Hierarchic NoC).

    MPSoC organized as independent clusters (IP security andcommunication characteristics): Security zones.

    Distributes the security policy management (global and local)

    by partitioning the NoC topology (High-NoC, Low-NoC).

    O h

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    Our approachGlobal security:* Configuration control.

    * Policy keeper.

    * Monitor

    Local security:

    * Security mechanisms.* Local configuration control (Manager)

    QoSS needs.

    O h

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    Our approach Security policy changes:

    The global configuration control (High-NoC)notify the

    managerof the corresponding security zone.

    The Manager of the security zone (Low-NoC) modifies thesecurity tables of the firewalls.

    The reconfiguration doesnt take place until the arrival of the

    packets that are inside the network and whose destination is

    any of those interfaces that are going to change.

    St d

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    Study case

    Functions of the 3 applications

    3 applications of the MiBench benchmark.

    Automotive.

    Consumer electronics.

    Telecommunication.

    3 different security policies.

    All possible combinations.

    Predefined mapping cases.

    I l t ti

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    Implementation

    Automotive

    Consumerelectronics

    Telecomm.

    Sec. policy

    Sec. policy

    Sec. policy

    Implementation

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    ImplementationNoC parameters

    Evaluation

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    SystemC-TLM

    Traffic/attacks

    generators

    Monitors

    Analysis tools

    Evaluation

    Simulation

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    5 flits Payload.

    600.000 simulated cycles.

    Poisson traffic, LRD (Long Range Dependence).

    3 Types of attacks:

    Simulation Conditions

    Extraction.

    Modification.

    Denial-of-Service (DoS).

    30% are critical data

    Simulation

    Results

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    ResultsSecurity efficacy

    Security efficiency:

    Latency Power

    Security policy should change in order to achieve 100%.

    Results

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    Results

    The hierarchical

    approach alwaysperforms better than

    the simple dynamic.

    Layeredapproach:

    Doesnt interrupt othersecurity zones.

    Performance penality

    Conclusions and future work

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    We proposed a layered dynamic NoC-based security

    implementation for MPSoCs (security zones).

    Our approach provides an effective way to handle

    security policy changes and improves the overall system

    performance.

    We adopt the QoSS concept that allows the designer to

    customize the MPSoC protection in order to satisfy both,

    security and performance requirements.

    Results show that the inclusion of security issues in the

    hierarchic NoC performs better that the simple

    dynamical NoC architecture.

    Conclusions and future work

    Conclusions and future work

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    Conclusions and future work As a future work, we will study different techniques that

    allow an improvement in the implementation of the

    proposed security mechanisms.

    We will explore different security services (confidentiality

    and integrity).

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