Digest cases administrative law

8/13/2019 Digest cases administrative law

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People vs. MacerenG.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977Aquino J.

Facts:On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio SanPablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.

Issue:Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.Held:No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warrant

ed under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision tothat effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular departmentmust be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

Bito-Onon vs. FernandezG.R. No. 139813 January 31, 2001GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts:The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of BarangayTacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provi

ncial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in anypost proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed


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that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the RTCdenied Onon's motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.

Issue:Whether or not QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BYTHE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY.Held:The court held that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with theregular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which providesthat the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, r

egulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority tomerely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof performtheir duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power ofthe DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favorof the greater autonomy of the local government.**take note of the meaning of power of supervision and power of control..The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution.14 The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."15 This is distinguished from the power of contr

ol or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."

GMA Network Inc. vs. Movie and Television Review and classification boardG.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007CORONA, J.:

Facts:Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspensionagainst petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a p

ermit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed


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in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension orderissued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.Hence, this recourse.Issue:Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitionerHeld:The court held that while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which arenot published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.9Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000.10 Hence, the same is yet to be effective.11 It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filedin the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.

Pesigan vs. AngelesG.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984AQUINO, J.

Facts:Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and acalf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan,

Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardlessof age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transportedfrom one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violationof this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos"Issue:Whether or not Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, pr

oviding for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982Held:The court held that the said executive order should not be enforced against thePesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982.It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of theCivil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circular


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s and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprisethe public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian ofCamarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not havebeen expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

Araneta vs. GatmaitanGR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957Felix, J.

The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, betwee

n the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolutionthat they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. Inanother resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban theoperation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EOwas amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the samenull and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative

enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation andheld that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.ISSUES:1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 802. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislativepowers unduly delegated to the PresidentHELD:1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction andbanning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the generalsupervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decr

ees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law.2. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the useof any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When thePresident, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines


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Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waterscomprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regardfor the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. GonongGR No. 91023, July 13, 1990Cruz, J.

Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed by petitioner while his vehicle was parked in Escolta. He filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila. He questioned the petitioners act on the ground that not only was the car not illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance authorizing such removal. The lower court ruled that LOI 43, which the defendant (petitioner)invoked, did not empower it to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates ormotor vehicles illegally parked and unattended. It merely authorizes the removalof said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways. Moreover, the said LOI had been PD 1605.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic violations as suchHELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles

that stall on streets and highways and not those that are intentionally parkedin a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private respondentsvehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The act, if true is a violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory BoardGR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990Sarmiento, J.

The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing itsOrder mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleumproducts. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing.ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretionHELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not precludethe Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject toits final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdictionto decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing

. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of TransportationGR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982Melencio-Herrera, J.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order provides for the


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phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors,the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police powerHELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,safety andgeneral welfare of the people.

Balbuna,et. al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Education, et. al.GR No. L-14280, November 29, 1960Reyes, J.B.L., J.

The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republi

c Act No. 1265. Petitioners, who are members of the Jehovas Witnesses, contend that the said Department Order denied them freedom of worship and of speech, amongothers. They also contend that the Order is not valid for it was not publishedin the Official Gazette as required by law.ISSUE:1. W/N the Department Order is invalid2. W/N RA 1265 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powerHELD:1. NO. The contention that assailed Department Order has no binding effect,not having been published in the Official Gazette is without merit. The assailed order being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools andeducational institutions under their supervision, cannot be said to be of general application, requiring previous publication in the Official Gazette before it

could have binding force and effect.2. No. The requirements of the law constitute an adequate standard.

SAADO vs. CA

The Philippine Fisheries Commission issued petitioner a fishpond permit. Thereafter, petitioner and private respondent Nepomuceno executed a contract which stipulated that Nepomuceno would undertake to develop an area or 30 hectares out ofthe 50 hectares covered by the permit issued to petitioner.

In 1979, the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the Ministry of Natural Resources to convert the fishpond permit issued to petitionerinto a 25-year agreement which covered a reduced area. The lease agreement was

then issued to petitioner.

In 1980, private respondent waived his rights, interests and participation overthe fishpond area in favor of Edgar Chu. Private respondent then informed BFAR of his development contract with petitioner and that the fishpond was almost fully developed at his expense.

In 1981, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent and Chu with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages. During the pendency of the case, t


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he Minister of Agriculture and Food cancelled petitioners fishpond lease agreement. The matter was elevated to the Office of the President but was dismissed.

Meanwhile, the court rendered a decision in the civil case ordering the defendants to restore possession and control of the fishpond area, among others.

ISSUE: W/N the decision of the Office of the President in cancelling petitionerslease agreement should be given weight

HELD: YES. The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or insuspending or revoking a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. A decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of theland, and it thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice.

RCPI vs. Board of Communications

In GR No. L-43653, Diego Moralesdaughter sent him a telegram while he was in Manila, informing him that his wife has died. The telegram was sent through petitioner RCPI. The telegram, however, never reached Morales. Because of the failure o

f the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages.

Meanwhile, in GR No. L-45378, complainant Pacifico Inncocencio claims that his sister, Lourdes, sent him a telegram on July 13 through petitioner for the purpose of informing him of the death of their father. However, the telegram was neverreceived by Pacifico but the sneder, Lourdes, was never notified of such failure. Because of this failure, Pacifico claims to have suffered mental anguish andpersonal inconveniences and thus prays for damages.

After hearing, respondent board in both cases imposed upon petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine.

ISSUE: W/N the Board of Communications has jurisdiction to take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of obligation arising from negligence

HELD: NO. As provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing theorganization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, the BOC has the power to issuecertificates of public convenience. But this power to issue certificates of public convenience does not carry with it the power or supervision and control overmatters not related to the issuance of the certificate of public convenience orin the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. The Board of Communications has power to impose fine only where public service violates or fails to comply with terms and conditions of the certificate of publicconvenience or the orders, decisions or regulations of the board. Moreover, theproper forum for complaints of injury caused by breach of obligation should be

in the courts.

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission

Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain throughthe telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service


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Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability butquestioned PSCs jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.

ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner

HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision andcontrol over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commissions jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

BOISER vs. CA

Petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbiliran City and other municipalities in the province of Bohol under the name of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Petitioner and private respondent PLDT entered into a contract whe

reby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities.

Without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a circuit authorization orderto its co-respondents to terminate the connection of PLDTs relay station with the facilities of the petitioners telephone system.

Petitioner then instituted with the CFI a petition for injunction and damages. The court issued a temporary restraining order. Five months after the issuance ofthe TRO, the private respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Three years after the filing of their motion to dissolve the TRO, the private respondents elevated the case to the CA on the ground that the CFI judge had no authority to issue the restraining order.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI has jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection of communications facilities

HELD: NO. PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by PD No. 1 to the Board of Communications, now NTC. There is nothing in the Commissions powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages.

Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava

Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcingan examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before saidoffice. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers andother persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified.Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office.


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On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patentcases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the applicationof scientific and technical knowledge and training.

ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in thepractice of law

HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles.

Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because ofhis legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the saidoffice, without further examination or other qualification.

CARMELO vs. RAMOS

The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies involving t

he license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division ofthe Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of thesaid office. He named Jesus Carmelo as chairman.

The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos requiring him to appear before it in connection with an administrative case but Ramos refused to appear. Claiming that Ramosrefusal tended to impede or obstruct the administrative proceedings,petitioner filed with the CFI a petition to declare Ramos in contempt. The trial court dismissed the petition. It held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand witnesses testify under oath and that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: W/N the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and ask for their punishment in case of refusal

HELD: NO. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as isdone in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.

GUEVARA vs. COMELEC

Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tendedto interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudicationof a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to beused in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon theground, among others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied themotion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.


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ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings

HELD: NO. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted incontroversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerialduty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish forcontempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

PEFIANCO vs. MORAL

Former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria filed a complaint which charged respondentMaria Luisa Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaultof the Filipiniana and Asian Division of the National Library which were underher control and supervision as Division Chief. The DECS Secretary found respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. She was ordered dismissed from the government service.

Respondent did not appeal the judgment but she filed a petition for production of the DECS investigation committee report, which was, however, denied. She reiterated her request but likewise denied. She then filed an action for mandamus andinjunction before the regular courts against Sec. Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS investigation committee. Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of action, but the trial court deniedhis motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion, which was dismissed as well for lack of merit. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari

HELD: YES. The challenged order of the trial court falls short of the requiremen

ts prescribed in Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis by petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied.

NOTE: There is no law which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. A respondent in an administrativecase is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him.

Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank

Petitioner Bienvenido Batongbacal started his banking career as a manager of theSecond Rizal Development Bank. He then transferred to Citizens Bank and Trust Company and was appointed as assistant vice-president and concurrently, as actingmanager of the personnel department. Subsequently, Citizens Bank merged with Association Banking Corporation and later became known as Associated Bank. In thenew bank, petitioner resumed his position as assistant vice president.

Years later, he found out that his salary was very much below the standard remuneration of the banks other assistant vice presidents. He asked for the board to g


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ive him the accrued salary withheld from him but to no avail. Thereafter, as part of its streamlining measures, the management required all bank officers to submit their courtesy resignations. Petitioner did not submit his courtesy resignation. As a result, he received a letter from the Bank informing him that his resignation was accepted. Petitioner made repeated demands for the reconsiderationof the banks decision to terminated his employment. He then filed a complaint forillegal dismissal and damages in the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC ordered petitioners reinstatement with full backwages. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the bank appealed to theNLRC which ruled in favor of the legality of petitioners dismissal.

ISSUE: W/N respondent bank legally dismissed petitioner for refusing to tender his courtesy resignation

HELD: NO. Petitioners dismissal was effected through a letter acceptinghis resignation, even if petitioner did not actually submit such letter. It is clear fromprivate respondents pleadings that it terminated petitioner for insubordination in view of his failure to comply with the order to submit his letter of courtesyresignation. However, the Court held that insubordination may not be imputed toone who refused to allow an unlawful order. Moreover, the Court held that the record fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of petitioner.

NOTE: The SC remanded the case to the NLRC for determination of factual issues.

It noted the impracticality of the position paper method of disposing labor cases. As exemplified by this case, there are instanced wherein claims of parties arenot properly ventilated because they agree to dispense with the hearing not knowing that more often than not both of them suffer adverse consequences.

Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL

PAL is granted a legislative franchise to provide domestic and international flights. In 1970, it required Flight 213 (Tug-Mla) to pass Baguio to pick up 20 passengers. No airline was affected by the flagstop.

Thereafter, the CAB Chairman filed a complaint against PAL contending that the latter should have first obtained permission from CAB. The Board then resolved toimpose a fine against PAL. PAL filed a motion for reconsideration claiming thatthe power and authority to impose fines is a judicial function and does not belong to the CAB. Subsequently, the Board resolved to reduce the fine imposed uponPAL.

ISSUE: W/N CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to impose a fine

HELD: YES. RA 776 provides that the CAB has the power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty orfine in connection with the violation of any provision of the said Act or rules

and regulations issued thereunder. In the case at bar, the fine imposed on PALis that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the relevant provision of RA 776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the RPC. It is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution.

Bautista vs. Board of Energy


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MERALCO filed with the BOE an application for an upward revision of its rates. In the same petition, MERALCO prayed for an ex parte provisional approval of theproposed rates. Subsequently, petitioners filed an opposition to the applicationand prayed that no provisional approval be granted by the BOE. They claim thatthe increases in rates is exorbitant and unreasonable.

In an order, the BOE provisionally approved MERALCOs revised rate schedules without hearing. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration stating that they were no afforded the opportunity to be heard. Without setting for hearing, the BOE deniedthe motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: W/N the BOE committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the provisional increase of MERALCO rates

HELD: No. When BOE provisionally authorized private respondents application without hearing, it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law. Under similar circumstances, the Court has upheld the authority of regulatory boards like the Energy Regulatory Board , to grant provisional relief upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter, and without need ofprior hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter for the determination of its final decision. The order granting such provisional relief, however, must be based upon substantial evidence supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, and is without prejudice to rendition of a final decision after hearing.

DELFIN vs. INCIONG

The 136 petitioners herein are former employees of private respondent Atlantic Container Corporation, organized themselves into Atlantic Container Employees Organization (ACCO) and affiliated with the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU).

Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement the Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioners and FEDLU held a strike. Thereafter, ACCO and FEDLU filed a case in the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR found Atlantic Container Corporation and Jacinto guilty

of unfair labor practice and ordering them to cease and desist from further committing the same and to reinstate complainants striking members. They filed motions to reconsider the said decision, presumably for the reinstatement of all the petitioners, but the CIR denied the motions.

The petitioners again filed a charge with the CIR alleging that the named respondents established a corporation which was an alter ego of Atlantic and which wasallegedly organized to engage in the identical business as Atlantic Container,absorbing all the assets including the facilities and machineries.

When the CIR was abolished, the case was transferred to NLRC which ordered the reinstatement of complainants. Only 86 out of the 136 petitioners were ordered reinstated. The appeal was dismissed, based on the ground of res judicata. Petitio

ners appealed to the Minister of Labor through respondent Deputy Minister Inciong who affirmed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE: W/N the cause of action was barred by the principle res judicata

HELD: YES. While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the union, in reality it had no material interest in the outcome of the case. The realparty who stands to be benefited or defeated by the case brought in the name ofthe union are the union members themselves. Since the judgment therein had become final and executor, the subsequent filing of another charge against Atlantic f


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or the same violations committed during its existence, is barred by res judicata. The bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of the union will not take out the case from the ambit of the principle of res judicata.

Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. vs. NLRC

Private respondent Juanito Collado was employed by petitioner as security guard.In the course of his employment, 4 crates of lawanit boards were stolen. He wasimplicated in the theft and thereafter placed under preventive suspension. NALCO then filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Laborfor clearance to dismiss Collado. The application was approved was approved by Officer-in-Charge Rey Seneres. The said officer certified the case to the labor arbiter who, after a perusal of records (position papers submitted by the parties), returned the case to the Regional Director, who recommended that the case beelevated to the Secretary of Labor. The acting Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of Seneres granting petitioners application for clearance to dismiss Collado.

Collado then filed a complaint before the District Labor Office for unjust dismissal and reinstatement with backwages and benefits.NALCO filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the order of the Acting Secretary had become final and e

xecutory, making the issue of illegal dismissal res judicata. The Labor Arbiterordered NALCO to reinstate Collado without backwages. Both Parties appealed tothe NLRC. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters decision adding backwages.

ISSUE: W/N the principle of res judicata applies

HELD: NO. The principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to exercise of administrative powers.

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERGOstrand, J

Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)

FACTS:This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to

issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from givi


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ng the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent as cause of action

HELD:Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.

The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the timethe Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and itcannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. Thatbeing so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA

Glorious Sun was a recipient of a substantial number of EQ allocations from theGTEB. Glorious Sun was charged before the GTEB and was found guilty of, misdeclaration of values of its imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting, andother related frauds, in connection with its importations in 1983. Its export quotas were thereafter given to two newly-formed corporations the De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil) and the herein petitioner American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). The cancelled EQs of Glorious Sun which were givento AIFC are the subject of dispute between GTEB and petitioner. Glorious Sun continues to claim its right over the aforementioned EQ. AIFC was able to maintainits EQ from 1984 up to the time of the filing of this petition.

With the establishment of a new government in 1986, Glorious Sun filed an appeal

with the Office of the President, which, in turn, set aside the GTEB decision adverse to Glorious Sun and remanded the case for genuine hearings where due process would be accorded both parties. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court.

After further proceedings were conducted concerning Glorious Sun's alleged violations and frauds, the GTEB adopted a resolution providing that the disqualification of Glorious Sun and its principal stockholders and officers from engaging inthe garments export business is lifted.

AIFC, on the other hand, prior to the Supreme Court denial of its petition for review of the cancellation of its registration, requested the GTEB to release itsEQ allocation for 1993. This request was, however, refused by the GTEB. The RTC

denied AIFCs petition for injunction. AIFC's subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not GTEB have the power and authority to grant or cancel export quotas or authorizations

HELD: YES. The Court held that that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate onthe question of AIFC's entitlement to the export allocations subject of the above-entitled petitions (be they export quotas or export authorizations), which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export allocations, belongs so


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lely to the GTEB, and not to the regular courts. On the basis of EO 537 and EO 952, which amended the former, the power to adjudicate on the question of an entity's entitlement to export allocations was expressly granted to the GTEB, or atthe very least, was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or suspend quota allocations, is beyond cavil.

GSIS vs. CSC

According to Asuncion Salazars service record filed with the CSCS, she was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She became permanent with a designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide.

Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS Presidentand General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. She was then promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for thereason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority.

Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, bu

t reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the MeritSystems Promotion Board and the CSC.

In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motionfor reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988. the Board set aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but wasdenied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning the removal of officers and employees from the service. Hence, the Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations an

d actions of the Civil Service Commission. The GSIS appealed but the CSC deniedthe motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board provides that the Merit Systems Board has the function to Hear and decide cases broughtbefore it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination ofappointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officersin the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the merit system.When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide

cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction isexclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over thematter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot takeoriginal cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, exceptin the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administ


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er the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions:j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with itin accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absenceof a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assumejurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of Salazar and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are void. Likewise, the Order of the Board setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law withsuch jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, andJOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:

as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-boundworkers. Pursuant to the DOLE circular, POEA issued a Memorandum providing guidelines in the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. POEA administrator also issued a Memorandum circular on processing employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

Petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the followin

g reasons:1. That the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;2. That the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and3. That the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitions are with merit

HELD:There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.

Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies withinthe coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities]and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations tocarry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasisours.)

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bod


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ies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It is noteworthy thatthe assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment.

The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack ofpower publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTSGancayco, J.

Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines

Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

FACTS:On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECSsubmitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuitionand Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases weretoo high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lowerceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases.

Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court an

d filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendereddeclaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. Thepetitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the powerto regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees.Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing be

fore school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

ISSUE:Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees

HELD:Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the


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authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodgedwith the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement ofdue process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and therates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislativefunction? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of TransportationGR No. L-39655, March 21, 1975

Fernando, J.FACTS:Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate apublic utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to Mactan Interantional Airport and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Boardfor the issuance of a certificate of private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Without the required publication, theBoard issued on order granting it provisional permit to operte on the line applied for. A motion for reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of suchprovisional permit but without awaiting final action, this petition was filed on

the ground that the issuance of provisional permit was patently illegal or wasperformed without jurisdiction.ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial determinationHELD: YES. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed, there was pending with respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.

Tiangco vs. LauchangGR No. L-17598, September 30, 1963Padilla, J.

FACTS:These are petitions for a writ of certiorari to review an amended judgment rendered by the Court Appeals holding Faustina Lauchang is entitled to acquire by purchase whole of Lot No. 10, Block 2, of the Tambobong Estate.It appears that Lot No. 10, Block No. 2 of the Tambobong Estate in the municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, was formerly leased by the Archbishop of Manila to one Matea Suarez. Matea Suarez sold her leasehold interest in the land to Anacleto Lauchang, father of the plaintiff-appellee and appellant Faustina Lauchang. When Anacleto died in 1923, his daughter, the plaintiff, took over and since then has been occupying said property paying rents therefo


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r to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila up to August 31, 1927 when furtherpayments of rents was suspended because the Archbishop of Manila sold the Tambobong Estate to the Government of the Commonwealth of Philippines.ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Rizal should have dismissed the case for lack of cause of action, in view of respondents failure to exhaust all administrative remediesHELD: NO. The contention of the petitioners that the action brought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action, in view of respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is untenable. It is well to recall that the lot, subject of the litigation, is not apart of the public domain, but of private ownership acquired by the Governmentfor resale to private persons, and for that reason any aggrieved party may bringan action in court without the need of exhausting all administrative remedies.

Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.GR No. L-17860, March 30, 1962De Leon, J.

FACTS:Petitioner was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of theCentral Bank. He was charged in an administrative case resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board and the creation of a three-man committee to investigat

e him. After conducting hearings, the committee recommended petitioners reinstatement. The Monetary Board, however, adopted a resolution stating that petitioneris deemed resigned as of the date of his suspension. Subsequently, respondent Mariano Marcos was appointed to replace petitioner. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto. After several hearings, the courtdismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have exhausted all administrative remediesHELD: NO. The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislative intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not bee

n exhausted.Tan vs. Director of ForestryGR No. L-24548, October 27, 1983Makasiar, J.

FACTS:The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a certaintract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land consists of 6,240 hectares and located within the former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland. Petitioner submitted his application in due form alongwith nine other applicants. Thereafter, President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids

received for the issuance of timber license be rejected. The Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources sustained the recommendations of the Director ofForestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions. Finally, thearea was awarded to petitioner. Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happickfiled motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which later on, declared the license issued to petitioner by Director of Forestry as null and void. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies


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HELD: YES. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal theorders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. From the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complainedof, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing to the Chief Executive. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again, it being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must exhaust the administrative remedies available.KBMBPM vs. DominguezGR No. 91927, January 13,1992Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a contract with petitioner for the latters management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio Bunye, Mayor Carlossuccessor,claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,and the patently inequitable rental, directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract.Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against theMunicipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM offic

ers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals.Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman acomplaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuseof authority and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market.On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye andthe lattersheavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretaryof Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal

and is a mere Xerox copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying thatrespondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remediesavailableHELD:1. NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision , petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated

himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.2. NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply wherethe respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by h


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im. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office ofthe President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions,such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, orwhere the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

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