Concentration Camps in the Boer ConflictAn analysis of the Second Boer War 1899-1902

Professor Ole MolvigHIST 285 Capstone Assignment

Matt Grichnik12/13/10

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The words ‘concentration camp’ convey the despair and ultimate desolation of a group of

humanity facing possible extinction. Operated by Nazi Germany in World War Two, these

camps have come to symbolize the plight of human beings facing organized slaughter,

symbolizing the final degradation of morality and civilized norms in armed conflict.

However, concentration camps did not always serve this purpose and appeared long

before either Nazis or fascism, most notably during the Second Boer War of 1898-1902. These

camps were in fact first implemented for limited strategic purposes that bore no intention of

annihilating a civilian population. Instead, the British Empire first employed these camps in

order to counter the highly successful Boer strategy of irregular warfare. Though originally

devised solely as an anti-guerrilla tactic, the widespread use of concentration camps broke the

psychological barriers that had until then constrained the conduct governing ‘civilized’ warfare

of the time, and made acceptable to European nations the total war tactics that would later be

used to disastrous effect in the World Wars. These concentration camps combined with scorched

earth tactics advanced principles of modern total warfare in three major ways: these camps

affirmed the superiority of achieving cold-hearted strategic objectives that did not differentiate

between combatants and civilian as military targets, they destroyed the basic civil treatment

whites in colonial conflict had previously enjoyed over other races, and removed both the moral

and strategic prohibition on targeting women and children during wartime. Through these

methods, British use of concentration camps advanced the principles of modern total war in

which both soldiers and civilians, regardless of race, age, or gender could be considered military

targets.

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The idea of total war originated from Carl Von Clausewitz, who stated that “The

plan of war comprehends the whole military act, which must have one final determinate object in

which all particular objects [resources] must be absorbed.”1 Through this definition, Clausewitz

analyzed a conception of war which advocated the employment of every available means in

order to achieve military victory. There have been few examples of total war more apparent than

the World Wars, in which over 40 million civilians lost their lives and tactics such as unrestricted

submarine warfare and the firebombing of the cities of Dresden and Tokyo clearly demonstrated

that it had become an acceptable military strategy to target civilians during wartime. The total

war tactics that devastated Europe during these conflicts shocked the world and led to an

international outcry over the sheer ruthlessness of modern warfare as citizens questioned how

such a calamity could have developed. The Second Boer War helped advance these total war

principles, by making the brutal tactics that occurred during this conflict both acceptable and

well known.

The Second Boer War

1 Clausewitz, Karl Von. On War. 1873. Reprint, Berlin: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & co., 1908. P. 79

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Fig. A

The Second Boer War began as a struggle over the control of precious metals in South

Africa.2 In 1886 gold had recently been discovered in Transvaal and the Orange Free State,

which piqued the interests of the British Empire who attempted to seize these valuable resources

from the Boer republics. After discovery, the Boer nations did not have the manpower or the

resources necessary to extract gold, and needed to import British assistance from their territories

in Natal and Cape Colony. This influx of English workers led to tensions between the British and

the Boers, which eventually escalated into open conflict. According to one Boer account, “The

war was inevitable. The British government had made up its mind to force the issue…but

Transvaalers were also spoiling for a fight.”3 There had already been continuous animosity

between the two states for many years, and dispute over a valuable resource escalated

disagreement into open conflict.

2 Lee, Emanoel C. G.. To the bitter end: a photographic history of the Boer War, 1899-1902. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Viking, 1985. P. 5

3 Reitz, Deneys. Commando; a Boer journal of the Boer War,. London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1929. P. 15

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Violence erupted in October 1899, and combination of superior rifle technology,

geography, and irregular tactics allowed the Boers to annihilate the British Commonwealth

armies, eventually forcing the British Empire to implement total war tactics to achieve strategic

victory. At the beginning of the conflict, the Boers had equipped their army with modern rifle

technology that would prove disastrous to British infantry tactics. The president of Transvaal,

Paul Kruger, had purchased German Mauser 303 rifles for his militia in the months leading to

conflict which contained smokeless cartridges and were accurate at much longer range than

British firearms. These weapons proved devastating against British infantry line formations that

emphasized line order and thus prepared soldiers to “march proud and becoming into a valley of

death” instead of dispersing and taking cover.4

With the advantage of the vast expanse of the South African veldt and irregular

commando tactics, the Boers devastated the British in a preemptive invasion of Natal in 1899

and nearly defeated the British before reinforcements could arrive. The Boers took full advantage

of the terrain of the savanna with tactics suited to dispersion and cover. As The Liberal Review

put it, “The modern rifle is primarily a guerilla weapon, as it tends to put the civilian on a level

with the regular.”5 The Boers agreed. Their main infantry unit, called a commando, consisted of

approximately 20 men trained in long-range sniping, free of a strict chain of command, who

were also taught to retreat when facing a massed British attack. Many of these units were

horsed, and quite successfully used speed and knowledge of the terrain in order to disrupt supply

convoys and capture small units of Commonwealth soldiers. In many instances, after Boer

tactical victory, “The white flag was raised…and the haul was good this time, there were 1,100

4 Lee, Emanoel C. G.. To the bitter end: a photographic history of the Boer War, 1899-1902. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Viking, 1985. P. 315 "The Week." The Liberal Review [London] 6 June 1901, sec. The Week: P. 3. Print.

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prisoners.”6 By dividing and disrupting the conventional British army, the Burghers, or Boer

citizens, managed to annihilate much of the existing defenses of the English colonies and laid

siege to cities such as Mafeking and Kimberly. By the time that British reinforcements arrived,

they faced an enemy in a dominant position, who used irregular warfare tactics and had great

knowledge of the terrain.

The British Empire’s overwhelming manpower and military resources marshaled from

three quarters of the globe consistently failed against the Boers, and forced them to adopt anti-

guerilla total war tactics in order to sequester the Boer commando units and effectively use the

Empire’s massive strategic advantage. The commando’s tactics proved extremely successful and

frustrated a British military unable to engage with the guerrilla units. As Michael Rimington of

the 6th Dragoons stated, “you would hardly call it fighting: long-range sniping is most of it.”7

Facing an impasse, the British military began to proceed with a scorched-earth farm

burning campaign, yet faced legal restrictions against openly declaring total war. The British

Manual of Military Law in 1898 prohibited “soldiers from entering private houses or molesting

the civil population in any way” and warned that the “infliction of any injury beyond that which

is required to produce disability is needless cruelty.”8 In addition to British national law, the

Hague Convention of 1899 had affirmed the illegality of treating civilians as military targets.

The agreement stated “any compulsion of the population in occupied territory…is prohibited.

Private Property must not be destroyed or confiscated.9” Within the context of both British

6 Reitz, Deneys. Commando; a Boer journal of the Boer War,. London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1929. P. 427 Phillipps, L. March. With Rimington . London: E. Arnold, 1901. P 1938 Hobhouse, Emily. The brunt of the war, and where it fell . London: Methuen & Co., 1902 P. 19 Hobhouse, Emily. The brunt of the war, and where it fell . London: Methuen & Co., 1902 P. 1

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military law and international treaty, total war tactics against a civilian population were thus

expressly prohibited.

The British Empire bypassed both international and military law by claiming that civilian

structures in the Boer conflict were “camps of the enemy.”10 Because the irregular nature of the

conflict did in fact provide ambiguity between Boer commandos and civilians, the

Commonwealth could legitimately defend, in some cases, the destruction of civilian property.

Oftentimes, British soldiers would visit farms and homesteads to demand the loyalty and

submission of the civilians found there, yet they would find the same individuals fighting for the

Boer cause a few weeks later on the battlefield. Thus, the British Empire failed to secure the

loyalty of the existing populace through force and sworn oath, stifling their efforts to reduce the

supplies available for commando units. Having failed to secure allegiance by traditional

methods, “the policy of farm burning and ‘concentration’ became justified on the grounds that

the Boers were no longer fighting in a regular manner.”11 However, the British abused the policy

of “camps of the enemy” which applied only in certain circumstances and began systematically

targeting all Boer homesteads for destruction. In this way, the British blurred the distinction

between civilian and soldier as British soldiers now had a specific task to destroy civilian

property.

The British farm burning policy attempted to destroy the psychological morale of the

Boer commandos as well as diminish their supply of food and shelter through “burning the farms

of our opponents of war, breaking down water dams, and bringing agriculture to a deadlock

throughout an immense area dependent on existence for such pursuits.”12 Thus, after 1900, the

10 Hobhouse, Emily. The brunt of the war, and where it fell . London: Methuen & Co., 1902 P. 3-411 "The Week." The Liberal Review [London] 6 June 1901, sec. The Week: 2-3. Print. P. 20112 Cox, J Charles. “Farm Burning and the Twentieth Century” The Speaker [London] 5 January 1901 p. 372

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Commonwealth began to systematically dynamite homesteads as part of their scorched-earth

policy. Official reports began to tally the number of farmhouses burnt, and any excuse became

sufficient in order to continue the destruction of civilian property in occupied territory.

According to Michael Rimington,

“I do not gather that any special reason or cause is proved against the farms burnt. If

Boers have used the farm, if the owner is on commando, if the line within a certain

distance has been blown up; or even if there are Boers in some of the neighborhoods who

persist in fighting…Anyway we find one reason or another that covers pretty nearly

every farm we come to.”

The destruction of Boer homesteads by British soldiers proceeded at a rapid pace.

Official reports commented upon the hasty process of property demolition with common tallies

such as “today eighteen houses were wholly or partially burnt in the Jacobsdal district alone.”13

Often, the only Burghers occupying the homes when the British soldiers arrived were the elderly,

women, and children who were unable to fight in the commando units. The policy of

methodically burning Boer shelters shattered the livelihoods of many of these dependent family

members; in many cases they had to be taken into custody in order to prevent starvation.

Through this scorched earth policy, the British began the process of the dispersion of the Boer

population and provided the legal rational of “camps of the enemy” for attacking civilian targets.

As the British army advanced into Transvaal and the Orange Free State to implement

scorched earth tactics, the irregular nature of the Boer war continued unabated and further total

war measures were soon deemed to be necessary for victory. The Commonwealth soon realized

13 Hobhouse, Emily. The brunt of the war, and where it fell . London: Methuen & Co., 1902 P. 6

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that incinerating farmsteads did not reduce the commando’s fighting ability, and thus adopted

measures to further limit the movement of Boer fighters. These new tactics called for a chain of

blockhouse forts connected by barbed wire and railroad in order to partition the open savanna of

Transvaal in into manageable tracts of territory for military operations. The British hoped to

simultaneously constrain the movement of the Boers while gaining the ability to move British

columns by train, which would allow them to attack with precision and rapidity.

These combined tactics proved very successful, as both the blockhouses and burned

farms began to exact a heavy toll on the Boer fighters. The blockhouses were prefabricated,

constructed with corrugated steel, and had both a retractable ladder set to an entrance eight feet

above the ground and a machine gun platform to repeal Boer raiders.14 Combined with railways

and barbed wire fences, these fortress lines rapidly proved their strategic worth and the British

Empire began a swift expansion of this strategy. By the end of the Boer war, General Herbert

Kitchener, a leading British General, had over 8,000 of these forts traversing Natal and

Transvaal.15 The combination of burning farms and fencing in the open veldt allowed the

Commonwealth to counter Boer guerilla tactics and slowly win the Second Boer War.

The expansion of blockhouses and railway lines throughout South Africa also had

another important effect: the British Empire acquired the technical means to deport the civilians

of the Boer nation away from the zone of conflict. In their attempt to combat guerilla tactics, the

British unwittingly provided the logistical framework that allowed for the possibility of

uprooting an entire population. Combined with the legal precedent of “enemy camp” set by the

14 Lee, Emanoel C. G.. To the bitter end: a photographic history of the Boer War, 1899-1902. P. 15815 Lee, Emanoel C. G.. To the bitter end: a photographic history of the Boer War, 1899-1902. P. 159

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British farm-burning campaign, the blockhouses and railway lines provided both a means and

motivation for the internment of Boer nationals in concentration camps.

The Concentration Camps

Perspective about British total war tactics during the Second Boer war can be gained

through comparison with the conflict in which total war tactics were first implemented, in the

American Civil War. During the Civil War conflict, General William Tecumseh Sherman

embarked upon a Savannah Campaign through the American South with the purpose of inflicting

as much damage as possible in order to force the South to capitulate and bring the conflict to a

more rapid close. General Sherman became famous for “Sherman’s neckties” in which railroad

ties were heated up and twisted around trees in order to ensure that the railroads remained

permanently destroyed, and also notoriously allowed his troops to burn Atlanta to the ground.16

Moreover, poorly managed prisoner of war camps, such as Andersonville, led to exceptionally

high inmate deaths since there almost no infrastructure existed to support the massive inmate

population.17 Brutal total war tactics implemented during the American Civil War, led to

unprecedented violence and devastation. However, the strategies used during the American Civil

War lacked the large-scale, semi-permanent organization with the universal inclusion of all

races, women, and children that allowed the British during the Second Boer War to set a

precedent for inclusion of civilians during conflict that would later occur during the World Wars.

Most importantly, in the United States, total war tactics did not lead to large scale removal and

incarceration of the civilian population of the American South.

16 Ballard, Michael. Civil War Mississippi: A Guide. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000. P. 8017 Davis, Robert. "Escape From Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment. “Journal of Military History 4, no. 67 (2003): P. 1066

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The erection of concentration camps in Natal began for practical purposes. The British

faced a recalcitrant civilian population, who could not be stopped from providing aid to the Boer

commandoes and remained defiant even as their soldiers were slaughtered and homesteads

burned. British soldiers questioning women in the veldt received answers such as “of course we

shall go on fighting…as long as may be necessary or until you go away.”18 Faced with an

increasingly resistant population despite a lack of shelter and fighting a losing war, the British

decided to remove from the countryside anything and anyone that could be useful to the

commandoes, including civilians.19

General Kitchener, the commander of the Commonwealth forces, declared in December

1900:

“The General Commander in Chief is desirous that all possible means shall be taken to

stop the present guerilla warfare. Of the various measure suggested…one that is strongly

recommended is the removal of all men, women, children, and natives from the districts

which the enemy’s band persistently occupy. The women and children brought in should

be divided in two categories. 1st, refugees, and families of neutrals. 2nd Those whose

husband’s fathers and sons are on commando… It should be clearly explained to

burghers in the field, that, if they voluntarily surrender, they will be allowed to live with

the families in the camps until it is safe for them to return home.”20

The general’s statement makes it abundantly clear that the British Empire regarded

concentration camps as an acceptable military tactic. With the declaration that unarmed Boers

18 Phillipps, L. March. With Rimington . London: E. Arnold, 1901. P 20319 Lee, Emanoel C. G.. To the bitter end: a photographic history of the Boer War, 1899-1902. P. 16220 Circular Memorandum No. 29 from the Archives of the Military Governor, Pretoria, quoted in S.B. Spies, “Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer republics, January 1900 to May 1902 (21st December 1900)

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were to be put into concentration camps and that these prisoners were to be separated on the

basis of their wartime allegiance above other factors, the British government broke many norms

governing warfare during this era. For the first time, it had become both technically feasible

acceptable for a government to systematically remove an entire population from a battlefield area

for strategic purposes.

Though the British military had begun the internment of the Boer nation into

concentration camps, they did not officially demonize the Boer population. Rather, the British

emphasized a positive image of the Burghers to the British public which contrasted directly with

their abysmal wartime treatment. British military testimonial emphasized the similarities and

mutual civility between themselves and the Boers. According to Basil Williams, a soldier tasked

with burning farmhouses, “We hardly ever left a farm, even when we had been conducting

somewhat forced sales for the battery, without having a piece of bread or a glass of milk offered

to us by a woman who had been grieving a dead husband minutes previously.”21 This image of

fair treatment and understanding even extended to the battlefield where a captured British soldier

often “had nothing but praise for his captors” and that British prisoners “were always treated as

an honorable foe expects to be treated.”22 Throughout this conflict, the British military

emphasized the similarities between the English and the Boers, seemingly undue given the brutal

treatment that these Burghers received at British hands.

This courtesy extended even to the national British media. Though sometimes tinged

with jingoism and nationalist tendencies, the British media failed to characterize the Boers as

outlandish or inhuman, and instead portrayed these peoples as worthy foes. Many British 21 Williams, Basil. "On Some Boer Characteristics and the Burning of Farms." Monthly Review[London] 10 Jan. 1901, sec. 2:4: 1118-130. Print. P. 12322 Williams, Basil. "On Some Boer Characteristics and the Burning of Farms." Monthly Review[London] 10 Jan. 1901, sec. 2:4: 1118-130. Print. P. 122

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journalists stated that the war had been fought to remedy “the uncertainty as to which was the

master of the two white races of South Africa.”23 Though the treatment of the Boers by the

British media varied among newspapers, British publications dedicated to understanding the

Boer sympathies demonstrated the degree to which journalists failed to dehumanize their enemy

during wartime. Books such as With the Boer Forces written by known Boer sympathizers were

popular during the time period, and there seems to be a concerted effort to characterize the Boers

as fair combatants.24 From the reports of the British media and the military establishment, the

British did not consider the Boer population as subhuman and instead characterized them as fair

and worthy foes. By portraying the Boers as civilized combatants yet subjecting them to the dire

conditions of the concentration camps, the British military regularized total war practices as

acceptable and rational during wartime circumstances. These depictions turned a formerly

extreme and exceptional practice into a normal strategic tool of the military that could be used

against any foe.

Race and Concentration Camps

Surprisingly, this civil depiction also extended to the black population of South Africa.

Though racism predominated throughout these times and the Boer War began at the height of

European colonization, the British claimed the same fundamental strategic rationale without

racial overtones that interned both blacks and Boers in concentration camps. This departs

significantly from the treatment that the blacks and other native populations received in the

colonial wars during much of the 19th century, as white Europeans often treated those who

inhabited the territories they sought as mere pawns or slaves. Thus during the Second Boer War,

23 Williams, Basil. "On Some Boer Characteristics and the Burning of Farms." Monthly Review[London] 10 Jan. 1901, sec. 2:4: 1118-130. Print. P. 11924 WITH THE BOER FORCES., Review of Reviews, (1900:Oct.) p.399

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the British failed to dehumanize the black population they interned in concentration camps and

further regularized these total war practices as a normal strategic tool for the military to be used

on any population regardless of ethnicity.

Race relations during the turn of the 20th century had anything but an equitable image. In

the same year that the Boer War began, the United States crushed the native population of

Manila while King Leopold of Belgium enacted exceedingly harsh treatment and widespread

mutilation of rebelling native Africans enslaved to rubber plantations in the Congo Free State.

This worldwide violence occurred under the guise of colonial ideology and racial prejudice. The

ruthless practices used against native populations, common in colonies during this time period,

were not at all acceptable practices for use against a white population. The ideology of “White

Man’s Burden,” a poem representing a dominant ideology written by Rudyard Kipling in the

same year that the Boer War began, justified these worldwide colonial conflicts on the basis of

continued white domination. 25 For these reasons, the Second Boer War proved a remarkable

transformation as harsh treatment during times of conflict became acceptable regardless of race.

The importance of this official image of equitable treatment became apparent in

comparison to Spanish behavior during the Cuban revolt of 1895. During this insurrection, the

population proved difficult for the Spanish to quell due to the adoption of guerilla tactics by the

native population; General Weyler ‘The Butcher’ responded by forcing the population of the

island into fortified camps in 1897. The Spanish neglected to provide supplies for the Cubans,

25 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden: The United States & The Philippine Islands, 1899.” Rudyard

Kipling’s Verse: Definitive Edition (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1929). Take up the White Man’s burden

/Send forth the best ye breed—/Go send your sons to exile/To serve your captives' need/To wait in heavy harness/On

fluttered folk and wild—/Your new-caught, sullen peoples,/Half devil and half child/Take up the White Man’s

burden/In patience to abide…

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which created highly inhumane conditions, and by some estimates killed up to 200,000 or nearly

one third of the local and largely black population.26 Though they were the first to use armed

camps as a military anti-guerrilla tactic, the Iberian version of concentration camps failed to

break the psychological norms governing warfare of the day and did not necessarily entail a

departure from regular colonial conflict at the turn of the 20th century. This continuity stems from

the fact that the Spanish interned a colonized population made up in a large part of African

ancestry, and not a largely independent white nation of European descent.27 The Spanish held

calcified colonial prejudices against the Cubans, whereas the British took great pains not to

create official discrimination against the Boers. Since the Spanish treatment of Cubans during the

revolt remained firmly within traditional colonial and racial dispositions, the construction of

armed camps did not significantly influence the development of modern total war.

In light of Spanish practices, British rationale behind the treatment of Boers and native

Africans shattered wartime European norms. Fundamentally during the Second Boer War, “the

reason that black concentration camps were established was for the same reason that white ones

were established.”28 This action is astonishing, and represents a break from the previous colonial

rationale of European domination over other races towards a more equitable military reasoning

that treats all enemy parties equally poorly, regardless of civilian or combatant status.

Many Boers and Africans were separated by race into different concentration camps.

However, many camps were also unsegregated, and the similar experiences shared by blacks and

whites during wartime led to the understanding that the British Empire treated both groups very

26 Canalejas, José in Cantón Navarro, José. History of Cuba, (2001) p. 66.27 Over one million slave had been imported into Cuba over a 30 year period and their population in 1899 was 1.5 million. Cuban Census 1899. Washington : The War Department of the United States of America, 1899.28 Nasson, Bill. "Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899- 1902."Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (2002): 813-828.

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similarly. Over the course of the war, more than 100,000 Boers were interned and approximately

30,000 perished in the camps. A similar number of blacks faced imprisonment, and the South

African Government estimates that nearly 20,000 lost their lives (Emily Hobhouse, a human

rights activist, reported 13,315).29 Both the Africans and Afrikaners faced astronomically high

casualties at the hands of the British in extremely similar circumstances. As Liz Stanley explains,

“In regards to Black people… they not only died and were buried with Boers but were

sometimes in authority over Boer concentration camp inhabitants.”30 Thus, the concentration

camps were not organized by racial hierarchy and largely treated inmates of different ethnic

backgrounds in the same manner.

As it is difficult to understand the racial prejudice of a population through limited literary

sources alone, concentration camp records can assist in understanding British distinctions

between the Boers and blacks in Natal and the Orange Free State.

Fig. B

29 "Black Concentration Camps | South African History Online." South African History Online - Homepage. http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/special-chrono/governance/1902-blkconcentrationcamp.htm (accessed December 2, 2010).30 Stanley, Liz. Mourning becomes-- post/memory, commemoration and the concentration camps of the South African War. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008. P. 172

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This document details the concentration camp deaths at Vryburg over a one month period.

Though the British had an official policy of segregating blacks and whites into different camps,

this procedure clearly had not been enforced, and in fact many concentration camps such as

Vryburg and Brandfort throughout South Africa contained sizeable portions of all races detained

in war.31 As many camps seemingly were multiethnic in nature, the British detained both

Caucasians and Africans for the same military goals and forced them to live and die together in

internment. These actions expanded the conception of total war to include every civilian,

regardless of race.

Even more revealing, the British government did not clearly label the prisoners within the

concentration camps according to race. Racial categorization varied among each camp, and

included a multitude of categories other than white and black. In the concentration camp of

Barberton, bureaucrats recorded ethnicity according to their original ‘tribe,’ and not with the

broader racial category they fit into. These records indicated that not only did the British

disregard race as they housed the civilian population of the Orange Free State and Transvaal in

the camps, they did not even have ‘black’ or ‘white’ as singular race unto itself. The detail to

which the recordkeeping went to identify each person’s tribe clearly negated any assumptions

that race may have been a factor in concentration camp internment during the Boer war.

31Commission, Great Britain. Concentration Camps. "Report on the concentration camps in ... - Google Books." Google P. 165, P. 64

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Fig. C

It also seems as if the Boers themselves did not self-identify as a white race alone, which

further confuses arguments that the concentration camps were run according to racial ideology.

In Boer/European culture the term Burgher can be used to describe a citizen of a certain polity.

As these records indicate, ‘Colored Burgher’ would therefore describe a citizen of African

descent who fully identified with the Boer cause. Even more telling, the label of ‘Colored Dutch’

fused two formerly racial terms together, and connoted that the individual may have dark skin

but claims to be a member of the Boer community. Since the Boers themselves seemed not to

have been an exclusively Caucasian ethnic community, it would have been even more difficult

for the British to discriminate military actions based upon racial prejudice. It seems that the

British Empire treated Boers and blacks somewhat equally in military policy, furthering the total

war conception that all races were equal targets in conflict.

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Fig. D

Conditions within the Concentration Camps

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Conditions within the concentration camps were completely appalling. Disease ran

rampant throughout overcrowded sites, and a shortage of hospital facilities allowed diseases such

as cholera to run rampant throughout the concentration camps. A large percentage of these

deaths fell upon children. According to the British Medical Journal in 1901, 278.4 out of 1,000

children in the concentration camps perished every year. The author points out that “if the

present conditions within the concentration camps continued for three years, all the Boer children

would be annihilated.”32

The discovery of the horrific death rate among the Burgher population confined to the

camps high forced the British to send an official commission to analyze the state of the camps

and provide recommendations in order to improve conditions.33 The official report of the

Concentration Camps Commission had three stated aims: determine how to allocate charitable

funding so as to provide the most effective improvement of the Boer condition, analyze the

condition of each camp and provide recommendations for improvement, and consider whether

the location of the camp was sufficient of whether it needed to be moved to a better geographical

location.34 As the Concentration Camps Commission inspected sites throughout Natal and

Transvaal, they gave an extremely positive analysis of the conditions within the concentration

camp facilities. According to the report, “considering the ample provision of all necessaries for

the healthy, and luxuries for the sick which has been made, it is rather difficult to find a suitable

channel in which to direct the flow of private charity.35” As the Commission examined the

camps, it deemed much of the organization and management of these sites quite sufficient and

often considered the concentration camps well provisioned and adequately run. 32 Fox, R, Hingston. "The Mortality in the Boer Concentration Camps." The British Medical Journal (London), November 16, 1901.33 The development of which is to be detailed later in the paper34 Report on the concentration camps in South Africa . London: Eyre & Spottwoode, 1902. Print. P. 135 Report on the concentration camps in South Africa . London: Eyre & Spottwoode, 1902. Print. P. 4

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This opinion clearly runs counter to the death rate concentration camp inmates, and in

order to confront this disparity, the Commission reported,

“Considering the favorable opinion which our commission has formed in the majority of

cases on details of camp management which have bearing on health, we are brought face-

to-face with a difficult problem: How to account for the extraordinarily high death rate

which has prevailed at one time or another in every camp in the Orange River Colony and

Transvaal?”36

The Concentration Camp Commission largely dismissed British responsibility, using a twofold

explanation to analyze the deaths of many imprisoned Boers. Admitting that “the heavy part of

the death rate is children under five,” the government commission first described the need to

understand the concentration camp deaths within the context of the normal Boer death rate which

the Commission suspected “was extremely high compared to European standards,” using an

occurrence in which a Boer woman had lost nine out of ten children as an example.37 In addition,

the Concentration Camp Commission stressed the unsanitary conditions created by war and that

environmental chaos may be responsible for these deaths. Secondly, the Commission blamed the

habits of the Boers themselves, stating that “every superintendent had to wage war against the

insanitary habits of the people.” They blamed the Boers for practicing destructive folk medicine

and keeping in close contact with the sick and poor personal hygiene. Using these claims, the

Concentration Camp Commission absolved the British Empire of responsibility for massacring

Boer inmates, instead blaming these deaths on natural circumstances and the lifestyle of the

Boers themselves. 36 Commission, Great Britain. Concentration Camps. "Report on the concentration camps in ... - Google Books." Google Books.http://books.google.com/books?id P. 1437 Commission, Great Britain. Concentration Camps. "Report on the concentration camps in ... - Google Books." Google Books.http://books.google.com/books?id P. 15

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The British Government in effect made it both acceptable for a nation to remove an entire

population from an area for strategic military objectives and absolved themselves of

responsibility when large numbers of this population died while in its custody. Out of a total

population of around 100,000 at the start of hostilities, official records estimate that 27,927

civilian Boers died in concentration camps, some 26,000 of which were women and children.38

Combined with around 10,000 combat deaths, these appalling statistics suggest that the British

presided over the near-genocide of Boer population, setting a clear precedent for the devastation

that total war tactics could wreak upon a population.

Women and Children in the Camps

The British treatment of women and children during the war can be considered even more

appalling than the volume of casualties itself. Despite violations of both internal military law

and international treaty, the British Empire systematically persecuted women and children in

order to achieve strategic military aims. These policies resulted in twice as many civilian

casualties among women and children than Boer commando soldiers, a much higher

civilian/military casualty ratio than occurred during both World Wars.39 Moreover, the British

broke the cherished code of “chivalric soldier”, which had protected the sanctity of Exposed

European women and children in an exposed European Colonial world.40 By detaining women

and children in the concentration camps, the British Empire committed both an illegal and

immoral act according to their own legal code and social norms, relying only on cold rational

calculation in order to attempt to bring the Boer conflict to a close.

38 Lee, Emanoel C. G.. To the bitter end: a photographic history of the Boer War, 1899-1902. P. 18639 Note: The Boer war civilian/military casualty ratio is only higher than World War Two if the civilian deaths in China are discounted40 Nasson, Bill. "Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899- 1902."Society of Military History 66, no. 3 (2002): 813-828. P. 816

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British ruthlessness towards women and children during the war extended even further,

as a half-ration system starved camp “undesirables,” or families who still had soldiers out

fighting. Under this scheme, women and children who had family members actively fighting

were given only half the normal camp rations in order to provide an incentive for the Boer

commando to surrender.41 Using the data from the Bethulie Concentration camp, this

corresponds to 8 ounces of meal, 2 ounces of sugar, and ½ an ounce of coffee per day. With half

rations, it appeared that meat was rarely served at all.42 In effect, the British used women and

children as a weapon of war in order to hold the Boer commandoes hostage and induce them to

surrender. This policy of withholding sustenance likely increased the death rate among

‘undesirable’ women and children, further emphasizing brutal British total war policies that

treated civilian women and children as they would enemy prisoners of war.

During the Second Boer War, the British successfully turned civilian women and children

into weapons of war while at the same time ‘normalizing’ this strategy by refusing to claim that

these actions were exceptional circumstances or practiced upon a subhuman population.

Conversely, the concentration camps resulted from a rationally calculated military strategy to

reduce the amount of aid given to commandoes in the field and to demoralize the Boer soldier.

The policy of half rations provided even further incentive to surrender, and in effect held each

Boer’s family hostage until the hostilities ended. This British concentration camp policy had its

justification solely based upon rational calculation as to what actions could bring the Boer

conflict to a close more rapidly. This rationale permeated through not only the British military

but its citizenry as well, evinced by the response of one prominent Anglican clergyman who

41 Hobhouse, Emily. The brunt of the war, and where it fell . London: Methuen & Co., 1902 P. 12442 Commission, Great Britain. Concentration Camps. "Report on the concentration camps in ... - Google Books." Google Books.http://books.google.com/books?id P. 62

Grichnik 23

refused to contribute aid to Boer women and children in the concentration camps as he believed

it may “prolong the war.”43

International Outcry and Human Rights

Fortunately, the atrocious British treatment of civilians during this conflict did not go

unnoticed. International outcry arose over the condition of women and children in the camps, and

a reformist by the name of Emily Hobhouse came to represent human rights during the Boer

conflict. She led a human rights campaign gained world attention and created such

condemnation that she eventually succeeded in both illuminating the horrendous conditions

imposed upon civilians during this conflict and significantly ameliorating their living

circumstances.

Emily Hobhouse became involved in the Boer War at the request of the women’s branch

of the South African Conciliation Committee, who sent her to South Africa to for the purpose of

distributing supplies in 1901. As she arrived, Ms. Hobhouse encountered the awful conditions in

the concentration camps and described in detail what she encountered to the British government,

sending them the “Report of a Visit to the Camps of Women and Children in the Cape and

Orange River Colonies” in 1901. In this report she made many dire predictions, stating “to keep

these camps going is murder to the children” and “thousands, physically unfit, are placed in the

conditions of life in which they have not strength to endure.”44 These claims alarmed both the

British government and citizenry, and Emily Hobhouse quickly gained fame for her advocacy of

women and children in South Africa.

43 Hobhouse, Emily. The brunt of the war, and where it fell . London: Methuen & Co., 1902 P. 9444 Harlow, Barbara , and Mia Carter. Archives of Empire: The scramble for Africa. 2nd ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. P. 668

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These statements completely contradicted government statements about the camps in

South Africa. The War Secretary at the time, St. John Broderick, first called the concentration

camps “volunteer summer camps” in which the Boers had been interned of their own accord and

were living comfortably.45 These declarations were corroborated by The Times, which claimed

“Neither sentries nor fences are necessary to prevent desertions from the camps. The occupants

can come and go as they will.”46 For this reason Miss Hobhouse’s report caused great

consternation and she received immediate fame as both the members of the British parliament

and the public learned of the full extent of the atrocities that were committed in their name in

South Africa.

Ms. Hobhouse had placed considerable pressure on members of parliament, and clearly

raised the plight of the Boer woman and children throughout the Commonwealth and brought

publicity to their plight. After her first report on the concentration camps, newspapers credited

her with the reforms that immediately ensued; as one claimed that “every one of the remedies

that has been introduced of late [in the camps] is solely due to Miss Hobhouse’s initiatives and

perseverance.” The publicity garnered by this report in fact forced the British government to

organize the Concentration Camp Commission headed by Millicent Fawcent to investigate Emily

Hobhouse’s claims. Eventually, Ms. Hobhouse and her allies in parliament succeeded in

reforming the concentration camps when, “Miss Hobhouse in particular, and the bulk of the

Liberal opposition have won a great victory. Mr. Brodrick has at last announced his conversion

to their view that the camps should be broken up.”47

45 Parliament, Great Britain.. "The parliamentary debates - Google Books." Google Books. (1901) P. 223-224

http://books.google.com/books?id=5d1Wk_NOy3QC&pg46 "The War." The London Times18 Jan. 1902: 14. Print.47 The Liberal Review (London), "The Week," December 14, 1901, sec. The Speaker. P. 290

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During this era, Great Britain controlled nearly 10 million square miles of territory and

claimed dominion over nearly 400 million people, and any notion that spread throughout Great

Britain also impacted nearly a quarter of the globe under its control. Since it was the British who

implemented the concentration camps in South Africa and not a lesser power, their treatment of

to the civilian Boer populace immediately created international notoriety and exposure on a

much greater level than what would have occurred to any other nation during the time period.

In addition to this publicity, areas outside of British control learned of the Boer

concentration camp controversy and British use of total war tactics. The Watchmen, an

American periodical, reported on the British controversy stating, “Americans certainly do not

believe this reconcentration to be a military necessity.”48 Even in Europe, continental nations

began to write about the treatment of Boer civilians. According to the New Tilburg Courant, “hot

aantal koortskien bedroeg per dag 10 a 15 zoodat't hospitaal te klein bleek en velsn met een ziek

lichaam in dein toestand moesten blijven vortleven,” remarking upon the atrocity of seeing pale

and heaving sick Boer children within the concentration camp hospitals.49 Due to the enormous

size of the British Empire at this time, Emily Hobhouse managed to spread international

awareness about the condition of Boer civilians throughout much of the world.

Because of Emily Hobhouse, the British government not only set precedent by using total

war methods in conflict, these actions ensured that both the Commonwealth and the international

community knew about these practices in depth which elicited international reaction. In a very

real sense the actual actions of the British government mattered far less than the international

impression of British total war strategy that Ms. Hobhouse espoused to the world. In this manner,

48 "Reconcentration in South Africa." The Watchmen [New York] 11 June 1901: 6. Print.49 (translated) New Tilburg Courant, "The War in South Africa. A Compliant," August 19, 1901, Daily edition.

Grichnik 26

Emily Hobhouse helped the Boer conflict become a precedent for modern total war by

illuminating of British action through controversy, which would cement the image of a brutal

British total war policy in the minds of the international community.

After the War

During World War One, the British Journal Fortnightly Review claimed,

“When the horrors of the present struggle come to be viewed by posterity, it will be a

source of pride to all persons of British blood that neither the government nor the people

of the United Kingdom were responsible for opening the gates of hell and the fiendish

spirit of German militarism to prey upon humanity.”50

With statements like this, the British public denied any responsibility for contributing to the

development of total war used throughout the duration of World War One. The English instead

actively forgot their imperial legacy and focused on the apparently atrocious tactics of the

German nation the British had first used at the turn of the 20th century. In this manner,

Commonwealth Empire began to condemn the German total war tactics that were developed

throughout the Second Boer War.

The British claimed that the Germans violated “the rule to observe even in war certain

humane and reasonable limitations. The pillage or unnecessary destruction of private property,

and the slaughter or ill-treatment of non-combatants has long been forbidden.”51 Many English

50 Hurd, Archibald . "The Miracle of the War." Fortnightly Review97.582 (1915): 964. Print.51 NEWBOLT, HENRY,THE WAR AND THE NATIONS., Fortnightly Review, 98:584 (1915:Aug.) p.251

Grichnik 27

characterized German actions as heinous because “the Hague convention was arbitrarily set

aside” in Belgium and that German application of total war tactics constituted unprecedented

illegal warfare.52 In this manner, the British absolved themselves of responsibility for total war

policy by instead blaming the Germans for implementing these tactics; foregoing their extensive

imperial legacy with past violations of both international and military law during the Boer

conflict. The British may have excused themselves of previous conduct; however “The three men

who conducted the war were Mr. Askith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr. Churchill,” who also

happened to be prominently involved at the beginning of the Second Boer War.”53

Though the British may have overlooked their past military in the Second Boer, the

Germans did not. They chartered an official review of the Boer War in 1904 and analyzed

British military tactics and strategies for dealing with the Boer combatants. Throughout this

examination, the Germans analyzed the conflict scientifically and attempted to understand how

British performance could have been improved throughout the struggle. According to The

Speaker, “The German account of the Boer war is just what one would have expected it to be. It

is the judgment of critics who have come to regard warfare as wholly technical and

mechanical.”54 With this controlled analysis, the lessons that the Germans drew from the Second

Boer War entirely focused upon the efficiency of the British military and dismissed aside

negative moral or ethical judgment regarding the use of total war tactics. In fact, the Germans

claimed the opposite and defended British morality, and asserted

“In view of the many errors that were disseminated by a badly informed press throughout

the world, as to the conduct of the English, it seems to be the duty of a truth loving historical

52 NEWBOLT, HENRY, “THE WAR AND THE NATIONS”., Fortnightly Review, 98:584 (1915:Aug.) p.25053 Harrison, Austin “Britian’s Lesson.” English Review (April 1917) P. 354 Print54 “BOER TACTICS AND GERMAN CRITICS”., Speaker, (1906:Feb. 10) p.460

Grichnik 28

account…to lay stress on the fact that the behavior of the British was invariably thoroughly

chivalrous and humane, so long as they were opposed by the Boer forces.”55

Instead, the German review of military strategy during the Second Boer War criticized

the British for a failure to be ruthless and inability to use the considerable British strategic

advantage to full effect. The Germans concluded that the inability to “to sacrifice ruthlessly,

when necessary,” and “fight to the last man” condemned the British to a long and costly conflict

that could have been resolved more efficiently.56 This followed from the German conception of

the “scientific method that efficiency in warfare can only come, according to German dogma,

from drill and discipline.”57 In this manner, the Germans not only agreed with the British military

and total war tactics were acceptable during conflict but criticized the Commonwealth Empire

for failing to be ruthless enough.

As World War One developed and total war tactics used by the British began to be

implemented by the Germans throughout continental Europe, the Allies claimed that this

barbarous must be stopped at any cost. The Bryce Committee on Alleged German Outrages

detailed the depth of alleged German depravity for propaganda use to the British and American

public. In response, the Germans “called for a bitter counter attack recounting British

imperialism. British treatment of the Boers in particular was given special attention in

Germany’s press.”58 Thus, the German military both acknowledged the British development of

total war tactics and used British conduct during the Second Boer War as a defense for targeting

civilians during World War One. Despite the criticism of the international press, the Germans 55 “The German Staff on the Boer War.” Monthly Review. 15.42 (1904) 1 print. 56 “BOER TACTICS AND GERMAN CRITICS”., Speaker, (1906:Feb. 10) p.461, The German Staff on the Boer War.” Monthly Review. 15.42 (1904) P. 3 print.57 BOER TACTICS AND GERMAN CRITICS”., Speaker, (1906:Feb. 10) p.46058 Welch, David. Germany, propaganda, and total war, 1914-1918: the sins of omission. New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 2000. (Quoting Frankfurter Zeitung 16 September 1915)

Grichnik 29

continued to implement total war policy which increasingly became accepted on both sides of the

conflict as the years progressed. As the Germans both studied British total war policy and used

these actions in their own defense years later, it remains undeniable that British strategy during

the Second Boer War both developed and normalized of total war tactics implemented during

World War One and later in the 20th century.

Conclusion

The modern conception of concentration camps in many ways could not be more

different that their actual usage during the Second Boer War. The Nazi concentration camps,

more aptly named death camps, had been founded upon ideological hatred and a racial

supremacy that advocated the cleansing of undesirable groups in society. These camps became

part of the “Final Solution” in which the organized genocide of the Jewish population during

World War Two began, representing the ultimate supremacy of racist ideological thought over

rational military action. Concentration camps during the Second Boer War were the result of a

rational strategic military calculation that held military supremacy over any underlying

ideological racial hatred. The deaths in these camps were a byproduct of military policy and

coercion against combatants and not the goal of the British government, whereas genocide

constituted the ultimate aim of the Nazi establishment. Though the modern association with

concentration camps evokes Nazi genocidal action, concentration camps in the Second Boer War

had been formed under much different circumstances and instead advanced the principles of total

war used in World War One subsequent years.

The British actions during the Second Boer War advanced the principles of total war in

contrast to ideological discrimination and broke the psychological barriers constraining

Grichnik 30

acceptable warfare during this time. Though the Commonwealth did not pioneer the total war

tactics, they put to use during this conflict, the semi-permanent, large-scale organization of

internment camps for the indiscriminant incarceration of civilians regardless of race, gender, or

age. This action constituted an unprecedented application of this total war strategy. The lack of

official dehumanization that occurred and the general acceptance of placing a worthy foe within

these horrible conditions also set further precedent: a harsh total war military tactic was

unleashed on a normal population and made such as tactic acceptable for use against a great

number of potential adversaries. Since these events occurred within a large empire and a

controversy ensured that the international community knew of British total war policy, the

British use of farm burning and concentration camps advanced the principles of modern total war

by making it acceptable to target an entire civilian population regardless of race, gender, or age

for strategic military purposes; principles later used increasingly in the conflicts of the 20th

century.

Fig. E

A Concentration Camp

Grichnik 31

Fig. F

This is Lizze Van Zyl. She became a poster child for Emily Hobhouse’s human rights movement.

Fig. G

A burning farm, part of the British scorched earth campaign.

Bibliography

Grichnik 32

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Figures

Figure A: "Map of the Seat of War in South Africa." Gutenberg. N.p., n.d. Web. 6 Dec. 2010. <www.gutenberg.org/files/16337/16337-h/images/image03.jpg>.

Figure B : Commission, Great Britain. Concentration Camps. "Report on the concentration camps in ... - Google Books." Google P.164

Figure C: Stanley, Liz. Mourning becomes-- post/memory, commemoration and the concentration camps of the South African War. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008. P. 200

Figure D: Stanley, Liz. Mourning becomes-- post/memory, commemoration and the concentration camps of the South African War. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008. P. 207, 209

Figure E: "Boer War BoerWar.info." Boer War BoerWar.info. http://boerwar.info/ (accessed December 8, 2010).

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Figure F: "Boer War BoerWar.info." Boer War BoerWar.info. http://boerwar.info/ (accessed December 8, 2010).

Figure G: "Boer War BoerWar.info." Boer War BoerWar.info. http://boerwar.info/ (accessed December 8, 2010).