Egypt: 2018 Law on the Organisation of Press, Media and ... · resolution 5/1, Egypt,...

Egypt:2018LawontheOrganisationofPress,MediaandtheSupremeCouncilofMedia


ARTICLE19–FreeWordCentre,60FarringdonRd,LondonEC1R3GA–www.article19.org–+442073242500Page2of24

October2018ExecutivesummaryInOctober2018,ARTICLE19analysed the2018Lawon theOrganisationofPress,MediaandtheSupremeCouncilofMedia(theLaw)of theArabRepublicofEgypt for itscompliancewithinternationalfreedomofexpressionstandards.TheLawispartofacollectionofnewmediaandcybercrime measures which together serve to legalise the Egyptian government’s existingrestrictionsonfreedomofthemedia.ARTICLE19 finds theLaw tobeextremelyproblematic and fails to complywith internationalhumanrightsstandards.Inparticular,wehighlightthefollowingissues:• TheLawprovides sweeping powers to block journalistic and personalwebsites toa

body subordinated to the President. The Supreme Council of Media (Supreme Council),whichislargelyappointedbythePresident,istaskedwithregulatingmedia.Thisincludesthepowertoblockjournalisticwebpages,socialmediaaccounts,oranypersonalwebpagewithover5,000followersforawidevarietyofgroundsthatareimpermissiblegroundsforrestricting freedom of expression.We note that under international standards,measuressuch as mandatory blocking of access to websites are generally disproportionateinterferenceswiththerightoffreedomofexpressionandshouldonlybeorderedbyacourtor independent adjudicatory bodies. The Law provides no suchmechanism, allowing theSupremeCouncil toorderblockingofwebsitesatwill.Finally, there isnotransparencyorpublic listastothenatureofblockingordersorwhatsiteshavebeenblocked;the lackoftransparency effectively eliminates the ability of the public to challenge decisions in thecourts.

• TheLaw failsto distinguishbetweendifferent formsof regulation forbroadcastandprint and Internet-based media. We emphasise that self-regulation by the press andInternet-basedmediashouldalwaysbepreferredoverastate-establishedregulator.

• The Law creates numerous restrictions on journalists which are fundamentallyincompatiblewith international freedom of expression standards. These include onerousadministrative and licensing requirements for individuals to disseminate information inEgypt,especiallyviatheInternet,orevenforjournaliststoattendconferencesorinterviewcitizens.Italsoplacesstrictobligationsonjournaliststoadoptspecificregulatorypolicies,contracts, and todiscipline their employees.Weemphasise that licensingof journalists isneveranacceptablerestrictiononfreedomofexpressionunderinternationallaw.

• The Law introduces broad and ill-defined restrictions on content, censoring content

fromabroad, andpreventing journalists from reporting onmatters of public interest likepublic trials. This includes broad prohibitions on ‘pornography,’ ‘false news,’ and‘defamation,’aswellaspublishedcontentthatallowsfor‘activitieshostiletotheprinciplesofdemocracy’or ‘advocating indecency.’TheLawalsoallows theSupremeCouncil tobanpublications from abroad on grounds of ‘national security’; and also prohibits journalists



fromreportingoncertaininvestigationsandtrials,asdoingsowould“affectthepositionsofthoseinvolvedintheinvestigationortrial.”

ARTICLE19isgravelyconcernedthattheLawwillservetofurtherexpandthealreadyharshlyrestrictive actions taken by the Egyptian government against journalists, bloggers, anddissentingvoices.TheLawwaspassedinthecontextofhundredsofnewssitesandblogsbeingblockedinrecentmonthsinEgypt,andaroundadozenindividualsbeingarrestedandchargedwithpublishingfalsenews,amongthemjournalistsorprominentgovernmentcritics.WebelievetheproblematicaspectsoftheLawneedtobeaddressedwithgraveurgencyinordertoguidepressfreedominEgypttoamorepositivedirection.WeurgethegovernmenttoreviewtheLawandbringalldomesticlegislationintofullcompliancewithinternationalhumanrightsstandards.Summaryofkeyrecommendations• Anymediarelatedlegislationshouldexplicitlyreferenceandsafeguardrightstoaccessand

publishinformation,inaccordancewithinternationalhumanrightsstandards;• Newcriminaloffenses,introducedinSectionVIoftheLawshouldbeabolished;• Websiteblockingpowersgranted to theSupremeCouncil -namely,Articles 3 and 4and

theblockingpowergrantedinArticle6para2-shouldbestrickenentirely;• The blocking powers in Article 19, which include vaguely-defined standards such as

defamationor‘falsenews’,shouldbestricken;• Articles4,19,20and21shouldbestrickenintheirentiretyfortheadditionalreasonsthat

theyintroduceoverbroadandcontent-basedrestrictionsoncontent;• Anymedia related legislation shoulddistinguishbetweenprint and Internet-basedmedia

on the one hand, and broadcast media on the other, with regulation only specified inrelation to broadcastmedia. The Supreme Council’s role asmedia regulator should notcoverthepressandtheInternet-basedmedia;

• To the extent that the SupremeCouncil is retained, it shouldbe to fully independent andprotected against any interference, in particular, by political forces or economic interest.The membership of the Board should ensure, at a minimum, an equal representation ofmembers of the media profession, media owners, and the public. The Law should beamendedtoguaranteecompleteindependenceoftheSupremeCouncilfromthePresident,specifically by removing the ability of the President to appoint several members of theboardincludingtheChair,NTRArepresentative,andpublicpersonalityinArticle73;

• ThelimitationoftherighttoestablishencryptedplatformsinArticle72shouldbestricken;• Insteadofhavingstatutorysystemsfordealingwithcontentimposedonthem,theEgyptian

mediashouldbegivenanopportunitytodevelopaself-regulatorycomplaintssystemthatcanalsoprovidespecificcodesofethics.Specifically, thebroadrestrictionson journalisticconduct in Article 17 should be stricken, the requirements ofmedia outlets to disciplinetheiremployeesinArticle18shouldalsobestricken;

• ThemandatorydutytoissuecorrectionsuponanyrequestinArticle22shouldbelimited.Specifically, the duty to issue corrections should be protected by self-regulatorymechanisms,andonlybeavailable torespondtostatementswhichbreacha legal rightofthepersoninvolved.



• ThelimitationoftherighttoestablishencryptedplatformsinArticle72shouldbestricken;• Articles 5, 6, 12, 35, 40, 41, 59, 95, and 106 should be stricken entirely as licensing

requirementsfor journalistsarenever justifiedunder international freedomofexpressionstandards.



TableofContents

Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................6

Internationalhumanrightsstandards...................................................................................................7

Theprotectionoffreedomofexpressionunderinternationallaw...........................................................7

Limitationsontherighttofreedomofexpression...........................................................................................7

Mediaregulation.............................................................................................................................................................8

Onlinecontentregulation........................................................................................................................................10

Websiteblockingandfiltering...............................................................................................................................11

ConstitutionofEgypt..................................................................................................................................................13

AnalysisoftheLaw......................................................................................................................................13

Generalobservations.................................................................................................................................................13

Serviceinterruptionsandsuspensionswithoutpriorjudicialauthorizationorexceptionalcircumstances................................................................................................................................................................15

Contentrestrictionsandcensorship...................................................................................................................16

TheSupremeCouncilandregulationofthemedia.......................................................................................18

Failuretodistinguishbetweendifferenttypesofthemedia...............................................................18

LackofindependenceoftheSupremeCouncil...........................................................................................19

Interferenceinthemediaindependence......................................................................................................19

Licensingofjournalists.............................................................................................................................................21

AboutARTICLE19........................................................................................................................................24



IntroductionInOctober2018,ARTICLE19analysed the2018Lawon theOrganisationofPress,MediaandtheSupremeCouncilofMedia(theLaw)of theArabRepublicofEgypt for itscompliancewithinternational freedom of expression standards. ARTICLE 19 is closelymonitoring the state offreedomofexpressioninEgyptwithdeepconcernandhasactivelyparticipatedininternationalprocedures surrounding Egypt’s compliancewith international standards, including providingcommentsinEgypt’s2014UniversalPeriodicReview.1ARTICLE 19 notes that the current government in Egypt has severely limited freedoms ofexpression, association, and protest, and has implemented severe restrictions on dissentincluding through prosecution of dissenters and blocking of websites of media outlets andhumanrightsorganisations.2Atthe39thSessionoftheHumanRightsCouncilinSeptember2018,ARTICLE 19 called for the Human Rights Council to condemn recent actions of the Egyptiangovernmentinhandingdeathsentencesandtermsoflifeimprisonmenttodozensofprotesterswhoattendedassembliesin2013.3TheLawwaspassedinthecontextofhundredsofnewssitesand blogs being blocked in recent months in Egypt, and around a dozen individuals beingarrested and charged with publishing false news, among them journalists or prominentgovernment critics.4It has already been sharply criticised by journalists and legal groups forcontainingnumerousprovisionsthreateningbasicpressfreedoms.5Inthisanalysis,ARTICLE19highlights itsconcernsandconflictsoftheLawwithinternationalhuman rights standards;wealso actively seek tooffer constructive recommendationsonhowtheLawcanbeamended.WeexplainthewaysinwhichproblematicprovisionsintheLawcanbemadecompatiblewithinternationalstandardsonfreedomofexpressionandprivacyandsetoutkeyrecommendations.ARTICLE 19 urges the Egyptian government and the Parliament to address the shortcomingsidentifiedinthisanalysistoensurethecompatibilityoftheLawwithinternationalstandardsoffreedomofexpression.Westandreadytoprovidefurtherassistanceinthisprocess.

1HumanRightsCouncilWorkingGroupontheUniversalPeriodicReview,SummarypreparedbytheOfficeoftheHighCommissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with paragraph 15(c) of the annex to Human Rights Councilresolution5/1,Egypt,A/HRC/WG.6/7/EGY/3,25November2009.2ARTICLE19,informationonEgypt.3ARTICLE19,HRC39:Oralstatementoncountries’violationstohumanrights,18September2018.4Egypttargetssocialmediawithnewlaw,Reuters,17July2018.5MostafaMohieandRaniaal-Abd,StateCouncil, JournalistsSyndicatecondemn ‘unconstitutional’mediabill,Mada,12July2018.JournalistandformerSyndicateofJournalistschairmanYehiaQalashsaidthatthelawamountedtoan“assassinationof the journalismprofession;” seeAnassassinationof journalism’:Egyptpasses controversialmedialaws,MiddleEastEye,17July2018.



InternationalhumanrightsstandardsARTICLE 19’s comments on the Law are informed by international human rights law andstandards. The Law should also comply with the guarantees of freedom of expression in theEgyptianConstitution.TheprotectionoffreedomofexpressionunderinternationallawThe right to freedom of expression is protected by a number of international human rightsinstruments,inparticularArticle19oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights (UDHR)6andArticle19oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)7aswellasin Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.8Additional guarantees tofreedom of expression are provided in the 2002 Declaration of Principles on Freedom ofExpressioninAfrica(AfricanDeclaration).9Importantly, General Comment No 3410explicitly recognises that Article 19 of the ICCPRprotects all forms of expression and themeans of their dissemination, including all forms ofelectronicandInternet-basedmodesofexpression.11StatepartiestotheICCPRarealsorequiredtoconsider theextent towhichdevelopments in information technology, suchas Internetandmobile-based electronic information dissemination systems, have dramatically changedcommunication practices around the world.12The legal framework regulating mass mediashouldtakeintoaccountthedifferencesbetweentheprintandbroadcastmediaandtheInternet,whilealsonotingthewaysinwhichmediaconverge.13Similarly,thefourspecialmandatesfortheprotectionoffreedomofexpressionhavehighlightedintheirJointDeclarationonFreedomofExpressionandtheInternetofJune2011thatthedevelopmentof tailoredapproaches for responding to illegal contentonlineareunnecessary.1TheyalsopointoutthatspecificrestrictionsformaterialdisseminatedovertheInternetarealsonotrequired.14LimitationsontherighttofreedomofexpressionUnderinternationalstandards,restrictionsontherighttofreedomofexpressionmustmeetthe

6UNGeneralAssemblyResolution217A(III),adopted10December1948.7GAResolution2200A(XXI),21UNGAORSupp.(No.16)at52,UNDoc.8CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5I.L.M.58(1982).9Adoptedatthe32ndSessionoftheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples'Rights,17-23October2002,ArticleII.10HumanRightsCommittee(HRCommittee),CCPR/C/GC/3,adoptedon12September2011.11Ibid,para12.12Ibid,para17.13Ibid,para39.14JointDeclarationonFreedomofExpressionandtheInternet,June2011.



conditionsofsocalled“three-parttest”whichmandatesthatrestrictionsmustbe:• Providedforbylaw;anylaworregulationmustbeformulatedwithsufficientprecisionto

enableindividualstoregulatetheirconductaccordingly;

• Inpursuitofalegitimateaim,listedexhaustivelyas:respectoftherightsorreputationsofothers;ortheprotectionofnationalsecurityorofpublicorder(ordrepublic),orofpublichealthormorals;

• Necessaryandproportionate inademocratic society, i.e. ifa lessintrusivemeasureiscapable of achieving the same purpose as a more restrictive one, the least restrictivemeasuremustbeapplied.15

The same principles apply to electronic forms of communication or expression disseminatedovertheInternet.16Additionally, Article 20(2) ICCPR provides that any advocacy of national, racial or religioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolencemustbeprohibitedbylaw. At the same time, inciting violence is more than just expressing views that peopledisapproveoforfindoffensive.17Attheinternationallevel,theUNhasdevelopedtheRabatPlanofActionwhichprovidestheclosestdefinitionofwhatconstitutesincitementlawunderArticle20(2)ICCPR.18MediaregulationTheguaranteeoffreedomofexpressionapplieswithparticularforcetothemedia.Internationalhumanrightsbodieshaverepeatedlyemphasisedthe“pre-eminentroleof thepress inaStategovernedbytheruleoflaw”19andtheessentialroleofthepressinademocraticsociety.20Regulationofthemediapresentsparticularproblems.Ontheonehand,therighttofreedomofexpression requires that the government refrain from interference, while on the other hand,Article2oftheICCPRplacesanobligationonstatesto“adoptsuchlegislativeorothermeasuresasmaybenecessary togiveeffect to the rights recognisedby theCovenant.”Thismeans thatstates are required also to take positive steps to ensure that rights, including the right tofreedomofexpression,arerespected.

15HRCommittee,Velichkinv.Belarus,CommunicationNo.1022/2001,UNDoc.CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001(2005).16GeneralComment34,op.cit.,para43.17C.f.theEuropeanCourtforHumanRights(theEuropeanCourt),HandysidevtheUK,6July1976,para56.18SeeUNRabatPlanofAction(2012).Inparticular,itclarifiesthatregardshouldbehadtosixparttestinassessingwhetherspeechshouldbecriminalisedbystatesasincitement.19See,e.g.theEuropeanCourt,ThorgeirsonvsIceland,25June1992,para63orCastellsvsSpain,24April1992,para43.20EuropeanCourt,DichandandothersvsAustria,26February2002,para40.



In order to protect the right to freedom of expression, it is imperative that the media bepermitted to operate independently of government control. This ensures the media’s role aspublicwatchdogandthatthepublichasaccesstoawiderangeofopinions,especiallyonmattersofpublicinterest.Thishasimportantimplicationsforregulatorymodelsofthemedia:• Self-regulation is the preferred model of regulation for print and Internet-based media,

whichmeansthatitshouldbelefttotheindustrytodevelopandholditselfaccountableforethicalmediastandards.ThisisoftenachievedthroughtheestablishmentofPressCouncilsthatare independent fromtheState,andopen toallprintmedia to joinasmembers.Themandates of Press Councils vary, but they are generally tasked with formulatingprofessional and ethical standards, and with receiving complaints regarding compliancewiththosestandards.

• Theregulationofbroadcastmedia,i.e.radioandtelevision,shouldbeestablishedseparately.Thisisbecausethebroadcastingspectrumisalimitedpublicresource,andthestatehasanimportant, albeit limited, role to play in ensuring that the spectrum is used in the publicinterest for diverse and plural programming. Ensuring diverse and plural broadcastprogramming while safeguarding media independence is a complex task. It requires thestate toestablishan independent, transparentandaccountable regulatorybody toensurebroadcast frequencies are allocated fairly, according to a transparent broadcast policydesigned tomaximisemediapluralismanddiversity.Unlike theprintand Internetmedia,thisbodyisnotself-regulatorybutisindependentfromtheindustry,aswellasthestateandpoliticalparties.

Thespecialmandateson theright to freedomofexpression,appointedbymechanismswithintheUN,theOSCE,andtheOAS,havewarnedoftheriskofinterferenceintheworkofregulatorybodiesandemphasisedthecrucialimportanceoftheirindependence.21Declarationsonfreedomofexpression fromintergovernmentalregionalbodies inotherpartsof theworld, including inAfrica,havestatedexplicitlythat“effectiveself-regulationisthebestsystemforpromotinghighstandardsinthemedia.”22Itisacceptedthat,asageneralrule:

All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory powers over themedia should beprotectedagainstinterference,particularlyofapoliticaloreconomicnature,includingbyanappointmentsprocessformemberswhichistransparent,allowsforpublicinputandisnotcontrolledbyanyparticularpoliticalparty.23

As for the broadcast media, the need for protection of regulatory bodies against political orcommercialinterferencewasspecificallyemphasisedinthe2003JointDeclarationoffreedomofexpressionmandates,whoconsidered:

21The2003JointDeclaration,theUNSpecialRapporteuronFreedomofExpression,theOASSpecialRapporteuronFreedomofExpressionandtheOSCESpecialRepresentativeonFreedomoftheMedia,18December2003.228DeclarationofPrinciplesonFreedomofExpressioninAfrica,adoptedbytheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples’Rights,Banjul,October2002,PrincipleIX.23TheUNSpecialRapporteuronFreedomofOpinionandExpression, theOSCERepresentativeonFreedomof theMedia and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration on regulation of the media,restrictionsonjournalistsandinvestigatingcorruption,18December2013.



All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory powers over the media should beprotectedagainstinterference,particularlyofapoliticaloreconomicnature,includingbyanappointmentsprocessformemberswhichistransparent,allowsforpublicinputandisnotcontrolledbyanyparticularpoliticalparty.24

Guaranteeingtheindependenceofaregulatorinpracticeinvolvesvariousaspects.Forinstance,the Access to the Airwaves: Principles on Freedom of Expression and BroadcastRegulation25highlightthat:

[The] institutional autonomy and independence of broadcast and/or telecommunications[regulatorybodies] shouldbe guaranteed andprotectedby law, including in the followingways:• specifically and explicitly in the legislationwhich establishes the body and, if possible,

alsointheconstitution;• byaclearlegislativestatementofoverallbroadcastpolicy,aswellasofthepowersand

responsibilitiesoftheregulatorybody;• throughtherulesrelatingtomembership;• byformalaccountabilitytothepublicthroughamulti-partybody;• andinfundingarrangements.

Fromacomparativeperspective,itisworthmentioningthestandardsdevelopedbytheCouncilof Europe on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcastingsector.26Although these are not binding on Egypt, we believe that the standard setting byregional human rights bodies, as well as non-binding standard-setting documents, such asauthoritative international declarations and statements, illustrate the manner in whichinternational and constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression have been interpretedglobally. As such, they are authoritative evidence of generally accepted understandings of thescope and nature of all international guarantees of freedom of expression. They also providestrongguidanceregardingtheinterpretationoftheguaranteesoffreedomofexpressionfoundintheEgyptianConstitution.OnlinecontentregulationInaddition to theaboveoutlinedstandards, theUNSpecialRapporteuron thepromotionandprotectionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression(SpecialRapporteuronFOE)inhisSeptember 2011 report, clarified the scope of legitimate restrictions on different types of

24The2003JointDeclarationofspecialrapporteurs,op.cit.25ARTICLE19,AccesstotheAirwavesPrinciplesonFreedomofExpressionandBroadcastRegulation,March2002.26 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2000) 23 of the Committee of Ministers to thememberstatesontheindependenceandfunctionsofregulatoryauthoritiesforthebroadcastingsector,adoptedbytheCommitteeofMinisterson20December2000,atthe735th;ExplanatoryMemorandumtoRecommendation(2000)23oftheCommitteeofMinisterstomemberstatesontheindependenceandfunctionsofregulatoryauthoritiesforthe broadcasting sector; and Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions ofregulatoryauthorities for thebroadcastingsector,adoptedbytheCommitteeofMinisterson26March2008at the1022ndmeetingoftheMinisters’deputies.



expressiononline.27Heidentifiedthreedifferenttypesofexpressionforthepurposesofonlineregulation:• Expression that constitutes an offence under international law and can be prosecuted

criminally.28 He further made clear that even legislation criminalising these types ofexpression must be sufficiently precise, and there must be adequate and effectivesafeguardsagainstabuseormisuse,includingoversightandreviewbyanindependentandimpartialtribunalorregulatorybody;29

• Expressionthatisnotcriminallypunishablebutmayjustifyarestrictionandacivilsuit;and

• Expressionthatdoesnotgiverisetocriminalorcivilsanctions,butstillraisesconcernsintermsoftolerance,civilityandrespectforothers.30

Inhis2016reportonfreedomofexpressionintheprivatesector,theSpecialRapporteuronFOEreiterated the need in the communication technology context for any demands, requests, orsimilar measures related to the take down of content or accessing customer information tosatisfythethree-parttestunderICCPRArticle19(3).31Heemphasisedthatstatesshouldsetoutto transparently implement regulationsandpolicies.Healsoobserved that service shutdownsarea“particularlyperniciousmeansofenforcingcontentregulations.”32WebsiteblockingandfilteringFour special mandates on freedom of expression called blocking “an extreme measure –analogous tobanninganewspaperorbroadcaster–whichcanonlybe justified inaccordancewith international standards, for examplewhere necessary to protect children against sexualabuse.”33Additionally,inhisreportof16May2011,theUNSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofexpressionsummarisedthekeyconcernsasfollows:

States’useofblockingorfilteringtechnologiesisfrequentlyinviolationoftheirobligationtoguarantee the right to freedom of expression... Firstly, the specific conditions that justifyblockingarenotestablishedinlaw,orareprovidedbylawbutinanoverlybroadandvaguemanner,whichriskscontentbeingblockedarbitrarilyandexcessively.Secondly,blockingisnot justified to pursue aims which are listed under [Article 19 para 3 of the ICCPR], and

27ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronFOE,A/66/290,10August2011,para18.28Ibid.,inparticular,theSpecialRapporteuronFOEclarifiedthattheonlyexceptionaltypesofexpressionthatStatesare required to prohibit under international law are child pornography, direct and public incitement to commitgenocide,hatespeechandincitementtoterrorism.29Ibid,para22.30Ibid.31ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronFOE,A/HRC/32/38,11May2016,para85.32Ibid.,para48.33 JointDeclarationonFreedomofExpressionandtheInternet,op.cit.



blockinglistsaregenerallykeptsecret,whichmakesitdifficulttoassesswhetheraccesstocontent is being restricted for a legitimate purpose. Thirdly, even where justification isprovided, blocking measures constitute an unnecessary or disproportionate means toachieve the purported aim, as they are often not sufficiently targeted and render a widerangeofcontent inaccessiblebeyondthatwhichhasbeendeemedillegal.Lastly,content isfrequently blocked without the intervention of or possibility for review by a judicial orindependentbody.…

[S]tates that currently block websites [should] provide lists of blocked websites and fulldetails regarding the necessity and justification for blocking each individual website. Anexplanation should also be provided on the affected websites as to why they have beenblocked. Any determination onwhat content should be blockedmust be undertaken by acompetentjudicialauthorityorabodywhichisindependentofanypolitical,commercial,orotherunwarrantedinfluences.34

Similarly, theOSCE concluded in the 2011 report on Freedomof Expression and the Internetthat:

Blocking measures are not always provided by law nor are they always subject to dueprocessprinciples.Furthermore,blockingdecisionsarenotnecessarilytakenbythecourtsof lawandoftenadministrativebodiesorInternethotlinesrunbytheprivatesectorsinglehandedly decide which content, website or platform should be blocked. Blocking policiesoften lack transparency and administrative bodies (including hotlines) lack accountability.Appeal procedures are either not in place or where they are in place, they are often notefficient.Therefore,increasingly,thecompatibilityofblockingwiththefundamentalrightoffreedomofexpressionmustbequestioned.

ARTICLE 19’s policy brief on blocking and filtering summarises the relevant internationalstandards, demonstrating that blocking can only ever be compatible with internationalstandards on freedom of expression where it has been provided by law and a court hasdeterminedthatablockingmeasureisnecessaryinordertoprotecttherightsofothers.35Thebrieffurtherstipulatesthat:• Anydeterminationonwhatcontentshouldbeblockedmustbeundertakenbyacompetent

judicial authority or body which is independent of any political, commercial, or otherunwarrantedinfluences;

• BlockingordersmustbestrictlylimitedinscopeinlinewiththerequirementsofnecessityandproportionalityunderArticle19(3)ICCPR;

• Listsofblockedwebsitestogetherwithfulldetailsregardingthenecessityandjustificationforblockingeachindividualwebsiteshouldbepublished;

34TheSpecialRapporteuronFOE,A/HRC/17/27,16May2011.35 ARTICLE19,FreedomofExpressionUnfiltered:Howblockingandfilteringaffectfreespeech,2016.



• Anexplanationastowhyapagehasbeenblockedshouldalsobeprovidedonapagethatissubstitutedfortheaffectedwebsites;and

• Itshouldbepossibletochallengeblockingandfilteringordersbeforeanindependentandimpartialtribunalandseekclarificationandremedies.36

ConstitutionofEgyptFinally,the2014ConstitutionoftheRepublicofEgyptguaranteesfundamentalrightsinseveralprovisions. Article 65 guarantees that “All individuals have the right to express their opinionthroughspeech,writing,imagery,oranyothermeansofexpressionandpublication.”Article70guaranteesfreedomofthepress;specifically:

Freedom of press and printing, along with paper, visual, audio and digital distribution isguaranteed.Egyptians—whethernaturalorlegalpersons,publicorprivate—havetherighttoownandissuenewspapersandestablishvisual,audioanddigitalmediaoutlets.

Finally,Article71guaranteesfreedomofpublication,andholdsthat“Itisprohibitedtocensor,confiscate,suspendorshutdownEgyptiannewspapersandmediaoutletsinanyway.Exceptionmaybemadeforlimitedcensorshipintimeofwarorgeneralmobilization.”

AnalysisoftheLawGeneralobservationsAttheoutset,ARTICLE19highlightsthatdemocraciesdonothaveaspecificlawonregulationofthe press. These are viewed as ordinary commercial activities that should not be regulatedseparately; the procedure to establish them is the same as for any comparable business. Thisdoesnotmeanthattherearenorestrictionsatallonwhatthepresscanpublish.Forexample,prohibitions on content that incites to violence or discrimination, sexually exploitsminors orinfringesa trademarkcanbe found invirtuallyeverycountry.But indemocracies, these rulesareusuallyfoundinlawsofgeneralapplication,ratherthaninspecificpresslegislation.Hence,althoughtheadoptionoftheLawisnotinherentlyproblematic,legislationofthiskinddoesraisethe questionwhether its purpose and effect is to strengthen freedom of expression - such asdefining rightsof journalistsorpromotingdiversityandpluralismof themedia–or rather tocreateadditionalmechanismstocontrolthepress,overandabovethegenerallawsapplicabletoanyindividualorbusiness.Generally, ARTICLE 19 notes that, frequently, press laws are vehicles by which governmentsattempttoover-regulateandcontrol–improperlyandimpermissiblyfromthepointofviewof

36Ibid.,p.13-14.



the international lawof freedomof expression –whatnewspapers andotherperiodicalsmaysay, andwhomaypractice journalism. Such improper controlsmay take such forms as broadand vague content restrictions directly applied to the press; registration requirements onnewspapers and accreditation requirements on journalists, both of which may be open toserious abuse; and obligatory codes of conduct for journalists which potentially turn“independent” journalistassociationsintoarmsofgovernment.Atthesametime,agoodpresslawcan,insteadofregulatingandconstrainingthepress,worktoensuregenuinepressfreedom.A goodpress law should, for instance, prohibitprior censorship, protect the confidentialityofsources,protecttheindependenceofjournalists’associationsandensureaccessforthepresstotheworkingsofgovernmentandtothejudicialprocess.Itshouldnotcontainanypressspecificcontentrestrictions,althoughitmightprovidefortherightsofcorrectionandreply.ARTICLE19notesthattheLawdoesnotmeetthesecriteria.Instead,asfurtheranalysisshows,it contains numerous provisions that violate international freedom of expression standards.Additionally,ARTICLE19observesthefollowingkeyproblems:• The Law establishes a number of criminal penalties: Section VI establishes numerous

criminal offenses and penalties,many ofwhich concern administrative violations outsidethe scope of this analysis. However, we note that a media regulation measure is not anappropriatemethod for introducingcriminalsanctions,andanycriminalsanctionsshouldbeaddressedinamendmentstothecriminalcodeorseparatelegislation.Atthesametime,we reiterate that any restrictions on freedom of expression – including in criminal law -should meet the three-part test of restrictions under the international freedom ofexpressionsstandards;

• The Law lacks procedural safeguards for human rights protections: There are fewreferences tohumanrightsprotection -guaranteeof freedomof thepressandpublishing(Article2),therightofjournaliststopublishinformation(Article9),andtherighttoobtaininformation(Article10).However,theLawalsoexplicitlylimitstheserightssolongasthe“lawdoesnotprohibit” their realisation, andonother grounds such as “national securityand defence of the homeland.” While observing that these stipulations undermine theguaranteesoftheLaw,wealsonotethattheLawcouldgofurtherinexplicitlyreferencingEgypt’sobligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslawtoprotecttherighttofreedomofexpression.

Recommendations:• IftheLawistoberetained,itshouldexplicitlyreferenceandsafeguardrightstoaccessand

publishinformation,inaccordancewithinternationalhumanrightsstandards;• The Law should remove all new criminal offenses introduced in Section VI; criminal

penaltiesaremoreappropriatelyaddressedinseparatelegislation,notamediaregulationlaw;however,anyrestrictionsonfreedomofexpressionshouldstrictlymeetthethree-parttestundertheinternationalhumanrightsstandards.



Service interruptions and suspensions without prior judicial authorization orexceptionalcircumstancesARTICLE19 is very concerned that the Law creates broad powers to interrupt or shut downwebsitesandcensormediawithoutpriorjudicialauthorisationorexceptionalcause.NumerousarticlesintheLawprovidetheSupremeCouncilwithbroadpowerstoblockcontentbasedonsweepingandvaguestandards.Inparticular:• Article3,whileclaimingthatitis“prohibitedinanywaytocensor”newspapersormedia

outletsundertheLaw,continuestodojustthat—provideforcensorship“intimeofwarorgeneralmobilization.”TheSupremeCouncilinthosecasesareempoweredtoseizecopiesofnewspapersor“deleteorblockthecontent”inthecaseofdigitalcontent;

• Article 4 allows the SupremeCouncil “for reasons of national security” to “prevent fromenteringEgypt”anynewspapersormediafromabroad.Article4alsoempowerstheCounciltoprohibitcirculationofpornographiccontentandothercontentonbroadgrounds;

• Article6providestheabilitytoblockanywebsitethathasnotappliedforandobtainedalicensepriortopublication;

• Article 19 allows any “site, blog or personal account” to be blocked on a wide range ofgrounds, includingdefamation, ‘falsenews,’orothervaguely-definedterms(seebelowformoredetailsonthecontent-basedrestrictionsintheLaw);

• Article 106 orders courts to “block” any site that “is in violation of the nature of thelicensedactivity.”

ARTICLE19makesthefollowingkeyobservationsontheseprovisions:• The blocking orders can be issued based on provisions that are extremely vague and

overbroadand incompatiblewith freedomofexpressionstandards. Inparticular,wenotethatlawsrestrictingfreedomofexpressiontoprotectpublicorderandnationalsecurityarelegitimate only if carefully tailored to prevent abuse. Such restrictions should beunambiguouslywordedandnarrowinscope.Theyshouldbeengagedonlyinthecontextofa clear and close nexus between the expression in question and the national security orpublicorderrisk.

• Underinternationalstandards,measuressuchasmandatoryblockingofaccesstowebsites,

IPaddresses,ports,networkprotocolsortypesofusesshouldonlybeorderedbyacourtoflaw.WenotethatthecensorshipprovisionsoftheLawdonotrequireacourtorder.Thereis also no transparency as to when and how blocking occurs, or any requirements forpublicationofalistofentitiesthatareblocked,henceremovinganynoticeforthepublictobeabletochallengeblockingdecisions.Failuretoobtainalicenseisnotavalidrestrictiononfreedomofexpressionunderinternationallaw



In times of genuine emergency, there may be legitimate grounds for authorities to adoptexceptional measures, such as requiring broadcasters to carry emergency announcements.However,theprovisions,asdrafted,donotdealwithsuchpermissibleandexceptionalmeasures.Recommendations:• WebsiteblockingpowersgrantedtotheSupremeCouncilshouldbestrickenentirely; this

meansthatArticles3,4,19and106shouldbestrickenentirely.

ContentrestrictionsandcensorshipAs alreadynoted above,ARTICLE19 is concerned that theLaw creates several content-basedoffensesthatarevagueandoverbroad.Theseinclude:• Article 4 which prohibits interalia any content “which contradicts the provisions of the

Constitution, calls for violation of the law, violates the obligations of the Code ofProfessionalEthics[and]violatespublicorderandmorals.”It furtherprohibitscirculationof content fromoutsideof thecountrywhich is “pornographic”or “addresses religionsorreligiousdoctrinesthatareliabletodisturbgeneralpeace”;

• Article 19prohibitsnewspapersorwebsites frompublishing “falsenews”orengaging in“defamationofthereputationandhonourofindividuals”orto“disregarddivinereligionsorreligious beliefs.” The provisions apply broadly to “every personal website, blog orelectronicaccountwith5,000ormorefollowers;”

• Article20prohibits journalistsfromexposing“theprivatelifeofcitizens,publicservants,publicprosecutorsorpublicservantsexceptinmattersthatarerelevanttotheirworkandthattheexposureisaimedatthepublicinterest;”

• Article21prohibitsjournalistsormediafrom“addressingongoinginvestigationsortrialsin such a way as to affect the positions of those involved in the investigation or trial.”Furthermore, newspapers and websites are “prohibited from publishing on any of theabove.”

ARTICLE 19 notes that these provisions do not meet international freedom of expressionstandardsastheyarevagueandoverbroadanddonotmeetarequirementofrestrictionbeing“providedbylaw”astheydonothavethequalitiesoflegalcertaintyoraccessibility.Additionally,theydonotfollowlegitimateaimsasperArticle19para3oftheICCPR.Inparticular:

• The phrases “contradicts the provisions of the Constitution” and “religious doctrines that

areliabletodisturbpeace”arenotdefined.Inanycase,wenotethattherighttofreedomofexpressionhas longbeen interpretedasbeingapplicablenotonly to informationor ideas



thatare favourably receivedor regardedas inoffensiveorasamatterof indifference,butalsotothosethat“offend,shockordisturb.”37Importantly,theICCPRdoesnotsupportthenotion that religionsorbeliefs as such canbe the subjectof adefamatoryattack.TheHRCommitteehasneverrecognisedsuchanotioneitherorheld thatdefamationof religionscould be a legitimate ground for restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression. Itprotectsonlytherightsofindividualpersonsand,insomeinstances,ofgroupsofpersons,butnotreligiousdoctrines,beliefsorideas.

• Asfortherestrictionsofcontentonthebasisofpornography,ARTICLE19notesthatoneof themost controversial issues ishow tobalance theneed toprotect societyagainst thepotential harm thatmay flow from pornography and obscenematerials, and the need toensure respect for freedomof expression and to preserve a free flow of information andideas.ARTICLE19recommendsthatanyrestrictionsonfreedomofexpressionshouldavoidusing vague and subjective terms, such as ‘pornographic’, without providing furtherclarification.Definitionsshouldprovideasmuchclarityaspossiblebyelaborating,inmoredetail,exactlywhat isprohibited.Wealsonotethat lawsmayonlyrestrictmaterialwhichcan be shown to be harmful. Merely offensive material should not be prohibited. Inparticular,expressivedepictionsoflegalactsshouldnormallynotbeprohibited.Inaddition,restrictionsonsimplepossessionmaybeimposedonlywherethiscanbeshowntomakeapractical contribution toa legitimategoal.Theprovisionsof theLawdonotprovidesuchspecificdetailsanddonotmeetthetestofrestrictions.

• We also note that the falsity of information is not a legitimate basis for restrictingexpression under international human rights law. International and regional freedom ofexpression mandates have stated that “general prohibitions on the dissemination ofinformationbasedonvagueandambiguous ideas, including ‘falsenews’or ‘non-objectiveinformation’, are incompatiblewith international standards for restrictionson freedomofexpression.”38The freedomofexpressionmandatesalsoreiterated, in thecontextof ‘falsenews,’ that blocking sites is an impermissible restriction on freedom of expression.Importantly,restrictionsonpublishing‘falsenews’havebeenruledbyconstitutionalcourtsaroundtheworldtobeincompatiblewiththerighttofreedomofexpression.39Theyfailtotake into account the daily pressure that journalists face to report news under constanttime-pressures, which will inevitably lead to mistakes being made, and are frequentlyabusedtostiflecriticalreporting.

• Individualspossessarighttoreceiveinformation,andthisincludesinformationaboutandaright to access judicialproceedingsandpublic trials.Thebroadly-conceivedprovisionsofArticle21thatprohibitreportingonongoinginvestigationsortrialsnecessarilydiscouragetheflowofinformationtothepublicaboutjudicialproceedings.40

37C.f.EuropeanCourt,HandysidevtheUK,op.cit.38JointDeclarationonFreedomofExpressionand“FakeNews”,DisinformationandPropaganda,March2017.39E.g.Rv.Zundel,[1992]2SCR731(SupremeCourtofCanada);ChavundukaandChotov.MinisterofHomeAffairs&AttorneyGeneral,22May2000,JudgementNo.S.C.36/2000(SupremeCourtofZimbabwe). 40Forinstance,Article10oftheUDHRguaranteeseveryoneaccesstoa“fairandopenedcourt.”TheICCPRinArticle14para1statesthat“everyoneshouldhavetherighttoafairandopen”legalprocess.TheEuropeanCourthasalso



• ARTICLE19notesthatanydefamationlegislationshouldmeetwithinternationalfreedomof expression standards.41The provisions on defamation (Article 19 of the Law) lacksnecessary safeguards such as intentionality requirements, consideration for statementsaboutpublic figures, or a varietyofdefences. It isnot clearhow these link todefamationprovisions in other legislation. This is concerning since defamation laws are inherentlyvulnerabletobeingexploitedwheretheyarelefttogovernmentauthoritiestoenforce.

• While individuals maintain a right of privacy and reputation, the right of privacy of

individualsactinginpublicpositionsmustbebalancedagainsttherightofthepublictobemade aware of activities about their government. A strict prohibition on reporting of theprivatelifeofpublicofficialsstrikesthisbalanceinamannerthatunderminesthepublic’srighttoknow.

Recommendations:• Articles4,19,20and21oftheLawshouldbestrickenintheirentirety,astheyintroduce

overbroadandcontent-basedrestrictionsoncontent.TheSupremeCouncilandregulationofthemediaTheLawprovides,inSectionV,sweepingpowerstotheSupremeCounciltoregulatethemedia,whichincludespowerstoblockaccesstoinformationandpreventindividualsfrompublishing,aswell asmove for criminal penalties against individuals.42ARTICLE 19makes the followingcommentsontheseprovisions:FailuretodistinguishbetweendifferenttypesofthemediaARTICLE19observesthatalltypesofmediaareplacedunderasingleregulatorysystemunderthe Supreme Council. The Council has a broad regulatory control which covers not onlybroadcastingmediabutalsoprintmediaandInternetmediaproviders.Asnotedearlier,underinternationalfreedomofexpressionstandards.We reiterate that allmedia are subject to laws of general application, and it is therefore notnecessarytodevelopspecificregulation forprintor Internet-basedmedia.43ExperienceshowsthatStateregulationofprintandInternet-basedmediaisinvariablyabusedbythestatetolimitexpressionthatitdisagreeswithordisapprovesof,andunderminestheabilityofthemediato

statedthatthe“publiccharacterofproceedingsbeforethejudicialbodies.protectslitigantsagainsttheadministrationofjusticeinsecretwithnopublicscrutiny;”Pretto&OthersvItaly,8December1983.41ARTICLE19,DefiningDefamation:PrinciplesonFreedomofExpressionandProtectionofReputation,2017.42TheconcernswiththeextentofpowersvestedintheSupremeCouncil,suchasitsblockingpowers,areaddressedinotherprovisionsofthisanalysis.43C.f.,the2011JointDeclaration,op.cit.



effectivelyshareinformationwiththepublic.Self-regulationisthepreferredmodelofregulationfor the print and Internet-basedmedia,whichmeans that it should be left to the industry todevelop andhold itself accountable for ethicalmedia standards. It is concerning that the Lawfailstotakethisimportantdistinctionintoaccount.The regulation of broadcast media should be established separately. The regulatory body,independentofthelegislature,shouldalsobetaskedwithcreatingacodeofconducttoguidetheethicalconductofbroadcastmedia.Enforcementofthecodeofconductshouldnotbepunitivebutshouldfocusonremediessuchasthebroadcastofrulingsbytheregulatorybody.ARTICLE19doesnotbelievetheSupremeCounciliswellsuitedtothisfunction,andthattheregulationofbroadcastingshouldbesetoutinaseparatelaw.LackofindependenceoftheSupremeCouncilWhilethelawclaimsthattheSupremeCouncil is“independent,”Article73explicitlymakesitscomposition subject to the President, who appoints the Chair of the Board who also has theabilitytobreakdrawsunderArticle78.SeveraloftheninemembersaresubsequentlychosenbythePresidentorbytheChair,includingtheNTRArepresentativeanda“publicpersonalitywithexpertise.”Moreover,thePresidenthasthepowertofillanyvacanciesbasedonparliamentarynomination, and the council cannot include members who have either been sentenced to amisdemeanouroranydisciplinarypenalty; councilmembers canbeexpelledunderArticle81for“committingadeedthatiscontrarytotheindependenceoftheCouncil.”As noted earlier, one vital requirement formedia regulatory bodies is its independence fromsourcesofpower,whetheritbefrombusinesspower,politicalpowerorpresspoweritself.TheLaw undermines this crucial principle by allowing for potential political interference in theappointment of its members. As the Law stands now, all the Council’s members would bepolitical appointees, pickedwithout parliamentary oversight. As such, the Councilwould verymuch be an extension of the government, rather than an independent regulator, and wouldprobablyuseitspowerstofavorpro-governmentmedia(oratleastbeconstantlysuspectedofdoing so). In order to bring the Law in line with international standards, the appointmentsprocessandcompositionoftheCouncilwouldneedtobealteredquitedrastically.Therewouldhavetobeanopennominationsprocess,andMemberswouldneedtobechosenbyParliamentthrough a procedure ensuring ameasure of cross-party support. Persons holding concurrentpositionsingovernmentormediashouldbeineligibletoserveontheCouncil.InterferenceinthemediaindependenceThe Law imposes unnecessary and stifling duties and obligations on journalists; severalprovisionsinChapter3requirejournaliststoadoptspecificrulesandpolicies,maintaininternaldiscipline,andprovidereaderswithamandatoryrightofresponse.Inparticular:• Article 17 requires journalists tobehave in amanner “thatdoesnot violate the rightsof

citizen[s]orinfringesontheirfreedoms;”

• Article18imposesmandatorydisciplineonjournalists,and



• Article22forcesmediaoutletsoranyelectronicsitetopublishcorrectionsuponrequest.ARTICLE 19 notes that in order to ensure that members of the media profession adhere toethicalstandards,ethicalcodesshouldalwaysbeelaboratedbymediaprofessionalsandmediaowners.Theyshouldultimatelybeadoptedbytheunionsorassociationsofjournalistsandtheowners/publishers themselves. On the other hand,many aspects of these codes are of directimportance to members of the public and constitute a key tool for building trust andaccountability.Withrespecttotherighttocorrectionandtherighttoreply,ARTICLE19pointsoutthatthesearebestprotectedthroughself-regulatorysystems,andshouldbedistinguishedasfollows:• Arightofcorrectionislimitedtopointingouterroneousinformationpublishedearlier,with

anobligationonthepublicationitselftocorrectthemistakenmaterial.

• Arightofreply,ontheotherhand,givesanypersontherighttohaveamassmediaoutletdisseminatehisorherresponsewherethepublicationofincorrectormisleadingfactshasinfringed a recognised right of that person andwhere a correction cannot reasonably beexpectedtoredressthewrong.44

Recommendations:• Anymedia related legislation shoulddistinguishbetweenprint and Internet-basedmedia

on the one hand, and broadcast media on the other, with regulation only specified inrelation to broadcast media. The Supreme Council’s role as media regulator should notcoverthepressandtheInternet-basedmedia;

• To the extent that the SupremeCouncil is retained, it shouldbe to fully independent andprotected against any interference, in particular, by political forces or economic interest.The membership of the Board should ensure, at a minimum, an equal representation ofmembers of the media profession, media owners, and the public. The Law should beamendedtoguaranteecompleteindependenceoftheSupremeCouncilfromthePresident,specifically by removing the ability of the President to appoint several members of theboardincludingtheChair,NTRArepresentative,andpublicpersonalityinArticle73;

• Insteadofhavingstatutorysystemsfordealingwithcontentimposedonthem,theEgyptianmediashouldbegivenanopportunitytodevelopaself-regulatorycomplaintssystemthatcanalsoprovidespecificcodesofethics.Specifically, thebroadrestrictionson journalisticconduct in Article 17 should be stricken, the requirements ofmedia outlets to disciplinetheiremployeesinArticle18shouldbestricken;

• ThemandatorydutytoissuecorrectionsuponanyrequestinArticle22shouldbelimited.Specifically, the duty to issue corrections should be protected by self-regulatorymechanisms,andonlybeavailable torespondtostatementswhichbreacha legal rightof

44SeePrinciple7,theCamdenPrinciplesonFreedomofExpressionandEquality,2009.



thepersoninvolved.RegulationofencryptionARTICLE19notesthattheprotectionofanonymityisavitalcomponentinprotectingtherightto freedom of expression aswell as other human rights, in particular, the right to privacy. Afundamental feature that enables anonymity online is encryption. Thus, restrictions onencryptionandanonymitymustmeetthethree-parttestoflimitationstotherighttofreedomofexpressionunderinternationallaw.InMay2015,theSpecialRapporteuronFOEpublishedhisreportonencryptionandanonymityinthedigitalage.45Thereporthighlightedthat:

Encryptionandanonymitymustbe stronglyprotectedandpromotedbecause theyprovide theprivacyandsecuritynecessaryforthemeaningfulexerciseoftherighttofreedomofexpressionandopinioninthedigitalage.46

However,Article72grantstherighttoestablish“encryptedplatforms”asan“exclusiverightoftheSupremeCouncil”andanyfurtherusagerequiringgovernmentapproval.Thisexclusiverightfailsthethree-parttestandisimpermissible.Recommendations:• ThelimitationoftherighttoestablishencryptedplatformsinArticle72shouldbestricken.LicensingofjournalistsVariousprovisionsoftheLawcreatestrictpre-requisitesandlicensingrequirementsforanyonewishingtopublishinformationinEgypt:• Article5preventsanylicenseforthecreationofanypress,media,orelectronicoutleton

grounds including “engaging in activities hostile to the principles of democracy, orundergroundactivity,oradvocatingindecency”orcallingforanyoftheaboveamongotherformsofconduct;

• Article 6 requires a license from the SupremeCouncil in order for anyone to establish awebsite in Egypt. The penalties for failing to obtain a license are severe and can include“blocking it in the absenceof a valid license.”Asnoted in this analysis,measures suchasmandatoryblockingofaccesstowebsites, IPaddresses,ports,networkprotocolsorothertypesofusesshouldonlybeorderedbyacourtoflaw.TheLaw,aswritten,onlyallowsfor

45ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthepromotionandprotectionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression,DavidKayeA/HRC/29/32,22May2015.46Ibid.,paras12,16and56.



anopportunityforjudicialreview,butitdoesnotrequireanyjudicialauthorisationfortheSupremeCounciltoissueblockingorders;

• Article 12 further contemplates that journalists andmedia professionalsmust possess apermitinordertoattendconferences,attendpublicmeetings,oreveninterviewindividualsinpublic.

• Article 35 imposes hefty financial requirements on establishing a paper or electronicnewspaper.47NewspapersmustalsomaintainacopyofaserverinsideEgypt;thisprohibitsnewspapersinEgyptfrombeinghostedabroad.

• Article 40 requires any person “wishing to issue a newspaper” or establish awebsite tonotifytheSupremeCouncilandprovideadescriptionofthetypeofcontent,editorialpolicy,sourcesoffunding,andotherdetailedinformation.UnderArticle41,itis“notpermittedtoissue a newspaper or establish a website before completing the notification data.”Furthermore,theeditor-in-chiefofanynewspaperorwebsitecannothaveacriminalrecord.

• Article59holdsthat“nomediaoutletorelectronicsitemaybeestablishedoroperated,oradvertised, before obtaining a license from the Supreme Council, which will specify thelicensingrequirements.”

• Article95allowstheSupremeCounciltorevokelicensesifalicensee“violatedoneof[theLaw’s]centralprovisions.”

• Article106allowstheSupremeCounciltopenaliseamediainstitutionwithafineofuptotwomillionpoundsfor“violationofthenatureofthelicensedactivity.”

These provisions create a framework under which any individual, whether a professionaljournalist or a blogger,must obtain prior approval from the government before publishing inprint or online. Such a framework is fundamentally incompatiblewith freedomof expression.We note that licensing of journalists is never justified under international law. In practice,licensingschemesforjournalistsarevirtuallyunheardofinestablisheddemocracies.Inpractice,thepowertodistributelicencescanbecomeapoliticaltool,usedtopreventcriticalor independent journalists from publishing. For this reason, and simply because the right toexpress oneself through themassmedia belongs to everyone irrespective of qualifications ormoral standing, licensing schemes formediaworkers are a breach of the right to freedom ofexpression.TheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightshasexplicitlyrecognisedthatlicensingofjournalists is a disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression.48Further, the threespecialmandatesforprotectingfreedomofexpression—theUNSpecialRapporteuronFreedom

47Specifically, six million pounds are required for a daily, twomillion for a weekly, onemillion for a monthly orregionaldaily,fourhundredthousandpoundsforaregionalweeklyandtwohundredthousandpoundsforaregionalweekly.Electronicnewspapersmustpossessonehundredthousandpounds.48CompulsoryMembership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, AdvisoryOpinionOC-5/85of13November1985,SeriesA.No.5.



of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OASSpecialRapporteuronFreedomofExpression—statedintheirJointDeclarationthat“Individualjournalistsshouldnotberequiredtobelicensedortoregister.”49Thespecialmandateswentontoexpress that “Imposingspecial registrationrequirementson theprintmedia isunnecessaryandmaybeabusedandshouldbeavoided.”50Recommendations:• ThelicensingrequirementsandaccompanyingpenaltiesintroducedinArticles5,6,12,35,

40, 41, 59, 95, and 106 should be stricken entirely as licensing requirements forjournalistsareneverjustifiedunderinternationalfreedomofexpressionstandards.

49 The Joint Declaration of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCERepresentativeonFreedomof theMediaand theOASSpecialRapporteuronFreedomofExpression,18December2003. 50Ibid.



AboutARTICLE19ARTICLE19advocatesforthedevelopmentofprogressivestandardsonfreedomofexpressionandfreedomofinformationattheinternationalandregionallevels,andtheirimplementationindomestic legal systems. The Law Programme has produced a number of standard-settingpublicationswhichoutlineinternationalandcomparativelawandbestpracticeinareassuchasdefamation law, freedom of expression and equality, access to information and broadcastregulation.On the basis of these publications and ARTICLE 19’s overall legal expertise, the organisationpublishes a number of legal analyses each year, comments on legislative proposals aswell asexisting laws that affect the right to freedom of expression. This analytical work, carried outsince1998asameansofsupportingpositivelawreformeffortsworldwide,frequentlyleadstosubstantial improvements inproposedorexistingdomestic legislation.All ofouranalysesareavailableathttps://www.article19.org/law-and-policy/.Ifyouwouldliketodiscussthisanalysisfurther,orifyouhaveamatteryouwouldliketobringto the attention of the ARTICLE 19 Law Programme, you can contact us by e-mail [email protected]. For more information about ARTICLE 19 in MENA region, contactSalouaGhazouaniOueslati,[email protected].

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