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Egypt under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post-Populist State

Author(s): Raymond A. HinnebuschSource: Social Problems, Vol. 28, No. 4, Development Processes and Problems (Apr., 1981), pp.442-464Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social ProblemsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/800057 .

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SOCIALPROBLEMS,Vol.28, No. 4, April1981EGYPTNDERADAT:ELITES,OWERTRUCTURE,NDPOLITICALHANGEINA POST-POPULISTTATE*

RAYMOND . HINNEBUSCHThe College of Saint Catherine

Inthis paperI examine the transformationsnthe Egyptian tate-specifically inthe politicalestablishment-as Egypt moves into a new stage of developmentcharacterizedby economic liberalizationnda westwardpoliticalrealignment. ex-amine persistence and change in the structureand distribution f power in theestablishment, nelite ideology,recruitment racticesand social composition,andinthe patternsand cleavages of intra-elitepolitics. Through his examinationItrytoassess the relativestrengthandeffect of forces pulling he political ystem towardpolitical iberalizationn the one hand,andtowardconservativeauthoritarianismnthe other. I conclude that the currentregimeremainsanauthoritarianne, butthatithas taken on an increasingly onservativeface and is characterizedbya greater,ifuninstitutionalized,luralismimited o elite levels. It is implicit n the analysisthatthe open door policy cannot be fully explained without reference to thesesociopolitical ransformations.

The Egyptian political system under Sadat is undergoing a fundamental transformation fromNasir's authoritarian nationalist-populist state to one distinctly different, a "post-populist"sociopolitical formation. This study will examine the nature of this transformation.The nature of the Nasir regime and its potentialities for change have inevitably shaped thedevelopment of the political system emerging under Sadat today. Nasir's regime resulted from a"breakthrough"of the emerging middle class into a political arena heretofore dominated by thetraditional upper classes- at a time when the lower classes were barely politically aware and in acountry still strugglingto throw off western imperialistcontrol. The "new elite" saw its main tasksas the creation of a modern, less dependent national state, socioeconomic modernization, and aredistribution of power and wealth from the upper to the middle and lower classes. Behind this"populist-nationalist"program, it mobilized a broad middle-lower-class support coalition. Realpolitical power, however, was concentrated in the hands of a charismatic leader and militarycadre who shaped and presided over a huge authoritarianbureaucraticstate, extended its controlthrough all sectors of society, and attempted to impose a revolution from above.This state proved, however, to have inherent structural weaknessess which made it vulnerableto pressuresfor transformation emanating from its changing environment- both from powerfulexternal forces, and from internal forces generated by the very socioeconomic changes it tried tocarry out. Both Infitah (the open door policy) and the westward political realignment accompa-nying it, are symptomatic of radical changes taking place in the Egyptian state as under SadatEgypt enters a new "post-populist" phase. But what precisely can we expect to happen to thestructureof the state and to politics in this new phase? Political development theories suggest twomodels useful in understandingthe complex processes by which rather different tendencies maybe simultaneously pulling the current transformation of the Egyptian political system in opposingdirections.

A model (proposed by liberal writers), which could be called "Pluralization and Absorption,"suggests one possible operative tendency. It holds that economic development and socialmobilization initiated by modernizing regimes lead to a growing expansion and proliferation ofsociopolitical forces. The middle class expands in size and complexity while the lower class is also* Ed. note: In the original typescript the analyses presented here were well documented with extensive cita-tions. The author graciously agreed to cut these to the minimum to save space. (D.C.)


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EgyptUnderSadat 443increasingly mobilized. These multiple concentrations of new social power, increasinglyresistantto state control, produce differentiated elites and counterelites who demand a greater share ofpower. Ultimately, the uninstitutionalized authoritarian state can no longer contain thesedemands; to avoid the costs of repression, it responds by loosening controls and with liberal in-stitutional arrangements for power sharing. Open to the free rise of elites through competitionfor mass support, the absorptive and representativecapacity of the political system expands andultimately all the various sociopolitical forces are incorporated into it as participants.1

Such an outcome is by no means inevitable, however, and another model (proposed by Marx-ists) suggests that liberalization may face powerful counterpressures. This model, one of "Conser-vatization and Exclusion," holds that in the post-populist phase, despite pressuresfor a diffusionof power, the authoritarian political structure can indeed persist-but its concentrated politicalpower is then used to resist social and political change rather than to propel it. This happensbecause after a time elites lose their ideological commitments to revolution from above, and theimpetus to collective change gives way to conservatization and privitization in elite circles. Such achange in orientation corresponds to a gradual social transformation of the elite from a previous-ly deprived "new middle class" in conflict with the traditional establishment into a newbourgeoisie of wealth and power defending the status quo from risingmass demands and advanc-ing its interests through reintegration into the world capitalist system. While the new bourgeoisiewould prefer a liberal to an authoriatarian state, it fears that a more open political system wouldpermit the political mobilization of egalitarian and anti-imperialist mass demands which couldthreaten its interests. Hence, the authoritarian state in the post-populist phase is maintained tocontain such demands -a change in orientation which representsa virtualsystem transformation.2Both models seem to have some explanatory power in the Egyptian case. On the one hand,modernization policies have indeed sparkedrising levels of social and political mobilization and aproliferation of social forces - especially a rapidly expanding middle class- which could push thesystem toward liberalization. On the other hand, forces which could lead to the maintenance ofthe authoritarian state, albeit in defense of a new conservative order, are also apparent. Growinginequality and a rate of social mobilization in excess of economic development are increasingclass contradictions. Conflicts over how to deal with the intense international pressureson Egyptsince 1967 have widened political cleavages. A desire by elites to contain these conflicts throughexclusion of counterelites from the political arena could well work against pressuresfor liberaliza-tion.

The changes in the socioeconomic infrastructure and global setting of the Egyptian state underInfitah are examined elsewhere in this issue. Here the focus will be on persistence and change inthe political "superstructure"of contemporary Egypt - specifically, in the political elite, itsideology, and the power structure on which it rests as Sadat's state adapts itself to the conflict-ing pressures emanating from its post-populist environment.

THE PYRAMIDOF POWER:THE STRUCTUREOF THE SADAT ESTABLISHMENTTen years after Nasir's death, the huge authoritarian bureaucractic state which he built remainsintact. It is used increasingly for purposes different from those for which he shaped it and, also

increasingly, forces inside and outside of it are altering it. But so far, while adapting to and con-taining these forces, it has resisted structural transformation and continues to set the frameworkof elite politics.1. For an application of this model to the Turkish case see Frey (1965). Several important writers, includingBerger (1962) and Halpern (1963), have suggested that Arab military republics like Nasir's Egypt might fol-low a similarcourse oward iberalism.2. For an application of the authoritarian conservative model stressing class contradictions to Egypt, seeHussein (1975).


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444 HINNEBUSCHTheApex. PresidentialMonarchy

President Anwar al-Sadat has preserved and defended against all threats the authoritarianpresidency inherited from Nasir. The 1971succession conflict between Sadat and Ali Sabri was asmuch about the powers of the presidency as about policy. In Sabri'sbid, Sadat perceived an at-tempt to restricthis "right"to make presidential decisions as Nasir had done. In defeating Sabri,he defeated an alternative conception of the political system which could have made the presidentaccountable to a wider collective leadership of equals ensconced in other power centers of thebureaucraticstate, notably the party. Since Sabri'sdefeat, no member of the elite has been able toseriously challenge the prerogatives of the presidency.The powers of the presidency remain enormous: its formal constitutional powers greatly over-shadow the legislature and the judiciary, and it presides over a huge largely compliantbureaucracywhich envelopes Egyptian society. The president is above such formal constraints aslaw or the administrativeregulations which bind his subordinates; he remains the sole source ofmajor policy or ideological innovation (although such innovations may be responses to pressuresfrom below); and he still defines and can change at will the "rulesof the political game"- the con-ditions of political participation. The presidency today is no less a concentration of enormouspersonalized power than under Nasir.Yet the man makes the office as well as vice versa, and Sadat'sgoals, style, and leadershiphaveleft a distinctive imprint. A major change from Nasir's time is Sadat's traditional conception ofthe president'srole. Essentially, Egyptian society is seen as the authoritarian patriarchal family,writ large, with the president as the "father,"entitled to respect and obedience.3 Such a concep-tion of leadership is, of course, profoundly illiberal, and- incompatible with legitimate demandsfor a redistribution of wealth and power- part of the symbolism of authoritarian-conservativerule worldwide.

However, coexisting with, if subordinate to, this role conception is a cautious commitment to acertain liberalization of the political system, as expressed in Sadat's desire to create a "state oflaws and institutions," rather than men, and in his experimentswith a multiparty system. But it isclear that Sadat is prepared to accept and encourage liberalization and pluralization only in acarefully controlled way: only to the extent that it does not encroach on the prerogatives of thepresidency, and that it does not spread downward to the mass level. In other words, it is accept-able only at the middle levels of the power structureand the top levels of the class system. Whilesuch limited liberalization has important consequences for the political system, it stops far shortof the expectations of those who hoped Sadat might be prepared to withdraw "above" thepolitical arena and allow elites to compete for mass support and over the determination of policy.That Sadat never had any such intention is clear from his unwillingness in the course of themultipartyexperiment to concede any of his unilateralright to determine basic policy or to permitcriticism of his policy. It is also clear from his expectation that opposition should be "construc-tive"-that is, offer, in restricted elite councils, practical alternatives within the broad lines ofpresidential policy.Sadat's personal style has also had an impact on the real distribution of power in the system.Nasir made the presidency a highly activist, interventionist force. He was hard-driving, dynamic,domineering and suspicious of other members of the elite; he was personally a source of enor-mous energy at the top of the system, pushing the elite into motion and holding it accountable tohis plans. Sadat is more easygoing and tolerant; his presidency has meant a relaxation and con-traction of control over the elite. But far from being merely a matter of personal style, these

3. SeeDimbleby 1977)for an insightfulportraitof Sadat'spersonal tyle.


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EgyptUnderSadat 445contrasts also reflect decisive differences in the goals of the two leaders. Nasir wanted totransform Egypt, even if this required running roughshod over vested elite interests; much of hisactivism and interventionism was a response to the natural tendency of these elites to resist anddeflect his goals. Sadat accepts the status quo and with it the right of elite interests to defend andadvance themselves incrementally, as long as this does not encroach on presidentialprerogatives.Sadat was aware of the resentment in elite circles at Nasir's interventionist, domineering style.Part of his support from the elite has depended on maintaining a lower presidential profile instate and society.

Thus, at the very apex of the political system, populist charismatic leadership seems now to beroutinized in the form of "Presidential Monarchy"(see Apter, 1965:214-215). Concentrated per-sonalized power persists, but is wielded in increasingly traditionalist fashion. The cautiousliberalization and contraction of control from the apex should be seen basically as an attempt tosatisfy (and win legitimacy from) elites, while containing pressuresfor a more significant openingup of the political system.Presidency and Elite: Decision Making and Control

It would be hard to argue that basic decision making in Egypt is less concentrated today than itwas under Nasir. Nasir was at least partiallyconstrained by a minimum of accountability to an in-ner core of Free Officers - men who made the revolution with him, and who, far from being hiscreatures, were relatively permanent members of a team not easily disregardedand who on occa-sion could defy him. In the case of Sadat, the elite are much more "his"men-often obscure per-sons co-opted to power- whom he makes and breaks as he pleases. There is no inner core ofequals or revolutionary comrades to whom he is in any way accountable. No centers of power in-dependent of the president have emerged. It is well known that Sadat makes many major deci-sions with little consultation with or concern for the opinions of the members of the elite, whomhe tends to regardas his staff ratherthan as colleagues. Especially in foreign policy Sadat has ledratherthan followed elite opinion. No member of the elite has been able to stand against him andkeep his position.A number of factors account for Sadat's ability to maintain himself far above the rest of theelite. The authority of presidential office and the deference of the state machinery to such legallegitimacy are substantial in Egypt. This superior legal legitimacy was no small factor in account-ing for Sadat's victory over the Sabri faction in 1971,and since then it has given him uniquestature. Sadat also enjoys personal legitimacy resources flowing from his status as the senior FreeOfficer in 1971, his association with the October 1973 War, the partial recovery of lost Egyptianterritory, and steps toward peace. Sadat has also rewarded the elite, winning loyalty by policieswhich respond to its interests and ideals- from Infitah and political relaxation to his relativetolerance of corrupt practices.4 The Egyptian establishment must know it can expect no bettertreatment from any other leader. Yet Sadat has taken care, through periodic shakeups in the eliteto prevent any individual member from acquiring a personal base from which to challenge thepresidency and its powers; moreover, he has proven himself a masterof the politics of "divide andrule," of the exploitation of intra-elite rivalries. In the early years when the main threat was fromthe left, Sadat mobilized the Nasirite center, including many Free Officers and the professionalmilitary, to purge both Marxists and the radical Ali Sabri faction. But with the left deposed,Sadat then gradually edged mainstream Nasirite personalities out of power. The Free Officerswere the first to disappear. After the 1973 war Sadat undermined the center furtherby encourag-

4. For an argument that corruption had become "institutionalized" in the 'seventies see Ayubi (1979).


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446 HINNEBUSCHing the emergence of quiescent elites on the right and brought in a new team to preside over In-fitah. But since then new waves of replacements have periodically swept out incumbent govern-ments. Three times as many ministers per year have served under Sadat as served Nasir.5 In theprocess of moving to the right and shaking up his subordinates, Sadat has left behind a trail ofold supportersoften in tacit or open opposition to his policies, but who, deprivedof their institu-tional bases, have proved little threat to the president so far.There are two qualifications to this picture of "one-man rule," however. First, although Sadathas insisted on his unilateral right to make major policy decisions, it does not follow that he isisolated from the influence of the elite. In his effort to maintain and expand his legitimacy, Sadathas been open - particularilyin matters outside foreign policy which he regardsas his special do-main- to an exchange of influence, especially with his inner entourage. Second, although Sadatreserves the right to intervene in the smallest matter, in practicehe has allowed elites considerablejurisdiction over lesser decisions and more automony in their own domains than they enjoyedunder Nasir. Nevertheless, between the presidentand the next rung in the power elite there is cer-tainly a bigger gap than there was under Nasir. The structureof elite "ranks"underSadat is brief-ly suggested by what follows.The top elite. The most striking transformation in the top elite-the inner core of power-isthe disappearance of the Free Officers organization and the substitution for it of personal ad-visors, confidants and chief ministers who together resemble a royal court. Sadat's original suc-cession governments contained large numbers of Free Officers; and after the 1971 plit when aslight majority of Free Officers supported him, many were kept on as ministers or advisors. But,in a fairly rapid process of attrition, most were retiredor pushed into peripheral positions; only afew remain as informal members of Sadat's team.

The new inner core is headed by four men who enjoy extremely close personal relations withSadat (three being linked to his family by marriageties); this mixture of political with primordialties gives the group the aura of a "royal family." Osman Ahmad Osman, director of the hugeArab Contracting Company and perhaps the number two man in Egypt today, is the country'slargest capitalist and seems to representthe nonagriculturalwing of the bourgeoisie at the centerof power. One of his sons is marriedto one of Sadat'sdaughters. He presidesover a vast clientagenetwork. He has held several public offices including those of Minister of Reconstruction andhead of "food sufficiency projects." His power rests, however, not on formal office but on hisbusiness empire and his personal and familial relations with the president.Next to Osman, and also married into the Sadat family, are Sayid Marei and Mahmoud AbuWafia, both from old landed families. Marei, in particular, has had a long and distinguishedcar-reer in the elite concerned with agrarian policy, and has his own formidable clientage network.These men representthe agrarianbourgeoisie in the inner circles of power. Marei has served as aminister, as First Secretary of the state party, and as Speaker of Parliament. He appears to in-fluence Sadat's policies and is regarded as a force behind Infitah. Both he and Abu Wafia wereactive forces supporting the political liberalization experiment and the organization of the newruling party.The fourth member of the inner core is Vice President Husni Mubarek. Mubarek, in additionto authority of office, seems to enjoy the close trust of Sadat; as a successful Air Force com-mander he has prestigeand a following in the military. (Former Vice President Shafei was held inlight regard by Sadat and enjoyed little political power.) All these men have had distinguished5. InNasir's18years,131personsheld ministerial ortfolios an average f 7.2 peryear); n Sadat's yearsfrom 1970-79, 186 have so served (20.6 per year). The averagetenure of a minister under Nasir was 44 monthscompared to 21 under Sadat.


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EgyptUnderSadat 447careers. It is also significant that some, notably Osman, have private power bases outside theState, a marked departure from Nasir's time. But most of their political power accrues fromcloseness to Sadat, from their ability to influence his decisions and, because this is known, to thusinfluence a wide range of lesser decisions by other elite elements. Their permanencealso separatesthem from the rest of the elite: ministers, even prime ministers, and generals come and go, butthese man stay at the center of power.The outer ring of the top elite is made up of the Prime Minister and other important ministers,top militarycommanders(The Ministerof War and the Chief of Staff), top partyleaders,and closepresidential advisors. Prime ministers are powerful because as the president's chief policy im-plementers they have opportunities to influence and shape policy, and they make a host of lesserbut crucial "who gets what" decisions. They can also fill many cabinet and lower-level positionswith clients. But for tenure they depend on the president, rather then their own political bases:Sadat has had five prime ministers since 1970 and none has remained in office longer than threeyears. Only one, Aziz Sidqi, showed any signs of independence from the president. Top militarycommanders rank in the top elite since military support is crucial for the regimeand because theyrepresent a potential veto group. Four of Sadat's top commanders have, to some degree,challenged his policies; but because they were unable to carry the military establishment withthem they were all dismissed with apparent ease.

Rounding out the top elite are holders of certain critical ministerialportfolios that arepresiden-tial, not prime ministerial, appointments and who participate in broader policymaking: theMinisters of Economy, Finance, Interior and Foreign Affairs; a few ministerswho have enjoyedexceptional longevity because of special technical competence or close personal relations withSadat; and the president's top political advisors and party managers.The middle elite. Most cabinet ministers and governors of the provinces make up the middleelite. They exercise considerable discretion in their own domains, albeit within the lines ofpresidential and government policy, and where technical expertise is called for they may have in-put into broader policies. But, dependent on presidential favor, rather than political bases fortheir positions, few last more than one or two years in their positions. Significantly, not oneminister in Sadat's first post-Sabri government was still around in 1979. The ministerial elite islargely nonpolitical, made up of technicians lacking both ideological commitment and constit-uencies. Because the recruitment pool is so large and tenure so brief, networks of solidarityamong ministers or governors do not seem to develop and the cabinet hardly functions as a col-legial body. There is thus little possibility that those in the middle elite could or would challengepresidentialpolicy. A few have resigned in disagreementbut their typical attitude to the presidentis deferential. Over the fate of those below them, however, they are men of power.Thesubelite. The subelite is here considered to be those subcabinet members who link the eliteto the population and comprise the elite recruitmentpool. This group includes top civil servantsinthe various departments of the state, commanders of military units, public-sector managers,editors of newspapers, religious leaders, leaders of professional syndicates and chambersof com-merce, and local notables who head branches of the state party. The basic meeting ground for allthese elites is parliament, the institutional arena where the interests of the "second stratum,"thesolid core support base of the regime, are expressed and taken into account by top and middleelites.

Parliamentary elites do not make big decisions or even hold top decision makers accountable.Big issues such as foreign policy - in which Sadat has refused to be constrained by parliamentaryopinion-are beyond their competence, and even major economic and technical decisions areoften made by ministers enjoying extensive right to "legislate"by decree, with little or no con-sultation. The government is not really dependent on parliamentary support, nor is the president


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448 HINNEBUSCHTABLEI1

OriginalOccupations of Egyptian Ministers*Inherited Nasir Elite Sadat Elite Post-1971 Sadat Elite Post-Infitah1970-71 Period Recruits (1974)Recruits

Original Occupations No. % No. % No. %Military 16 38.1 23 17.0 6 7.8Academia 9 21.4 33 24.4 23 29.9Engineering 5 12.0 34 25.2 21 27.3Law 4 9.5 22 16.3 11 14.2Bureaucrat 4 9.5 4 3.0 4 5.2Business/Professional 1 2.4 7 5.2 6 7.8Police 0 0.0 4 3.0 3 3.9Diplomacy 3 7.1 7 5.2 3 3.9Other 0 0.0 1 0.7 0 0.0TOTALS 42 100.0 135 100.0 77 100.0

* Source: al-Ahram.

TABLE 6Career Recruitment Paths of Egyptian Ministers*InheritedNasir Elite Sadat Elite Post-1971 Sadat Elite Post-Infitah1970-71 Period Recruits (1974)Recruits

Recruitment Paths No. % No. % No. %1 Military 1 2.4 7 5.3 2 2.72 Milit-Bureaucrata 6 14.3 14 10.5 7 9.33 Milit-Politicalb 9 21.4 5 3.8 0 0.04 Academic Only 3 7.1 9 6.8 7 9.35 Academic-Engineer 3 7.1 6 4.5 2 2.76 Academic-Bureaucrat 3 7.1 15 11.3 11 14.77 Academic-Politician 2 4.8 6 4.5 4 5.38 BureaucratOnly 1 2.4 4 3.0 3 4.09 Bureaucrat-Engineer 4 9.5 27 20.3 17 22.710 Bureaucrat-Politician 1 2.4 1 0.7 1 1.311 Law 0 0.0 1 0.7 0 0.012 Law-Academic 0 0.0 6 4.5 1 1.313 Law-Bureaucrat 1 2.4 4 3.0 2 2.714 Law-Judiciary 2 4.8 3 2.3 2 2.715 Law-Politician 1 2.4 4 3.0 2 2.716BusinessOnly 0 0.0 2 1.5 2 2.717 Business-Bureaucrat 0 0.0 2 1.5 2 2.718 Business-Politician 0 0.0 2 1 0.7 1 1.319 Professionalc 0 0.0 2.4 3 2.3 9.8 3 4.0 14.720 Professional-Politician 1 2.4 2 1.5 1 1.321 Professional Academic 0 0.0 3 2.3 2 2.722 Diplomat 3 7.2 7 5.3 3 4.023 Syndicalist 1 2.4 1 0.7 0 0.0

TOTALS 42 100.0% 133 100.0% 75 100.0%* Source: al-Ahram.a Denotes officers who served in the bureaucracy or public sector or in the foreign policy bureaucracy.Police officers are included.b Denotes officers who served as political advisors or trouble-shooters in the presidential bureaucracyor aspartyofficials or parliamentary eaders.c Denotes professionals other than lawyers, e.g., doctors, journalists, and pharmacists.

6. Tables I and 2 classify Egyptian ministers according to original occupation and according to "careerrecruitmentpath," meant to denote certain basic combinations of occupation and institutional career servicewhich have been followed by those entering ministerial roles.


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EgyptUnder adat 449constrained to ensure such support by picking government leaders from parliamentaryinfluen-tials. Thus, parliament exercises influence at the sufferance of the presidentand the more power-ful ministers. Nevertheless, Sadat seeks through parliament to keep his main constituencysatisfied. Parliamentary seats are desirable because they enhance local power and influence andmay even count in recruitmentto higher elite levels. Parliament gives the "second stratum"accessto decision makers, permittinggrievancesto be redressedand the interests of the state bourgeoisieto be reconciled with those of its private cousins. In this process, government policies are occa-sionally altered. When the government is considering a policy shift it may sound out opinion at itsbase through parliamentary debate. Parliament has sometimes criticized abuses by the govern-ment and exposed corrupt practices. On one occasion Sadat was forced to reversea personal deci-sion, though subsequently that troublesome 1977parliamentwas dissolved (see Fouad, 1979, andGami, 1979). However, parliamentaryelites have seldom demonstrated much sense of collectiveinstitutional solidarity vis-ia-vis he executive; parliamentis viewed by membersmore as a channelto cultivate strategic personal connections higher up than as a base from which to challengegovernment decisions in the name of alternative conceptions of public policy.

ELITERECRUITMENTNDSOCIALCOMPOSITIONThere is substantial continuity in the Egyptian political elite from the Nasir to Sadat periods: a

majority of those who preside over Sadat's post-populist redirection rose throught recruitmentchannels established under Nasir. Nevertheless, an accumulation of gradual changes since 1952 isproducing an emergent transformation in the social composition of the elite.Under Nasir there were three quite separatechannels of recruitment, each tending to terminateat a separate level in the power structure. The Free Officers movement channeled into top andmiddle elite roles military officers of rural lower-middle-class background. Academia and thebureaucracy channeled into the middle elite (but usually no further) persons of the urban upper-middle class (Dekmejian, 1974). The subelite was recruited from middle class officials and ruralnotables serving in local branches of the state party and parliament. Access to elite roles fromeach channel required co-optation from above. Most of the old elite of aristocratic or hautebourgeois background was excluded from the new elite.This four-way segmentation, and the political subordination of higher status elites by lowerstatus ones, could not persist indefinitely, and intra-elite social differentiation was already beingbridged before Nasir died. The new lower-middle-class power elite, gradually acquiring wealth(through high salaries, corruption and even business) and social status, transformed itself into a"statebourgeoisie," a process largely completed though never quite legitimized under Nasir (whoretained a petty bourgeois lifestyle and never identified with Egypt's bourgeoisie).Under Sadat, elite transformation is being carried considerably further. First, the recruitment

The tablescompare hreeperiods.The firstcolumnsbreakdownthecompositionof ministries ccordingto occupationandrecruitment athfor the transitional eriodafter Nasirhaddied butduringwhichSadatstill had to share power with the rest of the Nasirite elite. As such it represents the Nasirite elite at its mostmature level of development, and is an excellent benchmark with which to compare later changes in the com-positionof the eliteonceSadathadconsolidatedhispower.The secondcolumnsrepresenthecompositionof the ministers recruited after May 1971, the date when Sadat purged much of the Nasirite elite, consoli-dated his power and began to recruit his own men. Note that not all ministers serving after this date are in-cluded in the data, but only those first recruitedafter May 1971. By confining the data to those recruitedafterthis date, the data are made more sensitive to emergent changes in recruitment patterns. The third columnsrepresent the compostion of the elite recruited beginning in 1974 when Sadat initiated the major redirectionin Egypt'scourse which goes under the name of Infitah. Again not all ministersservingafter 1974 are includedin thedata,but onlythose firstrecruited fter1974-in order o highlight hechanges n elitecompositionwhich have accompanied this redirection in the regime's orientation.The data, taken from al-Ahram files, are fairly complete, but data on occupation are lacking for nine min-isters and on career paths for eleven.


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450 HINNEBUSCHTABLE 37EducationalSpecializationsof EgyptianMinisters*

InheritedNasir Elite Sadat Elite Post-1971 Sadat ElitePost-Infitah1970-71 Period Recruits (1974)RecruitsEducationalSpecializations No % No. % No. %Military 9 22.0 13 9.8 4 5.3Miltary-Technocratica 3 7.3 10 7.5 4 5.3Military-Otherb 4 9.8 4 3.0 1 1.3Engineering 4 9.8 29 21.8 17 22.7Agronomy 3 7.3 10 7.5 7 9.3Medicine 3 7.3 6 4.5 3 4.0Law 8 19.5 27 20.3 14 18.7Economics/Business 3 7.3 20 15.0 16 21.3Humanities 1 2.4 3 2.3 2 2.7Social Science 2 4.9 1 0.7 1 1.3Pure Science 1 2.4 4 3.0 3 4.0Religion 0 0.0 5 3.8 3 4.0None 0 0.0 1 0.7 0 0.0TOTALS 41 100.0 133 100.0 75 100.0

* Source: al-Ahram.a Denotes persons combining militarywith technical or scientific education.b Denotes persons combining militarywith another nontechnical degree, e.g., law.

system has altered in important ways. One basic change is the clear and continuing decline of themilitary career as a route into the elite. While the presidency and vice-presidency are stillpreserves of ex-officers, the prime ministership, once a monopoly of the military, now goes tocivilians; ministerialportfolios are open to a dwindling number of officers. (Under Nasir, officersmade up about one-third of the elite; by the late Sadat years, little more than one new recruit inten has been an officer.) The disappearanceof the Free Officer-military career route means thatthe one recruitment channel by which younger persons of modest social status could reach topelite positions has eroded, and not been replaced. It also means an opening of top elite roles tocivilians. Academia continues to serve as a main recruitment channel, supplying about one-third of elite recruits. Egypt's top economic managers in particular tend to be picked from theuniversities. The bureaucracyper se is still a major and expanding recruitmentchannel, but theclassical career bureaucrat has increasingly been replaced in ministerial roles by a new breed ofengineer-bureaucratswho work their way up through state organization and the public sector.Their emergence at the top is an outcome of the "technocratic revolution" begun under Nasir.Although their presence is somewhat incongruent with the growing threat to the public sectorfrom Infitah, it indicates that the influence of the "state bourgeoisie" is unlikely to disappearovernight. Diplomacy remains an important subsidiaryroute to the elite, and as the age of revolu-tionary militancy gives way to that of accomodation, professional diplomats are replacingsoldiers in Egypt's top foreign-policy management roles.More significant yet, it now appears that the one career route outside the state-academic com-plex- in private business and the professions - is increasingly reopening. Under Nasir, this routedwindled in significance (except for the recruitmentof judges to ministerialpositions), but by thelate 'seventies one-quarter of new ministers were reaching office from such careers. Moreover,

7. The data on the educational specializations of ministers are broken down into three time periods definedin exactly the same way as those for occupation and for career paths.


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EgyptUnderSadat 451Sadat has deliberately co-opted into top political roles representativesof both new business (nowflourishing under Infitah) and old wealth (respectable once more).8 It is also significant that"private sector" persons have often served in parliament and the government party beforereaching the top; thus these institutions, dominated by the military-bureaucraticelite and largelydead-ending in subelite roles underNasir, may now be emergingas recruitmentchannels to higherlevels.

These changes, taken together, seem to spell the end of the three-track system which underNasir segmented the elite into separate compartments. A similar pattern can be seen in recruit-ment to governorships; while under Nasir these positions were in good part a military preserve,civilians now dominate, and professionals and academics as well as career bureaucrats nowqualify for such appointments. Finally, there has been a significant increase in ministers witheducational specializations in economics, law and engineering. Presumably, these are the skillsneeded in an era of Infitah and peace with its stress on the free market and internaldevelopment.The decline in those with militaryand social science education may reflect the end to the period offorced social engineering from above.Of equal significance for change in elite composition are the outreach strategies incumbentelites are using to build connections outside the state establishment. Increasingly the "statebourgoisie," acquiring wealth and status through state service, is investing it in the private sec-tor and forming alliances with forces outside the state. First, Infitah has opened up oppor-tunities, hardly existent under Nasir, to acquire wealth - notably through commissions and otherlicit or illicit payments from foreign investors; it has also opened up opportunities to invest thiswealth in collaboration with foreign or private Egyptian capital. In brief, the Egyptian politicalelite is going into business, transforming itself into a private-property owning bourgeoisie. Se-cond, an amalgamation of the old and new bourgeoisies is taking place as business, marriage,andeven political alliances are formed between these once ratherantagonistic social forces. This pro-cess, begun to some extent under Nasir, has advanced under Sadat, whose own marriage,lifestyle, and political alliances provide a legitimizing model at the top.The decline in military domination of elite roles, the diversification of recruitmentchannels,the growing development by state elites of resource bases outside immediate state control, and thegreater incorporation of previously excluded or peripheral elites into the power structure dopoint to a tendency toward the pluralization of power among differentiated bourgeois elites in-side Sadat's state. In the long run this tendency may indeed provide conditions for politicalliberalization, but as yet it remains rudimentary. Elites outside the state still cannot use theirresources in open competition for elite roles, and they depend ultimately on co-optation fromabove. Moreover, no business or professional base can at present be more than partiallyindepen-dent of state control in Egypt. Far more significant are countertendencies toward a closed, dif-fuse elite: the closure of recruitment channels from the lower-middle class; the growing web ofties between previously disparate sections of the elite; the bridgingof the gap between power andwealth, state and society; the effacement of the separate track recruitment system; and the in-creasing overlap of state and extrastate careers. Despite the persistence of intra-elite contradic-tions, all these tendencies seem to spell the emergenceof an increasinglycohesive bourgeois rulingelite. Completing the process is the replacementof a president-leaderwho tried to stay above andjuggle the different classes by one who bases himself chiefly on (and identifies mostly with) thebourgeoisie.

8. Recentadditions o Sadat's nnercircle ncludeMansurHasan,animportmillionaire, ndFikriMakramObayd,a prominentprofessional roma prestigious ld family.


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452 HINNEBUSCHELITEIDEOLOGY

The ideology of the Egyptian power elite in the post-populist phase has undergone a rapidand thorough transformation which has effaced the "Nasirism" of the previous period. Theelite never was intensely committed to Nasirism as a belief system; rather, "Nasirism" was inpart a pragmatic response to specific experiences and circumstances which are nowsuperceded in elite consciousness by more recent experiences. In particular much of the cur-rent outlook of the elite seems shaped by a perception of the very high costs incurred byEgypt in its effort to challenge the world-imperialistorder in the Middle East and a belief in theneed to avoid such costs in the future-indeed, to reap benefits by accomodation to thatorder. But at a deeper level, the eclipse of radical populist nationalism reflects the socialtransformation of the elite from petty bourgeois outsiders in conflict with a traditional rulingclass into a privileged establishment with interests to preserve and a growing desire to be ac-cepted as part of what may be called the "international bourgeoisie." The emergence of thisnew elite orientation can be seen by tracing several dimensions of the direction of currentideological change.Dimensionsof Change

Conservatization. Increasingly the symbolism of revolution and radical change typical ofNasirism is disappearingfrom the elite vocabulary and being replaced by traditionalism and con-servatism. President Sadat, in particular, advocates a model of social life emphasizing deferenceto traditional authority, harmony between rich and poor, and adherenceto the traditional valuesof family and religion. Socialism, and particularly Marxism, are regarded with abhorrence asalien ideas employed by "haters" who play on the envy of the poor to stir up class strife (seeCritchfield, 1978: Intro.).

Cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is used here to mean the tendency of westernized elites indeveloping countries to identify themselves as members of a global-actually western-com-munity, adopting such values and perceptions partly at the expense of identification with theirown cultures. A tendency by elites to identify more with the West than their own culture increas-ingly displaces the nativist radical nationalism of the Nasir era. The Egyptian ruling class wasdistinctively cosmopolitan in prerevolutionary days, but under Nasir an Arab-Islamic identitywas favored. Now, with the embourgeoisment of the elite and its amalgamation with the western-ized old upper classes, cosmopolitan tendencies are strongly reemerging. This shift can be seen inthe abandonment of anti-imperalismand nonalignment in favor of a close American alliance, inthe devaluing of self-sufficiency, and in the opening up to a vast influx of western cultural andconsumer commodities. It can be seen in the currentattempts to define Egyptian national identityby deemphasizing its Arab-Islamic content in favor of "Pharaonic" or "Mediterranean"alter-natives which set Egypt apart from her Middle East environment and link her westward.Elitism. As Nasir's populism fades, elitism as ideology is increasingly accentuated. Nasiriteefforts to redistribute resources by administrative means have fallen into disrepute, and there is acorresponding rehabilitation of the market as a mechanism supposed to distribute rewardsaccording to efficiency. Populist measures, such as subsidies on mass consumption goods, themaximization of employment and limits on salaries and profits, are increasingly seen as distor-tions of the market efficiency needed for development. It is also held that capital, advancedtechnology and highly skilled personnel, now seen as the chief keys to development, must be ob-tained and kept through rewards at internationally accepted levels. The inequalities resultingfrom the allocation of rewards to the minority who control such scarce resources are taken as partof the cost of economic development. In the political field, elitism can be seen in the devaluationof the role of the masses. Under Nasir some efforts were made to draw the masses into participa-


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EgyptUnderSadat 453tion; the elite now explicitly seeks mass demobilization and depoliticization (e.g., of the campusand mosque).

Privatization. The pursuit of private interests has emerged as a dominant elite orientation atthe expense of the state and public goals stressed under Nasir. Nasir's emphasis on duties ratherthan rights, and on the hierarchical enforcement of discipline and control by the leviathan state,has under Sadat generated a sharp contrary reaction among the elite. The emphasis now is oncontraction of state economic controls over society and the liberation of private initiative. Thepursuit of individual self-interest, castigatedunder Nasir, is now legitimized;"socialism"has beenreplaced by "freedom" as the ideological watchword. But "freedom" has been translated into agrowing acceptance of the soft state and its increasing subordination to and colonization bypowerful privileged interests.Liberalization. A strong current of political liberalism now competes with the inheritedauthoritarian model for the loyalities of Egypt's political elite. Official ideology holds that Egypthas passed from an era of "Revolutionary Legitimacy" to one of "Constitutional Legitimacy."The increased personal security and enhanced rule of law under Sadat are indeed so valuedamong the elite that a return to harsher controls would be difficult for the ruler. Moreover,pressures to dismantle the single party and expand political freedoms have emanated fromparliamentary subelites as well as from personalities in the very top elite. Nevertheless, only aminority of the elite believe a fully open competitive liberal regime is suitable for Egypt, fearingthe erosion of authority such a system might entail. At a deeper level, Egypt's bourgeoisie is pro-foundly ambivalent about liberalism: it wants enough to allow it to share power with the ruler,but fears that excessive relaxation of controls could open opportunities for radical counterelitesto mobilize a mass threat from below. Thus, the starts and stops in Eygpt's effort to arrive atsome form of limited or elite-level pluralism correspond to the dominant attitude among the eliteand its bourgeois constituency.Elite ideology is clearly undergoing a major change, away from the nationalist-etatist-populistNasirite mix toward a more cosmopolitan-privatist-conservativeblend. On the other hand, move-ment away from authoritarianism is far less marked; indeed, though challenged by a liberal cur-rent, the persistence of authoritarianism is quite compatible with the new conservative elitism.Thus, the dominant emergent orientation today is authoritarian conservatism, a tone set by thePresident himself. Three secondary tendencies can also be identified. A politically liberal butsocially conservative tendency, perhaps best represented by Sayid Marei, the President's closeconfident, is the next strongest orientation among the elite. Far weaker is liberal populism, bestrepresented by the leader of the official opposition party, Ibrahim Shukry. Authoritarianpopulism- that is, mainstream Nasirism- does persist among the elite, but is clearly a recessiveorientation. These differences in elite orientations should be seen as subtle shadings, rather thansharp cleavages, because general deference to the ruler and a sense of shared class interests haveincreasingly resulted in a remarkable level of elite cohesion. Nevertheless, intra-elite politics andconflict are neither absent nor detached from the big issues and choices which face Egypt as shemoves into the post-populist era, as the following section will seek to show.

ELITEPOLITICS: NTRA-ELITEONFLICTAND COHESIONThe Military Elite and Defense Policy

The military elite remains the most critical force in the Egyptian political system. Without itssupport, Sadat's rule would be very vulnerable to challenge; moreover, it remains the only forcewith the potential to impose a change of policy or leadership at the top. Yet, without losing con-trol of the military establishment, Sadat has been increasingly able to exclude the officer elite


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454 HINNEBUSCHfrom political decision making and to alter profoundly the role assumed by the Egyptian armyunder Nasir as defender of the revolution and of the Arab nation against imperialism andZionism.

Certain basic long-term transformations help explain military acquiescence in Sadat's policies.The military has undergone an increasing embourgeoisment and ideological conservatizationwhich parallels that of the civilian elite. If in the early 'fifties the officer elite acted as the populist"tribune of the people," by the end of the Nasir era it was becoming increasingly conservative.Moreover, its 1967 defeat by Israel, which many officers blamed on Nasir's anti-imperialist,Arab-Nationalist policies, or on lack of Soviet support, inclined the military away from supportfor radical causes outside Egypt. Also, since the 1967 defeat, the military has increasingly ac-cepted a more strictly professional role and an ethic of noninvolvement in politics, and the rela-tive success in the 1973 war following the greater professionalization of the officer corps has legit-imized this role change in military eyes. Professionalization has implied unquestioning accep-tance of the commands of legitimate authority-that is, of the president. As Sadat has pushedthemilitary out of the political arena, he has been careful to foster the organization of countervail-ing civilian political forces to fill the vacuum against the possibility of a reemergenceof militarypoliticians.These policies have not, however, gone unchallenged by elements of the military elite. In thefirst decisive intra-elitestruggle, Sadat faced left-wing Free Officers led by Ali Sabri, but won outlargely because of the support of the more conservativeprofessional officer corps. In the yearsofstalemate with Israel (1971-73) he had to contend with "rightists" led by War MinisterSadek) in-censed with the Soviet advisors and "militants"(such as Chief of Staff Shazli) dissatisfied withEgypt's inaction in the face of the Israelis. The expulsion of the Soviet advisors, and the OctoberWar, eased this dissatisfaction and greatly bolstered Sadat's legitimacy in militaryeyes; but in thepostwar period both militants and more moderate officers challenged Sadat'sdecisions to give upthe war option and rely on American diplomacy in dealing with Israel and then to sign a separatepeace with her. Securing his position with other more compliant officers, Sadat successfully dis-missed all such dissenters. By the late 'seventies, he had transformedthe army from a vanguardofchange into a conservativeguardian of order; internally, it put down the popular disturbancesof1977; externally, it was on polite terms with Israel, engaged on the side of the right in Zaire, andin open conflict with radical Libya. Though this transformation has generatedunease in the offi-cer corps, for most officers there is little viable alternativeto Sadat. A change in leadershipcouldjeopardize the privilegesand prestigeSadat has been careful to accord them and open up the pos-sibility of another unwinnable war with Israel. Moreover, because the militaryhas so far failed toact as a cohesive interest group in the system, allowing Sadat to count on the support of loyalistelements against dissenters, the risks of opposition are very high.Technocratic-AdministrativeElites: The Politics of Economic Management

Under Nasir, technocratic and administrative elites constituted a privilegedstratum, largely re-cruited from the urbanupper-middle and middle classes. In political attitude they were etatist andlargely illiberal; pragmatic and adaptable as well, they had become, by the 'sixties, "socialistsbypresidential decree." They were not, however, entirely happy with Nasirism as it had evolved inthe 'sixties and almost unanimously welcomed the victory of Sadat over the Nasirite "left." Al-though, unlike the military, the technocrats offered no immediate threat to Sadat's position, hehas sought their support as a contribution to the legitimacy of the regime;and because his policieshave been very favorable to them, he has, on the whole, received it.Most technocrats have applauded the reversal of the policies of the Nasirite left. In the 'six-ties, Ali Sabri's ASU faction had made the high salaries and privilegesof the technocrats an ob-


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EgyptUnderSadat 455ject of attack, accusing them of forming a "new class" above the masses. Moreover, western-trained, few of them felt comfortable with the Soviet connection represented by Sabri. Nasir'ssocialist policies had, by Egyptian standards, liberally rewarded the technocrats; but by thewestern standards against which they measured themselves, their living standards were modest.Under Sadat they have fared better: he has freed them of ASU harassment; lowered their taxes;raised their salaries (Ahmad Ali, 1977);and through trade liberalization given them access to theconsumer goods and western lifestyle they believe their due. The more tolerant view taken bySadat of self-enrichment, the relaxation of controls from the top, and the influx of foreign busi-nessmen under Infitah have greatly widened licit and illicit opportunities for tax-free commis-sions and other kinds of income supplements. Managersand technocrats, having acquiredexperi-ence and connections in public service, now find chances to go into business for themselves or tojoin high-paying foreign firms.

Politically, under Nasir, the military domination of power was resentedby civilian elites, but asSadat has pushed the military out of top elite roles, opportunities for civilians have expanded. Itwould be wrong to say Egypt is ruled by technocracy, for the big decisions are the exclusive pre-rogative of the president; the technocrats lack institutional bases secure from his unrestrainedpowers of appointment and dismissal, and they have failed to act as a cohesive interest groupseeking power-sharing arrangements. Yet they now enjoy more personal security, more profes-sional autonomy, and more freedom to take middle-level decisions free of political controls -whether from above (the presidency), laterally (the ASU), or below (trade unions). Distrustful ofthe consequences of an open political system, they can be easily satisfied by the current experi-ments in limited pluralism.For all these reasons the technocratic elite has largely supported Sadat's policies, including In-fitah. Nevertheless there has been in technocratic circles some ambivalence, even some opposition,to Sadat's course. Moreover, on issues where Sadat has not imposed an official view, there havebeen conflicts among elites advocating different policies. In the early 'seventies, four divergenttrends could be identified among the technocratic elite (Aziz, 1972). One, an etatist view associ-ated with Aziz Sidqi, remained suspicious of foreign and private capital unless tightly controlled.There was also a lesser trend (in alliance with the private sector) espousing free enterprise capi-talism, and (at the other extreme) a small genuine socialist tendency. The largest trend consistedof centrists who advocated a mixed economy in which new private and foreign capitalist sectorswould be created to compete with the public sector; the public sector would contract, but stillplay a major role in the economy, largely confined to heavy industry.In the early Sadat years the etatists had the upper hand and Aziz Sidqi- long time rival of AliSabri and a conspicuous supporter of Sadat in the succession crisis served as Minister of Indus-try and then (in 1972-3) as Prime Minister. But he met fierce resistancefrom parliament, especial-ly from the agrarian bourgeoisie led by his rival and presidential confident, Sayid Marei; he wastoo much of a Nasirite and too strong and independent a public figure for Sadat's taste.In the wake of the October war, buttressed by his newly won legitimacy, Sadat launched theopen door policy (Infitah), bringing in Abdul Aziz Hegazy, long-time TreasuryMinister and lib-eral economist, to replace Sidqi. This marked the eclipse of the etatist orientation in the elite, andthe beginning of a major reorientation in Egypt's economic policy. In the October Paper, Sadatstressed the need to open Egypt to foreign investment and to revitalize the private sector; he af-firmed that the public sector would remain, but it was soon clear that it was no longer regardedasthe cutting edge of development. Sadat encouraged attacks on the public sector's efficiency andproductivity in parliament and appointed the leader of those attacks, Ahmad Abu Ismail, a lib-eral economist from a wealthy bourgeois family, Minister of Finance. In 1975, Ismail SabryAbdullah, who had waged a losing battle to submit foreign investment to a coherent state plan,


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456 HINNEBUSCHwasdismissed sMinister f StateforPlanning,markinghe fall of thetiny eft-wing omponentof the technocratic lite. By 1975Nasir's"ArabSocialism" ad died a quietdeath.

By the mid-'seventies,nfitahwas well underway,but Egypt's op economicmanagersdis-agreedabouthowfar a return o freemarketoperations houldbepermittedo whollydismantleNasir'spopulistpoliciessuchas food subsidiesandemploymentecurity.Oneviewwasthatthenorms of operationof international apitalism, ntroduced hrough he foreigncapitalsector,shouldeventually pread o andengulftherestof the socioeconomicystem.Then,forexample,publicsector irmswouldoperateaccordingo normsof capitalistprofitability ndcostaccount-ing,and thestatewouldceaseto administer nd subsidizeprices.Others awthis courseassocial-ly dangerous, ikelyto leadto classgapsandpossibly o the destabilizationf the system.Thisgrouptendedto see Infitahas merelyan opening o outside nvestment nd freer rade.As theInternationalMonetaryFundand westernnvestorspressured gypt o lift subsidies nd floatthepound measureswhichwouldgreatly ncrease he cost of livingfor themasses intra-elite if-ferencesover economicpolicycameto a head. It appears hat both Abu IsmailandEconomyMinisterZaki Shafeiresisted hese demands.In November1976 heyweredismissed ndAbdulMoneimQaysunibecameDeputyPrimeMinister or EconomicAffairs, presidingovera newmore iberal eam, includingHamidSayehas Minister f EconomyandMuhammedHamidasFi-nanceMinister.Qaysuniargued hat subsidies ueledinflationandactuallybenefited,throughabuse,the well-offas much as the poor. The resultof the decision o lift the subsidieswasthe1977"food riots."The governmentbackeddown and restored he subsidiesand before longQaysuniresigned, he riots havingstrengthenedhe hand of those who opposedhis reforms.However,his prot6g6,HamidSayeh,remained s top economicmanager;he regimehas sincefloatedthe poundandappears ommittedo a gradual emovalof the subsidies.Otherpopulistpolicies,suchas overstaffing ndguaranteed ppointment f graduateso thebureaucracy,realso underattack,but theirreversal s alsopoliticallydangerous.Bythe endof the 'seventiesn-fitah was firmlyestablished,but economicdecisionmakingremained aughtbetween he de-mandsof capitalist conomicrationality ndpoliticalexpediency.Thereweresomesigns hat,toavoid the high politicalcosts of dismantlingpopulism,it had been decidedto ease the drivetowardeconomicrationalizationnd, as the country's oreigndebtmounted, et theAmericanspick up the tab.Moreambivalenthanthe economists oward nfitaharepublic ectormanagers ndthe Minis-tryof Industry. nInfitahsomemanagers o seeopportunities:heyhave beengivensomewhatmoreauthority han underNasir, and more freedomfrom centralcontrol, laborunions, andworkerrepresentativesn the factory.Some havewelcomed he accessto advanced echnologyandmethodswhichtheybelieveparticipationn jointventureswithforeign irmswillbring seeHendoussa,1979).UnderInfitahsomemanagers avebranched utintoprivatebusinessoradd-ed to their ncomes hrough ommissions; uta good partof themanageriallite alsoperceivesthreat nthe new economiccourse.Somehavefelt theirprestige ndopportunitieseduced ythedevaluation ndpossiblecontractionof thepublicsector.Somefear thegreater esponsibilitiesand risksof operationundercompetitivemarketconditions.But theirmaingrievances thatwhiletheyaretold by the governmenthattheymust facewidening oreigncompetitionby in-creasing heirefficiency whichwill be measuredby profit,not employmentevels or outputoflow-priced opulargoods), theyhavebeen denied he freedomn pricingandemployment olicyneeded o operateas entrepreneursn a competitivemarket.Moreover,whilemostEgyptiann-dustryprobably ouldnotcompetewiththeinfluxof cheapforeigngoodsunderanyconditions,current ax and customs aws-which exemptnew foreignand privatefirms-put the heavilytaxedpublicsectorat a big disadvantageHendoussa,1979).So far,managers ave acked hepoliticalpoweror thewillto protect heirdeterioratingases


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EgyptUnderSadat 457in theatmosphere f Infitah.Liable o removalwithoutredress,andevidently ackingmuchco-hesion,theyare not in a strongbargaining osition.WhiletheMinistryof Industrydoes some-times defendthepublicsector andsomeministers ave osttheir obs bydoing so), theMinistryis expected o discipline hemanagers.TheMinistry'snterest n centralized ontrolclasheswiththemanagerial rgeforautonomy.Themanagers'emands or a lowered ax burden lasheswiththetreasury's eed for revenue.Themanagers' esire o raisepriceswithcosts and to dismissex-cess laborfrightenspoliticians earfulof popularreaction.Their call for tariffprotectionandmore restrictions n foreign mports s drownedout by the insatiable onsumptiondemandsofthebourgeoisie sa whole.Theregime'snterestn promotingoreign nvestment as so far over-riddenany urgeto protectnational ndustry. nrulingcircles,compradors'nterestsn free tradeseem to overrideheneedsof thepublicsector.Unable o fight Infitah, manypublicsectorman-agersseek to join it by linking partsof theirfirms in joint ventureswith foreign nvestors; fpublicsectormanagers an be consideredEgypt'snationalcapitalist lass,thisprocessmayeven-tuallyefface its nationalcharacter. t willalso meanthe end of the publicsectoras a sourceof"populist" enefits.Interest Group Elites: Interest Articulation by the Private Bourgeoisie

Interestgroupelitesarethoseleaderswho"represent"n councilsof governmenthepowerfulprivateandsemiprivatenterestsn Egyptian ociety, n particularhoseof thecurrentlyavoredclass, the bourgeoisie.SincehisvictoryoverAli Sabri,Sadathasworked o winthesupportof theprivatebourgeoisiein order o broadenhis basebeyondstateelites;andin doingso he hasshaped hepolicyof thestate n manywaysto meettheirneeds. He hasrelaxed hestringent ontrolsof theNasirite tateoversociety, allowing he bourgeoisie reater ecurityandautonomy n its businessandprivatelife. Sadat's xperimentswitha multiparty ystemwereresponseso thedesireof the liberalbour-geoisiefor more"democracy." n independentiberalparty, heNewWafd,wasevenallowed oemerge.Its subsequent epression ost Sadatsome hard-wonegitimacyn bourgeois ircles,butthedamagewas limitedby thepersistent mbivalence f thebourgeoisieowarda liberal ystem:it desiresone, yet fearsthatit could leadto chaosor the riseof a massthreat.Moreover,underSadat,accessto theverycenterof power,almost nonexistentunderNasir,has beenopenedupfor this class. Its interestgroupassociations,used underNasirmorefor control haninterestar-ticulation,arenow moreautonomousandeffective npressingdemands.More mportant, con-stellationof powerfulpersonalities,argely ecruitedrom theprivatebourgeoisie,dominateshePresident'snnercircle.Judgingby policy outputs,this accesshas not been ineffective.Infitah,the American onnectionandthepeace reaty,all servebourgeoisnterests irst,bringinghe revi-talizationof the privatesector, free accessto westernculturaland consumergoods, and thechanceto get rich as compradors.Thus,in general, heprivatebourgeoisiehasmanyreasons osupportSadatand, by and large,has done so.The businesswingof thebourgeoisie inds a moresympathetic earing n elite circles han ithasenjoyedsince the revolution.To be sure,Egypthasas yet few of thebigbusinessmagnateswho wieldgreatinfluence n oldercapitaliststates. But in a relatively hort time Infitahhascreateda stratum f newmillionaires, nd nOsmanAhmadOsman,headof Egypt'sbiggestbus-inessconcern,andMansurHasan,one of thenew millionaire ompradorswhoservesas "Minis-ter at the Presidency,"he businessworldfinds effective inkage o decisionmakers.Below thislevel,through ts businessandmarriageonnectionswithstateelites,thebusinessbourgeoisiesfindingpaths ntothe statecenter.Therearealsomore nstitutionalizedhannelsof access o thepoliticalelite. The Chamber f Commerce, epresentingmerchants ndemployers, peakswithincreasing uthority.The NationalCouncilon Productionvoicesthe interestsof Egypt'smiddle-


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458 HINNEBUSCHsized ndustrialists.f there s a dimspotin thepicturet is here,foralthoughocalindustrialistshaveevidentlywontax and customsprivileges qual o thoseof foreign nvestors, heirpleasforhelpagainst oreigncompetition eemto carry ittleweightbeside heinterests f thoseenrichingthemselves n free trade.Theagrarian ourgeoisies no less well servedby accesschannels.SayidMarei, eadingmem-ber of the president'snnercircleand a veteranpolitican-bureaucrat,s one of their number. nhis roleas head of theAgronomists'Union,herepresentsheir nterests.Significantly,Marei,anarchitectof Nasir's andreform,now argues hat the reform imitedproductionby rewardingpoor peasantswith a highpropensityo consume;by implication,f the state wantsagriculturalgrowth t must now favorthe investment-pronegrarianbourgeoisie.TheAgriculturalAffairsCommittee f Parliament,o whichalllegislation n the sector s submitted y government, lsospeakseffectively or the agrarian ourgeoisie. n 1972,it deflecteda bill offeredby the etatistSidqi governmento tax fruit trees the lucrative ashcropon which heagrarian ourgeoisiescurrentlynrichingtself.Thisproposalwasrejected ndonlyafterfouryearsandpresidentialn-terventiondid the committeeaccepta verydilutedversionof the originalbill (see Nazli, 1979).The committeehas also won land rentincreases,a wateringdownof the agrarian elations awwhichreduces he securityof tenants,anda provision hatlandownersmayacquireand in ex-cessof theagrarian eformceiling n newlyreclaimed reas.Up to now, its campaigno abolishcompulsorymarketing f cotton andothervitalcropswiththe statehasfailed,forhere t runsupagainst he vitalinterestsof the statebourgeoisie.The "freeprofessions" re representedn the elite by theirsyndicate eaderships nd thosememberspickedto fill cabinetposts-such as the doctor normallyrecruitedas MinisterofHealth,or thelawyerwhoheadstheMinistry f Justice as well asby theirmanymemberswhoenjoypersonalor politicalconnectionsat the center.UnderNasir,professional yndicateswerenot without nfluencen defenseof professionalnterests.Buttheregime,particularlyn the'six-ties, madeseriouseffortsto controlthemthrough he ASU andsometimesmposed eadershipfromabove- thoughsuchproregimeeadersweresometimeswelcomedas offeringbetteraccessto decisionmakersSpringborg, 978).Thesyndicates ave,of course,welcomed hedismantlingof ASU controlsandthe consequentncreasen autonomywhichtheynowenjoyunderSadat.Syndicates avevaried n theirattitude oward heregimebutgenerally upported ndtried oexpand heregime's oliticaland economic iberalizationmeasures; ndtheyhavetried o defendand widen theirprofessionalautonomyagainstpersistent overnment ffortsto influence heirpoliciesandinternal lections.Somesyndicates ontinue o seekprominent egimepersonalitiesastheirspokesmen e.g., MustafaKhalilandOsmanAhmadOsmanhaveboth servedas headsoftheEngineers' yndicate nd Mareiashead of theAgronomists yndicate).Others,especiallyheLawyersSyndicate,have taken liberalpolitical positions notablyindependentof the regime.Lawyers, orexample,openlysupported tudentandworkerdemonstrationsn 1972,gaveWaf-dist leaderSeragad-Dina forum orhisblistering ttackon therevolution ndhis effortto resur-rect the Wafd as a politicalforce, labeledthe Wafd'ssubsequent epressionunconstitutional,burnedanIsraeli lagat itsheadquartersn protestagainst"normalization"f relationswiththatcountry,andfiercelyattacked he Lawof Aib. Theircousins n thejudiciaryhavebeen active nthe defenseof personalandproperty ights n the nameof "ruleof law,"sometimes o the an-noyanceof the regime.Strikinga blow for the sanctityof privatepropertywhichcouldbe verycostlyfor thetreasury,udgeshave ruledsomeof thenationalizationsf the'sixtiesunconstitu-tionaland theirvictimsentitled o compensation. udgeshave alsoopposedeffortsof thepoliceto represspoliticaldissent.Sadat,unlikeNasir,has so far steered hyof a majorpurgeof suchre-calcitrantudges.Lawyers ndjudgesare animportant olitical orceworking o defendandex-pandthe limited iberalizationhe regimehas permitted.


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EgyptUnderSadat 459Educational lites havealso supported he regime'siberalizationnitiativesand occasionallytriedto articulate iberalvalues o theauthoritiesDessouki,1978).However, heir ackof secur-

ity of tenure,and the practiceof recruitingministers romtop educationaladministratorsndseniorprofessors,seem to have contributed o makingEgyptianacademiamorecompliantwiththe wishesof governmenthan is true elsewhere e.g., in the effort to ridcampusesof trouble-some Islamic undamentalisttudents).Journalistshave been less fortunate n defendingprofessional reedomsbecausethe massmedia s regarded,no less underSadat hanNasir,as an instrument orshapingpublicopinion nthegovernment'snterest.Thefall of Heikalat al-Ahramwhoopposedtotaldependence n theU.S. for recoveringost land)not only silenceda prominentNasiritepersonality,but also sig-naledthat no majorindependent oice at variancewithpresidential olicywouldbe tolerated.Today, as underNasir,editorsof majorpapersareappointedandperiodically emovedby thepresident.In 1977,Sadatdid permit he newlyformedoppositionparties o publish heir ownnewspapers, ut thosewhichhavegonetoo oftenbeyond"constructive"riticism n major ssueshave beenrepressed.Through heirsyndicate, ournalistshaveconsistentlyurgedgreaterpressfreedom,andin theirwritingshave tested he limitsof governmentolerance,buttheyhavewonno substantially reaterreedom o write.UnderNasir,at leastthepoliticaleftcarvedout aplacefor itself beside the mainstream fficialpress;underSadat,it has lost this placeas the officialpressmovescontinuously o the right.Yet the presshas experienced yclesof contractionandlooseningof control, reflecting he contrary mpulsesof the regime o repressdissentand yetavoid antagonizingiberalpublic opinion;in the periodsof greateropenness,journalistshavebeen able to writemorefreely hanusual,even if this hasoftensubsequentlyost themtheir obs(MustafaAmin interviewn Dalia, 1979).

Religious lites aretodayno lesspliantthanunderNasir.TheIslamicreligiouseadership, p-pointedby the government,has responded avorably o Sadat'sdesire or religious egitimationof controversial oliciessuch as thereformof thepersonal tatus aw and thetripto Jerusalem.Indicative f thetendencyo allowgreater utonomyo elites s thefact thattheMinister f Waqfsis now regularly ecruited rom the religiousestablishmenttself. The leadership f the Copticchurch, ong enjoyingmoreautonomy hanits Islamiccounterparts, as been less amenable opoliticalmanipulation, lthoughas representativef a minoritycommunityt cannotafford toantagonize he regime.In summary,underSadat,economicand professional lites have been more successful hanpreviouslyncarvingout autonomous pacefor themselves ndinwinningaccess o the centerofpower. Yet, while some are learninghow to colonize the leviathanstate, all must live in itsshadow.Moreover, heprivatebourgeoisie asyetto wintheright o organizetselfasa classforpoliticalaction.Party Elites: Elite-Base Linkage

Egypt'srulingparty s the organizational ondbetween he top regimeelite and the subeliteswhichrepresentts coresupportandits linkagewithwidersocial forces.Thecurrent ulingNa-tionalDemocraticParty, a directdescendantof the ASU inherited rom Nasir, stillpreservesmanyof the characteristics f thatorganization.Most of the party eaderships inherited romtheASU anddrawn rom the sameoverlappingocialgroups officialdom,urbanprofessionaland businesselements,and the ruralnotability.Members f thepartycadre ypically ome frommiddle andowningamilies,were educatedas professionals,madecareerspartly n the bureau-cracy,andwereelected o parliament.Theyhavegoodreason o supportSadatunderwhom heyhave recovered he localpowerandparliamentaryeatsAli Sabrideprivedhem of in the 'sixties.Leadership ecruitment rocessesarecurrently mixtureof advancementrom belowandco-


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460 HINNEBUSCHoptationfromabove.Originallyhepartyemerged s a centrist actionof notables n parliamentunderthe leadership f MohmoudAbu Wafia,andbecauseelections o parliament t the timethepartywasforming 1976)were eft relativelyree,theparty ended o incorporatehose nota-bleswhoalready njoyed ocalprestige ndsupport.Subsequently, owever, hepartywastakenover"fromabove"with theimpositionof severalministers nd Sadathimselfas theparty eader-ship. Moreover, n the 1979election,this partyleadership urgedmanylocalnotable-deputiesand ran newcomers n many constituencieso producea more compliantparliament.Otherleaders,suchas MansurHasanandFikriMakramObaydhave since beenimposedat the topbypresidential atronage,although hese leadersdo havelocal basesof theirown. Thus,as underNasir, the cultivationof local or intrapartybases is less important n recruitment han is co-optation from above. Yet partyand parliamentaryervicenow counts for more in the co-optationprocess tself.Thus,bureaucratswhomoveupseemto needpartyas well as purelybu-reaucratic redentials.Moreimportant, he end to militarydominationof top partyroleshasopenedroomat thetopforelites oftenwithprivate ectorcareers)o riseessentiallyhroughpar-ty rather hangovernmentervice.Partyservice erse seems o give ittleright o share n centralpolicymaking;while formalrulesexistfor providingor internalpartyconsultationoverpolicyand for electionsof leaders, hese areso farvirtuallynoperative.But it does provideaccesstolocalpower,the leversof localgovernment atronage,andstrategic onnections o the center.Theparty'sbase ncludesa broadsetof socialforces,heldtogetheressby ideologyandorgani-zationthanbypersonal onnections,pragmaticoncerns or career ndpatronage,and awilling-nessto follow PresidentSadat.Formal deology s of minimalsignificance:eadersdo not feelboundby thepartyprogram,andregularmembershavevariedattitudes hough heyarelargelydeferent o governmenteadership.Muchof thebase,simplyborrowedromtheASU, willserveSadatjust as it didNasir.Organizationally,hepartyso farlacksrealcadres,and the organiza-tionalgapbetweencenterandbase,characteristicf theASU, seemsreplicatedn theNDP. Al-thoughSadathasspokenof the need for organizationaleform, heregime eemscontentto letpatron-client ypesof ties servefor organizationalinkage o the masses.At thevillage evel,the NDP lacks formalpresence,relying xclusively n personal iesto en-suresupport.Thisstrategy eems o reflecta lack of interest n theorganizational enetration fmasssocietyandindeedrepresents degreeof demobilizationomparedwith the'sixties.Never-theless, this clientagenetworkreachesdownto pettynotablesand richpeasantswho providemuchof the natural eadershipof the village;combinedwith traditionalpeasantdeference oauthorityand the president's atriarchal illage-notabletyleof publicappeal, hisprobably n-surestheregimeat leasttheacquiescence f a good partof thevillage.Thus,theweightof pea-sant votes, soldiers,and inertiahelpcontainthe largelyurban-based pposition.In the tradi-tionalurbanquarters, imilar ocalbrokers inkgovernment ndpopulation.Manygovernmentemployeesprotector advance heircareershroughpartymembership, overnment arty eaderspresideovermanyof the professional yndicates,anda substantialpartof the educatedbour-geoisiesupportshegovernment arty.Theparty's tudentorganizationompetes withthehelpof university dministrations withIslamic undamentalistsor controlof the studentunion;andprogovernmentaborleaders,co-optedinto the partyleadership, ontrol the organized aborhierarchyhoughat the basesthey face competition romthe left. In general, he governmentparty inks the politicalelite to a widebase;butapartfrom its innercore of subelites, hisbase,lacking deologicalor organizational olidarity, s probably"softer"han the smallerbut morehighlymobilizedbasesof the oppositionparties.On the whole,it wouldbe difficultto make acasethattheNDP is a moreeffective nstrument ororganizingmassparticipationhanwastheASU. Furthermore,t has not yet becomean effectivemeansby whichpoliticians an mobilizepowerbasesfrombelowto competewithgovernmentavor or disfavor.Butit maybe evolving


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462 HINNEBUSCHstrategy,combinedwith the traditionaldeference o authority,economicdependenceon thestate,andlack of politicalresources f themasses,has so far worked o contain hemassmobili-zationalpotentialof theopposition.Nevertheless, y the 1980s hereweresignsthat the variousoppositionforceswerecoalescingnto a unitedantiregimeront.At the sametime,thegrowingcost of Infitah,which he masseshavebeen forced o bearwhilea tinyclassenrichestself,grow-ingresentment t the lack of democracy,and revulsionagainst oreignculturalpenetration nddependency epresentinder or whichcounterelites, avingpersisted nabsorbedntolegitimatechannelsof participation,mightstillprovide he spark.

CONCLUSIONS:AUTHORITARIANISM ITHA CONSERVATIVE ACETheauthoritariantate npost-populistEgyptremains ssentiallyntact,butits orientation asradically hanged.At thetop, a presidentialmonarchhoardshispoweragainstallcomers,propa-gatesanideologyof massdeference o patriarchaluthority nd,morethanever,treats he stateas if it werehis personalpatrimony. t is here,at theverytop, that the impulse o conservativeauthoritarianisms thestrongest.Thebulkof theelite,abandoningts formernationalist,popu-list, etatist deology n favorof growingcosmopolitanism,litismandprivatism, enerally up-portsor acquiescesn this reorientation.Those elites who defended hepopulistcoursehavein-creasinglyost out in intra-elite onflictto otherswilling o presideover the subordinationf na-tionalcapital o internationalapital,the erosionof populistsocialpolicies,the transformationof thearmy ntoa conservativenternalandregionalgendarmerie,nd theslide ntodependencyon the United States.Thischange n the orientationof the statecorresponds,mostbasically, o the social transfor-mationof theelite froma multilayered,egmentedtructure ominatedby a military ore drawnfrompoliticallyand sociallydeprived"outsiders"nto an increasingly omogeneous,bourgeoisestablishment.Theintermixingf state andprivateas well as old and "new" ourgeois lements,the effacementof the military-civil leavageby the civilianization r withdrawal f the militaryinto professional oles, the expulsionof leftist or populist deologicaldissidentsnherited romtheNasiritecoalition,and the lateral ncorporationf economicelites nto thepolitical stablish-mentwhilerecruitmentrombelow s closed areallcontributingo theemergence f a moreco-hesive,moreconservative,bourgeoiselite. Thisdevelopment oes not precludentra-elite on-flict;indeed t hasresulted,n part,froma decadeof suchconflict.Moreover, onflictsand con-tradictions till persist n the elite:notably,the divergencen the interestsof stateand privateelites,the clashof authoritarian nd liberal endencies,anddisputesover the wisdomof variouspolicies such as how farpopulistmeasures houldgive wayto marketrationality, r thecondi-tionsof peacewithIsrael.But these conflictsarenow more and morecontainedby thedevelop-mentof a greater enseof shared lass nterestdistinctandapart romthemasses,andby theex-pulsionof dissidents romthe elite.Thesystemof elitepolitics nheritedrom Nasirhas, underSadat,so farbeenable to adapt oand containpressuresortransformation,lthoughntheprocess t hasbeenaltered ndmayyetchangemore.In thepersisting uthoritarianureaucraticndpersonalisticharacter f politics,elementsof continuityareclearlydominant.Thepresidentialmonopolyof decisionmakinghasnot changed;conflictand bargainingdo take place amongthe elite but are only legitimateatlevelsbelowthepresidency, nd theexercise f influenceon thepresidents onlypermissiblef hisultimateauthorityo refuse s acknowledged.Theeliteis moredependenthan everon thepresi-dent: recruitment ependson co-optation romabove far morethancultivationof basesfrombelow;the exerciseof powerdependson bureaucraticuthorityof office andpersonal onnec-tions to thetop, rather hanthesupportof constituencies;ndmostelites,especially tateelites,lackingsecure enureand subjectto presidential ismissal,do not enjoythe independent aseswhichcouldprovidesupport or the pluralization ndsharingof power.Elites,especially tate


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EgyptUnderSadat 463elites,do not actas coherent orporate roups.Moreover,because lite connectionso themassesdo not reston issuesor politicalorganization,but are mattersof tenuouspatron-clientage,litepolitics s largelysolated rom the widerpublicarena.Thus, n thepoliticalgame,elitesactlarge-ly as individuals r smallgroups hroughbureaucratichannelsorpersonal onnections,withouttrying o bring o bearas a resourcemobilizedpopular upport rom below. UnderSadat,estab-lishmentelites, far from seekingto mobilizemasssupport,actuallyseek massdemobilization;and the charismaticbond that mitigatedthe elitist bureaucraticcharacter of the Nasirregime andlinked opand bottom hasdisappearedndnot beenreplaced.As longasthose nthe elite do not act together n largecohesivegroups,and as long as masssupportcannot bemobilizedas a politicalresource,no memberof the elite canhopeto competewiththepresident;up to now, none has been able to challengehimand survive.Nevertheless,ome evolution owarda form of limitedbutgreater litepluralismanclearlybeseen.BecauseSadat acksNasir'sambitiono transformEgypt hrough he use of politicalpower,he has relaxedhis personalcontrolover the elite, allowingthemgreaterautonomyand moreopportunity o defendand advance heirparticularnterests.The statehas relaxed ts controloversociety, permitting litesto accumulate rivateresources;whileas yet power ranslatesntowealth morereadily han vice versa,wealth s finding ncreasing ccessto the centerof power.Not onlyhas theprivatebourgeoisie orgedpersonalinks to thetop, butprivatenterestgroupshavebeen allowed o developmorecorporate ohesionandautonomy,and therulingparty s be-coming for privateelites)a more nstitutionalizedhannelof access o thetop, outside hestatemachine erse. On the onehand,theprivatebourgeoisies using tsnew nfluence o colonize hestate;on the other,it is developing ountervailingower,ableto restrain tateelites.As longasthisprivatepowerremains onsiderably ependent n the state and thepresidentialmonarch e-mains mmune rom its sway,thisprocessremains udimentary;ut asInfitahgenerates rowingcentersof socialpoweroutside mmediate tatecontrol, t shoulddevelop urtherandmayeven-tuallyprovide hesocialbaseforgenuinepluralism.Finally,adding o thepicture, heincreasingdominationof the bourgeoisieover the state, the expulsionof dissidentelitesfromthe regime,and the relaxation f politicalcontrolshaveprovided onditions ortheemergence f oppositionelites and thusan incipient endency owardpluralization utside the establishment.Sadat, seeking egitimacyamongthe liberalbourgeoisieand the institutionalization f thesetendenciesn a controllableorm,hasexperimented itha "multipartyystem"n whichelites, nreturn or greaterpoliticalfreedoms,would refrain romchallengingheauthorityof the presi-dencyand eschewattemptsatcompetitivemassmobilization.However,becauseoppositioneliteswerenot contentwith nominalparticipation nd didtryto mobilizemasssupport n a challengeto regimepolicy,Sadatcurbed heexperiment.Had it been allowed o mature, t could have re-sulted n a virtual iberal ransformation f thepoliticalsystem.Incallinga halt to this cautioussteptoward iberalization, adatwas ableto count on the fearsof elites and thebourgeoisiehatan openpoliticalsystemwouldbe unable o containchallengeso thepost-populist oursewhichfavorsthem so much. Thusthethreat rom below andthe authoritarianroclivities f thepresi-dent havecombined o containdemands or a greaterdiffusionof power nthesystem.Inconse-quence,there has been little movement oward a more institutionalized oliticalsystemunderSadat: hepresident,abovethelaw,canchange he rulesof politicalparticipationtwill;opposi-tionelites,containedbut not absorbedntolegitimate hannelsof participation,mustchoosebe-tween submission nd rebellion.The resultant ystem- a kindof uninstitutionalizedimitedelitepluralism,whichopensup greater nformalaccess for the bourgeoisie o sympatheticdecisionmakersbut deniesrightsof participationo leaderswhowouldmobilizeandspeakforthoseout-side the establishment clearlyfavorsthe havesover the have-nots.Thisauthoritarianystemwith a conservativeace, farfrombeingprimarilyn artifactof Egyptianpolitical ulture, houldbe seen as anothercaseof perhaps he mostwidespread olitical ormationn thecontemporary


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464 HINNEBUSCHdeveloping world: a state which has passed the early populist stage, produced an expanding andprivileged bourgeoisie, and now braces itself against the rise of the masses.

REFERENCESAli, ShafifAhmad1979 "Imaginaryministers."Ruzal-Yusuf,Cairo,July4:18.Apter,David1965 The Politics of Modernization.Chicago:University f ChicagoPress.Ayubi,Nazih1979 "Administrativeorruptionn Egypt:Phenomenon, ausesand costs."Cairo:NationalCenter orCriminal ndSocialResearch.Aziz, Khayri1972 "Thenationalbourgeoisie." l-Talia,Cairo,June:121-35.Berger,Morroe1962 The ArabWorldToday.New York:Doubleday.Critchfield,Richard1978 Shahhat:An Egyptian.Syracuse,N.Y.: University f SyracusePress.Dalia,N.1979 "'InterviewwithMustafaAmin,'reportedn 'Theevolutionof theEgyptianpressfromNasirtoSadat.'" Paper presentedat seminar on "Egyptunder Sadat" offered by R. HinnebuschatAmericanUniversityn Cairo,Fall.Dekmejian,H. R.1974 EgyptUnderNasir.Albany,N.Y.: StateUniversity f NewYork Press.Dessouki,Ali (ed.)1978 "Democracyn Egypt."CairoPapers n Social Science1 (2):entirevolume.Dimbleby,Jonathan1977 "Sadat'solitaryhand."The New Statesman12(August):204-6.Fouad,Neamat

1979 "Thepyramidsplateauproject."CairoPapers n Social Science2 (4):137-57.Frey,Frederick1965 The TurkishPolitical Elite.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.Gami',Ahmad1979 "Thepyramidsplateauproject."CairoPapers n Social Science2 (4):162-74.Halpern,Manfred1963 ThePoliticsof SocialChangenthe MiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUni-versityPress.Hendoussa,Heba Ahmad1979 "Time or reform:Egypt'spublicsector ndustry."CairoPapers n Social Science2 (3):101-123.Hussein,Mahmoud1975 L'Egypte,1967-73. Paris:Maspero.Nazli1979 "Socieoeconomicnd politicalstudyof taxationon fruitgardens n Egypt."Paperprepared orSeminaron Elites n the MiddleEast,AmericanUniversityn Cairo,Spring.Springborg,Robert1978 "Professionalyndicatesn Egyptianpolitics." nternational ournalof MiddleEasternStudies9(3):284-85.

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