Election Laws NALDOZA vs. LAVILLES ( 254 SCRA 286 ) ( 254 SCRA
286 ) Election Offense, B. Jurisdiction Over Election Offenses
1
Facts: Complainant Alberto Naldoza, accused in the aforestated
cases ran for reelection in the May 8 Barangay elections. The
spouses Generoso Flame and Lucia Flame and the spouses Marlon
Piedad and Rosemarie Piedad thereafter accused complainant of
vote-buying in winning the election. Accordingly, the Chief of
Police of Miagao with whom the charge was lodged, filed two
separate complaints against Naldoza for vote-buying. Respondent
examined the private complainants, adopting for the purpose the
transcript of the question-and-answer type of examination conducted
by the Chief of Police and sworn before him by the parties.
Respondent issued an order finding probable cause to believe
complainant Naldoza committed the crime charged, and respondent
thereupon issued the warrants for complainants arrest.
Subsequently, respondent issued another order, reconsidering his
order, insofar as it referred the cases to the Comelec. The cases
were instead remanded to the Chief of Police of Miagao, Iloilo with
instructions to file the same directly with the provincial
prosecutor. The warrants of arrest were lifted and complainants
release was ordered. Issue: Whether or not there is ignorance of
the law for failure to comply with Section 4 of Comelec resolution
No. 2695, authorizing chiefs of police to conduct the preliminary
investigation of charges for violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. Held: Yes, service in the judiciary means a continuous study
and research on the law from beginning to the end. A judge owes it
to the public and to the legal profession to know the factual basis
of the complaint and the very law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. A reduced fine is deemed proper where there is
no malice or evil intent in a judges actuations in unwarrantedly
conducting a preliminary investigation and in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest.
Election Laws
2
KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 128054, Oct. 16, 1997 )
Election Offense, B. Jurisdiction Over Election Offenses Facts:
Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)
under Republic Act No. 7180, allocates a specific amount of
government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and
activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said
amount should have the following mandatory requirements: (1)
Approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) Release of the
amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3)
List of projects and activities. Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then
DILG Secretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into,
sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited NonGovernmental
Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize them to implement the
projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180. Respondent
Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the
abovementioned request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was
extended to all the Regional Directors of the DILG. Pursuant to the
above-described authority granted him, respondent Tiburcio Relucio,
on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with an
accredited NGO known as the Philippine Youth Health and Sports
Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from
petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of two serious
violations of election laws, among them that the amount of P70
million was released by the Budget Department, shortly before the
elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of PYHSDFI a private entity,
which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices
in said elections and requesting that these offenses and
malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially,
without fear of favor. Issue: Based on recommendations by the
Comelec Law Department, the Commission en banc dismissed the
letter-complaint for lack of evidence. Held: The constitutional and
statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute
cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an
information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course
of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should
be issued. Although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is
needed to support a finding of probable cause, the same cannot be
justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary
or probative value in this jurisdiction.
Election Laws
3
CORPUZ vs. TANODBAYAN ( 149 SCRA 281 ) Election Offense, B.
Jurisdiction Over Election Offenses Facts: Petitioners were members
of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January
30, 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of
the Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was
then a candidate and later elected mayor in the same election.
Private respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for
vice-mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President
Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election
Code, specifically for electioneering and / or campaigning inside
the voting centers during the election. Regional Election Director
of San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and on
September 29, 1981, submitted its report recommending to the
Comelec the dismissal of the complaint. Private respondent Mangaser
formally withdrew his charges filed with the Comelec stating his
intention to refile it with the Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981
the Comelec dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary
investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan
against the same parties and on the same charges previously
dismissed by the Comelec. The Tanodbayan asserted exclusive
authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the Comelec
Chairman that a lawyer of the Comelec if not properly deputized as
a Tanodbayan prosecutor has not authority to conduct preliminary
investigation s and prosecute offenses committed by Comelec
officials in relation to their office. Issue: Whether or not the
Tanodbayan has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
election offenses. Held: Comelec, not the Tanodbayan, or
Sandiganbayan, has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses committed by a private individual or
public officer or employee. Nature of the offense, not the
personality of the offender, is important.
Election Laws COMELEC vs. NOYNAY ( 292 SCRA 254 ) Election
Offense, B. Jurisdiction Over Election Offenses
4
Facts: In an Order issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge
Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio
ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the
Comelec Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate
Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of
B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. no. 7691, the Regional Trial Court
has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable
penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of
imprisonment. Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7691 has divested
Regional Trial Courts or jurisdiction over election offenses, which
are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six years. Held:
By virtue of the exception provided for in opening sentence of
section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by
specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Pursuant to Section
268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall
within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa 129. Republic Act 7691 can by no means
be considered as a special law on jurisdiction it is merely an
amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 and it does not have the effect of
repealing laws vesting upon the Regional trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to heart and decide
the cases therein specified. Congress may thus provide by law that
a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined
by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed
as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts.
However, Congress never intended that R. A. no. 7691 should repeal
such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that
it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129 providing for the exception.
Election Laws PEOPLE vs. REYES ( 247 SCRA 328 ) Election
Offense, A. Election Offenses
5
Facts: Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs,
Collection District II, Manila International Container Port (MICP)
Customs Personnel Order assigned Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs
Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of
Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. Ebio filed with the
Comelec a letter complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed
that his new assignment violated Comelec Resolution No. 2333 and
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, which
prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days
before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections.
Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the
information on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute
an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14,
1992 did not violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date the act was
not yet punishable as an election offense. It purportedly became
punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity of
Comelec Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P.
Blg. 881. The trial court granted private respondents motion to
quash and dismissed the criminal case. Issue: Whether or not
transfer is violative of section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Held:
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the
transfer of a government officer or employee during the election
period. If done to promote efficiency in the government service.
Hence, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2333 provides that the Comelec
has to pass upon the reason for the proposed transfer or detail.
Prescinding from this predicate, two elements must be established
to prove a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1)
The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee
within the election period as fixed by the Comelec; and (2) The
transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the
Comelec in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.
An officer cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261 (h)
of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, before the effectivity of
Comelec Resolution No. 2333 promulgating the necessary implementing
rules.
Election Laws MAPPALA vs. NUEZ ( 240 SCRA 600 ) Election
Offense, A. Election Offenses
6
Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by Jacinto
Mappala against Judge Crispulo A. Nuez, the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabangan, Isabela for gross
inefficiency, serious misconduct and violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics. In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro
shot complainant inside Precinct No. 2, located at the elementary
school building in Sto. Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay
elections. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the one who
surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender of the weapon was
an implied admission that it was the one used by Alejandro in
shooting complainant. Inspite of all these findings, respondent
acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly weapon inside a
precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while
he was inside the precinct. Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge
erred in ruling that Alejandro was not in violation of illegal
possession of firearms. Held: To support a conviction under Sec.
261 (p) of the Omnibus Election Code, is not necessary that the
deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was
in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom, as it
is enough that he carried the deadly weapon in the polling place or
within 100 meters thereof during any of the specified days and
hours.
Election Laws
7
JAVIER vs. COMELEC ( 144 SCRA 194 ) Election Contests, G.
Interpretation of Certain Words and Phrases Facts: The petitioner
and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to
enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of
being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On
the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came
to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed
and killed, allegedly by the latters men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the
Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling
party. It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the
post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what
he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondents
proclamation, the petitioner went to the Comelec to question the
canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and
the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division
of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court,
arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a
division and not by the Comelec en banc as required by the
Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the
Comelec authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held: Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides
that: The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions. All
election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except
contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be
heard and decided en banc.
Election Laws
8
MALALUAN vs. COMELEC ( 254 SCRA 397 ) Election Contests, F.
Award of Damages Facts: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private
respondent Jose Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the
Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Private respondent was
proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected
Mayor with a winning margin of 706 votes. Petitioner filed an
election protest with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court
declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor with a
plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found
private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses
but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was
granted by the court. Subsequently the First Division of the
Comelec ordered Malaluan to vacate the office. The Comelec en banc
affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition on May 31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant
to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in
the May 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition,
thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns
petitioners right to the mayoralty seat because expiration of the
term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of
rendering the same moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not the
Comelec gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited
damages in favor of private respondent. Held: The overriding
requirement for a valid and proper award of damages is that the
same is in accordance with law, specifically, the provisions of the
Civil Code pertinent to damages. The Omnibus Election Code provides
that actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election
contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law.
Comelec Rules of Procedure provide that in all election contests
the Court may adjudicate damages and attorneys fees as it may deem
just and as established by the evidence if the aggrieved party has
included such claims in his pleadings. Notwithstanding his
subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective
official who has been proclaimed by the Comelec as winner in an
electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the
performance of the duties of office is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided for that
position. The emolument must go to the person who rendered the
service unless the contrary is provided.
Election Laws
9
ATIENZA vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 108533, Dec. 20 1994 ) Election
Contests, F. Award of Damages Facts: Private respondent Antonio G.
Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in
the 1998 local elections. Following Sias proclamation, petitioner
filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court questioning
the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the
municipality. Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower
court, petitioner obtained a plurality of 12 votes over the private
respondent. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision
declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and
ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount
of P300,856.19 representing petitioners expenses in the election
protest. Private respondent appealed. Meanwhile, the Regional trial
Court granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal,
which was opposed by respondent. The Comelec issued a preliminary
injunction stopping the enforcement of the order of execution. The
Comelec, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside
the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to
assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending
resolution of his appeal. However, following the synchronized
elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the
Comelecs Second Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992
dismissing petitioners appeal for being moot and academic. Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the lower courts judgment. Held: The dismissal of an
appeal in an election protest case for having become moot and
academic due to the election of new municipal officials referred
only to that part of the appealed judgment which was affected by
the election and not to that portion relating to the award of
damages. However, it would appear virtually impossible for a party
in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory
damages in the absence of a law expressly providing for situations
allowing for the recovery of the same. This, petitioner has been
unable to do. The intent of the legislature to do away with
provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred
in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission
clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid in
fine, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for
the granting of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with
law. The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely
recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without damage or
damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor
creates a civil obligation.
Election Laws ZACATE vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 144678, Mar. 1, 2001
) Election Contests, E. Execution Pending Appeal
10
Facts: Petitioner Javier E. Zacate and private respondent Thelma
C. Baldado were candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, in the May, 1998 elections.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers, proclaimed private respondent as
the duly elected mayor having garnered 2,958 votes as against the
2,719 votes of petitioner, private respondent winning by 239 votes.
Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial
Court of Borongan, Samar. The trial court declared petitioner as
the duly elected Mayor with only one vote as his winning margin. On
the same date private respondent filed a notice of appeal. The
following day, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal which private respondent opposed on the
ground that she had already perfected her appeal. The trial court
rendered a Supplemental Decision, correcting the winning margin of
petitioner to 2 votes instead of 1 vote and at the same time denied
the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal filed by
petitioner and ordered further the transmission of the complete
records of the protest case to the Comelec. Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration to reverse denial of his motion
for execution pending appeal. After hearing, the trial court issued
a Resolution reversing its Supplemental Decision. The Resolution
ruled that the trial court still had jurisdiction over the motion
for execution pending appeal, that there are good and valid reasons
for granting the same. Issue: Whether or not the trial court has
jurisdiction of the case and whether or not discretionary execution
is proper. Held: Discretionary execution is barred when the trial
court loses jurisdiction and this occurs when all the parties have
filed their respective appeals or when the period to appeal has
lapsed for those who did not file their appeals and when the court
is no longer in possession of the records of the case. The
perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period
is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to so
renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives
the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment much less to entertain the appeal. While petitioner timely
filed motion for execution pending appeal, petitioner belatedly
filed the motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion
for execution pending appeal rendering said denial final and
executory. While the Supplemental Decision wrongly denied
petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, the remedy left
for petitioner then was to timely seek relief from the erroneous
ruling. This petitioner failed to do.
Election Laws
11
ASMALA vs. COMELEC ( 289 SCRA 746 ) Election Contests, E.
Execution Pending Appeal Facts: In the elections of May 8, 1995,
eight candidates vied for the position of Vice Mayor for the
Municipality of Tuburan, Province of Basilan. The canvass of votes
by the Municipal Board of canvassers, indicated that Hadji Husni
Mohammad garnered 3,065 votes, Emmanuel Manny Alano 2,912 votes,
and Halim Asmala got 2,542 votes. On the basis of the aforesaid
results of canvass of votes, Hadji Husni Mohammad was proclaimed,
and later he assumed office as Vice Mayor of Tuburan. On May 22,
1995, Halim Asmala filed an election protest with the Regional
Trial Court of Basilan. The protest alleged that election fraud and
other irregularities tainted the election and canvass of votes.
During the hearing, the court a quo found that several ballots were
written by just one hand while other ballots were prepared by only
two persons. Consequently, such ballots were invalidated. The trial
court rendered its decision crediting Halim Asmala, the herein
petitioner, with 2,130 votes, Emmanuel Alano with 1,920 votes and
Hadji Husni Mohammad with 1,729 votes, and adjudging petitioner the
duly elected Vice Mayor of Tuburan, Province of Basilan. After the
promulgation of the aforementioned decision, private respondent
Hadji Husni Mohammed filed his Notice of Appeal with the same
Regional Trial Court. On the following day, the petitioner
presented a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Thereto, private
respondent interposed his opposition, theorizing that his perfected
appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to resolve the
Motion foe Execution Pending Appeal. Issue: Whether or not filing
of notice of appeal divests a trial court of its jurisdiction over
a case. Held: The mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest
the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending
incidents. Where the motion for execution pending appeal was filed
within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, the filing
of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is of no moment and
does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve the
motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal
because the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part
of the records to be elevated on appeal. Filing by one party of an
appeal on the same day the judgment was rendered does not deprive
the other party of the right to avail himself of the entire period
of five days within which to appeal, if he so desires including
motions for execution pending appeal. An appeal is perfected upon
the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party it is not
perfected on the date the notice of appeal was filed.
Election Laws
12
ROBERTO D. RAMAS vs. COMELEC ( 286 SCRA 189 ) Election Contests,
E. Execution Pending Appeal Facts: Petitioners and private
respondents were the official candidates of the NPC Lakas-NUCD for
elective municipal positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur. After
the canvass of election returns, petitioners were proclaimed as the
duly elected municipal officials therein. Private respondents
seasonably filed an election protest with the RTC of Pagadian City
which ruled in their favor. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion
for Immediate Execution of Decision pending Appeal, however,
petitioner filed an Opposition to this Motion. The trial court
issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.
COMELEC concurs with the trial courts decision, hence, this
petition. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it concurs with the decision of the trial court.
Held: The Supreme Court held the it has explicitly recognized and
given approval to execution of judgments pending appeal in election
cases filed under existing election laws. All that was required for
a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending
appeal was that the immediate execution should be based upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale why such
executionis allowed in election cases is to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which
is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board
of canvassers. To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant
execution pending appeal would bring back the ghost of the
grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to
perpetuate their hold to an elective office. The following
constitutes good reasons, and a combination of two or more of them
will suffice to grant the execution pending appeal: (1) public
interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness
of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; (3)
the length of time that the election contest has been pending. In
this case, all elements was present, considering that this has been
pending for a year, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
Election Laws MANUEL C. SUNGA vs. COMELEC ( 288 SCRA 76 )
13
Election Contests, D. Distinction between Quo Warranto in
Elective and Appointive office Facts: Petitioner was one of the
candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig,
Cagayan in the May 1995 Elections. Private respondent Trinidad was
then the incumbent Mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the
same municipality. Sunga filed a complaint accusing Trinidad of
violation of the Omnibus Election Code for using threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion. Hearings were
held wherein Sunga adduced evidence while Trinidad opted not to
submit any evidence. The election results showed that Trinidad
garnered the highest number of votes while Sunga trailed second.
The complaint filed by Sunga was denied by COMELEC ruling that the
petitions filed shall be deemed to be the amended petition filed on
May 11,1995 which was clearly filed after the election mandates the
dismissal of the disqualification case. Issue: Whether or not
COMELEC can hear and decide disqualification cases against winning
candidates even after the election. Held: The Supreme Court ruled
that COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. The fact that
Trinidad was already proclaimed and has assumed the position of
mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to
continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification
case. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was
elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. Hence, Sunga cannot claim the right to take the oath for
the mayoral office because the Local Government Code clearly
provides that in case of disqualification of the one proclaimed for
the said office, the vice-mayor shall assume office.
Election Laws BENJAMIN P. ABELLA vs. COMELEC ( 201 SCRA 253
)
14
Election Contests, D. Distinction between Quo Warranto in
Elective and Appointive office Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela
Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition
with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running
as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her
residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was
alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same
office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the
Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed
the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who
gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take
his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. Issue: Whether or not the
candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as
governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No.
88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local
elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded
with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of
the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a
qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net
effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate.
Election Laws
15
BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC ( 243 SCRA 538 ) Election
Contests, C. Quo Warranto Facts: It is averred that at the time
respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft
of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court
of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest,
it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on
account of his alleged flight from that country. Before the May
1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents
certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidates
disqualification was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the
petition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of
Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against
private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the
petition. Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a
criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of
arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice. Held: The
Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Article
73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified
from running for any elective local position: (a) xxxx
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has
been convicted by final judgment. It is clear from this provision
that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been
convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any
definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive
from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo
warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve
and proceed with the case.
Election Laws
16
MELANIO SAMPAYAN, et al. vs. RAUL DAZA, et al. ( 213 SCRA 807 )
Election Contests, C. Quo Warranto Facts: Petitioners filed a
petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of
their congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise
the functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a
greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United
States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or
declaration renounced his status as permanent resident thereby
violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987
Constitution (section 18, Article III). Respondent Congressman
filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident
of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had
long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on
August 12, 1985. Issue: Whether or not respondent Daza should be
disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: The
Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is
moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by
petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the
respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his
term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.
Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the
House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns
and qualification of its members. The petitioners appropriate
remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent
Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election for a quo
warranto case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days
after Dazas proclamation.
Election Laws
17
JIMMY S. DE CASTRO vs. COMELEC ( 267 SCRA 806 ) Election
Contests, B. Election Protest Facts: Petitioner De Castro was
proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during the 1995
Elections, so as the private respondent as Vice-Mayor of the same
municipality. The late Nicolas Jamilla filed an election protest
before the RTC of Pinamulayan, Oriental Mindoro. During the
pendency of the said contest, he died. Shortly thereafter, the RTC
dismissed the election protest ruling that as this case is
personal, the death of the protestant extinguishes the case itself.
When private respondent learned about the dismissal, he filed a
motion for intervention and/or substitution in the same case which
the petitioner opposed. The motion of private respondent was
denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the COMELEC assailing that the trial courts orders were issued with
rave abuse of discretion. COMELEC grants the petition ruling that
an election contest survives the death of the protestant or the
protestee. Issue: Is an Election Contest a personal action
extinguished upon the death of the real party in interest? Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Court held that while
the right to public office is personal and exclusive to the public
officer, and election protest is not purely personal and exclusive
to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. The assertion of petitioner that private respondent is
not the real party in interest entitled to be substituted in the
election protest in place of the late Jamilla is Utterly without
legal basis.
Election Laws
18
ALAN M. LOYOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 245 SCRA 477 ) Election
Contests, B. Election Protest Facts: In the barangay election of
May 1994, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Poblacion,
Tangalan, Aklan on May 10, 1994. Private respondent Fernandez filed
an election protest against the petitioner on May 18, 1994.
However, the petition was not accompanied by a certification of
non- forum shopping required under Administrative Circular No.
04-94 of the Supreme Court. The following day, May 1994, the
private respondent submitted to the MCTC his certification of
non-forum shopping. On May 25, 1994, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the protest due to private respondents failure to strictly
comply with the Circular. The MCTC issued an order denying the
motion to dismiss. The RTC of Aklan denied the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit. Issue: Whether
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is mandatory and jurisdictional,
and whether it is applicable in election cases. Held: The filing of
the certification was within the period for filing an election
protest. When petitioner was proclaimed as the Punong Barangay on
May 10, 1994, respondent has ten days from such proclamation within
which to file the election protest. In this case, when respondent
filed his certificate of non-forum shopping on My 19, 1994, it was
within the reglementary period provided for in the Omnibus Election
Code, thus, he still has until May 20, 1994 to complete the
requirements of his petition. Also, the fact that the Circular
requires that it should be strictly complied with merely
underserves its mandatory nature in that it cannot dispensed with
or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances. There is nothing in the Circular that
indicates that it does not apply to election cases. On the
contrary, it expressly provides that the requirements therein shall
be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions,
applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and
agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Election Laws
19
DANILO GATCHALIAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 245 SCRA 208 ) Election
Contests, B. Election Protest Facts: Gatchalian and Aruelo were
rivals for the office of the Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in the
May 11, 1992 Elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed Vice-Mayor by a
margin of four votes on May 13, 1992. On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed
with the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul the proclamation of
Gatchalian. He also filed on June 2, 1992 with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan an election protest. When Gatchalian received the summons,
instead of filing an answer, he filed a motion to dismissw on the
following grounds: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b)
there was a pending pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC, hence
the protest was premature; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the
prescribed fees. The pre-proclamation case was denied by COMELEC,
but the Motion to Dismiss was denied by the trial court, hence this
petition. Issue: Should the proclamation contest be denied? Also,
should the election contest be dismissed for failure to pay the
filing fees? Held: On the first issue, the Court held that Aruelo
filed with the COMELEC preproclamation case against Gatchalian nine
days after May 13, 1992, the latters proclamation date. The filinf
of the pre-proclamation case suspended the running of the period
within which to file the election protest which was one day after
June 22, 1992. He filed the election protest on June 2, 1992 with
the trial court ex abudante cautela. On second the issue, the Court
held that, indeed, respondent failed to pay the required filing fee
of P300,00 for the election protest prescribed by the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for it is the
payment of the filing fee that vests jurisdiction of the court over
the election protest.
Election Laws
20
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. FIDEL RAMOS ( 253 SCRA 559 )
Election Contests, B. Election Protest Facts: The protestant lost
in the May 1992 Election. In her Motion of 16 August 1995,
reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining
precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision
process in the pilot areas be deemed computed. The Court deferred
action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and
protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this
petition. Issue: Whether or not the election protest filed by
Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator in the
May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on June 30,
1995. Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. The Court
held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned
or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and
functions thereof. The protestant abandoned her determination to
protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of
who is the real choice of the electorate. Moreover, the dismissal
of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate
the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential
elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political
stability of the nation during this period of national
recovery.
Election Laws
21
BENJAMIN F. ARAO vs. COMELEC ( 210 SCRA 290 ) Election Contests,
B. Election Protest Facts: Petitioner Arao and private respondent
Pulmones were candidates for the office of City Mayor of Pagadian
City in the January 18, 1988 local elections. After canvassing the
votes, petitioner garnered 12,447 votes, while Pulmones got only
12,030 votes. Consequently on January 21, 1988, petitioner was
proclaimed City Mayor-elect of Pagadian City. Private respondent
filed his Protest with COMELEC particularly alleging that fraud and
anomalies were rampant in practically all the voting centers in
Pagadian City on January 28, 1988. He also filed an amended protest
on February 15, 1988 or after the ten day period to file an
election protest. The First Division of COMELEC denied the said
amended protest. Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc granted the
amended protest and declared Pulmones as the duly elected mayor of
Pagadian City and ordered petitioner to vacate his office and
surrender the same to private respondent. Issue: Whether or not
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Pulmones
as the duly elected Mayor of Pagadian City. Held: The extraordinary
power of the Supreme Court to pass upon an order or decision of
COMELEC should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution,
while giving it the highest regard and respect due a constitutional
body. For, not every abuse of discretion justifies the original
action of certiorari, it must be grave. Nor any denial of Due
Process within its ambit, it must be patent and it must be
substantial. The test therefore is whether petitioner has
demonstrated convincingly that COMELEC has committed grave abuse of
discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process in issuing the challenged
decision. Here, petitioner has utterly failed. The complaint of
petitioner against the alleged omission of COMELEC to state the
reasons for its conclusion that certain ballots were with identical
handwritings, some marked and others stray, does not in any
magnitude diminish the straight forward statement of the public
respondent that it painstakingly examined and appreciated
individually the contested ballots for both protestant and
protestee in accordance with existing norms. Consequently
petitioner may be deemed to have waived his right to question the
Resolution when he failed to act accordingly despite the
opportunity to do so. He should not be permitted, in other words to
remain mute and unaffected in the face of a perceived
jurisdictional defect and, worse, profit from his acquiescence only
to grumble in the end when it turns out to be prejudicial to his
interest.
Election Laws
22
GALIDO vs. COMELEC ( 193 SCRA 78 ) Election Contests, A.
Jurisdiction over Election Contests Facts: Petitioner Galido and
private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988
local elections for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner
was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an
election protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court
upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed
the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the
RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected
mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division.
The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct
containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots
and, therefore, invalid. Undaunted by his previous failed actions
the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and
injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a
temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition,
private respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C),
Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that Final
decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests
involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and
not appealable. Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it
sets aside the trial courts decision involving marked ballots, be
brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the
aggrieved party? Held: The fact that decisions, final orders or
rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not
preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action
of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution,
which petitioner cites, it is stated, Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
thereof. We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. We do
not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC has the inherent
power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity,
law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of
its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such
precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which
should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to
the prejudice of either party. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
DIMISSSED.
Election Laws
23
Election Laws
24
FLORES vs. COMELEC ( 184 SCRA 484 ) Election Contests, A.
Jurisdiction over Election Contests Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores
was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest
number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in
Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong
barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his
election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed
second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and
installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after
deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. Flores
appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in
toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for Flores only,
without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have
been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between
the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad.
The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2,
demoting him to second place. The petitioner went to the COMELEC,
which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to
review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679,
that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the
municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact
shall be final and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari,
the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners
appeal. Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or
Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering
Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679? Held: The dismissal of the appeal is
justified, but on an entirely different and more significant
ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution,
providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal or Metropolitan
Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in
barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence,
the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should
have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC.
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides
that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a
barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be
declared unconstitutional.
Election Laws RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA ( 243 SCRA 502 ) Election
Contests, A. Jurisdiction over Election Contests
25
Facts: In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner
Relampagos and private respondent Cumba were candidates for Mayor
of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the
winning candidate, with a margin of twenty-two votes over the
former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an
election protest with the RTC which found the petitioner to have
won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On 4 July 1994, the
private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The
petitioner, on 12 July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion
for execution pending appeal, which the trial court granted On 3
August 1994. The private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of execution which was denied on 5
August 1994. The private respondent then filed with the respondent
COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of
the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal
and the writ of execution. On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC
promulgated its resolution granting the petition. Accordingly,
petitioner was ordered restored to her position as Municipal Mayor,
pending resolution of the appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved
by the resolution, the petitioner filed this special civil action.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where
it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction? Held: The Court in
concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P.
697 has not been repealed by the Omnibus Election Code, held that
the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and
whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioners motion
for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution.
Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the
period for the perfection of the appeal. Since the motion for
execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after
the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer
validly act thereon. COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly
set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.
Election Laws
26
MALALUAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( 254 SCRA 397 ) Election
Contests, A. Jurisdiction over Election Contests Facts: Private
respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato as against petitioner Luis Malaluan. The latter filed an
election protest with the RTC, which declared petitioner as the
duly elected mayor. Acting without precedent, the court found
private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses
but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC.
Petitioner, for his part, filed a motion for execution pending
appeal which was granted by the trial court. Petitioner then
assumed and exercised the powers and functions of said office. This
did not last, because the First Division of the COMELEC ordered
Malaluan to vacate the office, having found private respondent to
be the rightful winner and awarded damages, consisting of attorneys
fees, actual expenses for zerox copies, unearned salary and other
emoluments for the period, en masse denominated as actual damages,
notwithstanding the fact that the electoral controversy had become
moot and academic on account of the expiration of the term of
office. The COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision. Hence, Malaluan
filed this petition. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor
of private respondent? Held: The decision of a judicial body is a
basis for a winning candidates right to assume office. We deem
petitioner, therefore, to be a de facto officer and is thus legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office. Section 259 of the
Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election
cases of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law.
The victorious party in an election case cannot be indemnified for
expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation
clearly attributable to the losing party. If any damage had been
suffered by private respondent due to the execution of judgment
pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum
absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or damage or
injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without
violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the
law provides no remedy. That portion of the decision awarding
actual damages to private respondent Joseph Evangelista is hereby
declared null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
Election Laws ALVAREZ vs. COMELEC (GR No. 142527 March 01, 2001
) Election Contests, A. Jurisdiction over Election Contests
27
Facts: On May 12, 1997, petitioner Arsenio Alvarez, with 590
votes, was proclaimed Punong Barangay of Doa Aurora, Quezon City,
his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585
votes. Private respondent filed an election protest in the
Metropolitan Trial Court claiming irregularities in the reading and
appreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After
a recount of the ballots in the contested precincts, the Trial
Court ruled that the private respondent won the election, garnering
596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes. On appeal, the COMELECs
Second Division ruled that private respondent won over petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, private
respondent filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which
petitioner opposed. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division.
It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal. Petitioner
brought before the Supreme Court this petition for Certiorari
assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirming the
Resolution of its Second Division alleging that the COMELEC En Banc
granted the respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal when
the appeal was no longer pending, thus the motion had become
obsolete and unenforceable. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely acted on the
Motion for Execution pending appeal? Held: We note that when the
motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a
motion for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending
motion for reconsideration suspended the execution of the
resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then, the division
must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second
Division resolved both petitioners motion for reconsideration and
private respondents motion for execution pending appeal, it did so
in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELEC abused its
discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal. Petition
is DISMISSED, and the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC is
AFFIRMED.
Election Laws CASTROMAYOR vs. COMELEC (250 SCRA298)
Pre-Proclamation Controversy, D. Procedure
28
Facts: Petitioner Castromayor was a candidate for a seat in the
eight-member Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Calinog,
Iloilo in the elections held in May 1995. The winners were
proclaimed on the basis of the canvass which showed that petitioner
received votes for the eighth place. When Alice Garin, Chairman of
the MBC, rechecked the totals in the Statement of Votes the
following day, she discovered that the number of votes cast for
Nilda Demorito, as member of the Sanguniang Bayan, was 62 more than
that credited to her. As Garin later explained to the Provincial
Election Supervisor, the returns from one precinct had been
overlooked in the computation of the totals, therefore, the total
number of votes cast for Demorito was 51 votes more than the votes
cast for petitioner. Garin reported the matter to the Regional
Election Director, who advised her to request authority from the
COMELEC to reconvene for the purpose of correcting the error. A fax
letter was sent to the Law Department of the COMELEC in Manila
explaining the problem and asking for the authority to reconvene
and correct the error, to annul the proclamation of petitioner and
proclaim Demorito as the eighth member of the Sangguniang Bayan. A
formal letter was later sent to the COMELEC and the same issued a
resolution annulling the proclamation of Castromayor and proclaimed
Demorito as the duly elected eighth member. Petitioner protested
the proposed action and questioned the legality of the actuations
of Garin. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion when he was not afforded with right to refute the
resolution of the COMELEC? Held: No. MBC proclamations may be
raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its
constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections.
What has just been said also disposes of petitioners other
contention that because his proclamation has already been made, any
remedy of the losing party is an election protest. Where a
proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation
at all and the proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot
deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul
the proclamation. The MBCs action to reconvene for purposes of
correction of errors is valid under Rule 27 Sec. 7 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. Though it pertains to preproclamation
proceedings and here proclamation of petitioner has been made,
there is nothing to suggest the it cannot be applied to the case at
bar, in which the validity of the proclamation is precisely in
question.
Election Laws
29
DUREMDES vs. COMELEC ( 178 SCRA 746 ) Pre-Proclamation
Controversy, D. Procedure Facts: Petitioner Ramon D. Duremdes,
private respondent Cipriano B. Penaflorida, and Rufino Palabrica
ran for the office of Vice-Governor of the Province of Iloilo.
During the canvass of votes by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Iloilo, Penaflorida objected verbally to some 110 election
returns from various precincts, which he followed up with written
objections. The Board overruled the same in separate Orders either
because they were not timely filed or that the formal defects did
not affect the genuineness of the returns, or that in case of
allegations of tampering, no evidence was presented to support the
charge. COMELEC an Appeal by Way of a Petition for Review, from the
aforesaid rulings of the Board pleading, among others, for the
exclusion of the questioned election returns and for Penaflorida s
proclamation as the elected Vice-Governor of Iloilo. Penaflorida
filed, also with the COMELEC, a Petition seeking the annulment of
election returns and the suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate. The Board proclaimed Duremdes as the duly elected
Vice-Governor. Duremdes took his oath and assumed office. COMELEC
after hearing, issued a Per Curiam Resolution, sustaining the
rulings of the Board of Canvassers on Penafloridas objections, as
well as Duremdes proclamation. Duremdes faults the COMELEC with
grave abuse of discretion for having disregarded the well-settled
doctrines (1) that matters of protest, objections or issues not
originally raised before the Board of Canvassers upon the opening
of the returns, cannot be raised for the first time before the
COMELEC; and (2) that after a proclamation has been made, a
preproclamation controversy is no longer viable, the proper
recourse being an election protest. Issue: Whether or not the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies not
raised before the Board of Canvassers level? Held: Yes. The COMELEC
has the power to decide all questions affecting elections (Article
IX[C] Section 2[3], 1987 Constitution), a question pertaining to
the proceedings of said Board may be raised directly with the
COMELEC as a preproclamation controversy. When so elevated, the
COMELEC acts in the exercise of its original jurisdiction for which
reason it is not indispensable that the issue be raised before the
Board of Canvassers during the canvassing. The COMELEC is not
discharging its appellate jurisdiction under Section 245 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which has to do with contests regarding the
inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns, with
a prescribed appellate procedure to follow. Matters of correction
of the statement of votes may be the subject of a pre proclamation
case which may be filed directly with the Commission.
Election Laws VILLAROYA vs. COMELEC ( 155 SCRA 633 )
Pre-Proclamation Controversy, D. Procedure
30
Facts: Petitioner Villaroya and private respondent Roa were
among the congressional candidates in Cagayan de Oro City.
Villaroya garnered 38,222 votes, while respondent Roa got a total
of 38,196 votes, with a plurality of 6 votes, in favor of
petitioner Villaroya. Due to the protest of the lawyers of Roa,
Villaroya was not proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers. Roa filed
a petition in the COMELEC contesting the election claiming fraud,
duress, falsification and other grounds. Upon a formal request made
by Roa, the Board of Canvassers furnished her a copy of the
Statement of Votes. Roa filed with the Board of Canvassers a
protest for the error or mistake in the tabulation of the election
returns based on such copy. COMELEC directed the Board of
Canvassers to reconvene to verify the election. After the
verification of the election returns Roa was proclaimed. Petitioner
filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction alleging that Roa not
having filed an objection with the Board of Canvassers during the
canvassing, deprived the COMELEC of appellate jurisdiction to
entertain Roas petition for the verification of the election return
in question and that the question was not proper for a
pre-proclamation controversy but in an election contest that should
be brought before the house electoral tribunal. Villaroya further
alleged that the direct filing of the protest with the COMELEC did
not make it a pre-proclamation controversy; that the decision of
the COMELEC authorizing such verification by the Board of
Canvassers was illegal, arbitrary and was issued without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether or
not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the City Board of Canvassers to verify the election returns and
that the subject protest must be filed with the electoral tribunal.
Held: No. It must be observed further, that there is no plausible
reason to prohibit an aggrieved candidate from filing an objection
regarding the election returns directly before the Comelec itself
if the election irregularities that vitiate the integrity of the
election returns are not apparent upon their faces. What is
therefore involved is the original jurisdiction of the Comelec
rather than its appellate jurisdiction for precisely the objection
is filed not before the Board of Canvassers because the
irregularities are not apparent upon the face of the election
returns. The Commission en banc rules, therefore, that the protest
or objection filed by Petitioner Bernardita Roa after discovery of
the discrepancy in the Statement of Votes was filed seasonably.
Election Laws ALFONSO vs. COMELEC ( GR 107847, June 2, 1997 )
Pre-Proclamation Controversy, D. Procedure
31
Facts: In the May 11, 1992 elections, Pedro Alfonso ran for
councilor in the First District of Manila, which is entitled to
elect six councilors. On the eve of the elections, Pedro Alfonso
died. His daughter Irma Alfonso, petitioner herein, filed her
certificate of candidacy in substitution for her deceased father.
After the canvassing of the election returns by respondent City
Board of Canvassers, the results of the elections for councilors
for the First District of Manila were announced as follows: 1st -
Ernesto Nieva-60101, 2nd - Gonzalo Gonzales-44744, 3rd - Honorio
Lopez-35803, 4th Pedro Alfonso-34648, 5th - Avelino Cailian-32462,
6th - Roberto Ocampo-31264, 7th - Alberto Domingo-28715.
Apparently, the City Board of Canvassers added the votes of Pedro
Alfonso to those of petitioners thereby placing her in the fourth
slot. Consequently, private respondent questioned such action. He
prayed that the votes cast for Pedro Alfonso be declared as stray
votes and that, he be proclaimed as the sixth winner for councilor.
The COMELEC resolved private respondents petition declaring votes
cast in favor of Pedro Alfonso as stray votes and to CREDIT in
favor of respondent Irma Alfonso only those votes cast with the
name ALFONSO or IRMA ALFONSO. Petitioner thereby questioned said
resolution before this Court, which dismissed the aforesaid
petition in a minute resolution, after finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners motion for recount? Held: No. At the outset,
petitioners prayer for a reopening of the ballots is not a proper
issue for a pre-proclamation controversy. The issues raised by
petitioner should be threshed out in election protest. Errors in
the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper
subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation
of ballots. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts
is not a proceeding of the board of canvassers for purposes of
pre-proclamation proceedings under Section 241, Omnibus Election
Code, but of the boards of election inspectors who are called upon
to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of
appreciation provided in Section 211, Omnibus Election Code.
Otherwise stated, the appreciation of ballots is not part of the
proceedings of the board of canvassers. The complete election
returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie
considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and
proclamation of the winning candidates.
Election Laws
32
MATALAM vs. COMELEC ( 271 SCRA 733 ) Pre-Proclamation
Controversy, D. Procedure Facts: Petitioner Matalarn and Private
Respondent Candao were both candidates for Governor of the Province
of Maguindanao in the May 1995 elections. During the canvass of the
election returns in the municipalities of Datu Piang and Maganoy,
Petitioner challenged before the respective Municipal Boards of
Canvassers the authenticity of the election returns in said towns.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers rejected the pleas of the
petitioner, thus a petition for exclusion of the results of the
said municipalities were filed before the COMELEC. During the
pendency of the action, respondent was proclaimed duly elected
governor. The same proclamation was nullified by the second
division of the COMELEC and thereafter reinstated the proclamation.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner and for
technical examination of signatures and thumbmarks of registered
voters. The same was denied, hence a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner further claims that the returns in one municipality were
falsified and spurious as there was actually no election conducted
in that place and in some precints, the number of votes exceeded
the number of voters. Issues: 1. Whether or not the questioned
election returns be the proper subjects of a preproclamation
controversy? 2. Whether or not the COMELEC may go beyond the face
of election returns in a preproclamation case? Held: 1. No. The
Omnibus Election Code defines a pre-proclamation controversy as any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns. The issues raised by the petitioner are not among those
enumerated under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
enumeration therein is restrictive and exclusive. Petitioner did
not claim and failed to characterize the returns as incomplete,
contain material defects, appear to be tampered with falsified, or
contain discrepancies. 2. No. The COMELEC is not required to go
beyond election returns which are on their face regular and
authentic. The proper remedy available to the petitioner in this
case is election protest. Pre-proclamation controversies are to be
resolved in a summary proceedings and should not subject the
returns to meticulous technical examinations.Technical examination
is not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Election Laws
33
MENTANG vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 11037, Feb. 4, 1994 )
Pre-Proclamation Controversy, D. Procedure Facts: Petitioner
Mentang was certified and proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvasser as the third and last winning candidate for Regional
Assemblyman in the Second District of Maguindanao over private
respondent Ali Bernan for garnering 2,000 more votes than the
latter. He took his oath of office as a duly elected member of the
Regional Legislative Assembly. Private respondent learned of the
proclamation on a Sunday. On the fifth day following the
proclamation, he filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Correct
Manifest Error and Annul the Proclamation of petitioner Mentang and
asked that he be proclaimed instead as the third winning candidate
for Assemblyman in the Second District of Maguindanao. Petitioner
questioned COMELECs jurisdiction to hear and decide private
respondents petition on the ground that being a pre-proclamation
controversy which relates to the correction of manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass, the same should have been filed within
the reglementary period of 5 days counted from petitioners
proclamation. The petition was, however, filed 8 days after
petitioners proclamation. The COMELEC en banc held that the
petition was filed by Ali Bernan on time and sustained its
jurisdiction over the petition in the exercise of its broad
administrative powers over the conduct of elections. It also
directed the retabulation of the votes for petitioner Mentang and
private respondent Ali Bernan. Petitioner Mentang petitioned the
Supreme Court to set aside the decision of COMELEC. Issue: Whether
or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that it has jurisdiction to decide private respondent Ali Bernans
petition? Held: The Supreme Court sustained COMELECs jurisdiction
and dismissed Mentangs petition. The petition filed, although
designates petition to correct manifest error and annul the
proclamation of Mentang, is in reality a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of proclamation, which need not be filed
within 5 day reglamentary period but only within a reasonable time.
Ali Bernans petition which was filed 8 days after Mentangs
proclamation was filed within the 10-day period for filing an
election protest or quo warranto petition.
Election Laws
34
JAMIL vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 123648, December 15, 1997 )
Pre-Proclamation Controversy, D. Procedure Facts: Petitioner Jamil
and Private respondent Balindong were among the mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur
during the May 1998 elections. During the canvassing of the
election returns by the MBC headed by Sansarona, private respondent
objected to the inclusion of 4 election returns from 4 precincts on
the grounds of duress, for being spurious returns and for not being
an authentic copy. The Sansarona MBC issued its ruling on the 3
objection setting aside the election returns from a precinct for
further investigation or to go deeper into the contradicting
testimonies of the Chairman and the watchers or to summon the 2
BFIs who failed to affix their signature and explain the alleged
increase of votes of a candidate. The MBC composition was changed
with Macadato as its head. It denied the exclusion of return from
precinct. Private respondent Balindong appealed to the COMELEC the
ruling of the Macadato MBC. Petitioner also appealed to the COMELEC
challenging the Sansarona MBC rulings. While these 2 cases were
still pending in the COMELEC, the Macadato MBC proclaimed
petitioner Jamil and other winning candidates. The COMELEC Second
Division issued an Order directing the MBC to reconvene and
proclaim the winning candidate for Mayor of Sultan Gumander, Lanao
del Sur. The Macadato MBC proclaimed petitioner Jamil as duly
elected Mayor. Private respondent filed with the COMELEC an urgent
motion to annul petitioners proclamation on the ground that the
proclamation was without authority of the COMELEC, and to
constitute a new Board of Canvasser. The COMELEC Second division
annulled petitioner Jamils proclamation and directed the
constitution of a new MBC. The newly constituted MBC headed by
Cariga proclaimed private respondent Balindong as the newly elected
Mayor. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the Second
Division. Petitioner Jamil asked the Supreme Court to revise and
reverse the decision of the COMELEC en banc Issue: Which of the 2
proclamations is valid. Held: The Supreme Court held that both
proclamations are not valid. The Macadato and Cariga MBC did not
make definite rulings or pronouncement on the inclusion or
exclusion of returns so that there was no complete and valid
canvass which is prerequisite to a valid proclamation. Petitioner
Jamils proclamation by the MBC had no authority from COMELEC. The
Omnibus Election Code prohibits the proclamation by the Board of
Canvassers of a candidate as winner where returns are contested,
unless authorized by the COMELEC.
Election Laws DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC ( G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April
20,2001 ) Pre-Proclamation Controversy, C. Issues Which May Be
Raised
35
Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival
candidates for the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May
1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing by the MBC,
petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts
of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism,
intimidation and coercion committed in said precincts during the
casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioners
objections and proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent
Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner. Petitioner
appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election
returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and
finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and
then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private
respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the
Second Division with the COMELEC en banc. The MBC proclaim
petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed
an urgent motion to declare void petitioners proclamation. The duly
proclaimed ViceMayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n
action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of
Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel
Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion declare void
petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal
should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo
warranto action. The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the
Second Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas proclamation; and
constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the
newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the
Municipality. Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set
aside the COMELEC en banc resolution. Issue: Whether the COMELEC
was correct in including in the canvass the returns of the
contested precincts? election
Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only
evidence presented by the petitioner to prove the alleged
irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his watchers and
inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the
returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their
face appear to be regular and without any physical signs of
tampering. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner
would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in
a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.
Election Laws PATORAY vs. COMELEC ( 249 SCRA 440, 1995 )
Pre-Proclamation Controversy, C. Issues Which May Be Raised
36
Facts: Petitioner Patoray and private respondent Disomimba were
the mayoralty candidates of Tamporan, Lanao del Sur during the May
8, 1995 elections. During the canvassing of the votes by the MBC,
private respondent objected to the inclusion of election returns
from 4 precincts for being substituted, fraudulent and obviously
manufacture but the same was denied by the MBC. On appeal, the
COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion from the count of
election returns from 2 precincts owing to discrepancy between the
taras and the written figures and the incomplete data as to
provincial and congressional candidates. The COMELEC en banc denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered the constitution
of a new MBC to implement the second Divisions resolution.
Petitioner Patoray filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul
the decision of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether the exclusion of the 2
election returns was the proper remedy to answer the discrepancy
between the taras and the written figures and the incompleteness of
the data as to provincial and congressional candidates? Held: The
Supreme Court held that the discrepancy between the taras and the
written figure and the incomplete data as to the provincial and
congressional candidates found in the excluded election returns
constituted materials defects in the election return. While the
COMELEC was correct in excluding the 2 election returns, in
addition it should have also ordered a recount of the votes cast in
the 2 precincts. Its failure to do this resulted in the
disenfranchisement of the voters in these precincts. The recounting
of the votes is consistent with the summary nature of proceedings
involving pre-proclamation controversies.
Election Laws
37
LAUDENIO vs. COMELEC ( 276 SCRA 705,1997 ) Pre-Proclamation
Controversy, C. Issues Which May Be Raised Facts: Respondent
Longcop was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvasser
(MBC) for the position of Mayor of Mapanas, Northern Samar during
the May 8, 1995 elections over another candidate, petitioner
Laudenio. Five days after, Laudenio filed with respondent COMELEC a
petition to annul Longcops proclamation and to declare the
constitution of the MBC and its proceedings illegal. He alleged
that the MBC repeatedly adjourned the canvassing of votes and
secretly reconvened with a new Chairman who was appointed by the
Provincial Election Supervisior, not by the COMELEC. Petitioner
Laudenio filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court.
The COMELEC dismissed Laudenios petition for lack of merit, stating
that he was deemed to have consented to the new composition of the
MBC when he actively participated in the proceedings otherwise, he
should have appealed the issue on appeal to the COMELEC and the
pre-proclamation controversy was no longer possible since Longcop
had already been proclaimed and assumed office. Laudenio filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC.
Laudenio petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the COMELECs
decision. Issue: Whether the pre-proclamation controversy filed by
Laudenio with COMELEC was proper? the
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, a pre-election controversy which relates to the
illegal composition of the Board must be filed immediately when the
Board begins to act as such or at the time of the appointment of
the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes
after the canvassing of the Board or immediately at the point where
the proceedings begin to be illegal. In the case of Laudenio, he
filed his petition 5 days after Longcop had been proclaimed. A
pre-proclamation controversy before the COMELEC is no longer
possible and must be dismissed after a proclamation has been made.
Besides, he can no longer question the Boards composition after
having actively participated in the proceedings.
Election Laws
38
LAGUMBAY vs. COMELEC ( 16 SCRA 175, 1966 ) Pre-Proclamation
Controversy, C. Issues Which May Be Raised Facts: This is a
petition for revision of the order of the COMELEC refusing to
reject returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in
Mindanao which were obviously manufactured. It appeared that all
the 8 candidates of the Liberal party garnered all the votes, with
each of them receiving exactly the same number of votes while all
the 8 candidates of the Nacionalista party getting zero. Issue:
Whether the COMELEC was correct in not rejecting obviously
manufactured election returns of certain questioned precincts.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is no such
thing as blockvoting now-a-days. The election returns showing all 8
candidates of the Liberal party getting all the votes, with each
one of them getting the same number of votes while the 8
nacionalista candidates got zero are evidently false or fabricated
because of the inherent improbability of such a result. It is
against statistical improbabilities especially because al least 1
vote should have been received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e.
the Nacionalista inspector. While it is possible that the inspector
did not like his partys senatorial live-up, it is not, however,
possible that he disliked all of such candidates and it is also not
likely that he favored all the 8 candidates of the Liberal party.
Hence, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false return
by force or duress. If he signed voluntarily, then he betrayed his
party and any voting or counting of ballots was a fraud and a
mockery of the popular will. Rejecting such returns on the ground
that they are manifestly fabricated or falsified would constitute a
practical approach to the COMELECs mission to insure a free and
honest elections.
Election Laws
39
OLFATO vs. COMELEC ( 103 SCRA 741, 1981 ) Pre-Proclamation
Controversy, B. COMELEC Jurisdiction Facts: During the January 30,
1980 local elections, petitioner Olfato and the other petitioners
were the official Nationalista Party (NP) candidates for Mayor and
Sanggunian Bayan, respectively, of Tanauan, Batangas. On the other
hand, Lirio was the official candidate of the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) fo Mayor of said town. Three (3) days after the
elections, private respondent Lirio, together with the candidates
in his ticket, filed with COMELEC a petition for suspension of the
canvass and proclamation of winning candidates for the elective
positions of Tanauan, alleging disenfranchisement of voters,
terrorism, fake IDs of voters and flying voters. Based on the
result of canvass of votes, Olfato and the rest of the petitioners
were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Sanggunian members.
Lirio filed a supplemental petition praying for the annulment of
petitioner Olfatos proclamation citing fake voters and massive
disenfranchisement which affects the very integrity of the election
returns. He also filed an election protest against Olfato in the
CFI of Batangas citing fake voters, fake voters identification
cards, flying voters, substitute voters and massive
disenfranchisement. Olfato assumed the office of Mayor. The COMELEC
issued a Resolution dismissing Lirios petition and reinstating the
proclamation made by the MBC of respondent Olfato and the entire
ticket, without prejudice to other legal remedies under the
Election Code. Issue: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
pre-proclamation Controversy filed by Lirio? Held: The Supreme
Court riled in the affirmative citing previous rulings of the
Court. The COMELEC has the power and authority to inquire into the
allegation of fake voters, with fake IDs in a pre-proclamation
controversy in order to determine the authenticity or integrity of
election returns or whether such election returns faithfully record
that only registered or genuine voters were allowed to vote. Under
the election Code, the COMELC is the sole judge of all proclamation
controversies. The COMELEC has vast powers under the Election Code
in consonance with its primordial task of insuring free, orderly
and honest elections. The Court dismissed the petition for review
filed by Lirio and directed the COMELEC to proceed with dispatch on
the pre-proclamation controversy (petition for suspension of
canvass and proclamation of winning candidates). The court noted
that the COMELEC Resolution considered the proclamation made in
favor of Olfato and his ticket as temporary in nature as it was
made subject to the final outcome of the preproclamation case.
Election Laws
40
DIPATUAN vs. COMELEC ( 185 SCRA 86, 1990 ) Pre-Proclamation
Controversy, A. Defined Facts: Petitioner Dipatuan and private
respondent Amanoddin were mayoralty candidates of Bacolod, Grande
during the 1988 special local elections in Lanao del Sur. The Board
of Canvassers chaired by a certain Mangray proclaimed petitioner
Dipatuan as Mayor. Five days thereafter, a separate Board headed by
Minalang proclaimed private respondent Amanoddin as the duly
elected mayor. Both proclamations were set aside by the
