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Election Laws Digest

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  • 7/28/2019 Election Laws Digest






    DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence

    requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. On 6

    May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO

    disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district ofSarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the

    cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.

    On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental

    Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted

    but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution

    disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.

    The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of

    the Provincial Board of Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest

    number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province

    of Sarangani. On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the

    Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its

    decision dated 29 May 1998. Domino prayed: for Petition for Certiorari with prayer

    for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC

    committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

    when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. Thecandidate who gathered the second highest number of votes intervened in the

    case and said that she should be declared as a winner since Domino was

    disqualified from running for the position.

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    a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City

    declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,

    conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on


    b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district

    for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and

    c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for

    the disqualification of petitioner.


    a. The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

    Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province

    of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC

    cannot be sustained.

    The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its

    jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani,

    approved and ordered the transfer of his voters. It is not within the competence of

    the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a

    resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion

    cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or

    to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in whichhe is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification.

    b. No. He did not meet the residency requirement.

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    A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be

    deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of

    domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of

    domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and

    establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In

    other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non

    revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an

    indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the

    residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The lease

    contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a

    change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINOs intention to

    reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required toprove abandonment of ones original domicile (Ilocos Sur to Quezon City).

    While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from

    the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he

    sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997,

    and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by

    reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one

    year residency requirement under the Constitution..

    c.DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition

    is bereft (lacking) of merit.

    The COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction

    over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.

    The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does notautomatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be

    proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a

    member of the House of Representatives.

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    Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the

    Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a

    member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the

    Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a


    It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest

    number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is


    In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their

    expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and

    elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in theelection for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.

    It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally

    guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or

    plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a

    constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots

    that they do not choose him.

    The petition of Domino is denied. The resolution of the COMELEC en banc is


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    On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of

    the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the

    administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza,

    Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons

    move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party. On

    March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference, but, when convened,

    the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant andelected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately

    filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections

    claiming that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National

    Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not

    properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution,

    party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on

    November 30, 2007. Petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO

    and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly.

    On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting

    respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the

    holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of

    petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly

    did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the

    amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons

    term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in aholdover capacity until new officers were elected. Both sides of the dispute came to

    this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court

    issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilons petition and denying that of

    petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had

    jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had

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    been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP

    president was to end only on November 30, 2007. Subsequently, the LP held a

    NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired.

    Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new

    LP president.


    Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas

    election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s

    expulsion from the party.


    The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not

    have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.

    Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference

    from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only

    when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The validity of

    respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC

    had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing

    authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective

    positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue

    certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is

    the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.

    To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld

    Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s

    expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications onthe COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the

    Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s

    expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party

    membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the

    limited scope of its power over political parties. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the

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    petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18,

    2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.



    The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for

    having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

    jurisdiction. The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that

    preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspendedpublic official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term

    should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

    Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive

    terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September

    2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively

    suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,

    however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he

    resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007

    election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners

    Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)

    sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the

    ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for

    a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of

    the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELECs Second Division ruled

    against the petitioners and in Asilos favor in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. Itreasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render

    complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the

    Sandiganbayan had ordered.

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    Whether or not preventive suspension of an elected local official is an

    interruption of the three-term limit rule; and Whether or not preventive suspension is

    considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160.


    NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes

    the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no

    more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in

    Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word

    "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law

    describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a

    qualified interruption.

    In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the

    disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the

    public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public

    official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and

    executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the

    disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three

    consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully

    served three consecutive terms). The petitioner vacated his post a few months

    before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance

    with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and

    thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. "Interruption" of a

    term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves

    no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have

    involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective

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    interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its

    strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous

    stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary

    renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an

    interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that

    preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an

    elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot

    simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in

    office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the

    office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials

    continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the

    authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

    4.)NICOLAS-LEWIS VS COMELEC, GR no. 162759 August 4, 2006


    Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship

    under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among

    others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought

    registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter only to be advised by the

    Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the

    Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to

    vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement

    prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different

    Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as

    the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certainindividuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Prodded for

    clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal

    vs. COMELEC on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:Faced

    with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the

    COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,

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    petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and

    mandamus. A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30,

    2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, therein praying for the denial of the petition.

    As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said

    elections.On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a

    Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas

    Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do

    so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the

    petition moot and academic. The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG

    pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as

    petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and

    transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety ofallowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections,

    however, remains unresolved.


    whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or

    reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter

    under R.A. 9189.


    WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so

    holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act

    No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the

    right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, theOverseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

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    5.)BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009


    On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-

    List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)

    before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of

    the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC

    is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the

    Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats." BANAT filed a petition for certiorari

    and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a

    motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, BayanMuna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its

    decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60

    because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act

    No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration

    during the proceedings of the NBC.


    Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in

    these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments

    set on 22 April 2008:

    1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),

    Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

    2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

    3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for

    one seat constitutional?

    4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

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    5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in

    the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from

    participating in the party-list elections?


    In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

    allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes

    garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes

    garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list

    candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, thepercentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the

    difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and

    the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of

    the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share

    in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of

    the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We

    distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.

    Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each

    qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

    Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from

    participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution

    clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections

    through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission

    voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative thereservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that

    participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A.

    No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the

    party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is

    manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and

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    R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially

    legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent

    violation of the Constitution and the law.

    The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.

    COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation

    of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded

    by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of

    Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major

    political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct

    congruence with theirs, hence, There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list

    parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This isborne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were

    initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear

    expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major

    political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162

    parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50.

    These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes

    counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties

    (including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an

    average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of

    the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat

    that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In

    contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of

    the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.

    In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people atthe time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through

    the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In

    ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and

    powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who

    have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow

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    major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will

    surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray

    the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of

    the party-list system.

    Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a

    threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was

    explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate

    concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a

    minimum vote requirement is needed

    1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as afallback position;

    2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose

    chances are very low, from participating in the elections;

    3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

    4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their

    seats within the system;

    5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the

    elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree

    their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an

    appointment by the President of the Philippines;

    6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and

    those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to

    represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament

    through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and

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    7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be


    However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the

    party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative

    districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote

    requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable

    changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution,

    because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

    It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that

    Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely providesa ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law,

    R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the

    constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling

    completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down

    the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an

    inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this

    Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of

    statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a

    constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

    6.)G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec / G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001


    Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved

    the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,

    in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private

    respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the

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    marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-

    marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec

    acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.


    1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.

    2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

    3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

    promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.


    1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of

    other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is

    involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it


    2. Political partieseven the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections

    subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the

    statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

    Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified

    from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.

    Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of

    Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,

    regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon theComelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and

    underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the

    party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list


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    3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of

    respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations

    was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier

    of facts.

    However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the

    law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the

    law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that

    the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party




    On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea

    filed his certificate of candidacy with theCOMELEC for the position of

    Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.2)

    On January 22 , 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as i ts

    incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with theCOMELEC a petition for the

    disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly

    not a Filipinocitizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.3)

    On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a

    Certificate issued by the thenImmigration and Deportation CommissionerMiriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is

    anAmerican and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.

    B-21448 and Immigrant Cer tificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued

    at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").4)

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    During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained

    that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that heis the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio

    D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that heis a

    holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on

    March 25, 1987; that he has beencontinuously residing in the Philippines since

    birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months;and that he has

    been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.5)

    Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the

    petition for disqualification for not havingbeen timely filed and for lack of

    sufficient proof that pr ivate respondent is not a Fi lipino citizen. Hence,

    thepetition for Certiorari.


    Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by

    acquiring dual-citizenship?


    Supreme Court dismissed petition for certiorari upholding

    COMELECs decision. The petitioner fai led to present direct proof that

    private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes

    provided for under C.A. No. 63 . these are : (1 ) by naturalization in a foreign

    country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath

    of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From

    the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose hisPhilippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by

    any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.In the instant case, private

    respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the

    United States. He is holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has

    continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to

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    the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent

    remains a Filipino andthe loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

    Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an

    American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an

    American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of

    Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he

    is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.

    Indeed, th ereis no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;

    truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship.

    When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine

    citizenship must be "express", it stands toreason that there can be no such

    loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express"or "implied".

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    8.) TABASA vs. CA G.R. No. 125793


    Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

    In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old (minor), his father, Rodolfo Tabasa,

    became a naturalized citizen1 of the United States.

    By derivative petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

    On August 3, 1995 Petitioner arrived in the Philippines, and was admitted as a

    balikbayan for one year.

    After that petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID

    on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay,Aklan. Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila.

    Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law

    and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996. On the same day, Tabasa was

    accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative

    Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:

    1. That on 3 August 1995, Tabasa arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as

    a balikbayan;

    2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General

    of U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport had been revoked

    by the U.S. Department of State;

    3. Hence, Tabasa is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be

    summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by

    then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.On May 29, 1996 - BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the

    United States. US Consul filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport

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    the Tabasa on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has

    been issued against him, and that the Tabasas passport has been revoked.

    Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary

    Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order Tabasa alleged that he was not

    afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by

    immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of

    the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to

    admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant

    because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a)

    of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of

    the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due

    to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.

    On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of

    the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and

    restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID

    presented Tabasa before the CA. On June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten

    (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be

    considered submitted for decision. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration

    granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond.

    On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had

    acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171, and that

    because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the

    respondent Bureau.

    On August 7, 1996 Decision, denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he

    had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship asprovided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen

    by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no

    evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or

    economic necessity, as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing

    the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit

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    does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for

    petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968.

    CA concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to

    avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America.

    The court ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.


    Whether or not the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA



    RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriat ion of Filipino Women Who Have

    Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos,

    was enacted on October 23, 1995. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated

    under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his

    Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

    Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is

    available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of

    political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born

    Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship

    due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his

    repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a

    situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a

    naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino willallow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine

    citizenship on his children ofjus sanguinis or blood relationship.

    To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the

    time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.

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    He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on

    Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation

    pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) Applicants for repatriation

    are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth

    certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship.These

    requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the

    applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine

    citizenship. What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the

    Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he

    registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil

    Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such

    registration. At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue ofthe June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.

    Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA

    8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance

    according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. Thus, petitioner should have instead

    filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.

    Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State.

    This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides

    that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State

    has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements

    for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets

    the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will

    be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like

    petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in

    rejecting the petition for repatriation.

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    9.)CO vs. HRET


    The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and

    a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional

    election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates

    who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the

    petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

    Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second

    district of Northern Samar.

    The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not anatural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of

    Northern Samar.


    Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.


    Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the

    Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,

    Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in

    1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court

    an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the

    private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted

    there during those elections.

    Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino

    mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both

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    considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than

    merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the

    Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a

    house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should

    live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require

    him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount

    to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet

    the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

    10.)Jacot vs. Dal GR NO. 179848


    Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from

    running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007

    National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal

    renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who

    became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to

    reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.


    Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as

    a vice-mayor?


    No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for

    all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation

    of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or

    reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek

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    elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than

    one citizenship.


    FACTS :

    On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification

    as a party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its

    petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the

    Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Courtin the case ofAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec(Bagong

    Bayani case)[6] for party-list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the

    party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat re-organized itself in order that it will

    comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court[7] in the said


    The Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered

    as an organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as

    identified under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). Further, the Comelec

    held that AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable under the cla ssification

    of regular members just to convince us that it is now cured of its defect.

    Aklat filed aMotion for Reconsideration.The Comelec denied the motion in

    its questioned Resolution dated February 13, 2004, on three grounds, namely: the

    petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 forregistration of party-list organizations; the petition was not one for re-qualification as

    Aklat was never a registered party-list organization having failed to meet the eight-

    point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong Bayani case; and that its decision

    not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list organizations is valid, the

    Comelec being in the best position to make such a determination.

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    In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions

    for registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than ninety (90)

    days before the elections. I t therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth

    (90th) day before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its

    petition. Hence, its petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within

    the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution No. 6320[12] which requires the filing of

    such petitions not later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends R.A.


    It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in

    the Bagong Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000persons who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has

    established information and coordination centers throughout the country for the

    benefit and in representation of indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory

    workers including fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is different from

    Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously

    de-registered by the Comelec.


    Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it denied its petition

    for re-qualification.


    The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that the Comelec did not

    commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. According tothe OSG, Resolution No. 6320 is not in conflict with and is, in fact, germane to the

    purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope of the authority granted to the

    Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320 setting the deadline for filing petitions for

    registration under the party-list system on September 30, 2003. In line with the

    purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized sectors to actively participate in

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    legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient time to evaluate all petitions for

    registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to be filed to the end that only

    those truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list system. Besides,

    Republic Act No. 8436[13] allows the Comelec to change the periods and dates

    prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to ensure their accomplishment.

    The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to

    comply with the provisions of Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the

    petition was not properly verified there being no showing that Mr. Dominador

    Buhain, the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,

    was duly authorized by Aklat to verify or cause the preparation and filing of the

    petition on its behalf. Moreover, Aklat was registered with the Securities andExchange Commission only on October 20, 2003, a month before it filed its petition

    for re-qualification. Hence, it has not existed for a period of at least one (1) year

    prior to the filing of the petition as required by Section 6 of Resolution No. 6320. The

    OSG also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition with the documents

    required under Section 7 of Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of its officers and

    members particularly showing that the majority of its membership belongs to the

    marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a track record

    or summary showing that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and

    underrepresented sectors of society.

    Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are

    invariably known as pillars of the book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as

    re-organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors, book publishers, and

    publishing companies, rather than the organization of indigenous cultural

    communities, farm and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be.For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that the

    period of ninety (90) days prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period

    beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be filed. Furthermore, the

    documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its members belong to the

    marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.

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    Aklats contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and

    amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides:

    Sec. 5. Registration

    Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelecs denial of Aklats petition

    on the ground that it failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the

    marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It should be noted that it

    was Aklat which asserted in its petition before the poll body that it has re-organized

    and is now applying for re-qualification after its de-registration for failure to comply

    with the guidelines set forth in the Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot

    be faulted for relying on its earlier finding, absent any evidence in Aklats petition to

    the contrary, that Aklat is not an organization representing the marginalized andunderrepresented sectors, but is actually a business interest or economic lobby

    group which seeks the promotion and protection of the book publishing industry.

    Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact,

    four (4) of Aklats six (6) incorporators[14] are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.[15] This

    substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed

    re-organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not really

    changed its character as a business interest of persons in the book publishing


    The Court observes that Aklats articles of incorporation and document entitled The

    Facts About Aklat which were attached to its petition for re-qualification contain

    general averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups such as the

    youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk. These general

    statements do not measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagong Bayani casefor screening party-list participants, i.e., that the political party, sector, organization

    or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified

    in Section 5 of R.A. 7941. In other words, it must showthrough its constitution,

    articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record

    that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

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    12.)Tecson vs. Commission on Elections / GR 151434, 3 March 2004Facts:

    On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic

    of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the

    2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to

    be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or

    "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be

    Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA

    04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to

    deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ

    made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be

    a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were

    foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,

    was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,

    Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have

    transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an

    alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two

    assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez

    before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had

    existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23

    January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or

    on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was

    denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier

    assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with

    Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition

    likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or

    any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC

    resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR

    161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and

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    asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only

    the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue

    on the case.


    Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the

    offcie of the President of the Philippines.


    Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may

    be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a

    registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the

    election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately

    preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include

    "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any

    act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and

    year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935

    Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,

    jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinishad been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli andjus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the

    Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With

    the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.

    Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the

    primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the

    parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the

    marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with

    some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ

    were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3)

    Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

    (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11

    September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F.

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    Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of

    Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The

    documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during

    the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may

    not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the

    evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he

    cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate

    of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus

    Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,

    notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position

    and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material

    misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must notonly be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.


    Petition for mandamus to compel De Venecia to proclaim Codilla as the duly

    elected Congressman of 4th District of Leyte. Codilla (incumbent Mayor of Ormoc)

    and Locsin (incumbent Representative) are both candidates for the Representative

    of the 4th District of Leyte in the 2001 elections. Josephine De La Cruz - a registered

    voter then filed a petition for Disqualification against Codilla for indirect solicitation

    of votes, prohibited by section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC

    (Division) delegated the hearing and reception of the evidence of such case to the

    Regional Director. Election times came, and yet still no hearing from the Regional

    Director. When it was apparent that Codilla garnered the most votes, Locsin

    intervened in the DQ case, and filed an urgent motion to suspend proclamation.Codilla was not served with the Motion.

    COMELEC issued an order suspending the proclamation due to the

    seriousness of the allegations. Again, Codilla was not served with a summons to air

    his side and provide contrary evidences. Although Codilla filed a petition to lift the

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    suspension, COMELEC nevertheless issued a Resolution finding Codilla guilty of

    indirect solicitation.

    As a result, COMELEC disqualified Codilla and considered votes cast for him

    as stray even though such resolution is still not yet final. Locsin was proclaimed the

    winner and assumed her seat in Congress as the Representative. Codilla then

    seasonably filed an MR to COMELEC (En banc), which reversed the Division

    Resolution. Locsin then questioned jurisdiction of COMELEC , stating that it was the

    HRET who has jurisdiction over the case now that she has assumed the post. De

    Venecia concurs with COMELEC, but since Locsin said in one of her privilege

    speeches that she will not obey the COMELEC reversal, he said that it was up to the

    SC to decide on the matter. Thus, the petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto.


    Whether or not the proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of

    jurisdiction to review its validity.


    The Proclamation of Locsin is void. The petitioner was denied due processduring the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.

    The Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division disqualifying the petitioner is not

    based on substantial evidence. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division

    cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on

    affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the

    COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the

    affiants. Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation ofrespondent Locsin was done with undue haste. The COMELEC Second Division

    ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the

    proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the

    opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial

    Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution

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    excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin

    received the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was


    Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the

    COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the

    afternoon of June 15, 200198 when everything was already fait accompli.

    Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass

    and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due

    process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is

    deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights

    is void.

    The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and

    respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. As previously stated, the

    disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process

    and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the

    petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division

    to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this

    basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of

    votes. The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of

    the petitioner cannot be considered "stray." Respondent Locsin, as a mere second

    placer, cannot be proclaimed.

    14.)LOONG vs. COMELEC, GR NO. 93986, DECEMBER 22, 1992FACTS:

    Petitioner Benjamin Loong filed with the COMELEC his COC for the position

    of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on

    February 17, 1990 (January 15, 1990 being the last day of filing their COC); he

    prayed that the petition be dismissed alleging that it has never been a practice of

    Muslims to register a birth of child before the LCR; that prior to the election, he

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    consulted his mother about his true age and assured that his correct birthdate is July

    4, 1954; that COMELEC has no jurisdiction since under Section 78 of the OEC, it

    should have been filed within 5 days following the last day for the filing of the COC;

    that the period has already prescribed

    Respondent Nurhussein Ututalum and Alim Bashir- filed a petition before the

    COMELEC to disqualify Loong on the ground that the latter made a false

    representation in his COC as to his age, said petition was filed on March 5, 1990 (16

    days after the election and 49 days from the date that Loong filed his COC); that

    although the period has already prescribed, there is still cause of action on the

    petition since under Section 3,Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure it states

    that the petition to disqualify a candidate on the grounds of ineligibility shall be filed

    any day after the last day for filing of COC but not later than the date of

    proclamation, hence, since there was no proclamation of winner yet when the

    petition was filed, the petition deserves a merit

    COMELECheld that the petition was timely filed applying sections 6 and 7

    of RA 6646 and section 2, rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states

    that the petition to deny course to or cancel a COC must be filed within 5 days

    following the last day of the filing of the COC


    Whether or not the petition to cancel the COC of Loong was filed within the

    period prescribed by law.


    No. The petition was filed beyond the period prescribed by law

    The age requirement to be qualified to run as V-Governor for autonomous region is

    at least 35 years old under RA 6734.

    Section 78 of the OEC, it states that

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    Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A

    verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy

    may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material

    representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The

    petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the

    filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and

    hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

    In this case, clearly, the petition filed by the private respondents was filed beyond

    the 25-day period prescribed under Section 78 of the OEC.

    Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate

    fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the

    Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless

    as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a

    petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of

    the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the

    Comelec Rules of procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the

    election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of

    disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with

    the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten

    (10)days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

    It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be

    stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made

    only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code,

    through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who

    would want the disqualification of the candidate committing themisrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap

    between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is

    made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time

    when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called

    "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the

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    candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the

    results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate,

    that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission

    sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, it

    unnecessary and should be remedied.

    At the same time, it cannot be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the

    legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of

    protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen

    in Section 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the

    need to remedy this so-called "procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribed what

    the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether

    the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the

    Legislature to decide and remedy.

    15.)FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC / GR No. 87193, JUNE 23, 1989FACTS:

    Petitioner Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of

    Sorsogon on 1988; he admitted that he was naturalized in the US but pleaded

    special and affirmative defense that he had sought American citizenship only to

    protect himself against President Marcos; that he forced upon himself as a means of

    survival against the unrelenting persecution; that he is a Filipino citizen since his

    naturalization was not impressed with voluntriness; that he returned after the EDSA

    Revolution to help restore democracy; that in his oath in his COC that was a natural-

    born Filipino should be a sufficient act of repatriation

    Respondent League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by Salvador

    Nee Estuye filed a petition before the COMELEC for the Annulment of Frivaldos

    election and proclamation on the ground that he is not a qualified since he was not

    a Filipino citizen prior to the election

    Solicitor General supported respondents argument that Frivaldo is disqualified

    since he was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his

    naturalization as an American citizen; that his election did not cure the defect

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    because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, LGC and

    the OEC.


    Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his

    election on Janurary 18, 1988.


    No. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of the 1988 election,

    hence, he is disqualified.The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution

    that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution

    "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local

    Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a

    citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is


    In his COC, he described himself as natural-born Filipino, omitting mention of any

    subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows that he was naturalized as a

    citizen of the US in 1983, such evidence was not denied by him. However, he

    interposed that he was naturalized as a measure to protect himself from the former


    The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies

    of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof

    he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his

    naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally

    unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

    There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as

    Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it

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    necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their

    cherished status as Filipinos. . The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of

    those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine

    citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

    The Nottebohm case is not applicable in the case at bar. That case is not

    relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the

    nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in

    the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its

    national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of

    the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can

    decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section

    1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its

    law who are its nationals."

    Frivaldos claim for repatriation: If he really wanted to disavow his American

    citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in

    accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.

    473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of

    Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He contends that by simply filing his

    certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered

    Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions

    surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the

    Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that

    the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or

    judicial proceedings. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements

    and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or

    assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required

    qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. This Court will not permit

    the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing

    exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the

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    people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting

    public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the

    people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,

    especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was

    qualified. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe

    his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to

    any other state.

    16.)Labo, Jr. vs. COMELECFACTS:

    Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted

    Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being


    Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained

    an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status

    from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration

    and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has

    not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of

    the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an

    Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to

    prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws

    of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted

    Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath

    includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of

    Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis

    Lardizabal, filed a petition forquo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from

    holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's

    proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

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    1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?

    2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?

    3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?

    4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the

    elections, replace him?


    1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition forquo warranto was filed on time.

    Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first

    considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require

    the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal

    immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day

    period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial

    decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case.

    2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes

    specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express

    renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support

    the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine

    citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of

    Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.

    Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual

    citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to

    national interest.

    The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically

    divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had

    automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino

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    citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian

    citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.

    The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a

    Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally

    baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be

    reversed because the doctrine ofres judicata does not apply to questions of


    3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a

    qualified voter when he was elected.

    4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume

    the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of

    Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead,

    the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

    17.) G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 / MACALINTAL, petitioner VS. COMELEC, ROMULO,

    and BONCODIN, respondents


    Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a

    declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting

    Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file the

    instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly

    presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering

    that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said


    Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:

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    (1)That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are

    immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing

    an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the

    residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;

    (2)That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the

    winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the

    President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII,

    Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-

    President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and

    (3)That Section