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Emile Durkheim

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Key Concepts Anomie Social facts Social solidarity Mechanical solidarity Organic solidarity Collective conscience Ritual Symbol Sacred and profane Collective representations There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirm- ing at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which makes its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments. (Durkheim 1912/1995:474–75) H ave you ever been to a professional sports event in a stadium full of fans? Or to a religious service and taken communion, or to a concert and danced in the aisles (or maybe in a mosh pit)? How did these experiences make you feel? What do they have in common? Is it possible to have this same type of experience if or when you are alone? How so or why not? 3 ÉMILE DURKHEIM (1858–1917) 94
Transcript
  • Key Concepts

    Anomie

    Social facts

    Social solidarity

    Mechanical solidarity

    Organic solidarity

    Collective conscience

    Ritual

    Symbol

    Sacred and profane

    Collective representations

    There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirm-ing at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas whichmakes its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achievedexcept by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals,being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments.

    (Durkheim 1912/1995:47475)

    Have you ever been to a professional sports event in a stadium full of fans? Or toa religious service and taken communion, or to a concert and danced in the aisles(or maybe in a mosh pit)? How did these experiences make you feel? What dothey have in common? Is it possible to have this same type of experience if or when youare alone? How so or why not?

    3 MILE DURKHEIM (18581917)

    94

  • These are the sorts of issues that intrigued mile Durkheim. Above all, he sought toexplain what held societies and social groups togetherand how. In addressing these twinquestions, Durkheim studied a wide variety of phenomenafrom suicide and crime, to abo-riginal religious totems and symbols. He was especially concerned about how modern,industrial societies can be held together when people dont even know each other and whentheir experiences and social positions are so varied. In other words, how can social ties, thevery basis for society, be maintained in such an increasingly individualistic world?Yet Durkheim is an important figure in the history of sociology not only because of his

    provocative theories about social cohesion, but also because he helped found the disciplineof sociology. In contrast to some of the other figures whose works you will read in this book,Durkheim sought to delineate, both theoretically and methodologically, how sociology wasdifferent from existing schools of philosophy and history, which also examined socialissues. Before we discuss his ideas and work, however, lets look at his biography because,like Marx, Durkheims personal experiences and historical situation deeply influenced hisperception and description of the social world.

    A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

    mile Durkheim was born in a small town in northeastern France in 1858. In his youth, hefollowed family tradition, studying Hebrew and the Talmud in order to become a rabbi.However, in his adolescence, Durkheim apparently rejected Judaism. Though he did notdisdain traditional religion, as a child of the Enlightenment (see Chapter 1) he came toconsider both Christianity and Judaism outmoded in the modern world.In 1879, Durkheim entered Frances most prestigious college, the cole Normale

    Suprieure in Paris, to study philosophy. However, by his third year, Durkheim hadbecome disenchanted with the high-minded, literary, humanities curriculum at theNormale. He decided to pursue sociology, which he viewed as eminently more scientific,democratic, and practical. Durkheim still maintained his interest in complex philosophi-cal questions, but he wanted to examine them through a rational, scientific lens. Hispractical and scientific approach to central social issues would shape his ambition to usesociological methods as a means for reconstituting the moral order of French society,which he saw decaying in the aftermath of the French Revolution (Bellah 1973:xiiixvi).Durkheim was especially concerned about the abuse of power by political and militaryleaders, increasing rates of divorce and suicide, and rising anti-Semitism. It seemed toDurkheim that social bonds and a sense of community had broken down and social disor-der had come to prevail.1

    Upon graduation from the cole Normale, Durkheim began teaching in small lyces(secondary schools) near Paris. In 1887, he married Louise Dreyfus, from the Alsace regionof France. In the same year, Durkheim began his career as a professor at the University of

    1As indicated in Chapter 1, France had gone through numerous violent changes in government sincethe French Revolution in 1789. Between 1789 and 1870, there had been three monarchies, twoempires, and two republics, culminating in the notorious reign of Napoleon III who overthrew thedemocratic government and ruled France for 20 years. Though the French Revolution had brought abrief period of democracy, it also sparked a terrifying persecution of all those who disagreed with therevolutionary leaders. Some 17,000 revolutionaries were executed in the infamous Reign of Terror, ledby Maximilien Robespierre. Consequently, political and social divisions in France intensified. Frenchconservatives called for a return to monarchy and a more prominent role for the Catholic Church. Indirect contrast, a growing but still relatively small class of urban workers demanded political rightsand a secular rather than religious education. At the same time, capitalists called for individual rightsand free markets, while radical socialists advocated abolishing private property altogether.

    mile Durkheim 95

  • Bordeaux, where he quickly gained the reputation for being a committed and excitingteacher. mile and Louise soon had two children, Marie and Andr.Durkheim was a serious and productive scholar. His first book, The Division of Labor in

    Society, which was based on his doctoral dissertation, came out in 1893; his second, TheRules of Sociological Method, appeared just two years later. In 1897, Suicide: A Study inSociology, perhaps his most well known work, was published. The next year, Durkheimfounded the journal LAnne Sociologique, which was one of the first sociology journals notonly in France, but also in the world. LAnne Sociologique was produced annually until theoutbreak of World War I in 1914.In 1902, with his reputation as a leading social philosopher and scientist established,

    Durkheim was offered a position at the prestigious Sorbonne University in Paris. As he haddone previously at Bordeaux, Durkheim quickly gained a large following at the Sorbonne.His education courses were compulsory for all students seeking teaching degrees in philos-ophy, history, literature, and languages. Durkheim also became an important administratorat the Sorbonne, serving on numerous councils and committees (Lukes 1985:372).Yet not everyone was enamored with either Durkheims substantial power or his ideas.

    Durkheims notion that any social thingincluding religioncould be studied sociolog-ically (i.e., scientifically) was particularly controversial, as was his adamant insistence onproviding students a moral, but secular, education. (These two issues will be discussed fur-ther below.) As Steven Lukes (1985:373), noted sociologist and Durkheim scholar,remarked, To friends he was a prophet and an apostle, but to enemies he was a secularpope.Moreover, Durkheim identified with some of the goals of socialism, but was unwilling

    to commit himself politically. He believed that sociologists should be committed to educa-tion, not political activism. His passion was for dispassionate, scientific research.This apparent apoliticism, coupled with his focus on the moral constitution of societies

    (rather than conflict and revolution), has led some analysts to deem Durkheim politicallyconservative. However, as the eminent sociologist Robert Bellah (1973: xviii) points out, totry to force Durkheim into the conservative side of some conservative/liberal dichotomy isinappropriate. It ignores Durkheims lifelong preoccupation with orderly, continuous socialchange toward greater social justice (ibid.:xvii). In addition, to consider Durkheim politi-cally conservative is erroneous in light of how he was evaluated in his day. Durkheim wasviewed as a radical modernist and liberal, who, though respectful of religion, was most com-mitted to rationality, science, and humanism. Durkheim infuriated religious conservatives,who desired to replace democracy with a monarchy, and to strengthen the military. He alsocame under fire because he opposed instituting Catholic education as the basic curriculum.Moreover, to label Durkheim conservative ignores his role in the Dreyfus affair.

    Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish army colonel who was charged and convicted on false chargesof spying for Germany. The charges against Dreyfus were rooted in anti-Semitism, whichwas growing in the 1890s, alongside Frances military losses and economic dissatisfaction.Durkheim was very active in the Ligue des droits de lhomme (League of the Rights ofMen), which devoted itself to clearing Dreyfus of all charges.Interestingly, Durkheims assessment of the Dreyfus affair reflects his lifelong concern

    for the moral order of society. He saw the Dreyfus affair as symptomatic of a collectivemoral sickness, rather than merely anti-Semitism at the level of the individual. As Durkheim(1899, as cited by Lukes 1985:345) states,

    [w]hen society undergoes suffering, it feels the need to find someone whom it can holdresponsible for its sickness, on whom it can avenge its misfortunes; and those againstwhom public opinion already discriminates are naturally designated for this role. Theseare the pariahs who serve as expiatory victims. What confirms me in this interpretation

    96 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

  • is the way in which the result of Dreyfuss trial was greeted in 1894. There was a surgeof joy in the boulevards. People celebrated as a triumph what should have been a causeof public mourning. At least they knew whom to blame for the economic troubles andmoral distress in which they lived. The trouble came from the Jews. The charge had beenofficially proved. By this very fact alone, things already seemed to be getting better andpeople felt consoled.

    In 1912, Durkheims culminating work, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, was pub-lished. Shortly after that, WorldWar I broke out, and Durkheims life was thrown into turmoil.His son, Andr, was killed in battle, spiraling Durkheim into a grief from which he never fullyrecovered. On October 7, 1916, as he was leaving a committee meeting at the Sorbonne,Durkheim suffered a stroke. He spent the next year resting and seemed to have made muchprogress toward recovering. But on November 15, 1917, while in Fontainebleau where he hadgone for peace and fresh air, Durkheim died. He was 59 years old (Lukes 1985:559).

    INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES AND CORE IDEAS

    As indicated previously, Durkheim wrote a number of books and articles on a wide variety oftopics. Nevertheless, there are two major themes that transcend all of Durkheims work. First,Durkheim sought to articulate the nature of society and, hence, his view of sociology as anacademic discipline. Durkheim argued that society was a supraindividual force existingindependently of the actors who compose it. The task of sociology, then, is to analyze socialfactsconditions and circumstances external to the individual that, nevertheless, determine theindividuals course of action. Durkheim argued that social facts can be ascertained by usingcollective data, such as suicide and divorce rates. In other words, through systematic collectionof data, the patterns behind and within individual behavior can be uncovered. This emphasis onformal methods and objective data is what distinguished sociology from philosophy andput sociology on the map as a viable scientific discipline. The significance of Durkheimsposition for the development of sociology as a distinct pursuit of knowledge cannot beoverstated. As one of the first academics to hold a position in sociology, Durkheim was on thecutting edge of the birth of the discipline. Nevertheless, his conviction that society is sui generis(an objective reality that is irreducible to the individuals that compose it) and amenable toscientific investigation owes much to the work of Auguste Comte (17981857). Not only hadComte coined the term sociology in 1839, but he also contended that the social world could bestudied in as rational and scientific a way as physical scientists (chemists, physicists, biologists,etc.) study their respective domains. Moreover, Durkheims comparative and historicalmethodology was in large measure a continuation of the approach advocated earlier by Comte.

    Auguste Comte (17981857): The Father of Social Physics

    Born in southern France during a most turbulent period in French history, AugusteComte was himself a turbulent figure. Though he excelled as a student, he had littlepatience for authority. Indeed, his obstinate temperament prevented him from com-pleting his studies at the newly established cole Polytechnique, Pariss elite univer-sity. Nevertheless, Comte was able to make a name for himself in the intellectual

    (Continued)

    Significant Others

    mile Durkheim 97

  • 98 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

    (Continued)

    circles of Paris. In 1817, he began working as a secretary and collaborator to HenriSaint-Simon. Their productive though fractious relationship came to an end seven yearslater in a dispute over assigning authorship to one of Comtes essays. Comte next setabout developing his system of positivist philosophy while working in minor academicpositions for meager wages. Beginning in 1926, Comte offered a series of private lec-tures in an effort to disseminate his views. Though attended by eminent thinkers, thegrandiosity of his theoretical system led some to dismiss his ideas. Nevertheless,Comte continued undeterred: from 1830 to 1842, he worked single-mindedly on hismagnum opus, the six-volume The Positive Philosophy (183042/1974). In the series,Comte not only outlines his Law of Three Stages (which posits that science developsthrough three mentally conceived stages: (1) the theological stage, (2) the metaphysi-cal stage, and (3) the positive stage) but also delineates the proper methods for his newscience of social physics as well as its fundamental taskthe study of social statics(order) and dynamics (progress). The work was well received in some scientificquarters, and Comte seemed poised to establish himself as a first-rate scholar.Unfortunately, his temperament again proved to be a hindrance to his success, both per-sonal and professional. His troubled marriage ended soon after Positive Philosophywas completed, and his petulance further alienated him from friends and colleagueswhile costing him a position at the cole Polytechnique. Comtes life took a turn for thebetter, however, when in 1844 he met and fell in love with Clotilde deVaux. Their affairdid not last long; Clotilde developed tuberculosis and died within a year of their firstmeeting. Comte dedicated the rest of his life to his angel. In her memory, he foundedthe Religion of Humanity for which he proclaimed himself the high priest. The newchurch was founded on the principle of universal love as Comte abandoned his earliercommitment to science and positivism. Until his death in 1857, Comte sought not sup-porters for his system of science, but converts to his Positive Church.

    NOTE: This account of Comtes biography is based largely on Lewis Cosers (1977) discussion inMastersof Sociological Thought.

    Herbert Spencer (18201903): Survival of the Fittest

    Born in the English Midlands, Herbert Spencers early years were shaped largely by hisfather and uncle. It was from these two men that Spencer received his education, an edu-cation that centered on math, physics, and chemistry. Moreover, it was from them thatSpencer was exposed to the radical religious and social doctrines that would inform hisstaunch individualism.With little formal instruction in history, literature, and languages,Spencer conceded to the limits of his education, and at the age of sixteen declined toattend university, opting instead to pursue a practical career as an engineer for theLondon and Birmingham Railway. Nevertheless, he would prove to be an avid student ofand a prolific writer on a range of social and philosophical topics.With the completion of the railway in 1841, Spencer earned his living by writing

    essays for a number of radical journals and newspapers. Of particular note is a series

    Significant Others

  • of 12 letters he published through a dissenting newspaper, The Nonconformist. TitledThe Proper Sphere of Government, the letters are an early expression of Spencersdecidedly laissez-faire perspective. In them, Spencer argued that the role of govern-ment should be restricted solely to policing, while all other matters, including edu-cation, social welfare, and economic activities, should be left to the private sector.According to Spencer, government regulations interfere with the laws of human evo-lution that, if left unhampered, ensure the survival of the fittest. It is not hard to seethat Spencers view of government still resonates with many American politiciansand voters. Less sanguine, however, is the racism and sexism that was interjected intoSpencers argument. Following the logic of his view, those who dont survivethatis, succeedare merely fulfilling their evolutionary destiny. To the extent thatwomen and people of color are less successful than white males, their successand failure hinge not only on individual aptitude and effort, but also on institu-tional and cultural dynamics that sustain a less-than-level playing field.

    mile Durkheim 99

    A second major theme found in Durkheims work is the issue of social solidarity, or thecohesion of social groups. As you will see, all of the selections in this chapterfromThe Division of Labor in Society, The Rules of Sociological Method, Suicide, and TheElementary Forms of Religious Lifeexplore the nature of the bonds that hold individualsand social groups together. Durkheim was especially concerned about modern societieswhere people often dont know their neighbors (let alone everyone in the larger commu-nity) or worship together, and where people often hold jobs in impersonal companies andorganizations. Durkheim wondered how individuals could feel tied to one another in suchan increasingly individualistic world. This issue was of utmost importance, for he main-tained that, without some semblance of solidarity and moral cohesion, society could notexist.In his emphasis on the nature of solidarity in traditional and modern societies,

    Durkheim again drew on Comtes work as well as that of the British sociologist HerbertSpencer (18201903).2 Both Comte and Spencer formulated an organic view of society toexplain the developmental paths along which societies allegedly evolve. Such a viewdepicted society as a system of interrelated parts (religious institutions, the economy, gov-ernment, the family) that work together to form a unitary, stable whole, analogous to howthe parts of the human body (lungs, kidneys, brain) function interdependently to sustain itsgeneral well-being. Moreover, as the organism (society and the body) grows in size, itbecomes increasingly complex, due to the differentiation of its parts.However, Durkheim was only partially sympathetic to the organic, evolutionary models

    developed by Comte and Spencer. On the one hand, Durkheims insistence that social soli-darity is rooted in shared moral sentiments, and the sense of obligation they evoke, stemsfrom Comte (as well as from Jean-Jacques Rousseau; see Chapter 1). Likewise, his notionthat the specialized division of labor characteristic of modern societies leads to greater inter-dependency and integration owes much to Comte (as well as to Saint-Simon; see Chapter 2).

    2Durkheim was influenced by a number of scholars, and not only by Comte and Spencer. Some ofthe more important figures in developing his views were the French Enlightenment intellectualsCharles Montesquieu (168975) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (171278), Henri de Saint-Simon(17601825), Charles Renouvier (18151903), and the German experimental psychologist WilhemWundt (18321920).

  • Nevertheless, Durkheim did not embrace Comtes assertion that all societies progress througha series of identifiable evolutionary stages. In particular, he dismissed Comtes Law of ThreeStages, wherein all societiesas well as individual intellectual developmentare said topass from a theological stage characterized by militaristic communities led by priests, to ametaphysical stage organized according to legalistic principles and controlled by lawyersand clergy, and finally to a positivist or scientific stage in which industrial societies aregoverned by technocrats and, of course, sociologists.In terms of Spencer, Durkheim was most influenced by Spencers theory on the evo-

    lution of societies. According to Spencer, just as biological organisms become more dif-ferentiated as they grow and mature, so do small-scale, homogeneous communitiesbecome increasingly complex and diverse as a result of population growth. The individ-uals living in simple societies are minimally dependent on one another for meeting theirsurvival and that of the community as they each carry out similar tasks. As the size ofthe population increases, however, similarity or likeness is replaced by heterogeneity anda specialized division of labor. Individuals become interdependent on one another asessential tasks are divided among the societys inhabitants. As a result, an individualswell-being becomes tied more and more to the general welfare of the larger society.Ensuring the functional integration of individuals now becomes the central issue for thesurvival of the society.In this regard, Durkheims perspective is compatible with that of Spencer. As further dis-

    cussed below, Durkheim hypothesized that a different kind of solidarity was prevalent inmodernas opposed to smaller, more traditionalsocieties. Durkheims equation of tradi-tional societies with mechanical solidarity and modern societies with organic solidarity(discussed on pp. 103105) shares an affinity with Spencers classification of societies aseither simple or compound.However, the two theorists diverge on the crucial point of integration. Spencer saw

    society as composed of atomistic individuals, each pursuing lines of self-interested con-duct. In a classic expression of utilitarian philosophy, Spencer maintained that a stable,well-functioning social whole is the outgrowth of individuals freely seeking to maximizetheir advantages.By contrast, Durkheim (and Comte) took a far less utilitarian approach than Spencer.

    Durkheim emphasized that society is not a result or aftereffect of individual conduct; rather,it exists prior to, and thus shapes, individual action. In other words, individual lines of con-duct are the outgrowth of social arrangements, particularly those connected to the develop-mental stage of the division of labor. Social integration, then, cannot be an unintendedconsequence of an aggregate of individuals pursuing their self-interest. Instead, it is rootedin a shared moral code, for only it can sustain a harmonious social order. And it is this moralcode, along with the feelings of solidarity it generates, that forms the basis of all societies.Without the restraints imposed by a sense of moral obligation to others, the selfish pursuitof interests would destroy the social fabric.

    DURKHEIMS THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

    As discussed previously, Durkheim was most concerned with analyzing social facts: hesought to uncover the preexisting social conditions that shape the parameters for individualbehavior. Consequently, Durkheim can be said to take a predominantly collectivist approachto order (see Figure 3.1).This approach is most readily apparent in Suicide. In this study, Durkheim begins

    with one of the most seemingly individualistic, psychologically motivated acts thereissuicidein order to illuminate the social and moral parameters behind and withinthis allegedly individual behavior. So too, Durkheims emphasis on collective conscience

    100 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

  • and collective representations indicates an interest in the collective level of society(see Figure 3.2). By collective conscience, Durkheim means the totality of beliefs andsentiments common to average citizens of the same society that forms a determinatesystem which has it own life (Durkheim 1893/1984:3839). In later work, Durkheimused the term collective representations to refer to much the same thing. In any case,the point is that Durkheims main concern is not with the conscious or psychologicalstate of specific individuals, but rather with the collective beliefs and sentiments thatexist independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are placed; theypass on and it remains (ibid.:80).This leads us to one of the most common criticisms of Durkheim. Because of his pre-

    occupation with social facts and the collective conscience, it is often claimed that heoverlooks the role of the individual in producing and reproducing the social order.Durkheims emphasis on the power of the group makes it seem like were just vesselsfor societys will. Yet this criticism ignores two essential points: First, Durkheim notonly acknowledged individual autonomy, but also took it for granted as an inevitablecondition of modern societies. Durkheim sought to show how, in modern societies,increasing individuation could produce detrimental effects because individuals are oftentorn between competing normative prescriptions and rules. For instance, in Suicide,Durkheim maintains that, rather than rest comfortably on all-pervasive norms and val-ues, a thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of whichlose their savor once known . . . [but that] all these new sensations in their infinite quan-tity cannot form a solid foundation for happiness to support one in days of trial(Durkheim 1897/1951:256). To be sure, the criticism could still be made that Durkheimignores individual agency in traditional societies based on mechanical solidarity. Inthese societies, Durkheim did in fact posit a lack of individual autonomy, perhapsreflecting the Enlightenment-driven, Eurocentric thinking of his day. (We discuss thisissue more fully below.)

    mile Durkheim 101

    Mead DURKHEIM

    Simmel

    Individual

    Du Bois

    Collective

    Weber

    GilmanMarx

    Nonrational

    Rational

    Figure 3.1 Durkheims Basic Theoretical Orientation

  • 102 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

    Relatedly, to assert that his orientation was singularly collectivist overlooks Durkheimsassumption that collective life emerges in social interaction. For instance, a major part of hisanalysis of the elementary forms of religious life involved showing how mundane objects,such as lizards and plants, take on the sacredness of the totem (the symbol of the tribe) byvirtue of individuals coming together to participate in ritual practices. Similarly, in his studyof suicide, Durkheim examined marriage and divorce rates not simply because he was fas-cinated by abstract, collective dimensions of social life, but also because he wanted touncover objective factors that measure the extent to which individuals are bound together inan increasingly individualistic world.This leads us to the issue of action. In our view, Durkheim is primarily nonrationalist

    in his orientation (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). He focused on how collective representationsand moral sentiments are a motivating force, much more so than rational or strategicinterests connected to economic or political institutions. Yet it is important to point outthat in emphasizing the external nature of social facts Durkheim also recognized thatsuch facts are not confined to the realm of ideas or feelings, but often possess a concretereality as well. For instance, educational institutions and penal systems are also decisivefor shaping the social order and individuals actions within it. Thus, social facts are capa-ble of exerting both a moral and an institutional force. In the end, however, Durkheimstressed the nonrational aspect of social facts as suggested in his supposition that thepenal system (courts, legal codes and their enforcement, etc.) ultimately rests on collec-tive notions of morality, a complex symbolic system as to what is right and what iswrong. This issue will be discussed further in the next section in relationship to thespecific selections you will read.

    Nonrational

    Rational

    Figure 3.2 Durkheims Core Concepts

    Individual Collective

    Division of Labor

    Anomie

    Collective Conscience

    Collective Representationssacred and profane

    Social Solidaritymechanical solidarityorganic solidarity

  • 1Durkheims distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity was developed, in part, as a criti-cal response to the work of the German sociologist Ferdinand Tnnies (see Significant Others box,Chapter 6, pp. 274275). In his book, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society),Tnnies argued that simpler, traditional societies (Gemeinschaft) were more organic and beneficialto the formation of social bonds. In contrast to Tnniess conservative orientation, Durkheim con-tended that complex, modern societies were, in fact, more organic and thus more desirable becausethey promote individual liberties within a context of morally binding, shared social obligations.

    mile Durkheim 103

    Readings

    In this section, you will read selections from the four major books that Durkheimpublished during his lifetime: The Division of Labor in Society (1893), The Rules ofSociological Method (1895), Suicide (1897), and The Elementary Forms of ReligiousLife (1912). We begin with The Division of Labor in Society, in which Durkheim setout the key concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity, and collective con-science.We then shift to excerpts from The Rules of Sociological Method. It is here,as you will see, that Durkheim first laid out his basic conceptualization of sociol-ogy as a discipline and delineated his concept of social facts. This is followed byexcerpts from Suicide: A Study in Sociology, which is notable, first, in that it exem-plifies Durkheims distinctive approach to the study of the social world, and second,because it further delineates Durkheims core concept of anomie.We conclude thischapter with excerpts from The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, which many the-orists consider Durkheims most theoretically significant work. In it, Durkheim takesan explicitly cultural turn, emphasizing the concepts of ritual and symbol, and thesacred and profane, and collective representations.

    Introduction to The Division of Labor in Society

    In Durkheims first major work, The Division of Labor in Society (1893), which was basedon his doctoral dissertation, Durkheim explains how the division of labor (or economic spe-cialization) characteristic of modern societies affects individuals as well as society as awhole. As you may recall, this issue had been of utmost concern to Marx as well. Marx con-tended that modern, competitive capitalism, and the specialized division of labor that sus-tained it, resulted in alienation. In contrast, Durkheim argued that economic specializationwas not necessarily bad for either the individual or the society as a whole. Instead, heargued that an extensive division of labor could exist without necessarily jeopardizing themoral cohesion of a society or the opportunity for individuals to realize their interests.How is this possible? Durkheim argued that there were two basic types of solidarity:

    mechanical and organic.1Mechanical solidarity is typified by feelings of likeness.Mechanicalsolidarity is rooted in everyone doing/feeling the same thing. Durkheim maintained that thistype of solidarity is characteristic of small, traditional societies. In these simple societies, cir-cumstances compel individuals to be generalists involved in the production and distribution ofa variety of goods. Indeed, in small, traditional societies, specialization in one task to the exclu-sion of others is not possible because the society depends on each individual providing a hostof contributions to the group. For instance, men, women, and children are often all needed topick crops at harvest time, and all partake in the harvest-time celebrations as well.Durkheim argued that a significant social consequence of the shared work experience

    characteristic of traditional societies is a shared collective conscience. People in traditional

  • 104 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

    Photo 3.1b Organic solidarity, based on specialization, is characteristic of large, modern industrialsocieties, such as Braslia (Brazil).

    Photo 3.1a Durkheim maintained that different types of society exhibit different types of solidarity.Mechanical solidarity, based on likeness, is characteristic of small, traditional societies, such as this villagein Namibia (Africa).

  • mile Durkheim 105

    societies tend to feel one and the same, and it is this feeling of oneness that is integralin the maintenance of social order.Yet, Durkheim saw that in large, complex societies, this type of solidarity was waning. In

    large, modern societies, labor is specialized; people do not necessarily all engage in the samework or share the same ideas and beliefs. For Durkheim, organic solidarity refers to a type ofsolidarity in which each person is interdependent with others, forming a complex web of coop-erative associations. In such situations, solidarity (or a feeling of oneness) comes not fromeach person believing/doing the same thing, but from each person cultivating individual differ-ences and knowing that each is doing her part for the good of the whole.Thus, Durkheim arguedthat the increasing specialization and individuation so readily apparent in modern industrialsocieties does not necessarily result in a decline in social stability or cohesion. Rather, thegrowth in a societys density (the number of people living in a community) and consequentincreasingly specialized division of labor can result in simply a different type of social cohesion.Significantly, however, Durkheim maintained that organic solidarity does not automati-

    cally emerge in modern societies. Rather, it arises only when the division of labor is spon-taneous or voluntary. States Durkheim, For the division of labor to produce solidarity, itis not sufficient, then, that each have his task; it is still necessary that this task be fitting tohim (Durkheim 1893/1984:375). Moreover, a normal division of labor exists only whenthe specialization of tasks is not exaggerated. If the division of labor is pushed too far, thereis a danger for the individual to become isolated in his special activity. In such cases, thedivision of labor becomes a source of disintegration for both the individual and society(ibid.). The individual no longer feels the idea of common work being done by those whowork side by side with him (ibid.). Meanwhile, a rigid division of labor can lead to theinstitution of classes and castes . . . [which] is often a source of dissension (ibid.:374).Durkheim used the term anomie (a lack of moral regulation) to describe the pathologicalconsequences of an overly specialized division of labor. This is a pivotal concept to whichwe will shortly return.Most interestingly, then, the important point is not that Durkheim ignored the potentially

    harmful aspects of the division of labor in modern societies; on the contrary, Durkheimacknowledged that the division of labor is problematic when it is forced or pushed to anextreme. This position offers an important similarity as well as difference to that offered byMarx. As we noted previously, Marx saw both alienation and class conflict as inevitable (ornormal) in capitalist societies. By contrast, rather than seeing social conflict as a normalcondition of capitalism, Durkheim maintained that anomie results only in abnormal con-ditions of overspecialization, when the rules of capitalism become too rigid and individualsare forced into a particular position in the division of labor.

    From The Division of Labor in Society (1893)

    mile Durkheim

    INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

    The division of labor is not of recent origin,but it was only at the end of the eighteenthcentury that social cognizance was taken of

    the principle, though, until then, unwittingsubmission had been rendered to it. To besure, several thinkers from earliest timessaw its importance;i but Adam Smith was thefirst to attempt a theory of it. Moreover, he

    SOURCE: Reprinted and edited with the permission of The Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster Inc.,from The Division of Labor in Society by mile Durkheim, translated by George Simpson. Copyright 1947,1964 by The Free Press. All rights reserved.iAristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, E, 1133a, 16.

  • adopted this phrase that social science laterlent to biology.Nowadays, the phenomenon has developed so

    generally it is obvious to all. We need have nofurther illusions about the tendencies of modernindustry; it advances steadily towards powerfulmachines, towards great concentrations of forcesand capital, and consequently to the extremedivision of labor. Occupations are infinitelyseparated and specialized, not only inside thefactories, but each product is itself a specialtydependent upon others. Adam Smith and JohnStuart Mill still hoped that agriculture, at least,would be an exception to the rule, and they saw itas the last resort of small-scale industry. Althoughone must be careful not to generalize unduly insuch matters, nevertheless it is hard to deny todaythat the principal branches of the agriculturalindustry are steadily being drawn into the generalmovement. Finally, business itself is ingeniouslyfollowing and reflecting in all its shadings theinfinite diversity of industrial enterprises; and,while this evolution is realizing itself withunpremeditated spontaneity, the economists,examining its causes and appreciating its results,far from condemning or opposing it, uphold it asnecessary.They see in it the supreme law of humansocieties and the condition of their progress. Butthe division of labor is not peculiar to theeconomic world; we can observe its growinginfluence in the most varied fields of society. Thepolitical, administrative, and judicial functions aregrowing more and more specialized. It is the samewith the aesthetic and scientific functions. It islong since philosophy reigned as the scienceunique; it has been broken into a multitude ofspecial disciplines each of which has its object,method, and though. Menworking in the scienceshave become increasingly more specialized.ii

    MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY

    We are now in a position to come to a conclusion.The totality of beliefs and sentiments

    common to average citizens of the same society

    forms a determinate system which has its ownlife; one may call it the collective or commonconscience. No doubt, it has not a specificorgan as a substratum; it is, by definition,diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless,it has specific characteristics which make it adistinct reality. It is, in effect, independent ofthe particular conditions in which individualsare placed; they pass on and it remains. It is thesame in the North and in the South, in greatcities and in small, in different professions.Moreover, it does not change with each gen-eration, but, on the contrary, it connectssuccessive generations with one another. It is,thus, an entirely different thing from particularconsciences, although it can be realized onlythrough them. It is the psychical type of society,a type which has its properties, its conditions ofexistence, its mode of development, just asindividual types, although in a different way.Thus understood, it has the right to be denotedby a special word. The one which we have justemployed is not, it is true, without ambiguity.As the terms, collective and social, are oftenconsidered synonymous, one is inclined tobelieve that the collective conscience is thetotal social conscience, that is, extend it toinclude more than the psychic life of society,although, particularly in advanced societies, itis only a very restricted part. Judicial,governmental, scientific, industrial, in short, allspecial functions are of a psychic nature, sincethey consist in systems of representations andactions. They, however, are surely outside thecommon conscience. To avoid the confusioniii

    into which some have fallen, the best waywould be to create a technical expressionespecially to designate the totality of socialsimilitudes. However, since the use of a newword, when not absolutely necessary, is notwithout inconvenience, we shall employ thewell-worn expression, collective or commonconscience, but we shall always mean the strictsense in which we have taken it.We can, then, to resume the preceding

    analysis, say that an act is criminal when it

    iiDe Candolle, Histoire des Sciences et des Savants, 2nd ed., p. 263.iiiThe confusion is not without its dangers. Thus, we sometimes ask if the individual conscience varies as the col-lective conscience. It all depends upon the sense in which the word is taken. If it represents social likenesses, thevariation is inverse, as we shall see. If it signifies the total psychic life of society, the relation is direct. It is thusnecessary to distinguish them.

    106 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

  • offends strong and defined states of thecollective conscience.iv

    The statement of this proposition is notgenerally called into question, but it is ordinarilygiven a sense very different from that which itought to convey. We take it as if it expressed, notthe essential property of crime, but one of itsrepercussions. We well know that crime violatesvery pervasive and intense sentiments, but webelieve that this pervasiveness and this intensityderive from the criminal character of the act,which consequently remains to be defined. We donot deny that every delict is universally reproved,but we take as agreed that the reprobation towhich it is subjected results from its delictness.But we are hard put to say what this delictnessconsists of. In immorality which is particularlyserious? I wish such were the case, but that is toreply to the question by putting one word in placeof another, for it is precisely the problem tounderstand what this immorality is, and especiallythis particular immorality which society reprovesby means of organized punishment and whichconstitutes criminality. It can evidently come onlyfrom one or several characteristics common to allcriminological types. The only one which wouldsatisfy this condition is that opposition between acrime, whatever it is, and certain collectivesentiments. It is, accordingly, this oppositionwhich makes crime rather than being a derivativeof crime. In other words, we must not say that anaction shocks the common conscience because itis criminal, but rather that it is criminal because itshocks the common conscience. We do notreprove it because it is a crime, but it is a crimebecause we reprove it. As for the intrinsic natureof these sentiments, it is impossible to specifythem. They have the most diverse objects andcannot be encompassed in a single formula. Wecan say that they relate neither to vital interests ofsociety nor to a minimum of justice. All thesedefinitions are inadequate. By this alone can werecognize it: a sentiment, whatever its origin andend, is found in all consciences with a certaindegree of force and precision, and every actionwhich violates it is a crime. Contemporarypsychology is more and more reverting to the ideaof Spinoza, according to which things are good

    because we like them, as against our liking thembecause they are good. What is primary is thetendency, the inclination; the pleasure and pain areonly derivative facts. It is just so in social life. Anact is socially bad because society disproves of it.But, it will be asked, are there not some collectivesentiments which result from pleasure and painwhich society feels from contact with their ends?No doubt, but they do not all have this origin. Agreat many, if not the larger part, come from othercauses. Everything that leads activity to assume adefinite form can give rise to habits, whence resulttendencies which must be satisfied. Moreover, it isthese latter tendencies which alone are trulyfundamental. The others are only special formsand more determinate. Thus, to find charm in suchand such an object, collective sensibility mustalready be constituted so as to be able to enjoy it.If the corresponding sentiments are abolished, themost harmful act to society will not only betolerated, but even honored and proposed as anexample. Pleasure is incapable of creating animpulse out of whole cloth; it can only link thosesentiments which exist to such and such aparticular end, provided that the end be in accordwith their original nature. . . .

    ORGANIC SOLIDARITY

    Since negative solidarity does not produce anyintegration by itself, and since, moreover,there is nothing specific about it, we shallrecognize only two kinds of positive solidaritywhich are distinguishable by the followingqualities:

    1. The first binds the individual directly tosociety without any intermediary. In the second,he depends upon society, because he dependsupon the parts of which it is composed.

    2. Society is not seen in the same aspect inthe two cases. In the first, what we call society isa more or less organized totality of beliefs andsentiments common to all the members of thegroup: this is the collective type. On the otherhand, the society in which we are solitary in the

    ivWe shall not consider the question whether the collective conscience is a conscience as is that of the individ-ual. By this term, we simply signify the totality of social likenesses, without prejudging the category by whichthis system of phenomena ought to be defined.

    mile Durkheim 107

  • second instance is a system of different, specialfunctions which definite relations unite. Thesetwo societies really make up only one. They aretwo aspects of one and the same reality, butnone the less they must be distinguished.

    3. From this second difference there arisesanother which helps us to characterize and namethe two kinds of solidarity.

    The first can be strong only if the ideas andtendencies common to all the members of thesociety are greater in number and intensity thanthose which pertain personally to each member.It is as much stronger as the excess is more con-siderable. But what makes our personality ishow much of our own individual qualities wehave, what distinguishes us from others. Thissolidarity can grow only in inverse ratio to per-sonality. There are in each of us, as we havesaid, two consciences: one which is common toour group in its entirety, which, consequently, isnot ourself, but society living and acting withinus; the other, on the contrary, represents that inus which is personal and distinct, that whichmakes us an individual.v Solidarity whichcomes from likenesses is at its maximum whenthe collective conscience completely envelopsour whole conscience and coincides in allpoints with it. But, at that moment, our individ-uality is nil. It can be born only if the commu-nity takes smaller toll of us. There are, here, twocontrary forces, one centripetal, the other cen-trifugal, which cannot flourish at the same time.We cannot, at one and the same time, developourselves in two opposite senses. If we have alively desire to think and act for ourselves, wecannot be strongly inclined to think and act asothers do. If our ideal is to present a singularand personal appearance, we do not want toresemble everybody else. Moreover, at themoment when this solidarity exercises its force,our personality vanishes, as our definition per-mits us to say, for we are no longer ourselves,but the collective life.The social molecules which can be coherent

    in this way can act together only in the measurethat they have no actions of their own, as themolecules of inorganic bodies. That is why we

    propose to call this type of solidarity mechan-ical. The term does not signify that it isproduced by mechanical and artificial means.We call it that only by analogy to the cohesionwhich unites the elements of an inanimate body,as opposed to that which makes a unity out ofthe elements of a living body. What justifies thisterm is that the link which thus unites theindividual to society is wholly analogous to thatwhich attaches a thing to a person. Theindividual conscience, considered in this light,is a simple dependent upon the collective typeand follows all of its movements, as thepossessed object follows those of its owner. Insocieties where this type of solidarity is highlydeveloped, the individual does not appear, as weshall see later. Individuality is something whichthe society possesses. Thus, in these socialtypes, personal rights are not yet distinguishedfrom real rights.It is quite otherwise with the solidarity which

    the division of labor produces. Whereas theprevious type implies that individuals resembleeach other, this type presumes their difference.The first is possible only in so far as theindividual personality is absorbed into thecollective personality; the second is possibleonly if each one has a sphere of action which ispeculiar to him; that is, a personality. It isnecessary, then, that the collective conscienceleave open a part of the individual conscience inorder that special functions may be establishedthere, functions which it cannot regulate. Themore this region is extended, the stronger is thecohesion which results from this solidarity. Ineffect, on the one hand, each one depends asmuch more strictly on society as labor is moredivided; and, on the other, the activity of each isas much more personal as it is more specialized.Doubtless, as circumscribed as it is, it is nevercompletely original. Even in the exercise of ouroccupation, we conform to usages, to practiceswhich are common to our whole professionalbrotherhood. But, even in this instance, the yokethat we submit to is much less heavy than whensociety completely controls us, and it leavesmuch more place open for the free play of ourinitiative. Here, then, the individuality of all

    108 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

    vHowever, these two consciences are not in regions geographically distinct from us, but penetrate from all sides.

  • grows at the same time as that of its parts.Society becomes more capable of collectivemovement, at the same time that each of itselements has more freedom of movement. Thissolidarity resembles that which we observeamong the higher animals. Each organ, in effect,has its special physiognomy, its autonomy. And,moreover, the unity of the organism is as greatas the individuation of the parts is more marked.Because of this analogy, we propose to call thesolidarity which is due to the division of labor,organic. . . .

    THE CAUSES

    We can then formulate the following proposition:The division of labor varies in direct ratio withthe volume and density of societies, and, if itprogresses in a continuous manner in the courseof social development, it is because societiesbecome regularly denser and generally morevoluminous.At all times, it is true, it has been well

    understood that there was a relation betweenthese two orders of fact, for, in order thatfunctions be more specialized, there must bemore co-operators, and they must be related toco-operate. But, ordinarily, this state of societiesis seen only as the means by which the divisionof labor develops, and not as the cause of itsdevelopment. The latter is made to depend uponindividual aspirations toward well-being andhappiness, which can be satisfied so muchbetter as societies are more extensive and morecondensed. The law we have just established isquite otherwise. We say, not that the growth andcondensation of societies permit, but that theynecessitate a greater division of labor. It is not

    an instrument by which the latter is realized; itis its determining cause.vi

    THE FORCED DIVISION OF LABOR

    It is not sufficient that there be rules, however, forsometimes the rules themselves are the cause ofevil. This is what occurs in class-wars. Theinstitution of classes and of castes constitutes anorganization of the division of labor, and it is astrictly regulated organization, although it often isa source of dissension. The lower classes notbeing, or no longer being, satisfied with the rolewhich has devolved upon them from custom or bylaw aspire to functions which are closed to themand seek to dispossess those who are exercisingthese functions. Thus civil wars arise which aredue to the manner in which labor is distributed.There is nothing similar to this in the

    organism. No doubt, during periods of crises, thedifferent tissues war against one another andnourish themselves at the expense of others. Butnever does one cell or organ seek to usurp arole different from the one which it is filling.The reason for this is that each anatomic elementautomatically executes its purpose. Its consti-tution, its place in the organism, determines itsvocation; its task is a consequence of its nature. Itcan badly acquit itself, but it cannot assumeanothers task unless the latter abandons it, ashappens in the rare cases of substitution that wehave spoken of. It is not so in societies. Here thepossibility is greater. There is a greater distancebetween the hereditary dispositions of theindividual and the social function he will fill.The first do not imply the second with suchimmediate necessity. This space, open to strivingand deliberation, is also at the mercy of a

    mile Durkheim 109

    viOn this point, we can still rely on Comte as authority. I must, he said now indicate the progressive conden-sation of our species as a last general concurrent element in regulating the effective speed of the social move-ment. We can first easily recognize that this influence contributes a great deal, especially in origin, in determininga more special division of human labor, necessarily incompatible with a small number of co-operators. Besides,by a most intimate and little known property, although still most important, such a condensation stimulatesdirectly, in a very powerful manner, the most rapid development of social evolution, either in driving individu-als to new efforts to assure themselves by more refined means of an existence which otherwise would becomemore difficult, or by obliging society with more stubborn and better concentrated energy to fight more stifflyagainst the more powerful effort of particular divergences. With one and the other, we see that it is not a ques-tion here of the absolute increase of the number of individuals, but especially of their more intense concourse ina given space. Cours, IV, p. 455.

  • 110 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

    multitude of causes which can make individualnature deviate from its normal direction andcreate a pathological state. Because thisorganization is more supple, it is also moredelicate and more accessible to change.Doubtless, we are not, from birth, predestined tosome special position; but we do have tastes andaptitudes which limit our choice. If no care istaken of them, if they are ceaselessly disturbed byour daily occupations, we shall suffer and seek away of putting an end to our suffering. But thereis no other way out than to change the establishedorder and to set up a new one. For the division oflabor to produce solidarity, it is not sufficient,then, that each have his task; it is still necessarythat this task be fitting to him. Now, it is thiscondition which is not realized in the case we areexamining. In effect, if the institution of classesor castes sometimes gives rise to anxiety and paininstead of producing solidarity, this is because thedistribution of social functions on which it restsdoes not respond, or rather no longer responds, tothe distribution of natural talents. . . .

    CONCLUSION

    But not only does the division of labor presentthe character by which we have defined morality;it more and more tends to become the essentialcondition of social solidarity. As we advance inthe evolutionary scale, the ties which bind theindividual to his family, to his native soil, totraditions which the past has given to him, tocollective group usages, become loose. Moremobile, he changes his environment more easily,leaves his people to go elsewhere to live a moreautonomous existence, to a greater extent formshis own ideas and sentiments. Of course, thewhole common conscience does not, on thisaccount, pass out of existence.At least there willalways remain this cult of personality, of

    individual dignity of which we have just beenspeaking, and which, today, is the rallying-pointof so many people. But how little a thing it iswhen one contemplates the ever increasingextent of social life, and, consequently, ofindividual consciences! For, as they becomemore voluminous, as intelligence becomesricher, activity more varied, in order for moralityto remain constant, that is to say, in order for theindividual to remain attached to the group witha force equal to that of yesterday, the ties whichbind him to it must become stronger and morenumerous. If, then, he formed no others thanthose which come from resemblances, theeffacement of the segmental type would beaccompanied by a systematic debasement ofmorality. Man would no longer be sufficientlyobligated; he would no longer feel about andabove him this salutary pressure of societywhich moderates his egoism and makes him amoral being. This is what gives moral value tothe division of labor. Through it, the individualbecomes cognizant of his dependence uponsociety; from it come the forces which keep himin check and restrain him. In short, since thedivision of labor becomes the chief source ofsocial solidarity, it becomes, at the same time,the foundation of the moral order.We can then say that, in higher societies, our

    duty is not to spread our activity over a largesurface, but to concentrate and specialize it. Wemust contract our horizon, choose a definite taskand immerse ourselves in it completely, instead oftrying to make ourselves a sort of creativemasterpiece, quite complete, which contains itsworth in itself and not in the services that itrenders. Finally, this specialization ought to bepushed as far as the elevation of the social type,without assigning any other limit to it.vii No doubt,we ought so to work as to realize in ourselves thecollective type as it exists. There are commonsentiments, common ideas, without which, as has

    viiThere is, however, probably another limit which we do not have to speak of since it concerns individual hygiene. Itmay be held that, in the light of our organico-psychic constitution, the division of labor cannot go beyond a certainlimit without disorders resulting.Without entering upon the question, let us straightaway say that the extreme special-ization at which biological functions have arrived does not seem favorable to this hypothesis. Moreover, in the veryorder of psychic and social functions, has not the division of labor, in its historical development, been carried to thelast stage in the relations of men and women? Have not there been faculties completely lost by both?Why cannot thesame phenomenon occur between individuals of the same sex? Of course, it takes time for the organism to adapt itselfto these changes, but we do not see why a day should come when this adaptation would become impossible.

  • been said, one is not a man. The rule which ordersus to specialize remains limited by the contraryrule. Our conclusion is not that it is good to pressspecialization as far as possible, but as far asnecessary. As for the part that is to be played bythese two opposing necessities, that is determinedby experience and cannot be calculated a priori. Itis enough for us to have shown that the second isnot of a different nature from the first, but that italso is moral, and that, moreover, this dutybecomes ever more important and pressing,because the general qualities which are inquestion suffice less and less to socialize theindividual. . . .Let us first of all remark that it is difficult to

    see why it would be more in keeping with thelogic of human nature to develop superficiallyrather than profoundly. Why would a moreextensive activity, but more dispersed, be superiorto a more concentrated, but circumscribed,activity? Why would there be more dignity inbeing complete and mediocre, rather than inliving a more specialized, but more intense life,particularly if it is thus possible for us to findwhat we have lost in this specialization, throughour association with other beings who have whatwe lack and who complete us? We take off fromthe principle that man ought to realize his natureas man, to accomplish his o o, asAristotle said. But this nature does not remainconstant throughout history; it is modified withsocieties. Among lower peoples, the proper dutyof man is to resemble his companions, to realizein himself all the traits of the collective typewhich are then confounded, much more thantoday, with the human type. But, in moreadvanced societies, his nature is, in large part, tobe an organ of society, and his proper duty,consequently, is to play his role as an organ.

    Moreover, far from being trammelled by theprogress of specialization, individual persona-lity develops with the division of labor.To be a person is to be an autonomous source

    of action. Man acquires this quality only in so faras there is something in him which is his aloneand which individualizes him, as he is somethingmore than a simple incarnation of the generictype of his race and his group. It will be said thathe is endowed with free will and that is enough toestablish his personality. But although there maybe some of this liberty in him, an object of somany discussions, it is not this metaphysical,impersonal, invariable attribute which can serveas the unique basis for concrete personality,which is empirical and variable with individuals.That could not be constituted by the whollyabstract power of choice between two opposites,but it is still necessary for this faculty to beexercised towards ends and aims which areproper to the agent. In other words, the verymaterials of conscience must have a personalcharacter. But we have seen in the second book ofthis work that this result is progressivelyproduced as the division of labor progresses. Theeffacement of the segmental type, at the sametime that it necessitates a very great speciali-zation, partially lifts the individual consciencefrom the organic environment which supports it,as from the social environment which envelops it,and, accordingly, because of this doubleemancipation, the individual becomes more of anindependent factor in his own conduct. Thedivision of labor itself contributes to thisenfranchisement, for individual natures, whilespecializing, become more complex, and by thatare in part freed from collective action andhereditary influences which can only enforcethemselves upon simple, general things. . . .

    mile Durkheim 111

    Introduction to The Rules of Sociological Method

    In The Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim 1895/1966:xiii), Durkheim makes at leastthree essential points. Durkheim insists, (1) sociology is a distinct field of study, and(2) although the social sciences are distinct from the natural sciences, the methods of thelatter can be applied to the former. In addition, Durkheim maintains, (3) the social fieldis also distinct from the psychological realm. Thus, sociology is the study of social phe-nomena or social facts, a very different enterprise from the study of an individuals ownideas or will.

  • 112 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

    Specifically, Durkheim maintains there are two different ways that social facts can beidentified. First, social facts are general throughout the extent of a given society at a givenstage in the evolution of that society (Durkheim 1895/1966:xv,13). Second, albeit related, asocial fact is marked by any manner of action . . . capable of exercising over the individualexterior constraint (ibid.). In other words, a social fact is recognized by the coercivepower which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals (ibid.:10). This doesnot mean that there are no exceptions to a social fact, but that it is potentially universal inthe sense that, given specific conditions, it will be likely to emerge (ibid.:xv).The coercive power of social facts brings us to a critical issue raised in The Rules of

    Sociological Method: crime. Durkheim argues that crime is inevitable or normal in all soci-eties because crime defines the moral boundaries of a society and, in doing so, communicatesto its inhabitants the range of acceptable behaviors. For Durkheim, crime is normalnotbecause there will always be bad or wicked individuals in society (i.e., not for idiosyn-cratictic, psychological reasons, though those may well exist too), but because crime isindispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law (Durkheim 1895/1966:69). Ashe maintains, A society exempt from [crime] is utterly impossible because crime affirmsand reaffirms the collective sentiments on which it is founded and which are necessary for itsexistence (ibid.:67). The formation and reformation of the collective conscience is nevercomplete. Indeed, Durkheim maintains that even in a hypothetical society of saints, a per-fect cloister of exemplary individuals, faults will appear, which will cause the same scan-dal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousnesses (ibid.:68,69). It is impossiblefor all to be alike . . . there cannot be a society in which the individuals do not differ more orless from the collective type (ibid.:69,70). Simply put, you cannot have a society withoutcrime for the same reason that you cannot have a game without rules (i.e., you can do A,but not B) and consequences to rule violations (if you do B, this will happen). Thus, whenchildren make up a new game, they make up not only rules, but also consequences for ruleinfractions (e.g., you have to kick the ball between the tree and the mailbox; if the ball touchesyour hands, youre out). So too, one could argue, society is like a game. There are rules(norms and laws), and there are consequences or punishments if you break thosenorms/rules/laws (whether social ostracism or jail). Most importantly, it is the consequencesof the action (crime and punishment) themselves that help clarify and reaffirm what the rulesof the game are and thus the basis of society itself.

    From The Rules of Sociological Method (1895)

    mile Durkheim

    WHAT IS A SOCIAL FACT?

    Before inquiring into the method suited to thestudy of social facts, it is important to knowwhich facts are commonly called social. Thisinformation is all the more necessary since thedesignation social is used with little precision.It is currently employed for practically all

    phenomena generally diffused within society,however small their social interest. But on thatbasis, there are, as it were, no human events thatmay not be called social. Each individual drinks,sleeps, eats, reasons; and it is to societys interestthat these functions be exercised in an orderlymanner. If, then, all these facts are counted associal facts, sociology would have no subject

    SOURCE: Reprinted with permission of The Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster Adult PublishingGroup, from The Rules of Sociological Method by mile Durkheim, translated by Sarah A. Soloway and JohnH. Mueller, edited by George E. G. Catlin. Copyright 1938 by George E. G. Catlin. Copyright renewed 1966by Sarah A. Soloway, John H. Mueller, George E. G. Catlin. All rights reserved.

  • matter exclusively its own, and its domain wouldbe confused with that of biology and psychology.But in reality there is in every society a

    certain group of phenomena which may bedifferentiated from those studied by the othernatural sciences. When I fulfill my obligationsas brother, husband, or citizen, when I executemy contracts, I perform duties which aredefined, externally to myself and my acts, in lawand in custom. Even if they conform to my ownsentiments and I feel their reality subjectively,such reality is still objective, for I did notcreate them; I merely inherited them throughmy education. How many times it happens,moreover, that we are ignorant of the details ofthe obligations incumbent upon us, and that inorder to acquaint ourselves with them we mustconsult the law and its authorized interpreters!Similarly, the church-member finds the beliefsand practices of his religious life ready-made atbirth; their existence prior to his own impliestheir existence outside of himself. The system ofsigns I use to express my thought, the systemof currency I employ to pay my debts, theinstruments of credit I utilize in my commercialrelations, the practices followed in my profession,etc., function independently of my own use ofthem. And these statements can be repeated foreach member of society. Here, then, are ways ofacting, thinking, and feeling that present thenoteworthy property of existing outside theindividual consciousness.These types of conduct or thought are not only

    external to the individual but are, moreover,endowed with coercive power, by virtue of whichthey impose themselves upon him, independentof his individual will. Of course, when I fullyconsent and conform to them, this constraint isfelt only slightly, if at all, and is thereforeunnecessary. But it is, nonetheless, an intrinsiccharacteristic of these facts, the proof thereofbeing that it asserts itself as soon as I attempt toresist it. If I attempt to violate the law, it reactsagainst me so as to prevent my act before itsaccomplishment, or to nullify my violation byrestoring the damage, if it is accomplished andreparable, or to make me expiate it if it cannot becompensated for otherwise.In the case of purely moral maxims; the public

    conscience exercises a check on every act whichoffends it by means of the surveillance it

    exercises over the conduct of citizens, and theappropriate penalties at its disposal. In manycases the constraint is less violent, but never-theless it always exists. If I do not submit to theconventions of society, if in my dress I do notconform to the customs observed in my countryand in my class, the ridicule I provoke, the socialisolation in which I am kept, produce, although inan attenuated form, the same effects as apunishment in the strict sense of the word. Theconstraint is nonetheless efficacious for beingindirect. I am not obliged to speak French withmy fellow-countrymen nor to use the legalcurrency, but I cannot possibly do otherwise. If Itried to escape this necessity, my attempt wouldfail miserably. As an industrialist, I am free toapply the technical methods of former centuries;but by doing so, I should invite certain ruin. Evenwhen I free myself from these rules and violatethem successfully, I am always compelled tostruggle with them. When finally overcome, theymake their constraining power sufficiently felt bythe resistance they offer. The enterprises of allinnovators, including successful ones, come upagainst resistance of this kind.Here, then, is a category of facts with very

    distinctive characteristics: it consists of ways ofacting, thinking, and feeling, external to theindividual, and endowed with a power ofcoercion, by reason of which they control him.These ways of thinking could not be confusedwith biological phenomena, since they consist ofrepresentations and of actions; nor with psycho-logical phenomena, which exist only in theindividual consciousness and through it. Theyconstitute, thus, a new variety of phenomena; andit is to them exclusively that the term socialought to be applied.And this term fits them quitewell, for it is clear that, since their source is notin the individual, their substratum can be noother than society, either the political society asa whole or some one of the partial groups itincludes, such as religious denominations,political, literary, and occupational associations,etc. On the other hand, this term social appliesto them exclusively, for it has a distinct meaningonly if it designates exclusively the phenomenawhich are not included in any of the categoriesof facts that have already been established andclassified. These ways of thinking and actingtherefore constitute the proper domain of

    mile Durkheim 113

  • 114 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

    sociology. It is true that, when we define themwith this word constraint, we risk shockingthe zealous partisans of absolute individualism.For those who profess the complete autonomyof the individual, mans dignity is diminishedwhenever he is made to feel that he is notcompletely self-determinant. It is generallyaccepted today, however, that most of our ideasand our tendencies are not developed byourselves but come to us from without. How canthey become a part of us except by imposingthemselves upon us? This is the whole meaningof our definition. And it is generally accepted,moreover, that social constraint is notnecessarily incompatible with the individualpersonality.i

    Since the examples that we have just cited(legal and moral regulations, religious faiths,financial systems, etc.) all consist of establishedbeliefs and practices, one might be led to believethat social facts exist only where there is somesocial organization. But there are other factswithout such crystallized form which have thesame objectivity and the same ascendancy over theindividual. These are called social currents.Thusthe great movements of enthusiasm, indignation,and pity in a crowd do not originate in any one ofthe particular individual consciousnesses. Theycome to each one of us fromwithout and can carryus away in spite of ourselves. Of course, it mayhappen that, in abandoning myself to themunreservedly, I do not feel the pressure they exertupon me. But it is revealed as soon as I try to resistthem. Let an individual attempt to oppose one ofthese collective manifestations, and the emotionsthat he denies will turn against him. Now, if thispower of external coercion asserts itself so clearlyin cases of resistance, it must exist also in the first-mentioned cases, although we are unconscious ofit. We are then victims of the illusion of havingourselves created that which actually forced itselffrom without. If the complacency with which wepermit ourselves to be carried along conceals thepressure undergone, nevertheless it does notabolish it. Thus, air is no less heavy because we donot detect its weight. So, even if we ourselves havespontaneously contributed to the production of thecommon emotion, the impression we havereceived differs markedly from that which wewould have experienced if we had been alone.Also, once the crowd has dispersed, that is, once

    these social influences have ceased to act upon usand we are alone again, the emotions which havepassed through the mind appear strange to us, andwe no longer recognize them as ours. We realizethat these feelings have been impressed upon us toamuch greater extent than they were created by us.It may even happen that they horrify us, so muchwere they contrary to our nature. Thus, a groupof individuals, most of whom are perfectlyinoffensive, may, when gathered in a crowd, bedrawn into acts of atrocity. And what we say ofthese transitory outbursts applies similarly to thosemore permanent currents of opinion on religious,political, literary, or artistic matters which areconstantly being formed around us, whether insociety as a whole or in more limited circles.To confirm this definition of the social fact

    by a characteristic illustration from commonexperience, one need only observe the manner inwhich children are brought up. Considering thefacts as they are and as they have always been, itbecomes immediately evident that all educationis a continuous effort to impose on the childways of seeing, feeling, and acting which hecould not have arrived at spontaneously. Fromthe very first hours of his life, we compel him toeat, drink, and sleep at regular hours; weconstrain him to cleanliness, calmness, andobedience; later we exert pressure upon him inorder that he may learn proper consideration forothers, respect for customs and conventions, theneed for work, etc. If, in time, this constraintceases to be felt, it is because it gradually givesrise to habits and to internal tendencies thatrender constraint unnecessary; but neverthelessit is not abolished, for it is still the source fromwhich these habits were derived. It is true that,according to Spencer, a rational education oughtto reject such methods, allowing the child to actin complete liberty; but as this pedagogic theoryhas never been applied by any known people, itmust be accepted only as an expression ofpersonal opinion, not as a fact which cancontradict the aforementioned observations.What makes these facts particularly instructive isthat the aim of education is, precisely, thesocialization of the human being; the process ofeducation, therefore, gives us in a nutshell thehistorical fashion in which the social being isconstituted. This unremitting pressure to whichthe child is subjected is the very pressure of the

    iWe do not intend to imply, however, that all constraints are normal. We shall return to this point later.

  • social milieu which tends to fashion him in itsown image, and of which parents and teachers aremerely the representatives and intermediaries.It follows that sociological phenomena cannot

    be defined by their universality. A thought whichwe find in every individual consciousness, amovement repeated by all individuals, is notthereby a social fact. If sociologists have beensatisfied with defining them by this characteristic,it is because they confused them with what onemight call their reincarnation in the individual. Itis, however, the collective aspects of the beliefs,tendencies, and practices of a group thatcharacterize truly social phenomena. As for theforms that the collective states assume whenrefracted in the individual, these are things ofanother sort. This duality is clearly demonstratedby the fact that these two orders of phenomena arefrequently found dissociated from one another.Indeed, certain of these social manners of actingand thinking acquire, by reason of their repetition,a certain rigidity which on its own accountcrystallizes them, so to speak, and isolates themfrom the particular events which reflect them.Theythus acquire a body, a tangible form, and constitutea reality in their own right, quite distinct from theindividual facts which produce it. Collective habitsare inherent not only in the successive acts whichthey determine but, by a privilege of which we findno example in the biological realm, they are givenpermanent expression in a formula which isrepeated from mouth to mouth, transmitted byeducation, and fixed even in writing. Such is theorigin and nature of legal and moral rules, popularaphorisms and proverbs, articles of faith whereinreligious or political groups condense their beliefs,standards of taste established by literary schools,etc. None of these can be found entirelyreproduced in the applications made of them byindividuals, since they can exist even withoutbeing actually applied.No doubt, this dissociation does not always

    manifest itself with equal distinctness, but itsobvious existence in the important and numerouscases just cited is sufficient to prove that thesocial fact is a thing distinct from its individualmanifestations. Moreover, even when thisdissociation is not immediately apparent, it mayoften be disclosed by certain devices of method.Such dissociation is indispensable if one wishes toseparate social facts from their alloys in order to

    observe them in a state of purity. Currents ofopinion, with an intensity varying according to thetime and place, impel certain groups either tomore marriages, for example, or to more suicides,or to a higher or lower birthrate, etc. Thesecurrents are plainly social facts. At first sight theyseem inseparable from the forms they take inindividual cases. But statistics furnish us with themeans of isolating them. They are, in fact,represented with considerable exactness by therates of births, marriages, and suicides, that is, bythe number obtained by dividing the averageannual total of marriages, births, suicides, by thenumber of persons whose ages lie within the rangein which marriages, births, and suicides occur.ii

    Since each of these figures contains all theindividual cases indiscriminately, the individualcircumstances which may have had a share in theproduction of the phenomenon are neutralizedand, consequently, do not contribute to itsdetermination. The average, then, expresses acertain state of the group mind (lme collective).Such are social phenomena, when disentangled

    from all foreign matter. As for their individualmanifestations, these are indeed, to a certainextent, social, since they partly reproduce a socialmodel. Each of them also depends, and to a largeextent, on the organopsychological constitution ofthe individual and on the particular circumstancesin which he is placed. Thus they are notsociological phenomena in the strict sense of theword. They belong to two realms at once; onecould call them sociopsychological. They interestthe sociologist without constituting the imme-diate subject matter of sociology. There exist inthe interior of organisms similar phenomena,compound in their nature, which form in their turnthe subject matter of the hybrid sciences, suchas physiological chemistry, for example.The objection may be raised that a phenomenon

    is collective only if it is common to all members ofsociety, or at least to most of themin otherwords, if it is truly general. This may be true; but itis general because it is collective (that is, more orless obligatory), and certainly not collectivebecause general. It is a group condition repeated inthe individual because imposed on him. It is to befound in each part because it exists in the whole,rather than in the whole because it exists in theparts.This becomes conspicuously evident in thosebeliefs and practices which are transmitted to us

    mile Durkheim 115

    iiSuicides do not occur at every age, and they take place with varying intensity at the different ages in which they occur.

  • ready-made by previous generations; we receiveand adopt them because, being both collective andancient, they are invested with a particularauthority that education has taught us to recognizeand respect. It is, of course, true that a vast portionof our social culture is transmitted to us in thisway; but even when the social fact is due in part toour direct collaboration, its nature is not different.A collective emotion which bursts forth suddenlyand violently in a crowd does not express merelywhat all the individual sentiments had in common;it is something entirely different, as we haveshown. It results from their being together, aproduct of the actions and reactions which takeplace between individual consciousnesses; and ifeach individual consciousness echoes thecollective sentiment, it is by virtue of the specialenergy resident in its collective origin. If all heartsbeat in unison, this is not the result of aspontaneous and pre-established harmony butrather because an identical force propels them inthe same direction. Each is carried along by all.We thus arrive at the point where we can

    formulate and delimit in a precise way the domainof sociology. It comprises only a limited group ofphenomena. A social fact is to be recognized bythe power of external coercion which it exercisesor is capable of exercising over individuals, andthe presence of this power may be recognized inits turn either by the existence of some specificsanction or by the resistance offered against everyindividual effort that tends to violate it. One can,however, define it also by its diffusion within thegroup, provided that, in conformity with ourprevious remarks, one takes care to add as asecond and essential characteristic that its ownexistence is independent of the individual forms itassumes in its diffusion. This last criterion isperhaps, in certain cases, easier to apply than thepreceding one. In fact, the constraint is easy toascertain when it expresses itself externally bysome direct reaction of society, as is the case inlaw, morals, beliefs, customs, and even fashions.But when it is only indirect, like the constraintwhich an economic organization exercises, itcannot always be so easily detected. Generalitycombined with externality may, then, be easier toestablish. Moreover, this second definition is butanother form of the first; for if a mode of behaviorwhose existence is external to individualconsciousnesses becomes general, this can onlybe brought about by its being imposed upon them.

    But these several phenomena present the samecharacteristic by which we defined the others.These ways of existing are imposed on theindividual precisely in the same fashion as theways of acting of which we have spoken. Indeed,when we wish to know how a society is dividedpolitically, of what these divisions themselves arecomposed, and how complete is the fusion existingbetween them, we shall not achieve our purposeby physical inspection and by geographicalobservations; for these phenomena are social, evenwhen they have some basis in physical nature. It isonly by a study of public law that a comprehensionof this organization is possible, for it is this law thatdetermines the organization, as it equally determinesour domestic and civil relations. This politicalorganization is, then, no less obligatory than thesocial facts mentioned above. If the populationcrowds into our cities instead of scattering into thecountry, this is due to a trend of public opinion, acollective drive that imposes this concentration uponthe individuals. We can no more choose the style ofour houses than of our clothingat least, both areequally obligatory. The channels of communicationprescribe the direction of internal migrations andcommerce, etc., and even their extent. Consequently,at the very most, it should be necessary to add to thelist of phenomena which we have enumerated aspresenting the distinctive criterion of a social factonly one additional category, ways of existing;and, as this enumeration was not meant to berigorously exhaustive, the addition would not beabsolutely necessary.Such an addition is perhaps not necessary, for

    these ways of existing are only crystallizedways of acting. The political structure of asociety is merely the way in which its componentsegments have become accustomed to live withone another. If their relations are traditionallyintimate, the segments tend to fuse with oneanother, or, in the contrary case, to retain theiridentity. The type of habitation imposed upon usis merely the way in which our contemporariesand our ancestors have been accustomed toconstruct their houses. The methods of communi-cation are merely the channels which the regularcurrents of commerce and migrations have dug,by flowing in the same direction. To be sure, ifthe phenomena of a structural character alonepresented this performance, one might believethat they constituted a distinct species. A legalregulation is an arrangement no less permanent

    116 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

  • than a type of architecture, and yet the regulationis a physiological fact.A simple moral maxim isassuredly somewhat more malleable, but it ismuch more rigid than a simple professionalcustom or a fashion. There is thus a whole seriesof degrees without a break in continuity betweenthe facts of the most articulated structure andthose free currents of social life which are not yetdefinitely molded. The differences between themare, therefore, only differences in the degree ofconsolidation they present. Both are simply life,more or less crystallized. No doubt, it may be ofsome advantage to reserve the term mor-phological for those social facts which concernthe social substratum, but only on condition of notoverlooking the fact that they are of the samenature as the others. Our definition will theninclude the whole relevant range of facts if we say:A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not,capable of exercising on the individual an externalconstraint; or again, every way of acting which isgeneral throughout a given society, while at thesame time existing in its own right independent ofits individual manifestations. . . .iii

    THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL

    If there is any fact whose pathological characterappears incontestable, that fact is crime. All cri-minologists are agreed on this point. Althoughthey explain this pathology differently, they areunanimous in recognizing it. But let us see if thisproblem does not demand a more extendedconsideration. . . .Crime is present not only in the majority of

    societies of one particular species but in all societiesof all ty


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