EPISTEMIC SEEING AND OBJECTIVITY’ Paul O’Connor Conco rdia Senior College

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The nature of seeing is of philosophical interest in many ways. The relation of our perceptual (especially visual) processes with our beliefs has great importance for the question of the objective control of our beliefs by observation. Once one rejects, as many have, the notion of a “given” in experience that is free of any description or belief about its character, or?once one challenges, as Israel Scheffler has in Science and Suhjectivitj’,A the notion of a n ineffable and therefore error-free “given” as itself confused, then a grim possibility arises. If descriptions, interpretations and beliefs cannot be stripped away from the visual manifold of experience, and if believing is a necessary condition for seeing, then people with radically different beliefs might be said to see entirely different things.

Fred 1. Dretske, in his book Seeingand Knowing,’countenances such a possibility. He says that if seeing is entirely epistemic (i.e., not achieved without acquiring some belief), then what we see can be influenced by “all those variables that are capable of influencing what we believe,” and then, if people possessed radically different beliefs or conceptual orientations, we would have to say that they “did not, indeed could not, see the same things .... and this is but a prelude to the view that we each have our private perceptual world” ( S K , pp. 76-77).

The alternative that Dretske seeks in dealing with this problem of subjectivity is to find a type of seeing, basic to all others, that is “non- epistemic,” namely, a “fundamental visual ability.. .whose successful exercise is devoid of positive belief content” ( S K , p. 6). If one can see without believing, then, according to Dretske, one’s beliefs need not influence one’s seeing and two people can see the same thing even though they share no beliefs. Dretske has supposedly struck a blow against the relativity and subjectivity of perception with this kind of analysis of seeing.

In opposition to Dretske, I defend the following claims: ( I ) All seeing is epistemic in the sense that acquiring a belief about something is a logically necessary condition for seeing that thing. In other words, it is a conceptual mistake to say that an observer, S, saw x without Sacquiring any beliefs about x. (2) My philosophical analysis of seeing is not only compatible with but also can further clarify and strengthen arguments

Paul 0’ Connor I S an Assisrani Prqfessor of Philosophy at Concordia Senior College in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He received his B. A . f rom Concordia Senior College, M . Div.. frum Concvrdia Seminar?, and Ph. D. f rom Washington Universic.v. He also has served as a part-rime visiiing lecturer ai Purdue UniL3ersity in Fort Wayne s ime 1971.

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against subjectivity, such as those offered by Scheffler. I first discuss the inadequacies of Dretske’s analysis of seeing and the reasons for accepting my alternative analysis. I then apply the results of this alternative analysis to the problem of subjectivity in scientific observation, with particular reference to Scheffler and Thomas Kuhn.

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Dretske claims that basic visual ability is a physical capacity: “Seeing a bug in this fundamental way is like stepping on a bug; neither performance involves, in any essential respect, a particular belief or set of beliefs on the part of the agent” ( S K , p. 6). Dretske defines this non- epistemic seeing as follows:

S non-epistemicallq sees D I 4,. D is visually differentiated from its immediate environment b) S ( S K , p. 20).

S’s differentiation of D is merely D’s looking some way to S that is different from its immediate environment. It “presupposes or entails nothing about whether S notices D , whether he takes, or is inclined to take, D to be something in particular, o r whether he exploits his visual experience in any way whatsoever” (SK, pp. 20-21).

M y claim that all seeing is epistemic is that acquiring a belief is a necessary condition for seeing. Dretske’s claim for non-epistemic seeing is based on the contention that “for any proposition, P the statement ‘S sees D does not fogically entail the statement ‘S believes P”’ (SK, p. 6; italics mine). In other words, 1 claim that “S sees x” cannot be true without “S believes (some) P about x” also being true; Dretske claims the opposite. Therefore, if I can show that there are instances in which one disclaims seeing (i.e., judges reports about seeing to be false) because of S’s lack of belief, then I provide support for my claim and counterinstances for Dretske’s claim. It is to such considerations that I now turn.

Dretske gives an example of a n observer, S, looking quickly a t thirty- three lights on a chandelier. He claims that it is possible for S to differentiate (i.e.,, non-epistemically see) this scene (all thirty-three “elements”) without this differentiation being “a feature of S’s beliefs” (SKn p. 21). This is so, he claims, because S would probably respond that he saw “a lot” of lights even though he is unaware of exactly how many he saw, and because there are thirty-three true statements about what he saw-one for each of the “elements”-which d o not characterize or express S’s beliefs (ihid.).

The description of these elements is an important factor in saying what there is for S to see and in disclaiming what S actually saw. In considering this example, we must note that there are not just thirty- three unique statements that are true of this scene. There is an indefinitely large number of statements-statements about characteristics such as the size, color, and distinguishing features of the

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lights. The problem in this example is that Dretske uses the comparison between S’s description of the scene (“a lot of lights”) and some more detailed description of the scene (“thirty-three lights”) to illustrate S’s lack of belief about the elements of the scene. Dretske, therefore, concludes that this is a case of non-epistemic seeing because of his requirement that, for S to epistemically see x, S must identify x as described ( S K , p. 34). All that my analysis requires, however, is that S acquire some belief in seeing these elements and that there be some description of an element to which S would assent. Dretske’s own disclaimer about having beliefs in perceptual situations seems to support this very point:

I have not said that S...can see something without any beliefs; I have only said that no particular belief is essential to the seeing ( S K , p. 17, n. 2).

I indeed do not require any particular belief about something as essential to one’s seeing. However, not requiring a particular belief does not show that seeing is non-epistemic. It merely reflects the fact that, upon analysis, there are so many statements about the scene for one to believe true. What Dretske would have to show is that there is no description of this scene to which S would assent. (But there is such a description, namely, “a lot of lights.”) All he has shown is that S’s beliefs are less determinate than some more privileged (or better situated) observer’s would be. Dretske’s line of reasoning masks the distinction between what one sees and what there is for one to see. But this distinction must be maintained if we are to have a clear idea of what it means to disclaim S’s seeing.

In examining disclaimers on seeing, it is also important to distinguish between the two locutions “ S sees -’; and “ S sees that -.” These two locutions seem to have different implications about what S happens to believe. While we can say that S sees the thirty-three lights without his having a belief about the exact number of them, we cannot say that S sees that there are thirty-three lights without attributing to him beliefs about the exact number of lights. The importance of this distincti2n is that the first way of speaking is, to use D.M. Armstrong’s term, an important “noncommittal” idiom. The use of this first way of speaking is to give some relatively stable and public description of what there is for S to see apart from subsequent disclaimers about what S sees or fails to see. We may subsequently revise or retract the original, noncommittal claim. After quizzing S, we might revise it in the following way: “ S saw the chandelier’s thirty-three lights, but his look was so quick that all he really saw was a flash of light.” And the force of “really” here is to retract or contradict the statement “Ssaw thirty-three lights.” One might say: “I guess he didn’t see them after all; what he saw iqstead was just a flash of light .”

The locution “ S sees that -” parallels the locution “ S believes -” in an interesting way, a way which brings out their conceptual similarity (as expressions of proposition attitudes). According to W.V. Quine, the

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term or expression which stands in the blank of this second expression is usually “referentially opaque,” i.e. the term or expression is not subject to the principle of sub~titutivity.~ The situation with the locution “ S sees that -” is similar. For example, if S is not in a position to discriminate and has no beliefs about (e.g.) the silver color of the candles or the “TM” stamped on them, then the following inference is not valid:

S sees that lights are before him. The lights are flames on silver candles, each of which has the letters “TM” stamped on it.

Therefore, (3) S sees that flames on silver candles, each of which has the letters

“TM” stamped on it, are before him.

Here we regard (1) as true (because S can give some indication about there being lights before him) and (2) as true, but we do not regard (3) as true. In other words, it seems that our only option here is to regard “flames (etc.)” and “lights” as being in an opaque context in this instance, because we want to avoid being wrong about what information S really has about the lights on the basis of his observation.

It would be even more interesting if these considerations applied to the locution “ S sees -.” Conceptual similarity would be further illustrated. Consider, then, the following inference:

(4) S sees the lights. (2) (above)

Therefore, (5) S sees flames on silver candles, each of which has the letters

“TM” stamped on it. Let us suppose two things: First, that S is ignorant of the detailed qualities of the candles (the truth of (2)), and second, that we are satisfied about the truth of (4) because of Ss response that there are “a lot of lights.” Given these two conditions, can we regard this inference as valid? In one sense we can, but only if we construe (5) as a “noncommittal” way of speaking, i.e., only if we take the rather detailed description of (2) as the relatively stable and public description of what there is to see, before adding any disclaimers about what S really saw. Suppose, however, that we do not construe (5) as noncommittal, i.e., we take ( 5 ) to describe just what S saw in the sense that we require S’s differentiation to be as detailed as the description suggests. Then I think we have to say that the inference is invalid; we cannot claim that (5) is true even though we grant (2) and (4). To grant that the inference is valid and that (5.) is true would suggest that S’s differentiation was more sophisticated that it really was. We can generalize from this instance and say that, in those cases that we do not regard as valid, we question whether S’s differentiation was as determinate or sophisticated as the description suggests. Our reasons for rejecting these inferences is S’s possible or probable lack of belief relative to what there is to be seen.

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An example that Dretske uses of a situation in which we might disclaim “ S saw x” is one in which S looks into a drawer where there is a cuff link, after which time S cannot remember seeing the cuff link and actually claims that he did not see anything ( S K , p. 18). At what point, Dretske asks, are we ready to withdraw the claim “Ssaw x?” He says that the only claims which would refute “S saw x” are like the following: “ S didn’t look into the drawer at all,” “The cuff link was not there,” or “ S had his eyes closed all the time.” What does not refute the original claim is an appeal to S’s ignorance (ibid.).

Notice that in this example S does not report a belief about “something in the drawer,” to which we might relate other beliefs (e.g., “That thing you saw in the drawer is a cuff link.”). The would-be percipient has no beliefs about what there was for him to see. Dretske still maintains, however, that we can insist that Srnust have seen the cuff link because the light was right, the person’s eyes were in good operating condition, etc. ( S K , pp. 18-19). . But the question is whether or not he has indeed differentiated this cuff link from its immediate environment. I submit that, if we are satisfied that S has no beliefs about the cuff link in this perceptual situation (even in the minimal sense of its being “something in the drawer”), then we should also be satisfied that he indeed has not seen it. (Of course, we should be willing to admit evidence of belief in terms of various subtle and even “non-conscious” responses of S. I will discuss such possibilities presently.) The only alternative to disclaiming seeing in this instance seems to be that we count the proper working of physiological processes not only as necessary but also as sufficient conditions for seeing. Such conditions by themselves do not offer a full analysis of what it means for S to see something. As my discussion of “seeing” and “seeing that” shows, the reasons we consider for disclaiming seeing reach well beyond an investigation of the stimulation of our sensory receptors.

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In addition to accounting for cases in which we disclaim seeing, the thesis that all seeing is epistemic further clarifies some of our notions about perceptual beliefs, about learning through vision, and about the objectivity of our appeals to observation.

With regard to perceptual beliefs, it may seem strange to characterize every act of seeing as involving the acquiring of a belief, for we usually think of the entertaining or assertion of a belief as a reflective and rather deliberate act. Surely when we open our eyes in the morning and view familiar surroundings, we do not regard this as a reflective or deliberate act. This is a serious objection, but I believe it can be met. Roderick Chisholm, in his study of perceiving, suggests that assuming or accepting a proposition about the character of one’s sensing is a

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necessary condition for perceiving something. However, he qualifies this suggestion in the following way:

In raying that [the percei\er] as\umes o r accepts these proposit ions. I d o not niean that ;ire tile oh.iect of deliberate o r conscious inference. In \aying that he assumes o r

,pt\ them. I mean mere11 that. if he w e i e to learn that they are false. he would he \urpri\cd :tiid would then set o u t , deliberately and consciously. t o rebise his store o l hcliets.”

We need not say that every perceptual belief is consciously or deliberately considered. Many beliefs, perceptual or otherwise, can be quite “automatic.” This does not mean, however, that these “automatically” derived or “intuitively” held beliefs cannot be made explicit and examined deliberately.

Take, for example, a case of “non-conscious” perception. Consider a man driving on a route he knows very well and “not thinking about the road” a t all. He passes through a gate and turns right. A few yards farther on he realizes he cannot remember seeing the gate. But of course he did see it. He might say that he could drive that stretch of road with his eyes closed. But, literally, he could not. Here we seem to have a case of seeing without any conscious beliefs or inference. However, we can say here, following Chisholm’s lead, that the driver has assumptions or beliefs in this (minimal) perceptual situation, which, while not consciously entertained, still can be shocked or shown to be false. After making his turn, if he were to find himself on an unfamiliar street o r driveway, he might then ’consciously and deliberately revise his belief that the gate he passed was the right one. Beliefs in such perceptual situations are “automatic,” and are deliberately considered only when they begin to clash with our already existing store of beliefs.

Indeed Chisholm’s construal of these assumptions or beliefs brings out an important characteristic of our beliefs in a perceptual situation, namely, that instead of there being a paucity of belief relative to our experience, there is, rather, a huge, systematically related store of beliefs that we carry with us, ready to be tested and revised. The importance of this characteristic will become more apparent in the discussion of objectivity.

With regard to perceptual learning, Dretske says that so-called non- epistemic seeing is important because it is belief-indcpendent. Belief- independent seeing is important because it can relieve our ignorance where belief-dependent seeing could not: “If a man cannot see an x because he is ignorant of x-ish things, how could such unfortunate people relieve their ignorance?” (SKn p. 37). According to Dretske, belief-independent (non-epistemic) seeing will provide a ground used in “justificatory contexts,” which will support beliefs that are inferred from basic seeing, and at the same time it will account for the “objectivity and publicity” of what we see in that it .provides some shared aspect of experience free from the vagaries of different and subjective beliefs ( S K , pp. 7 7 , 81).

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Here we seem to have a fortunate kind of seeing, which, while immune to the influence of beliefs, can still itself influence belief. However, confidence in this result is short-lived. It leads to a dilemma. In seeing some x, after we have “stripped away” as much collateral information, anticipation and interpretation as possible, there remains either: ( 1) some remainder which is still recognized by the percipient, in which case he has some belief about x, or (2) some remainder which is not at all recognized by the percipient, in which case (because of “total ignorance:’ to use Dretske’s phrase) this remainder can provide no grounds required in the “justificatory contexts” that support epistemic seeing. The remainder in (2) is indeed independent of belief influence in the sense that it cannot be contradicted by beliefs or judged false on the basis of existing beliefs. This is so because it shares a characteristic with tables, chairs and other furniture of the world, namely, it is ineligible for being judged true or false. Then it is fruitless to look to the situation of alternative ( 2 ) for “grounds” or evidence to be used in “justificatory contexts.” The relation of one thing being evidence for something else is a logical relation among statements. This is not to say that the only thing that exists in a perceptual situation is a belief or set of beliefs; there are surely stimuli from the environment and the various machinations of our nervous system. However, unless beliefs are part of (a necessary condition for) seeing, there can be no talk of “justification” or “contradiction” of other beliefs by appeal to a perceptual situation. If we accept the second alternative, we are saddled with an epistemologically barren notion and are still as far as ever from saying how our seeing informs us about the world. Therefore, the first alternative, while difficult, seems to be the more fruitful of the two. In accepting alternative ( l ) , we must reject the notion of non-epistemic seeing (just as Scheffler rejects the notion of the given) and find some other way of dealing with the problem of subjectivity. In accepting alternative ( l ) , we are saying, in effect, that the ground for our beliefs about the world is not some unrecognizable element or process in sensation; rather, the ground is the perceptual beliefs themselves, which are acquired in our seeing.

There is, however, something we can learn from Dretske’s mistake. It is that being ignorant of what one sees is not a matter of having no beliefs about it; it is, rather, a matter of which beliefs one has and how these beliefs relate t o others. I can be ignorant of what an X-ray tube is even if I see one, but this doesn’t mean that 1 have no beliefs about it. I believe, for example, if it were dropped, it would break, that it could not be used to hammer nails, and so on. What I a m ignorant of, among other things, are the kind of energy it gives off and the effect of this energy on photographic plates. In one sense the trained scientist can see something different from what 1 see in terms of his knowledge of atomic theory and various laboratory phenomena. He can cure my ignorance of X-ray tubes by imparting such knowledge to me. 1 can acquire true beliefs about various theoretical and observational properties. 1 can come to

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see more about what is before me. My differentiation itself can improve, e.g., I can learn to see defective tubes. Learning from what I see and learning what to see, therefore, go hand in hand. Notice, however, that such learning always begins with some belief or set of beliefs, which are then related to others.

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While this analysis of seeing may explain how learning can take place, it still leaves open the possibility of subjectivity. Thomas Kuhn, in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, cites psychological evidence about the influence of previous training and belief on perception. From this he concludes:

Something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see. (SSR , p. 113).

Given that “paradigms” for the scientist include a whole system of “law, theory, application, and instrumentation” (SSR, p. lo), he further concludes that, instead of there being “hard data” available to judge between rival theories (paradigms), the paradigm-orientation of the scientist determines his seeing of the world and “paradigm changes.. .cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement differently” (SSR, p. 11 1). This means that a conflict of beliefs is not to be resolved by independent and impartial criteria:

Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things. ... One group or the other must experience a conversion that we have been calling a paradigm shift. Just because it is a transition between incommensurablea, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time. forced by logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all a t once, . . . or not at all. (SSR , p. 150)

If what Kuhn says about the influence of belief on seeing is correct, then even if we have shown how one can learn about one’senvironment within a developing system of beliefs, we are still faced with the possibility of divergent, exclusive, and therefore non-debatable sets of beliefs between which one can decide upon only by a conversion experience and not by appeal to observation. We are also faced with the subjectivist difficulty (which Dretske feared) that two people with divergent beliefs are not able to see the same thing.

Israel Scheffler’s attack against Kutn’s analysis of theory change and subsequent subjectivism is extensive. Here I examine two of Scheffler’s arguments, both of which deal with the problem of subjectivity as it relates to seeing.

The first argument, found in Science and Subjectivity, involves a distinction between categories and hypotheses, which distinction provides two notions of determination. Categories commit us to ways of delimiting items to be recognized and ways of classifying items, and in themselves are neither true nor false. Hypotheses, on the other hand, are

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particular assignments of items to categories, and in this way form statements or assertions of belief ( S S , pp. 37-38). Therefore, our seeing may be in general determined by categorization, but debate concerning conflicting claims (category assignments) is still possible because these claims can be formulated within the more general conceptual apparatus ( S S , pp. 39, 40). Even if two categories or category systems do not overlap, these systems may still share the same way of individuating items (SS , p. 41). Therefore, we need not conclude that two observers with these differing systems are not seeing the same thing. (This distinction between identical items observed and category-determined observational differences is analogous to the distinction between seeing x and seeing x as something or other ( S S , p. 41).) Even if these category systems differ altogether in their individuation, we can, Scheffler says, characterize the differing items as composed of “elements admitted by us, though not uniformly by them [the elements]” ( S S , p. 41).

It may appear that the thesis that acquiring a belief about something is a necessary condition for seeing that thing is counter to Scheffler’s distinction between seeing x and seeing x as something. Seeing x as something requires a particular category assignment (hypothesis), while simply seeing x leaves open the question of the assignment of that item. However, Scheffler is forced to qualify this distinction in a way that shows it to be different from Dretske’s distinction between mere differentiation of x (non-epistemic seeing) and recognition of x as soemthing (epistemic seeing). According to Scheffler, individuation itself is dependent on categorization, leaving open the possibility that the items themselves could be divergent (relative to divergent categories) (SS , p. 41). Seeing x is not a confrontation with an unalterable “given.” To distinguish and compare these divergent items we must fall back on “elements admitted by us,” and the analysis and explanation of these common elements will involve some commitment about what there is; but, as Scheffler says, “such commitments are unavoidable, by our old principle that one can’t describe anything without describing it” ( S S , p. 41). What we have in seeing x, as well as in seeing x as something or other, is not an absolute objectivity in the sense of some item or element in our experience independent of our system of beliefs; rather, the objectivity of our seeing is conditional-given what we share in our system of beliefs, we can mark differences and make comparisons.

The proposed analysis of all seeing as epistemic can countenance the fact that two people see the same thing even when they do not share the same beliefs about that thing. All they need do is share some belief about that thing. Of course, these shared beliefs may be quite minimal and taken for granted in that they do not mark any of the “interesting differences ” of the two observers. Nevertheless, they are important because, given this opportunity for basic comparison, we can go on to mark the various differences in belief that make for the differences of more or less sophisticated observations. Also, this conditional construal of objectivity can counter arguments, such as those used by Kuhn, which

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cite evidence of perceptual relativity influenced by expectancy or previous beliefs. Such arguments lay the grounds for their own refutation. They would have no point except against a background of some shared standard or belief about what was already there. Therefore, 1 have shown that the thesis that all seeing is epistemic is compatible with and further clarifies Scheffler’s construal of objectivity, a construal which is capable of both defeating Kuhn’s subjectivist arguments and avoiding a retreat to some idea of an unalterable “given” in experience.

Another argument of Scheffler’s that deals with subjectivity and seeing is found in his latest response to Kuhn, “Vision and Revolution.” Here Scheffler resists the use of the metaphor of vision as Kuhn applies it to scientific theory change. Scheffler says that, while changes in scientific thought, even revolutionary ones, are still matters of commitment, argument and deliberation, visual changes (notably gestalt switches with respect t o reversible figures) are exclusive and intuitive and nothing like “good reasons” can be offered in such controversies. Indeed, there is no controversy in these visual switches (VR, 370-71). Kuhn has mixed his metaphors, Scheffler says, and come up with a “hybrid” notion-non-debatable or exclusive com- mitment-which is true of neither perception nor (revolutionary) theory change (VR, 371). This is so because changing visual experience and commitment appraisal are so different (ibid.). I d o not think that Scheffler is making an entirely illicit distinction here between conflicting commitments and conflicting perceptions. Visual switches are sudden and d o not seem to involve deliberation. We are tolerant in not choosing between the duck or the rabbit of a reversible figure as the correct view. (This sort of tolerance, according to Scheffler, is not characteristic of theory choice (VR, p. 373).) However, Scheffler’s distinction between exclusive vision and debatable hypothesis is too sharply drawn. Estimates of what we see d o form rival claims and can be debated, even in the case of reversible figures.

While Scheffler rightly points to the sudden or intuitive character of these visual switches (VR, p. 373), I have shown in the discussion of Chisholm’s construal of perceptual beliefs that neither suddenness nor “intuition” disqualify an activity as non-intellectual or beyond intelligible debate. The “automatic” or “intuitive” character of such activities is not a mark of either certainty or non-debatableness. There is room for explication and revision.

In the case of reversible figures, we might see and report seeing either a duck or a rabbit in a certain figure. We can switch back and forth between these two views, even a t will, and we therefore d o not want t o rule on the correctness of one view to the exclusion of the other. However, our tolerance has limits, and the notion of correctness can enter into such situations. First, with respect to the reversible figure, we d o not accept just any report. We rule out or regard as pathological varioqs “wild” responses, such as “man” or “elephant.” Compare this test situation with various ink blot tests, where “anything goes” and the

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purpose of the situation is to have the subject “read into” the figure various fanciful interpretations. Second, presenting the figure as just a sketch of lines and purposely restricting a host of possible clues that could be drawn as part of the sketch, we remain tolerant. However, as other clues are added to the scene-e.g., not just surrounding figures, but perhaps feathered or furry qualities drawn into the sketch-we may begin to choose one “reading” as the correct one to the exclusion of the other. These contexts in which correctness can become an issue show how the epistemic and critical character of seeing operates at even this supposedly exclusive and non-debatable level. These contexts also show that these perceptual beliefs or inclinations to believe become more vulnerable as they are related more to our present system of beliefs. For example, as various furry features are added to the duck-rabbit drawing, our “reading” of the figure as a duck becomes less probable as it clashes with our present beliefs about ducks being feathered rather than furry.

Vision itself (i.e., the very “readings” we give of the figures) is thus illustrated as having as a necessary condition the interplay of perceptual beliefs with the rest of a system of beliefs. Also, we can analyze the objectivity of such a system of beliefs along the same lines as Nelson Goodman’s analysis of the interrelatedness of statements about basic experience with the rest of a system of belief statements (an analysis to which Scheffler also appeals). Goodman’s statements about the basic elements of experience are viewed as “decrees” and are analyzed as follows:

A decree by itself thus may be unchallengeable [in the sense that a momentary sensum of “quale” cannot be retrieved] .... But in practice our choice, when a conflict arises, is influenced by two factors. In the first place, we favor the more‘natural’decree, the one best supported by an instinctive feeling of hitting the mark .... In the second place, we favor the decree that makes necessary the least adjustment in the body of already accepted decrees9

It should be noted that there are two factors here, which are interdependent: (a) that there bepsychologicalsupport for a decree, and (b) that a decree be judged in terms of its consistency with a body of decrees. To meet (b) without (a) (at some point in the system) would be to achieve a kind of certainty (although really a useless kind) at the expense of being able to give an organized and intersubjective account of experience. It should also be noted that the claim of psychological support for a decree is not the same as the claim that we can isolate some most real or most natural part of our experience. Favoring one decree as more “natural” than another is not an irrevocable decision. It is a decision made in the context of all the other accepted decrees. These two interrelated factors form for Goodman (1) the “initial credibility” of the sense reports of the system and (2) the overall coherence of the system, both of which must be balanced to give credibility-preservation (and empirical import) to that system.” (Since we have analyzed seeing in terms of acquiring beliefs, we can apply Goodman’s construal of the objectivity of our belief statements to the idea of “veridical” seeing:

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Cases of veridical seeing are just those cases of seeing in which the balance of credibility and coherence is properly maintained).

Given these considerations, we can characterize Kuhn’s and other subjectivists’ mistake in using the vision metaphor as follows: The one- to-one comparison gestalt switches and theory change is indeed misleading, but not because these two activities are utterly different. The mistake is, rather, to treat two rival theories as two isolated systems of belief, having no beliefs in common against which either system might clash. A simple sketch of a duck-rabbit figure approximates, but only approximates, such a situation. However, rival theories share too many beliefs about commonly accepted objects and elements in our experience to warrant such a simple comparison with reversible figures. Kuhn, in a later essay, is forced to admit the great amount of beliefs that are shared in theory debates: “The men involved share a history .... a language, an everyday world, and most of a scientific one. Given what they share, they can find out much about how they differ.”” We must, it seems, regard this later admission as either revising or being inconsistent with Kuhn’s earlier claims about the “incommensurability” or entirely exclusive commitments of rival theories (see SSR, pp. 148ff.).

The epistemic, and therefore critical, character of seeing is something we can appreciate at even the most basic level of our visual contact with and recognition of our environment. The beliefs received at this level can both challenge and be challenged by other beliefs. We can revise perceptual beliefs to the point where we say that we did not see what we though we saw. Given corroboration by other observations and intersubjective tests, we can give up previously held hypotheses. Also, given that we can show objectivity in our seeing (in terms of preserving the credibility of our system of beliefs with a judicious openness to revision), we can meet the subjectivist challenge in what seems its most radical form, namely, that appeals to even the basic elements of our perceptual experience are already prejudiced by what we believe. The influence of belief on seeing is not exclusive control; rather it is a mutual influence which, given a recognition of what we must revise and the cost of those revisions, provides what Scheffler himself is looking for-not uniformity but the “possibility of intelligible debate” (VR, p. 369). Nor does the extension of the metaphor of vision to theory imply that these theory debates are uncritical or always at cross purposes. In showing that vision itself is a critical activity, we block such a move in the subjectivist argument and we also show significant differences between visual switches and theory change. Scheffler has already provided the distinction of categories and hypotheses, which shows the possibility for comparing differences and intelligible debate. By resisting Scheffler’s sharp distinction between conflicting vision and conflicting judgment, we show the possibility of such debate at even the perceptual level and thereby strengthened the case against subjectivity.

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NOTES

’ This paper was first presented to the Department of Philosophy of Washington Universisty, St. Louis. I would like to thank Professors Robert Barrett and Richard Watson, and especially Professor Alfred J. Stenner, of Washington University, for their insightful critique and discussion of the issues involved in this study. Any present inadequacies are, of course, entirely my responsibility.

Isreal Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), ch. 2. All subsequent quotations from this source are noted in parentheses as “SS,” followed by the page number. ’ Fred I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

All subsequent quotations from this source are noted in parentheses as “SK,” followed by the page number.

D.M. Armstrong, “A Theory of Perception,” Scienttjic Psychology: Principles and Approaches, ed. B.B. Wolman (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 490.

W.V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960), pp. 141-51. ‘ Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 160. It is interesting that, while Chisholm’s remarks here refer to propositional seeing (“seeing that”), he elsewhere extends belief requirements to non- propositional seeing (“seeing”) by saying that an observer must at least take an object in view to be something (ibid., p. 150). ’ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). All subsequent quotations from this source are noted in arentheses as “SSR,” followed by the page number.

‘Scheffler’s criticisms are found in both Science and Subjectivity and a later article, “Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on Kuhn,” Philosophy of Science, XXXIX (l972), 366-74. All subsequent quotations from this later article are noted in parentheses as“VR,” followed by the page number.

Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance (2nd ed.; Indianapolis: Bobbs- Myi l l , 1966), p. 135.

Nelson Goodman, “Sense and Certainty,” Philosophical Review, LXI (1952), 162-63; see also Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, pp. 116-18.

I ’ Thomas S. Kuhn, “Reflections on My Critics,” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. 1. Kakatos and A. Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 276.

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