Eugenio to Inok

8/22/2019 Eugenio to Inok

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G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T.

GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,

JR.,respondents.

PUNO,J.:

The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the

Career Executive Service Board is challenged in this

petition for certiorari and prohibition.

First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the

Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a

Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank

on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On

September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the

President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service

Board. 1

All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993,

respondent Civil Service Commission 2passed Resolution

No. 93-4359, viz:

RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359

WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B

provides that Civil Service shall be

administered by the Civil Service

Commission, . . .;

WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the

1987 Philippine Constitution provides

that "The Civil Service Commission, as the

central personnel agency of the

government, is mandated to establish a

career service and adopt measures to

promote morale, efficiency, integrity,

responsiveness, progresiveness and

courtesy in the civil service, . . .";

WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle

A, Book V of the Administrative Code of

1987 grants the Commission the power,

among others, to administer and enforce

the constitutional and statutory

provisions on the merit system for all

levels and ranks in the Civil Service;

WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A,

Book V of the Administrative Code of

1987 Provides, among others, that The

Career Service shall be characterized by

(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to

be determined as far as practicable by

competitive examination, or based highly

technical qualifications; (2) opportunity

for advancement to higher career

positions; and (3) security of tenure;

WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A

Book V of the administrative Code of

1987 provides that "The third level shall

cover Positions in the Career Executive

Service";

WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes

the imperative need to consolidate,

integrate and unify the administration of

all levels of positions in the career service

WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17,

Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 confers on

the Commission the power and authority

to effect changes in its organization as the

need arises.

WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the

Constitution provides that the Civil

Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal

autonomy and the necessary implications

thereof;

NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises

considered, the Civil Service Commission

hereby resolves to streamline reorganize

and effect changes in its organizational

structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career

Executive Service Board, shall now be

known as the Office for Career Executive

Service of the Civil Service Commission.

Accordingly, the existing personnel,

budget, properties and equipment of the

Career Executive Service Board shall now

form part of the Office for Career

Executive Service.

The above resolution became an impediment. to the

appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable

Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:

xxx xxx xxx

On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service

Commission issued CSC Resolution No.

93-4359 which abolished the Career

Executive Service Board.

Several legal issues have arisen as a result

of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-

4359, including whether the Civil Service

Commission has authority to abolish the


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Career Executive Service Board. Because

these issues remain unresolved, the Office

of the President has refrained from

considering appointments of career

service eligibles to career executive ranks.

xxx xxx xxx

You may, however, bring a case before the

appropriate court to settle the legal issuesarising from issuance by the Civil Service

Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-

4359, for guidance of all concerned.

Thank You.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as

the Career Executive Service Board which recommended

her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the

petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No.

93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following

arguments:

A.

IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED

THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF

CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE

CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW,

THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC:

RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;

B.

ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE

CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC

USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS

OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY

AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC

MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF

CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.

Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed

with the contentions of petitioner. Respondent

Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It

posited the following position:

ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-

CSC

I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO

CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC

RESPONDENT-CSC.

II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED

TO THE PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT

TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER

EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE

CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT

DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.

III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS

ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE

VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION

OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER

EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS

PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANKFOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY

SITUATED AS SAID PETITIONER.

FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO

CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING

THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE

FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL

SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE

PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO

APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE

CESB.

IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB

INTO THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZEDBY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A,

Book V of the Administrative Code of the

1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD

ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE

HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE

PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A.

DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R.

BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND

MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380.

THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS

ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATIONOF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.

We find merit in the petition. 3

The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service

Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.)

No. 1 on September 1, 1974 4 which adopted the Integrated

Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan

provides:

Article IV Career Executive Service

1. A Career Executive Service is created to

form a continuing pool of well-selected

and development oriented career

administrators who shall provide

competent and faithful service.

2.A Career Executive Service hereinafter

referred to in this Chapter as the Board, is

created to serve as the governing body of

the Career Executive Service. The Board

shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil

Service Commission as presiding officer,


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the Executive Secretary and the

Commissioner of the Budget as ex-

officio members and two other members

from the private sector and/or the

academic community who are familiar

with the principles and methods of

personnel administration.

xxx xxx xxx

5. The Board shall promulgate rules,

standards and procedures on the

selection, classification, compensation

and career development of members of

the Career Executive Service. The Board

shall set up the organization and

operation of the service. (Emphasis

supplied)

It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was

created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.

This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the

creation and abolition of public offices is primarily alegislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on

Public Officers and

Employees, 5viz:

Except for such offices as are created by

the Constitution, the creation of public

offices is primarily a legislative function.

In so far as the legislative power in this

respect is not restricted by constitutional

provisions, it supreme, and the legislature

may decide for itself what offices are

suitable, necessary, or convenient. When

in the exigencies of government it isnecessary to create and define duties, the

legislative department has the discretion

to determine whether additional offices

shall be created, or whether these duties

shall be attached to and become ex-

officio duties of existing offices. An office

created by the legislature is wholly within

the power of that body, and it may

prescribe the mode of filling the office and

the powers and duties of the incumbent,

and if it sees fit, abolish the office.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any

law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary,

in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993,

the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of

CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section

17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to

abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Eachoffice of the Commission shall be headed

by a Director with at least one Assistant

Director, and may have such divisions as

are necessary independent constitutional

body, the Commission may effect changes

in the organization as the need arises.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor

General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16

of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the

respondent Commission, viz:

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The

Commission shall have the following

offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive

Directorheaded by an Executive Director,

with a Deputy Executive Director shall

implement policies, standards, rules and

regulations promulgated by the

Commission; coordinate the programs of

the offices of the Commission and render

periodic reports on their operations, and

perform such other functions as may beassigned by the Commission.

(2) The Merit System Protection

Boardcomposed of a Chairman and two

(2) members shall have the following

functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide

the Chairman with legal advice and

assistance; render counselling services;undertake legal studies and researches;

prepare opinions and ruling in the

interpretation and application of the Civil

Service law, rules and regulations;

prosecute violations of such law, rules

and regulations; and represent the

Commission before any court or tribunal.

(4) The Office of Planning and

Managementshall formulate development

plans, programs and projects; undertake

research and studies on the different

aspects of public personnel management;administer management improvement

programs; and provide fiscal and

budgetary services.

(5) The Central Administrative Office shall

provide the Commission with personnel,

financial, logistics and other basic support

services.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel

Records shall formulate and implement


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policies, standards, rules and regulations

pertaining to personnel records

maintenance, security, control and

disposal; provide storage and extension

services; and provide and maintain

library services.

(7) The Office of Position Classification and

Compensation shall formulate and

implement policies, standards, rules andregulations relative to the administration

of position classification and

compensation.

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination

and Placementshall provide leadership

and assistance in developing and

implementing the overall Commission

programs relating to recruitment,

execution and placement, and formulate


for the proper implementation of the

Commission's examination and placementprograms.

(9) The Office of Career Systems and

Standards shall provide leadership and

assistance in the formulation and

evaluation of personnel systems and

standards relative to performance

appraisal, merit promotion, and employee

incentive benefit and awards.

(10) The Office of Human Resource

Developmentshall provide leadership and

assistance in the development andretention of qualified and efficient work

force in the Civil Service; formulate

standards for training and staff

development; administer service-wide

scholarship programs; develop training

literature and materials; coordinate and

integrate all training activities and

evaluate training programs.

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and

Auditshall develop policies, standards,

rules and regulations for the effective

conduct or inspection and audit

personnel and personnel management

programs and the exercise of delegated

authority; provide technical and advisory

services to Civil Service Regional Offices

and government agencies in the

implementation of their personnel

programs and evaluation systems.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall

provide leadership and assistance in the

development and implementation of


in the accreditation of employee

associations or organizations and in the

adjustment and settlement of employee

grievances and management of employee

disputes.

(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall

formulate and implement policies,

standards, rules and regulationsgoverning corporate officials and

employees in the areas of recruitment,

examination, placement, career

development, merit and awards systems,

position classification and compensation,

performing appraisal, employee welfare

and benefit, discipline and other aspects

of personnel management on the basis of

comparable industry practices.

(14) The Office of Retirement

Administration shall be responsible for

the enforcement of the constitutional andstatutory provisions, relative to

retirement and the regulation for the

effective implementation of the

retirement of government officials and

employees.

(15) The Regional and Field Offices. The

Commission shall have not less than

thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be

headed by a Director, and such field

offices as may be needed, each to be

headed by an official with at least the

rank of an Assistant Director.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is

that respondent Commission's power to

reorganize is limited to offices under its control as

enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its

inception, the CESB was intended to be an

autonomous entity, albeit administratively

attached to respondent Commission. As

conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee

"the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to

view the problem of building up executive

manpower in the government with a broad and

positive outlook."6 The essential autonomouscharacter of the CESB is not negated by its

attachment to respondent Commission. By said

attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the

control of respondent Commission. Under the

Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of

attaching one functionally inter-related

government agency to another is to attain "policy

and program coordination." This is clearly etched

out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the

aforecited Code, to wit:


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(3)Attachment. (a) This refers to the

lateral relationship between the

department or its equivalent and attached

agency or corporation for purposes of

policy and program coordination. The

coordination may be accomplished by

having the department represented in the

governing board of the attached agency or

corporation, either as chairman or as a

member, with or without voting rights, ifthis is permitted by the charter; having

the attached corporation or agency

comply with a system of periodic

reporting which shall reflect the progress

of programs and projects; and having the

department or its equivalent provide

general policies through its

representative in the board, which shall

serve as the framework for the internal

policies of the attached corporation or

agency.

Respondent Commission also relies on the caseofDatumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No.

114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the

CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to

state that the reliance is misplaced considering that the

cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the

petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of action.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution

No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is hereby

annulled and set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 115942 May 31, 1995

RUBLE RUBENECIA, petitioner,

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FELICIANO,J.:

Petitioner Ruble Rubenecia assails Civil Service

Commission ("CSC" or "Commission") Resolution No. 94-

0533, dated 25 January 1994, aquitting him of a charge of

insubordination but finding him guilty of several other

administrative charges and imposing upon him the penalty

of dismissal from the service. He also questions the validity

of CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated 29 June 1993, which

allegedly abolished the Merit System Protection Board

("MSPB") and authorized the elevation of cases pending

before that body to the Commission.

Teachers of Catarman National High School in Catarman,

Northern Samar, filed before the MSPB an administrative

complaint against petitioner Rubenecia, the School

Principal, for dishonesty, nepotism, oppression and

violation of Civil Service Rules. After a preliminary inquiry,

the MSPB on 15 January 1992 formally charged Rubenecia

and required him to file an answer with the CSC Regional

Office in Tacloban City. On 24 February 1992, petitioner

Rubenecia, instead of filing an answer, requested that he

be furnished with copies of the documents submitted by

complainants in support of the charges against him. 1

On 15 May 1992, the CSC Regional Director assigned to

investigate the case invited Rubenecia to the RegionalOffice and there identify and pick up the documents he

desired. The Regional Office had then just received the

records of the case transmitted by the MSPB.

In response, Rubenecia requested that his visit to the CSC

Regional Office be deferred because of alleged problems in

his school relating to the enrollment period. The CSC

reiterated on 10 June 1992 its order to Rubenecia to file

his answer. In turn, petitioner through counsel in a letter

dated 9 July 1992, reiterated his request that the CSC

Regional Office furnish him copies of the documents

submitted in connection with the charges against him.

Although petitioner did not file his answer, the Regional

Director set the case for hearing on 20 August 1992. This

hearing, however, did not take place as the complainants

did not there show up. Petitioner Rubenecia appeared at

that hearing, but filed no answer. In an order issued on the

same day, i.e., 20 August 1992, the Regional Office declared

that the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the

basis of the documents theretofore filed.

On 25 August 1992, Rubenecia wrote to the Chairman of

the Civil Service Commission, praying that the case against

him be dismissed and attaching to that letter many

documents in support of his claim of innocence.

On 28 September 1992, the Regional Director submitted

an investigation report to the Chairman, MSPB. Before the

MSPB could render a decision, the Commission issued on

29 June 1993 Resolution No. 93-2387 which provided,

among other things, that cases then pending before the

MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision.

The Commission, accordingly, took over the case against

petitioner and on 25 January 1994, rendered its Resolution

No. 94-0533 finding petitioner guilty and ordering his

dismissal from the service. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration, asserting lack of jurisdiction on the part

of the Commission and attaching most if not all of the same

documents he had annexed to his letter-answer to support

his assertion of innocence. The motion for reconsideration

was denied in a resolution of the Commission on 31 May

1994.

Two (2) principal issues are raised in this Petition

for Certiorari:

(1) Whether or not the CSC had authority

to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and

assume jurisdiction over the

administrative case against petitioner;

and

(2) Whether or not petitioner had been

accorded due process in connection with

rendition of CSC Resolution No. 94-0533

finding him guilty and ordering his

dismissal from the service.

I

In respect of the first issue, petitioner Rubenecia contends

that the Commission had no jurisdiction to take over the

administrative case against him from the MSPB for the

reason that CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 was invalid. The

argument of the petitioner is that since the MSPB was a

creation of law, it could be abolished only by law, and that

Resolution No. 93-2387 was accordingly an ultra vires act

on the part of the Commission.

Resolution No. 93-2387 reads in full:

WHEREAS, the Civil Service Commission

recognizes the government-wide call and

the need for streamlining of operations

which requires implification of systems,

cutting of red tape and elimination of

unnecessary bureaucratic layer;

WHEREAS,one of the powers and functions

of the Commission provided for in Section

12 (11) of Book V of the Administrative


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Code of 1987 is to hear and decide

administrative cases institutedby or

broughtbefore it directlyor on appeal,

including contested appointments and

review decisions and actions of its

offices and of the agencies attach to it;

WHEREAS, Section 47 (1) of Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 specifically

provides that theCommission shall decideupon appeal all administrative disciplinary

cases involving the imposition of penalty

ofsuspension for more that thirty days, or

fine in an amount exceeding thirty days

salary, demotion in rank or salary or

transfer removal or dismissal from office;

WHEREAS, under Section 16 (2) of Book V

of the Code, the Merit System Protection

Board(MSPB),an office of the Commission,

has the function to hear and decide

administrative cases involving officials

and employees of the civilservice concurrently with the Commission;

WHEREAS,most decisions on

administrative cases rendered by the

MSPB are later appealed to the

Commission for review and final

resolution;

WHEREAS,the existing procedure wherein

most administrative cases are first

reviewed by the MSPB before they are

elevated to the Commission makes it

difficult for these cases to be finallyresolved within a short period of time ;

WHEREAS, the present situation

requires immediate streamlining of the

operation of the Civil Service Commission

to achieve as speedier delivery of

administrative justice and economical

operation without impairing due process

and the substantive rights of the parties in

administrative cases;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to theprovisions of Section 17 of Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 which

authorizes the Commission, as an

independent constitutional body, to effect

changes in its organization as the need

arises, the Commission Resolves as it is

hereby Resolved to effect the following

changes;

1. Decisions in

administrative

cases involving officials

and employees of the

civil serviceappealable to

the Commission pursuant

to Section 47 of Book V

of the Code including

personnel actions such

as contested

appointments shall now

be appealed directly to

theCommission and notto

the MSPB; and

2. Decisions and

administrative

cases involving the

officials and employees

of the Civil Service

including contested

appointments which

have already been

appealed to the

MSPB and other pendingadministrative cases

brought directly before

the MSPB, shall now

be elevated to the

Commission for final

resolution.

Parties in administrative cases pending

before the MSPB shall be notified in

writing that their respective cases have

already been elevated to the Commission

for final resolution. They shall have 15

days from receipt of notice to submit theircomments on or objections to the new

procedures.

This Resolution shall take effect on 1 July

1993 and the new procedure shall remain

effective until rescinded by the

Commission in another resolution.

Adopted this 29th day of June 1993.

Patricia A. Sto. Tomas

Chairman

Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr. Thelma P. Gaminde

Commissioner Commissioner

Juanito Demetrio

Board Secretary VI

(Emphasis supplied)

The Merit System Protection Board was originally created

by P.D. No. 1409, dated 8 June 1978, Section 1 of which


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said: "There is hereby created in the Civil Service

Commission a Merit Systems Board." The Board was

composed of "a commissioner and two (2) associate

commissioners" appointed by the CSC. 2 The powers and

functions of this Board were set out in Section 5 of P.D. No.

1409 in the following terms:

Sec. 5. Powers and Functions of the Board.

The Board shall have the following

powers and functions, among others:

(1) Hear and decide administrative cases

involving officers and employees of the

civil service.

(2) Hear and decide cases brought before

it by officers and employees who feel

aggrieved by the determination of

appointing authorities involving

appointment promotion, transfer, detail,

reassignment and other personnel

actions, as well as complaints against any

officers in the government arising fromabuses arising from personnel actions of

these officers or from violation of the

merit system.

(3) Hear and decide complaints of civil

service employees regarding malpractices

of other officials and employees.

(4) Promulgate, subject to the approval of

the Civil Service Commission, rules and

regulations to carry out the functions of

the Board.

(5) Administer oaths,

issue subpoena and subpoenaduces tecum,

and take testimony in any investigation or

inquiry. The Board shall have the power

to punish for contempt in accordance

with the rules of court under the same

procedure with the same penalties

provided therein.

(6) Perform such other functions as may

be assigned by the Civil Service

Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Decisions of the Board involving removal of officers and

employees from the service were "subject to automatic

review by the Commission;" all other decisions of the

Board were also subject to appeal to the Commission. 3

As noted, P.D. No. 1409 had "created in the Civil Service

Commission [the] Merit Systems Board." Section 16 of the

present Civil Service Law found in the 1987 Administrative

Code followed the same line and re-created the Merit

Systems Board as an office of the Commission and gave it a

new name: "Merit System Protection Board."

Section 16 of the present Civil Service Law reads as

follows, in pertinent part:

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The

Commission shall have the following

offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive Director . .

(2) The Merit System Protection Board

composed of a Chairman and two (2)

members which have the following

functions:

(a) Hear and decide on

appeal administrative

cases involving officials

and employees of the

Civil Service. Its decision

shall be final except

those involving dismissa

or separation from the

service which may be

appealed to the

Commission;

(b) Hear and decide

cases brought before it

on appeal by officials and

employees who feel

aggrieved by thedetermination of

appointing authorities

involving personnel

actions and violations of

the merit system. The

decision of the Board

shall be final except

those involving division

chiefs or officials of

higher ranks which may

be appealed to the

Commission;

(c) Directly take

cognizance of complaints

affecting functions of the

Commission, those

which are unacted upon

by the agencies, and such

other complains which

required direct action of

the Board in the interest

of justice;


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(d) Administer oaths,

issue subpoena and

subpoena duces tecum,

take testimony in any

investigation or inquiry,

punish for contempt in

accordance with the

same procedures and

penalties prescribed in

the Rules of Court; and

(e) Promulgate rules and

regulations to carry out

the functions of the

Board subject to the

approval of the

Commission.

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs . . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The 1987 Administrative Code thus made clear that the

MSPB was intended to be an office of the Commission like

any of the other thirteen (13) offices in the Commission:

e.g., the Office of Legal Affairs; the Office of Planning and

Management; the Central Administrative Office, and so

forth. The MSPB was, in other words, a part of the internal

structure and organization of the Commission and thus a

proper subject of organizational change which the

Commission is authorized to undertake under Section 17

of the present Civil Service Law:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Eachoffice of the Commission shall be headed

by a Director with at least one (1)

Assistant Director, and may have such

divisions as are necessary to carry out

their respective functions.As an

independent constitutional body, the

Commission may effect changes in the

organization as the need arises. (Emphasis

supplied).

Since it was part and parcel of the internal organization of

the Commission, the MSPB was notan autonomous entity

created by law and merely attached for administrative

purposes to the Civil Service Commission. InAida Eugeniov. Civil Service Commission, 4 the Court invalidated a CSC

Resolution which had transferred the Career Executive

Service Board to the Office for Career Executive Service of

the CSC precisely because the Career Executive Service

Board was an autonomous entity created by a special law

and attached, for administrative purposes only, to the Civil

Service Commission; that Board did not fall within the

control of the Civil Service Commission.

It will be noted that under the provisions of Section 16 (2)

(a) and (b) quoted earlier, cases originating outside the

Civil Service Commission itself and appealed to the MSPB

were, in cases involving division chiefs and higher officials

and cases where the penalty imposed was dismissal or

separation from the service, subject to further appeal to

the Commission itself. At the same time, cases filed

originally with the MSPB could also be filed directly with

the Commission itself under Section 12 (11) of the Civil

Service Law. It was this apparent duplication or layering of

functions within the Commission that the Commission

sought to rationalize and eliminate by enacting Resolution

No. 93-2387 quoted in full earlier.

The change instituted by CSC Resolution No. 93-2387

consisted basically of the following: decision in

administrative cases appealable to the Commission

pursuant to Section 47 of the present Civil Service Law

may now be appealed directly to the Commission itself and

not to the MSPB. Administrative cases already pending on

appeal before the MSPB or previously brought directly to

the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93-

2387, were required to be elevated to the Commission for

final resolution. The functions of the MSPB relating to the

determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in

other words, re-allocated to the Commission itself. Thesechanges were prescribed by the Commission in its effort to

"streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn

required the "simplification of systems, cutting of red tape

and elimination of [an] unnecessary bureaucratic layer."

The previous procedure made it difficult for cases to be

finally resolved within a reasonable period of time. The

change, therefore, was moved by the quite legitimate

objective of simplifying the course that administrative

disciplinary cases, like those involving petitioner

Rubenecia, must take. We consider that petitioner

Rubenecia had no vested right to a two-step administrative

appeal procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to

an office of the Commission, the MSPB, and thereafter asecond appeal to the Civil Service Commission itself (i.e.,

the Chairman and the two [2] Commissioners of the Civil

Service Commission), a procedure which most frequently

consumed a prolonged period of time.

We note also that Resolution No. 93-2387 did notpurport

to abolish the MSPB nor to effect the termination of the

relationship of public employment between the

Commission and any of its officers or employees. At all

events, even if Resolution No. 93-2387 had purported to

do so, petitioner Rubenecia, who does not claim to be an

officer or employee of the MSPB, has no personality or

standing to contest such termination of publicemployment. InFernandez and De Lima v. Hon. Patricia A.

Sto. Tomas, etc., et al., 5 the Court upheld Resolution No. 94-

3710 of the Civil Service which effected certain changes in

the internal organization and structure of the Commission.

The Court said:

We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710

has notabolished any public office as that

term is used in the law of public officers.

It is essential to note that none of the

"changes in organization" introduced by


10/25

Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or

necessarily involved the termination of

the relationship of public employment

between the Commission and any of its

officers and employees. We find it very

difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised

Administrative Code having mentioned

fourteen (14) different offices of the CSC,

meant to freeze these offices and to cast

in concrete, as it were, the internalorganization of the Commission until it

might please Congress to change such

internal organization regardless of the

ever changing needs of the civil service as

a whole. To the contrary, the legislative

authority had expressly authorized the

Commission to carry out "changes in the

organization," as the need [for such

changes] arises.

Petitioner Rubenecia also claims that the Civil Service

Commission itself (as distinguished from the MSPB) did

not acquire jurisdiction over his case because he had notbeen notified by individual written notice sent by mail that

his case had been elevated to the Civil Service Commission

as required by Resolution No. 93-2387. We consider this

objection unmeritorious. CSC Resolution No. 93-2387,

quoted earlier, did not require individual written notice

sent by mail to parties in administrative cases pending

before the MSPB. Assuming that Rubenecia had not in fact

been sent an individual notice, the fact remains that

Resolution No. 93-2387 was published in a newspaper of

general circulation (The Manila Standard, issue of 16 July

1993 6); the Commission may accordingly be deemed to

have complied substantially with the requirement of

written notice in its own Resolution. Moreover, petitionerhimself had insisted on pleading before the Commission,

rather than before the MSPB; he filed before the

Commission itself his letter-cum-annexes which effectively

was his answer to the Formal Charge instituted before the

MSPB. He cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction

of the Commission.

II

We turn to petitioner's contention that he had been denied

due process when the Commission rendered its Resolution

No. 94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal

from the government service.

The fundamental rule of due to process requires that a

person be accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard.

These requisites were respected in the case of petitioner

Rubenecia.

The Formal Charge prepared by the MSPB and given to

petitioner Rubenecia constituted sufficient notice which, in

fact, had enabled him to prepare his defense. The Formal

Charge contained the essence of the complaint and the

documents in support thereof and the conclusion of the

MSPB finding a prima facie case against Rubenecia.

Rubenecia himself admitted that he had been furnished

with copies of an affidavit and testimonies of the principal

witnesses against him that were given during the

preliminary hearing of the case against Rubenecia. 7

We are also not persuaded by petitioner's complaint that

he had not been furnished copies of all the documents that

had accompanied the Formal Charge. Rubenecia was given

an opportunity by the Investigating Officer, the RegionalDirector of CSC, to obtain those documents from the CSC

Regional Office. Rubenecia did not avail himself of that

opportunity and he cannot now be heard to complain that

he was not given such documents. At all events, as already

noted, he sent a formal letter-answer to Chairman Sto.

Tomas controverting the charges against him and

submitted voluminous documents in support of his claim

of innocence and prayed for dismissal of the Formal

Charge. This letter-answer constitutes proof that he did

have notice of the accusations against him and was in fact

able to present his own defense.

Petitioner's answer to the Formal Charge was consideredby the Investigating Officer. This Officer, however,

concluded in his report that "the evidence presented by

respondent [Rubenecia] could not outweigh that of the

prosecution as contained in the records. 8

Finally, the motion for reconsideration filed by Rubenecia

before the Commission cured whatever defect might have

existed in respect of alleged denial of procedural due

process. 9 Denial of due process cannot be successfully

invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be

heard on his motion for reconsideration. 10 In the instant

case, petitioner was heard not only in respect of his motion

for reconsideration; he was also in fact affordedreasonable opportunity to present his case before decision

was rendered by the Commission finding him guilty.

Rubenecia also claims that the Commission had erred in

disregarding the "overwhelming evidence" in his favor.

The settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the findings of

fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long

as such findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence, even if such evidence might not be

overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of

an appellate court, like this Court, to weigh once more the

evidence submitted before the administrative body and to

substitute its own judgment for that of the administrativeagency in respect of sufficiency of evidence. 11 In the

present case, in any event, after examination of the record

of this case, we conclude that the decision of the Civil

Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the

administrative charges prepared against him, is supported

by substantial evidence.

In Resolution No. 94-0533, the Commission drew the

following conclusions in respect of the charges against

petitioner Rubenecia:


11/25

I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE RULES

AND REGULATIONS

The records show that Rubenecia

committed the said offense. He himself

admitted that he did not accomplish his

DTR but this was upon the suggestion of

the Administrative Officer. Rubenecia

cannot use as an excuse the alleged

suggestion of an Administrative Officer.As the principal of a national high School,

he is expected to know the basic civil

service law, rules, and regulations.

II DISHONESTY

The Commission finds Rubenecia liable.

He was charged for misrepresenting that

he was on "Official Travel" to Baguio City

to attend a three-week seminar and

making it appear in his CSC Form No. 7

for the month of October 1988 that the

has a perfect attendance for that month.Rubenecia in order to rebut the same

simply reiterated previous allegation that

he attended the SEDP Training in Baguio

City during the questioned months

without even an attempt on his part to

adduce evidence documentary or

testimonial that would attest to the truth

of his allegation that he was indeed in

Baguio during those weeks for training

purposes. A mere allegation cannot

obviously prevail over a more direct and

positive statement of Celedonio Layon,

School Division Superintendent, Divisionof Northern Samar, when the latter

certified that he had no official knowledge

of the alleged "official travel" of

Rubenecia. Moreover, verification with

the Bureau of Secondary Schools reveals

that no training seminar for school

principal was conducted by DECS during

that time. It was also proven by records

that he caused one Mrs. Cecilia vestra to

render service as Secondary School

Teacher from January 19, 1990 to August

30, 1991 without any duly issued

appointment by the appointing authority.

III. NEPOTISM

With respect to the charge of Nepotism,

Rubenecia alleged that he is not the

appointing authority with regard to the

appointment of his brother-in-law as

Utilityman but merely a recommending

authority. With this statement, the

Commission finds Rubenecia guilty. It

should be noted that under the provision

of Sec. 59, of the 1987 Administrative

Code, the recommending authority is also

prohibited from recommending the

appointment to a non-teaching position of

his relatives within the prohibited degree.

IV. OPPRESSION

Rubenecia is also guilty of Oppression. He

did not give on time the money benefitsdue to Ms. Leah Rebadulla and Mr.

Rolando Tafalla, both Secondary Teachers

of CNHS, specifically their salary

differentials for July to December 1987,

their salaries for the month of May and

half of June 1988; their proportional

vacation salaries for the semester of

1987-1988, and the salary of Mr. Tafalla

for the month of June, 1987. Rubenecia

did not even attempt to present

countervailing evidence. Without being

specifically denied, they are deemed

admitted by Rubenecia.

V INSUBORDINATION

He is not liable for Insubordination

arising from his alleged refusal to obey

the "Detail Order" by filing a sick leave

and vacation leave successively. The

records show that the two applications

for leave filed by Rubenecia were duly

approved by proper official, hence it

cannot be considered an act of

Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia

when he incurred absences based on anapproved application for leave of absence

Rubenecia is therefore found guilty of

Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and

Violations of Civil Service Rules and

Regulations.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises

considered, the Commission hereby

resolves to find Ruble Rubenecia guilty of

Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and

Violation of Civil Service Rules andRagulations. Accordingly, he is meted, out

the penalty of dismissal from the

service. 12

We find no basis for overturning the above

conclusions as the product merely of arbitrary

whims and caprice or of bad faith and malice.

We conclude that petitioner Rubenecia has failed to show

grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of

jurisdiction on the part of public respondent Commission


12/25

in issuing its Resolution No. 93-2387 dated 29 June 1993

and Resolution No. 94-0533 dated 25 January 1994.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition

for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.


13/25

G.R. No. 112309 July 28, 1994

NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO, ANDRES DIZON, TOMAS F.

FALCONITIN and ADAP, Mediator Arbiters, National

Capital Region, Department of Labor and

Employment, petitioners,

vs.

HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as

Chairman, Civil Service Commission; RAMON P.

ERENETA, JR. and THELMA P. GAMINDE, in theircapacities as Commissioners of the Civil Service

Commission; and HON. MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in

her capacity as Secretary, Department of Labor and

Employment, respondents.

Rodrigo D. Sta. Ana for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

REGALADO,J.:

The present petition for certiorari seeks to annul: (a)

Resolution No. 93-4480 1of the Civil Service Commission,

dated October 12, 1993, which declared the reassignment

of petitioners valid and legal; (b) the Order, dated July 26,

1993, 2of the Secretary of Labor, Hon. Ma. Nieves R.

Confesor, placing petitioners under preventive suspension

for ninety (90) days pending investigation of the charge

against them for gross insubordination; and (c) the Order,

dated October 25, 1993, 3of the said Secretary of Labor

finding petitioners guilty of two counts of grossinsubordination and accordingly suspending them for one

(1) year.

Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the

National Capital Region and, as such, were discharging

their duties as hearing officers when respondent Labor

Secretary Confessor issued on May 26, 1993 Memorandum

Order No. 4 4reassigning several med-arbiters, including

herein petitioners, which reads as follows:

In the interest of the service and in order

to expedite the resolution of inter-union

and intra-union cases, the followingassignment of

Med-Arbiters is hereby being made

effective immediately:

Appeals and Review Unit, OS:

A

n

d

r

e

Bureau of Labor Relations:

Paterno Adap

National Capital Region


14/25

i

g

o

n

A

n

g

e

li

T

u

y

a

y

Region IV:

Anastacio Bactin

xxx xxx xxx

Med-Arbiters Brigida Fadrigon, Angeli Tuyay and

Anastacio Bactin promptly complied with the

memorandum order. However, petitioners, in a letter

dated June 7, 1993, 5sought the reconsideration and recall

of said memorandum order on the ground that their

reassignments were made without their consent, which

was accordingly tantamount to removal without just cause.

On June 23, 1993, respondent Secretary of Labor issued

another Memorandum 6declaring and clarifying that

Memorandum Order No. 4 contemplates, not a transfer as

erroneously alleged, but a mere reassignment wherein the

consent of petitioners is not required, and ordering

petitioners to report to their new assignments and to turn

over all records of cases and other documents in their

possession.

Petitioners, however, refused to comply and instead wrote

another letter, dated June 28, 1993, 7seeking the

reconsideration of Memorandum Order No. 4 and the

Memorandum of June 23, 1993, on the ground that the

same were issued in violation of their rights to security of

tenure and due process of law.

Acting on petitioners' letter, respondent Secretary issued

another Memorandum, dated July 7, 1993, 8denying their

request and directing them to show cause why they should

not be administratively charged for gross insubordination.

On July 12, 1993, petitioners filed an appeal 9with the

Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil

Service Commission (CSC), and a supplemental

appeal 10dated July 19, 1993.

On July 15, 1993, petitioners submitted their explanation

in compliance with the Memorandum of July 7, 1993,

arguing that they could not accept their reassignment

considering that the same is unconstitutional, illegal and

without valid cause; that quasi-judicial officers may not be

transferred or reassigned except on grounds provided by

law; and that the law provides that pending their appeal to

the Civil Service Commission, their transfer or

reassignment should be held in abeyance.

On July 26, 1993, petitioners were formally charged with

gross insubordination and, pending investigation, were

placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days.

On October 12, 1993, the CSC issued its questioned

resolution finding the reassignment of petitioners valid

and legal and, consequently, dismissed their appeal for

lack of merit.

On October 25, 1993, respondent Secretary issued another

Order finding petitioners guilty of two counts of gross

insubordination and accordingly suspending them from

the service for one (1) year.

Hence, this petition assailing the foregoing resolution and

orders.

Petitioners first contend that the CSC has no jurisdiction to

review on appeal the aforestated Memorandum Order No.

4 as the same is vested in the MSPB pursuant to Section 13

Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of

1987). There is no merit in the argument.

Resolution No. 93-2387 11of the CSC, which took effect on

July 1, 1993, declared the abolition of the MSPB in order tostreamline the operations of the CSC, so as to achieve a

speedier delivery of administrative justice and economical

operation without impairing due process and the

substantive rights of the parties in administrative cases.

Henceforth, decisions in administrative cases involving

officials and employees of the civil service appealable to

the Commission, including personnel actions, shall be

appealed directly to the Commission and not to the MSPB,

and those cases which have been appealed or brought

directly to the MSPB shall be elevated to the Commission

for final resolution. In the present case, petitioner's appeal

was filed only on July 12, 1993 when Resolution No. 93-

2387 was already in effect. Perforce, their appeal wasconsidered filed before the CSC.

Petitioners claim that there was malice, bad faith, undue

influence and partiality in the issuance of the order for

reassignment and its affirmance by the CSC. They aver that

there was undue influence exerted by respondent

Secretary and that the CSC acted with partiality because

respondent Secretary and CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas are

personal friends, aside from the fact that during the

pendency of their appeal with the CSC, the latter issued

legal opinions through its Director for Legal Affairs

concerning the very issues involved in the appeal even


15/25

before the same could be officially resolved. Furthermore,

petitioner Fernando specifically asserts that the

reassignment was actually in retaliation for the

independent stance he has taken in Case No. OD-M-9301-

028 (APSOTEU vs. EEI) pending before him wherein he

ordered the cancellation of the certificate of registration of

APSOTEU. These allegations of petitioners should be

considered as mere speculations and conjectures, no

substantial evidence having been presented in support

thereof.

The reassignment of petitioners was made "in the interest

of the service and in order to expedite the resolution of

inter-union and intra-union cases." That the order was

issued for this purpose is even presumed under Civil

Service rules where there is no proof of harassment,

coercion, intimidation, or other personal reasons therefor.

Additionally, public respondents have in their favor the

presumption of regularity in the performance of official

duties which petitioners failed to rebut when they did not

present evidence to prove partiality, malice and bad faith.

Bad faith can never be presumed; it must be proved byclear and convincing evidence. No such evidence exists in

the case at bar. The circumstances attending the issuance

of Memorandum Order No. 4 do not in any way reveal any

malicious intent on the part of respondent Secretary. On

the contrary, we consider her actions as a valid exercise of

her power and authority as department head to take and

enforce personnel actions.

It is likewise argued that the reassignment of petitioners is

tantamount to their constructive dismissal because it was

effected without their consent. In the case ofBentain vs.

Court of Appeals, 12we categorically held that a

reassignment in good faith and in the interest of thegovernment service is permissible and valid even without

the employee's prior consent.

The reassignment is also challenged as being illegal

because it involves a reduction in rank and status, and it

violates the right to security of tenure and to due process

of law. Petitioners contend that with the reassignment,

their functions were changed from those of a hearing

officer to the drafting of decisions appealed to the

Secretary. In their view, they were in effect demoted.

A demotion, under Section 11, Rule VII of the Omnibus

Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, is

defined as the movement from one position to another

involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution

in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may

not involve reduction in salary. On the other hand, Section

10 of the same rule defines a reassignment as the

movement of an employee from one organizational unit to

another in the same department or agency which does not

involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary and does not

require the issuance of an appointment. A demotion,

therefore, involves the issuance of an appointment.

In the case at bar, it is clear and undisputed that no new

appointments were issued to herein petitioners. Hence, it

is incorrect for them to claim that they were demoted.

Moreover, petitioners failed to sufficiently establish that

there was a reduction in their salary. They would want to

suggest that there was a diminution in rank in the sense

that their present assignment as drafters of decisions on

appeal to the Secretary are subject to review by higher

authority, whereas in their former assignment as hearing

officers, they themselves render judgment. Petitionersseem to forget that the decisions of hearing officers are

also subject to review by the National Labor Relations

Commission. Thus unmasked, their argument has

definitely no leg to stand on.

Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the

National Capital Region. They were not, however,

appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the

Department of Labor in the National Capital Region

(DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned

from one organizational unit to another of the same agency

where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their

services may be used more effectively. As such they canneither claim a vested right to the station to which they

were assigned nor to security of tenure thereat. As

correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners'

reassignment is not a transfer for they were not removed

from their position as med-arbiters. They were not given

new appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows,

therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4 ordering their

reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in

order.

Whatever alleged procedural infirmity may have rendered

defective the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 4 has

been cured when petitioners filed two motions forreconsideration seeking to recall the same. The two

motions were duly considered, discussed and resolved by

respondent Secretary. Petitioners were thereby afforded

full opportunity to present their arguments against the

issuance of said order.

Finally, we do not deem it appropriate to rule on the

merits of the order issued on July 26, 1993 by respondent

Secretary preventively suspending petitioners for ninety

(90) days, as well as her subsequent order dated October

25, 1993 finding petitioners guilty of insubordination and

imposing on them the penalty of suspension of one (1)

year. Evidently, herein petitioners, in asking us to resolvethe issues thereon in their present recourse, have

overlooked or deliberately ignored the fact that the same

are clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies.

On the first aspect, petitioners allowed the 90-day period

ofpreventive suspension to lapse without appealing from

the Order of July 26, 1993. In fact, the investigation which

necessitated such suspension has long since been

concluded and thereafter resulted in the condemnatory

Order of October 25, 1993. Hence, they are now clearly


16/25

estopped from invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of this

Court in a belated attempt to seek redress from the first

Order.

Secondly, as stated earlier, the Order dated October 25,

1993 imposing a punitive suspension of one year on herein

petitioners cannot be the proper subject of a petition

for certiorari for their failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Presidential Decree No. 807 and Executive Order

No. 292 explicitly provide that administrative disciplinarycases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension

for more than thirty (30) days are appealable to the Civil

Service Commission. 13Not having fully exhausted the

remedy available to them, petitioners cannot resort to

their present judicial action which is both premature at

this juncture and proscribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court. Neither do we find any of the exceptions to the

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which

could be applicable to the instant case, nor have

petitioners essayed any submission on that score.

WHEREFORE, no jurisdictional error or any grave abuse of

discretion having been shown to have flawed or taintedthe impugned resolution of respondent Chairman of the

Civil Service Commission or the challenged orders of

respondent Secretary of Labor, the present petition

for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.


17/25

G.R. No. 159940 February 16, 2005

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO-MORALES,J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside and

nullify Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service

Commission (CSC) dated August 28, 2003.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

By letter1dated March 7, 1994 addressed to then

Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, the CSC approved the

Qualification Standards for several positions in the Office

of the Ombudsman (petitioner) including that for Graft

Investigation Officer III. The Qualification Standards forsaid position are:

EDUCATION: Bachelor of Laws

EXPERIENCE: 5 years of experience in the practice of law,

counseling, investigation/ prosecution of cases, hearings of

administrative/ criminal cases, legal research or other

related work.

TRAINING: 24 hours of relevant training

ELIGIBILITY: RA 1080 (Bar)

The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) subsequently

advised the Ombudsman, by letter of May 29, 1996,2that

pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s.1994, the

position of Graft Investigation Officer III, among other

positions in petitioner therein mentioned, was classified as

a Career Executive Service (CES) position, hence, governed

by the rules of the CES pertaining to eligibility,

appointment to CES ranks, and performance evaluation,

among other things.1awphi1.nt

On September 29, 1999, the members of the Constitutional

Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), namely: the Commissionon Elections (COMELEC), CSC, Commission on Audit (COA),

Commission on Human Rights (CHR), petitioner and this

Court adopted Joint Resolution No. 623reading:

JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 62

WHEREAS, the independence of the members of the

Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) is

guaranteed by the Constitution;

WHEREAS, the Constitution has several provisions that

guarantee and protect such independence, among which

are Sections 4 and 5 of Article IX, A thereof, which

respectively grant them Fiscal Autonomy and authorize

them to appoint their own officials and employees in

accordance with law;

WHEREAS, Section 7(3), Title I, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 enumerates exclusively

and restrictively the specific positions under theCareer Executive Service, all the holders of which are

appointed by the President and are required to have

CES eligibility;

WHEREAS, in case of Home Insurance Guaranty

Corporation vs. Civil Service Commission and Daniel Cruz,

G.R. No. 95450, dated 19 March 1993, the Supreme Court

nullified the classification by the CSC of the position of

Corporate Vice President as belonging to the third level of

the Career Executive Services;

WHEREAS, the Court declared in the above cited case that

said position is not among those enumerated by law asfalling under the third level, nor one of those identified by

the CES Board as equivalent rank to those listed by law,

nor was the incumbent appointed by the President;

WHEREAS, in the case of Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T.

Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, dated 18 December 1990, the

Supreme Court ruled that "Article IX-A, Sec. 1 of the

Constitution expressly describes all Constitutional

Commissions as Independent. Although essentiallyexecutive in nature, they are not under the control of the

President of the Philippines in the discharge of their

respective functions."

WHEREAS, only the Chairmen and Commissioners of the

Constitutional Commissions, the Commission on Human

Rights, Justices and Judges, as well as the Ombudsman and

his Deputies, are appointed by the President;

WHEREAS, the Constitutional Commissions, the

Supreme Court, the Commission on Human Rights, and

the Office of the Ombudsman are empowered to

appoint officials and employees to positions belonging

to first level up to third level of their respective

agencies, and that they are notpresidential

appointees;

WHEREAS, Section 22 par. 1, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I,

Book V, of the Administrative Code of 1987, provides in

part that "[t]he degree of qualifications of an officer or

employee shall be determined by the appointing authority

on the basis of the qualification standard for the particular

positions[,]" and par. 2 thereof provides that [t]he

establishment, administration and maintenance of

qualification standards shall be the responsibility of the

department or agency, with the assistance and approval of

the Civil Service Commission;"
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1


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NOW, THEREFORE, the CFAG jointly resolves:

1. Thatall third level positions under each

member agency are career positions;

2. That, where appropriate and proper, taking into

consideration the organizational set-up of the

agency concerned, the overall screening and

selection process for these positions shall be a

collegial undertaking, provided that theappointment paper shall be signed only by the

Head of the member agency;

3. That all career third level positions

identified and classified by each of the

member agency arenotembraced within the

Career Executive Service (CES) and as such

shall notrequire Career Service Executive

Eligibility (CSEE) or Career Executive Service

(CES) Eligibility for purposes of permanent

appointment;

4. That should CFAG member agencies develop

their respective eligibility requirements for the

third level positions, the test of fitness shall be

jointly undertaken by the CFAG member agencies

in coordination with the CSC;

5. That in case the test of fitness shall be in written

form, the CSC shall prepare the questionnaires and

conduct the examinations designed to ascertain

the general aptitude of the examinees while the

member agency shall likewise prepare the

questionnaires and conduct in conjunction with

the CSC, the examinations to determine the

technical capabilities and expertise of the

examinees suited to its functions;

6. That the resulting eligibility acquired after

passing the aforementioned examination shall

appropriate for permanent appointment only to

third level positions in the CFAG member

agencies;

7. That the member agencies shall regularly

coordinate with the CSC for the conferment of the

desired eligibility in accordance with this

Resolution; However this is without prejudice tothose incumbents who wish to take the Career

Service Executive Examination given by the Civil

Service Commission or the Management Aptitude

Test Battery given by the Career Executive Service

Board. (Underscoring in the original omitted;

emphasis, italics and underscoring

supplied)1awphi1.nt

On July 31, 2002, Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer

M. Clemente and Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr. were

appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner by

the Ombudsman. The CSC approved the appointments on

the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of

tenure, they must obtain CES or Civil Service Executive

(CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB.

By January 2, 2003 letter to the CSC, the Ombudsman

requested for the change of status, from temporary to

permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente

and De Jesus effective December 18, 2002. Invoking the

Court of Appeals ruling in Khem N. Inok v. Hon. CorazonAlma de Leon, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 49699), "as affirmed by

the Supreme Court," the Ombudsman wrote:

x x x

In the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January

28, 2001 on CA G.R. SP No. 49699 as affirmed by

the Supreme Court with finality on July 2, 2002 in G.R.

No. 148782 entitled Khem N. Inok vs. Civil Service

Commission, it stated in said Decision thatthe letter

and intent of the law is to circumscribe the Career

Executive Service (CES) to CES positions in the

Executive Branch of Government, and that theJudiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, the Office of

the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human

Rights are notcovered by the CES governed by the

Career Executive Service Board. Said Decision thereby

effectively granted the petition of Mr. Inok for security

of tenure as Director II of the Commission on Audit

despite the absence of a CES eligibility.4(Emphasis and

italics supplied)

The relevant portions of the cited CA decision read:

Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil

Service Decree of the Philippines, provides the following

levels of position in the career service, viz:

SEC. 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.

(a) Classes of positions in the career service

appointment to which requires examinations shall

be grouped into three major levels as follows:

(1) The first level shall include clerical,

trades, crafts, and custodial service

positions which involve non-professional

or subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity

requiring less than four years of collegiate

studies;

(2) The second level shall include

professional, technical, and scientific

positions which involve professional;

technical, or scientific work in a non-

supervisory or supervisory capacity

requiring at least four years of college

work up to Division Chief level; and
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt4


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(3) The third level shall cover positions

in the Career Executive Service.

(b) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance

to the first two levels shall be through competitive

examinations, which shall be open to those inside

and outside the service who meet the minimum

qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher

level does not require previous qualification in

a lower level. Entrance to the third level shallbe prescribed by the Career Executive Service

Board.

(c) Within the same level, no civil service

examination shall be required for promotion to a

higher position in one or more related

occupational groups. A candidate for promotion

should however, have previously passed the

examination for that level.

The last sentence of Section 7(b) of P.D. No. 807 is similar

to the provision of P.D. No. 1, Article IV, par. IV, par. 5(a), to

wit:

(a) Membership. A person who meets such managerial

experience and other requirements and passes such

examinations as may be prescribed by the Board shall be

included in the register of career service eligibles and,

upon appointment to an appropriate class in the Career

Executive Service, become an active member in the

Service. In exceptional cases, the Board may give

unassembled examinations for eligibility. The area of

recruitment shall be government-wide, with provisions to

allow qualified or outstanding men from outside the

government to enter the service.

Thus, it could be gleaned from P.D. No. 1 of the Career

Executive Service (CES), which has been [d]rafted into

Executive Order No. 292, that the letter and intent of the

law is to circumscribe the Career Executive Service to CES

positions in the Executive Branch of government. Verily,

consistent with the principle of the ejusdem generisin legal

hermeneutics, the phrase "other officers of equivalent

rank" could encompass only such persons occupying

positions in the Executive Department. In the

contemporaneous case of the The Secretary of Justice

Serafin R. Cuevas, et. al. vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal, the

Supreme Court lent credence to this postulate, viz:

Security of tenure in the career executive service is

acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The

guarantee of security of tenure to members of the

CES does not extend to the particular positions to which

they may be appointed a concept which is applicable onlyto frst and second level employees in the civil service

butto the rank to which they are appointed by the

President. x x x

Prescinding from the foregoing disquisition, We are loathe

to stamp our imprimaturto the Commissions stance that

the "positions of Director III, including that of the COA,

belong to the third level. Hence, appointees thereto should

possess the x x x Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility

in accordance with the Qualification Standard of the said

position."

Ineluctably, the judiciary, the Constitutional

Commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the

Commission on Human Rights are not covered by the CES

governed by the CESB. The power of these constitutionaloffices to appoint their own officers and employees is

mainly intended to safeguard their independence, which is

the same power of appointment of all officials and

employees of the judiciary granted to the Supreme

Court.l^vvphi1.netAs commented by a noted

constitutionalist:

The authority of the Supreme Court to appoint its own

officials and employees is another measure intended to

safeguard the independence of the judiciary. However, the

Courts appointing authority must be exercised inaccordance with the Civil Service Law.

Irrefragrably, inherent in the power to appoint is the

power to administratively supervise the officials and

employees in the constitutional offices in the same

manner that the express power to appoint carries with it

the implied power to remove the personnel appointed in

said offices. x x x

x x x

Parenthetically, the power to administratively supervise is

designed to strengthen the independence of the

constitutional offices. A respected authority on political

law underscored the multifarious factors that are integral

to the independence of the constitutional offices, scilicet:

There are several factors that preserve the independence

of the three Commissions:

x x x

(3) Their appointment must be in a permanent capacity.

(4) The Commissions enjoy their own fiscal autonomy.

The independence of these constitutional offices serves to

exempt their respective officials and employees from the

coverage of the CES under the administrative authority of

the CESB. to be sure, they are embraced by the civil service

system. However, the administrative functions belong to

the constitutional offices, instead of the CESB in the same

manner that the Supreme Court administers the judiciaryscivil service.

x x x5(Italics and emphasis in the original;

underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied;


20/25

citations omitted)

It appears that Carandang and Clemente were in the

meantime conferred with CSE Eligibility pursuant to CSC

Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003.6

Petitioner subsequently reclassified several positions by

Resolution No. 02-03 dated August 18, 2003 including

Graft Investigation Officer III which was reclassified to

Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. TheOmbudsman thereupon requested the approval of the

proposed Qualification Standards for the reclassified

positions. With respect to the reclassified Graft

Investigation and Prosecution Officer III position, the

Qualification Standards were the same as those for Graft

Investigation Officer III.

Subsequently, the CSC, by the challenged Resolution of

August 28, 2003, changed the status of Carandangs and

Clementes appointments to permanent effective June 6,2003, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that

he "has not met the eligibility requirements." The

pertinent portion of the questioned Resolution reads:

Relevant to the matter are Sections 4 and 6, Rule III and

Rule VI, respectively, of the Omnibus Rules on

Appointments and Other Personnel Action, which state:

SEC. 4. Nature of Appointment. The nature of appointment

shall be as follows:

x x x

i. Change of status:

1. temporary to permanent the appointment issued to atemporary employee when he acquires the appropriate

eligibility or becomes fully qualified for the position to

which he is appointed.

x x x

SEC. 6. In cases where the appointee fully qualifies for the

position to which he is temporarily appointed, the

appointing authority shall no longer issue an appointment

for change of status from temporary to permanent. Upon

the appointees presentation of the required document/s,such change may be effected as a footnote on the

temporary appointment issued, copy furnished the

Commission.

It is explicitly provided therein that the change of status

from temporary to permanent can be effected only

once the appointee becomes fully qualified to the

position to which he is appointed.

x x x

The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in the Inok

case cannot be made the basis for changing the

employment status of De Jesus. Let it be stressed that

nowhere in the aforesaid decision states that the Office of

the Ombudsman or the other constitutional agencies

mentioned therein are exempt or are not covered by the

Civil Service Law and Rules. On the contrary, the same

decision declares that these bodies are covered by the civil

service system. Basic is the rule that all appointments in

the government service, particularly the career service,must be in accordance with the qualification requirements

as laid down under existing civil service rules and

regulations. Such policy is in line with the Commissionsmandate to professionalize the civil service. The

requirements spelled out in the Qualification

Standards (QS) Manual are designed to determine the

fitness of the appointee in a certain position. These

requirements are indispensable in order to satisfy the

Constitutional mandate that appointment in the civil

service shall be made according to merit and fitness.

While it is true that constitutional agencies such as the

Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to appoint itsofficials in accordance with law, such law does not

necessarily imply that their appointment will not be

subject to Civil Service Law and Rules; otherwise, these

independent bodies will arrogate upon themselves a

power that properly belongs to the Civil Service

Commission. Had the intention of the framers of the

Constitution been to isolate and grant full independence to

Constitutional Commissions in the matter of appointments

it would have been so provided. But that is not the case.

the Philippine Constitution provides: "The Constitutional

Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees

in accordance with law" (Article IX-A, Section 4).

Specifically, Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution statesthat "The officials, shall be appointed by the

Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law." And since

all matters pertaining to appointments are within the

realm of expertise to the CSC, all laws, rules and

regulations it issues on appointments must be complied

with.

The Constitution speaks of only one civil service, to

encompass the first, second, and third levels. It is subject

to the same set of laws, rules and regulations in the

manner of observing and ensuring that the merit and

fitness principle, unless otherwise exempted therefrom by

the Constitution or law, is the guiding factor in issuingappointments. Hence, until and unless there is a law or

rule exempting one category of public officials from the

test in determining merit and fitness, all levels in the

government are deemed subject to it. Simply put, the third

level eligibility requirement for third level officials in all

agencies is mandatory.

Further, let it be clarified that the ruling enunciated in Inok

case was with regard to the authority of the Career

Executive Service Board to prescribe and to administer the

Career Executive Service Eligibility and it did not


21/25

specifically nor particularly take away the functions of the

Civil Service Commission. This is evident from the

aforequoted decision in the Inok case, to wit:

The independence of these constitutional offices serves to

exempt their respective officials and employees from the

coverage of the CES under the administrative authority of

the CESB. To be sure, they are embraced by the civil

service system. However, the administrative functions

belong to the constitutional offices, instead of the CESB inthe manner that the Supreme Court administers the

judiciarys civil service.

Pursuant to the QS Manual, a Graft Investigation

Officer III position is a career service position

requiring a Career Service Eligibility or Career Service

Executive Eligibility. Considering that De Jesus has not

met the eligibility requirement, the change of status of

his appointment from temporary to permanent cannot

be effected. As held in Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA

235:

It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issuedonly to a person who meets all the requirements for the

position to which he is appointed, including the

appropriate eligibility prescribed. Achacoso did not. Atbest, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as

temporary.

x x x (Underscoring partly in the original and partly

supplied; emphasis supplied)

Hence, the present petition anchored on the following

ground:

THE GENERAL POWER OF RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION (CSC) TO ADMINISTER THE CIVIL SERVICE

CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY AND VALIDLY CURTAIL

THE SPECIFIC DISCRETIONARY POWER OF

APPOINTMENT, INCLUDING THE GRANT OF SECURITY OF

TENURE, BY THE OMBUDSMAN AS AN INDEPENDENT

CONSTITUTIONAL BODY IN FAVOR OF THE LATTERSOWN OFFICIALS, AND ANY SUCH CURTAILMENT BY THE

RESPONDENT CSC, AS IN ITS IMPUGNED RESOLUTION

NO. 030919 DATED 26 AUGUST 2003, IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY AND LEGALLY INFIRM.

Petitioner contends that the CSC misrea

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