EvolutionArmy3rdAD

Th E 1itic,ri cf t1 Rc,mri Army

d tir I r t Ii t Ii i r d c ri t tir y AD

by

MICHAEL C. IBEJI

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

IN THE SCHOOL OF ANTIQUITY

AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Faculty of ArtsUniversity of Blrmthgham

EdgbastonBirmingham

B15 2TT

October 1991

M. C. Ibeji

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROMAN ARMY IN THE THIRD CENTURY

ADDENDA

This thesis was written without access to Hoffman's Die SpätrömischeBewegungsheer das Römischen Heeres (1967), which addresses several of the pointsdiscussed concerning the late Third Century. It is recommended reading.

p.24 'Julius Verus' should read 'Lucius Verus'.

MAP 2: I am grateful to Dr Roger Tomlin for clarifring certain points: Aquileia(unit #3) was a vexillation staging post, and the reference probably alludes tothis; Unit #5 dates from the reign of Marcus Aurelius; Unit #7 is mostprobably numeri from a Constantinian battle. This in no way invalidates mycentral point that the so-called 'flying columns' were more likely to havebeen part of a long-standing tradition of ad hoc vexillation for defensivepurposes than a systematic precursor to the Comitatus.

p.159 The Equites Campani actually date from the Fourth Century BC (Tomlinpers. ref).

p.190 1RT88 is the same inscription as that discussed by Goodchild.

p.214 cf. Kennedy in Britannia 14 about Vellius Rufus.

p.303 itauta is more likely to read ircxu'rcov.

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M.C.Ibe,ji. C3 Army

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Current thinking concerning the third century Roman army is coloured byen over-reliance upon fourth century sources. This dissertation rectifiesthat imbalance by examining each individual institution from a third centuryviewpoint. Part 1 examines the math trends, with a necessarily speculativelook at the role of manpower, and a refutation of the concept of a mobilecavalry field army. Parts 2 and 3 describe how these trends affectedindividual troop types within the Roman army; in particular the extent towhich late Roman institutions, such as the equites of the Notitia Dignitatum,limitanei and barbarian foederati, can be identified in the third century.They also chart the rise of 'ethnic' units during the period, Part 4discusses the rise of the viz-i militares and their encroachment intoprovincial government. It outlines the development of the protectores withinthis background. Finally, virtue Illyrici is placed into its proper context.

In military terms, the reign of Gallienus is seen as the turning point ofthe century. He streamlined the Roman career-structure, allowing experiencedequestrians to rise into vital military posts, and integrated cavalry andpermanent vexillations into the existing army, utilising a strategy ofdefence-in-depth. The unconscious adherence to his principles by hissuccessors is seen as a major factor In the restabilisation of the empire.

M,C.Ibeii. C3 Army

To Mum, for faith.

M.C.Ibejl, C3 Army

Ac K ri cwl d mri t

The structure and function of the Roman army, and the monumentalchanges that were occurring within Roman society during the third centuryAD, have long been a subject of fascination for me. It seemed only natural,therefore, that Dr Simon Esmonde-Cleary should suggest the development ofthe Roman army during the third century as a fit study for his supervisionof my Doctoral dissertation. Throughout the subsequent five years ofresearch, the freedom he has given me to follow my instincts have beengreatly appreciated. Always freely available with advice, suggestions andexhaustive criticism, his wholehearted support of some of my morecontroversial attitudes has at times added courage to my convictions whichmight otherwise have been lacking.

I would also like to express my thanks to Dr Martin Goodman, whosecontinued encouragement was at times an anchor which held me to my task.Dr Stephen Halliwell was kind enough to read several of the more importantGreek inscriptions in order to clarify some detailed points of translationwhich had troubled me, though any errors of interpret&ion which arise fromthis are mine alone, Dr Nick Mimer in Oxford showed great patience at myconstant barrage of questions concerning Vegetius, and Andy Briggs providedchats beyond number, always therapeutic, at times inspirational. Manymembers of the School of Antiquity at the University of Birminghammaintained a friendly interest in my work, most especially Dr Chris Wickham,Dr Susan Limbrey, and our stalwart secretary, Valerie. Special thanks is dueto Dr Susan Fischler, who since her arrival In the department has providedevery support and who was Instrumental in introducing me to thepostgraduate community at Oxford.

From Oxford, Dr Hugh Elton read and commented upon some of my materialand kept me informed of events which were to prove both interesting anduseful. The members of the Oxford Late Roman Seminar and the BirminghamAncient History Postgraduate Seminar heard and discussed a draft version ofmy chapter Contra Comitatum. Their stimulating conversation was to promptsome of the points made in my chapters on the cavalry.

Outside the academic world, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to LynnJackson, whose encouragement and friendship have been the mainstays thatheld me to my course. To her and the many friends who expressed aninterest in my "essay thingy", I give my heartfelt thanks.

Finally, I would like to thank Miss Adams, my old maths teacher; RJ.Unstead; Peter Connolly; Mary Renault; Rosemary Suttcliffe; Henry Treece andMessrs. Goscinny and Uderzo, each of whom played no small part in setting myfeet upon the road down which I have embarked.

M.C. Ibeji. C3 Army

C ONrENTS

Introduction 1

PART 1: THE TRENDS

I: Historia 26

II: Manpower 42

III: Contra Comitatum 57

PART 2: THE TRADITIONAL UNITS

IV: Legiones 76

V: Auxilia Numerique 96

PART 3: THE 'NEW' UNITS

VI: Vexillationes 135

VII: Equites 159

VIII: Limitanei 182

IX: Foederati 194

PART 4: THE OFFICERS

X: Viri Militares 202

XI: Protectores 244

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

XII: Virtus Illyrici Gallieni 294

APPENDICES

1: The Antiqua Leglo of Vegetius 306

2: Traianus Mucianus 309

Addendum 312

BIBLIOGRAPHY & Abbreviations

M.C.tbeji, C3 Army

TABLES

Al: Auxiliary units first appearing after AD 161 124

A2: Auxiliary units of dubious date or provenance 127

A3: Auxiliaries surviving into the notitia Dignitatum 128

A4. : Units in the Notitia possibly related to earlier Auxilia_132

AS: Results from Tables A3 & A4 134

Vi: Vexillatioris prior to Marcus Aurelius 154

V2: Vexillations of Marcus and Commodus 156

V3: Vexillations of Severus & Caracalla 157

V4: Vexillations from AD 217-284 - 158

El: Equites units in the Notitia Dignitetum per Orientern_179

E2: Equites units in the Notitia Dignitatum per' Occidentezn_180

E3: The equites Promoti and the Legions 181

VM1: Provincial Governors 235

VM2: Praefecti Legionum 241

VM3:Duces 242

VM4: Survey Results 243

P1: Protectores Gallieni Augusti Nostri 287

P2: The Generals of Galllenus 288

P3: Ducenar'ii Protec'tores 289

P4: Centur'io Protector 290

PS: Protectores Diocletiani 291

P6: Other protectores for whom some career record survives2g2

P7: Non-protectorate Equestrian Careers c.250-284 293

M,C,Ibeji. C3 Army

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Map 1: The Roman Empire and it Neighbours in the C3 AD

preceding p.1

Map 2: The Garrison of Italy In the Late C3

facIng p.66

Map 3: Attested Garrisons and Fortifications AD 253-c.284

between pp.300 & 301

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I NTROD UC TI OM

A History of Rome by M, Cary and H.H. Scullard is a standard student

text, over 500 pages long, spanning the period from Pre-Roman Italy to the

deposition of Romulus Augustulus In AD 476. The third century, from the

reign of Septimius Severus to the accession of Diocletian (AD 193-284), is

covered in Just twenty-six short pages, from page 490 to page 516. Yet

within that span, the Roman empire had undergone such an earth-shattering

crisis that In order to survive it had been forced to modify the very

foundations upon which it was based. Not least among them was the Roman

army, the development of which was to have direct repercussions upon other

institutions, most notably taxation and provincial government.

That the history of such a transitional century should receive such

cursory treatment is hardly surprising given the nature of the evidence.

Only two contemporary histories are extant, both of which terminate after

the Seven, and their contlnuators survive only in fragments or in epitomes.

Other methods of investigation are equally unrewarding. Archaeology has

yielded little until recently; the epigraphic record remains a mainstay, but

is much sparser than for previous centuries; and numismatics, while lauded by

some, remains severely limited as a tool of research 1 . Faced with such a

dearth of material, early investigators were forced to rely on later sources

of information, dating mainly from the fourth century but extending as far

as the twelfth, with predictable consequences.

1, All types of evidence are discussed below, p 4ff1—1--

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction

Scholarly interest among military commentators turned to the third

century in the early 1900s. The German historians most active in the field

were especially concerned to identify the roots of the later Roman army in

this period. They saw a military institution transformed under Diocletlan

and Constantine from a predominantly infantry force arranged along the

frontiers, into a two-tier structure, with mobile elite troops stationed in

the hinterland (the comitatenses) and second-class soldiers remaining on the

frontiers (the limitanei and ripenses). Naturally, given the nature of thefr

sources which freely used late Roman terminology when talking about earlier

institutions, they assumed that this structure had taken shape 1n the mid-

third century. Two seminal works, by Ritterling and Grosse', gave voice to

that assumption and were swiftly followed by other scholars 2 until the ideas

they embodied became the orthodox canon. That canon has been transmitted to

the present day by a series of eminent historians, who did not think to

question the basis upon which it was made.

That basis is unsound, though through no fault of those early pioneers.

Ritterlthg and Grosse had meagre resources upon which to rely. The

authorship of the Historia Augusta had only Just come into question, and the

debate about its date and historical reliablility was still raging into the

193Os. Their only other useful sources were the Greek epitomators, Zosimus

1, Ritterling, 'Zue römischen Heerwesen des ausgehenden III Sahrhunderts', Pest, 0, Hirsc/?feIds(1903), 345ff; Grosse, Röaische Militärgescli/chte on ealileiws b/s zwi BegLn der byzantin/shenTheaenverfassung (1920),

2, eg: Alföldi, 'Der Usurpator Aureolus und die Kavalleriereform des Gallienus', Z(N37 (1927),

156ff; Aitheim, Ole Soidatenkaiser (1939),3, For an indication of the confused state of thought in 1939 cf, CA//UI (1939) 710f & 730,

Key papers in the argument of the time are: Dessau in Heaes 24 (1889), 337ff, & Heraes 27(1892),561ff; Mommsen in 6e5, Scrift, 7 (1909), 302ff; and N, Baynes, The Historla Augista, its date andpwrpose (1926),

—2-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction

and Zonaras, whose work was coloured by later Roman thinking. It was little

wonder, then, that they were to take those typically late Roman documents,

the Notitia Dignitat urn and the Epitoma Rei Militaris of Vegetius 1 and

swallow them wholesale, transporting their institutions back into the third

century.

Current thinking concerning the third century is therefore coloured by

an over-reliance upon fourth century sources. This dissertation has set out

to rectify that imbalance by examining each individual institution from a

third century viewpoint, before looking to see how it relates to the later

Roman empire. Part 1 is an examination of the main trends which dominated

the century, with a necessarily speculative look at the role of manpower in

the third century equation, and a refutation of the concept of a mobile

cavalry field army. Parts 2 and 3 describe how these trends affected

individual troop types found within the Roman army. They are particularly

concerned with the extent to which late Roman institutions, such as the

equites of the Notitia Dignitat urn, and the limitanel and barbarian foederati,

can be identified in the third century. As a secondary theme, they chart the

rise of 'ethnic' units during the period. Part 4 discusses the tangential

topic of the rise of the vir-i milit ares and their encroachment into

provincial government. It outlines the institution and development of the

protectores within this background. Specific conclusions have been reached

throughout the document. A general conclusion rounds it off by placing

virtus Illyrici into its proper context. Various topics proved outside the

scope of this study in its final form, most especially the effect of the army

on the economy of the empire and the development of the Primipilate with

1. Vegetius had not yet come into question, Ct, App 1: 'The Antiqzia Leg/c of Vegetius',

—3-


reference to the annona mi1itarie I hope to pursue these studies at a later

date.

With such a premise as Its starting point, the first task of this study

must be to examine the source material in an effort to determine what can

be trusted, what cannot, and just how much different types of evidence can

tell us about the subject in question.

A note of caution Is in order, best expressed by Millar In the

introduction to his Study of Cassius Dic

In plain terms, we do not know enough about how ancient historians worked, We have no grounds

for general assumptions about what an ancient historian would do when using one or more existing

works as sources of material, or how he would redeploy that material in composing his own

narrative,,,,,,Source-criticism is mere speculation, and its results often no more than the

product of the assumptions with which the examination of a text was begun.1

This was never more true than in the postulation of lost sources upon

which extant ancient historical texts are thought to have relied. Five such

sources are suggested for writers about the third century. Three are named,

with independent corroboration, and can therefore be inserted into the

chronological framework on which this discussion will hang2 . The two

remaining anonymi require a brief discussion now, before they can be used

with reference to later, known, works.

The first of these is the lost Kaisergeschichte (KG) postulated by

Enmann In 1883. This has been seen as the main source for Aurelius Victor,

1, Millar, Study of Cassius Dio (1963), viii,2, Marius Maximus, discussed below p,1Of Dexippus, ph: Eunapius, p13?,

3 Enmann in Deutsche Literuturzeitung4 (1883), 861, & Philoiogus, Supp,4 (1884), 335ff,—4-


Eutropius, and the Histoi-ia Augusta. It also seems likely that it was known

by Festus, Jerome and the Epitome of Victor. The argument hinges upon a

comparison of Victor and Eutropius, whose work is so similar in content and

form that one must either have copied the other, or both must have been

relying on a single main source. Victor cannot have copied Eutropius, who

was writing after him, and since Eutropius contains the bare bones of

Victor's account without any of his accretions, the existence of the KG seems

the most likely hypothesis. It probably went as far as AD 337, since the

similarities between Victor and Eutropius stop at the death of Constantine,

Nor was it entirely accurate, its most blatant mistakes being the existence

of two Gordians instead of three, and a fictitious battle at the Milvian

Bridge in AD 193 (which strongly advocates its placement after 312)1,

The influence of the KG upon the Latin epitomators seems to me proven;

but I am less convinced that it was known to the Historia Augusta. Barnes'

arguments are unconvincing, proving only that, contrary to his unsupported

assertion, the Histor'ia Augusta probably did know Jerome 2. Only his third

point, the independently corroborated extra information in the I-Li st aria

Augusta's account of Carus' Persian war, can be used to prove that it had an

independent source. Since "Victor, Eutropius, Festus, Jerome and the Histaria

Augusta describe Carus' expedition in closely similar wording, It should be

1, The best and most convincing summary of this argument can be found in Barnes, Sources of the

//istoria Augusta, Collections Latcius 155 (1978), 91ff,

2, Barnes states baldly that 'there is no sign that the Historia Augusta knows Jerome': Sources

of the HA, 91, However, Syme had already demonstrated that, while one could not prove the S/IA drew

extensively from Jerome, it was likely that it was familiar with his work: Aaiianus and the Historia

Augusta (1968), 80ff, With the single exception of S//A Aur, XXXV • 4, all references cited by Barnes in

his first two points merely strengthen the view that the S//A had read Jerome and the other Latin

epitomators, Barnes' statement that this reference 'may be accepted as authentic even in default of

explicit confirmation,' simply will not do, given the S/IA's proven track record,

—5-

M.C,Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Introduction

deduced" not "that the Historia Augusta has consulted the KG directly" 1 , but

that any information not common to all four epitomes (believed to have used

the KG) came from a completely different source, and that the Hist aria

Augusta used the epitomes as the basis for the account, onto which it

grafted the added information it had gleaned.

The other lost source, Ignotus, also relates to the Historia Augusta.

Syme and Barnes maintain that the early Vitae of the H/st aria Augusta

contain a core of sober and conscientious biography which must have been

drawn from a "good biographer" writing up to the death of Caracalla, whom

they have styled as 'Ignotus' 2. The main challenge to their hypothesis comes

from a school of thought which believes that Ignotus is rendered unnecessary

by the known biographer, Marius fvlaximus, and that it was he who was the

main source for the early Vitae3. The proponents of Ignotus have

demonstrated convincingly that this was not the case. Marius Maximus was a

secondary source grafted onto the early lives to liven them up, and any

assumption to the contrary requires "a large number of ad hoc hypotheses if

its inherent difficulties are to be surmounted" 4 , However, the argument in

favour of Ignotus and against Marius Maximus also requires a number of ad

hoc hypotheses and is in places both thin and contradictorys.

1, Barnes, Source5 o1 114 97,2, Syme, ,aaianus and the MQ, 92f &iperors and Biography (1971), 30ff; Barnes, op. cit,, 101ff,3, A, Birley, Septielus Severus (1971), 308ff: A, Cameron in IRS 61 (1971), 262ff: J

Schiumberger, Die Epitoie de Caesar/bus (1974), 124ff,4, Barnes, locc, cut,; Syme, 4aianus and the 114 90ff; Eaperors and Biography, 45ff & 112; Z,

Rubin in IRS 64 (1974), 233 summarises both arguments,5, Compare Syme, Eaperors and Biography, 46f to Barne5 lOif on Marius Maximus and the Macrinus,

The provision of dates by Ignotus is 'to be presumed accurate', except where they are manifestly wrong(ie, the birth of Severus: Syme, op. cit,, 42; Barnes, 19f), and the erratic nature of his genealogies

are automatically put down to abridgement, NB: Ignotus is never named as a source by the SHA, which

names Maximus 29 times, This discrepancy cannot just be ignored.

—6-


Perhaps the most dangerous of these hypotheses is best expressed by

Barnes:

,,Given his observable inclinations, he (the Scriptor Historiae Q/gustde3 will probably have

transcribed a single source, or series of sources, to which he added as he pleased, often from

his own head, sometimes on a later revision, and sometimes from another source or from the

recollection of what he had read or heard, 1

This hypothesis, attributing a minimum number of sources to a 'bad'

ancient historian, seems to me simply illogical when applied to the Historia

Augusta. Both Byrne and Barnes have demonstrated that the author of the

Historia Augusta was erudite and highly literate, with a wide-ranging taste

and a classical education which included all the major Latin poets along with

Greek poetry and most of the main historical writers of the third and fourth

centuries. Despite paring the Historia Augusta's main sources down to six

major works in his conclusion, Barnes' entire study demonstrates that Its

author had knowledge of, and was probably drawing upon, a vast number of

other histories2. Therefore it seems to me Illogical to claim that while

Ignotus "could no doubt consult archives, documents, inscriptions. The habit

of erudite enquiry was nothing novel", the author of the Historia Augusta is

simply assumed to have relied on this one unkown and unheralded source --

especially since he names his secondary source, Marius Maximus 29 tirnes.

As Green said:

It is certainly neater for Ignotus to be the HA's main source and Maximus a quarry for addition5,

but perhaps too neat for a writer who in the Life of Hadrian can not merely duplicate but

1, Barnes, $ouces of HA, 18,

2, For the main sources of the SHA see below, p,14f.

3, Syme, Eiperors and Biography, 41 & 461 Barnes, lOU,—7-

M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Introduction

quadruplicate material, and who uses Victor both in his main narrative and for additions

thereto

I find it difficult to reconcile the the concept of a single main source

for the early Vitae of the Historia Augusta with the idea that for the

later Vitae, their author is assumed to have used at least six named sources

and can be argued to have knowledge of almost every known historian from

the third and fourth centuries AD (even writing in opposition to the

annalistic history of Ammianus Marcellinus) -- especially since he is so

obviously familiar with the poets of the early Principate. Would it not be

neater to discard the ad hoc hypothesis of Inotus in favour of a simpler

hypothesis which takes into account the Scriptor Historiae Augustae's obvious

erudition?

Millar observed that:

It was indeed the attempt at originality of form, as opposed to that of content, which was

characteristic of ancient historians; the essential thing was not the discovery of new facts 1 but

the retelling of known facts in a certain style,2

Is this not exactly what the Historia Augusta has achieved: the retelling

of known facts in the new form of 'historical romance'? Perhaps Ignotus was

the Scriptor Historiae Augustae himself; a "sober biographer" who discovered

that his dry and lifeless accounts were better received when the salacious

material of Marius Maximus was grafted on. After trying his hand at some

sensationalism of his own, he found he had a taste for it, getting "bolder

and better, ending with elegant parody of erudition and polite letters."

This, in essence, is Syme's view, with the postulate of Ignotus removed. In

1, Green, review of Barnes in JRS69 (1979), 227f,

2, Millar, Study of Cassius Di4 28,

3, Syme liperors and Biography, 76,—8-


deference to the scholarship of both he and Barnes, Ignotus as a source for

the His toria Augusta cannot be discounted out of hand, but the evidence in

favour of him is not yet strong enough to eradicate all doubt.

Having examined the likelihood and influence of these lost histories, we

can now begin to look at the known sources for the period. The literary

authorities will be examined In chronological order, by century, and will be

followed by a discussion of other types of evidence.

THE THIRD CENTURY

Cassius DIO Coccelanus was a senator whose conservative and

uncontroversial attitudes gained him a series of important posts during the

reign of Severus Alexander. Born at Nicaea In Bithynia circa 163/4, he

received a classical education and entered the Senate in the final years of

Commodus. His history, in eighty books, composed between 197 and 219 (the

first ten years were spent making notes> covered the history of Rome from

its foundation up to AD 222, with a brief epilogue going up to AD 229, and

was written in his native Greek. He was in a position to witness events at

Rome from c.180 until 214 (when he spent the winter at Nicomedia) and from

216-218. His account is that of a politically aware man, circumspect enough

to curry favour with the power of the time 1 , and Is concerned mainly with

the actions of emperors. Detailed expositions of policies and wars are only

undertaken where he disagreed with them, and are often subject to hearsay

evidence (though he does seem to have made some effort at verification). As

such, he is a good indicator of the opinions of a conservative senator in the

I, He sent a pamphlet of prophetic dreams and portents predicting Severus' accession to the

emperor on his coming to power: i11ar, Study of Ca5sius Duo (1963), 16 & 24,

-9-


early third century AD. The text of his history is preserved only in books

XXXVI-LXIV. Books LXXIII-LXXX, which narrate events after 180 survive only

in fragments and epitomes. Exerpts appear in the Exerpta of Constantinus

Porphyrogenitus and the epitomes of Xiphilinus and Zonaras, of which

Xiphilinus is the more literal but Zonaras seems the more reliabl&.

I-iERODIAN was a contemporary of Cassius Din, who wrote a history of his

own time, from the death of Marcus Aurelius to the accession of Gordian III

(AD 180-238), also in Greek. He specifically states that he had a personal

share in some of the events he portrays during his imperial and public

service, which has prompted some debate as to his position and status. He

was probably an equestrian civil servant of some indeterminate intermediate

grade. His place of origin is equally obscure, and "by an unsatisfactory

process of elimination" western Asia Minor presents Itself as the least

unlikely location. Despite his claim to have checked all his information, his

chronology is at times confused, and he contains some errors of geography

and fact. Nevertheless, certain parts of his text are demonstrably superior

to Dio2.

The lost biographies of MARIUS MAXIMUS are independently attested in

Ammianus MarcellInus and elsewher&'. A senator and general of Septimlus

Severus against Pescennius Niger, he achieved high office, gaining the

consulate for the second time in AD 223. He began writing after March 222,

and is believed to have written twelve biographies of the main emperors from

I, i11ar, Study or Cassius D14 passim; Barnes, Sources of //4 Blf; on the date of writing cf,

Bowersock in 6noion3l (1965), 471ff contra Millar,

2, Whittaker, Introduction to the Loeb edition of Herodian (1969); Barnes, op, cit,, 82ff,

3, Ammianus XIYIII . 4 . 14, The scholiast on Juvenal mentions him in IV53, and the SHA mentions

him 29 times,

—10-

M,C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Introduction

Nerva to Elagabalus. The contention that he was the main source for the

Historia Augusta up to Elagabalus has been disproven by Syme and Barnes, who

have shown that he was used in a secondary capacity, though it seems that

he was probably the main source for the HaZiogabalus'.

P. Herennius DEXIPPIJS was prominent in Athenian city politics during the

mid-third century. Probably an equestrian (he was styled xptwtoç by IG

112 3670), he held several posts, the most important of which was Eponymous

Archon. He wrote three works, of which the latter two, the Chronica and the

Scyt hi ca, were accounts of the history of his day. The Chronica was an

annalistic history as far as the reign of Claudlus (or possibly Aurelian),

while the Scythica was an account of the Gothic wars in which he himself had

played a minor part 2 . Sadly, both only survive in fragments and epitomes,

and "we have to proceed largely on a priori assumptions to determine which

fragments of Dexippus relating to this period come from which of his two

major worksltB. His work forms the basis of the epitome of Zosimus down to

270, when his continuator Eunaplus takes over. Eunapius praised him for his

analytical methods in the writing of his history4.

THE FOURTH CENTURY

Sextus Aurelius VICTOR, an African probably of equestrian birth, was the

first and most independent of the fourth century Latin epitomators. He

1, Syme, A,ii,ianus and the I/A 89ff; Eaperors and 8iography, 45ff & 113ff; Birley, SeptialusSeei'us,' the African taperer (1971), 309ff; Barnes, Sources of the HA, 99ff.

2, He led a small band of 2000 Athenians in a guerrilla war against the Heruli after they had

sacked Athens in AD 267, Dexippus frag,28 reproduces an address to these troops attributed to

himself: Millar, 'P, Herrenius Dexippus', IRS 59 (1969), 26ff1 speech translated on 27f,

3, Millar, op. cit, 1 23,

4, Eunapius frag,l; on Dexippus, Millar, op. cit, 1 12ff esp,2Off; PLREDexippas2,

—11-


composed his Liber de Caesar-i bus some time between AD 358 and 360.

Dufraigne does not believe that he drew upon the KG, but can offer no

concrete refutation. A pagan and an admirer of Julian, his main

preoccupat ions were the decline of moral standards and the barbarisation of

the army, which obtrude strongly from his work. His villains were the

persecutors of the Senate (except Severus who was a fellow African), though

he does not hesitate to blame the Senate for its own downfall. Often

sloppy, he added to the mistakes of the KG, most obviously with the

attribution of the Constitutio Antoniniana to Marcus Aurelius1.

EUTROPIUS, a fellow pagan, served under lulian and attended his eastern

campaign. He dedicated his Breviariurn ab Urbe Condita to the emperor Valens

no later than 369 (deduced from the office held, given on the title page).

It is believed that he reproduces the text of the KG virtually unchanged2.

FESTUS OF Tridentum produced a Breviarium also dedicated to Valens.

Eadie believes that Eutropius was the only possible main source for the

entire Breviarium, which dates it to the late 360s; possibly as late as 372,

since Tomlin has shown that the ommission of Valentia from his provincial

list proves nothing about the dating, there being no allusion in the work to

events after the accession of' Valens in AD 364. Books XX-XXIV cover our

period, and probably used the KG among other unspecified sources3.

Two other epitomes deserve mention. Jerome's Chronicle is a translation

of the Chronicle of Eusebius, produced in 380/1. He has added to the church

history by excerpting passages from Victor and Eutropius. Barnes' arguments

1. Dufralgne, Aurelius 'ictor,' Livre des Csars (1975), Introduction, xvff,2, Watson, Justin, Cornelius Nepo5 end Eutropius (1897), Introduction, xivff Dessau in /Iree5 24

(1889), 361ff; Barnes, Sources of H 90ff esp,90 n2,

3, Eadie, The 8reviuriui of Festu5 (1967), 1ff, 70ff & 88ff; reviewed by Barnes in /RSS8 (1968),263ff; Tomlin, 'Date of the 'Barbarian Conspiracy'', Britanpia5 (1974), App,B, 308f,

—12-

M,C.IbeJl: C3 Army. Introduction

concerning the KG and the Historia Augusta seem to me to show that the

Historia Augusta was drawing on Jerome, who had probably independently used

the KG 1 . Finally, the anonymous Epitome de Caesaribus is a series of

biographies from Augustus to Theodoslus, which draws heavily upon the Liber

of Victor for its early biographies, often simply transcribing him. Its later

sources are arguable, but probably included the KG and Marius Maxlmus among

others2.

Two lost histories are known from the century; one of them being the

lost books of Ammianus Marcellinus. These were written between 382 and 397,

continuing the annalistic history of Tacitus down to Aminianus' day in thirty

one books. Books I-XIII have perished, and Book XIV begins in AD 353, which

suggests that his treatment of the history before his time was cursory at

best. In the preface to Book XV, Ammianus states that he had related events

he himself had been able to witness or he that had ascertained by careful

questioning; the inference being that prior to Constantine, his knowledge

(and therefore his history) would have been sketchy. There is no hint of the

lost books' survival in any other sources.

The other lost history was by EUNAPIUS of Sardis. A pagan apologist, he

wrote a Vita Sophistorum in direct opposition to the popular Lives of the

Saints, which continued Dexippus from AD 270-404. Two versions of his

history were known. Barnes would like Eunapius to be a source for the

1, Barnes, SoQrces of /1 90, 94 & esp,96 point I, t'ita Aiexano'd IV . 5, XXlY3 & XXVI.9correspond almost directly with Jerome C/iro, p215i & p,215d in Helm's edition, but differ slightlyfrom the other epitomes, According to Barnes, the first clause of XXVI • 9 corresponds word for word

with Jerome,

2, Dufraigne, Livre des Césars, xvii; Barnes, op. cit,, 94,3, Syme, 4aajanus and the H,, chil, Sf f; Matthews, Roaan Lap/re of Aaiiarnis (1989), ch,II,

esp,27ff, he rejects the Tacitean connection,

4, Photios BIb!, 77,

-13-


Historia Augusta, and so argues that the first of these works was completed

circa AD 380, and acted as a source not only for the Historia Augusta but

for Aznmianus. The latter case had been argued by earlier scholars 1 . The

argument is sound, and I can find no reason to doubt the hypothesis. One

need not even demolish the two references to events following AD 380, as

Barnes endeavours to do, since it is equally valid to maintain that Eunapius

added these to his second version. As the continuator of Dexippus, Eunapius

was used by Zosiinus to continue his history after 270,

THE HISTORIA AUGUSTA

It is now generally accepted that the professed date and authorship of

the Sc.ript ores Historlae Augustae (SHA) cannot be trusted. They were

probably all the work of one man s', writing during the late fourth century,

perhaps some time after 395. A series of sensationalist biographies

stretching from the emperor Hadrian to the emperor Car-us, their author has

been characterised as "a kind of rogue scholiast", both mischievous and

erudite, with an eclectic taste in literature and an audacious sense of

humour. A man of his time, he may have been writing in direct opposition to

the recent sober history of Anunianus, claiming to be a serious researcher

vindicating biography against history. As such, he delights in the parody of

other biographers, scourging them for their follies and fraudulence while

liberally inventing sources and creating bogus names which are at times

1, EA, Thompson in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (1970), 52; WR, Chalmers in CQNeW Series 10(1960), 156ff; A, Cameron in CQ13 (1963), 133,

2, Barnes, Sources of the H, 114ff; Matthews, Eipire of ,qasaianus, 504 n, 67,

3, The computer studies of Marriott, 'Authorship of the HA', IRS 69 (1979) are accepted as

conclusive, but see the cautionary note of Sansone, 'The Computer & the HA', .1R580 (1990),

—14-


little more than deliciously erudite puns 1 . Yet it would be wrong to discard

the SHA out of hand. Behind the historical romance, there lurks a core of

fact which can be extracted through rigorous examination, Barnes has

dissected the SHA for Just such a purpose, and while he himself admits that

he cannot always have been right, his work forms a good platform from which

to view the SHA2. Overall, a healthy scepticism should be maintained. The

SHA makes little effort to hide its mendacious nature, and faced with such

blatant falsehood, we are right in mistrusting Its information except where

independent corroboration can be achieved. Nevertheless, the list of sources

which can be attributed to it is impressive. It Is known to have used

Herodian, Menus Maximus, Dexippus, Victor and Eutropius. In addition,

influences have been detected from Eunapius and Jerome, and it was probably

familiar with the works of Dio and Ammianus Marcellinus, Two things should

be remembered. The first is that the SHA became bolder as time progressed:

the Vitae of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius are quite sober biographies, with no

more than two fictitious names between them, while the Vita Aur'eliani of

'Vopiscus' has been hailed as a masterpiece of historical fiction s. Secondly:

"Season and society at Rome fostered fraud and imposture as well as

erudition. Combining both, the author of the great hoax concords with his

own time."4 One should always bear in mind that, like most fourth century

1, eg, S//A 6ord, XXY • 6 perverts the name of Timisetheus into Misithel, 'God Hater', obviouslyJuxtaposing him with Philip the Arab, who murdered Gordian and was notoriously tolerant of the

Christians: Barnes, Sources of HA, 37,2, Barnes, op. cit,, ch4: 'The Factual Content of the Historia Augusta', 38ff3, Syme, AMM12QUS and the HA, 2f, 97ff & 192f; faperors end 8iography, 14, 36ff & 76 Barnes,

Sources of HA, 38ff, NB: even in the Aurelianus, Beneath much fluent fiction, there is a factualframework' which can be Independently corroborated: Barnes, op. cii,, 75,

4, Syme, Eøperors and Biography, 77,

—15-

M.C.Ibeji; C3 Army. Introduction

writers, the Scriptor Historiae Augustae was prone to interpret things in

terms familiar to himself and to his audience, Where the relaxed attitude of

the SHA is concerned, such terms should be treated with the greatest of

caution1.

LATER HISTORIES

Among the most important of the post-fourth century historians is the

Greek epitomator ZOSIMUS. Photios, the bibliophile, tells us that Zosimus

was a comes and advocatus fisci, and was renowned for his militant

paganism2 . He wrote his Nea Historia in the late fifth or early sixth

century, using Eunapius as his source for events between 270 and 404. Since

Eunapius was the continuator of Dexippus, it is assumed that Dexippus was

the source for events prior to 270, and there does seem to be a marked

emphasis in Zosirnus' history of the mid third century on the Gothic wars in

which Dexippus had such a personal interest. Photios charges him with being

a slavish copyist, and there are several examples within his work of this

mindless approach leading to contradictions. This serves us well, for it

suggests that what Zosimus has chosen to record is close to his original

sources. Unfortunately, the carelessness of his compilation at times makes

it difficult to construct a clear chronology. His major themes are the

I, The most useful and informative bibliography of research on the SHA is to be found in Barnes,

Sources of // ch,3: 'Bibliographical Excursus', 23ff, My own view of the SHA has been defined byBarnes 1 op. cit,; and Syme, Qtwianus and /e HA (1968), and Eeperors and 9iograp/iy (1971), Ny

disagreements with them on sources have been outlined in the text above & p,Gff, Honor&, 'Scriptor//isforiae Augustee', IRS 77 (1987), 156ff argued that the SHA was a sort of Aesopian history, writingpolitical fables, Such a possibility fits easily with the mischievous nature of the SHA,

2, Phot, 8Th), 98,

3, Most markedly his critical opinion of Stilicho in Book V, when he is drawing on Eunapius,

contrasted with the mildly eulogistic approach of the same subject In V34 after he had switched to

Olympiodorus,

—16-


decline of paganism and the barbarisation of the empire, both of which he

saw as contributing to the downfall of the western empire. The close

similarity of some of his passages to parts of the SHA is best explained by

the reliance of both on Dexippus. There is no indication that Zosimus was

using the SHA as a source1.

loannes ZONARAS produced an epitome of history from Creation to AD

1118, which drew upon Dio and Eusebius among others. Direct comparison

between his work and Dio shows that he was adept at condensing his material

whilst retaining the sense. The contents of his Book XII, covering events in

the mid third century, serve as a useful confirmation of other histories2.

Other later historians with information pertinent to our subject are:

Giorgius Syncellus, writing in the ninth century and drawing on Dexippus and

Eusebius; Giorgius Cedrenus (Kedrenos), writing in the late eleventh century;

loannes Malalas from the sixth century, who contains some useful information

about the east; and his contemporary Jordanes, whose Getica provides material

concerning the Gothic wars. Confirmation of related events can be found

from a host of minor historians, among them Orosius (C5), Petrus Patricius

(C6) and loannes Antiochus (C7).

OTHER DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL

At first glance, the Notitia Dignitatum and the Epitoma Rel Militaris of

Vegetius would seem a godsend to military students of the third century,

1, Ridley, Zosii,us,' New History, Byzantina Australiensia 2 (1982), Introduction; CAM XII (1939),711; Paschoud, Zosias,' Histoire Nouvelle (1971), Introduction; Barnes, Sources of HA, 111,

2, CAM XII, 712 & 722f; Millar, Cassius Oi 2f & App,1 on 195ff,3, CAMXII I 711ff,

-17-


yet they should both be treated with the utmost caution if the mistakes of

the pioneers in the field are not to be repeated.

The NOTITIA DIGNITATUM Oranlurn tam Civiliurn quam Miii tai-ium is in

essence a fourth century army list, probably compiled just after the division

of AD 395'. It lists the administrative and military posts within the

empire, giving the titles of all units under each specified military command,

and has long been a standard point of reference for late Roman military

specialists. For our purposes, it suffers from several disadvantages. The

first and most obvious is that it is a late fourth or eary fifth century

document, coming after the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. As such,

its value for third century research is severely limited. It is invaluable as

an indicator of the survival into the later Roman army of units

independently corroborated in the third century, but it can tell us nothing

about the origins of any units in its lists. This seemingly obvious caveat

has all too often been overlooked in the quest for the army of the third

century. Its second major disadvantage is that it is incomplete, and what we

have Is an agglomeration of entries from disparate and indeterminate dates.

It is also simply a bare list of unit names, which can tell us little about

their composition. It is a useful corroborative tool, allowing us to project

what we know about the third century army into the later Roman empire, and

to see how It developed; but it cannot be used as a starting point in the

1, A comparison of 5hield devices for the two western Praesental armies shows that their division

had occurred recently enough for an almost exact correlation between them to remain, This split fits

neatly with the division of the army for Theodosius' campaign against Eugenius in 394: Matthews, pers,

coim, cf, also van Berchem, 4r,e de Dioc/fien,,, (1952), 7 and Jones, LRE III (1964), App2,

—18-


search for the army one-and-a-half centuries in its past1.

The Epitorna Rel Militaris of VEGETILJS is a military manual produced some

time after AID 383. It has extremely limited value, and is notable only for

its representation of an antiqua legio which has only come into serious

question in recent decade&2.

EPIGRAPHY

Given the second-hand nature of most of our literary information, the

evidence of inscriptions has taken on paramount importance in this study. A

thorough review of CIL, ILS, AE and IGRR has been supplemented with the

more parochial collections of RIB, IGBR and other local corpora. In all

cases, reference has been made to the major collections in preference, so

that the material presented In this study is easily accessible to everyone.

Only when important evidence would otherwise be missed has recourse been

made to the local archives.

The material gathered is most useful when examining military careers,

terminology or unit deployment; but even here its information is limited.

For example, when talking about vexillations, it can be used to chart their

developing importance throughout the century; but it can shed little light

upon the vexed question of numbers, nor can it give any but a general

indication of the age of the units concerned. The presence of a unit on a

datable inscription gives a usable terminus post quem, but this is no

I, Van Berchem, Ariie de Dioclëtien,,,, 7ff, 94ff & 117; Seeck, Notitia Dignitatuas (1962),Praefatio; Jones, LRE III, App 2; ed, Goodburn & Bartholemew, Aspects of the Notitia Oignitafua. BARS15 (1976),

2, cf, Appi: 'The Antique Leg/oaf Vegetius',

—19-


more than a date of first appearance. Simply because, for instance, a

vexillat ion appears in Aquileia under Philip the Arab, we cannot say with any

certainty that it was placed there by that emperor. The presence of

different vexillations in the area prior to Philip might indicate that, at

some time between their attestation and the attestation of the units under

Philip, they were replaced; however, it might equally be true that the units

existed side-by-side with one another, and that one is simply not mentioned

on the other's inscription. The greater probability is that the units

changed, given the known penchant of the Roman military for naming all units

present in the area on such dedications. This probability increases when we

have separate instances of multiple units named on inscriptions, and the

names of these units change. Therefore, we can say with some degree of

certainty that units A and B were in Aqulleia under, say, the Seven, and

were probably replaced by the time of Philip by units C and D. However, if

the inscription is fragmentary (as, in fact, all vexillary inscriptions from

Aquileia are), we can never be sure that the names of units A and B have not

simply been lost, though the odds are against this.

The above discussion highlights two of the main problems with third

century inscriptions. Most are fragmentary and at times difficult to

interpret, and this exacerbates the already awkward problem of dating. For

the early Principate, a whole series of useful markers have been established

to aid the dating of inscriptions, especially tombstones. The development of

formulas such as IOM, DM and HSE on early imperial tombstones has been

charted and enables one to say with a certain degree of accuracy into what

era a stone can be fitted'. No such complementary conventions developed

1, On such criteria cf, Holder 1 Studies in the Auxilia of the Roaan Arsiy, BAR S70 (1980), 16Sf,—20-


during the third century, other than the placing of the imperial gentilicium

in the genitive after the name of a military unit, While this can be a very

useful aid to dating, often placing an inscription within the limited span of

a third-century emperor's short reign, it has its limitations. Units were

sometimes tardy at changing the gentillc.ium, and in the case of the

gentilicium 'Antoniniana', It could date anytime from AD 198, when Caracalla

became co-emperor with Septimius Severus, to AD 222, the death of Elagabalus

who may also have used the name. It does not help either that several

emperors suffered the damnatio memoriae during our period, so that we

sometimes find the name of an emperor erased from an inscription, and have

more than one option when trying to restore it.

Attempts to date Inscriptions on stylistic grounds have been accepted

within this study only as a last resort, and with severe reservations. The

characteristics of stonecutting which are used for such dating, in particular

the degenerate, ligature-strewn style which is often associated with third

century inscriptions, are not of themselves a strong enough basis upon which

to date most stones. Bad workmanship can be as much a function of regional

variation as It can of the era in which the stone was produced. While It is

true that the quality of stoneworking seems to have degenerated during the

century, sloppy inscriptions are not unique to the period by any means.

Such problems have combined with a decline in the number of inscriptions

extant for the century to make statistical surveys almost impossible.

Discussion of the protect ores under Gallienus, for instance, Is based on less

than 10 InscrIptions. The exact number cannot even be firmly set because

doubts concerning two of the inscriptions still remain 1 . Though this is the

1, Cf. C h, XI Pro tec tores,

-21-

M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Introduction

most severe example, the problem is universal. In no area of discussion

within these pages is the body of epigraphic material large enough to be

seen as a statistical sample, Yet, for the study of the legions, the Auxilia,

vexillations and equestrian officers, the epigraphic corpus Is the best and

at times the only body of evidence which we have. Even for the cavalry and

the limit anei it provides a valuable source of information divorced from the

fourth century perspective of the literary sources1.

PAPYRI

Where available, papyri can form an invaluable adjunct to information

gleaned from inscriptions and histories. Their occurrence is so rare and

usually so parochial that the information they provide can tell us little

about general trends (except in localised terms), but it is their very detail

that is most valuable. Virtually all our information about unit pay and

numbers comes from papyri. Usually this information occurs in Isolation with

single chance finds, but we are extremely fortunate in having a large archive

of military records from the fortress town of Dura Europos on the eastern

frontier, which came to prominence under Septimius Severus and was destroyed

in AD 256. This archive gives us a unique insight into the composition and

activities of its main garrison unit, the cohors XX Palmyrenorum. Another

important find was a series of correspondence from the military commander of

1, The decline in epitaphs during the century may be as5ociated with the decline in the value of

citizenship according to Meyer, 'Explaining the Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire: the Evidence of

Epitaphs', IRS 80 (1990), though this will not explain the falling numbers of imperial dedications or

career inscriptions (especially considering the rising status of the equestrians), Cf. also MacMullen

in .PhIj 103 (1982), 233ff and Mann in IRS 75 (1985), 204ff,

-22-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Introduction

Panopolis in the Thebaid (Egypt), dating to the reign of Diocletian, which

tells us how units in the province stood immediately after our period1.

LEGAL CODES

The rescripts of third century emperors and their jurists (mainly dating

from the Seven), preserved in the codex of Justlnlan, give us some direct

access to the thought processes of imperial policy makers. They can tell us

something about status and privilege, but are provided in a slightly

abbreviated form which sometimes makes them difficult to interpret. Nor is

it entirely clear to what extent the constant repetitition of a law was a

testimony to its waning efficacy. The Codex Theodosianus is less useful,

providing laws from 312 to 437 of which the first fifty years are

incomplete. Reading these back into the third century can cause confusion2

The great champion of numismatics was Andreas Alfdldi. Imperial coinage

was in his view a consistent tool of imperial propaganda and as such

provided a direct insight into imperial policy, and even the movements of

imperial troops. Such views can be taken too far. Numismatics has a

limited value, defined by a whole set of variables. The simultaneous minting

I, Diira Final Report V'l: The Parchments and Papyri (1959); Skeat, Papyri froi Panopol/s (1964);cf, also Fink, Rwan Military Records on PapyrUs (1971) Grenfell & Hunt, Greek Papyri II (1897);Duncan-Jones, Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', Chiron8 (1978), 541ff,

2, Most especially with reference to 1in.itanei, cf, ch,VIII: Liiitanei for more deiail,3, Alföldi in ZIN37 (1927), 158ff; Nuti, Chron,, ser,5 vol,9 (1929), 218ff; C4H XII, 713ff, cf,

also surnary of Maria Alfôldi (1957) in Cooper, C3 Origins of the Ne' .tiperial 4raty (1967), 234ff &266ff,

-23-


of different coin issues in separate mints does not prove any link between

the two, and the imperial propaganda stamped onto their reverses does not

necessarily depict the true state of affairs. Gallienus, for instance, was

minting coinage that styled him Restitutor Gal.Uarurn even as the Gallic

Empire slipped from his grasp 1 . Coin evidence is exceptionally useful in

telling us what individual emperors and usurpers deemed as important to

them, but it can only be used to tell us of the cornpostlon of armies and the

status of the empire in the most general of terms.

ARCHAEOLOGY AND ARTISTIC REPRESENTATION

Archaeology and art are of very limited use in a study such as this

which is concerned primarily with the organisation of the army and imperial

motivation. Work such as that of Strickland at Chester can give some

indication of the detailed effect of certain trends or imperial reforms that

occurred within the century, while more general surveys of archaeological

work can provide useful information, such as the detailed changes in Roman

military equipment, or an empirewide overview of fortification trends. Like

papyri, most archaeological evidence is extremely parochial in nature2.

The artistic record is only really useful when talking about Roman

military equipment. It is dominated by the monumental art of the columns of

Trajan and Marcus Aurelius, and the triumphal arches of Sept imius Severus,

Constantine and Galerius; but often more useful information can be gleaned

1, Orinkwaier, The 6allic Eapirej 1/istoria 52 (1987), 157,

2, Strickland, 'Third Century Chester', BAR S109, 415ff; Coulsion, 'Roman Military Equipment on

Third Century Tombstones', BAR S336, 143f & nil concentrates on the archaeological record von

Petrikovits, 'Fortifications in the North-Western Roman Empire', JRS61 (1971), 180ff,

-24-


from depictions on tombstones and elsewhere. Of specific usefulness is the

graffito of' a Persian clibanar'ius from Dura Europos, and some of the

illustrations in the Notitia Dignitatum depict late Roman equipment1.

This has been a brief overview of the main sources of evidence for the

Roman army in the period under discussion, examining their usefulness and

limitations. Certain pieces of evidence, such as the testimony of Galeri on

the plague of Marcus Aurelius, or the Res Gestae Dlvi Saporis, have been left

out of the equation as pertaining only to very specific circumstances (such

as a discussion of the plague, or the capture of Valerian).

Our examination of the trends begins with a narrative history, which

outlines the paramaters of' the period under discussion and seeks to place

the major trends and events within their chronological framework.

1, Couleton, op. cit. (above),—25-

PART 1:

Th TrrkcI

M.C,Ibeji, C3 Army

I: STORIA

On 28 March AD 193, the emperor P. Helvius Pertinax was murdered by the

Praetorian Guard, who immediately put the empire up for auction, The

highest bidder was one M. Didius Julianus, an elderly senator whose ambition

was only exceeded by his wealth. His price was 25,000 sesterces to each

member of the Guard, Julianus was not a popular emperor. Within a month,

both the governors of Syria and Pannonia Superior had been proclaimed in

opposition by their legions 1 and the latter, L. Septimius Severus, was

marching on Rome.

The city mob stood by and watched as Julianus desperately barricaded

himself in the palace, not even commanding the power to arrange the city's

defence, and was finally condemned to death by the Senate and executed. A

deputation of 100 senators met Severus in his camp at Interamna, 50 miles

north of Rome, of ferring him the purple, which he graciously accepted. He

*, To avoid endless repetition, the main secondary works referred to for this history are cited

here: Aitheim, Die $ojdatenkaiser (1939); van Berchem, L'Ar,áe de Dioc.látien,, (1952), pt,I;Besnier, L'Eapire Roiain de l'avennet#ent des &vères au Candle o'e Nftée (1937), 169ff; Birley, A, R,,Marcus Aurelius (1966), The African Fiperor,' Septiiius Severus (1988); The Ceabridge Ancient History(hereafter CAM), vol,XI (1936) & vol. XII (1939), esp, Alfãldi, Enssljn, Mattingly & Miller in CA/I X11

Dc Blois, The Policy of the Eperor Gaiiienus (1976), ch,1 & 2; Dc Regibus, La Monarchic Militare diGallieno (1939); Demougeot, La foreation de l'Europe (1969); Drinkwater, The eallic Eipie, Historic52 (1987); Grosse, Roat/sche Militärgeschichte von 6aliienus bis zuat Beginn der 8yzantinischenTheaverfassung (1920); Jones, A,H,M,, The Later Roatan Lipire (1964) (hereafter LRE), 'The Anarchy' &Decline of the Ancient florId (1966), ch,2; Jones & Martindale, Prosopography of the Later Roatan (aspire(1971) (hereafter PLRE); Luttwak, The 6rand Strategy of the Roasan Eapire (1976), ch,3; MacMullen,Enea'ies of the Roatan Order (1966); Manni, L'Iepero di Gallieno (1949); Mocsy, Pannonia and (/ppeHoesia (197fl, 184ff; Platnauer, The Life and Reign of the Emperor Lucius Septimius Severus (1918);Syme, Emperors and 6'iogaphy (1971), ch,9-15; Williams, Olocletian and the Roman Recovery (1985), ch,1,2 & 7,

All primary sources discussed in the introduction have also been used, Further reference to

•inor works both primary and secondary, will be found in the relevant sections of the main thesis,

Cross reference has only been made here to the most controversial subjects,

- 26 -

M.C,Ibeji: 03 Army. Historia

entered Rome at the head of his Danube legions, making a point of changing

from military regalia Into civilian dress at the gates of the city, and set

about the consolidation of his position. The Praetorians, who had been the

fickle arbiters of the empire's fate, were disbanded and punished, with

selected veterans from the loyal Danube legions taking their place. So began

the reign which officially heralds the start of the third century; but the

roots of that century's troubled history lie some thirty years before, with

the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

What follows Is a general history of the major events in the third

century which pertain In some way to the development of the Roman army. In

essence it is a bare bones account. No effort at analysis has been made,

for it is simply intended to provide a chronological background against which

the discussion that follows can be set, avoiding continual historical asides.

Marcus Aurelius was a conscientious ruler. A stoic, a philosopher, and

peaceful man, he inherited an empire on the brink of crisis. After years of

peace, the empire's complacency was about to be shattered by a wave of

disasters which would send it staggering into the third century poorly

prepared for the troubles that lay ahead, Within a year of his accession,

the Parthians had invaded Armenia, there were disturbances on the Antonine

Wall and in Germany, and the Marcomanni had begun stirring on the borders of

the Upper Danube.

Remaining In Rome, presumably to oversee events in the west, Marcus

despatched his co-emperor, Julius Verus, east to deal with the Parthian

threat, Despite his lack of experience, Verus was able to push the Parthians

out of Armenia and pursue them to the gates of their capital, Ctesiphon, but

in the ensuling seige his army contracted a plague which forced him to

withdraw, bringing the pestilence back into the empire, where it was to rage

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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Historia

sporadically for the next 15 years, almost certainly weakening the empir&.

In the wake of this disaster came the uprising of the Marcomanni which

had been looming since the start of the reign. Prompted by population

pressures from within and exacerbated by the southward movement of the

northern barbarian tribes, the Marcomannic movement took advantage of the

recent weakening of the frontiers and poured over the Danube 2 , penetrating

as far as Italy, and prompting the recruitment of two new legions, II and III

Italica, as well as the conscription of slaves and gladiators into the

province's defence, The ensuing wars dragged on for 13 years (AD 167-180),

and were fought by Rome largely with legionary detachments (vexillations)

commanded by equestrian officers3.

Marcus died in 180 -- just before the final push intended to settle the

Marcomannic question once and for all. His work was abandoned by his son,

Commodus, whose reign witnessed another plagued. His successor, Pertinax,

ruled for 87 days before his murder by the Praetorian Guard and the events

which ushered in the reign of Septimius Severus.

After a series of wars in which he eradicated his opposition and

bloodied the nose of Parthia, which had laid seige to Nisibis in 196, Severus

set about reorganising the empire to meet the challenges that faced it. In

the east, he created the new province of Mesopotamia, placing it into the

charge of equestrian officers instead of senators, and garrisoned it with two

1, On the severity of the plague, cf, chil: Manpower, p,47ff, and Duncan-Jones, Structwre and

caie in the R,ien Econoiy (1990), 72ff; contra Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus urelius', 14/Phil 73

(1961), 227ff Roiian Any Papers (1986) 229ff who doubts its severity,2, On the causes of the Marcoannic wars, cf, Mócsy, op. cii, (p26 n,1),

3 cf, chh,VI & X: Yex/Ilationes & Yi p! Militares for further discussion,4, Dio LXXIII . 14 . 3-4 (Loeb ed),

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Historia

of his newly raised Farthian legions 1 . The third, II Part hi ca, he brought

back to Italy, and placed in Albanum, just outside Rome, where it

complemented the newly revamped and increased Praetorian Guard 2. He

increased the garrison of Africa, possibly in response to trouble from the

native tribes, and revitalised the Auxilia with ethnic units mainly drawn

from Moorish and Osrhöenian contingents. In order to make army service more

attractive, he granted several new privileges to soldiers, among them the

right to marry and to wear the gold ring. He also began to split the

larger provinces, ensuring that no governor had more than 2 legions under

his command, in an attempt to prevent the events of 193-199 recurring;

though this was done in a haphazard fashion and was probably not completed

until the reign of Caracalla (see below).

After 199, his reign was relatively peaceful. There was some trouble in

Africa and possibly Egypt, and he had to deal with the depredations of a

brigand named Bulla Felix in 206/7, but his final campaign in Scotland may

have had as much to do with keeping his bickering sons occupied as it did

with any serious troubled . He died in York in 211, adjuring his sons not to

disagree among themselves, give money to the soldiers, and despise everyone

else.

The animosity between the siblings made the first injunction impossible

to uphold. Caracalla murdered his brother Geta at the feet of their mother

1, Cf. chh,IV & I: Legiones & 'iri Mu/fares for the Parthian legions and the role of theequestrians.

2, On II Part/iica ci, ch,IV: Lepione5, p,85ff; on the Praetorians cf, Durry 1 Co/ortesPrâtorienne5 (1938), 81ff.

3, In addition to various works cited above (p26 n,1), see Birley, 'Septimius Severus and the

Roman Army', Ep, Stud, 8 (1969), 63ff,4, Her, 111 . 14 . 1; Murphy 1 The Reipn of $'everus froø the E yidence of Inscriptions (1945), 77;

Miller, CAI/XII, 38f; Saiway, Poean Britain (1981), 223 & 227,

- 29 -


in 212; but he religiously followed the rest of his father's advice.

Donatives and pay increase8 were given to the soldiers, and he surrounded

himself with a German bodyguard called the Leones. It was probably he and

not Severus who oversaw the partition of Britain and Pannonia', while the

most important act of his reign was the institution of the Constitutlo

Antonin.Lna, which granted the citizenship to almost all members of the

empire and which was to have unforseen long-term effects upon the army2.

Apart from a short German war, the first Roman contact with the new

Alemannic confederation, Caracalla's main military concern was an abortive

invasion of Parthia. After several false starts, he was murdered on the

march towards the Euphrates, and for want of a better candidate, the purple

was conferred by the army onto his Praetorian Prefect, Macrinus. The reign

of this, the first equestrian emperor, was as ignominious as it was short.

Apart from experimenting with the armour of his Praetorians3 , he did nothing

of note. He suffered a reverse against the Parthians near Nisibis, and when

a young scion of the Severan dynasty, the priest-king Elagabalus, was raised

in opposition by the women of the Severan household, he was defeated,

captured arid executed. Elagabalus reigned for 4 short years (218-222)

before he too was maneovred out of the purple by the Severan matriarchs who

had tired of his excesses, transferring their favour onto his cousin, Severus

Alexander. The relative peace during the reigns of these last two

1, Graham, 'The Division of Britain', /R556 (1966), 92ff; Miller, CAHIll, 48; Murphy, SeverusIrca Inscriptions, 43f; Môcsy, Pannonia Ipper Iloesia, 198f; Fitz, Great Age of Pannonia (1982),50ff; cf, ch,V: Auxilia, 21f,

2, Salmon, 'The Roman Army and the Disintegration of the Roman Empire', Trans. R, 5cc, Can, 52,ser,3 sec,2 (1958), 56fl watson, The Ropian Soldier (1969), 137,

3, Dio LXXIX'37 . 4, This is indicative of the changing style of Roman armour, first seen in AD

211: Coulston, 'Roman Military Equipment on Third Century Tombstones', BAR 3336 (1987), 141ff esp,143;Robinson, Ar,our of Iriperial Poaie (1975), 183, NB Maximinus still seems to be using the old Romanorder of battle in 238, Her, VIIl•12-3,

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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Historia

representatives of the Severan dynasty was the calm before a storm of

mounting crises.

Forces in the east had been massing against the empire since the start

of the third century, exacerbated in part by the actions of the Roman

emperors themselves. The waning prestige of the Parthian Arsacid régime had

not been helped by its reverses against Verus and Septimius Severus, and the

activities of the Seven and Macrinus had served to distract the Parthian

emperor's attention from vital events occurring within his southern

provinces. The new Sassanid dynasty of the kingdom of Persis in southern

Iran had been consolidating Its power base to such an extent that in the

years between 224- and 227, the Sassanid Ardashir I was able to defeat the

Parthian emperor Artabanus V and replace the Arsacid with the Sassanid

empire. This was much more dangerous than the complacent Parthian empire

had been. Centred around the state religion of Zoroastrianism, the Sassanid

state was vigorous and expansionist, dedicated to regaining the lands of

Syria and Asia Minor which it regarded as Persia's by right, since the great

days of the Achaemenid hegemony. This aim was to be pursued with single-

minded purpose from AD 232 onwards, interrupted only by internal struggles

and events on the eastern frontiers of Persia.

Meanwhile, the northern barbarian tribes had rearranged themselves into

large confederations of Marcomanni, Alemanni and Franks, seemingly intended

to coordinate attacks against the Roman empire 1 . This was prompted in part

by pressures from the northern steppes, as Gothic tribes, themselves pushed

1, PrestIge accrued through contact with the eapire may have had something to do with the

confederating process also, as tribal groups gathered around particularly influential leaders,

- 31 -


west by a realignment of the Hunnic Hsiung-Nu and Sien-Pi in Mongolia,

penetrated to the Roman frontiers, pushing Vandals, Cerpi and luthungi before

them. The late Antonines had encountered the first of these realignments in

the Marcomanni. Now groups of Goths, Carpi and Vandals flooded over the

Danube looking for loot and land, prompting the reinforcement of Illyricuin

from other frontiers, which in turn were penetrated by opportunistic raids of

Franks and Alemanni. The whole Rhine and Danube limes became a series of

unpiuggable salients over which barbarians would pour the minute their

defences were relaxed,

Severus Alexander was murdered by his troops in the wake of an

unsuccessful Persian war for trying to negotiate with the Alemanni. His

death and its aftermath exemplified the forces which were to dominate the

empire's fate for most of the century. His successor, Maximinus Thrax, was a

soldier proclaimed by the troops, and was frustrated In his attempts to curb

the barbarian invasions by the advent of civil war. From 235 onwards, the

leaders of the empire were to spend most of their time on campaign, either

against barbarians, Persians, or their own subjects. Until Gallienus came on

the scene, they were to have no time in which to reform the defences of the

empire, and many of their successes would be rendered null and void by the

actions of their Immediate successors,

Maximinus Thrax (235-238) was forced to cut short a successful Danube

campaign to fight the Senate in Italy. Their ultimate candidate, Gordian III

(238-244) was a minor dominated by his Praetorian Prefect, Timesitheus,

whose successes against the Persians were thrown away by his successor,

Philip the Arab, who abandoned all Rome's gains in the east to rush west and

secure his claim to the purple. Philip (244-249) saw the millennium of Rome

ushered in by a domino sequence of barbarian invasions, usurpations and

- 32 -


mutinies all along the Danube. When his agent, Decius, succeeded In

restoring order, he had the purple forced upon him by the mutinous troops he

had been sent to discipline and Philip proved unable to stand against him.

Decius (249-251) was outmaneovred and killed by a dangerous new

confederation of the Gothic tribes, led by the charismatic Kniva. His

successor, Trebonlanus Gallus (25 1-253), was in no position to stop the

Goths returning home loaded with booty. During his reign, plague hit the

empire once again, and was to recur at regular intervals over the next 25

years killing one emperor and forestalling at least one campaign. In 253,

the usurpation of ft Aemilius Aemilianus was swiftly followed by the

usurpation of P. Llcinius Valerianus, and in the civil war that followed,

Valerian came out alive.

He inherited chaos. The abandonment of the Rhine and Danube In pursuit

of civil war had left the floodgates open for Franks, Marcomanni, Quadi,

lazyges and Goths, which poured into Germany and Illyricum. In the east,

Armenia, which had been abandoned to Persian attack since Philip's volte face,

hcid finally caved In, allowing Shapor to launch a prolonged offensive against

Rome's possessions, spearheaded by his son, Hormizd. Dura-Europos on the

Euphrates was destroyed, and the Persians punched through into Syria, taking

Antioch by treachery. The chronology Is so confused that it is unclear

whether there were two separate Invasions, with Antloch sacked twice, or

whether this was one long war lasting from 253 to c.264. The only firm

anchor-point seems to be the sack of Dura, which is generally fixed at AD

2562.

1, Vict, Caes, XXX . 2, On the plague and other disasters at this time cf, ch,II: Manpower, p,50f,2, Gilliam, 'Garrison of Dura', Dura Final Report V . 1, 27; De Blois, Policy of 6allieruis, 2 &

nn,5 & 6,

- 33 -


Va].erian is believed to have been in the east from 256 at the latest,

but had done nothing, egonised by indecision caused by an inability to trust

any of his generals. Persian activity forced him into action, which may

have been partially successful, but his army was wracked by plague and he

was In no position to fight. Seeking a peaceful solution, he was lured into

a meeting with Shapor and taken prisoner in AD 259. An emperor had fallen

into Persian hands.

He had left the defence of the west under the supervision of his son,

Gallienus, who proved to be an able and innovative ruler. I-fe had partially

solved his father's problem concerning trustworthy generals by promoting

equestrian officers to the fore under imperial patronage. These vfrl

militares were career soldiers and capable commanders able to command armies

in their own right, with a debt of loyalty to their patron arid (for the

moment) without the prestige to get themselves independently proclaimed by

their troops. With their help, and using a series of strategic innovations

designed around the concept of defence-in-depth, Gallienus was able to

achieve some measure of stability in the west1.

This stability was shattered in 259 with the news of Valerian's capture.

Gallienus had been distancing himself from his father since 257, now he

broke completely with his memory, but the empire-wide reaction against the

disaster-tainted régime was violent and hostile. In the east, the commanders

of Valerian's army united with Odaenathus, king of Palmyra, to rally against

the Persians, before usurping and marching into Pannonia where they were

defeated by Gallienus' most trusted general, Aureolus. Odaenathus remained

1, The measures of Gallienus and their significance have proven to be the main topic of this

study, See especially chh III, VI, X & XI: Conira Coiitatirn, 'exiIJationes, V/ri MilUares JPro fec fores,

- 34 -


in the east, ostensibly loyal to Gallierius, but now the de facto ruler of the

eastern Roman empire. Even before the coming of the Macriani from the east,

the Pannonians had expressed their resentment against what they perceived to

be the neglect of the Danube frontier in favour of the Rhine by raising two

pretenders of their own, Ingenuus and Regalianus, also put down by Aureolus.

Ironically, a similar resentment welled up in the Rhine provinces when

Gallienus was forced to move his army into Italy to deal with a dangerous

Alemannic invasion that overran the Agri Decumates and penetrated as far as

Milan. Sparked by a dispute, the causes of which are not entirely clear,

Postumus, the commander of the Rhine legions, rebelled, beseiging Gallienus'

son Saloninus in Cologne and killing him. It was a blow Gallienus was not to

forgive. The situation in Africa also seems to have become quite serious at

this point 1 . When the smoke cleared, Gallienus found himself in charge of a

sundered empire. Gaul, Spain, Britain and Germany were in the hands of the

Gallic Empire of Postumus, and the east was under the 'protection' of

Odaenathus. Only the Danube provinces, Achaea and Africa remained in

legitimate imperial hands, along with Italy. These were in a state of

turmoil.

By 263, Gallienus had stabilised the situation enough to attempt a

reckoning with Postumus. Penetrating deep into the Gallic Empire, he

defeated him on the field of battle, but the Gallic Emperor was allowed to

escape by Aureolus, It seems that only Gallienus was not convinced of his

general's guilt. Postumus was bottled up in an unspecified Gallic city, and

it seemed only a matter of time before he would be forced to surrender.

However, Fortuna was on his side. Gallienus was struck by a chance arrow,

1, cf, chX: Viri Miiitares1 p226 for discussion & references,

- 35 -


and forced to withdraw, seriously wounded. He would never regain the

opportunity to force the Gallic Empire back into the fold. Postumus was to

remain independent, faced by his own fair share of barbarian incursions and

employing remarkably similar concepts to Gallienus 1 , until killed by his

troops in 269. He was followed by a short-lived series of successors, the

last of whom, Tetricus, quite literally handed the Gallic Empire back to Rome

under Aurelian.

Gallienus seems to have been militarily quiescent in the years between

263 and 2672 . As well as recuperating from his wound, he had a host of

reforms to put in operation. It must be at this time that the

equestrianisation of the provinces was put into motion s, and in the military

sphere he strengthened the garrisons of Italy, Pannonia and Achaea, largely

at the expense of Dacia, while fortifying whichever parts of the empire

seemed to need it. Many of his measures were continued by his successors4.

In AD 267, Odaenathus of Palrnyra was murdered with the connivance of

the local Roman officials. Gallienus seemed to have been about to launch a

bid to regain control of the east, when he was forestalled by an invasion of

the Goths which swept over the Black Sea and ravaged the provinces of Asia

Minor and Achaea. Gallienus marched to meet them, defeating them at Nassus

in Moesia, but was prevented from following this up by the fateful news that

Aureolus, left in command of the cavalry at Milan to guard against the Gallic

1, Drinkwater, 'Gallic Empire', 89 cites some dubious literary evidence for Postumus' use of

barbarian mercenaries, His concept of fortification closely matches that of Gallienus, cf, chhIX &

XII: Poederati & Virfus Ilipici, plus Map 3,2, Though continued skirmishes may have occurred on the borders of the Gallic Empire: De Blois,

Policy of 6aJ)ienus, 7 & n21,3, cf, ch,X: V/ri Militare5, p220f,4, cf, chIll: Virtus Ilipid,

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army, Historia

Empire, had rebelled and declared in favour of Postumus. Once again a

crucial campaign had been stalled by treachery. Leaving command of the

Gothic war in the capable hands of his general Marcianus, Gallienus rushed

west to deal with the revolt, but was murdered in AD 268 by a cabal of his

officers as they laid seige to Milan. An excellent judge of ability,

Gallierius had proved a terrible judge of character. The man he had trusted

to defend Gaul for him had rebelled and killed his son. The man he had

trusted to guard Italy against this man's depredations had instead gone over

to his side. Now, the men he had raised from nothing to command his armies

turned against him, perhaps tired of his mistakes, perhaps feeling that now

their time had come.

The Illyrian soldier-generals of Gallienus shared a sense of comradeship

and purpose which was to serve them well. Even Aureolus surrendered to the

mercy of his peers once Gallienus was dead. Whether his execution was a

just and angry punishment for his disloyalty, or whether it was a salve to

pacify the angry troops remains unclear. Despite his successful continuation

of the Gothic war, Marcianus did not rebel either. Perhaps the troops did

not force the purple upon him, as they had done so many other emperors,

because there was an obvious soldiers' choice among the generals of

Gallienus. The candidate of the cabal, Claudius Gothicus, certainly proved

his worth against the Goths in the next two years, but was sadly cut down

by the plague in AD 270.

The soldiers' choice for his successor was his compatriot, Aurelian, who

ousted Claudius' brother, Quintillus, to carry on the line of Gallienus'

generals, employing the techniques they had developed with their mentor.

During his rule, Dacia was finally abandoned and two new provinces, Dacia

Ripensis and Dacia Mediterranea, were carved out of Moesia and Thrace. With

- 37 -


this move, he was able to pacify the Balkans and Pannonia, rationalising the

frontier and preparing the ground for the reconquest of Palmyra.

Pairnyra had openly split with Rome after the death of Odaenathus. His

son, Vaballathus Athaeriodorus, was little more than the pawn of his mother

Zenobia, who had extended direct Palmyrene control throughout much of Asia

Minor, and southwards into Egypt, That the Palmyrenes were setting

themselves up as an alternative Roman empire seems in little doubt.

Vaballathus adopted Roman forms and Roman manners, maintaining a hostile

posture towards Persia and even striking coins in his name, They seem to

have enjoyed extensive support in Syria and Egypt, though the troops of

Mesopotamia joined Aurellan against them.

Aurelian marched east in 272, defeating the Palmyrene army in two

pitched battles at Irnmae and Emesa. Palmyra surrendered after a short seige

and was placed under the control of the praefectus Ivlesopotamiae, Marcellinus,

with the title rector Orientis. The city was initially treated with leniency,

but when it attempted to subvert Marcellinus, without success, Aurelian

returned at his call and sacked the city with a vengeance, destroying its

walls and carrying off its populace into slavery.

In 273, after suppressing a revolt in Egypt, Aurelian marched Into Gaul.

There, Tetricus surrendered the Gallic Empire to him without a fight, though

some token resistance was put up by Tetricus' betrayed generals. By 274,

Aurelian was able to style himself restitutor orbis, and lead the captive

heads of both breakaway empires through the city of Rome in triumph. His

attention immediately turned eastwards, where It seems he intended to deal

with the Persian menace, but he was assassinated before he could do so. A

group of officers, tricked into believing themselves on an imperial hit-list

by Aurelian's scribe (himself fearful for his life after some misdemeanour)

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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Historia

took preemptive action. It is a measure of the soldiers' firm belief in the

wrongness of his murder that they reacted to It with such revulsion, shying

away from immediately choosing a successor themselves. It is also a measure

of the weakness of the Senate that the only candidate It could come up with

at this juncture was an aged senator, Tacitus, with his half-brother Florian.

Their brief interlude was ended in 276 by the natural successor to

Aurelian, his protege, Probus, who had been In Egypt when the emperor was

murdered. He was immediately called to Gaul in response to a series of

German invasions, probably prompted by the neglect of that frontier over the

last two years, since Tacitus and Florian had been occupied In Illyricum

against the Goths before marching east to meet Probus. He was so successful

there that it is claimed he could have established a new Roman province

across the Rhine, had he not been called away to deal with troubles In

Raetia and Illyricum -- the repeat of an old refrain. In 279, he suppressed

brigandege in Isauria and put down a series of revolts in Gaul and Germany,

before celebrating a triumph In Rome In 281 and turning his attention east

as Aurelian had done. However, the soldiers were disaffected by his strict

reimposition of discipline and his Implication that their usefulness was

nearly over. He was not a soldier's soldier as the generals of Gallienus had

been. They killed him at Sirmium, en route to the east. The year was 282.

Within 2 years his successor, Carus, was dead, along with his sons, and

the purple had been taken by Diocletian. Tradition has made Diocletlan

commander of the pro tectores domes tici at the time of his accession; but the

dornestici did not exist until 350 at the earliest 1 , so this must be

1 Haldon, Byzantine Praetarians (1984), 134ff; nes LRE 636ff,

- 39 -


historical interpolation. He was probably a dux, with the title of protector,

in command of part of the army, which would explain his popularity1.

He inherited a military machine which had been extensively reshaped to

meet the new needs of imperial defence, and had withstood all the tests

thrown against it, The task was not yet over: there were uprisings in Gaul

and barbarian incursions along the Danube; but the worst was past. If he

could refine the structure he had inherited and bring an end to the

pernicious cycle of usurpation, he would guide the empire intact out of the

darkest century it had yet experienced.

A better judge of character than Gallienus, he was able to establish the

Tetrarchy with loyal colleagues, so removing for a time the prime cause of

strife within the empire. This bought him the time to initiate the

refinements of state military structure that were so vital. Hard times

were still ahead. Within 2 years, Carausius had set up a rival state in

Britain. In Illyricum, the barbarian threat had only partially abated, and in

the east the Persian empire had achieved a revival of its own under Vahram

III and was to remain a thorn in the side of Rome. Still, thanks to the

unstinting work of his predecessors, Diocletian was now in a position to face

these threats with new vigour and an army which only vaguely resembled the

one which had carried Septimius Severus to power some ninety years before.

It had been shaped by internal pressures as much as external, forced to

respond to the new demands of defence-in-depth at the same time that its

1, He was 600'Mrsa'ç, probably under Probus: Zon, XII31,

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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Hist or ia

traditional bases of manpower were drying up. It had also become more

politically aware, recognising its ability to make and break emperors, who

often came from its own ranks. Not all of the changes it underwent took the

form in the third century to which they had evolved in the fourth. What

they were, and how they developed, is what this thesis is about.

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I I: MA NP 0 WER

Throughout this dissertation, one recurrent theme underlies the whole

work. It has developed out of the individual study of each aspect of the

Roman army in the third century, and simply put, it is this: that shortage of

manpower, and the compromises which this entailed, was a unifying factor

which can be identified in almost every aspect of third century military

reform. By this, I do not mean to argue that it was the only factor; nor

that it was the most important. As we shall see, countless forces reforged

the Roman army into the shape in which it emerged from the third century AD.

Yet underlying them all was the constant awareness, mainly implicit, that the

army was stretched to its limit and that the reforms which needed to be

made, for whatever reasons, had to be implimented with this in mind.

The thesis demands a certain circularity of argument, mainly due to the

nature of the evidence. Direct demographic evidence with which to chart

such a lack of manpower is hard to come by and largely unreliable; so Eie

possibility of such a shortage is first brought to our attention by

observing its effects on Roman military reforms.

These effects have been manifold. We shall see that large-scale use of

the vexillatiori came into being during the 160s, almost as a direct result of

the plague of Marcus Aurelius'. It became the standard strategic unit of

the third century because of the need to spread the limited resources at the

1, Ch,VI: Vexiilationn, p,I3Bff, Since the campaign of Lucius Verus which is universally blamedfor bringing back the plague was the last campaign of the Antonines to employ full legions rather than

vexillations, this conclusion seems inevitable,

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M,C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Manpower

army's disposal over an increasingly large area within the hinterland'.

Coupled with this was the growth in importance of cavalry, The equitea

Dalmatae of Gallienus came into being partly as a reconnaissance in force, by

which the movements of the enemy could be located and at least partially

controlled, and partly due to a lack of any other available resources within

his truncated empire2. Other units of equites, most notably the promot.4 the

stablesianl and perhaps the scutarlZ were drawn from existing units and

converted into independent cavalry formations 3. These and the ethnic units

such as the equites Mauri and sagittarli, along with various units of ethnic

numeri, seem gradually to have replaced the Auxilia of the early Principate,

which had gone into a drastic decline, caused at least in part by endemic

attrition and the unpopularity of military service4. Efforts were made to

counteract this unpopularity by increasing military pay and introducing new

privileges, but the decline continued, to the extent that no new legions were

raised after the creations of Septimius Severus until the reforms of

Diocletian; and ethnic units and barbarians continued to replace the AuKiliaS.

Reforms among the officer classes, resulting in the rise of the yin

militares, were also undertaken because of a failure of the senatorial order

to live up to its military responsibilities, and an increasing need for

competent military men in positions of importance throughout the empire6.

1, Ch,VI: Yexi1Iatione2, Chh,III, VII & VI: Contra Coaitatui, Equites& 'exi1Jationes, Both factors are representative

of a stretching of resources with which adequately to defend the empire,

3, Ch,VII: Equites, The prosoti seem to have retained some sort of link with the legions fromwhich they were drawn.

4, Ch,Y: uxi)ia.

5, Ch,IV: Legione on barbarians cf, Ch,IX: Foederati,6, Chh,X & XI: 1/fri Ifilitares & Protectores,

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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower

Taken in isolation, each of these admits to other, equally valid,

interpretations not directly linked to a shortage of manpower. The

vexillation provided greater flexibility with which to face the changing

circumstances of the later Roman empire. Cavalry came to the fore because

of its mobility, enabling it to catch and harass barbarian invaders within

the new strictures of defence-in-depth. Furthermore, the equltes promoti,

for which the strongest argument concerning a redistribution of military

resources can be made, seem unlikely to have been created earlier than the

reign of Diocletian, by which time other new units were being raised1.

Ethnic units can be seen as a resurgence of the early imperial practice of

military diversification around the core force of legions, replacing the

outmoded Auxilia which had lost its original ethnic Identity. Even the use

of barbarian troops can be viewed less in the light of manpower resources

than in terms of political expediency 2. Political expediency of a different

sort has also been seen as the driving force behind the rise of the equites

within the officer class, though this is less convincing3.

Yet throughout, there remains a constant and consistent refrain: that

each of these measures, taken for a variety of reasons, was implemented

under the implicit understanding that resources of manpower were at a

premium. A.E.R. Boak was severely criticised for laying too much emphasis on

the role of manpower shortage In the fall of the western Roman empire, and

rightly 60dm Lack of human resources was never the cause of the problems of

1, Ch,VII: Equites, p,166ff,2, Ch,IX: Foederati,

3, Ch,X: '/ri Mi1itiu contra the traditional view of imperial animosity towards the senate,

4, Boak, Manpover Shortage and the FaIl of the Roaan Eapire (1955); scathingly criticised in areview by Finley, IRS 48 (1958), 157ff: herefter cited as Finley, IRS,

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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower

the third century 1 nor for that matter the later Roman empire. In fact, I

would go so far as to quote Finley when speaking of the later Roman economy:

Merely to invoke a formula, manpower shortage • declining production • impoverishment, will

explain neither the fifteenth century nor the very different fourth (or fifth) century, A

difficult and sophisticated analysis is necessary, involving prices, wages, productivity -- and

social and political factors too -- before even tentative relationships can be established,

Jones, Indeed, argued the antithesis to Boak's concept2. In his view,

late Roman Imperial reforms generated an excessive economic burden which

weighed down the peasantry and dragged them below subsistence level,

creating a vicious downward spiral which brought about famine, depopulation,

Inflation end all the other factors associated with the decline of the

empire. In this model, shortage of manpower was not the cause of the

empire's decline, but rather an exacerbating effect. The empire's problems

were not created by a lack of manpower, but by the failure of the Roman

government to recognise that its resources were finite, so overburdening

them. This model, in a military context, can be transferred to the third

century, where by changing the variables we can demonstrate how an imperial

recognition that the resources were limited staved off the subsequent

decline.

Not even Finley would deny "that the plagues and disorders of the third

century cut the population of the western empire"3. Warfare was so endemic

that it would be pointless to chart the civil wars and invasions of the

century. More instructive are the periods of relative peace to be found

I. Finley, IR 163,

2, Jones 1 L,W(1964), 1040ff; cf, also Jones, A/7cient Econoaic History (1948), 14ff,3, Finley, /R 162,

- 45 -

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower

in the ninety years between AD 193 and 284. In all, only seventeen years

can be safely construed as 'peaceful', and even this number can only be

arrived at by ignoring known periods of brigandage and counting interregnal

years arid periods of special celebration (such as the celebration of the

Millennium) 1 . In this period, only one emperor, Sept imius Severus, was to die

a timely death of natural causes. Claudlus Gothicus died of plague in 270,

and Decius and Valerian were killed by the enemies of Rome. The remaining

20 'legitimate' emperors were all killed by assassination or civil war2.

Indeed, if we were to include all known usurpers throughout the century, the

average life-expectancy of someone who had taken the purple in the third

century was approximately 2 years. When one considers that this includes

the reigns of Septiinius Severus, Severus Alexander and Diocletian, which

account for 52 of the 112 years between 193 and AD 305, the truly horrific

nature of civil unrest throughout the century becomes apparent3.

The plague statistics are not much better. Three great plagues hit the

empire between the years 165 and 275, raging for a combined total of more

than 40 years. The first and most famous was the plague of Marcus Aurelius,

otherwise known as the Plague of Galen, which was brought back from the

east after the campaign of Julius Verus. Fourth century sources say the

plague began among the army at Seleuceia on the Tigris In the winter of 165,

1, AD 199-203: Severus in Egypt and Rome; AD 205-207: Severus returns to Rome from Africa (Bulla

Felix terrorises 8, Italy in 206/7); AD 212: Caracalla withdraws from Britain, murder of Beta: AD 222-

231: period of relative peace under Severus Alexander AD 247: Millenary celebrations at Rome, After

the Gothic invasion of 249, the empire was troubled by civil war and invasion on a continuous basis

until the end of the century (with one possible respite in the year 290),

2, Counting ioint emperors as a single entity,

3, Severus ruled from AD 193-211 (18 years), Alexander from AD 222-235 (13 years) and Diocletian

from AD 284-305 (19 years), Diocletian was the only emperor ever to retire (along with his colleague,

Maximian), and these three emperors were the only ones whose reigns reached double figures,

- 46 -

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower

though epidemics were reported at Nisibis and Smyrna in that same year.

Certainly, the plague had reached Rome by 166, and was raging among the

soldiers at Aquilela in 168/9, when the physician Galen noted its effects1.

Gilliam has expressed doubts over the severity of these effects. He

notes that Galen seemed unperturbed by the pestilence, though he referred to

the plague as a great and long-lasting one2 . Yet, as one recent commentator

has put it "Gilliam's rigorous discussion carries agnosticism to extremes"9.

His main objections seem to be that the plague was taken far less seriously

by contemporary commentators than by later Roman historians; that there is

little demographic evidence for the plague; and that what evidence there is

is open to alternative explanation.

On the first count, Gilliam's main objection lies in the comment of

Cassius Dio, that the epidemic which broke out in 189 was the worst he had

experienced4 . He combines this with comments from Galen, Lucian and

Aristides to show that the plague was not the major preoccupation of

contemporary authors. Aristides was far more concerned with the earthquake

which hit Smyrna in 178, and Lucian makes no mention of the plague in his

description of the Olympic Games in 165s. Yet in the mid-160s, Dio was an

infant in Bithynia, far from the pestilential confines of Rome. Even though

the plague of Galen continued into the 170s, its effects were uneven, so it

I, S//A Itpus Y1II . 1-3; Aim, Marc, IXXI . 624; Vict, Epit, XVI . 3; Calpurnianus, Fe// 118, N9 208;

Aristidea, Orat, XXXIII'6, XLVIII38-9, 1 . 9, 11 . 25 (K); Cf. Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus

Aurelius', A,J,P/il, 73(1961), 227ff Rotan Arty Papers (1986), 229ff for a full chronology andfurther references, For its effects on the army cf, Galen XIX in Scripta Ninora 11, 98(M); SHA Marc,X1II'3-6, XVII . 2 & XXI • 6-7; Eutropius YI11 . 12; Jerome C/iron, p.205; Qrosius VII'I5'5-6,

2, Gilliam op. cit., 227f,

3, Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roaan Econoty (1990), 72, n,37,4, Dio LXXII'14'3-4 (LXXIII in the Loeb edition); cf. also LXXI.2.4,

5, Gilliam, 227ff, esp, nn,16, 18 & 19,

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M,C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Manpower

is hardly surprising that a major epidemic in the crowded capital of the

empire, witnessed with the full understanding of adulthood, should affect the

historian more deeply than the sporadic pox with which he had grown up1.

Furthermore, it is not impossible that the plague of 189 could have been a

recurrence of the plague of Galen, though it is treated as the second of the

major plagues discussed here. Equally unsurprising are the preoccupations of

Aristides and Lucian. The Smyrna earthquake may well have been a worse

calamity to hit the city than the plague. Even if it were not, Aristides is

making a rhetorical point in his repeated juxtaposition of the city's

prosperity before the earthquake and the devastation after, and we should

not expect him to mention the plague, which would only have blunted his

argument. The same can be said of Lucian, who only seems to have referred

to disease when he could turn it to dramatic advantage s. Neither was a

historian, so neither should be expected to sacrifice good rhetoric in the

interests of historical accuracy. It is also of interest that while Galen's

reaction to the plague has been portrayed as almost blasé, the physician

declined to accompany Marcus on his Marcomannic campaign because Asclepius

forbade him to go. Whether this was out of fear of the plague, or because

he was required to stay and treat it is not clear, though he is known to

have left Rome soon after the plague reached it and returned to his native

Pergamum4.

Demographic evidence of any value concerning the Roman world Is

I, Boak, Manpower Shortage1 19; Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale, 72; Millar, A Study of 'asiusDic (1963), 13 & n4,

2, Aristides XVIII-XXII, He does comment on the plague elsewhere, cf, above p47 ni

3, cf, Lucian Peregrinus XIX,

3, All references in Gilliam, 'Plague of arcus', 227f nn, 10-13; Duncan-Jones, bc, cii,- 48 -


extremely difficult to come by, therefore it is hardly surprising that what

little evidence exists for depopulation at the time of the plague is open to

alternative explanation. Certainly warfare could have as much to do with the

unusually high enlistment figures for legionaries at the end of the reign of

Marcus Aurelius. Gilliam himself makes the point that recruitment figures

fluctuated drastically due to a whole series of variables, and that the seven

examples he provides cannot actually prove anything 1 . He is on firmer

ground when he suggests that evidence for depopulation in Egypt in the late

160s could have more to do with vaxprIcrLc (the abandonment of land) than

with the plague. Wilcken, who first suggested that the dramatic decline

exhibited in the Mendesian nome could have been caused by the plague,

retracted his explanation when P. Graux 2 was published by Henne in 1923,

showing that a similar decline in At) 55/59 was due entirely to desertion2.

Yet there is one crucial detail In the Mendeslan papyri which may suggest

that abandonment was not the sole cause. The format of the figures given

states the number of villagers originally In occupation, followed by the

I, Gilliam, 'Plague of Marcus', 236ff citing 111 . 6178; AE,1955,238; 111 . 8110; YI1I•18067;

111 . 6580; 111 . 14507 VIlI'18068 which list legionary veterans at time of discharge for the legions '

Macedon/ca, II T,afana, VII CJadja & III Augusta, His postulated average of 100 men disharged peryear Is slightly low, and if it is going to be used as a benchmark, it should be fixed at 126, On

this benchmark, the latter three Inscriptions, listing men who 5etVed from 168-194, 169-195 & 173-198,

give figures of 100, 240+ & 330, This indicates that the survival rate of men recruited into Legio IITralana in 166 was slightly (but not significantly) below average, while the number of men enlistedinto Vii Claudia & III Augusta in 169 & 173 was significantly above average, As indicated in the textabove, the figures are statistically worthless and may have as much to do with warfare as with plague.

However, if these figures are going to be used to refute the plague, Gilliam has failed to explain why

the number of men recruited at the epidemic's height was below the norm, while the numbers recruited

in its aftermath, to replace losses from both plague and warfare, were way above ii, NB: Gilliam, 239

on XI Palayrenorut, showing that fluctuations in recruitment are such that average assessments arevirtually meaningless; cf, the table In ch,V: Auxilia, p104 which illustrates the point.

2, Wilcken on 8811 902 & 903 In Fast, 0, HirschfeJds (1903), 123ff; retracted in Arch/v furFapyrusforach, VIII (1927), 311; Henne in Bali, Inst, Fr, Arch, Or, XXI (1923), 189ff; cf, Gilliam,op. cit., 239ff for a full discussion and further references,

- 49 -


number now extant, of whom a certain number had fled! '. This number

usually included the whole of the remaining populace. If the picture was

one of agri deserti created by abandonment, would not the numbers who had

'fled' be included among the figure for 'former occupants'? By

differentiating 'former occupants' from 'those fled', the papyri are explicity

stating that the desertion of the villages has been caused by something

other than the flight of the peasantry, This could have been the plague. In

this picture, the plague ravaged the village populace to the extent that only

a handful of villagers remained. Faced with the overwhelming burden of

taxation not just for themselves, but for their dead compatriots, this

handful then took the only other option open to them, and abandoned the

land. A recent analysis of Egyptian document totals has shown a virtual

collapse in output under the reign of Marcus Aurelius, which indicates that

the pestilence may have had a great effect 2. It would seem that the coin-

output of Marcus Aurelius also suffered a severe drop in 167, immediately

after the recorded arrival of the plague at Rome3.

The plague of Marcus Aurelius has exercised so much interest among

commentators, both ancient and modern, that other natural disasters during

the following century have often been overshadowed. The plague which Dio

described at Rome in AD 189 killed as many as two thousand people in a

single day4. The earthquake at Smyrna was followed in 242 and the early

260s by a massive series of 'world-quakes' which rocked large tracts of the

1, Figurem given by Gilliam, op. cli, 240: formerly 55, now 10, of which 8 have fled; formerly

27, now 3, fled 3; formerly 54, now 4, fled 4,

2, Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale, 71ff,

3, Duncan-Jones, op. cit., 73ff,

4 Dio LXfl'2'4 & LXXII . 14'3-4, discussed above, p.47,

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M,C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Manpower

Mediterranean 1 . Famine swept the empire In the wake of these disasters2,

the most devastating of which was the great plague of 25O-275. Whether

this was one great plague which reccurred sporadically throughout these

twenty-five years, or whether it was a series of separate epidemics is still

open to debate4. The fact still remains that plague ravaged the empire

during the reigns of Trebonianus Gallus, Gallienus and Claudlus Gothicus,

killing the latter, and leaving witnesses shaken by its severity6.

The effect on the population of these combined disasters, coupled with

the depredations of constant warfare, cannot have been slight. Burn equated

the mortality rate of Roman Africa with that of early twentieth century

India (among others), and was followed by Jones 7. Here, infant mortality was

high, and the life expectancy of males was significantly greater than

females, Burn declines to give proper 'expectation of life' figures for

reasons of statistical purity, but the figures he does provide show that the

probable duration of life in Roman Africa did not exceed the age of 5Q8,

Soldiers in the Roman army also had a generally lower life expectancy than

1, Dc Blois, The Policy of f/ic Esperor Gallienus (1976), 10; 8/14 Gord, XXVI . 1-2, GaIl, V•2-6,2, flacNullen, Eneties of the Rosen Order (1966), Appendix A, 251ff,3, Zos, 1 . 26 . 2, 37'3 & 46 . 2; Zon, XII • 21; Vict, Cees, XXX2 & XXXIII • 5; S//A Gail, V • 5; Eusebius

Mist, (cci, VII21-22: Joh, Ant, frag, 151; Cedrenus I p.452; Jerome C/iron, p.219; Orosius VII.21'4-5,22 .2-3 & 2?1O; Iordanes Get/ca XIX'104 IM); Pontivs 1 Cypt, 1X Cyprian Dc Hart, XIV . 16, Ad Dci.',

V'lO,

4, Boak, Manpover Shortage, 136 n,11 Alfôldi, CA//XII, 1671 & 227f; Jones, IRE, 1043,

5, los, I46 • 2; S//A Claud, XlI'2-3,

6, Contemporary accounts come from Cyprian and Eusebius, Zosimus, drawing on the contemporary

account of Dexippus, graphically illustrates the shock felt by those who experienced the plagues: refe

in n,3 above,

7, Burn, 'Hic Breve Vivitur', Past end Present4 (1953), 11ff; Jones, LRE 1041,

8, Burn, 1411, esp, Table I on p.16, Half of the inhabitants of the civil districts of Africa

could expect to reach the age of 4811 they were male, and 44 ii they were female, Among the imperial

slave population of Carthage, the duration of life drops to 38 and 33 respectively, In Europe and on

the Danube, probable duration was between 40f33 and 44/36 for males/females, Of those tha , ched

those ages, half could expect to reach the age of 600r more in all categories except souther

M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Manpower

their civilian counterparts, though their chances of reaching middle age

were significantly higher, presumably due to the régime of fitness required

of them'. The important factor here is the high female mortality rate. To

maintain its numbers, the Roman population would have needed a very high

birth rate2, According to Finley:

Low life expectancy obviously restricts the rate of reproduction by the mere fact that a large

percentage of women do not live through the entire period in which they are biologically fertile,

Given that limit, however, In a stable life-expectancy pattern (whether high or low) the

reproduction rate can vary greatly from generation to generation according to many factor5, The

argument must proceed from these factors to the population curve, not the other way round,

In the third century, these factors -- war, pestilence, famine,

catastrophe -- seem incontrovertibly calculated to disrupt the normal

pattern. Even after discarding Boak's assumptions about the long-term

effects of plague upon the population base 4, we find the empire still faced

by a continuous series of disasters, both natural and man-made, which

progressed with almost no let-up to a feverish crescendo in the middle of

the third century. From 240 onwards, the empire suffered the depredations

of earthquake and plague at regular ten-year intervals, linked by continuous

warfare, until the cycle of disaster (but not warfare!) ceased after 275.

Iones spoke of the resilience of the Roman population, highlighting its rapid

recovery "from any but the severest checks caused by massacres, famines or

epidemice lls . If thirty-five years, something like a generation, of continuous

1, Burn, op. cit. (above, n,7), 10 & 16,

2, Jones, bc, cit 1 (above n,7),

3. Finley, IRS, 157,

4, Boak, Manpove Shop tage, 19, 31, 56 & 113; refuted by Finley, IRS, 158 & 162,

5, Jones, bc, cit.

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M.C.Ibe.ji: C3 Army. Manpower

attrition was not a 'severe check', what is?

Thanks to a recent study, it is now possible to make some crude

comparison of life-expectancy in the early and later Principate. Figures

produced by Duncan-Jones from an, admittedly dubious, statistical base

purport to show that expectation of life within the Roman empire in the

early third century could have been slightly below 20 years for the servile

population, and slightly above 30 years for the urban middle classes 1 . Both

these figures are very low when compared to Burn's calculations. Direct

comparison can be made only with one of Burn's tables: that for the slaves

and freedmen of the imperial household in Carthage. All others are either

too late, or include figures from the third century in their calculations.

Since Burn's figures are not 'expectation of life' statistics, a more valid

comparison may be between the infant mortality rates assessed by both

studies. Duncan-Jones has estimated this at between 278 and 329 per

thousand for the middle classes in the third century, while Burn approximated

a minimum of 200-250 per thousand for the Principate as a whole, believing

it to be proportionately worse for the slaves of Carthage 2. What this tells

us is that the life-expectancy of the middle-class in the third century may

have been little better than that of imperial slaves in the early Principate.

I, Duncan-Jones, Stucturi and $j/ 91ff, His figures are based upon the Album of Canusiva,

which lists a town council of 100 members, of whom 68 had held a magistracy by AD 223; and a

comparison of the Ulpian Table (listing official calculations for life-annuities in the early third

century) with the models of the Princeton series, 8y dividing the Canusium figures by the regular

magisterial intake of 2, he arrives at a mean life-expectancy from age 0 of 32 years; the Ulpian Table

is less simple, arriving at a life-expectancy from 0 of under 20, which may be due to the inaccuracy

of the Table's own calculations, The Album of Canusium therefore provides figures for the magisterial

classes of an Italian town, while the Ulpian Table provides a Roman estimate of life for the servile

population, Neither is very reliable,

2, Duncan-Jones, 94; Burn, 14,

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M,c.rbeji: C3 Army. Manpower

The picture drawn so far equates with Boak's image of a declining

population, which may have plummetted in the mid-third century as natural

disasters took their toll 1 . However, a manpower shortage in military terms

does not necessarily require such a drop. In fact, I do not believe that the

empire sufferred any significant long-term 1086 in manpower until the period

of crises which followed the great quake of AD 242. Previously, the empire

had enough surplus manpower with which to create five new legions within

the space of some thirty years, despite the plagues of Marcus Aurelius and

Gommodus. It was these creations which in my belief stretched citizen

manpower to its limit, as evidenced by the reforms of the Seven and the

fact that no further legions were recruited until the reign of Dlocletian2,

The reforms may have had a dual purpose, increasing the popularity of the

emperor in the soldiers' eyes as well as increasing the attractiveness of

military service, but it was the latter which was of greater long-term

importance, and which ultimately failed. With regard to non-citizen

manpower, the recruitment of auxiliary units does not tail off significantly

until after the reign of' Caracalla, and does not die out until the mid-third

century. Yet it is noticeable that even among these there is a large number

of 'ethnic' troops, drawn mainly from the eastern and African provinces4.

Even if there was no decline in population, the third-century Roman army was

obviously stretched to its limit and forced to look to new methods of

defence in order to cover the ground it had to protect.

I, Soak, Manpower Shortage, 109ff,2, Cli, LY: Legiones,

3, Ch,IV: Legiones,4, ChY: 4uxi)ia, Table Al,

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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Manpower

This is what prompted the activities of Gallienus. By his reign, there

Is no gainsayirig that the empire's human resources were a].rnost exhausted,

Quite apart from the hammer-blows which the population had sufferred up to

that point, Gallienus was left with an empire that had lost control of both

Its eastern and western provinces, and with them that valuable source of

oriental troops upon which the empire had been drawing since the late second

century. Simultaneously, he had gained an extra frontier, looking westwards

towards the Gallic Empire, which required defence and which had removed the

troops dedicated to that part of the empire. With the death of Odaenathus,

he was also forced to look east. He had lost two of his main recruiting

grounds, gained two extra frontiers, and within them was faced with

rebellion, Invasion, famine and plague. The full burden of maintaining his

present army at its current level had fallen on his Illyrian and African

recruiting grounds, yet to hold this truncated empire together, he had to

find enough new troops with which to hit back. His solution was to

reorganise the way the army worked, and we shall see how he drew upon the

equites Dalma tee, as his only source of fresh manpower, to create a

coordinated cavalry/infantry strategy which could be built upon by his

successor&.

Cheesman has been quoted as saying: "The extent to which a ruling race

can safely use the military resources of its subjects and the effect on both

parties of such a relation is a question of universal historical lnterest."

In its limited scope, this work cannot answer the second question, but it can

1, Chh, iii a vii: Con Crc Coal Ca tua a Eqwi tes2, Cheesman, 1/ic AwxiJia of the Roam Icperial Arir (1914), 7,

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M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army. Manpower

endeavour to answer the first. The military resources of the empire in the

third century were limited. The repeated disasters which afflicted the

empire during that century must have limited them even further. Yet by

their tacit acceptance of these limitations, and by working around them,

rather than by legislating against them, the emperors of that century were

able to weather the storm and bring the empire into calmer waters. The

damage done to the population was not irreversible, and by the time of

Diocletian it had recovered enough for him to essay his reforms. It is

generally believed that he increased the size of the army, though what this

meant in numerical terms is debatable 1 . Since the recent findings of

Duncan-Jones suggest that the size of Diocletianic units may have been

considerably smaller than was previously believed, all earlier estimations

may have to be revised2. It may be that the actual number of men in the

army under Diocletian was not significantly greater than those under the

standards in the mid-third century. If this is the case, then he had enough

manpower with which to cope, but only because his predecessors had astutely

juggled the resources at their disposal to stave off the manpower crisis

which had been looming throughout the entire century.

1, Van Berchem believed that Diocletian doubled the size of the aray, Jones estisated a figure

of approx, 600,000 men, and Boak arrived at a figure anywhere between 400,000 and 650,000: Van

Berchem, Armée de Qloclètien, 113; Jones, LRE 679ff; Boak, /Yanpover Shortage, 86ff,

2, Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', Chiron8 (1978), 541ff,

- 56 -

I I I: CONTRA C OMI TA TUM

This chapter is deliberately controversial. It examines the evidence

both for arid against one of the most cherished preconceptions of third

century military studies: that of the mobile cavalry field army believed to

have been created by Gallienus. The subject is inextricably linked to that

of the equltes Dalmatae and the introduction of cavalry vexillations which

occurred at some time in the latter part of the century. On the following

pages, I shall review the evidence concerning the mobile field army. I

intend to illustrate the meagre foundations upon which the hypothesis has

been based, and to explore alternative possibilities equally supportable by

the present evidence. I shall end with an history of the growth of the

units termed equltes

The idea of a mobile field army arose from an assumption made by Emil

Ritterlthg in his excellent article, of 1903, on aspects of the later Roman

army 1 . Identifying Gallienus as the creator of the equites Dalmatae, in

which Ritterling had the greatest interest, he made the following statement:

Gallienus ist in der That der Schöpfer einer siets kampfbereiten, von den Besatzungen der

Provinzen und aus den alten Verbanden Iosgelôsien, für den Krieg im grossen verwendbaren Reiterei

ii römischen Heere geworden,2

His evidence for this was slim 1 but sufficiently convincing to persuade

others to search for more. This seemed forthcoming in 1927, when Andreas

1, Riiterling, 'Zurn rämischen Heerwesen des ausgehenden dritten Jahrhunderis', Pestschrift zuOtto Hirsch!elds (1903), 345ff,

2, Ritterling, 349: 6allienus is in fact the creator of an always battle-ready unit, resoved !ro,.provincial garrisons and old units, turning the Rosan ai'ey in to a versa tile cavalry force,

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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

Alföldi produced numismatic evidence of a cavalry force present in Milan

under the generalship of the usurper Aureolus 1 . Since then, the existence of

a mobile field army ha8 achieved the status of accepted fact, such that

respected scholars can refer to it en passant when discussing topics upon

which it touches; and its very existence can be seen as an answer to some of

the knottier problems of the period. Indeed, the idea of a Gallienic field

army has become so ingrained that it is now legitimate to search for its

precursors In the reigns of earlier emperors3.

At its most extreme, the field army is seen as an elite force of cavalry

under an independent command, with its operations completely separate from

either provincial forces or the imperial army and "wholly independent of the

Infantry"4. More conventional opinion still emphasises the mobility of the

cavalry, and its freedom of action under an independent cavalry commander.

The field army Is seen as "a landmark In the development of the Roman

army...anticipating the fourth century system for which Diocletian and

Constantine between them had previously been given the credit"6. In effect,

It Is viewed as a precursor of the comitatus with its substantial

components of shock cavalry.

Both views essentially rely on the assumptions made by Ritterllng:

1, Alföldl, 'Der Usurpator Aureolus und die kavallierereform des Gallienus', Stud/en zurfieschichfe der Ueitkrise de5 3 Ialirlwnderts nach Christus (1967), 1ff If/I, XIXYII (1927), 156ff,

2, Alföldi, CAN XII (1939), 216f (who attributed to it praeiorian status); Aliheim, DieSoldatenkaiser (1939), 178f; Christol, 'La CarriIre de Traianus Mucianus et l'Origine desProtectores', C/i/ron 7 (1977), 393ff (who viewed the protectores as centurions in the field army)Eadie, 'Developffient of Roman Nailed Cavalry', IRS 57(1967), 168; Speidel1 'Stablesiani', Cuì/ron IV(1974), 541ff Rotan Arty Studies I (1984), 391ff, and 'Rise of Ethnic Units', NRV II'3 (1975),202ff Ro4an Arty Papers, 117ff (who assumed that the equites had elite status as part of the fieldarmy),

3, E, Birley, 'Septimlus Severus and the Roman Army', Ep, $two 8 (1969), 661 discussed furtherin chIV: Legiones,

4, So Alfôldi, locc, citt, (above),

5, So Birley, bc, cit. (above),

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

assumptions which have never been questioned. Ritterling was concerned

primarily with the development of the equites Dalinatae. He saw in them the

origins of the equites Illyriciani listed among eastern units in the Notitia

Dignitatur&, Working with the minutest of scraps from the histories, he

pieced together a convincing picture of the equites Dalmatae in existence

under the emperor Gallienus, and commanded by the general Aureolus.

However, he immediately assumed that they were part of a field army, on no

stronger grounds than that they had their own commander and a few equites

Dalmatae were comita tenses in the Notitia2. It is this assumption which has

created the present orthodoxy. Remove this assumption, and the evidence --

both that with which Ritter]J.ng was working, and all that has been produced

since -- takes on a very different colour.

There seems little doubt that the equites Da1matae in whatever form

they took, were the creation of Gallienus. With the single exception of the

Vita Albini, which must be historical interpolation on the part of the SliP,

they do not appear in the sources until this emperor's sole reign, The

medieval historian, Cedrenus, claimed that:

Pi.1avoç rproç tflsAT ra'fiara xrrcv,'1( 1(o1 xari co TOAD Ut O1ftT&1S 1&V 1PaJIQIV

t3,Q,XOV,'

Zonaras described their crucial role in the campaign against Ingenuus,

while Zosimus spoke of their operations both before and after the battle of

I, Ritterling, op. cit. (above, p.57),

2, Ritterling, 34Sf, Only 6 equite5 Daliatae out of 37 in the Notitia were coiitetenses,3, S/M ,Qlb. VI . 2; Ritterling, 345 n,3: Albinus is said to have been 'trthunus equites Daliatas

(sic) Such an early date runs contra to all other evidence, and given the SHA's penchant for

importing institutions from its own time, it cannot simply be taken on face value,

4, Cedrenus 1, 454(B): Gallienus first introduced units of hor5e: for the Roean soldiers beganlainly as infantry.

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatuni

Naissus'. In both commentaries, the name of Aureolus figures highly.

Zonaras calls him hipparch and claimed he was appointed steward of the

'Royal Horse'2. He was in command of the cavalry stationed at Milan when he

rebelled against Gallienus, setting frito motion a series of events which were

to end th the deaths of both himself and the emperor 3. The passages which

describe his status at this time are important in unravelling the nature of

the cavalry:

Zonaras XII'25, P I 633(D): aQ#s ft hcpr xart ro rAqvo, ha'virtTra'oç rcrovv iv ApsoAoç

0Pv(cll/cIrO, tarqç 1tv riiq tiiov Xd'i /1('i iova'pcvoç,

ZO51NUS I'40'1 ,,,lyyAlza's f'a'L1sqv c rpoç !xokç Iyrqupoovri roAqi, ro y rc hrov rac

s TOPflcvoY Apaoov, h /fiioav rp roAi rqv ?ra rv 1za'A:a'v iipodov lloro,ioo rra'yjicvov

iapq'Aarusv dç ro vcsrc,scav rcrpapks xaa pvijcla'i rqv ra y 3A&v Ipiiv It.rp,

Victor Ccci, XXXIII'17: Masque Aureolus, cut per Ractias legionibus praesset,,,,suipto i.perio,

Roses con tendeba t,'

Aureolus is depicted as a powerful general, in charge not only of the

Milan cavalry, but also the forces in Raetia. Alföldi has demonstrated that

he had control of the mint in Milan, which extolled the virtues of the

cavalry, first for Gallienus and later on behalf of F'ostumus 7. His study has

proven that Aureolus did not in fact revolt in his own name, but declared

I, Zon, XII . 24, P I 631(D); Zo5, 1.43.2,2,Zon, ktI • 24, P 1 631<8) & 631(0),

3,Zon, XII'25, P 1 633(D); Zos, 1 . 40 . 1; cf, also Vict, Caes, XXXIII • 17-18; 5H44 Gall, 11 . 6, 111.1

& XIV'6-7, Trig, Tyr, XI • I & XII'2,

4, Zonaras: igain there arose another rebellion against 6'allienus, to which Aureolus, cossander

of all the cavalry end a very powerful tan, linked /,iaself,,,

5, 2osi,aus: ,, , Nit's t'as not' brought to 8aJJiernis, involved in f/ic war against the Scythians, that

aQureolus, cosiander of all the cavalry posted at Milan to prevent Postusus invading Italy, had

revolted and was seeking suprese power,

6, Victor: Now Aureo!u5, cossander of the Raetia, legion5,,,, took up the purple and sarched on

Rate,

7, Alföldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', 4ff, esp,l2ff,

- 60 -


for the Gallic Emperor, and indeed the vast majority of his coins were struck

in the name of Postumus' Earlier in the reign, he led the cavalry against

Ingenuus, and also campaigned against PostumuB and the Macriani2.

Yet we must not fall into the trap of automatically linking Aureolus to

the cavalry. All too often, the presence of Aureolus is seen to signify the

field army in action. In fact, the names of Aureolus and the equites

Dalmatae are never explicitly linked. True, Zonaras named him as the

commander of the cavalry ('tv tnov) which put Ingenuus to flight at the

battle of Mursa and pursued him to his death, but it was the Moorish troops

which that author singled out for praise when he came to name forces from

the campaign3 . In the war against Postumus, though Aureolus was acting like

a cavalry commander, pursuing the Gallic emperor after his defeat by

Gallienus4 , no explicit mention of cavalry is made. Nor do they figure in

his expedition against the Macriani, and it would be certain folly to assume

that he fought this campaign with nothing but a force of horsemen 5 . Even in

Milan, he is historically attested to have controlled the Raetian legions, and

it is likely that his authority extended to the legionary vexillations in

Aquileia. So similarly, when campaigning against the battle-tested eastern

army which had salvaged the situation after the capture of Valerian, he

1, 20 dIfferent types were struck in Milan in the name of Postumus, as opposed to 2 in the name

of Gallienus: RIC V, Posttrnus, 366-389 (excl,382-384) EaJllenws (sole), 445 & 472, I have not

included the a1acitatus coin cited by Alföldi, since it does not seem to me that the presence of a

flying Pegasus and the verso ALACRITATI are in themselves strong enough indicators to link it to the

cavalry: the assumptions implicit in its Inclusion serve only to confuse the issue, cf, Alföldi1

'Usurpator Aureolus', 13f.

2, Zon, XiI . 24, P1631(D), 632(B) & 632(D),

3, Zon, XII . 24, P I 631(0),

4, Zon, XII . 24, P I 632(8),

5, Zon, XII . 24, P I 632(0),

6, III'954 V • 808; cf, ch,VI: VexilIaiones, p,142f,

- 61 -


can hardly have been anything other than a dux exercitus in charge of a

powerful combined force of western troops loyal to Gallienus. In this

respect, he was no different to other generals campaigning on behalf of the

emperor. Marcianus taking over the emperor's Gothic war in AD 268

immediately springs to mind'. Simply because Aureolus was linked to the

cavalry at certain times, it does not follow that the cavalry was always

linked to him, nor that he was always linked to the cavalry.

It is equally mistaken to make too much of the hipparchos references in

Zonaras. The historian calls Aureolus hipparch in the campaign against

Irigenuus. Elsewhere, he says he was steward of the 'Royal Horse' and also

commander of "all the cavalry"2. Yet in this very same chapter we find

another general, Aureliani, following the emperor to Milan "with the cavalry"

(auv t inteua t )2, so it is obviouB that not all the cavalry were under the

control of Aureolus. The cavalry brought up by Aurelian were, by inference,

part of the army Gallienus was leading against the Goths when he heard of

Aureolus' rebellion. Why they did not accompany him immediately is unclear.

Perhaps they took some time to reorganise, or maybe they were needed to

complete some crucial manoeuvre before being freed for the emergency. It is

almost certain that they were in part equites Da1matae since tradition has

it that a tribune of this corps played a direct role in Gallienus' murder4.

On top of this, Aureolus is not the only hippar'ch named in Zonaras' account.

The same term is applied on behalf of' the Macriani to their fellow

1,Zos, 1.40.1,2, Zon, XII'24, P I 631(C): ,,, m yAaxv h,Gv /oYrio'v,iç ,poxqciporc XII . 25 P1633(D):

raiTç a,%GY rç

3, Zon, X1I25, P I 634(A): roAsopA'oPvwç TOD PJnACOç fil IfräoAa'va QpiiAsvoç ay

,por g' y hr&, Note also Zon, X1I . 26, P I 635(B) which calls Claudius hipparchos,

4, Zos, I'40 • 2-3; Zon, XII'25, P I 634(A-B); SHA Gall, XIV 6-7, which names the man Cecropius and

call5 him dux Daliatarua, Note that he could have been on secondient away from his unit,

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Coniitatum

conspirator and Praetorian Prefect, Callistus 'Ballista' 1 . This may, In fact,

have some substance, since Ballista's tactics in wearing down the Persians

possessed the flavour of a mounted guerrilla campaign. At any rate, no

matter how highly he figures in the recorded tradition, Aureolus was not

unique in his titles, nor in his command of cavalry.

Are we then to credit the claim that he was steward of the 'Royal

Horse'? I think we can do so In at least two ways, without applying elite

status to the equites Dalma tea The first possibility is that he was

commander of the equites singulares at some point in his career. The title

is known to have been held by another of Gallienus' favourites, L. Petronius

Taurus Volusianus3, so the idea is not unprecedented. Equally probable,

considering the circumstances, is a command of the Moorish javelinmen. Two

units of equites iteinque pedites Mauri are known, organised into formations

of seniores and luniores. The epigraphy strongly suggests that this command

was given to a praepositus in the rank of a former tribune of the urban

cohorts, before proceeding on to the praetorians 4 . The unit therefore had

some sort of 'household' status, and indeed the Mauretanian horse are ranked

alongside the praetorians in at least one commentary5 . This makes tharn

equally, if not more, likely to have been t 9catAtxoL trffot of Zonaras than

the equites Dalma tee which were, no matter what their status, always regular

units of the later Roman army.

I, Zon, 111 . 24, P1632(D): S/IA Sal!, 1 . 2-3 & III'2, Trig, Tyr, XII, XIV . l & XVIII'13,2, Zon, X1123; S//A Va), IV'S. Tr/g, Tyr, X1I'1 but remember that he had command of the remnants

of Yalerian's army which cannot have all been cavalry,

3, XI'1836 ILS 1332,4, VI1I . 20996 ILS 1356: l6RRI'1496 IL$9479 : A19O8,259,5, Zos, I52'4; Alföldi believed they had praetorian status, CAM XII, 215; Speidel, on the other

hand, claimed their elite status came from their position in the cotitatus, 'Ethnic Units', 215,

- 63 -


In fact, the equltes Dalmatae do not appear in the sources until AD 268,

when Zosimus place8 them at the battle of Naissus 1 . They are only

explicitly named by this author and the Hlstoriae Augustae and while it is

likely that they made up the bulk of the equites at Milan, they are

specifically attested only in the beseiging force2,

What, then, of the equltes in Milan? Such a strong body of evidence for

their presence indicateB that they must have been important 3 . Alfdldi

believed Milan was the headquarters of the mobile armyd, but if this

convenient explanation is not to be taken for granted, how else can we

explain the presence of such a large concentration of cavalry?

Zosinius provides us with a clear answer. He explicitly states that the

cavalry were: ". . .posted at Milan to prevent Postumus invading Italy." The

numismatic material confirms this, since the first types extolling the

virtues of the equites appear at Milan in AD 259 s . This was a year of great

events. Not only did Postumus rebel, but earlier a large force of Alemanni,

which had been on the rampage in Gaul, crossed the Alps and were eventually

caught outside Milan6.

Alföldi was convinced that this was the first year of production for the

Milanese mint, making it impossible for these coins to have appeared any

earlier7 . However, typological evidence strongly suggests that the

1, Zos, 1.43.2

2, Zos, I4O2-3; S/IA Gall, XIV'4 & 9, In spite of this, other evidence from the Notitia and

non-literary sources suggests that the Equites Dalaatae made up a significant proportion of the new

cavalry units available to Gallienus and his generals: ci, chYIl: Equites,3, Zon, XII'25, P I 633(D) Zos, I'40 . 1 Vict, Caes, XXXIII'17-18, discussed above, p,60f:

numismatic evidence supplied by Alföldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', llff RIC equivalents cited above, p.61

n, 1,

4, Alföldi, op. cit,, 3,5, RICV, Gall, sole, 445 & 472,

6, Alföldi, CAM XII, 154f,

7, Alföldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', 4.

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M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

Viminaciurn mint in Moesia was moved wholesale to Milan at around AD 255 or

256 1 , suggesting that plans for the protection of Cisalpina had been

underway some time previously. It is obvious that until 259 Fostumus was

not the enemy against whom such preparations could have been made. Instead,

they were to provide for the defence of northern Italy against incursions by

the Alemanni. This Germanic people had been troubling the empire since the

time of Caracalla, and had become a serious menace following the troubles of

the early 250s. Around AD 256, they overran the Agri Decumates, and

followed this with the extended campaign which Gallienus brought to an end

outside Milan2 . Their main line of attack was southwards through Raetia and

across the northern Alps, to enter the Po Valley at precisely those points

covered by Milan and Verona, which were fortified circa 265g . After 259, the

Alemanni did not attempt to penetrate into Italy until a full decade later.

This is crucially significant since it came ,Just at the time when the

defences of northern Italy and Raetia had been plunged into turmoil by the

usurpation of Aureolus4 . That the Alemanni remained historically quiescent

throughout the period in which cavalry are attested at Milan must be an

indication of the effectiveness of the garrison. It is worth bearing in mind

that measures for the defence of northern Italy had been under way since

approximately 255, and while cavalry probably formed a part of that picture

from the very beginning, they do not come to prominence until after the

usurpation of Postumus.

From this, the purpose of the Milan cavalry is clear. It was part of a

1, RICV1, pp.21-22,

2, 1fö1di, CAM XII, 153ff.

3 ILS 544 & 6730; V'3329

4, Alföldi, op. cii,, 156; Vict, (p/t, XXXIV'2,

- 65 -

MAP 2: THE GARRISON OF NORTHERN ITALY IN THE LATE C3

/

--- .-

p- \ I /

!# 3_J;--..-.c 444

--/

S.

- -

I - -I

Pt

D

'4 g

I

.4' b5'

"'

KEY:Fortified city S Garrison A Fort

1. Milan: fortified city with cavalry & possibly legionaries; Cedrenus I454(B); Zos. I401; Zon. X1125 P I 633 CD); Alföldi, ZfN 37, 156ff; Vict.

Caes. XXX11117; RIC V1, Gall. (sole), 447, 475, 477-48 1.

2. Verona: fortified city, garrison unkown.

3. Aquileia: vexx, of Legg. XIII Gernina & 11111 ?J; V'808.

4. Poetovio: vexx. of Legs'. V Macedorilca & XIII Gernina; A1936,53, 54 & 57.

5. Praetentura Ita.Uae et Alpiurn: line of fortlets; ILS 8977.

6. Eporedia: vex, catafractariorurn; V'6784.

7. Turin: numerus Deirnatarum; V'7000 & 7001.

Map 2

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

static garrison providing for the defence of northern Italy and tied to the

Clsalpthe territories. After the revolt of Postumus, its initial brief

against Alemannic raids was by necessity widened to include the Gallic

Empire, tying the garrison even more firmly to the Po Valley, since It was

now forced to keep watch in two directions. The force In Milan was only

part of the whole package. Eastern access Into Cisalpina was covered by

vexillations stationed at Aquileia 1 and screened by a line of forts called

the praetentura Itallae et Alplum2. A garrison at Poetovio further protected

the route from the Pannonian limes into northern Italy3. To the west, a unit

of cataphracts was stationed at Eporedia on the exit from the St. Bernard

Pass4, and a numerus Deliiatarum was eventually stationed at Turin, guarding

the Mt. Genèvre Pass, though this may have been at a later date9. The

existence of fides militum, exercitum and legi on urn series from the mint

under Gallienus also suggests that the Milan force was Itself a mixed one6,

The Raetlan troops also figured in this defensive scheme. Aurelius

Victor is emphatic upon this point, claiming that Aureolus not only

commanded the 'legions' In Raetie, but that he W85 present In the province at

the time of his rebellion'. Considering the initial purpose of the Cisalpine

garrison, this claim should hardly come as a surprise. Raetia In fact formed

the first line of defence against Alernannic incursion. Yet, given the

distances involved, it would be ludicrous to assume that the units in Milan

I, V.808,

2, ILS 8977,3, 4E,1936,53, 54 & 57,

4,V•6784,5, V . 7000 & 7001: dated to the late empire by the presence of an exarch in the unit, but the

dating can be no more precise, ci. Fiebiger, Exarc/ios, RE 1554,6, RJ'CV . I, 6a1!, (sole), 447, 475, 477-481,7,Vici, Caes, XXXIII.17,

- 66 -

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Couiitatum

were able to react across the Alps in response to a message from Raetia,

before the Alemanni had themselves taken one of the Alpine passes. Unless

we are going to believe that the 'mobile field army' split itself into two

parts and advanced down the passes above Milan and Verona simultaneously,

we cannot assume that the force in Milan was expected to advance into

Raetia. Even without these logistical problems, once the Gallic Empire came

onto the scene, its ominous presence would have served as a deterrent to

mobility. With the Gallic Empire on its doorstep, Cisalpina had become in

effect a frontier province. If the 'field army' reacted into Raetia, it would

leave northern Italy wide open to invasion from the west; even more so If

the above point about speed of communication is rejected, since this applies

as equally to the Gallic Empire as it does to the Milan garrison. Aureolus'

jurisdiction in Raetia must have been intended to coordinate the defensive

scheme. Such a unified command will have ensured that no conflict of

purpose existed between the operations on either side of the Alps. Some

communication will have existed, if only to warn the Cisalpine troops that a

raiding party was on its way. The testimony of Aurelius Victor implies that

at the very least he was required to inspect the Raetian 11me in person,

and may have been responsible for punitive expeditions to keep the Germanic

tribes under control. Yet the fact that the commander of the troops in

Milan was also the nominal commander of the troops in Raetia was not In

Itself an indication of the mobility of the former.

In that case, why was the Milan garrison made up of cavalry? The

coinage of Aureolus so obviously labours the point that no genius is

required to identIfy it as his crucial bargaining chip. If they were not a

mobile field army, why were the cavalry in northern Italy so important? The

answer, in my opinion, lies in the geography of the situation. The Alpine

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M,C.Ibe.Ji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

passes all debouched into the Po Valley which was dominated by two main

geographical features. The first was the River Po itself, which combined

with the River Adige and its own large tributaries to dissect the north

Italian plain, providing a series of natural obstacles which could only be

forded at specific points. Herodian testifies to the inconvenience this

caused an invading army'. The second was the very flatness of the terrain

making it perfect cavalry country. On the approach of any invasion force,

the cavalry could race ahead of it, destroying the vital bridges and

interdicting the fording places, constantly harassing the enemy in an attempt

to wear it down and influence it into a position of disadvantage where it

could be brought to battle. This is the way we see the Dalmatian cavalry

acting before and after Naissus, when they were credited with destroying

over 50,000 barbarians in a series of ambuscades2. To this extent, and to

this extent only were the Milan cavalry a mobile force. For all other

intents and purposes, the cavalry stationed in Milan and northern Italy were

no more than a highly specialised provincial garrison, tailored to take the

maximum advantage of their local environment with the minimum necessary

manpower. No wonder, then, that the single engagement attempted by the

usurper Aureolus before he hid himself in Milan was to interdict a bridge

which was later to bear his name9.

As a provincial garrison, the Milan cavalry were largely independent.

Like legionary forces elsewhere, they would have come under the control of

the emperor or his representative whenever a large-scale campaign was

conducted in the region. The material above indicates that the Imperial

1, Her, V1II'4'3,2, Zos, I'43'2,3,Vici, Caes, XXXIII'18,

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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatuni

representative was Aureolus himself, who sacrificed overall command only in

the presence of the emperor. This did in fact happen in AD 259 and 269

when Gallienus and Claudius campaigned against the Alemanni 1 . So even this

'independent provincial garrison' became an adjunct of the imperial army when

the emperor commanded in person.

It is also clear that the Milan cavalry cannot have been the same force

of equ.ites Dalinatae that was present at Naissus, since it was the emperor's

very preoccupation with that campaign which afforded Aureolus the

opportunity for rebellion2. Could it be, therefore, that the force at Naissus

was the 'mobile cavalry field army', which later became confused in the

sources with the 'Independent cavalry garrison' of Aureolus? To find out, we

must attempt to discover how the cavalry operated outside northern Italy, by

looking at the pattern of its use in the third quarter of the century.

Our most important source i.n this respect Is the sixth century

epitomator, Zosimus. He gives detailed accounts of every major cavalry

battle in the period, which are generally upheld by the incidental references

of other commentaries. Unfortunately, his treatment of the battle of Naissus

Is not one of his more impressive achievements. His chronology seems to

have become muddled during the chaotic circumstances of 259, causing him to

confuse the events at Naissus with similar incidents that occurred under the

emperor Claudlus IL As a consequence, the two accounts which come out of

this jumble should be taken not to describe individual engagements, but as a

general representation of the battles which occurred during the campaign.

1, Alföldi, CAM XII, 15Sf 1 Note that Aureolus was dead by 269, but his successor (Aurelian?) was

subordinate to Claudius,

2, Zos, 1 . 40 . 1; Vict, Caes, XXXIII'1S-17,

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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

At 'Naissus', the Dalmatian cavalry constantly harassed the enemy on

their approach to the battle. The engagement itself was lost by the Romans,

but the Gothic raiders were seriously weakened and worn down by continued

cavalry harassment in the wake of the defeat 1 . Similar events preceded 'Mt.

Haemas'. Once again the cavalry skirmished with the raiders, driving them

towards the chosen battleground. Once there they were engaged by the Roman

infantry, for whom the battle went disastrously, and the Romans were only

able to escape due to the timely intervention of the cavalry2 . The picture

is of a series of unsuccessful engagements, mitigated only by a mounted

guerilla war carried out in coordination with the imperial army. A couple of

comments from the Historla Augusta serve only to add to this impression2.

Aurelian's campaigns against the Palmyrenes are depicted in a more

successful light. If we were to hazard any reason for this, it must be due

to this emperor's superior experience in command of cavalry, since Zoslinus

makes it clear that the Palmyrenes were certainly no easier to defeat. At

both Immae and Emesa, Aurellan attempted the same tactic. He knew that his

cavalry was outclassed in every respect by the Palmyrene cataphracts. They

were less skillful, less well armoured and fewer in number. Therefore, he

ordered his cavalry to skirmish with the Palmyrenes, avoiding engagement for

as long as possible, in an attempt to exhaust their heavier armoured

cli.banarii and turn the superior manoeuvrabillty and endurance of his cavalry

to advantage. At Immae, the tactic worked. Once the Pa].myrenes had been

worn down, the Romans turned on them and destroyed them. However, at Emesa,

1, Zos, I.43•2,

2, Zos, 1.45,

3, S//A, Ga/I, XI1I . 9 & Claud, IX.1-2,

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M,C.Ibe.ji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

the Palmyrene cava]ry was able to catch the retreating Romans, and a

disaster was only averted by the timely intervention of the infantry'.

Several points of interest arise from these depictions. Most important

is the overriding impression that the Roman cavalry were lightly armed

skirmishing troops, which excelled at harassing their enemy but were less

capable of facing them in a knock-down, drag-out fight. Even at Mt. Haemas,

when they are supposed to have rescued the Roman infantry from disaster, it

seems probable that they engaged the Gothic force from the flanks and rear,

In the time-honoured tradition of ancient horse soldiers. In addition,

Zosimus consistently states that the Roman cavalry was inferior, both

qualitatively and quantatively, to their Palmyrene counterparts. Therefore,

the cavalry contingent cannot have been a large one. Nor was it likely to

have been an elite force, with the notable exception of the Moors (and

perhaps the Osrhoenians) for whom the sources seldom have anything but

praise2.

In most cases, neither the cavalry nor the infantry proved strong enough

to win an engagement by themselves. One usually had to support the other.

Even at Immae, it seems likely that the cavalry were actually trying to draw

the Palmyrenes towards the infantry who had been placed In reserve 3 . The

infantry should certainly not be discounted. True, it proved less than

successful against the Goths, but it was infantry which turned the tide at

1, Immae: Zos, I . 5O'2-4 Festus Breviariva XXIV'3-6, Emesa: Zos, 1 . 52 . 3 - 53 • 2; SI/A, Aur, IXV•3

tells the same story, especially if one replaces the 'supernatural agency' which is 5upposed to have

heartened the cavalry with 'Infantry support',

2, cf, Alföldi, CAM XII, 21Sf for a list of references and a somewhat over-eulogistic appraisal

of their merits,

3, But note that Zosimus says they were set apart somewhere over the Orontes River, and believes

that the cavalry achieved this victory independently: Zo5, I • 50 • 3 & 4,

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M.C.Ibe.ji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

Emesa; and an earlier incident at Antioch, when the infantry was forced to

storm the heights of the suburb at Daphnae, proves that the Roman legions

were still capable of disciplined, close-order manoeuvres under fire1.

The pattern that emerges is of a lightly armoured cavalry contingent,

linked to the imperial exercitus and acting as a powerful skirmishing force.

Nobody would deny that cavalry were being used in greater numbers and more

extensively than they had been previously, but it seems clear that they were

not acting independently. They were constantly linked to the infantry

operating under imperial command, arid were most successful when operating in

conjunction with these. In this respect, the new equites of the third

century were neither independent, nor mobile, since they were always tied to

the army on campaign.

The vast bulk of the evidence comes from Zosimus, albeit with

independent confirmation. So it is vital to establish that the pattern he

has described was not a literary topos, nor a reflection of the situation in

his own day. Zosimus was essentially an epitornator. According to the ninth

century bibliophile, Photius, he copied his sources slavishly; an observation

on which modern scholars agree 2. In this we are fortunate, since his first

major source was the contemporary Athenian historian, Dexippus.

Unfortunately, the history of Dexippus only goes down to 270, and his

Scyt hi ca covered only the wars against the Goths, So for Aurelian's

campaigns against the Palmyrenes Zosimus turned to Eunapius, the self-

proclaimed continuator of Dexippus from 270 onwards. This explains the

1,Zos, I'52.1,2,Phot, &bJ, cod,98; Ridley, Zosiaus, 8yrntina flustroliensia 11(1982), intro, xiif,3 Ridley, bc, cii,

- 72 -


distinct change of style which occurs in the history at approximately this

Juncture. From our point of view, the emphasis on the use of the cavalry

switches abruptly, changing focus from its activities off the battlefield to

its activities on the battlefield. Yet the image it produces remains a

consistent one of lightly armoured skirmishing troops. One further check can

be run, Eunapius was the main source for Zosimus up to AD 404, so a quick

scan of the battles described in book II should tell us whether Eunapius was

himself employing a formula.

Four battles are described between AD 312 and 324: the Milvian Bridge1;

Campus Ardiensis, called Cibalis by Zosimus2; Hadrianopolis, called the battle

of the River Hebrus by Zosimus 3; and Chrysopolis4. Since fourth century

cavalry was in general well armoured, we would expect mounted engagements

to be pitched battles, rather than the hit-and-run skirmishes favoured by

third century equite& This is exactly what we do find. At the Milvian

Bridge, both cavalry wings engaged one another, swiftly followed by the

infantry. The battle continued until Maxentius' cavalry broke, fleeing onto

the bridge which collapsed under their weight. Even though he was

outnumbered 10:1, according to figures given earlier by Zosimus, Constantine

did not skirmish with Maxentius' cavalry, but met them head-on. The figures

are obviously exaggerated, but the point remains the same; the cavalry simply

charged home. Events at the Milvian Bridge bore no resemblance to the

sophistication of Inimae or Emesa. At Campus Ardiensis, the cavalry did not

1,Zos, 11.16,2, Zas, 11.18-19,

3, Zos, I122'3-7.

4, Zos, I1.26'3,

5, 2os, fl.)5'1-2,- 73 -


even line up on the flank, but was placed in front of the infantry and

engaged the enemy with arrows, spears and javelins. The last two accounts

are confused and lacking in comprehensible detail. Yet we have learned

enough. Eunapius was not repeating himself. Each battle was being treated

on its own relative merits, and the patterns we have established are not the

result of a literary topo&

The equites Dalmatae outside Milan were, if anything, less independent

than the cavalry under Aureolus. They operated under the direct orders of

the commander in the field, supporting and supported by the infantry on the

battlefield, and maintaining a reconnaissance in force off it. A very

definite change in the role of cavalry had indeed come about, but it has

been misinterpreted and obscured by images of the fourth century comitatus.

The mobility of this new cavalry was certainly of very high importance1.

However, the equites were not yet powerful enough to carry out the

interception role which the cavalry of the comitatus were later to achieve.

Instead, the major innovation in the third century use of cavalry was to

integrate existing methods into the traditional Roman order of battle,

employing their capacity for extended reconnaissance and swift strikes in

combined cavalry/infantry strategy, Faced with barbarians seemingly raiding

at will along the borders of the empire, Gallienus was forced to restructure

the way in which the existing army worked. The cavalry was expanded and

1, Ii should be noted that the mobility of the barbarian invaders is not a 5ignificant factor in

the equation, Only the luthungi (Vandals) of Dexippus are depicted as having a large cavalry

contingent, and even this was outnumbered by the infantry at a ratio of 2:1, The Goths were more

noted for their seaborne raids, and It is significant that when they were on land they were often

engaged in prolonged seiges, They are also depicted as having large baggage trains, which will have

slowed them down enormously, as an army can only march as fast as its slowest component: Zos, 1.24.2,

42-43 & 45'1 Dexippus frag,6; Zon, XII . 26 Syncellus p. 717ff,

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M,C,Ibe.ji: C3 Army. Contra Comitatum

organised into new units of equltes, charged with the Job of finding the

enemy and goading it in the direction of the main imperial army. It was

mobile in that it ranged far afield to find its target. It was independent

in that it had the traditional freedom of an extended scouting force. Yet it

was not a field army. It was a loose agglomeration of individual units

subordinated to and operating from a traditional Roman army on campaign.

- 75 -

PARF 2:

1__l-1 Trditicri1 Uri1t

M,C.Ibeji. C3 Army

I V: L.EGIONE

In the earlier chapters, we established the general trends of

development which came about during the third century. Now it is time to

examine the effects of these trends upon individual troop types within the

Roman army. In the traditional manner, we shall begin with the legions.

Existing studies of later Roman legionaries usually contain the implicit

assumption that their importance was somehow diminished by the changes that

occurred within the Roman army. The image conjured up is of the empire

switching to a defensive posture for which the legion was unsuited, causing

it to lose its predominant position. As cavalry rose to the fore and the

vexillation became a permanent feature, splitting the legion into several

parts, the legion began to lose its tactical supremacy and consequently its

status. The argument is best summarised by Alföldi in his indispensible

article on the crisis of the empire; though it is put most forcefully by

Cooper, who went so far as to see this as the end of the legion, and by

MacMullen, who blamed the reforms of Septimius Severus for precipitating the

decline 1 . On the following pages, we shall examine the validity of this

assumption for the legion of the third century, merging it with the themes

of lack of manpower, the role of vexillations and the increased importance of

*, cf, also Appendix 1: 'The Antiqua Legioof Vegetius',

1, Alfôldj, CMXII (1939), 208ff; Cooper, C3 Origins of the New Roean Arwy, unpub, Oxford diss,(1967), chapter VII, entitled 'The End of the Legion' views the rise of the vexillation as the

harbinger of the legion's demise; MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian (1963), 21f, 154ff & 161ff wasconcerned more with the long-term effects of the legion's decline, but believed the rot set in at the

start of the third century,

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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Legiones

cavalry, which will be established later1.

A good starting point would be to determine how many new legions were

raised within the nominal timespan of our study. The end of the second

century saw a drastic need for troops, brought about by prolonged warfare

and the first (and probably worst) of a series of plagues which were to

strike the empire2. This manifested itself in part with the recruitment of

five new legions: II and III Italica, and the three Parthian legions of

Sept imius Severus. Each series was raised for different reasons; the Italian

legions were a desperate measure in response to the great barbarian invasion

of AD 167, while the Parthian legions were by comparison a less hectic

recruitment in preparation for Septimius' Parthian wars.

Ritterling observed that the raising of the Parthian legions was the

largest single recruitment of troops yet witnessed in the empire, with the

notable exception of the measures taken during the Year of the Four

Emperors4 . On the face of it, such massive recruitment would seem to

contradict the picture of manpower problems painted in the earlier chapters,

but a deeper analysis hints at complications probably caused by the

difficulty in finding the number of men required to fill the complement of

three entirely new legions.

Mommsen believed that Leglo I Parthica was raised prior to the other two

legions, basing his assumptions on the inscription of C. Iulius Pacatianus,

probably the first commander of the legion. This cites Pacatianus as:

I. ci', chh, II, VI & VII: Manpower, Vex//la tiones & Equites,2, ci', ch,II: Manpower,

3, Ritterling, 'Legio', RE 13001,4, Ritterling, op. cit., 13081,

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Legiones

praefectus legionis Parthicee, the omission of the numeral suggesting that no

other Parthain units had yet been raised 1 , This would explain Septimius'

extended pause in Rome after his defeat of Clodius Albinus, since it would

be at this point that the other two legions were raised. While Septiinius'

only objective had been the subjugation of Osrhoene and Adiabene, only one

extra legion may have been felt necessary; but the goalposts were moved by

the punitive action of the Persian king, Volgaeses, who had overrun

Mesopotamia and laid seige to the city of Nlsibis 2. Suddenly, a full scale

expedition had become necessary in response to Volgaeses' activity. However,

Septimius did not immediately march east, but remained in Rome for a period

of at least six months3 . He cannot have been occupied with reprisals

against the senate for so long, and if he had already raised the troops

needed for the campaign he is hardly likely to have tarried in face of the

seige of Nisibis. His vigorous response to all other threats encountered

during his reign runs counter to such a delay. Only if he was forced to

wait for the recruitment and training of more men can we explain this lack

of decisiveness,

The raising of a further Italian legion, IV Italica, has been posited in

the reign of Severus Alexander, however evidence for such a legion is

1, XII . 1856 & p230; but cf, Murphy 1 Reign of Severus froe the Evidence of Inscriptions (1945),66 for an argument against this on technical grounds, which I believe is invalidated by the chronology

outlined in my text,

2, Dio LIIV . 9; Miller, CAll XII, 16,

3, Albinus was defeated on 19 Feb. 197, Septimius may well have celebrated a triumph on his

return to Rome, as well as the quinquenelia, though the Ludi SeecuIere5 were not celebrated until May204, Both Dio and the S/IA refer to reprisals against the supporters of Albinus while in Rome, and the

coinage of 191 shows that Septimius departed sometime during the year, presumably for the relief of

Nisibis at the end of the summer Her, IlI • 8-9; Dio LXXY • 84; S/IA 5ev, XIIl . l-7; VI . 32326-32329; RIC

IY . 1, 103ff; Miller, bc, cit.

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M,C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Legiones

extremely tenuous. The only explicit reference to a Leglo IV Italica is in

the Notitia Dignit at urn, where it is listed among the legiones

pseudocornitatenses of the magister miUturn per orIentem 1 . Herodian spoke of

special levies from Italy and all the Roman provinces In preparation for

Alexander's Persian campaign; there is also epigraphic testimony of a

dilectus in Transpadanum during the reign2. The Historia Augusta claimed

that the later emperor Maxiininus was made tribune of a legion numbered IV

at this time by Severus Alexander3 . Ritterllng took this to refer to either

a Legio IV Italica or IV Parthica, and plumped for the former on the basis of

ILS 478, which refers to the novae Italicae suae of Maxirninus4 . Yet this

inscription must surely be referring to the reign of Maximinus Thrax himself,

and has no valididty for the reign of Severus Alexander. If any credence Is

to be given to the Historia Augusta whatsoever, we should follow Megle In

assuming that it has confused this tribunate with Maximinus' command of

troops on the Rhine and is referring to Legio IV F1avia, Without this to

give it direction, the other evidence could equally well indicate the creation

of an exercitus from forces in Italy and the provinces, or even more likely

an extraordinary levy to cope with the emergency. Since another inscription

attests to a recruiting drive in Italy which was definitely not linked to a

legion, the likelihood of a IV Italica having been raised at this time seems

extremely slim6.

1, Not, 01g. Or, VII•54,2, Her, V13 • 1; X . 3856 ItS 1173,3, S/IA, Mix, V.5,4, Ritter1ing RE 1329f,5, Magie Scrlptores Hlstoria Augustae III, Loeb ed,, 323 n,2,6, XIII6763 ItS 1188,

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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Legiones

Ritterling also believed that Legio I fllyricorum was raised in the third

century, by the emperor Aurelian. It appears in the Notitia Dignitatum

alongside the equites Illyriciani, which Ritterlirig assumed were placed in

the east by that emperor following his defeat of Palmyra in 272 1 . However,

I Illyricorum is not epigraphically attested until 316, and until firmer

evidence comes to light, I see no reason for dating it earlier than the

military reorganisation which took place under Diocletian2.

On similar grounds, I am lath to attribute .Zegio I Noricorurn and the

three Legiones Isaurae to a date earlier than Diocletian. I Noricorurn does

at least have one inscription which can be dated stylistically to the third

century 3 , though since all tegulae referring to the legion are of

indisputably late origin, there seems no reason to place it earlier than this

emperor4 . However, the earliest reference to the Legiones I&aurae comes

from Ammianus Marcellinus, who says Isauria was garrisoned by three legions

in AD 354g . In view of this, Ritterlirxg's assumption that these legions were

raised by Probus for his Isaurian campaign seems somewhat fanciful6.

Diocletian, as we well know, initiated a massive restructuring of the

Roman army. Contribution to the debate on the number of new legions he

created is outside the scope of this discussion, and has been dealt with in

greater detail elsewhere7 . Cooper named eight new legions definitely

1, Ritierling, RE 1406 and 'rämischen Heerwesen', Fest, C, Hirsch!elds (1903), 347; on theequites Illyriciani cf, ch,VII: Equites,

2, III6661; C/C 11 . 2941 = 1LS8875; ILS 8882,

3. 111.4803,

4, III . 4655a, 5756, 6489 & 11349.

5, Ama, Marc, XIV'2'14,

6, Ritierling, RE 1348,7, Van Berchem, L'Arse o'e Oioc]tien et la Re/one Consta/tinielrne (1952), 24ff; Parker,

'Legions of Diocletian and Constantine', IRS XXIII (1933), 175ff; A, H, M, Jones, Later Rosan Eepire(1964), 56ff; Seston, Diochtien el/a Tetrarchic (1946), 302ff; Williams, Diocletian and the RosanRecovery (1985), cap,7, 91ff,

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M.C.IbeJi: 03 Army. Legiones

created by him, and included three more probables1.

It would seem that, until Diocletian, no fresh recruitment of legions

occurred after the creations of Septitnius Severus. Even In the darkest

hours of the third century, the emperor looked elsewhere for troops with

which to meet the crisis, The question we must now attempt to answer is

whether this was due to a lack of willing citizen manpower with which to

construct new legions, or because the legions had had their day.

There were two main Incentives to join the legions: money and the social

status inherent in a lifetime career in the army. Money came in the form of

pay, regular donatives and a gratuity on discharge; the praemia mi1itia&.

The chronology of Herodian suggests that the reforms instigated by Septimius

Severus to improve conditions of service were introduced during the short

period between his defeat of Clodius Albthus and the start of the second

Parthian war3 . This is highly suggestive of measures taken to increase the

attractiveness of enlistment at precisely the point where Septimius needed

large numbers of legionary recruits. Such measures were indubitably

necessary. Salmon has demonstrated that the Roman army was constantly

plagued by problems of recruitment4 , and by the late second century these

problems had become exacerbated by hopelessly outdated rates of pay and

restrictive terms of service, not least the prohibitive length of enlistment.

Septimius could not do away with the latter if he wanted to retain a viable

fighting force, but he could and did come to terms with the other problems

1, Cooper, Origins, Appendix IV,2, Watson, Roaan Soldier (1969), 89ff, 108ff & 147ff,3, Her, 111.8-9,

4, Salmon, 'Roman Army and the Disintegration of the Empire', Trans. Royal Sac, Canada 52,ser, 111 . 2, 43ff,

- 81 -


of service. Pay was increased for the first time in 100 years, and the

soldiers were granted a whole series of privileges, among them the right to

marry'. By the time of Caracalla, it would seem that both legionary pay and

the praemia rnilitiae had risen in line with inflation 2. However, inflation is

a dynamic process, and by the late third century, soldiers' pay was largely

worthless, Even as early as AD 217, free rations were being introduced to

offset the declining value of military pay, and Dio speaks of the problems

encountered by Macrinus and Elagabalus in trying to meet the wage bill of

their army4.

By contrast, the social standing of the average soldier seems to have

improved during the chaos of the third century. Septimius' oft-quoted

advice, to 'enrich the troops and scorn everyone else' 8 , was indicative of the

underlying trend wherein the military had become the harbingers of the

empire's fate. The social avenues this opened to the more able veterans

were a reflection of this fact. In a later chapter I shall show how

Septimius Severus set into motion a snowballing process which turned the

army into a springboard of advancement for anyone with the requisite

ability6. It was now possible for the son of a peasant to enter the army

and progress by this route to the very heights of power, even achieving the

purple7.

1, Her, III8 • 4-5; Birley, 'Septimius Severus and the Roman Army', Ep, Stud, 8 (1969), 63f;Murphy, Severus fro. Inscriptions, 67ff; Wai5on, Roisan Soldier, 91,

2, Dio LXXVIII • 36; Watson, bc, cii,; Webster, Roisan lisper/al Any (1979), 257,3, Callu, 'Approches Numismatiques', A//RU 11 . 2 (1975), 602ff; Cravford, 'Finance, Coinage and

Money', AiVRU 11 . 2 (1975), 568,

4, Dio LXXVIII • 36 • 2-3; Birley, 'Economic Effects of Roman Frontier Policy', BAR S109 (1981),41ff,

5, Dio LXVI'15'2, 6, cf, ch,X: Wni Militares,7, The best examples are Maximinus Thrax and Aureolus: CA/I XII, 72; PLRE Aureolu Brunt,

'Princeps and Equites', IRS 73 (1983), 48f; Gage, Classes Soda/es (1964), 259; MacMullen, Soldier andCivilian, 96f,

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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Legiones

There is another side to this coin, however. While, as Watson put it,

"the direction of social mobility for the soldier was normally upward"1,

especially in the east, where prior to 212 men were often granted

citizenship on recruitment due to the lack of citizen manpower 2 ; service

within the army was hard. Burn has shown that the average life-expectancy

of veterans was lower than that of their civilian counterparts, indicating

that the Roman army had "considerable success in squeezing the best out of

its men before getting rid of them." 3 , adduced by Tacitus as one of the

reasons for the mutiny of AD 14. Salmon has suggested that enlistment in

the east suffered badly from the introduction of the Constitutio Antoniniana

in 212, removing as it did the principal inducement to military services.

His thesis Is in part borne out by what is admittedly an auxiliary example.

A study of the Dura rosters by Gilliam showed a severe tailoff in

recruitment for cohors XX Palmyrenorum which immediately followed the high

spate of Aurelii that heralded the introduction of the Constitutlo

Antoniniana. This came in the wake of Caracalla's preparations for the

Parthian war of 2 14/16, and was in marked contrast to the continued regular

recruitment which had followed the war of 203/4, seeming to indicate a lack

of interest in military service once the citizenship became an automatic

right, though it should be noted that even after 216 there was a constant

trickle of Aurelli into the army6.

I, Watson, Ro.an Soldier, 154,2, Salmon, 'Army and Disintegration', 49ff

3, Burn, 'Hic Breve Vivitu p ', PP4 (1953), 10 & 16,4, Tac, ,nn, I'17,5, Salmon, op. cit,, 56,

6, Gilliam, 'Dura Rosters and the Con5titutio Antoniniana', llist pj 14 (1965), 7Sf & 83f = Ro,anAny Papers, (1986), Discussed more fully in ch,V: Auxiiiae p.lO4ff,

- 83 -

M.C.Ibeji: 03 Army. Legiones

The reforms in the earlier part of the century seem to have been an

acknowledgement of the unattractiveness of military service. That they

ultimately failed Is clear from the introduction of compulsory service by

Dlocletian 1 . While the improvement of career prospects for capable recruits

may have served as inducement enough to maintain the legions at strength,

with the majority of recruits now being drawn from the Illyrian provinces2,

the system of voluntary enlistment still broke down in emergencies. At such

times, the emperor was forced either to resort to dilectus, or to use even

more drastic measures. The emperor Gallienus even went so far as to create

a new form of cavalry. Yet it is by no means clear that this action was

intended to replace the legion as the mainline unit of the Roman army. I

have already shown that the cavalry of Gallienus was designed to operate In

conjunction with, not instead of, the infantry of the legions. We shall see

that the legionary vexilletion assumed exceptional importance in the

defensive structure of the empire3.

Cooper has argued that the emergence of the vexillation as the strategic

unit of defence heralded the decline and disintegration of the classic legion

of the Principate4 . From one point of view, this makes a lot of sense. As

we shall see, the vexillat ion did play a key role in the latter part of the

third century. Cooper makes the interesting point that no legions were

recorded as destroyed during the century, despite the disastrous campaigns

1, Jones, Decline of the Ancient Vorid(1966), 213,2, Cooper, Origins, 284,3, As we have seen above (p.79), dilectus were called in Italy by Severus Alexander and during

the war against Maximinus, In the later part of the century, the usual response was to vexillate

legions from elsewhere; Gallienus responded to the problem by creating the equites DaJaatae cf,chh, III, VI & VII: Contra Coiitatwi, 'exillationes and Equites,

4, Cooper, op. cit., chapter VII: 'The End of the Legion', 288ff,

- 84 -


of Severus Alexander 0 Decius and Valerian, indicating the universal use of

vexillat ions since the Marcomannic wars1.

However, the predominance of the vexillation does not automatically

prove the disintegration of the legion. In the Notitia the majority of

legions are posted wholly in the same province, though there are numerous

exceptions4 , Furthermore, even when vexillated, they usually retained the

unit title , indicating that the Roman military mind was still thinking in

terms of 'leglo' rather than 'vexillatid3. Nor should we forget that the

standard vexillation was a detachment of legionarles, so that even if the

legion was indeed losing its supreme position, the legionary soldier was

still the standard 'grunt' of the Roman army. Nevertheless, the role of the

legion had changed, and the equipment used by its individual components had

evolved with it, This is illustrated nowhere more graphically than in the

history and function of a creation of the third century era itself; that of

Leglo II Parthica.

Recruited for the second Parthian war of Sept imius Severus, II PartMca

did not remain in the newly created province of Mesopotamia as did the other

Parthian legions, but accompanied Severus back to Italy, where Albanum was

to be its official base for most of the century 4 . Modern scholars have read

a great deal into this move, seeing It either as a means of browbeating the

I, Cooper, Origins, 246f,

2, eg, V Macedonica & XIII 6eaina whose vexillation had begun in the C3, They had components

in Dacia Ripensis, Egypt and also two different comitatensian armies: Not, 01g. Or, XLII•31-39;

IXVIII . 14-15: YIl39; VIII . 38, The ratio of 'single-province' legions to 'multi-province' ones is

27:19,

3, eg, the Dac Ian legg, P Mac, & XIII Gel,, can be found within the Notitia in Dacia Ripensis,Egypt, Italy, Thrace & the field army of the eagister ailitua per orientee, The title of XIII Gee, isomitted once, though it is cited 6 times (V//ac is cited 7): Not, Dig, Or, VII•39; VIIl . 38; XXYIII•14& 15; XLII'31-39, Legio XIII is unnamed in VIII.38,

4, Dio LV . 24 . 4; Ritterling, RE 1308 & 1478; Durry, Cohorte5 Prétoriennes (1938), 35 & 169,

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M.C.Ibe.Ji: C3 Army. Legiones

senate and "depressing the status of Italy" 1 , or as a "significant

foreshadowing" of the comitatensian armies of Diocletian 2. Neither view is

attractive, though it will be necessary to illustrate why before we can go

on to examine its true function in the scheme of things.

By AD 198, Septimius had nothing to fear from the senate. His purges

following the death of Albinus had removed all those likely to stand in his

way3, and it is moot point whether the senate had ever posed any real threat

to him. Even if such enforcement had been necessary, he hardly needed to

bring a legion back from the east to do the job, since he had on his

doorstep the men of the newly reconstructed Praetorian Guard, each of whom

owed him a personal debt of gratitude for their advanceinent. On his

victorious accession, Severus had made a point of removing his armour before

entering the gates of the city, despite the triumphant circumstances of his

arrival. This was hardly the action of a man contemptuous of Rome, If

Severus had wanted to snub the Senate, he had other more profitable means

at his disposal than bringing a legion onto Italian soil.

Platnauer in 1918 saw the existence of a legion at Albanum as a

precursor to the defensive field armies created by Diocletian. The argument

hinges upon the increase in numbers of the Praetorian Guard mentioned by

Herodian and quantified by Durrr. It views this, coupled with the Parthain

legion, as a force of some 30,000 troops within easy reach of the emperor

and acting as a central defensive reserve. The prosopographical records of

1, Miller, C.QH XII, 24; Fluss 1 'Septimius Severus', RE 1981; Besnier, VEipire Rouin,,, (1937),114,

2, Platnauer, Septilius Severus (1918), 162f Birley, 'Severus & the Roman Army', 66ff,3, Oio LXXV . 8; Herodian III8 . 6-8; SHA Severus XlII'1-7,4, Ourry, Priioriennes1 81ff,

5, Herodian 111 . 13 . 4; Durry, bc, cit,

- 86 -


several of Septixnius' most prominent generals have been used as a "further

indication of the de facto field army in being", and two passages from Dio

are also taken to illustrate the Severan use of cavalry as an "independent

striking force" in the manner of Gallienus and his successors1.

The main factor against this argument is the sheer immobility of the

Roman legion. The legionary was siinpiy not equipped to act as the member of

a mobile task fore, his panoply being too heavy and cumbersonie 2. Septimius

and his successors were most successful against accessible enemies who

either came out to meet them, as in the civil wars, or had an immobile focal

point which could act as a strategic objective, such as Ctesiphon in Parthia.

Against the more fluid tactics of the barbarians, they had to forgo the

power of the legions for the mobility of native troops such as the Osrhoeni

or the Moors. Only when the barbarians stopped to fight could the legions

be put to good use3. If II Parthica had been intended as a defensive force,

it would have been stationed In northern Italy, as was the cavalry of

Gallienus some fifty years later, As it was, a force of heavily arinoured

infantry stationed near Rome was in no position to provide quick help to any

likely trouble spot.

The prosopography cited In support of this theory merely names the dux

of a particular army for a particular series of campaigns. They provide

reasonable evidence for the use of vexillations during the civil wars, in

much the same way that Trajan or Marcus Aurelius had used detachments in

1, Oio LXXV • 7'4 LXXVI'6'8 Birley, 'Severus and the Army', 66ff,

2, cf, below (p.91) for a lull discussion of the changes undergone by Roman legionary equipment

during the century,

3, Dio UXVIII . 14 on Caracalla's campaign against the Cenni in 213 AD,

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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Legiones

their wars. In no way do they suggest the permanent retention of such a

force after the crisis had passed 1 . The passages from Dio are also

concerned with the civil wars, and simply show L. Valerius Valerianus

outflanking Pescennius Niger at the battle of Issus, a standard ancient

cavalry tactic, and a certain Laetus In command of the cavalry holding back

until he could see who was going to win the day, also standard practice if

you take a cynical view of the world. Later in the reign Laetus was

executed for his pains2.

The real function of II Parthica was, however, very similar to the idea

of a defensive reserve. As Luttwak showed, the old system of 'preclusive'

defence on which Septimius was forced to rely assumed that all threats would

be met by sufficient force on the outer cordon of the empire3. The

campaigns of the Seven were mainly intended to defuse the threat of

invasion by carrying the war to the potential aggressor 4 , but for this they

needed troops. In bringing back II Parthica to Italy, Septimius created not a

defensive reserve, but en offensive onet a nucleus of troops, sade up of the

Praetorians and the Parthian legion, which could be taken by the emperor on

campaign to satisfy the need for troops over and above those in the border

provinces concerned. Of these, II Parthica was by far the most important,

since the primary function of the Guard on campaign, even during the third

century, was to safeguard the person of the emperor5.

I, P1,? II, C 823, C 878 & I 1566; 1L52935 & 1141; AE1957,123 all cited in Birley, 'Severus and

the Army', 67, Also cf, ILS 1153 n,6 and AE 1890, 82 which go some way towards clarifying the problems

identified by Birley with Claudius Gallus and C, lulius Castinus,

2, Herodian lII7 . 4 and note I,

3, Lutiwak, grand Strategy of the Roean Lip/re (1976), ch, 2,4, With the probable exception of Caracalla's Parthian war, cf, Miller, CHXII, 48ff,

5, Campbell, fiperor and the Roian 4ray (1984), 114f,- 88 -


Apart from the Parthian war, Septimius never needed to use this reserve

himself. There were enough local troops available to satisfy the

requirements for his British campaign, with additional troops being drawn

from Germany, which was more convenient than transporting an entire legion

from Italy 1 . His successors, on the other hand, made full use of the legion.

its presence is attested at Antioch under Macrinus2, where it must have been

participating in Caracalla's Parthian war. Similarly, it was caught up in the

conflict between Maximinus Thrax and the senate. Some of its soldiers were

responsible for the assassination of the former3 , The legion had obviously

been part of his Dacian army prior to h18 march on Rome. It would also seem

to have been used across the Danube by Severus Alexander 4 . The legion was

also one of four mentioned on the V P(la) V F(idells) coinage of Gallienus,

which Maria Alföldi believed dated to that emperor's campaigns on the Rhine

in 257/86. There are therefore good instances of II Parthica being used as

an offensive core to which vexillatlons could be attached, and it is clear

that its presence in Italy was not of paramount importance.

Under Gallienus, a vexillat ion of the legion is found alongside a

detachment from III Augusta, sub cura Au,-. Augustiani ducis iustissimi at

Lychnidus on Lake Ochrid in Macedonia6 . It has been suggested that they

were part of an exercitus campaigning against the Gothic invasion of AD2677.

1, XlII'3494; Her, III'14'3, ri 'a1eria Pictrix does not seec to have been involved, Breeze,Northern Frontiers of Rosaii 8ritain (1982), 135ff,

2, Dio LXXIX'34,

3, Ensslin, CAHXII (1939), 80,4, Ensslin, op. cit., 71,

5, M, Alföldi, Liies Congress 1957 (1959), summarised in Cooper, Orig/ns, 234ff & 266ff, cf,ch,Vl: Vexiliationes, p.147 for a full discussion,

6, AE 1934, 193; ,,, vex/il, leg, Ii Perth, III Aug. sub cure Aur, Atigustiani duds iustissiei et', tRYJuII Syn for/an, praep, vex/I/a I 10 Inue,,,

7, PLRE, August/anus 2 Pflaum, Carriêpes Procuratoriennes (1960), 919ff,

- 89 -


Yet while a vexillat ion of II Parthica could plausibly be involved in such a

campaign, it seems inconceivable that the African legion could have been

transported to the area fast enough to respond to such an emergency. The

only reasonable explanation is that the vexillation of III Augusta was

already at Lychnidus before the Gothic troubles erupted. If this is so, it

is also more probable that II Parthica had been vexillated into the area at

the same time, in accordance with the custom of stationing vexillations in

pairs which seems to have been prevalent 1 . This then leads to the

inescapable conclusion that, far from being moved into the area in response

to the Gothic threat, the force in Lychnidus was part of a garrison force

established to defend the Illyrian passes. Like Aureolus in Italy2,

Augustianus would have had responsibility for the protection of the

Macedonian hinterland, charged with preventing incursion from Illyricum into

Greece. As such, this marks a distinct change In the role of Leglo II

Parthica, with significant consequences for the role of legions as a whole.

II Parthice was the core of imperial offensive capability. By vexillating

this into a defensive mode, Gallienus had unconsciously signalled a

fundamental change in imperial thinking. No longer was the army expected to

protect the empire through a series of punitive measures. Instead, it was

being converted into the first approximation of what Luttwak classified as

'defence-in-depth's . The punitive wars of Aurelian were the last truly

offensive operations of the third century, and even these were in response

to Gothic invasion and Pa].myrene usurpation.

1,111 . 954 & 3228; V808; 419O1,154; 41935,164; AE,193653,54 & 57,2,Zos, I . 40 . 1 cf, chil: Contra Coiltatwi,

3, Lutiwak, 6rano' strategy, 132ff,4,Alföldi, CA/IXII, 152 & 302ff.

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In response to these changes, the equipment of the legionary soldier

evolved to meet the new demands. To date, the only systematic study of

these changes has been In a short article by J. C. Coulston, though I am

reliably informed that a thorough study of third century military equipment

Is currently underway in Oxford'. Such a study Is long overdue.

Coulston relies heavily on funerary monuments because, as he puts it:

The sculptural monuments of Rome are quite useless for thIrd century equipment studies, The

arches of Severus are very heavily stylised in the large panels and hopelessly conservative in

the soldier-prisoner pedestal rel:ef5, The Constantinian panels on the Arch of Constantine are

for the most part the product of sarcophagus sculptors and the style is not concerned with small

details,,, 2

Where the Arch of Constantine is concerned, one can go further and show

that certain of its representations were direct copies from the column of

Marcus Aurelius, completely nullifying their usefulnes&. By contrast,

Coulston's study highlights the close parity between funerary monuments and

the archaeological record. In particular, he noted the absence of round

chapes (scabbard trimmings) on British tombstone depictions, which do not

occur in the province's archaeological record, though they are common

elsewhere in the empire4.

The rise of the vexillation seems to have coincided with the development

of a new panoply, markedly different from that of the early Principate. The

infantry paenula is replaced by the shorter cavalry cloak, the sagum. A

1, Coulston, 'Roman ilitary Equipment on Third Century Tombstones', &QR $336 (1987), 141ff,

Simon James' study in London has never been published: Esmonde-Cleary & Tomlin perse, coma,

2, Coulston, op, cit., 145,

3, RobInson, Ariour of J'speriai Roie (1975), plates 498 & 499 on p.185,4, Coulston, 143 & nil,

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M.C.Ibe.ji: C3 Army. Legiones

long-sleeved tunic is worn, gathered at the waist by a wide belt (the

cingulura) which Is fastened at the front by "an almost ubiquitous 'ring-

buckle" 1 , This buckle was to become the distinguishing feature of military

dress to the extent that the Praetorians cashiered by Septimius Severus had

their belts removed2.

The sword was of variable length, though the spa tha may have become

more prevalent as the century wore on. Of greater importance was its

method of attachment. No longer was it suspended statically from the right

hip, but it was now slung on a baidric from the left, and was attached to

the cingulum by a slide3. Such a suspension suggests a more open style of

fighting. Traditional Roman close order tactics required that the soldier

put his weight behind the shield, which was obviously designed to shoulder-

barge an enemy. When such a method Is adopted, it is clearly more sensible

to suspend the sword from the right hip, where it will not be impeded by the

pushing and shoving of the shield. Consequently, a shift of suspension to

the left hip, coupled with the lengthening of the sword, is indicative of a

change in tactics to a more open, fencing style of combat. Since the shields

depicted progressively lose the distinctive shape of the scuturn becoming

broader and squatter, and pila are gradually replaced by hastae or shorter,

barb-headed weapons, such a switch of tactics seems assured4.

Consistent with such a change would be the abandonment of lorica

segmentata. This classic suit of Roman armour seems always to have been

1, Coulston, op. cit (n,l above), 141f,

2, Her, II'13'1O Coulston, 149,

3, Coulston, 143 & 147f,

4, Couleton, 141 & 148, Note that the neck guards of legionary helMets also increased in size:

Robinson, Ariour of LeperiI Roae,

- 92 -


more difficult to maintain than other types of lorica, and Robinson's study

has illustrated how it had become increasingly less elaborate throughout its

history 1 . Various furierary depictions suggest that lorica hamata (chain

mail) was never completely phased out of fashion, and while Robinson is of

the opinion that the Tropaeum Tralani depicts chain- and scale-clad

legionaries because of the peculiar weaponry used by the Dacians 2 , my own

personal belief is that it is a more accurate representation of the true

state of affairs than the classic public monuments at Rome. The last

depiction of a suit of lorica segmentata comes from the Arch of Severus

dated AD 203, and the first datable evidence for the third century panoply

comes from AD 211, on which the sagum and ring-buckle are represented4.

Lorica segmentata seems specifically tailored to the classic Roman order of

battle, wherein the lower part of the torso and the legs were covered by the

scutum and therefore did not have to be protected. It is therefore highly

likely that as a more open style of combat began to be practised, this

somewhat quirky mode of protection should fall by the wayside. Certainly, by

the late fourth century the only remnants of laminated armour were banded

protections for the limbsB.

As the history of II Part hi ca has illustrated, the function of the

legions had changed dramatically by the later third century. No longer

I, Robinson, Ariour of liperial Roae 177ff & 181,2, Robinson, op. cii,, 159f & 169ff,

3, For an article in support of my own particular prediudices, cf, Coulsion, 'The Value of

Trajan's Column as a Source for Nilitary Equipment', 9AR S476 (1989), 31ff, Lepper & Frere concur

with Richmond's view that the Tropaeui was roughly hewn by local sculptors, This does not negate itsvalue as evidence compared to Trajan's column in Rome 1 which despite the Maestro's conscientious

approach still adopted 'artistic convention to clarify the narrative': Trujan's Coluan (1988), 266 &298ff,

4, Robinson, 183; Coulston, 'Equipment on C3 Tombstones', 143,

5, Not, Dig, Or, Xl'2; Not, Dig, 0cc, IX'2,

- 93 -


expected to undertake continual punitive campaigns across the frontiers, they

had become heavily vexillated, spread thinly over the empire in an attempt to

cover as many major routes of access into the hinterland as possible. The

emperors were unable to rest on their laurels however. They were if

anything even more busy than they had been in earlier centuries, required to

respond to incursions throughout the empire which gradually escalated to

endemic proportions. To face these threats, they would hastily assemble an

army of vexillations, later coupled with cavalry, and move to intercept the

invader. It is worth reiterating that nowhere is there firm evidence that

the same force of equites or vexillationes was being used for each campaign,

In fact, what little evidence we have is precisely contrary to this

assumption'. Nonetheless, the legions were required to change in response

to their new circumstances, and their equipment became tailored to a freer-

flowing, more open style of combat.

This should not be taken to indicate a fall in discipline or capability2.

Nor does it herald the end of the legion9. As late as 272, when combined

cavalry/infantry tactics would seem to have become the normd, the emperor

Aurelian was still able to command his infantry to storm the suburb of

Daphnae in Antioch (a steep height occupied by Palmyrene soldiers) in tight

formation, with their shields held close togethers. This sounds extremely

I, All relevant material is cited and discussed throughout chapters III & VI: Contra Coaifatusiand Vexillationes, in which I have proven that the equifes at Milan were not the same force of equitescampaigning in the Danube, and questioned the validity of numismatic evidence for determining the

composition of armies,

2, MacMullen, bc, cit, (above p76),

3, Cooper, Origins, cap,VII,4, ci, ch,III: Contra Coiitatua 70ff,5, Zos, I.52'l-2,

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M,C.Ibeji: 03 Army. Legiones

like a test udo In action. Even If It is not, the success of the operation

proves that the Roman legions were still capable of tightly disciplined

close-order marioeuvres under fire. Cooper himself showed that as late as

Valerian and Gallienus, the unity of the legion was still assured 1 . When

Legio III Augusta was recalled, It set up inscriptions commemorating the

reintroduction of several of its traditions. A retiring Pr-linus Pilus

dedicated a statue to Mars In the time-honoured way 2 , and the tabularium

principis was restored by the optiones of the first cohort s . At the same

time, a further inscription Illustrates that the system of shuffling optiones

up the file of cohorts In order was still in operation 4. This indicates that,

despite being vexillated into Macedonia on a semi-permanent basisE, Legio III

Augusta still retained Its own unit identity and customs. The legion had

not come to an end, but It had come to a watershed, and had developed

accordingly. The fact that Diocletlan was still creating units which styled

themselves Legio (albeit of a possibly smaller size6 ) illustrates the

continued importance of the legion into the fourth century, both as an

organisation and as a fighting unit.

1, Cooper, Origins, 2751,

2, ILS 2296,

3, ILS 2446,4, ILS 531, linked to ILS 2446 above by naming the lowest ranking optic of the latter as an

optio in a different cohort,5, Al, 1934, 193 discussed above, p.901,6, Duncan-Jones has shown that the size of legions within the Panopolite nome of the Thebaid

could have been as little as 500 men, One should remember that III Diocletiana, his main example is

listed in five places within the Notitia (three within the Thebaid alone), It is entitled 111

Olocletiana Thebaeorwa in the coiltatus of the aagister cilifu, per Thracias which is more likely tohave been a vexillation of the legion than a separate citation of the legion, If each known

detachment of the legion was approx, 500 strong the legion would be half the size of a legion of the

Principate, If, however, vexillations were of variable size (which seems more likely) the stump of

the legion could have been somewhat larger, Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Oiocletian's Army',

Chiron 8 (1978), 541ff; Not, Dig, Or, YIII • 37; XXVIII . 18; XXXI'31, 33 & 38.- 95 -

V: AUXIL.IA NUMERIQUE

The development of the Auxilia following the reign of Trajan is a topic

of such enormous scope that one cannot hope to do it just ice in the space of

a single chapter. Ideally, it should be the subject of an independent study,

wherein the creations of Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, the Seven and their

successors would be discussed, and their movements along with those of

already existing units could be charted. As it is, this chapter can only

scratch the surface of the monster by trying to answer those questions which

are pertinent to the subject in hand. No attempt has been made at

comprehensivity, nor do I make any claim to definitiveness. I merely hope to

have provided some general answers to general questions which have relevance

to the third century as a whole.

In his study of the Auxilia, Cheesman concluded that the pressures of

the third century resulted in the breakdown of old distinctions between the

legions and auxiliaries, as permanent field armies came to the fore and those

units which remained on the frontier diminished in status'. In this vein,

the Auxilia and the 'old style' numeri have become eclipsed In modern

commentaries by what is variously termed 'the rise of the ethnic units' or

'the barbarisation of the army', so much so that by the time of Gallienus,

they have been completely discounted in favour of the new 'elite' forces of

ethnic cavalry which have become ubiquitous In any discussion of the later

1, Cheesman, Auxilia of the Roian laperial Any (l914) 133ff esp, 136f,

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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia

third century 1 . The main function of this chapter is to view this

assumption from the perspective of the Auxilia, I shall attempt to ascertain

when 'true' auxiliary units ceased to be recruited, where they were

stationed, and how they were used. Some discussion of their size must needs

be included, as must an analysis of the effect of the Constitutio Antoniniana

upon auxiliary recruitment. I shall end by charting the survival of pre-

Diocletianic units into the Notitia Dignita turn, before going further in a

following chapter to use this document as a basis upon which to found a

study of the equites supposed to have replaced the old order.

As with the legions, I shall begin by identifying those units newly

raised in the late Principate. Given the deplorable state of the evidence, it

seems a minor miracle that any records of new units survive at all. Around

the date AD 145, a drastic downturn occurs in the epigraphic record, and the

previous flood of inscriptions concerning the Auxilia becomes a niggardly

trickle. This is partially offset by the more detailed evidence now produced

by third century papyri, such as the Dura archive and the Beatty papyri from

Penopolis; but even here the evidence is perforce parochial, and largely

limited to the first and last quarters of the century respectively. The

emphasis provided by such a corpus is of heavy recruitment under the

Antonines and the Seven, followed by a severe tail-off in the mid third

century. If this is a truly accurate picture, it is an important confirmation

of the generally held thesis outlined above. Yet it could be a view

distorted by the lack of relevant material. A closer look is required before

, Mö1di, C48 (1939), 210; Cheesman, bc, cit. (p96); Dc Bbois, Policy of Me(iperor 6allienus (1976), 26ff; Speidel, 'The Rise of Ethnic Units in the Roman Imperial Army', ANR'11 . 3 (1975), 202ff, RoianArayPupers(1984), 117ff,

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia

any conclusions can be reached.

The high spate of units with the kaiser'beiname 'Aurelia' are mainly

clustered in the south-eastern provinces of Illyricuni, centered upon Moesla

Superior 1 . Why this should be so is a mystery. It cannot have been in

preparation for the Marcomannic war, since for that they should have been

gathered in Pannonia, and it is clear that certain of these units remained in

Moesia for decede8. The only known creation of Marcus in Pannonia was cob.

II Aurelia Dacoruir1', and that was stationed in Poetovio, well away from the

front. It is also unlikely that they were raised in response to losses from

the greet plague of the 160s, for though we know that the plague swept

throughout the empire, there is no indication that it was especially bad in

Moesia. If, as is believed, it was brought back from Farthia by the

expedition of Lucius Verus, we would expect the brunt of Its effect to have

been felt in the eastern provinces, yet there is no indication of any great

Antonine recruitment in the east,

It is possible that since Moesia Superior was the closest well-

garrisoned province to Pannonia, its legions, IV Fla via and VII Claudia, were

required to provide more troops to the Marcomannic war than was the norm.

I, cf, Table A1 Awxiiia first appearing after AD 16/, and A2: Auxilia of dubious date orprovenance, Due to the limited scope of this study, the units of the C2 have not recieved thedetailed analysis they deserve, The creations of Marcus Aurelius have recieved only the most

perfunctory treatment, and those of his predecessors have not been examined at all,

2, Coh, 11 Aur°.Iia nova ii), eq. CR, first appeared on the Moesian/Dal3atian border in 179, Itwas still there, in Sto j nik ( j ust south of Singidunum) under Caracalla, though there are indications

that at least part of the unit had been moved to Thracia by Marcus: 111 . 14537 & 14541; AF,1901,24;

1910,98 & 1955,65, Cob, II Aurelia Dardanorwi iii, eq. was in the area around Ravna (slightly northof Naissus) from the time of Its first appearance until AD 242: 111 . 14556 & 14576; AF,1902,31;

1903,288 & 290; 1904,92; 1910,93, 94 & 97; 1952,189-191,

3, 1I115l84", Poetovzo in Pannonia Superior,

4, For a good synthesis if the sources on the plague, cf, Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus

Aurelius', A/PM!, 73(1961), 227ff Roean Any Papers (1986), 229ff cf, ch,11: Manpover,- 98 -


Despite being sheltered behind the buffer of Dada, the province was still

open to barbarian incursion: the Marcomannic war had been ushered in by

troubles all the way along the Middle Danube'. Marcus may have felt it

prudent to replace the drain on Moesia's legionary garrison with newly

created auxiliary units. This would explain the large proportion of milliary

units found in the area1 and also the appearance of coh. II Aurelia nova inil.

eq. CR. in 179; which probably acted as the counterbalance to a suggested

extra levy of legionaries required for the push planned Just prior to Marcus'

death2.

By far the largest recruitment came under the Severan dynasty. Thirteen

out of the twenty-six new units recorded come from the period between 198

and 238. Nine of these are 'ethnic', in that they have been drawn from

recruiting grounds hitherto tapped only for numeri if at all. Prominent

among them are the Moorish units and units of eastern archers, both of which

first became part of the regular Auxilia at this juncture. Septirnius Severus

created the milliary units coh. I 1-lemesenorum sag. and cob. I nova

Severiana Surorum sag., and probably recruited the series of Moorish cohorts

of which we know cohortes 11 and 1X4. Under his successors, these troops

became so important that they may have gained household status, and even

acted as kingmakers on more than one occasions, In particular, Osrhoenian

1, Weber, 'The War in Germany', CA/I XI, 349ff,

2, Weber, op, cit.

3, This does not include 'dubious' units such as the ala Paiyrenorui in Dacia, the alaAtectorigiana in Pamphylia and the cob, Partborui on the Jiies Tingitana, which should probably bedated to the Seven: AE,1974,565b; 1926,74 & 75; 1956,62,

4, Cl, Table Al, ii Mauroriii is first atested in 235, but must surely be part of the seriesincluding II Haurorue from AD 208,

5, Her, VI1'1 • 8 & VIlI • 1 . 9; S//A iYa IIl; Syncellus p674; Alfäldj, CA//XII, 73 & 199f; Speidel,'Ethnic Unhi g ', 211ff; on the eqwite.c iteeque pedites Maur cf, chh, III & VII Contra Coeltatirn andEqute5pp,63 & 164,

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archers and Moorish Javelinmen figure promInently in the accounts of all

wars from 213 onwards 1 . Yet the last known recruitment of these into the

regular Auxilia is the coh. mi.Z, Maurorum eq. first attested in Aquincum i-n

2352 . The lack of numerals for this and another less securely dated coh.

quingenaria Maurorum eq.3 suggest that they were not part of the sequence

created by Septimius Severus. The milliary cohort bears the gentilicium

Maxirni(nlian(a) on one of its corroborating inscriptions 1 which suggests that

it may have been stationed in the area by that emperor in the wake of his

successful Alemannic war, though it seems most likely that it was originally

raised by Severus Alexander or his predecessors.

Indeed, the high numerals on some of the Severan inscriptions are

unusual. Throughout the early Principate, most large sequences were in the

region of eight units strong: the only exception to this being the cohoi-tes

Gallorum. Yet even these only went as high as XI 4 . In contrast, under the

Seven we find the cohortes IX Maurorum, XII Palaestinorum and X.'(

Palmyrenorum mu. In the latter case, the large numbers, especially linked to

a milliary unit, have prompted commentators to posit a composite series in

support of which not only the units already mentioned are cited, but even

alae and cohortes from the Notitia Dignitatuffls.

1, Dio LXXVIII'J41; 32; Her, 1I13 • 4-5; 92; IV'lS • I; VI7 • 8; VlI'2 . 1-2; Vl1l • 1'3; Zon, XIJ•24;

Zos, 1 . 15; 20 5l'2-3,

2, IIL3444, 3542, 3545, 20673 & 10375,

3, 111 . 3324, Lusonium, Pann, Inf, Mention should also be made of 111 . 9539 from Dalmatia,

containing the title ,.,Hairorus,,,, though without any further corroborating evidence ii is

impossible either to date it or state what kind of unit these Moors were,

4 Holder, Sfiio'ies in the Auxilia of the Roaeii Any fros Augustus to Ira/an, BAR S70 (1980),Appendix III, esp, 221, I have discounted the many cohortes Yolwntanioniia which were recruited atdifferent times throughout the history of the empire,

5. Gilliam, 'The Cohors IX PaThyrenorut its History', Oura Final Report V . 1: The parcheents aPapyri (1959), 27 Rocan Any Papers (1986), 212; E, Birley, 'Septimius Severus and the Roman Army',(p. Stua 8 (1969), 68,

—100-

M.C.IbeJi; C3 Army. Auxilia

Gilliam claimed that:

,,,it is quite Incredible, first, that so many cohorts would have been raised at one time from

the territory of Palmyra, especially sinc, it continued to supply men for units of other types

and, secondly, that nineteen other Palmyrene cohorts should have left no trace of their

existence,

Yet we know from its later history that Palmyra was quite capable of

raising an army which could see off the Persians and challenge the Romans,

proving that its manpower base was strong2. Southern has shown that while

occasional levies of Pelmyrenes may have been sent to maintain the eastern

flavour of numer'i elsewhere in the empire, troops in these units were also

recruited locally3 , so that Palmyr&s commitments to units of other types was

negligible in terms of manpower.

Mann made the suggestion that the cohort was a native Palmyrene unit

stationed at Dura which was seconded into the Roman army when Syria was

split into two, and Dura and Palmyra found themselves In different

provinces4 . This has the virtue of explaining why there are no other extant

cohortes Palmyrenorum, as well as giving a reason for the unusual

organisation of the cohort 6 . However, it does not explain why coh, XII

Palaestinor'um, recorded in P.Dura 30, should be the only extant unit in

1, Gilliam, bc, cit (n,5 above),

2, Zos, 1 . 39; l'44 & 1 . 50-61, while it is clear that the raising of an army for campaign is

something of a different order to providing a permanent standing force of 10,000-20,000 men, Zosimus

doe5 make it clear that the Palmyrene army was itself a sizeable force before its combination with the

remnants of Valerian's eastern troops,

3, Southern, 'The Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army', Britannia XX (1989), 90 & 91,4, cf, Isaac, Litits of Eapire (1990), 144 n,221, In a similar vein, Augustus cobbled together

the Leglo XXII Delotariana from 2 native legions created by King Deiotarus of Galatia, to aid Caesaragainst Pharnaces after the battle of Pharsalus: Caes, Bell, Qle. XXXIV . 4; Parker, Roaa Legions, 64&88f,

5, cf, below p,T21f

—101--


the Palestinian series1.

A composite series is certainly not the answer, since it creates more

problems than it solves whilst flying directly in the face of Roman

convention. Why, we must ask, were the cohortes I Septimia Bel&arvm, I mu.

Hem esen orum and I mu, nova Severiana Surorum sag. not included in the

composite sequence, especially since the latter two are found in the same

province? How does this explain XX' Palmyrenorum being a milliary unit? It

does not.

My own point of view favours a partial acceptance of Mann's hypothesis.

The suggestion that the unit was part of the native Pa]inyrene militia simply

solves too many associated problems to be overlooked. The hypothesis

assumes that at some point at least nineteen other units existed under the

Palinyrene standard. In view of what has already been said about Palmyra's

capability for warfare, I do not see this as a problem, especially since the

city had maintained a long-term military presence to secure its caravan

routes as early as AD 54. Nor need its units have been all as large as XX

Palmyrenoz-um, since we are not dealing with a Roman convention here2. In

view of the discussion in earlier chapters about the third century military

situation, it would seem only natural for Septimius Severus to incorporate

Palmyrene forces into the Roman army on Its elevation to a coloni&. As to

1, A co/,ors /111 ?alaestinorus is cited in the Notitia (Or, XXXIV . 46, Palaestina), and if we take

this into account, we must also explain the presence of an ala VIII Palayrenoru. in Not, Dig, Or,XXXI . 49, the Thebaid,

2, On the Palmyrene presence along the Euphrates, both before and after Roman intervention 1 cf,

Isaac, Liiits or Eapire (1990), 150f, esp, n,239, Only on their incorporation into the Roman armywould the units need to be organised along vaguely Roman lines, as was IA' PaIiyrenorue, ISRR 1033

mentions a vex, Paliyrae a'egentibus in the city itself in AD 242/3, On the internal structure, cf,

below p.121,

3, cf, chh,Il, VI & IV Manpower, Vexillationes a Legiones, Palmyra was given the colonia tunaIta/ici some time during the late 190s, though whether this was before Severus' Parthian war or after

i5 debatable: Isaac, Liiits of Empire, 144; Miller, CAM XII I 18,

—102-

M.C.Ibe,Ji: C3 Army. Auxilia

their survival into the epigraphic record, approximately 510 auxiliary units

are recorded throughout the first two centuries AD, When, compared to this,

only 26 unequivocal references can be found to units created in the third

century, it seems to me more inconceivable that we should expect to find

records of other Palmyrene units than the fact that we do not, Indeed, we

should consider ourselves lucky that the Dura rosters have revealed to us

another two hitherto unknown series, rather than begrudging the dearth of

information concerning them. We shall see later that only one post-Hadrianic

unit is actually recorded as having survived into the Notitia Dignitatum, and

even that only tentatively 1 . To reiterate my comment at the start of this

section, it is a minor miracle that any records survive at all.

Nevertheless, the relatively high influx of auxiliary units posited under

the Seven remains unusual. There may have been a heavy recruitment to

replace the losses of the late second century. In the forty years between

160 and the end of the century, the empire had experienced two great

plagues, a civil war, two Persian wars and a barbarian war which had dragged

on for fifteen years; not to mention the internecine raids and usurpations

which had to be stamped out. Parts of the army were probably battered

almost beyond recognition, and Sept imius Severus was the first emperor since

Marcus Aurelius who either cared enough or had the time to put it back

together again. Added to this general state of decline, new recruits were

probably needed to meet with the strategic requirements created by

Septimius' actions in the east and in Africa. He had already raised three

I, Coh, I Ai,eIiana, which was possibly the coh, Piaasens(iva) iure(1iana) of ñ19O8,136: Not,

01g. Or, XL48.

-103-

M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia

new legions to cope with the situation, and the high numerals of his

auxiliary levies probably reflect the large amount of new troops brought in

to support these and fill the gaps elsewhere. We shall see later how this

related to Africa.

The effect of the Constitutio Antoniniana is of importance here. Thanks

to the sterling work of Gilliam on the Dura rosters, Salmon's thesis that the

grant of citizenship removed the principle inducement for service can now be

tested 1 . An analysis of Gilliam's figures show the following enlistment

pattern:2

DATES MAJOR IV1ENTS

PEDITES EQUES DROMEDARII

192-196 civil wars & let Parthian war 16 62 12

197-201 second Parthian war 29 114 2

202-206 Severus in Africa 135 131

1

207-211 Severus in Britain

53 12

1

212-216 Constitutio & Caracalla's PW 282 19 13

217-221 Macrinus and Elagabalus 14 0 1

Too many external factors are in operation for any definitive statements

to be made. Caracafla's Parthian expedition was abortive, so that despite

the heavy recruitment of AD 214 to 216 there was no corresponding upswing

in casualties, meaning that the unnaturally low enlistment figures for the

five year period 217-221 may be simply the cause of the unit's natural

recruitment patterns. On the other hand, the emperor Macrinus did suffer a

1, 6ilIiam, 'Dura rosters and the Cons^iiutio Antoninalana', H/utopia 14(1965), 74ff = RosanAny Papers (1986), 289ff; Salmon, 'Roman Army and the Disintegration of Empire', Trans. Royal Soc,Canada 52, ser, 111 . 2, 43ff,

2, Based on the figures extrapolated by Billiam from P,Dura 100 & 101,

-104-


reverse near Nisibis in Mesopotamia soon after his accession 1 , so some

casualties may have been incurred, It should also be borne in mind that

even after the unit had recovered from the losses of Septimius Severus' wars

with the recruitments of 202-206, it was still recruiting over 50 people

while Severus was otherwise occupied in Britain.

What cannot be ignored is the fact that the figures for 217-221 are the

first post Cons titutlo statistics which were not directly affected by the

preparations for Caracall&s Parthian war, and they show the lowest rate of

enlistment in the entire sequence. According to Gilliam's calculations 2, the

figures for the equites are lagging ten years behind those for the pedites,

so that they actually represent the state of a specific group of veterans

and should be removed from the calculation, Even were this not the case,

the rate of enlistment for equites in AD 222, the last year covered by the

rosters, has still not increased above zero. The number of pedites enlisted

in 222 was 10. Prior to the Constitutio, only the years 192, 194, 197/8 and

211 had worse figures, and of those all the dates in the 190s are times at

which the unit was likely to have been away on campaign, unable to

concentrate on enlistment 9 . The annual fluctuations downward are only

significant in the extended period immediately following the death of

Caracalla, and these exhibit a marked shortfall which may be explicable in

terms of the Constitutio Antoniniana, though certainty is sadly unobtainable,

We can only lament the lack of any firm figures for the five year period

following 221, which would have indicated whether this trend was

1, Miller, CAHXII, 50,

2, Gillia., 'Dura Rosters', 76ff,

3, Gilliam, op. cii,, 751,

-105-


temporary or permanent1.

The latest period at which new units are recorded in the regular Auxilia

is during the joint reign of Valerian and Gallienus. Most of the units at

this point are first attested circa 253, and it should be noted that two

cohortes numbered VII & VIIi Fida are known, implying a sizable influx of new

troops2. Following this, references to new auxiliary units dry up completely

until the reign of Diocletian, when three new auxiliary units appear in the

Beatty papyria. Since the papyri date from late in the reign, we can assume

that Diocletian had completed his overhaul of the army by this point, and

that the units were probably his own creations4 . These observations lend

some validity to the idea that the role of the Auxilia was being usurped by

the new 'ethnic' units of the later third century, especially since their

disappearance from the record coincides so neatly with the appearance of

Gallienus' equites Dalmataes. Yet before we condemn the Auxilia to

obscurity, we should take note that new units were appearing under

Diocletian. We should also bear in mind that over 100 units termed elae and

cohortes appear for the first time in the Not itia Diffnita turn, with no

1. Since we do not know the purpose for which the partial roster of AD 222-228, P,Dura 102, waswritten, we cannot use this with any confidence to continue the sequence, On the other hand, a

compari5on of P,Dura 3, 9, 100 & 101 show that the strength of the unit had dropped steadily from over1000 to 781 by AD 239, Once again, external factors may be to blame,

2, 41979642-644; 1902,46 cf, E1895,l7, All units for this period are listed on Table Al,

3, Ala I Hiberorue, P,Beatty II • 37; ala II Herc, Droiedariorua P,Beafty 11 . 29 & 169; co/i, XlChaiavoruai P,Beatty I1'292, As a point of interest relating to the survey later in this chapter,both the alae survive into the Not/tie Oigiiitatue, occupying the same station as in the Beattypapyrus, No co/iortes Chaiavorwi survive, though the cob, I Apaaenoru. of P,Beatty 1 . 46 is also foundIn the NotitM Not, Dig, Or, XXXI'46, 54 & 60,

4, The papyri are dated to AD 298 & AD 300 respectively, P,Beatty intro,viii, On the reforms ofDiocletian, cf, Ensslin, CAN XII, 396ff; il1lams, Dioclet/an and the Rosen Recovery (1985), 91ff, Onthe reforms as they related to the Thebaid, Cf. van Berchem, L'Ariëe de Oioclètien ef la RtoreeCons fanfinienne (1952), 66f,

5, cf, ch,III: Contra Cositatus,-106-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Auxilia

discernible link to any units of the first two centuries AD 1 , so the Auxilia

did not simply roll over and die.

To understand what was actually happening, we must now begin to look at

how these units were being used. This is best done through examples. We

shall look at the nature of the Roman military presence in three areas

attested to have recleved specific attention at varying times throughout the

third century. Starting with Mesopotamia and the east, we shall go on to

examine the Roman presence in Africa before finishing on the reorganisation

of the Pannonian garrison.

In his new study of the eastern frontier, Isaac has laid great emphasis

on what might be called the non-military responsibilities of the Auxilla in

the area. In particular, he has highlighted the importance to Rome of

controlling the eastern trade routes, most notably the caravan route which

ran through Dura-Europos to Palmyra2. A direct Roman military presence was

maintained In Pa].myra from approximately AD 165, when a-la I Ulpia

Singula.rium was in occupation, to be replaced early in the third century by

cob. I Fla via Chalci den orum eq.3. Once Septinhius had extended Roman

suzerainty into northern Mesopotamia, Dura became the keystone to the Roman

frontier with Persia, as the strength of its garrison implies4. Prior to

this, cob. II Ulpia eq. had been stationed there under Coinrnodus, and some

1, The precise figure is 119, counting the units in the Beatty papyri as fourth century units,

since they are essentially a part of the post-crisis revival, The figure is extrapolated from the

calculations made in Tables A3 to AS, discussed later in this chapter.

2, I5aac, Lisits of Eipire, 141ff ISOf,3, Isaac, op. cit., 143f, 155 & nn,217 & 218 for references,

4, It contained vexillations of the Syrian legions and III Cyenaica from Arabia, along with

accompanying auxiliaries, cf, Gilliam, 'Garrison of Dura' Dun Pine.! Report V . 1, 24ff Roaan /r1y

Papsrs (1986), 209ff & ch,VI: PexillaUonesp.142 nn,1 & 2 for references,

5, Isaac, 151, It was accompanied by a native unit of Palmyrene archers,

—107-

M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Auxilia

time before AD 245, Dura became the headquarters of the new dux ripae1.

The main function of the dux ripae seems to have been to monitor the

trade routes mentioned above, though the size of the garrison at his

disposal lends force to Gifliem's conclusion that his was the first line of

defence against a sudden Persian attack2. An important part of that

monitoring brief must have been to keep himself informed of Persian

movements along the Euphrates, and for this the extended watchposts spread

along the Euphrates beyond Dura will have fulfilled a dual role: traffic

control and forward observation. Gilliam seems to have viewed this

espionage function as incidental, but he himself admits that despite its

garrison, Dura could not delay a determined Persian force for long; so the

main military function of the dux ripae must needs have been

reconnaissance4 . His situation on the trade route will have facilitated this,

since such routes are historical lines of communication for spies, and much

incidental information could be learned simply by keeping an ear to the

rumours brought in by passing merchants. Similar reasons have been put

forward by Isaac for the presence of coh, IX Naurorum in Hatra under Gordian

II'S.

Many of the auxiliary units attested in this area were either new or

native. The frontier posts of Ana and Gamla seem to have been occupied by

1, Gilliam, 'flux Ripae at Dura', Trans, J Frocs, iaer, Philological A5s, 72(1941), 172ff Rosan4riy Papers (1986), 38ff,

2, Isaac 1 iSif & 155 Gilliaa, op. cit., 168ff, esp, 171,3, On these fortlets ci, Isaac, 147ff & ISOf,

4, Gillia. 171,5, Isaac 1 152ff,

-108-


detachments of Palmyrenea, as were possibly the forts of Biblada and BiJan1.

Of the known Roman auxiliary units in the area, three units from the early

Principate accompanied XX Palmyrenorum in or around Dura at different

times2 , and another was stationed in Osrhöene3 . New units in the area were

XX Palmyrenorum, XII Palaestinorum and 1K Maurorum, all discussed earlier.

Another new unit appears in the 250e at Dumeir in Syria 4 . What we know of

the pre-third century units suggests that they were constantly chopping and

changing5 . However, the only force in the area for which we have much

information Is XK Palmyrenorwm With the evidence as it stands, all we can

say is that a large proportion of the garrison covering the new Severan

frontier in the east was made up of units first attested during this period,

possibly reinforced by detachments of native troops.

Dura was destroyed in AD 256 by the invading Persian army, graphically

confirming what has been said above about Its inability to hold the

PersIans6 . With the capture of Valerian, defence of the east fell under the

auspices of Palmyra7 . The Palmyrene army seems to have been a combination

of the Roman garrison in the east and native Pelmyrenes, who formed an

indeterminate but highly important proportion of the force5 . It is unclear

1, Isaac, 1501, esp, nn,239 & 241,

2, Cob, 11 i.iipia eq. was in the fort under Commodus, and may have still been present in 251,though the altar attesting the presence of a oicpa $ rixq light be referring to co/i, 11 Equestris,Co/i, 1! Pap/ilagoni. Is also attested in 251 by a twin altar set up in the Dolicheneum, and III Aug.Thracua is known from P. Dura 26 to have been on the Lower Chabur in 227: 6illiam, 'Garrison of Dura',2Sf,

3, Co/i, I 6eeiu1opua V111.7039,4, Ala Epuo(lui?), 111.130,

5, Gillia., bc, cit,

6, Gilliam, op. cit., 27,

7, Alfäldl, CAHXII, 171ff,

8, Zos, .39; I • 44; 1 • 503; 1 . 523-532; Festus, 8reiariui, XXIV . 3-5; SHA, Aur, IXV.3,

—109-

what new troops Aurelian brought in following his destruction of Palinyra.

Ritterling believed he established units of equites drawn from the Iflyrian

army 1 but we have no firm evidence for their existence prior to the reign of

Diocletian 1 . By this point, the nature of the garrison had changed radically,

to the extent that only three pre-fourth century units can be found among

the Auxilia of the eastern provinces2 . A large proportion of the remaining

twenty-eight lend weight to the idea of the 'barbarised' army, bearing titles

such as Saxonum, Alamannorum, luthungorum, Gothorurn and so on3.

Fentress has commented at length upon the superficial similarities

between the Syrian limes and that of Nunildia, sounding several notes of

caution in the process 4 . With the new view of the eastern frontier espoused

by Isaac, many of her objections have been laid to rest, and indeed the

similarities are quite striking. Both frontiers were essentially porous,

designed, as Fentress puts it, as "a system of customs and surveillance

posts" rather than a preclusive defensive network. Each was garrisoned by a

collection of auxiliaries and numer.4 with backbone provided by legionary

detachments, and while the nature of the Persian menace was certainly more

threatening than the Moorish tribesmen, each had its own bugbear with which

to come to terms. This was never more true than in the third century.

Roman colonisation of Africa existed side by side with native

1, Ritterling in Pest, Li, Hirsthtelds (1903), 346f, For a full discussion cf, chYIl: Equite5,All we know for certain of Aurelian's arrangements are that he placed the area under the temporary

control of the practectus Mesopotaiiae, with the title of rector Urientis Zos, I•60•I,2, Coh, / 8aetuior€ie, still in Osrhöene, Not, Dig, Or, XXXV32; coh, I Wpia Dacoriiaj and an ala

Parthorus, Not, Dip, Or, XXXIII'33 & XXXV'30: van Berchem, Qrie Qe Dioclétiem 10ff, 15ff & 26ff,,3, Cf. Not, Dig, Or, chapters XXXII, XXXIII, XXXV & XXXVI I for Foenicia, Syria, Osrhôene and

Mesoptamia,

4, Fentress, Nuiiaia and the Roac,, Qray, 9ARS53 (1979), 117.

-110-


'unpacified' tribes occupying the mountains, and relied as much on their

support for the maintenance of its defensive structure as it was designed to

defend against them 1 . This seeming paradox was resolved by the permeable

nature of the fosatum Afrlcae, and reinforced in the reign of Septimius

Severus by a series of watchstations extending into the Saharan Atlas as far

as Castellum Dimmidi (Mesead), as well as a series of 'prestige' forts

governing the oases in southern Tripolitania, most notably Bou Ngem. The

system worked only as long as it was tolerated by the tribes whose

movements it was designed to control3, so that when rebellion flared, as it

did in the 250s, extraordinary measures were required to put it down4.

Auxiliaries and numeri played an increasingly Important role as the

century progressed. The provinces of Mauretania seem to have been

reinforced during the reign of Septimius Severus, suggesting that unrest was

brewing there from the very start of the century. Work by Speidel has shown

that a couple of units from Dada were transferred at this time, reinforced

by 1000 Thracian recruits6 , and to this company can be added the ala (Pia

Gernina) Sebastena from Syria, first attested in Africa in AD 2016. The

latter seems to have been based In the fort of Cherchel, and is later

1, Matthews, 'Mauretania In Ammianus and the Notitia', BAR S15 (1976), 163ff, 170ff & 177ff,

2, Feniress. Nutidia, 111ff & 114ff esp, 116,

3, Matthews, op, cii,, 177,

4, A coalition of Berber tribes, under their leader Faraxen, 'prcvinc.iaa Nwaida. vasfabant', itwas so serious that the praeses of Plauretania Caesariensis was made dux per Atricat Mutidiat

Maureaniaique, and was only able to fully pacify the area by 263: Pflaum, Carr, Proc, II, 374bis,

905ff; YII1'21000 AE,1954,136; VIlI'12296 = iLS 2774; A1907,4; 1920,108; Fentress, Nutidia, 109f;

Matthews, 'Mauretania', 16Sf,

5, Speidel, 'Numerus Syroru. Malvensium', Dada 17 (1973), 170f & 173f = Roman Arty Studies

(1984), 150f & 153f; 'Ala I Claudia Gallorum Capitoniana', in Metoriat Con5tantini Daicovidu (1974),319 ft. Arty Studs, 221; 'A Thousand Thracian Recruits for Mauretania Tingitana', Antiquites

Africaines 11(1977), 168 & 172 ft. Arty Studs, 342 & 346, Her, VII'9'2 talks of Moorish raids,

6, Dip, Roxan 3; YIII17900; AE,1954,143b,

-111-


found participating in the suppression of the Berber revolt under Valerian

and Gallienus' • The forts in the Saharan Atlas established by Severus were

occupied not only by detachments of leglo III Augusta and the eastern

numez-.4 which had been garrisoning the fossatum Africae since at least the

time of the Antonines2, but also by a vexillation of legIo III Gallica from

Syria, and ala I Pannoniorum which had been in Africa since the Julio-

Claudjans3 . Numidia also recieved the new coh. II MaurorumL,

Despite trouble In AD 227, Severus Alexander seems not to have altered

the nature of the limes, but maintained the Severan structure, sending a

vexillation of Pa].myrenes to Castellum Dimmidi6. Even the removal of III

Augusta under Gordian seems not to have affected it greatly. Fentress

believed that the disbanding of the legion was marked by a withdrawal from

the Saharan Atlas, rationalising the frontier to facilitate its defence by the

Auxilia7 , but she stresses that there is no direct evidence for the legion's

replacement by auxiliaries. It would seem that the remaining garrison was

able to cope quite adequately, and it should be borne in mind that the

1, A1894,26; 1900,125; 1954,136, The unit is attested in Africa Proconsularis during the joint

reign of Valerian and Gallienus, but apparrently was not permanently transferred, since it is later

found back in Cherchel after Valerlan Jnr, had been raised to Caesar,

2, Fentress, Nialdia, 111ff & 117; Southern, 'Numeri', 90f,3, Feniress, op, cii,, 116f; Southern, op. cii,, 127; Holder, Stuo'ies in the AuxiJia, 225,4, VlII . 4323 & 18528,

5, ,W,1966,597 records a desperatissi.taa turL')ai et fact/one, in the vicinity of Auzia in 227,and further disturbances say have occurred in the 240s, VLil9288 = 20863, For discussion of the

evidence for iiaitanei in Alexander's reign, cf, ch,VII: Li.itanei,6, Southern, op. cii,, 91,

7 Fentress, op. cit,, 117; but cf, Le Bohec, La Troisiêae Legion Augute (1989) 453ff, wcautions against arguments from silence,

8, Feniress, 119,

-112-


more troubled Mauretania had never recieved much support from the legion'.

Even after the troubles of the 250s, the African garrison remained

largely unchanged. The new coh. VII Fida appeared in Tripolitania at Bou

Ngem circa 253, presumably to bolster the forces in Tripolitania, and that

province seems to have remained peaceful throughout the Faraxen uprising2.

In the west, the nurnerus Surorurn was still at its post in AD 272.

By the late fourth century, all this had been transmuted into a series

of .Zirnitanei commanded by preepositi. Van Berchem believed this was the

work of the emperor Diocletian4 , but an inscription dated to the emperor

Philip suggests that the process may have been underway a great deal

earlier5.

The African frontier was unique in that despite its size and volatility

It maintained only the one legion throughout the history of the Principate,

and at times lost even that. This rendered the role of the Auxilia crucial

in maintaining peace within the country. Yet despite the influx of alae and

cohorts mentioned above, the overriding theme of the African garrison is the

use of nurneri. Several detachments of Palmyrenes have already been

mentioned. At El Kantara, they were accompanied by a nurnerus Hernesenorum,

which is also attested under Caracalla occupying burgi In the southwest of

Numidla7 . The numerus Suror urn guarded western Caesariensis, and was

I, Fentress, Nwiidia, 109, Numerus Surorum on the western edge of Caesariensis was the onlymilitary outpost within about 350km 1 and the size of the fort suggests a strong garrison (Speidel

guessed 1000) expected to fend for itself: Southern, 'Numeri', 127ff; Speidel, 'Numerus Syrorum', 171,

2, AE 1979,642-644,

3, Speidel 1 bc, cit.

4, Van Berchem, Ariée dE Oioci 3 tien, 39ff,

5, 4E,1950,128 discussed in ch,VI11: L/altanel,6, Apart from its disbandment by Gordian III, the legion was vexillated to Greece by the emperor

Gallienus: QE,1934,193 cf, ch,VI: 'exiiJationes, 7, Southern, 90f,

—113-

M.C.Ibe,Ji: C3 Army. Auxilia

possibly as much as 1000 men strong 1 , while Speidel has illustrated that

Moorish lrregUlar8 may have been active in the suppression of the revolts in

AD 227 and the 250s. At certain times and in certain areas, the numeri

seem to have stepped beyond the role of "frontier police and customs guards"

with which they are usually associated 3, to take on the duties of the Auxilia

and at times the legion. Once again, we can see 'ethnic units' coming to the

fore.

In Parinonia, on the other hand, it was the regular Auxilla which gained

In importance during the first half of the century. As early as the reign of

Marcus, a new cohort, II Aurelia Dacorwn, was located In the vital strategic

crossing point at Poetovio on the banks of the Drava, where it was joined

(or replaced) later in the century by vexillations of the Dacian legions4.

Yet It was in eastern Pannonia that the greatest influx of auxiliaries

occurred. The cohors III Alpinorum is known from tile stamps, but the vast

majority were new units. The new coh. I mid. Hem esen orum sag. appeared at

Intercisa as early as AD 198, where it was accompanied by a numerus

Hosroenorum which may have been in occupation under the later Anton1nes.

They were Joined in the reign of Maximinus by the ala firma mu.

Katafractaria, arid the unit was still at Intercisa some time during the 240s

before it was moved to Cannstatt in Germania Superior7. In AD 230, the cob.

1, cf, n, 1 above,

2, Speidel, 'Ethnic Units' 1 216ff,

3, Sirley, 'Hadrianic Frontier Policy', Liies2 (1956), 25,

4, 111.1518416; E,1936,53,54 & 57,

5, 111 . 3759 & 4665; E,1966,301,

6, cf, Table Al for references; date provided by E,l973,437bis,

7, 111 . 99 ILS 2771; lII • 10307 = ILS 2540, cf, Speidel, 'Ethnic unit5', 229 n,89a; XII1'7323 &

7328; AE,1931,68; Eadie, 'Roman Mailed Cavalry', .1RS57 (1967), 168 n87,

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M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Auxilia

I mu. nova Severiana Surorum sag. was first attested in Ulcisia Castra,

though Nagy has shown that it was brought into the province by Caracalla and

was redeployed to the east in AD 242', Just south of this, the legionary

fortress of Aquthcum received the coh. mu. Maurorum under Maximlnus, and

this may have been the time of arrival for the coh. quin. Maurorum attested

at Lussonium2. The final influx of auxiliaries known came during the reign

of Gallienus, when vexillations of the German and British legions were

stationed at Sirmium ...cum auxilis (elaruir?. Unfortunately, there is no

indication of the units Involved, nor have any units from the German and

British garrisons appeared in the later epigraphy of Pannonia Inferior. It

seems most likely that the auxiliaries mentioned were themselves

vexillations, since we have a reasonable corpus of evidence for auxiliary

vexillations both before and during the third century4.

A pattern can be discerned in this establishment, from which a couple of

important points emerge. The first is the location of these reinforcements.

Without exception, all of them had been stationed in eastern Pannonia, along

the southward flowing stretth of the river Danube between Aquincum/Ulcisia

Castra and the legioriary fortress of Sirmium. The second is their size,

With the single exception of XX Palmyrenorum, every milliary unit created

after the death of Marcus Aurelius was stationed along this stretch of

1, Between 212 and 222 ii was engaged in camp construction, The unit was probably created by

Septimius Severus for his Parihian expedition of 197: Nagy in Budapest Rgisgei 23 (1973), 39ff;

AE1973,439; date provided by 111 . 3638; cf, Table Al for other references,

2, 111 . 10375; 111 . 3324; ci, above p.5 & Table Al for references,

3, 111.3228,

4, Two C3 exaaples shall suffice, XIII • 6509 from Schlo5sau (Ger, Sup,) mentions the

yexil(Iatio) coli(ortis) I $eq(uanorue) et Raw'(icorua) eq.,,, Of greater interest, a career

inscription set up near Sarmizegetusa (Dacia) during the reign of Philip speaks of a ,,praep(osifu5)

vexiil(atiornrn) auxiiiar(iorua) Pann(oniae) Infer(ioris),,,, AE 1980,758 cf, 111 1464,—115-


frontier at some point during the first half of the century, and if our

chronology is correct, none of them was removed until the 240s.

Such a strong reinforcement, at its height something In the region of

7,000 troops, including legionary vexillations 1 , suggests that the east

Pannonian frontier was not as secure as its history throughout this period

would have us believe. Following the Marcomrnanic war, no serious barbarian

incursion occurred in Pennonia until the 250s, and even then it seems to

have been limited to the upper province2 . Yet in AD 214 we hear of the

emperor Carracalla "completing his business with the garrison of the

Danube". This must have been the point at which he reorganised the borders

of Pannonia Inferior to bring the legionary fortress of Brigetio, and all of

northern Parmonia to the east of Arraboria and north of the Drava, into the

province. The revision of the frontier was a massive undertaking: it split

Pannonia in half, strengthening the lower province by the addition of a

legion and up to 4,000 auxiliaries4 . To do this, Caracalla seems to have

diverted from his journey eastwards to the Parthian war, The move has been

seen largely as a measure for internal security; removing the third legion

from Pannonia Superior to create a parity of forces between the upper and

lower province, in accordance with his father's policy. However, the

reinforcement we have charted does not look inward, but out towards the

1, AE,1901,154; cf, ch,VI: Vexi/latione5, p.144,2, Alföldi, CiTh' XII, 139 speaks of raids by the Quadi, Sar.atae and Marcomanni which plundered

Upper Pannonia and even penetrated Into northern Italy as far as Ravenna: Eutropius IX'7; Jerome

Chron, p220, Orosius VII . 22 . 7 & Jordanes Rotana 28Th confuse these raids with the Alemannicincursions,

3, Her, IV•8.1,4, Fitz, 6reat Age of Pannosila (1982), 50ff,5, Fitz, bc, cit, Miller, CAHXII, 48,

—116-


barbarian threat. In a passage from Dio, Caracalla is heard to boast at

having created hostility between the Marcomanni and the Vandals 1 . We have

seen already that sometime during his reign, I mu. Surorum sag. probably

appeared at IJicisia Castra, where it was busily engaged in fortification. All

this evidence paints a picture, not of peace and harmony as Herodlan would

have us suppose, but of a frontier preparing for war 2 . Caracalla would seem

to have pre-empted a threat from the barbarian tribes on the north-eastern

frontier of Pannonia, playing them off against one another whilst shoring up

Pannonia's defences at the point of expected attack. The further

reinforcement under Maximinus Thrax illustrates that the danger did not

disappear, so the peaceful nature of the east Pannonian limes must have been

a product of these measures. Barbarian raids only start to recur in the

decade following the breakup of this garrison, resulting in similar pre-

emptive measures by Gallienus3.

Earlier in the century, Septimius Severus appears to have been anxious

to retain the strength of the garrison despite the need to vexillate part of

II Adiutrix into Aquileia4 , for we have seen that he not only placed I mu.

Hem esen or urn into Intercisa, but used the Dacian legions to cover for its

departures . it should be noted also that the reinforcement of Sirmium by

Gallienus was as much a protection agains the Goths, who were by now

penetrating deep into Illyricum, as it was against the tribes of the Middle

I, Dio LIXVII'20'3-4,

2. Her, IY7 Is at pains to stress the friendly relations between Caracalla and the trans-

Danubian tribes, The passage smacks of imperial propaganda at a time when all other evidence hints at

Roman/barbarian relations stretched almost to their breaking point.

3, Alfôldi, CAM XII, 214: A1935,164; III3228; cf, chh,X & IX: Viri Hi//fares, p.232, &Foedera fi,

4, 111 . 954 discussed fully In chYl: 'exi1lationes, p 142ff,

5, cf, above p.114.

—117-


Danube.

The auxiliaries in Pannonia Inferior were performing a very important

function during the first half of the third century. A series of units, most

of them milliary, were arranged along the Pannonian border to ward off

barbarian attack. Despite, or most probably because of their effectiveness,

they were drawn upon to provide troops elsewhere as the century reached its

mid-point, so weakening the frontier. Gallienus, realising the importance of

a strong Pannonian garrison, reinforced it with legionaries from Dacia,

Britain, Germany and even Moesia. It is at this point, with permanent

vexillatlon becoming the norm, that we find the Auxilia disappearing once

again. Where once a cohort was found, now we find records only of a

legionary vexillation 1 . More importantly, in the Notitia Dignitatum, we can

find auxiliaries being replaced by units of equites which were themselves

eventually replaced by the cunei and new-style auxilia of Constantine2.

Throughout the empire, an important process was taking place wherein the

Auxilia of the Principate was gradually disappearing to be replaced by new

irregular units, often of 'ethnic' origin.

The picture from the Notitia Dignitatum is not a pretty one. Little

more than 137. of the Auxilia known to have been in existence before AD 250

can be found in its lists3 . Such a massive shortfall is nothing short of

cataclysmic, especially since pre-Diocletianic Auxilia account for just under

1, cf, n,3 above, Whether these vexlllation5 superceded the units already in place, or simply

reinforced them Is not clear, Either event exhibits an erosion of confidence in the Auxilia

2, In Pannonia, this occurred at Ulcisia Castra, Intercisa and Lussonium, The process has been

best illustrated by van Berchem, 4raóe de Dioclètien,,,, 95ff

3, The figure drawn from my own independent study is 71 out of approx, 536 units; cf Tables A3 —

A5, No units from the third century can be seen to have survived,

-118-


38% of all auxiliary units listed In the document; meaning that the total

complement of auxiliaries found in the Notitia 18 three times smaller than

the establishment of the mid-third century1.

A geographical breakdown of the results might help to explain this2.

The lowest survival rate was In the areas which had endemic trouble

throughout the century. In Illyricum, only 6 out of 85 units known to have

occupied the area before AD 250 survived. Africa fared little better, with

an equally bad survival rate of 7%. Raetia retained 11%, while the eastern

provinces retained 10% (only one of these came from Osrhöene). The best

survival rate came from Asia Minor, where Isaurian brigandage forced an

Imperial response only twice throughout the century3 . Elsewhere, the

relatively untroubled provinces of Britain and Egypt had survival rates of

25% and over, while the figures for Spain are too small to be of any

statistical value. Little is known about the areas of the empire missed by

the Notitia, though It Is worth noting that the dux Mogontiacensis had

nothing but praefecti militum on his lists4.

Given the limitations of our material, such an analysis of the Notitia

can be little more than an academic exercise. Its lists are incomplete, and

what we have may be a mish-mash of information dating from Diocletian until

the end of the fourth century&. Our information concerning the pre-

Diocletianic Auxilia Is also nowhere near as complete as we would like it to

1, 188 a/ac and co/ioHes are listed by Seeck; 37 . 8% are pre-Diocletianic, and the total accounts

for only 35% of the 536 units known to have been in existence during the Principate,

2, cl, Tables A3-A5,

3, Once under Severus Alexander, and once under Probus cf, CAN XII. 68 & 31Sf,

4, Not, Dig, Oc, XLI, This part of Germany was constantly harassed by the Alemanni during the

C3,5, On this very subject cf, van Berchem, Araâe de Dioc/êtien,,,, 93ff,

—119-


be; to the extent that the figure we choose to extrapolate from, no matter

what its exactitude, remains at best an educated guess. As if this were not

enough, another far more important consideration must be addressed: the

question of unit size.

It appears that by the late fourth century, auxiliary units throughout

the empire had suffered a drastic reduction In size. Where forts named In

the Notitia can be equated to remnants on the ground, they have often shrunk

to less than one fifth the size of those containing similar units under the

Principate. In many cases, they have actually been built inside the remnants

of an earlier site'. Material extrapolated from the Beatty papyri from

Panopolis indicates that auxiliary units with a complement of 165 or less

would seem to have been the norm in Egypt at the time of Diocletian 2. This

means that by the fourth century, not only had over 857. of units known from

the Principate disappeared from the record, they had also shrunk in some

cases to approximately one fifth of their original sizes . Whether this was a

universal trend remains unclear. If the trend in fort sizes is anything to

go by, the phenomenon was empirewide.

What we know of XX Palmyrenorum suggests that the unit was in a good

state of health during the first half of the third century. It should be

stressed that the state of this unit cannot be taken to indicate the health

1, All relevant evidence can be found in: Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army',

C/i/ron 8 (1978), Appendix I esp, 553ff; Johnson, Late Rocan Fortification (1983), 53f James, 'Britain

and the Late Roman Army', BAR 136 (1984), 165f,2, Duncan-Jones, op. cit., 546ff,

3, Figures calculated by Duncan-Jones from P,Beatiy make the ala I //iberorua 118 strong and the

co/i, II C/iaaavorua 165 strong at most, The most recent calculations on auxiliary size in the earlyPrincipate give between 436-512 men to an ala quingenaria, approx, 480 to a co/i, quingenaria and

approx, 600 to a coh, quin, eq.: Holder, Studies in ifle Auxilia, BAR S70 (1980), 7ff,

-120-


of all the Auxilia in the third century. The unit itself was an unusual one,

in that it had 6 centuries and 5 turmae (plus dromedaril) instead of 10 and

8 which is believed to have been the norm for milliary cohorts 1 . Fink

believed it was impossible for 40% of the unit to have been on permanent

detachment, such that it was never included in any of the Dura rosters.

Considering the early date of the main rosters, he is probably correct.

Permanent vexillation did not become the norm until the mid third century,

and since the two main rosters of XX Palmyrenorwn give totals of 1210 and

1040 men respectively, the unit would seem to have been at full milliary

strength despite its organisation2. In fact, the earlier figure, for AD 219,

puts it seriously over-strength, best explained by recruitment for

Caracalla's abortive Parthian expedition3. Despite this apparent good health,

in AD 251, a partial list of the equites in the unit shows "a desperate state

of affairs, with a fourth of the cohort's horses having to be replaced in a

period of four months and a third of the personnel still lacking

mounts.....the papyrus itself is evidence of strenuous effort by both

government and the army to cope with the situation"4. Elsewhere, Holder

cites a pridiarium of AD 215 which shows a coh. quin. eq. from the east with

an infantry complement of only 350, "below strength even for a century

complement of 60 men". Its editors have pointed out that there were no new

recruits due to heavy fighting3.

I, Fink 1 Dw'a Final Report V . 1, 28ff; Holder, Studies in the Auxilia, 8, The unusualorganisation may be explained by the native origins sugge5ied by Nann above, p.101,

2, Fink, op. cit,, 30 on P,Oura 100 & 101 for AD 219 & 222 respectively, However, note Gilliam's

observation that the cohort had nine centurions in P,Dura 82 of Ad 233: cf, Gillaim, 'Dura Rosters',74 n,2,

3, cf, above, p,104f,

4, Fink, Roaan Milifay Reco,d5 on Papyrus (1971), N2 83 P,Dw'a 97,5, Holder, bc, cii, on Thomas & Davies, 'A New Hilitary Strength Report on Papyrus', IRS 67

(1977), 50ff,

-121-


The fate of cob. III Alpinorum may be of relevance here. Found in

Dalmatia during the second century, it was moved to Pannoriia sometime during

the third. From there its movements become confused, since the name appears

three times in the Notitia Dignitatum, once in Arabia and twice in Pannonia

Secunda. At one point it is called the cob. III Alpinorum Dardanorum. This

has led scholars to posit two or even three cohortes III Alp.inorum while at

present there remains evidence for only one'. Yet if, as we have already

determined, auxiliary units were being vexillated in the third century2,

might it not be most sensible to view these units as vexillations of the cob.

III Alpinorum? Like other vexillat ions that became fossilised in the third

century, the detachments eventually took on their own identity, until by the

time of the Notitia they could be seen as three separate units, distinguished

in Pannonia by the attachment of a nickname, possibly relating to its

location within the province. Other such vexillations could be the two alae

novae Diocletianae found in the east; the two alae milliariae in Palaestina;

the ala II felix Velentiniana located in that province and in Arabia; the cob.

I Ituraeorum found in Tingitena and Egypt; and possibly, though less likely,

the cobb. IV Gaflorum which appear in Britain and Rhodope in the Notiti&,

It would seem that at some point between AD 250 and AD 395 the Auxilia

of the early Principate suffered a severe decline. In view of the Egyptian

evidence provided by the Beatty papyri, It seems most probable that this

I, 111 . 14935; Not, Dig, Or, XXXVII . 35; Not, Dig, O, XUII'53 & 57 Alföldy, Qcta Qrch, Acad,

Scient, //ungaricae 14(1962), 263ff; Wilkes, Daliatia (1969), 140ff; Roxan, 'Auxilia in the Not/tie',

66,2, cf, above, p115 & n,4,3, Not, Dig, Oj XXXII . 34 & UXV . 31; XXXIV'36 & XXX1V32; XXXIV'35 & XXXVI1•30; Cc, XXVI . 16 & Or,

XXVIII • 42; Oc, XL'41 & Or, XL.46,

-122-

M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Auxilia

decline had occurred prior to or perhaps during the reign of Diocletian. Its

cause is unclear, but may have been a combination of ailing recruitment,

permanent vexillatlon and the endemic attrition associated with the problems

of the century. It seems likely that in the compromises which were made to

overcome these problems, the lowly auxiliaries suffered worst, Not

prestigious enough to be treated like the legions, and too inflexible to be

as useful as the numeri, the Auxilia were neglected until gradually they

became replaced by new units of equites and other 'ethnic' troops more

suited to the support role which they had enjoyed 1 . The rescripts of

Diocletian amply illustrate this new attitude towards the auxiliaries. Whilst

deprived of the privileges accorded to the legions and the new-style

vexillatioris of cavalry, the sons of auxiliaries were now tied by law to the

career of their fathers2 . These laws, and the appearance of new alae and

cohortes under Diocletian and his colleagues are evidence that the Auxilla

still retained some usefulness under the Tetrarchy. Yet by the age of

Constantine, the Auxilia of the Prthcipate had become third-class frontier

fodder, and their supercession by 'ethnic' equites and auxilia was complete.

1, Note there is no indication in the unit titles of the Not it/a that the Auxilia were being

transformed into these new unit5, but cf, ch,YII: Equites for discussion,

2, Cod, Just, X . 54 . 3 (55 . 3 in some editions); Cod, Theod, VII.22'I,

—123-

Tb1E A 1:AL1.c111ry trnit f1rt pptririg

ftr- AD 161.

Dates given are dates of first and last firmly datable attestation. Where thecreator of the unit is uncertai.n, It has been placed under the emperor in whichits first attestalon occurs.

Mr i_i At.ir1 i L1:N11Nfli PROVINCE

oai REFS

Coh, Pimasens(ium) AureCliana) Thracia

Marcus 4E,1908,136

Coh, I Aurelia Dardanorum (mu, eq?] Moesia Sup.

Marcus 111.8251

Coh, II Aurelia Dardanorum iii, eq. Moesla Sup.

Marcus/242 111 . 14556 & 14576;

41902,31; 1903,288 & 290:

1904,92: 1910,93, 94 & 97;

1952,189-191

Coh, I Aurelia nova

Pas(i]natui CR iii,

Moesia Sup,

Marcus 111.14545; qE1901,23

Coh, II Aurelia nova cii, eq. CR,

Moesia Sup,

179 111.14537 & 14541

Caracalla E191O,98

Dalmatia

179 E,19O1,24

Thrac ia

Marcus AE,1955,65

Coh, II Aurelia nova Sacorum

Moesia Sup,

Marcus 111.142176; E,1901,2l

Coh, II Aurelia Decorum

Pannonia Sup,

Marcus 111.1518416; SHQ Marcus XXI'7,

Spt. i_ nii i._L

V1LI1NNi PROVINCE

REEL

Coh, I Septimia Belgarum Germania Sup,

231/241 XIII'1042-1045, 6687, 7038, 11758 &

11759

Coh, I .11 Hemesenorum sag, eq. CR Pannonia Inf,

from 198 111.10303, 10304, 10306, 10307,

10315, 10316 & 10318;

AE,1891,59; 1909,148-ISO; 1910,131,

133, 136, 137, 140, 141, 144, 147,

& 148; 1912,7; 1914,99; 1929,49;

1971,334, 335, 345 & 476;

1973 437bis

Coh, I cii, nova

Severiana Surorum sag, Pannonia Inf,

230/242 111.3638,3639, 10518 & 15170;

AE,1947,31; 1973,439

Coh, II Maurorum Numidia

208 VIII'4323 & 18528

Coh, IX Maurorum Mesopotamia

238 A1958, 239 & 240

—124-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army

Svr1.i t d:

H11NPROVINCE

Coh, XX PalayrenoUl El, (eq. mag,) Syria

Auxilia

208/256 P,Dura misc, esp, 56, 100 & 101

A 1940, 240; 1948,124

C r r 1 1 :

VN11N

Coh, I Athoetorum

Coh, (I] Concord(ia)

Coh, II Conco(rldia

Coh, Treverorum

Coh, II Treverorum

PROVINCE

Dacia

Thracla

Moesia Sup,

Germania Sup,

Germania Sup,

QI

Caracal la

from c,269

Caracal Ia

222/c, 238

c,211/c,235

REEL

AE 1961,315

IGRRI'1496 = !L59479AE,1908,259 1688 1112 1570

cf, Domaszewski, Rangordnung,

LVIII-LX, 185f1 also my Appendix

Trajanus Mucianus

AE 1934, 212

(XIII . 7612 & 11971

(XII17615-7619; AE1 1898,9, 10 & 63

S , r t.i Al - ___rid

L!NJIN. PROVINCE

Nova ala firma iii, Katafractaria Pannonia ml,

Germartia Sup,

Coh, XII Palaestinorum

Syria

DME REEi

234/238 111.99 = JLS 2771; II1'10307 = ILS2540

238/256 XIII7323, 7328: AE 1931,68

cf, Eadie, /RS 57 (1967), 168 n,37

232 P,Dzira 30

M>c I ml ri ti 1h. rVN1IN PROVINCE

OAT

Coh, iii, Maurorum eq. Pannonia ml,

Maximinus

111 . 3444, 3542, 3545, 10673 & 10375

Coh, quin, Maurorum eq. Panonnia ml,

?Maxlminus

111.3324

V1riri & G1J_lriLi (,Jcirit):

1L Ni PROVINCE REEi

Ala Epuo(lum?) Syria 253/9 111.130

Coh, III Collect(arum) Moesia ml, c,253 41957,340

Coh, VII Fida Tripoiltania c253 AE,1979,642-644

-125--

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army

Auxilia

V]riri & G11iri td:NUNi

PROVINCE DRIB REFi

Coh, VIII Fida

Palaestina Gallienus AE,1902.46

Diocletian AE 1895 17

—12 6-

Tb] A2:Awci11r-y Lir1it cf dtibici cit cx-

U NflI PROVINCE DME EEI

Ala Sariatorum Britannia ? VII•229 & 230

Coh, I Sunicor(um) Britannic I AE,1914,293

Coh, I Aresac(um) Belgica 1 AE,1929, 173

C(o)h, Ruson(ianae) Germania mt. AE1956,169 cf, AE11939,130

Ala Fida Vindex Germanla Sup, I XIII'8307 (probable renaming)

Ala Vallensium Germania Sup . I XIIl.6361

Coh, Hel(vetiorum)

Germanla Sup,

IHadrian AE,l897,148

cf, Birley, His toia-Qugusta-Coi1oquiva(1972/74), hf

Coh, V Spanorum

Germania Sup,

?pre C3 4E 1899, 192 (probably V (Hi)spanorum)

Coh, II Crestarum

Dalmatia

?pre C3 AE,1961,303 (probably II Cyrrhestarum, cf,

III' 14934)

Ala Elec(torum)

Dada

I AE,1957,331

Ala Pal.(yrenorum)

Dacia

post 124 A 19741 545b

Coh, I Aurelia Brittonum iii,

Dada

201 AE1SO1,46 (possibly I (Ulp,) Brittonum

ill, CR eq,, cf, Holder, Atix//Ja, 217)

Ala Atectorigiana

Lyc ia/Pamphyl ia

?c,202 AE,1926,74: cf, AE,1926,75

Coh, Stablesianorum

Cappadocia

?late C3 f6VI187 cf, Speidel, C/,iron4 (1974),

545

Ala Herakliana

Syria

?pre C3 AE,1940, 166 (probably (Thracue) Herculiana

cf, Holder, Auxilia, 227)

Coh, III Cilicium eq.

Egypt

193 AE,1905,54; cf, Holder, Auxilia, 230 for aI (Flay ,) Cilicium eq, of AD 83- same

series?

Ala II Ammiorum

Nauretania

I AE,1898,74 (probably II Hammiorum)

[ala Expl(oratorum)] Pomet,

Nauretania

?pre C3 AE,1889,54 (reconstructed to Pomarensium,

Shares inscription with Flavio-Trajanic II

Sardorum)

Coh, Parth(orum)

Mauretania

7 A195662

-12 7-

Tb] A3:Awci11ri i,irig iritc t1i

ITc t i t i Di gr I t t tim.The following are the results of my own Independent study on the survival ofpre-fourth century auxiliaries into the Notitia. Most unit histories are derivedfrom the excellent appendices of Holder's Studies in the Auxilia of the RomanArmy from Augustus to Trajan, BAR S70 (1980), PP.167-240. Other sources

(mainly those with relation to post—Trajanic units) are cited where used.Unless a compelling link to an earlier unit can be shown, units with thepraenomina Herculia and Valeria have been taken as fourth century creations and

ignored.

Since the completion of this work, a similar study by N. Roxan, entitled 'Pre-Sevran Auxilia Named in the Notitia Dignitatum', BAR S15 (1976), pp.59-80 hascome to my attention. It has the luxury of being able to go into greater depththan my own study would allow, and is highly recommended to anyone wishing topursue this topic of discussion still further. Despite some minor differencesin interpretation, I have deemed it best to keep both studies entirely separatesince they were carried out independent of one another. Roxan includes severalalae in the Notitia believed to have been upgraded from cohortes equitata, yet

with these taken into account, along with the additional units provided to me byHolder, our results are substantively similar.

NQtiti DigrIittLIm pr r-iritm:Ujjj PROVINCi RECENT HISTORY

IXVIII'lB ala veterana Gallorum Aegyptus Changed name to Gallica & moved to Egypt

in 130.

XXVIII . 40 coh, I Sagittariorum

XXYIII'41 coh, I Augusta Pannoniorum

XIVIII . 44 coh, II Ituraeorum

XIVIII . 45 coh, II Thracum

1111 . 58 coh, I Lusitanorum

XXXI'59 coh, Scutata CR.

XXII60 coh, I Apamenorum

111111'33 coh, I Ulpia Dacorum

XXXIV'32 ala all, Sebasiena

Ac gy p tu S

Aegypti1S

AegyptuS

Aegypt5

Thebaid

Thebaid

Thebaid

Syria

Palaestifla

—128-

Knovn in 6cr, Sup, under Julio-Claudians,

In Syria from 88,

Coh, eq. in Egypt from 83, cf, I Itur, on

Table A4,

Coh, eq. moved to Egypt in 105,

I Aug. (Pr, ) Lusitan, eq. moved to Egypt

by 105,

In Egypt under Julio-Claudians,

Coh, eq. sag, moved to Egypt in 143,

Coh, eq. in Syria from 156,

In Africa from 201; cf, A!, 189426;

1900,125; 1954, 136 & 143b,

M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army

Auxilia

Nc, t I t I D I gr I t t Lixn p F r I r tm c t d:VNLLNANE. PROVINCE RECENT HISTORY

XXXIV'44 coh, II Galatarum Palaestina II Ulpia Galat, in Syria-Palaest, from 139

XXIIV'45 coh, I Flavia Palaestina Coh, eq, 1 cf, (6RR IV216; VIII'28,

XXIV'32 coh, I Gaetulorum

Osrhöene Cl, VIII'7039,

XIXVII'31 coh, I ml, Thracum

XXIVII'32 coh, I Thracum

XXXVII • 33 coh, VIII Yoluntaria

XXIVIII . 21 ala I Aug, Colonorum

XXIVIII • 22 ala Auriana

XIXVIII . 23 ala I Ulpia Dacorum

XIXVIII . 24 ala II Gallorum

XIXVIII'27 coh, III Ulpia

mu, Peiraeorum

XIXVIII'28 coh, IV Raetorum

XXIVIII . 29 coh, mil, Bosporiana

XXIVIII . 30 coh, iii, Germanorum

XIXVIII'34 coh, Apuleia CR

IXXVIII'35 coh, I Lepidiana

XXIVIII'36 coh, I Claudia eq.

Arabia Moved to Syria-Palaestina in 139,

Arabia Probably I Aug, Thracum eq,, 1QE11947,171,

Arabia VIII Voluntariorum in Dalmatia since

Jul io-Claudians,

Armenia Moved to Cappadocia by 135,

Armenia II Ulpia Auriana in Cappadocia from 1351

Armenia In Cappadocia from 135,

Armenia Moved to Cappadocia in 135,

Armenia Coh, eq, sag, moved to Cappadocia by 135,

Armenia Moved to Cappadocia in 135,

Armenia I Bosporanorum sag, moved to Cappadocia in

135.

Armenia I 6cr, mil, eq. in Cappadocia from 135,

Pontica I Apula CR, moved to Cappadocia by 135,

Pontica Coh, CR, eq, moved to Armenia by 199,

Pontica In Cappadocia, cf, 11.2958,

XL'48 coh, I Aureliana

KL'49 coh, III Valeria

Brac araugustanorum

Thracia

Thrac ia

—129-

Coh, Pimasensium Aur, in Thracia under M,

Aurelius 1 cf, AE,1908,136,

Probably the III Bracaur, moved to Raetia

in 156,

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Auxi].ja

Nctiti Diriitti..jm pr— Ocidrtrn:U1(E. VNIINAII.E. PROVINCE RECENT HISTORY

XXYI • 14 coh, II Hispanorum Tingitana Coh, CR, eq, In Tingitana by 109,

XXVI'16 coh, I Ituraeorum Tingitana Coh, sag, CR, moved to Tingitana in 109,

XXVI'19 coh, III Asturum Tingitana Coh, CR, eq, in Tingitana from 109,

XXXII'57 coh, III Alpinorum

Pannonia II

Coh, eq, moved to Pannonia in C3; cf,

Wilkes, Da/Nafia, l4Offl 6, Alföldy, AA$H14 (1962), 263ff,

XXXII'59 coh, I Thracum CR,

Pannonia II

Coh, CR, pf, in P, Inf, from 110,

XXXV'25

coh, III Britannorum

Raetia Coh, eq, in Raetia from 107,

XXXV '27

coh, VII Valeria Raetorum

Raetla Moved to Britain by 166,

XXXV'28

coh, I Herculia Raetorum

Raetia Probably the I Raetorum in Raetia by 107,

XL'33

coh, IV Lingonum

XL'36

coh, I Frisiavonum

XL'37

ala Sabiniana

XL'39

coh, I Batavorum

XL'40

coh, I Tungrorus

XL'41

coh, IV Gallorum

XL'42 coh, I Asturum

XL'43 coh, II Dalmatarum

XL'48

coh II Lingonum

XL'49

coh, I Hispanorum

XL '50

coh, II Thracum

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

Britannia

—130-

Coh, eq, in Britain from 122,

In Britain from 105,

I Pannonlorum Sab, in Britain from 122,


Coh, mu, in Britain from 103,

Coh, eq, in Britain from 122, though

attested in Raetia in 166,

Possibly II Asturum, known to be in

Britain by 105, though attested on

Dip,LXIX in P, Inf, 145/60,

Most likely II Dela, eq, in Britain from

105, though attested in Dalmatia along

with I Delm, eq, on III'1979 & 6374 dated

170,


Coh, eq, moved to Britain under Flavians,

Coh, eq, moved to Britain in 103,

M,C.IbeJl: C3 Army

Auxilia

Nc' t i t I Di ri I t t tim p r- C) I d r t mct d:UIIE. UNIINAIIi PROVINCE RECENT HISTORY

XL'52 coh, I Norinorum Britannia I for, et, Cersiacorum in Britain from

103,

XL . 53 coh, III Nerviorum Britannia In Britain from 122,

XL'56 coh, VI Nerviorum Britannia In Britain from 122,

XLII'30 coh, Celtibera

Gallaecea

I Celtiberorum coh, CR, eq, moved to Spain

by 132,

-131-

Fib1 A4-:Uriit In tli NtitI pib1y -1td

t r1ir Ai,ci1I.

These include units which do not provide enough detail in their titles tobe placed accurately, as well as units which are possibly part of anearlier known series but for which no pre—Notitia record survives. CetainUnits which may have been vexillations of pre—fourth century Auxilia are

also included.

Or-i r]:

L1ll UN11NA

XIVIII • 26 ala VII Saritarum

XXVIII'35 coh, III Galatarum

XXVIII . 38 ala II Ulpia Afrorum

XXVIII • 42 cot,, I Ituraeorum

IXYIII . 46 coh, IV Numidiarum

1111 . 45 ala IV Britonum

1111.49

ala VIII Palmyranorum

XXXI'66

coh, VI Sugambrorum

1111 . 57 ala I Yaleria Dromedariorum

1111 . 54 ala II Herculia Dromedariorum

XIXI48 ala III Dromedariorum

XX11V46 coh, Palaestinorum

X1X1V47 coh, II Cretensis

XXXV . 30 ala I Parthorum

XXXVII35 coh, III Alpinorum

PROVINCE

Aegyptus

Aegyptus

Aegyptus

Aegyptus

Aegyptus

Thebaid

Thebald

Thebaid

Thebaid

Palaestina

Palaestina

Osrhäene

Arabia

—132—

POSSIBLE LLN&

Ala Sarmatorum known in Britain, VlI . 229 &

230, date uncertain: part of series!

I & II Ulpia Galat, known in Syria-

Palaestina from 139: part of series?

Ala Afrorum vet, known in Ger, Inf, from

78: part of series?

Possible renumbering of II & III Itur,

known in Egypt from 83, but NB, coh, I

Itur, in Cappadocia by 135, cf, Table A3,

11 Itur,

I & II (Fl) Numid, eq (sag ) found

throughout empire: part of series?

I Brit, known in Dacia from 110: part of

series?

Ala Palm, known in Dacia some time after

124, ,QL1974,565b: part of series!

I & IV known in Noesia & Caesariensis from

26 & 107 respectively: part of series?

(Possibly all derived as vexillations from

(ala I Ulpia Dromedariorum ail,, last

(known in Syria in 156,

XII Palaest, in Dura in 232, P,Dw'a 30:

part of series?

I Cretum sag, in N, Sup under Julio-

Claudians: part of series?

Possibly any of 5 alae Parth, throughout

the empire,

Possibly a vex, of III Alp, in Pann, II,

Not, Dig, Oc, XXXII.57,

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army

Or—i c t d:LINi NILNAi

gL46 coh, IV Gallorum

Auxilia

PROVINCE POSSIBLE 111K.

Moesia II Possibly either of the IV Gall, known in

Thracia in 114 or in Raetia in 147,

i ci ra :

LINi U11NANi

XIXII . 53 coh III Alpinorum

Dardano rum

XL'51 coh, I Aelia Classica

XLII'29 coh Lucensia

PROVINCE POSSIBLE 111K.

Pannonia II Pos5ibly a vex, of III Alp, in Pann, II

Not, Dig, Oc, XXXII.57,

Britannia Possibly the I Class, pf, in Ger, Inf, by

80,

Gallaecea Probably one of 4 cohh, Lucensium

throughout the empire,

—133-

Tb1 A :Rti1t frcm tb1 A3 & 4

SURVIVALS IN THE NOTITIA:

Alee prior to AD 161Cohorts prior to AD 161

Alee created after 161Cohorts created after 161

Auxilia from Table A4Other known pre-C4 units

Total survivals

# UNITS SURVIVALSURVIVING OUT OF RATE

6 109 557.45 380 118%

0 3 01 23 537.

19c. 21

71 c.536 133%

GEOGRAPHICAL BREAKDOWN (in descending rates of survival):I UNITS SURVIVAL

SURVIVING Qf Q RATE

Asia Minor 11 19 57'g%

Egypt 7 21 33•3%

Britain 14 57 24•6%

Spain 1 6 16'7%

Raetia 2 17 11•7%

The East 6 56 107%

Africa 3 43 7%

Illyricum 5 85 5•97.

(I)

11/58%19/90%15/26%2/33%3/18%12/21%3 / 7%6/7%

(t) The calculation in this column includes units first found in the regionin the Notitia, giving the number of units found before the slash and thesurvival rate this generates after it. The rest of the table utilises onlythose units known to have been in the region prior to the Notitia, andtherefore to have survived as part of the area garrison since the second orthird century.

-134-

M,C,Ibeji. C3 Army

PART 3:

Tl-i • Nw' Uriit

VI: Vci 11 t I cri

The history of vexillation can be divided into three distinct phases, two

of which occurred during the turbulent years of the third century. Whereas

the detachments of the first and second centuries AD had been used largely

on campaign, and very rarely engaged in garrison duties outside the province

of their mother unit, the manpower shortages of the third century

nece sitated the increasing employment of vexillary garrisons outside their

province of origin. By the end of the century, these garrison vexillations

had become permanent fixtures in their new positions, and a mould-breaking

evolution was taking place. As the permanent vexillation assumed an

independent unit identity, new units of cavalry, probably originating in part

as vexillary detachments, took on the term vexillatlo as a unit description.

The development of the permanent detachment, and the semantic change in the

term vexillati4 is what this chapter sets out to chart.

To understand whet happened to the vexillation in the third century, it

is necessary to have a clear picture of the nature of these detachments

during their earlier history.

The vexillations of the first and second centuries AD were detachments

of up to 2,000 men 1 , largely used to reinforce a specific campaign. A

cursory analysis of the epigraphic record reveals only 15 references to

vexillations being used as garrison troops in the period before Marcus

Aurelius, whilst on the same timescale there are 40 separate instances of

1, Hyginus V . 5i4; Saxer, 1eiJ1ationen, p , Stud, (1967), 119; Jones, LR 680; X'582,

-135-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes

vexillary troops in the field1.

The practice of sending detachments of legionaries, often with attached

auxiliaries2 , from peaceful provinces to the war front became ever more

prevalent during the second century. Prior to Trajan, campaign vexillations

seem mainly to have been employed during the exigencies of civil war or

revolt . Under his reign, they may have received far wider use, taking part

in all his wars, whilst Hadrian employed detachments from the Danube, Syria

and Arabia to quell the Jewish revolt in 132". By the time of the Antonines,

expeditionary forces composed largely of vexillations seem to have become

standard practices.

Little can be said about vexillations as garrison troops during this

period, since the corpus of evidence is too small to allow any meaningful

analysis of their development. Yet one thing is absolutely clear. Whilst a

1, Refer to Table Vi listing the results of my own independent examination of C/LI AEand IGRR,

Saxer, VeAJJ/atlonen (1967), gives an even more comprehensive list, but includes many references ofuncertain date which I was less prepared to include than he,

2, III19i9; XIII . 4623, 7697, 7715, 7716 all attest legions with attached auxiliaries, See also

the Brohi series in CIL XIII, These are a series of dedications to Hercules Saxanus by a variety of

vexillations from the legions, the Auxilia, and even the c18551s 6erianica, dating largely from theFlavian period (the latest are most likely by units involved in Trajan's German campaign), The number

and variety of units would suggest that Brohi, in Upper Germany, served as a staging post for

vexillations about to embark on campaign, since garrison vexx tended to be less variable and more

static than this: 1111 . 7693, 7695-7698, 7700, 7703-7706, 7714-7718, 7720-7722 & 7727,

3, Tacitus Anna/es XIV38'1 and V . 1; Josephus V42-44; the Brohi inscriptions are most likely

dated to the Year of the Four Emperors (AD 69) and the revolts of Civilis and Saturninus, though they

could refer to Domitian's German campaign,

4, 1111 . 7704, 7715, 7716, 7718, 7727 for legions involved in Trajan's German campaign, VI

'IctriA, I 6eina and XXII Priiigenia all recieved the title Pia Fidelis Doiitianae for their loyaltyduring the revolt of Saturninus, but the lack of the Cognoaen on the inscriptions, or of its erasureby Ouanatio suggests a date after his reign, Since all three legions were transferred out of Germanyby Hadrian, the reign of Trajan is most likely, None of the three legions is attested in either his

Dacian or Parthian wars, so the campaign on the borders of their own provinces seem most likely,

AE,1901,50 & 1934,223 for Trajan's Dacian wars, AE1912,179 for his Parthian war, For the revolt

of 132, see 111.141552: VI3505; E 1894, 166 1896,53, also Parker, Ronian Legions (1928), 162,5, Parker, 163ff; VI . 3185; VIII6i9; IX • 2457; 1 . 5829; XI1I.3496,

-136-


unit may have been vexillated to garrison the outlying areas of its own home

province, there are only two instances prior to Marcus Aurelius of

vexillations being used as garrisons outside these areas, Both were in

exceptional circumstances, and both were only temporary measures.

AE,1895,24 is from an aquaeduct constructed in Judaea by a vexillation

of Leglo III Cyrenaica during the reign of Trajan. At this time, X Fret ensis,

the normal garrison of the province, was involved in Trajan's Parthian war,

so III Cyrenaica had obviously been vexillated from neighbouring Arabia to

fill the gap.

The same can be said of vexillations from Leglo X Fret ensis, II Tralana

and XII Fuirninata found in Judaea at the time when detachments of VI Ferrata

were in Africa, dealing with a serious Moorish incursion circa 144/51. An

alternative explanation may be that they were concentrated here in response

to the Parthian crisis whith had developed at the end of the reign of

Antonthus. In support of this latter theory, IX'2457 shows one L. Neratius

Proculus sent by Antoninus to command just such a concentration of vexillary

troops established in Syria for this purpose.

A marked change in the pattern of vexillary employment occurred at the

end of the second century. It is difficult to define Its genesis, for while

the early Seven seem to have been the main innovators, it was during the

reigns of Marcus Aurelius and his son that this switch of emphasis began.

It is best illustrated during the Marcomannic wars, in which, as Parker

puts it: "all of the legions on the Rhine-Danube front were engaged, but not

as complete units (my emphasis). The permanent camps were not abandoned,

1, ,QL1904,91: Parker1 Roaan Legions 165; VIII'2490 1 10230,

—137-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes

but the main body of the legions remained to garrison them, and sent

vexillationes to the actual scene of the fighting." In fact, there is

epigraphic evidence for the participation of detachments from not only the

Illyrian and Dacian legions, but of Legio III Augusta from Africa as well1.

The point is emphasised by the column of Marcus Aurelius, on which the

vexilla have taken the place of both the legionary aquila and the manipular

signa, in marked contrast with the reliefs on Trajan's column2.

AE,1910,161 is a different example of the phenomenon. It records the

occupation of Armenia by vexillations of XV Apollinaris and XII Fuirninata

during the reign of Commodus. Both legions were at the time stationed in

Cappadocia to the west, and detachments were obviously put into the

bordering province following its annexation by Lucius Verus in 161.

Both examples are indicative of a chronic shortage of manpower during

which the defence of the empire could only be achieved by the spreading of

existing forces as thinly as was feasible. The cause of this shortage may

have been the plague brought back from the east by Lucius Verus following

the Parthian war. It can be no coincidence that the last campaign of the

Antonines in which full legions were deployed was this conflicts.

Vexillation was not the only imperial response to this problem. Marcus

raised his two Italian legions, though both were immediately vexillated to

guard the access routes into Italy4 and the very use of Italian recruits is

indicative of the severity of the crisis. It is also likely that he raised

1, Parker, Roman Legions, 168; II1'14433; VI . 31856 AE, 188866; YIII . 619; QI92O,45,

2, Parker, bc, cit, Saxer, t'exillationen, 124,3, Ritterling, RE, 1427 & 1449; Parker, 166: cf, chIl: Manpower, p46ff4, 111.1980,

5, Dio LV . 24; Ritterling, 1300f; Salmon in r,ans, fl' Soc Can, 52 (1958), ser,3 sec,2, 52,—138-


several new auxiliary units and recruited heavily into exist thg ones1.

However 1 the career inscription of L. lulius Iulianus 2 , who commanded

vexillatioris during the Marcomannic wars, the British campaign of Commodus,

led detachments in Spain against Moorish rebels, and also held two other

vexillary commands, is a clear indication of the extent of Antonine

vexillation.

The manpower situation can only have been exacerbated by the wars of

Septiinius Severus during the 190s. There are plenty of references to

vexillary commands in the various exercitus of the civil wars, whilst the

careers of L. Valerius Valerianus and L. Fabius Fulcianus 4 might point to

their use in Septimius' first Parthian war.

By 197, Septimius had raised three new legions with which to promote his

second offensive against Parthia, and had taken steps to encourage

enlistment and counter the negative effect on offensive capability which

seems to have been inherent in the use of vexillary armies. For while

vexillations were very effective in police actions against insurgents, the

lack of' full legions does seem to have been felt during the Marcomannic

wars, which dragged on without a satisfactory conclusion for fifteen years.

To this end, the Praetorian guard was increased fourfold's and II Parthica

1, cf, ch,V: AuIia,

2, VI . 31856 488866,

3, VI14O8; AE,1944,80; 1971,476, The 4 German legions of iE,189O,82 = FIR2 1 566 must be

involved in the war against Albinus, and not later as Birley suggests in (p. Stwo 8 (1969), 67, They

are probably the 4 legions which replace Coh, XIII Urbana in Lyons (ILS• 9493; cf, also 1143), ILS

2319 & 2345 of Leg, II Tr(uimna) Qer(ianica) Fort(/s) suggest that this legion was also involved,

4, E,1971,476; 1926,79, If an alternative reading to Birley (bc, c/f) is being taken 1 the

command of Claudius Gallus might also be dated to this war 1 cf, E',1957,123 & PIR2 C 878,

5, For a lull discussion of the chronology cf, ch,IV: Leg/ones, p,77f,6, Durry, Co/iorte5 Pr'foriennes (1938), 81ff,

-139-


was established in Albanum. This provided a strong offensive nucleus, not

tied to any frontiers, which could be used on campaign and to which the

emperor could attach as many units and/or detachments as he deemed

necessary1.

Despite these measures, the empire was to remain stretched for manpower,

exacerbated by periodic recurrences of plague d , which placed it firmly on the

defensive and dominated the pattern of vexillary deployment throughout the

third century. The only truly offensive wars of the third century were the

British campaign of Septiinius and the Parthian war of Caracalla. The former

had the pretext of pacifying the tribes north of the Maeta&3 . In paradoxical

fashion, these two campaigns were made possible by the tacit acceptance of

the empire's defensive posture by both Septimius and his son. In Africa,

Syria and on the Danube, vexillations began to appear in garrisons wholly

divorced from the province of their mother unit 4 . One could also argue that

the Severan policy of limiting each province to two legions might have been

as much an attempt to spread available forces as it was a security measure;

especially since it was carried out in such dilatory fashions.

This shift in emphasis must in part be explained by the nature of the

evidence. The wealth of material produced by Cagnat from Africa and by

I, cf, ch,IY: Legionesp,85ff,

2, cf, ch,II: Manpover,

3, Dio LXXVII • 111; Herodian III'14 . 1-2; Miller, CAM XII (1939), 36ff; Murphy, St'verus Iroi

.[175CP1pfiOfl5 (1945), 77; Saiway, Roaan Br/tain (1981), 223 & 227, Caracalla's war was, in itself, a

bizarre and exceptional circumstance: Dio LXXVIII . 20-LXXIX; Herodian IV . 9 & 10; Miller, 48ff,

4, Vexillations of the Dacian legions are attested in Aquincum by AE,1901,154, The African and

Syrian evidence is discussed in more detail below,

5, It is highly likely that Septimius only supervised the reorganisation of Syria, and that

Britain was divided by his son, The division of Pannonia may have had more to do with local

circumstance than either policy: cf, ch,V: Auxilla, p. 116f

—140--

r


Rostovtzeff from Dura tends to overshadow the relative lack of anything else

from other areas. In Germany, for instance, the only references to

vexillations under the early Seven are of woodcutting details from Legio

XXII Primigenia'. Yet the picture even this unbalanced view provides hints

at an empire-wide increase in the use of vexillary garrisons.

In Africa, it would seem that the Numidian limes was garrisoned by small

detachments of between 5 and 15 men, commanded by a decurion 2, whilst the

castella on the more active frontiers of Tripolitania and Mauretania housed

somewhat larger groups. An epigrephical history of the cast ellum at Gholaia

cBou-Ngem) in Tripolitania shows that between 201 and 238 it was occupied

by a vexillation of Legia III Augusta with a numerus conlatus, under the

command of a centurion. After the legion's dissolution by Gordian, the

numerus remained on its own commanded by a decurion, until 253 from which

date it was replaced by cohors VII Fid&. Meanwhile, in Castellum Dimmidi

(Messad, Mauretania Caesariensis), a vexillat ion of III Augusta co-existed

alongside a detachment from the Syrian-based Leglo III Gallica throughout

the reigns of Septiinius and Caracalla4.

One might simply attribute this to the exceptional nature of Africa and

its garrisons, were it not for comparable events at Dura-Europos and, at a

later date, elsewhere in the empire. Situated at the apex of Roman

expansion along the Euphrates, Dura had great strategic importance for the

1, XIII • 6618, 6623, 11781; QE,191O,154,

2, 4E,1978,893,

3, QE,1972,677; 1979,642-644,

4, Al, 1939,213 & 215; 1948,214 & 217,

5, For the nature of the African iiees Fentress, Nuisidia and the Roasan Any, BAR S53 (1979), 115

& 139,

-141-


Seven as a post of forward defence. Its garrison was drawn largely from

the Syrian legions and from III Cyrenaica, based in Arabia, arid was usually 3

vexillations strong, with accompanying auxiliaries 1 . In addition, a

dedication of 211/2 in honour of Septirnius' son Geta shows that vexillations

from Europe were also part of the garrison2.

This instance and that of III Gallica above, are indicative of the change

that was occurring under the Seven. No longer were units being detached

only to guard areas within their home province. With manpower at a premium,

the emperors were finding it increasingly necessary to take detachments from

areas which were adequately garrisoned and place them where they were most

needed; or to deploy units where and when they became available. One

possible example of this latter case comes from Aquilela, and briefly refers

o vexillations from the Pannonian legions I & II Adiutri'P.

The dating of this inscription is tentative at best. It has been

universally assumed that the approaches into Italy were not permanently

garrisoned until the mid third century. At this time, Dornaszewski4 maintains

that garrisons were established at Concordia and Aquileia by Philip. His

arguments for the Concordia garrison cannot be accepted, based as they are

on the inscription of Traianus Mucianus', who served in xi'i r'i xovxop8(.a)

at the start of his career. Even if we make allowance for Domaszewski's

1, 4E,1934,275, 276 & 280; 1937,239; 1940,220 & 240; 1948,124,

2, QE,984,921b 1934,276, revised by Speidel, Ro,san Any Studies I (1984), 301ff,3, III•954,4, Domaszewski, Rangordming des rös,ischen Heeres (1967), 185ff,5, 1LS9479 AE,1908,259,

-142-


dating 1 , the fact that coh. I Concordlensvm was recruited from Concordia

does not prove that it was stationed there: if anything, it militates against

the possibility2 . His evidence for the Aquileia garrison is more reliable,

and shows that the town was garrisoned by vexillations of a Leglo 11111?] and

XIII Gemina circa 244, Yet while this does show that two legionary

vexillations were guarding the eastern approaches to Italy in the mid-third

century, it does not prove that the garrison was established by Philip, as

Domaszewski believed; nor does it explain where the mysterious vexillations

of the Pannonian legions fit in.

It seems unlikely that they co-existed with the other two legions in

Aquileia, since this does not fit the usual pattern of vexillary garrison,

broken only at Dura, in which the maximum number of detachments present was

two. Nor does it seem probable that they replaced the existing garrison at

a later date, since the history of Illyricum in the latter part of the third

century is one of constant barbarian incursion. Rather than withdrawing

detachments from the Danube provinces, Gallienus and the soldier emperors

were constantly on campaign with them and taking measures to strengthen the

Danube 1imes'. The only remaining possibility is that they were in Aquileia

1, As it stands, Mucianus would be ' rpocrop .lq, r' r(I! circa the reign of Gallienus, This

is hardly likely, since all securely datable references to the Protectorate in this reign follow the

format protector Augusti nostri, and have a far higher status than that of centurion, Without further

corroborative evidence, the inscription cannot be dated as early as Domaszewski would have us believe,

2, A quick perusal of Holder's Appendix III in BAR S70 (1980), 217ff will illustrate just how

rare it was for units to be stationed in their province of origin following the Batavian revolt of AD

69, Even the two Italian Legions of Marcus, raised specifically for the defence of the province, were

stationed on the opposite side of the Alps,

3, V . 808: dated by reference to V • 8237, XIII Gealna came from Dacia, The origin of the other

legion is more obscure, Mommsen suggested that the corrupted text should read Leg, 111(1?) P(Iaviae)fntoninianaeJ, but Domaszewski preferred Leg, III (Italicee) P,P. t/////////J, The former is morelikely, since the honorific of III Italica was Copcors, not Pie Fidel is,

4, cf, ch,X: Viri Miiitares, p2301,—143-


at an earlier date, and were themselves replaced by the units stationed

there under Philip.

It is possible that these vexillations were part of the army of

Septimius in 193, and were left by him in Aquileia as a second line of

defence, in case the weakened Danube frontier should be penetrated while his

attention was elsewhere. At this time, two vexillations from Dada could

have been stationed at Aquincum to cover for the departed legions 1 . If this

is the case, the vexillations are likely to have been removed back to

Pannonia by Caracalla in 214, when he reorganised the province to bring

Brigetlo into the sphere of Pannonia Inferior 2 . There is some minor

epigraphic evidence to support this-. The garrison of 244 could then have

been placed In Aquilela any time from 214 onwards.

In doing this, Septimius would simply have been following in the

footsteps of his illustrious predecessor: just as Marcus Aurelius raised the

Italian legions to protect Italy during the Marcomannic wars, so Septiraius

was using the manpower available to similar ends. It was an ad hoc measure,

taken at a time of stress. Such measures colour the history of vexillation

throughout the century. Most affected by this were the Dacian legions V

Macedonica and XIII Gemina, which were continually weakened to provide

troops needed elsewhwere until the province was completely denuded by

1,4E,1901,154,2, This was probably done in response to tension on this frontier, Herodian IV . 8 . I speaks of him

'completing hs business,,,on the Danube', whilst in Dio LXXVII . 20 • 3-4 he claims to have created

hostility between the Marcomanni and the Vandals, It is probable that he reinforced the Pannonian

part of the Danube Iiaesat this time: cf, ch,V: Auxilia, p,llGf,

3, E,1944,121 shows I Qd, in Brigetio under Caracalla & three milestones from a later date list

the involvement of II d, on the Aquincum-Brigetio road: III.143544_6, Though bear in mind that we

are only talking in terms of detachments

—144-


Gallienus to provide the strategic garrison at Poetovio 1 . It is at this point,

with the empire threatened on two fronts, and the East under the de facto

control of Palrnyra, that the crippling extent of the imperial shortage in

manpower can be seen. No longer able to draw on the Dacian legions to fill

his needs, Gallienus was forced to look elsewhere for the troops he needed.

Vexillations from Lower Moesia were moved to Aquincum, and detachments of

the German and British legions, which must have been In Illyricum prior to

259, occupied Sirmium. Most significantly, the main access from Illyricum

into Greece was garrisoned by vexillations of Legio II Parthica and III

Augusta. That Gallierius was reduced to drawing from the legion in Africa

was bad enough; but by vexillating II Parthica, the core of imperial

offensive capability, and placing it into a defensive mode, he proved beyond

any shadow of doubt that he was at the absolute limit of his resources'.

With the reign of Gallienus, there comes a turning point in the nature

of the Roman military response. The vexillation of II Part hi ca was

symptomatic of a greater change, one that had begun one hundred years

previously. It symbolised the final end of the era in which whole legions

were taken on campaign, and established the vexillation as the new strategic

unit of the later third century. At the same time, Gallienus had found a

I, Alfoldi, CAM 1I (1939) 214 & n,6 for references, Also 14E,1936,53, 54 & 57

2, AE,1935,164; 111.3228,

3, AE 1934, 193, These vxi/iationes were sub cira Aur, Augusizani duds iustissjii, which might

suggest that they were part of an exercitus, It has been suggested that they were campaigning againstthe Goths in 267: PLRE, 4ugustianus 2' Pflae,, Car p, Proc., 919ff, While I can accept that II

Pap thjca was likely to have been involved, it is hardly likely that the African legion could have been

transported to the area fast enough to respond to the invasion, A more reasonable explanation is

that, like Aureolus in Italy, Augustianus had responsibility for the defence of the Illyrian passes,

and the two vexillations were part of this garrison force: on II Parth, cf, ch,IV: Legiones, p87ff;

on Aureolus & the Nilan cavalry cf, chill: Contra Coaitatut, p 64ff,

—145-


new source of manpower in the cavalry of Dalmatia 1 , and had set about

integrating this into his existing military force 2 . The results are visible

in the campaigns of his successors. Cavalry and infantry worked together to

harass, wear down and finally bring to battle the opposing army, be it Goth,

Vandal or heavily armoured Palrnyrene. Aurelian's army of reconquest against

Palmyra contained leglonaries from all the provinces of Illyricum and Asia,

which must perforce have been vexillations, unless he stripped over half the

empire of its defences.

One piece of epigraphy would seem to prove this point. CIL XII'2228

from Gallia Narbonensis (Grenoble) is a dedication to Claudius from the

'v xivatIones adque equites' which made a reconnaissance in force under the

command of lulius Placidianus, the Prefect of the Vig11es'-. Though no unit

titles are given, the above wording suggests that it was a composite force

of legionary vexillations and the new-style cavalry: the new exercitus of the

late Principate.

The new exercitus It may have been, but it was not a new comitatus.

Various attempts have been made to use numismatics and some epigraphic

material to show that the vexillatlon of the third century was a part of the

assumed mobile field army. Birley argued that the prosopographical records

of several of Septlinius' most prominent generals were an ". ..indication of the

1, Ritterling, 'Ro.ischen Heerwesen', Pest, 0, Hirschfelds (1903), 345ff; lföldi, 'Usurpator

Aureolus', %f// (1927), 11ff, Cooper draws on Mann's thesis to show that this recruitment began under

Marcus Aurelius, and suggests that Gallienus drew so heavily from Dalmatia because it was the only

fertile recruiting ground remaining: Cooper, C? Origins of the flew Roøan Ara y ( 1967), 284 & 373,

2, cf, ch,III: Contra Co,itatui,

3, Zosimus I • 43 • 2; I451; 1 . 50 . 3 & 1.52.3-53,

4, .IL$ 569, Saxer, Vexillationen, 108 & Domaszevski, Rangordnwng, N2 253,

-146-


de faca field army in being...". He was supported by Cooper, who took Maria

Alföldi's claim, that the 'Pia Fide.Us' coinage of 259/60 was minted to pay

vexillatioris in Gallienus' field army, one step backwards and applied it to

Septimius' coin issues of 1932. It has also been argued that the distinction

found in some of the law codes between vex±Zlationes and the Auxilia was a

distinction between the higher status comitatensian troops and their lower

status counterparts on the frontiers.

Birley's arguments cannot be credited. The records he cites each merely

name the dux of a particular army for a particular campaign, or series of

campaigns. While this has provided reasonably good evidence for the

continuing u e of vexillary armies under the Seven, there is nothing In them

which can be construed as new or revolutionary. In no way do they suggest

the permanent retention of the force once Septimius' wars were over;

therefore in no way are they specials.

The hypothesis of Maria Alföldi is more tenable, but does admit an

alternative explanation. The argument stems from the problematic coinage of

Gallienus, which comrnemmorated legions from the Gallic Empire, as well as

imperial legIons'. AlföldI believed that since identical legions were

comemmorated on both the VI P(ia). VI F(idelis). and the VII P. VII F. issues,

they were vexillations in an identical field army which defeated the

Alemanni, first outside Milan, then later in a battle near Verona which she

I, Birley, 'Severus and the Army', 66f,

2, Cooper, 0r191n5, 234ff & 266ff summarising M, Alföldi (1957),

3, FIR2 C 823; C 878 ,1957,123; I 566; ILS 1141 & 2935, cf, also above pnn,3 & 4

4, RICV . I pp.92-97 & 34 cf, also Ritterling R 1341,

—147-

M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillationes

inferred from a series of coin hoards. Furthermore, the V P. V F. issues

which comrnemmorated four legions of diverse origin' were taken to indicate a

similar field army operating on the Rhine between 257/8. Her chronology can

hardly be faulted, merely her interpretation. That the legions involved in

the Italian campaign were vexillations is not seriously in doubt, but the

coinage of 259 lists every single legion from the Rhine and Danube, including

II Parthica and the Praetorians. Such a force was certainly not in Italy at

the time of the Aleinannic invasion. The Alemanni were only repulsed from

Rome due to emergency measures taken by the Senate, and the force with

which Gallienus finally defeated them is believed to have been numerically

inferior2.

A more probable explanation is that, like the Rstitu tar coinage of his

reign, Gallienus was trying to minimise the loss In that year of the Gallic

Empire . A similar propo8anda move comes from the Gallic Empire itself, with

the coin series of Victorinus, which commemorate legions from as far afield

as Syria and Egypt, whilst ignoring certain of the British and German legions

known to be within Its borders 4 . The 193 issues of Septixnius were also

more likely designed to consolidate his position than to commemmorate the

vexillations in his exercitus, especially since they omit Leglo III Augusta

Vindex and X üeiaina, two legions which were manifestly loyal to hiin,

I, 'III wgust from Germania Superior; I Adiutrix from Panonnia Inferior; II Italica from

Noricum; and II Part/iica from Albanum,2, Zosimus I . 37 Alfóldi, CAN XII, 182,

3, On the Restitutor coinage cf, Drinkwater, Gall/c Eapire, Hi5tor/a 52(1987), 167,4, Cooper, Origins, 270,5, III Augwsta gained the title Vindex for avengeing the death of Pertinax, and I Ge.*ina was one

of the Pannonian legione that elected him, R1C IV'1 pp,65 93 p180 n,652,

—148-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army Vexillat iones

Conversely, the V P. V F. coinage, with its mention of only four legions,

does seem to be commemorating a particular campaign, and is a very good

example of II Parthica being used as the core for an expeditionary force

around which other units were vexillated. Gallienus was sent to Gaul in

response to Gallic pleas for help 1 , and his taking an exercitus with him can

hardly be seen as unusual.

Turning to the law codes, which refer to the cavalry vexillationes of

Dioclet Ian and the Tetrarchy, it Is true that one rescript granted immunities

to those equites who served in vexfllatione, whilst categorically denying

them to those in the a1ae; but It is not until Constantine that such a

distinction is drawn between comita tenses and ripenses3, Rather than

serving in the field army, several of these equites can be found in the

Notitia as garrison troops, stationed there during the later third century4.

What the law codes do illustrate is the semantic change In the term

vexillaticP. The Table of' Brlgetio provides us with a clear example of the

change in terminology when it extends privileges to: "...tam legionari.i milites

quam etiarn equites in vexillationibus constituti inlyriciani (sic)".

The change must have occurred some time in the last third of the

century, since the Table of Brigetlo dates to 311, and the Placidianus

inscription shows the old terminology still in effect at the time of

I, Drinkwaier, Gd//ic Eipire, 248,2, Cod, .1(/5t, X.5533, Cod, Theod, VII2O4: Cooper, Origins, 388,4, Ritterling, 'Romischen Heerwesen', 345ff who believed that the eqwtes garrisons found in the

Notitia Dignifatua were placed there by Aurelian after his defeat of the Paleyrenes, Against thisview cf ch,VI1: Eqiites,

5, Cod, ,Twst, VII649; Cod, Theoo', V'6'l,

—149-


Claudius 1 . The clue lies in the status of the new cavalry units, as

indicated by the equites Promoti,

Ritterling2 believed that the equites Promoti were recruited from the

cavalry of the legions. This would neatly explain their name, since he

thought the eques in a legion was a pri.ncipalis and the ordinary miles

gregarius therefore had to be promoted to enter the legionary cavalry.

Cooper, following Gilliam-', corrected the status of the legionary eques to

that of irnmunis, and pointed out that the same was true of the eques in a

cohors equitata4 . The whole argument hinges upon a papyrus dated to 302, in

which one Aurelius Heron describes himself as:

riruç irpopotaw ZExouvrav ciro As'yuLvoç $ piavç Svixipevsç v T&vtaup

tno Mcixpa',8tov (rp.krLJrocn1.ov.6

Whatever reading of this passage you acceptG, the fact remains that

Heron had transferred from Legio II Tralana into the equites Prornoti Secund.Z

proving that some link between the Prornoti and the legions existed. Such a

measure is Just the sort of solution which Gallienus could have adopted in

his search for manpower, vexillating the equites out of the legions and

converting them from messengers and reconnaissance troops into fighting

1, XlI . 2228 discussed on p.146 above,

2, Ritterling, 'Römischen Heerwesen', 346f,

3, Cooper, Origins, 368 following Gilliam in Hisfria (1965), 77ff,4, 1LS2332,

5, P. Gre,,!, 74,6, Some controversy has existed about what It is the io is actually referring to, Ritterling

believed it referred to the unit and showed that the equies Proaoti were closely affiliated to thelegion of their origin, However, Cooper follows van Berchem in believing that the io referred to

Heron himself, who had just been drafted from the legion into the cavalry unit, For some reason, he

believed this proved that the eqiites Proioii were not recruited from the legions: Cooper, Origins,369; van Berchem, 4rie de Diociâtien,,, (1952), 104 n,3; cf, ch VII: Eqiites, 167ff,

—150-


units. Though there is no evidenfce for the existence of equites Promoti

prior to Diocletian, the nomenclatures, Armigerui, Scutarli, Sagittaril, are

strongly suggestive of similar measures, and Speldel has argued convincingly

that the Stablesiani were raised from the stratores of provincial governors1.

If this Is the case, several of the new cavalry units could have started out

as vexillat ions, colourfully named to denote their origins, and gaining their

own unit Identity. Gradually the terminology and privileges which went with

these units were subsumed into the equites as a whole.

It was not uncommon for vexillatlons to take on their own identity after

a protracted absence from the mother unit. Saxer dealt with this subject at

great length2, and produced an excellent example in the vex. equitum

Illyricorum. This was a unit formed out of Illyrlan auxilliary detachments

during Trajan's Daclan war which lost contact with its origins and was

even ually turned into an a1. From the third century, Legia II Ital(ica)

Divitensiurrtt , stationed on the Rhine, had assumed Its independent status

after a protracted absence from its parent, II Italica in Noricum. The same

may be true of the legions commanded by Pompillus Piso, if Parker is

correct

In support of the equites Promoti, various attempts have been made to

prove an increase In the legionary cavalry from 120 men to 726, to little

1, Speidel, 'Stablesiani', C,iron4 (1974), 541ff: cf, ch,VII: Equifes, 169ff,2, Saxer, Vexii1ationei 124f,

3, Saxer, N2 48,

4, ILS 2316 & 2777,

5, IL$ 1l11 Parker, Roaan Legions, 164f,

—151-


avail 1 . This only has relevance if vexillations are assumed to be of a

standard, fixed size, at which point the legionary cavalry do not hcive enough

men to vexillate. Yet all evidence points to the contrary. Far from being

of any fixed size, vexillations seem to fluctuate according to the task in

hand. Hunt's Pridianum is indicative of the extent of vexillation in even a

small, quirigenary unit. Soldiers are listed on supply missions, garrison duty

elsewhere, seconded as bodyguards and procuratorial staff, on reconnaissance,

participating in an expedition across the Danube, and in vexillatione. The

third century history of Gholaia3 is another illustration, showing how the

garrison of a fort could fluctuate with the circumstances of the century,

and the small garrisons on the Numidian limes illustrate that a vexillation

could as easily be five as five hundred men.

Hyginus spoke of vexillations which Cooper worked out to be 550 strong.

Based on this, he constructed an ingenious argument to show that the cohort

size in the Antiqua Leglo of Vegetius, given as 550, was in fact the

standard size of a vexillation4 . Great emphasis was laid upon the passage

In Cassius Dio when a junior officer promised to end the seige of Hatra with

just 550 men, and Septimius is said to have snapped "And where am I going to

find so many men?". Cooper went to great pains to explain why the number

550 was used, rather than a simple reference to a vexillation. He need not

have worried. Five hundred and fifty Is a very fortuitous number to have

fixed upon, since it was approximately one tenth of a standard legion. It

I, Besnier (1937), 194; Ensslin (1939), 379, based on the antiqwa /eioof Vegetius, cf, Appi,2, Fink Roaan Military Records on Papyrus (1971), 217ff,3, cf, above, p,141f,

4, Hyginus V . 5 . 4; Vegetius 11 . 6 & 11 . 8; Cooper, Orzgins 40ff,5, Dio LXXVII2•5

-152-


may well be that whenever they needed a vexillat ion, the Rornans simply

detached a cohort plus a few extra men (cavalry ?) and put them under the

command of a senior centurion or military tribune. The request of the

officer at Hatra was so exact precisely because there was no fixed

complement for a vexillation. The man in the story was a soldier. The

comment may be apocryphal, but the implication is still there. He was asking

for a finely Judged number of men, estimated to be the minimum required for

his purposes. The moral of the story is in Severus' reaction to the

statement.

Vexillations were exactly what the term implies: detachments of as many

men as were required to do a specific duty. In the case of strategic

detachments, they were almost certainly quirigenary and rnilliary vexillations,

since these were the standard building blocks which Roman commanders were

used to working with. Yet this did not preclude them from placing five men

in an unthreatened border fort, or enough men on the Rhine to be classed as

a legion by themselves. In the crisis of the third century, the very

flexibility of the vexillary unit was its great advantage. Only when

relative order had been restored, and the emperor had time to impose a rigid

structure on the existing status quo, was the ad hoc disposition of the

third century restructured into the new order of the Tetrarchy.

-153-

rABL.E V 1:

Vc i 11 t i cr pr i r t c Mr- c

AL1r1 I Li

Grr± ri

CIRCUMSTANCE UNIT(S1.

IN HOME PROVINCE:

iClaudlus Vexx, in Thracia XV

Flavians XIII Geuina

?Tra j an Vex, L(eg) Tr(aianae ?)

Hadrian X Fretensis

VI Ferrata

Anioninus Pius VI Victrix

IV Scythica & XVI Flavia

Uncertain date III Augusta

XV Apollinaris

REFERENCES

IQIRL

11.3272

4E,1903,218; 1910,66

2

XIII•8082a

4E, 1928, 136; 1974,656 & 657

AE 1928,131

4

A1912,199; 1975,563

SE 1903, 252

3

AE 1900,121

AE 1975, 783

2

IM NEIGHBOURING PRO VINCE

Trajan III Cyrenaica in Judaea AE, 1895, 24

Antoninus Pius X Fretensis, II Traiana,

XII Fulminata in Judaea 4 1904, 91

Cmpi ri V<c:

CIRCUMSTANCE UNIT(SJ

?CLAUDflJS:

British expedition Vexill, Leg IlL,,,,

in expe]diiione Briiann(,, VIII'14400

FLAVIAN:

?AD69 Civil war I Gemina XIII4624

Xliii Gemina E,l920,I18

XXI Rapax X11I'4623

VexilatiLo]

Germani[c]ianoruLi] XIi'5733

?AD69 revolt of Civilis Leg, XVI ci vle]x, XIII.7720

AD89 revolt of Saturninus X Gemina 1111.7717

VI Victrix 1111.8533

REFERENCES

15

1QIL

4

2

TRAJAN:

?German campaign

Dacian war

Unknown expedition

HADRIAN:

'Adversus Armloricano]s'

Exercitus Moesiaci

X Gemina + auxilia

XXII Primig, + auxilia

I lialica & V Nacedonica

4 Pannonian legions

VII Claudia

clohort(es) alaru]m

Britanici(n]iarum (sic)

vexillationi

exercitus Nloesiaci

XIII'7697, 7716 & 7718

XIII • 7704, 7715 & 7727

E 1901,50

QE 1934, 223

1912,179

III' 1919

XII .1358

6

2

-154-

M,C.Ibeji: 03 Army

CIRCUMSTANCE

HADRIAN CTD:AD132 Jewish war

ANTONINUS PIUS:

British expedition

AD145 vs doors

Parihian crisis

UNCERTAIN DATE:?A021

?Pre AD89

Pre C3,

Vexillationes

UNIUSI

IQIL

V Macedonica & XI Claudia 111 . 14155 2; AE,1894,l66; 1896,53

Trib, X Beam, missus

,,,,,ad vexilla(tiones VI'3505

4

VII Gemina, VIII Augusta

& XXII Primigenia X'5829

XXII Primigenia VII846; XIII'3496

II Augusta, VI Victrix, XX Valeria Victrjx

coniributi cx 6cr, duobus E, 1903, 360

Unnamed vexx, VII1I09 1110k

6

VI Ferrata VIII.2490; 10230

2

Unspecified vexx, IX.2457

Vexx Legg I, V, XX & XXI XIV.3602

VI Victrix XIII.7695 & 7696

X Gemina XIII.7698

XXI Rapax XIII7714

XXII Primigenia XIII•7703

5

Leg XV XIII•7700

C, Vellius Rufus, praef vexillariorum

I Adiutrix, II Adiutrix, II Augusta,

VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, XIII Gemina,

XX Victrix, XXI Rapax AE,1903,368

2

40

—15 5-

TABL.E V 2:Vci 11 t i c,x-i cf Mc1 iid GcrI1DdL1

Grri_ ri

REFERNCE PROVINCE UNIT(S)PURPOSE

Af,1910,5 Hispania VII Geminagarrison

AE1914,188 Britannia VI Victrix garrison

X1II7946 Germania Inf I Minerviagarrison

A1899 1 195 Raetia Ill lialica garrison

111.14370 2Raetia III Italica garrison

111 . 1980 Dalmatia II & III Italica Frumentarius in charge

1L82287 suggests a supply

Ii5SiOfl,

41,1910,161 Armenia XV Appollinaris & XII Fulminaia Armenia annexed in 161.

C mp i ri Sf c c:REFERNCE PROVINCE UNIT(S) PURPOSE

V1II . 7050 P. lul, arcianus leg, Augg, sulper] Verus' Parthian war?

PIA2 1340 vexillationes in Capp(ado]cia

4E1920,45 praepositus vexillationibus ex Illyrico Marcomannic war,

•issus ad,..,expeditionem Germ, et Sari,

VIII'619 praeposiius vexillationibus Ponticis Danube & Marcomannic

ILS 2747 aput Scythia et Taurica. + vex, III Aug. wars,

aput Marcorannos,

111 . 14433 Moesia Inf I Italica & V Macedonica 'Tropa(e]i (agens)'

During Marcomannic war?

YI'31856 praep, vexx, tempore belli Marcommanic war,

41,1888,66 Germanici et Sarmat,

praep, vexx, per Achaiam et Macedoniam Spanish war of Commodus,

et in Hispanis adversus Castabocas et

Mauros rebel les,

praep, vexx, tempore belli Britannici, British wr of 183/4,

— 15 6-

III Augusta

III Augusta

III Augusta

IV Scythica

& XVI Flavia Firma

misc,

III CyreflaiCa

& IV Scythica

XIII Geilna

V Macedonica

V Nacedonica

& XIII Lemma

XII Primigenia

XII Prmmigenia

I Nmnervia

& XXX Ulpia

REFERENCE

V1II8796

E,1939,2l3, & 2)5;

1940, 141;

1948, 214 & 217

VIII2465; 2466 & 4322

AE 1909, 151;

1922,53 & 54

4E 1962, 304

4E, 1976, 698 & 700

AE 1940, 220

AE 1934, 276; 1984, 921b

cf, Speidel Rian 1qr,,y

Styd. (1984), 301ff,

AE, 1934, 275 & 276;

1937, 239,

E1890,IO2; 1912,305

4E 1912, 73;

cf, 1909,35

4E 1901, 154

XIII . 6618 & 6623;

4fi 1899, 194

XIII.11781

AE 1898, 18

E 1944, 80

4 1890, 82

VI . 1408 & 1409

4E 1926,79

VIII'5349, 7978;

AE 1977, 858

X'5178, 5398;

AE 1985, 332

XIlI6104

AE 1985,37

cf, VI'lSSl & 1477,

rABLE V 3:

Vxi11tt icr cf Sr-ia & Crc1 1

Qr-r I x-i

W.E. PROVINCE FUNCTION

III Augusta Maur, Sitif, garrison of Messad under Severus

III Augusta Maur, Caes, garrison of Castellum Diromidi

& III Gallica under Severus

Numidia garrison of various forts

under Severus

Tripolitania vex, alongside coh, Syrorum Sag,

under Severus

Tripolitania garrison of $u-Ngem under Severus

Syria garrison of Dura under Severus

Syria

'(miUtes vex,] Ant, europa(eorum]

Syria

garrison of Dura under Caracalla

Dacia garrison of Deva under Caracalla

Dacia(!) 'vex, D(acorum) P(arihica) L(eg)

V M(ac) p,f,' at Potais5a under

Severus

Pannonia garrison of Aquincum under Severus

Ger, Sup, 'vex, leg, agens in lignaris'

Ger, Sup, 'vex, leg, agens ad abiegnas pilas

secundas'

Germanma tilestamps reading 'vex, ex(ercitus)

G(e)r(manici)

Crnpi ri V'c<:PROVINCE FUNCTION

Valerianus praep, vexx, exped, urbic(ae)

itemque Asianae adversus hosies

publicos p(opuli) R(omani)

(campaigns in Italy & vs Niger]

Felix praep, vex, agentium in Ital,

Castinus dux vexx, advers(us) defectores

et rebelles (Niger & Albinus]

Fulcianus dux vexx, per Italiam

praep, vexx Illyricianis in exped-

itione orientali

Claudianus praep, vexx, Daciscarum XIII G & V M,

(in first Parthian war]

Sabinus praep, vexx, Germanicae expeditionis

(Caracalla's German campaign]

IV Flavia agens expeditione Germaniae

XI Claudia in German, epedit,

& I Italica?

REFERENCE

AE 1971, 476

-157-

REFERENCE

1940, 162

cf, 1929,183

VIII . 10990;

AE 1979, 645

XIII'7944

AE 1940,153

AE, 1972,677

AE 1957, 341

V.8237

V.808

111.954

AE 1934, 193

AE,1936,53,54 & 57

AE 1977, 560

XIII'6668

REFERENCE

11 . 484 : ILS 1372

A 1978, 440;

cf, I1'3688

4E 1935,164

VI . 31871

VII '212

ThBLE V 4:Vci11t1cri fr-c,m AD 2 17-284-

Grj ri Vcc:NifiIE. hAlE. FUNCTIOPt

III Augusta 8ev, Alex, garrison of Castellue Dirimidi in

Mauretania Caesariensis

III Augusta 8ev, Alex, garrisons in Tripolitania

I Minervia

8ev, Alex, garrison at Iversheia in Ger, Inf,

III Augusta

Naximinus garrison at Castellum Diramidi

III Augusta

pre-Gordian garrison of Bu-Ngem in Tripolitania

I Italica

Gordian vex, in Moesia Inferior

XIII Gemina

AD 244 garrison of Aquileia

XIII Gemina

Philip? garrison of Aquileia

& Legio 111(1?]

I & II Adiutrix

I C3 garrison of Aquilsia

11 Parthica

Gallienus posted at Lychnidus in Macedonia

& III Augusta

V Macedonica

late C3 in Poetovio, Pann, Sup, commanded

& XIII Gemina

by L, Flavius Aper

XIX Ulpia

C3 garrison of Euskirchen, Ger, Inf,

XXII Priaigenia

C3 garrison at mogontiacum, Ger, Sup,

Crnpl ri Tcc:

NAE. QIE. FUNCTION

Similis early C3 praep, vexx, expeditionis per

Asiam, Lyciam, Pamphyliam et Phryiam

Urbanus AD 238 vet, princeps vex, VII Gem,

Gradivus

Gallienus aput VII Cl,,,,missus cum vexx,

Moe5iae Inferjoris,,,to Aquincum

Galliar, C3 praep, vexx, per Ital, ci Raei,

ci Noric, bello Germanico,

]nius

C3 praep, vex, Raetor, et Noricor,

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VII: Eqt.iit

During the late Roman period, a whole series of 'ethnic' units, many of

them cavalry, came to the fore, distinguished from the alae and cohorte by

a new nomenclature coupled to exotic names. Their titles were descriptive,

often seeming to denote their origins, and in several cases implied that

they had been vexillated from institutions already In existence. For some,

such as the equites ArmlgerZ we simpiy have not unearthed enough material

with which to construct a satisfactory history'. For others too numerous to

mention, a single Inscription or a reference in the Notitia Dignitatum is the

only evidence of their existence. They could have been named after the

place they were stationed2 , the peoples from whom they were recruited 3 , or

the manner in which they fought4 . Yet those which occur most commonly In

the Notitia have in general left behind some sort of imprint from which to

trace a sketchy picture of their creation.

The ubiquity of the Notitia in the study of late Roman cavalry units is

a problem in itself. Ever since Ritterling's study of the equites Iflyriciani

1 Seven units are mentioned in the Notitia, four of them comitatensian, and a nuaeriisAraigerorwi is mentioned on the tombstone of a ceiiturio protector in Concordia (Italia), which istentatively dated to the early fourth century: Not, Dig, Or, V . 35, VIl'26, XXXIX'17, XL'14 & 15 Not,Dig, Ccc, VI'54 & 80 VII . 173 & 198: V.8747,

2, Such as the equitas vex/list/ones Aegissensisat Aegyssus (floesia): AE,I976,637,3, Such as the comitatensian equ.ztes ifarcotanni, possibly recruited by Aurelian: Not, Dip, Dcc,

VI'GS = V1I . 183; 86'2074,II,5 (c,AD 286); Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 224,

4, Such as the equites Caapa'7i, which are believed to have fought on horseback 'in theHellenistic manner': AE 1963,81: Weege, ,Iahrbuch des Arch, fast, 24(1909), 99ff,

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites

in 1903 1 , scholars have taken units from the Notitia Di&nitatum and tried to

project them back into the previous century, sometimes successfully but more

often not. It is a worthwhile endeavour only if independent evidence for the

existence of such cavalry units can be attributed to the third century.

Otherwise, extrapolation from the Notitia is a misleading and pointless

exercise. In this chapter, I intend to explore the evidence for the most

common cavalry units In the Notitia in order to show which units will reward

such study and which units will not.

I shall begin with some comments on the equites Dalmatae. Their

history is so enmeshed with that of the supposed Gallienic field army that

it is impossible to speak of one without the other, end most of what could

be said has already been iterated above in my chapter Contra Comitaturri. An

examination of their place in the Notitia only serves to reinforce those

points. Forty-eight units of equites Dalmatae are listed In the Notiti&,

almost as many as the total number of equites promoti, Mauri and scutarli

put together4 . Thirty-one of these came from the west, of which only 2 were

comitatensian and 3 were cunei. In the east, 8 out of 17 units were cunei

and of the remaining 9, 4 were comita tenses. With no Palatinate units, and

only 1 in 8 of the Dalmatae being comitatensian, it is difficult to envisage

them as elite troops. There is little doubt that as vexillations of equites

1, Ritterling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen', Pest, 0, Hirsch!elds (1903), 346ff.

2, Above 1 ch,III,

3, Not, Dig, Ccc, YI . 174 & 175; XIVIII . 16; XXXII'23, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34 36 & 37 XXXIU'25, 29,

32-35 k 37 & 39-43; XXXIV'14, 18-20, 34 & 35; XXXVIII . 7 XL'19 Not, Dig, Or, V . 36 & 37; VI . 37 VII.27;

XXXIl . 21: XXXIII . 25; XXXIV . 18; XXXY'is; XXXVIIl6; XLI . 15, lB & 19; XLII'13, 14 & 15-18; cf, Tables El

& 2,

4 These are th. other types of equifes li/yriciani identified by Ritterling,

—160-


they held a higher status than their auxiliary counterparts. This much is

spelled out in two rescripts of Diocletian 1 . The Placidianus inscription from

Grenoble in AD 269, with its reference to vexil.Zationes adque equ1tes shows

that the distinction was in place even before the new nomenclature had

become firmly established, and the equites were classed as the equals of

legionary detachments 2 . Yet this is as far as the distinction goes. No one

would dream of claiming that the vexillationes in Grenoble had elite status,

and any attempt to paint this as anything other than an expeditionary force

would be undoubtedly mistaken.

Speidel has put forward the suggestion that the equites Dalmatae were

not named for their national origin, but were vexillations of auxiliaries

stationed in Dalmatia as a strategic reserve 3 . This is unlikely, since it

involves the notion of an uninvolved rear-echelon force. We have already

established that the Dalmatae were extremely active throughout the empire,

and that the concept of a mobile field army to which this suggestion is

tantamount is not tenable. In all probability, the recruitment of the

equites Dalmatae was the act of an emperor desperate for manpower. We have

seen how Gallienus resorted to extensive vexillation in an attempt to cover

all fronts with adequate forces4 . He would seem to have been so short of

troops that he was willing to recruit any fighting men he could find.

Cooper was of the opinion that the recruitment of Dalmatian cavalry had

I, Cod, 1U5t, VII'64'9 & X . 54 . 3 (or 55 . 3 in certain editions),

2, XII'2228 1L5569,

3, Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 22Sf,

4, cf, ch,VI: Yexillationes, p 1451,

-161-


begun in the reign of Marcus Aurelius 1 1 and it is worth noting that this

coincided with the start of large scale vexillation. The Dalmatian hill

tribes had been heavily drawn upon in earlier centuries to provide a whole

series of auxiliary units2 , If they were no longer capable of providing

anything but lightly-armed skirmishers, it is unsurprising that these

resources should remain largely untapped until the third century.

Skirmishers of exceptional quality could be obtained elsewhere, most notably

from Mauretania. Only when necessity became the mother of invention were

the equltes Dalmatae to come into their own.

The equltes Mauri often seem to be lumped together with the Dalmatae,

as aspects of the same thing, but their history is very different. Very few

units appear in the Notitia Dignitatum; of those which do, most were equites

Illyriclani?. Two units of equites Maurl are listed in the west, and the

magister equitum praesen tails had two units of comita tenses4. Nowhere in

the Notitia is there mention of the equites item que pedites Mauri known from

inscriptions5 , which seem to have been a phenomenon of the third century.

One cuneus equitum Maurorum scutar'iorum is known6.

The Moors were a highly esteemed adjunct of the Roman army throughout

1, Cooper, C3 Origins of the 'New' Roian Any, Oxford DPhil (unpub. 1967), 284 & 373,

2, Known coliortes are I, II, VI a VII Deliataru. eq., Jill Del,atarui, V Deliatarue CR, 11!Oal.aiarus p1, V Delia tarui and I Pannoniorui et Delia tarue CR eq. The sequences probably started inthe Jullo-Claudian period, since the earliest dated references come from the reign of Tiberius:

Xl I'11962, 1111 . 7581, 4E 1921, 31, VIII' 21040; Holder, Studies in the Auxilia of the Roian Any (roeAwgustu5 to Ira/an, BAR $70 (1980), 226 & 306f,

3, Not, Dig, Or, XXXII'18; XXXIII'26; XXXIV'21; XXXV17; XXXVII . 17; cf, Table El.,

4, Not, Dip, VI.58 & 61; XXXIII3l; XXXIV23: cf, Table E2,5, VIII'20996 ItS 1356; IGRRI'1496 ItS 9479 = Ql908,259,6, Not, Di;, Or, XXXI'23,

-162-


the history of the empire, arid indeed before 1 . In the days of Trajan, the

native commander of an elite Moorish contingent gained such a powerful

position through this command that he achieved consular office and was

eventually removed by Hadrian on grounds of treason 2. A group of Maui-i

gentiles were raised by Antoninus Pius, as part of the tribute from his

Mauretarilan war according to Speidel, and were stationed in Dacia 3 . Another

Moorish unit from his reign can be found in Moesia Superior 4 . These may

have been the origins of the numeri Maurorum found in Dacia half a century

later, but the link has not been provens. A distinct change may have come

with the Maui-i equites of Marcus Aurelius which, if Southern is correct, were

clearly distinguished from the alae and were used in his Danubian wars.

Moorish cavalry were certainly a fully-fledged arm of the Roman army by

the time of the Seven. They fought for Pescennius Niger In AD 193, when

their ferocity was remarked upon7 . In AD 216 and 218 they took part in the

Parthian campaigns of Caracalla and Macrinus 6 , and fought for Severus

Alexander and Maxiininus against the Germans, invading Italy with the latter

in 238a• Under the Severan emperors, the Moors became a part of the regular

Auxilia 10 , while some units of mixed cavalry and infantry achieved household

I, Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 208ff,

2, Lusius Quietus: Speidel, op. cii,, 212.

3, XVI . 108 Speidel, 209,

4, XVI'114,

5, 111 . 6267; AE,1944,74; Speidel 1 210; Southern, 'Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army', Britannia11(1989), 93 sounds a note of caution,

6, Southern, op. cit,, 931,

7, Her, 111.4-5,

8, Dio LXX VIII'32,

9, Her, VI'7 .8, VII2'1 & VIII . 13; S//A Max, 11 . 1; Zos, 1.15,

10, cf, ch,V: Aixi1iae

—163-

M,C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Equites

status1,

In the mid third century, they defeated the Carpi under Philip and were

part of Valerian's eastern army 2. Speidel has argued that the vexillationes

equitum Maurorum in terr.itorio Auziensi praetendentium during the 250s were

detachments of the equites item que pedites !fauri which were at Auzia In AD

227. Against this, Southern pointed out that the phrase in territorlo

Auziensi praetendentium strongly suggested a non-permanent garrison, and

claimed that these units were instead detachments drawn from bodies of

auxiliary cavalry 4. The equites ite.mque pedites Mauri were probably sent to

the area by Severus Alexander to quell riots in Tingitana early In the

reign6, and it would seem strange for such an elite unit to have remained

once the troubles were over. On the other hand, an extensive fortification

effort In Caesariensis immediately followed these riots, so the unit may have

stayed to aid In this6.

An equally important contingent of ethnic troops drawn upon by the

Seven was the Oshroenian archers. Osrhoene was annexed as a province by

Sept imius for a very short while, with the town of Nisibis established as a

colonia on its borders, but he was forced to abandon it in pursuit of the

civil war against Albinus. On his return to the Parthian theatre, King

Abgar forestalled its reannexation by submitting to the emperor as a client

I, The equites iteique pedifes Mauri, discussed above, chill: Contra Coaitatu p63,2, Zos, 1 . 20; Petrus Patricius, frag, 1,

3, VIII . 9045 & 9047; Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 216ff,4 Southern, 'Numeri', 94,5, Alfaldi, CA/IXII, 68,

6, Carcopino, 'Castella de la Plaine de Setif', Revue Africaine LIX (1918), 5ff.

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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites

king'. The troops they supplied were therefore technically symmachiar-il and

not part of the Auxilia. In fact, a numerus 1-losroenorum at Intercisa in

Pannonia is the only 'regular' unit of these troops known prior to the

Notitla. Even here, there is Just a single reference, listing the equites

sagit tar-li indigenae primi OsrhoenP. This links the Osrhoenians to the

larger series of equites sagittarli, of which they assumed the highest

profile in the early decades of the century,

Eastern archers have almost as long and chequered a history In the

service of the empire as do the Mauretanians, The primary source of

manpower came from Palmyra, which by the third century was supplying units

to the regular Auxilia4. The Osrhonenians were a small part of the vast

wells of specialist manpower In the east, first drawn upon in a systematic

fashion by the Seven. By the time of the Notitia, the equites sagit tar-il

seem to have adopted a similar role in the east to the equites Dalinatae in

the west, making up the main bulk of the equites in the theatre. Indeed, the

proportions are very similar. Thirty five units of sagittarii existed in the

east as opposed to seventeen in the west. Of these, 13 (a large proportion)

were comltatenses and only 2 were cune.L Most of the eastern units were

equites indigenae, an epithet designed to differentiate them from the equites

Illyriciani found on the eastern frontier, which indicates that they were

1, Dio LXXVIII . 12 . 1-2; Her, III9 • 2; Miller, CAR XII, 9ff.

2, Nuae,'us Hosroenorui, IlI'1O3O7 equites Osrhoeni, Not, Dig, Or, XXXV23,

3, Southern, 'Numeri', 89ff,

4, Most notably co/i, Xl palsyrenorua sag,; AE,1940,240 & cf, chV: Auxilia

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M,C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Equites

indigenous elements of the eastern garrison1.

Little more is known about the equites sagittariI Only one inscription

mentions them; a brickstamp from Viminacium in Moesia 2. Another inscription,

in Greek, mentions a .,,J ypav, which has been expanded to (numerus]

sa8'ittarlorum, but the interpretation is uncertain.

With the equltes sagittaril, we come to the end of the major cavalry

nationes listed In the Notitia Dignitatum, and it is now time to turn our

attention to the exotically-named units. By far the most numerous of these,

and probably the most important for our understanding of' them, were the

equites promoti Thirty-five units are listed In the Notitia, 2 palatine, 3

comitatensian and 3 cunei. RltterlJ.ng showed how the term promoti related

to legionary cavalrymen, and his thesis that the equites prornoti were drawn

from these still holds s. Gilliain corrected the status of the leglonary eques

from principalis, as Ritterling had assumed, to that of .immunis and pointed

out that such promoti could also be found in the cohortes equitatae6. In

this he was followed by Cooper, who took it to mean that the equites proinoti

were not linked to the legions7.

I, Not, Dig, Or, VII33; VIII'30 & 31; IX . 19; XXXI • 25-29; XXXII . 24-26 & 29; XXXIII . 18 & 20-22;

XXXIV25-29; XlXV20-23; XXXVI'25 & 27-28; XXVII'20 & 23; XXXYIII • 11 &12; XLI'14 & 17; 27 were

indigenu Not, Dig, 0cc, VI . 67-73, 77, 83 & 84; XXXII . 32 & 35; XXXIII . 38 & 44: XXXIV . 17, 21, 32 & 33;

cf, Tables El & 2,2, E,l903,298, The Moesian quites sagittarii in the Notitia are cwiei Not, Dig, Or, XLI . 14 &

17,

3, QE,l90O,29,

4, Not, Dig, Or, V'28 & 39; VII'31 XXXI • 30; XXXII'22 & 23; XXXIII'19 & 27; XXXIV'23 & 24;

XXIV'18 & 19; IXXVI'23 & 24; XXXVII'18 & 19; XLI'13 & 16; Not, Dig, 0cc, VI'44 & 76; XXXII'25, 30 &

38; XXXIII'30 & 36; XXXIV'16, 22, 31 & 36; cf, Tables El & 2,

5, Ritterling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen', 348,

6, Gilliam, 'Dura Rosters and the Constifufio Antoniniana', Britannia 14 (1965), 77ff,


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M,C,Ibeii: C3 Army, Equites

This question of 'linkage' is, in my opinion, superfluous to the central

thesis. The debate is centred around a papyrus from AD 302, in which one

Aurelius Heron describes himself a8: ... rireuç rpopoav oExovviv Loro Aeyunvoç

Tperic'vrç...'. Ritterling believed this indicated that the equites promoti

were themselves closely affiliated to the unit of their origin, but was

contradicted by Van Berchem who argued that the word &Jro referred to

Aurelius Heron himself, indicating that he had just drafted from the legion

Into the cavalry unit 2 . Cooper seems guilty of a fundamental

misunderstanding. Simply because the equites promot.i secundi were not

necessarily linked to Leglo II Tralana i.n this passage, it does not

automatically follow that the equites promoti had nothing to do with the

legions. The papyrus as it stands is categorical proof that the prornoti did

draw upon legionary equites for their manpower, whether formally associated

or not. In fact, further evidence from the Beatty papyri in Panopolis

suggests strongly that Leglo II Trelana and the equites promoti secundi were

linked. Two letters order the strategos of the Panopolite nome to pay out

donatives to the "k,reucrt rpoparotc )teysvoç TpxIirvrc", under the command

of the praepositus Leontius. Skeat's translation: "the equites proinoti of

Legio II Tralana", seems the only one possible3.

This brings us on to the vexed question of numbers. Besnier and Ensslin

believed that to provide enough horsemen In the legions for the equites

proinoti, the leglonary cava]ry was increased from 120 to 726. They had as

1,P. Gre,ii'. II, 74,2, Ritierling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen', 348; Van Berche. Larift de Oiocltien et là Rfoie

Constantinlenne (1952), 104 n,3,3 P, Beattyil, 198 & 204, trans, p.89,

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M,C,Ibe.ji: C3 Army. Equites

their sole evidence the antiqua leglo of Vegetius, which bears no

relationship to the real world and should be discarded out of hand'. Since

the promoti could technically be drawn from the cohortes equitatae as well

as the legions, the problem would seem to solve itself. With legionary

cavalry as the core, the equites promoti could draw additional recruits from

wherever they liked and still maintain a link to the legion8. It should

also be borne in mind that according to Duncan-Jones, the very unit of

promoti for which we have the most Information, the equites promoti secundi

of Leglo .11 Traiana, was probably no more than 120 men strong in the first

place2

Ritterlthg noted the regular spacing of the equites promoti in the

Notitia Dignitatum. He assumed that, with the exception of the equites

prom oti Illyr'icianZ which were moved east from Illyricum, all the prom oti

were split from their parent legions in situ and stationed in the same

province 3. In general, this holds true as the table below will show 4. It

falls down only in Thebaidos, where there would seem to be vexillations of

six different legions; Palaestina, from where Legio VI Ferrata had been moved

before the Notitia was compiled; and Osrhoene. The cunel are a different

matter which will be dealt with in time. This does suggest that the equites

promoti were created no earlier than the emperor Diocletian, especially since

all of the eastern promoti were labelled as indigenae in their Diocletianic

1, Vegetius IL'G; Besnier, L'eapire Roiain,,, (1937), 194: Efl55ljfl, C// XII, 379, cf, App,1:'The Ant/qua Legioof Vegetius',

2, Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', Chi,'on8 (1978), 546ff,3, Ritierling, 'Rômischen Heerwesen' , 348f,4, Table E3: The equites proeoti and the legions.

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M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites

provinces of occupation, and the earliest dated attestation of promoti is

from AD 2931. In this picture, the equites promoti Illyricieni fit neatly

with the six remaining legions from Illyricum2.

Legionarles would also seem to have been the source for another exotic

unit: the equites stablesiani. Speidel has constructed a convincing argument

to show that these units had been seconded from the strat ores of the

tribunus stab1ensis. He is on less firm ground when he tries to date their

creation to Gallienus. He notes that no stablesiani are listed In the

eastern provinces of the Notitia, and suggests that this is because Gallienus

did not have control of the east 4 . Yet we know for certain that the equites

Dalma tee and Maui-i were In existence under Gallienus, and both of these crop

up in the east, so this cannot be the case.

There were definitely very few of these cava]ry. Only 15 are extant in

the Notitia, and of these only five were simple equites (four of them in the

west). Four were comitatensian, and the rest were cunei8. what little there

is in the way of epigraphy militates for a later, rather than an earlier,

date since the only extant inscription of a vex.illatio equitum stablesianorum

is commanded by an exarchosE.

Even less can be surmised about the equites scutarii. Their name

implies that their distinguishing feature was the use of the legionary

I, P, Grent, II, 110; P. Beatt,vIl date5 to AD 300, AEI9O7,143 & XIII'8332 are of no real help,

2, cf, Table E3,

3, Speidel, 'Stablesiani', Chiron4 (1974), 541ff.

4, Speidel, 545f,

5, Not, Dig, Or, VlI'29 & 30; XXVIII . 16; XXXIX • 14 & 15: XL • 17: XLII . 19; Not, Dig, Oc, Vl'21 & 64;

Y1 . 39=82 :VII . 180; VII182; XXVIII . 17; XXX1II27; XXXIV . 15; XXXV . 14, 15 & 16,

6, V . 4376, For exarchos see Fiebiger, RE 1552 who Ca115 it a junior cavalry officer of the

later Roman empire, and can be no more precise, SEe VI'187, cited on Speidel, 545, is of little help

in corroborating dates,

-169-


scutum instead of the cavalry parma. The existence of a cuneus equitum

Maurorum scutariorurn 1 can tell us little, except that a standard unit of the

equites could be equipped in this manner, Twenty two equites scutarii are

listed in the pages of the Notitia, most of them in the east. Six were

comita tenses and another half-dozen were cuneF. The earliest known

reference comes from the late third century, possibly Diocletian 3 . The only

other inscription is post-Constantine4.

Most Roman cavalry, certainly among the equites, were very lightly

armoured. The obvious exception were the equites catafractarii and their

heavier counterparts, the equites clibanaril. Only 14 of these units are

listed in the Notitia 7 catafractariP and 7 clibanarii6. Of these, of the

cataphracts were comitatensian and 1 was a cuneus, while all except one of

the clibanari.i were comitatenses, the exception being palatine. Only one of

each type is to be found in the west.

Eadie has cautioned that Roman catafractarli were not armoured cavalry

In the proper sense of the term, being Instead mailed contaril astride

unarnioured horses. This is borne out by the Tropaeum Traiani and the

column of Marcus Aurelius, on which Roman mailed cavalry are depicted

I, Not, Dig, Or, XXXI'23,2, Not, Dig, Or, V38; Vl • 39; VII • 28: XI'4, 5, 7 & 8 XXI . 23 & 24; XXXII • 18; XXXIII'16;

XXIIV . 20; XXXVI . 19; XXXVII . 14: XXXIX'12 & 13; XL . 11, 12, 13 & 16; XLI . 15; XLII'20 Not, Dig, Oc,

VI . 2063; VI . 3477:VII . l95; VI . 38: 81 :VIl . 197 VII'209 IX'4, 5 & 8 XXXII'23 XIXIII • 24: cf Tables El& 2,

3, QE,1976,634,4, E,1935,171,5, Not, Dig, 0,, V . 34; VI • 35 & 36; YII25; VlII'29; XXXIX16; Not, Dig, Dcc, XL • 21; cf, Tables El

& 2,6, Not, Dig, Or, V . 40; Vl'32 & 40; VII'31, 32 & 34 Not, Dig, Dcc, VI • 67 cf, Tables El & 2,

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M,C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Equltes

wearing chain mall and wielding a lance (contu) from the backs of

unprotected mounts, in stark contrast to the fully-armoured nature of their

enemies'.

The Tropaeum Traiani at Adamklisi suggests that catafractaril of this

type were in existence from the early second century. The conventional

argument, that this was artistic licence, does not convince. It hinges on

three observations. First, it assumes that a convention existed wherein

Romans were depicted wearing armour, while barbarians were not. Second, it

maintains that the only known unit of con tarui from the period, the ala I

Ulpia con tariorum miliaria, was not armoured and this is a better indication

of the true state of affairs than artistic representation. Third, it cites

Arrian, who confirms the existence of contaril under Hadrian, but does not

indicate that they were armoured2.

However, the recent study of Trajan's column by Lepper and Frere has

pointed out that, while artistic convention was adopted, "to clarify the

narrative", the column's depiction of war-horses was a remarkable exception.

Cavalry mounts on the column were depicted in exceptionally subtle detail,

which "must surely be the result of observation, however transmitted" 3 . On

the other hand, the Roxolani cataphracts on the column were dressed

impossibly in scale mail body suits which covered both horse and rider from

head to toe4 . Even the graffito of a c.Zibanarius at Dura, which must have

been sketched to convey the full enormity of this new kind of cavalryman,

1, Eadie, 'Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry', INS 57 (1967), 168 & plates.

2, The argument is best represented by Eadie, 167, who admits that it is not conclusive,

3, Lepper & Frere, rra/an'5 Coluin (1988), 269,

4, Lepper & Frere, op. cit,, pl,XXXI/76 & XXXVIII93-4,

-17 1-


pays more attention to practicality than does the column 1 . Nevertheless,

both representations indicate that, far from being conventionally depicted as

more heavily armoured than their barbarian counterparts, the opposite is true

of Roman cavalry. The Tropaeum Traianl is argued to have been sculpted by

local military stonemasons, who depicted on the reliefs the opponents most

familiar to them2. If this is the case, then it seems clear that they would

also have depicted the Roman cavalry panoply as they knew it, and that the

metopes of the Tropaleum Tralani are in fact a reliable indication of the

equipment belonging to the Lower Danube army in the early second century.

While I will agree that reconstructing equipment from artsistic evidence

is dangerous, it cannot be any more so than arguments from silence, which Is

essentially what the example of ala I Ulpia con tar.iorurn mu, amounts to.

This ala may be the only example to date of Roman lancers fighting for

Trajan, but there is always the potential for new evidence to come to light.

Nor can Arrian be cited as a trustworthy source, since his failure to speak

of armoured cavalry under Hadrian, when our first firm indication of

catafractaril comes in the ala I Gallorum et Pannoniorum catafractata from

this reign, is more prone to make this omission suspect rather than

conclusive3 . On the whole, since the Tropaeum Traiani does depict a new

departure in the Roman cavalry known to have occurred within that half of

the second century, it ought to be trusted as a legitimate source.

I, For easily accessible photographs of all cavalry type5 mentioned here 1 ci, IRS 57 (1967), p1,

I & XI and IRS 60 (1970), p1, XIV XV,

2, Lepper Frere, op. cit,, 298f,

3, Arrian, ractica IV; XI.5632,

-172-


Herodian spoke of cataphracts in the army of Maximthus, and we have

epigraphic testimony of one such unit 1 ; yet it was not until the later third

century, arid possibly early into the fourth, that units termed equites

catafractarli came to the fore2 , Depictions of these resemble the

cataphracts from the column of Marcus Aurelius in that none wear full scale

or ride armoured horses. A couple of numeri catafractariorum have also been

epigraphically dated to the later third century on stylistic grounds3.

Of greatest interest is a vexillatio catafractariorum stationed at

Eporedia in the Po Valley4. Eadie was at a loss to explain why this unit

was not stationed in a frontier area8 . Since Eporedia was situated at the

eastern exit of the St. Bernard Pass, the most likely explanation would seem

to be that the unit was a detachment of the Milan garrison, stationed there

to provide advanced warning of an incursion from the west. Eadie very

tentatively suggested that one of the nuineri above, attested in Gallia

Lugdunensis, may also have seen service In Cisalpina6. So it may be that the

unit was, in fact, stationed in the area at the time when it formed a

frontier with the Gallic Empire. At any rate, the fortuitous coincidence of

the Milan cavalry, historically attested to guard against Postuznus invading

Italy, and a cataphract garrison at one of' the major passes, should not go

unnoticed.

I, 41a nova Piria ailliaria catafraciaria Phiiippiana1 111 . 99 ILS 2771; 111 . 10307 ILS 2540;

XIII7323; Her, YIII . 1 . 3; Eadie, 'Mailed Cay ,', 168 & n,37,

2, Equites catafractarii Pictavenses, III . 14406a eqziites catafractarli qL'bianenses, XIII • 3493 &

3495; Eadie, 1681, Note also vexillatione Ii'! catafractafriorual froa Histria (Moesia), 4E 1919, 18,3, XIII . 1848 & 6238,

4, V.6784,

5, Eadie, 169,

6, Eadie, bc, cit,

-173-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites

Alföldi believed that the emperor Aurelian introduced clibanarii after

his experience of them ifl his Palmyrene war. These cavalry, as depicted by

Heliodorus and the 'charging c1ibanarius graffito at Dura, were much more

heavily armoured than cataphracts, completely encased in banded scale armour

and with a coat of scale mail draped over the flanks of the hors&.

However, Eadie has pointed out that the 'dlibanarif depicted on the Arch of

Galerius were little different to the catafractarll mentioned earlier:

sporting scale mail instead of chain, but otherwise mailed riders on

unarmoured horses2 . He is probably correct in arguing that Aurelian did not

create the equites prom oti clibanarii (nor, for that matter, the equites

Palmirenorum clibinariorurn), This was not due to any lack of respect for the

clibanar.Li on Aurelian's part. Zosimus makes it very clear that Aureliari's

tactics at Immae and Emesa were adopted to neutralise a cavalry force which

he deemed to be superior to his own3. Unfortunately, the use of fully-

armoured cavalry will have required stronger horses and completely different

tactics to those utilised by his own cavalry. The only handy proponents of

such warfare were the Palmyrenes, and Zosimus makes it abundantly clear that

they were not prepared to be either trustworthy or cooperative4.

It was not until the reign of Diocletian, or later, that clibanarla

(armament factories) capable of producing the armour worn by clibanaril were

1, He1iodoru Aet/ilopica 1X15; Excavations at Dura Europos, Fourth Season (1933), 207ff &pl,XXII; Eadie, 170,

2, Eadie, 171,3, Zos, 1'50 . 2-4 1 . 52 . 3 53.2,4, Zos, 1.60-61,

-174-

M.C.tbeji: C3 Army. Equites

attested. Since the Arch of Galerius is also dated to his reign, Diocletian

must be the obvious person to whom the recruitment of equites cli banarli

into the ranks of the Roman army should be attributed1.

We now come to the equites Illyriciani. These were units of Dalmatae,

promoti, scutaril and Mauri stationed along the eastern frontier and

distiguished from the equites indigenae by the epithet IllyricianL

Ritterling believed that they were drawn from the Illyriari army brought east

by Aurelian on his reconquest of Palmyra, and were dispersed along the

frontier to replace the disbanded Palinyrene forces. His only evidence for

this was the presence of the equites Da1matae created by Gallienus, and

Leglo I Illyricorunz which he believed had been created by Aurelian from his

Illyrian troops2. Other historians have argued for a later date on various

grounds. Alföldi could not bring himself to believe that Aurelian would

break up the 'field army', so argued that it was done by Diocletian; while

Seston was of the opinion that Carinus brought about the change for fear of

the growing power of the cavalry commander, though he did not believe they

were comitatenses.

There are no firm criteria by which we can date these Illyrician.L The

present arguments against Ritterling all rely on the mobile field army, which

we have shown did not exist. Yet Ritterling's own arguments are fatally

flawed. The presence of Dalamtae among the fllyriciani can provide a

terminus post quem, but can be used to prove nothing else. If I Illyricorum

had been created by Aurelian, there might yet remain some grounds for dating

I, Eadie, 171 & n,56,

2, Ritterling, 'Rônischen Heerwe5en', 346ff.

3, Alföldi, CA/I XII (1939), 217: Seston, Oiocitien t Ja retarchie (1946), 298ff & 305,—175-

M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites

the Illyriciani to him, though the argument just adduced against the Dalmatae

remains pertinent in all cases. As things stand, I Illyricorum can only be

tentatively dated to the reign of Diocletian 1 . Since the same is true of the

equites promoti which are among the I11yriciani their presence in the east

cannot be placed any earlier than his reign. Galerius is known to have

drafted in contingents from the Illyrian army for his war against Narses in

AD 297/82, and this seems a propitious point at which to place the

Illyriciani. However, we can only confidently state that this Is the earliest

date at which the Illyriciani can be attested.

Before we finish this survey of the equites one final point needs to be

addressed. Frequent mention has been made of the cunel equitum noted in the

Notitia Dignitatum. With one exception3, these units always head the lists

of the Notitia, taking precedence over other equites. In the Illyrian

provinces, they supercede the equites entirely4. Van Berchem thought they

were a separate group of units created by Constantine, but this view is

over-simplistic as Southern has showns , Troops such as the equites

Dalmatarum Divitiensium can be seen to have predated the Notitia, usually in

the form of numeri6.

As usual, the nature of these formations is a complex mesh of

possibilities. Perhaps the cunei in the Notitia were the equites equivalent

of milliary units, or maybe the reforms of Diocletian or Constantine

I, cf, ch,IV: Leg/ones, p.80,

2, Eutropius IX24; Jordanes Roianap,301(N); Orosius VII'25.9,3, Not, Dig, Or, VII'34,

4, NoE, Dig, Or, XXXIX: Scyihia; XL: Moesia Secunda; XLI: Moesia Prima; XLII: Dada Ripensis,5, Van Berchem, sraIe de 0ioc1tien,,,, 93ff Southern, 'Numeri', 115,6, Southern, bc, cit.; Not, Dig, Or, XUI • 14; V . 7000, 7001 & 7012,

-176-

M.C.Ibe.ii: C3 Army. Equites

introduced a more pedantic scheme of troop designation requiring that

formations originally known by the blanket term numerus be redesignated to

reflect their mode of combat more accurately'. On average, the number of

cunel garrisoning a province in Illyricum was less than the number of

equltes to be found elsewhere, which might indicate that the cunel were

larger, but the difference is neither a significant nor a general one.

Southern is to be heeded when he warns that each incidence of cunei should

be taken on its own merits2.

The history of the equites is a chequered one and not without

controversy. Many of the horsemen involved would seem to have developed

out of earlier experiments within the Auxilia. Others, most notably the

Dalmatae seem to have burst out of the blue. Cooper has put forward an

interesting theory that the Dalmatians were drawn upon by Gallienus because

this was the only recruiting ground left open to him3. This makes a great

deal of sense, especially if one examines the probable ethnic mix of his

cavalry. Moors, Dalmatians and possibly some exotic units would seem to

have made up the bulk of it. The Gallic recruiting grounds were closed to

him by the advent of Postumus and his empire. The eastern troops were

under the de facto control of Palmyra (and we have already seen that most

sagittaril were equites indigenee). One glance at the Notitia will tell us

that the Moors could not provide manpower in the volume required to fill the

emperor's needs. However, over-reliance on the Notitia can provide a stilted

view. It is a snapshot in the history of the later Roman cavalry force and

1, It should be noted that no rnrneri exist in the lists of the Notitia, Also it should be borne

in •ind that cwisus could at least technically be applied to an infantry unit which adopted a wedge-

shaped formation and was not the sole preserve of cavalry: Yegetius 111.17-18,

2, Southern, bc, cit,


-177--

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Equites

should not be taken as a homogeneous whole. Equites Mauri were active

within the Roman array decades before equites Dalmatae came onto the scene,

while equites promoti probably did not make their appearance until the very

end of our period. Stablesieni were a late addition, but cataphractarii of

one form or another had been around since the reign of Hadrian. Without a

doubt, each type of equites, be they Dalrnatae, promoti, sagittarli or

cataphracts, were recruited gradually over a vast number of years, and the

picture as we receive it In the Notitia Dignita turn is the culmination of this

gradual and constantly dynamic process.

-178-

TABL.E E 1:Eqziit L1r1it In tIi

sj ,titi Di ittt.tm pr Or-iratm

FQ(/ITE$;

CHAPTER Diii iw Sik Siul ii CflV: NM, Praesentalis I: CC PC C C C PC

VI: NM, Praesentalis II: C CC CC PC PPP

VII: N.M. Orieniem: C C C CC C C CCC CC

VIII: N.M. Thracias: CC C PC

IX: MN, Illyricum: C C

lxviii: Aegytus: e e

XXXI: Thebaid: CC j15 i c e

XXXII: Foenicla: I I i14 iii I ie

XXXIII: Syria: I i i14 Iii I

XXXIV: Palaestina; I I j15 Iii I Il

XXXV: Osrhoene: I I i14 Iii

XXXVI: Nesopotamia; ui iii Ii 112

XXXVII: Arabia: I I ii Iii I

XXXVIII: Armenia: ee

XXXIX: Scythia: cc c c cc

XL: Moesia Secunda:

XLI: Noesia Prima; ccc cc cc c

XLII: Dacia Ripensis: c15 C CC C

KEY:

P Palatine

C Comitatenslan

I equites 11Iyricinic = Cuneus

e equJe51 equites indigenac

same unit (eg, equites proloti clibanarli)

NOTES

1, equites Thaaudeni Ii!yrician2, equites ducatore5 lilyriciani & equites feud Honoriani Iiiyridian4 The latter is an honorificawarded for loyalty to the emperor honorius, and cannot be used for dating purposes.

—179-

TABLE E 2:EqLlit Lrn1t In tI-i

Nc, t I t I Di I t t im p x— C)c c I ci ri t m

EQWTES:

CHAPTER Diii lia Stab Si 1 Cli Mi

Y: M, Eq. Praesentalis:

Italia: C P P14

Gailia: CC C px3,C13

Britannia: C

Tingitana: cc c

Africa: C*C17 C CC C C CIS

kIVIlI: Lit, Saxonici: e e

lxxii: Pannonia: ceI7 ee cee c ccc

lxxiii: Yaleria; celil e ee ee c c cce

XIXIV: Panonnia Prima: cex5 e e14 e14 c

XXXV: Raetia: eee

XXXVIII: Belgica II: e

XL: Britannia: e e e

KEY:

P Palatine

C ' Comitatensian

c = Cuneus

e = eqwifes

z same unit (eq. equites clthanarii sagitarii)

—180-

Tb1 E 3:TI qL1ite Pr-mcti

rid th

NQLIL NUECHAPTER PROVINCE

IN PARTIBIJS ORIENTIS.

XXXI Thebaidos

XXXII Foenicia

XXXII! Syria

XXXIV Palaestina

XXXV Osrhoene

XXXVI Mesopotamia

XXXVI! Arabia

XLI Moesla Prima

IN FARTI8US OCCIDENTIS.'

XXXII Pannonla

XXXII! Valeria

XXXIV Pannonia Prima

N2QE

PRONOTI

2

2

2

2

2

2

(2 cwnei)

2

(#1 cune5)

2

4

LEGIONS

vexx,(?) III Diocletiana, II Traiana,

I Yalentiniana, I Haximiana1 II Flavia &

II Valentiniana,

I Illyricum1 III Gallica,

IV Scythica, XVI Flavia,

X Fretensis,

IV Parthica,

I Parthica, II Parthica,

II! Cyrenaica, IV Martia,

IV Flavia, VII Claudia,

IV !ovla, VI Herculea,

I Adiutrix, II Adiutrix,

X Geeina, XIV Geina, II Italica, I Noricum,

1Q11! TES PROHOTI ILL YR/ClAN!:

XXXII Foenicia

XXXII! Syria

XXXIV Palaestina

XXXV Osrhoene

XXXVI Mesopotamia

XXXVII Arabia

SPARE LEGIONS PRON ILL YRICUNL

I Io y ia (Scyihia)

1 II Herculia (Scythia)

I I Italica (Moesia Secunda)

1 XI Claudia (Noesia Secunda)

1 V Macedonica (Dacia Ripensis)

1 XIII Gemina (Dacia Ripensis)

—18 1-

VII: I I MIT-A J'JEI

I 1949 R. G. Goodchfld and I. B. Ward-Perkins published an inscription

from Tripolitania which threw the discussion of the nature and origins of

lirnitanel wide open'. Previously, the view of scholars, best summarised by

Miller in the Cambridge Ancient History, had seen the lirnitanei as a

militarised peasantry tied to the land by hereditary service and originating

from the various reforms of Septimius Severus2 . This view had been

gradually losing ground, to the extent that van Berchem felt confident in

asserting that .Zimitanei did not appear until the reign of Diocletian; yet

his views seemed to run contrary to the evidence produced by Goodchild and

Ward-Perkins which, as Matthews puts it: "...shows that the system of frontier

lirnites commanded by praepositi existed already in the mid-third century (at

least in Tripolitania) long before the Tetrarchic period with which it had

been previously associated"4.

The inscription In question came from a centenarium structure at Gasr

Duib in Tripolitania, dated quite firmly to the reign of Philip the Arab (AD

244-246), and reads:

Imp(erator) Caes(ar) (M(arcus) lulius Phlilipus invictuis Aug(ustus)3 et

M(arcus) Iul(ius) P(hilippus Cales(ar) n(oster) regionern .Zimit(is

I, Goodchi/o' 'apd-PepkJns, 'The Lthe5 rrJpoiitanu5 in the Light of Recent Discoveries', IRS 39(1949), 81ff esp, 91f, Hereafter referred to as Goodchild, IRS,

2, Miller1 CAM XII, 311 summarising the views of Lesquier, Cumont, Carcopino and Rosiovtseff

discussed below p.185ff, cf, also Momsen, 'Das römische llilitãrwesen seit Diocletian', Heres 24(1889), 195ff,

3, Van Berchem, L'Araóe de Dioclêtien et la Rëforaie Constantinienne (1952), 21, 46-48 & 86,4, Matthews, 'Mauretania in Ammianus and the Notitia', BARS15 ( 1976), 171,

—182-

M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army. Limitanei

Tenitheitani partitarn et feiusJ viam incursib(us) barbairoirum constituto

nova ce.ntenario (/////?////J//A/S praefdlluseru(ntl Cominio Cassiano

leg(ato) Aug(ustorum) pr(o) pr(aetore) Gallicanto ...7 letters...J v(iro)

e(gregio) praep(osito) limitis cura Numisii Maximi domo [...4 letters...Jsia

trib (uni).1

The centenarium had presumably been erected by the tribunus Nuinisius

Maximus under the orders of the praepositus limitis, Gallicanus, who was

subordinate to the provincial governor. Goodchild commented upon its

construction by a tribunus as opposed to a centenarius as would be expected,

and in the light of other inscriptions (discussed later) this may have been a

peculiarity of Tripolitania2. Since the limes Ten theitanus actually appears

In the Not itia Dignitatum under a praepositus, the match between this

inscription and the percieved system of later Roman lirnitanei had been seen

as conclusive3. Yet several notes of caution have already been sounded.

Fentress and le Bohec warned that no evidence for an organised military

peasantry deserving the term limitanel is forthcoming at such an early date,

while A.H.M. Jones has shown that the so-called limitanei of the African

frontier were in fact made up of native African gentiles, first referred to

in the early fifth century.

The only evidence for limitanei existing within Africa in the mid-third

century is this inscription and its close resemblance to the terminology of

I, Goodchild, .TR$, 91f, Cassianus is assumed to have been related to the N, Aurelius Cominius

Cassianus who was Legate of Numidia in 211/12: PIi C 1265; YIII.2611,

2, Goodchild, 92 & n,36 cf below p191,

3, Hot Dig, Cc, XXXI'19, limes Tenthetianus; Goodchild, 92; Matthews, 'Mauretania', 170f,

4, Fentress, Nwiidia and the Roaaii Any, 84R S53 (1979), 1)8f; le Bohec, La Troisirie Lgion

Awg,ste (1989), 454; Jones, LRE II (1964), 651ff; cf also Seston in Histonia 4 (1955), 286ff most

recently, Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Liaes& Liaitanei', /RS78 (1988), 125ff.—183-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Lirnitanei

the Notitia Dignita turn. The infamous reference in the Vita Alexandri1 which

seems to refer to limltanei during his reign and could have provided vital

corroborative evidence has been cast into considerable doubt by Isaac, Jones

and van Berchem, who quite rightly remarked upon the Historia Augusta's

propensity for fabrication and interpolation 2 . So the existence of lirnitanel

in the third century hangs entirely upon the implications of the Teritheltanus

inscription. If it can be shown that the occupants of the cente.naria were

not in fact a niilitarised peasantry under the control of Roman authority,

then the case for limitanel prior to the fourth century collapses.

The pioneering work of A.H.M. Jones has already paved the way for us3.

He has demonstrated that limitanei, in Goodchild's sense of a peasant militia

defending the land which they cultivated, do not appear in the source

material until the early fifth century. Prior to this, the limitanei do not

seem to have been much different to any other type of troops in the later

Roman Army. Service for them was no more or less hereditary than that of

the comitatenses, and like the cornita tenses they received recruits drafted

through conscription: some units of 1.Lznitanei were even upgraded to

comitatensian status. Most telling of all, the lirnitanei were wholly supplied

by rations in kind until the year 364, after which they were supplied for

nine months of every year. None of this seems at all compatible with the

concept of a self-sufficient hereditary militia tied permanently to the

1, $1/A Alex, LYIII . 4-5, Loeb translation: The lands taken froa the enecy were presented to the

leaders and soldiers of the frontier arcies (liiianei] with the provision that they should continue

to be theirs only if their heirs entered .ilitary service, and that they should never belong to

civilians, for, he said, ien serve with greater zeal if they are defending their own lands too,

2, Isaac, 'Liee5 & Liiitanei', 140; Jones, LR 650; van Berchem, Areâe de Diocltien, 21 n, 1

contra cf, MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian, 13 n,34,

3, Jones 1 LR 650ff,

—184-

M.C,tbe.Ji: C3 Army. Limitanel

frontiers.

Yet this view may have been created simply by a lack of evidence, and If

the archaeological material from Africa actually does show limitanel in

action during the third century, then a revision of the view is necessary. I

think it does not; and furthermore, I believe that enough evidence has been

accumulated from Africa for us to put together a skeletal picture of the

development of limitanel in that part of the Roman empire, from the start of

the third century to the end of the fifth.

Contrary to the beliefs of Miller and his sources, the Seven did not

create a peasant militia out of veteran soldiers. Carcopino, Cumont and

Lesquier believed that veteran colonies were used as a defensive network

founded upon vested interest 1 . Most specif1cally Carcopino showed that the

cast ella in Mauretania Sitifensis were built arid manned by veteran coloni

under government supervision, a conclusion later confirmed by Février2.

However, even if these colonies had retained much of their old functions

from Augustan times, their purpose and arrangement was not primarily

military. Isaac has demonstrated that the Augustan colonies in the eastern

provinces "were incapable of defending themselves in times of full-scale

warfare", and were hardly able to maintain Internal security on a local

level 3 . Rather than being seen as military outposts, they were "instrumental

in the consolidation of conquest and subjugation" as a "social, political

I, Carcopino, 'Lee Caste/Ia de la Pleine de Setif', Rev, Af 59(1918), 5ff; 'Le Idaes de Numidieet sa Garde Syrienne', Srria 6 (1925), 30ff; Cumont, 'Une Dedicace de Dura-Europos, Colonie Romaine',

Syria 5(1924), 351f; Lesquier, L'Arae Rota/ne o'Eqypte d'Qiiguste I Dioclétien (1918), 330ff,2, Carcopino, 'Castella de Setif', 8ff; Février, 'Inscriptions Inédites Relatives aux Domaines de

Ia Region de Setif', IfI/anges P/genial (1966), 220ff,3, Isaac, Litits of Eapire (1990), 311ff,

—185-

M.C.IbeJl: C3 Army. Limitanei

and economic complement to military power." His view is mirrored by Février

on the Mauretanian castella, who argues against Carcopino's purely military

interpretation of the structures and sees the circuit walls more as a sign

of Roman urbanisation and its administration than as a defensive measure1.

Matthews saw this as an overreaction against the traditional view and

tempered it somewhat by pointing out the equal validity of a civil and a

military interpretation2 . Yet he, too, made it clear that the defensive

capability of such colonies was largely dependent on the toleration of the

population they existed to control s . The fact that these particular

castella are limited entirely to Sitifensis, and stop abruptly at the border

with Nurnidia, suggests that any function they may have had in an overall

defensive plan took second place to the administrative considerations

associated with them. So, too, does their supervision by the imperial

procurator, whose function was civil rather than military4. A survey of

veteran settlement in Nurnidia has shown that its distribution owed far more

to the existence of good farmland than to the exigencies of defences,

In my opinion, the limited distribution of the castella in Sitifensis also

invalidates any attempt to link them with the advance into the Saharan Atlas

made by Septimius Severus6, The only true resemblance between the castella

of Sitifensis and the cast ella in the Saharan Atlas is their name. The

Saharan Atlas was garrisoned by the army with no recourse to veteran

I, Février in M1anges Piganiol, 223f,2, Matthews, 'Mauetania', 164,

3, Matthews, 177,

4, Février, 220ff,

5, Fentress, Nuildia, 138f 142ff,6, Matthews, 164,

-186-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanei

settlement, and this occurred much earlier than the 'fortification' of

Sitifensis which does not seem to have begun until the reign of Ceracalla.

Even this military advance into the Saharan Atlas owed more to the

administration of trade than it did to the defence of Africa1,

Centenaria did not appear in Africa until the mid-third century, and most

of these structures are not securely dateable before the fourth. At the

outset, a definite distinction should be drawn between centenaria as military

establishments constructed and occupied by the army, and the organic growth

of civilian structures which copied the centenarium design.

The centenarium at Gasr Duib stands on an isolated hillock overlooking a

tributary of the Wadi Sofeggin approximately 200km south-west of Lepcis

Magna in Tripolitania. Its sister fort, Gasr iJames, lies twenty-five

kilometres to the east of this, forming a line of outposts which guarded the

Roman road known to have run along the Upper Sofeggin from Zintan to Mizda.

Positioned as they are, they formed the first line of contact between Roman

Tripolitania and the nomadic tribesmen of the area. The location is

described by Goodchild as isolated, grim and barren 2 . Their military

function as described on the Tentheitanus inscription was to guard the road

against barbarian raiding parties, and to this end they were created by

order of the governor. Most significantly, the inscription was in Latin, as

opposed to the native Libyan script.

Other cente.naria sporting Latin inscriptions testifying to their official

creation can be found in equally strategic areas throughout Africa. At Aqua

Frigida in Mauretania, a centenarium guarding the exit from the Petite

I, Fentress, Nuildia, lUff & 136,2,Goodchild, IRS, 88ff, 93 & cf, ap p85,3, ,,, v/al incursib(us) barbatrojru.,,,,,, ,praeciusarunt,,,

-187-

M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanel

Kabylie into the Choba strip was restored under the auspices of Aurelius

Litva, praeses of Mauretania during the early 290s 1 . Another was built at

Bir Haddada north of the Hodna mountains by a governor of Constantine and

Licinius2 . South of the Chott e]. Hodna, the centenarium Aqua Viva, discussed

at length by Leschi, is attested In AD 303 and later under the control of

the praepositus 1imiti Thubuniensis, In northern Tripolitania, the

centenar'ium Tibubuci was also built on the orders of two provincial

governors4 . Like the centenaria on the Upper Sofeggin, these structures were

generally isolated, often in barren locales, and were set up by the Roman

authorities to serve a specific and local police function.

This contrasts dramatically with the civilian centenaria, found mainly In

eastern Tripolitanla, though a few have been identified in MauretanIa.

Their distribution is best described by Goodchild:

These buildings do not stand isolated in grim and barren areas, as do the Upper Sofeggin

outposts: they are found in chains along the banks of the more fertile wadis 1 and sometimes

grouped together as embryonic villages at the junction of several tributary wadis, Their density

varies according to the size and fertility of the wadi beside which they stand: sometimes we find

a long series scattered at intervals of only 1km but more often the interval is considerably

greater, Many of the buildings are accompanied by elaborate and well-built mausolea, which

contrast vividly with the 'gsur' themselves; and they are invariably associated with a complex

system of terrace walls across the width of the wadi, and with catchment channels and cisterns,

1, VIlI'20215 : ILS 6886: Matthews, 'Mauretania', 166 & 171, Litva also restored a war-damaged

bridge at Auzia VIIl . 904l = .IL$ 627,2, C'entene p lui Soils, VIll . 8713 Matthews, 171,3, 4E,194213,81; Leschi, 'Le Centenariva d'Aqua Viva', Rev, f, 87 (1943), 5ff Etudes

d'Epigraphie (1957), 47ff; Matthews, bc, cit14, VIII22763 ILS 9352; Matthews, bc, cit & n71,5, Matthews, bc, cit.

6, Goodchild, ,1RS 93.

—188-

M.C.Ibe,Ji: C3 Army. Limitanel

Of the "embryonic villages", the best example is Ghirza in the Wadi

Zeriizem. This is a group of some thirty 'gsur' "set close together without

communal planning or defences", containing a series of elaborate mausolea.

Goodchild viewed it as a "reductio ad absurdum of the whole 'gasr' system"1,

but he failed to recognise in this observation the key to the nature of

these settlements. For the 'gsur' of the Tripolitanlan basins, and the

centenar.ia and castella of the Mauretanian populace, were exactly what he

described them to be: a civilian reductio of a workable military structure.

Matthews showed how, in Mauretania, a permeable limes was maintained by

Roman authority through the cooperation of the local dynasts2 . Most of

Africa was in effect a fronier zone, and this was especially true of

Mauretania and Tripolitania, where tribal quarrels and nomadic raiding had

merely been given Roman trappings by its colonial observers (in much the

same way that the Roman occupation of Africa was given colonialist trappings

by the early French historians who studied it). Therefore, Matthews was able

to argue that the revolt of Firmus, described by Ammianus Marcellinus, was

in fact a tribal dispute which spilled over Into the Roman sphere of

influence precisely because it was a dispute between Romanised princes3.

These princes aped Roman forms and utilised those Roman practices which

superceded their own traditional methods. Among them was Roman Irrigation

and settled agriculture. In such circumstances, the Roman-style castella had

obvious security advantages in an area where feud and nomadic incursion was

a way of life.

1 Goodchild, IRSI 93 n37,

2, Matthews 'Mauretania', 174ff.

3, Matthews, op. cit.-189-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanei

Goodchild saw in the growth of 'gsur' villages, the seeds of what he

called "incipient feudalism". He saw the natives building centenaria on the

Roman model, and aping Roman forms by erecting inscriptions which, while in

their native Libyan, were written In the Latin alphabet and contained the

occasional Roman word such as CENTEINARI. All this evoked the aura of a

militarised peasantry 1 . Not unnaturally, he and his colleague automatically

assumed that the 'gsur' were the domain of limitaneZ and this assumption

was confirmed for them by the occasional (and very rare) relief depicting

their Inhabitants at war.

Yet the 'feudalism' exhibited was historical, stemming from the pre-Roman

tribal structures of the Inhabitants. The clearest example of this comes

from Bou AtellI in the Grande Kabylie, Mauretania. Here a local dynast

calling himself M. Aurelius Masaisilen founded a centenarium at his own

expense in AD 328, which acted as the focal point for a settlement including

tombs and a christian chapeF, almost like a medieval village clustered

around a Norman wotte.

In this context Masaisilen and his contemporaries built centenaria for

two reasons. First, they were a sign of prestige exhibited In a hybrid form

by a partially Romanised native aristocracy. Secondly, the cent enaria

themselves acted as the status symbol because of their obvious utility in

the context of the African frontier. The very fact that they were still

being used under the Islamic occupation speaks volumes for their functional

economy, Goodchild believed that Roman engineers had taught the natives

1, Goodchfld, IRS, 92ff,

2, Matthews, 'Mauretania', 171,

3 Goodchild, 95,-igo-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanei

how to construct the buildings 1 , but the original construction probably was

done by the natives themselves2 . The existence of words such as centenarius

or tribunus within several of the native structures is not particularly

significant. Goodchild himself pointed out that the title tribunus in native

Libyan use bore very little resemblance to its official Roman capacity, and

Matthews has argued a similar case against the official recognition of a

self-styled pr-aepositus and decurio from Mauretania3 . It seems likely that

the local chiefs took on Roman titles which they believed best suited their

native office, and this was tolerated as a function of Romanisation by the

provincial authorities. As for the word can tenarius, its recurrence is no

more significant than the present day use of the term 'pill-box'. A 'pill-

box' structure is equally likely to house an electricity generator for

civilian use as it is to contain a military gun emplacement. The name in

itself does not imply an official military function, it merely describes the

structure.

We can therefore distinguish between official military cent enaria and

organic civilian cent enaria, The latter arose separate from and anterior to

the former in a completely unofficial capacity, as the haphazard nature of

their distribution ought to Indicate. The very fact that each 'gasr' was an

independent fortlet in its own right, even when clustered into a small

communities, is testimony to the absence of Roman military planning.

Goodchild wanted to date the growth of civilian 'gsur' to the reign of

I, Three 'gsur' wentioned by Goodchild are fronted by well-dressed ashlar, and have distinctive

rounded corners, Goodchild saw thew as 'an early, official stage of 'gasr' construction"; Goodchild,

IRS, 93,

2, Barker Jones, UNE8O Libyan 'aIJeys Survey 1979-1981 (1982), 3ff,

3, Goodchild, IRS, 95 & n44; Matthews, 'Mauretania', 172 & n82; 1RT886,

—191-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Limitanei

Severus Alexander, on the basis of the proximity of certain centenaria to

the fort of that emperor at Gheria el-Garbia 1 . Yet recent surveys of the

Libyan valleys have indicated that the principal development of native 'gsur'

occurred during the second century, long before the centenarlum structure

was put to official military use2,

In the third and fourth centuries, 'the 'limitanel' in centenaria such as

Gasr Duib were probably garrisons of Auxilia and numeri, much like the

occupants of casteflum Dimmidi discussed in the previous chapter. Following

Yones, we should see them as regular units of the Roman army, drawing pay

and supplies of men and materiel like any other unit. However, as pressure

increased on the frontier in the later fourth and fifth century, Roman

authority was forced to rely more heavily on the cooperation of the native

geJ2tiles and we should see Matthews' picture of an integrated tribal limes

gradually coming into effect. By the early fifth century, the law codes show

that this transformation was complete and a iimitanei made up of native

African en tiles had taken the place of the Auxilia and numeri which had

defended the frontier during the Principate3.

Studies of the limitanei, like studies of other late Roman institutions

have sufferred at times from a failure to recognise that such institutions

could and did change. It is likely that there never was an official policy

of militarising peasantry within the Roman administration: it just happened.

In Africa, as a process of gradual attrition wore down the forces which had

1, Goodchild, 93f,

2, UNESCO Libyan Valleys Survey 1975-8/, 6,

3, Coo Theoo VII . 15 . l (AD 409); VII . l52 (AD 423), Isaac, 'Lii,es & Liaitanei', 144 is morecircumspect: "It is clear that we are faced with the organisation of some sort of militia, but it is

an organisation distinct from that of the lj,,itanei, who are not mentioned in this text,—192-

M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Limitanel

originally carried the burden of defence, what had begun as a grass-roots

movement towards greater security among native agricultural settlements

found itself shouldering more and more responsibility for the protection of

the frontiers they cultivated. Whether the existing status quo was finally

recognised by Diocletian or Constantine, or in the later fourth century is

unclear, and will remain so until more and better evidence is forthcoming,

though the trend would seem to indicate a later date at present 1 . What is

clear from the inscriptions at Gasr Duib and other sites, is that a definite

distinction existed in the third century between the military function of

centenarium sites, and the civil one. Van Berchem believed that limitanel

existed by the time of Diocletian, and I would concur that by his reign we

can find limitanaei In Iones' sense of dedicated non-comitatenslan frontier

troops garrisoning the military cent enaria of Africa and the Strata

Diocletiana in the east. The Tentheitanus inscription indicates that this

system was in place by the mid-third century, but as Fentress puts it: "The

fact that one element of the Diocletianic reorganisation has been shown to

have its origins in the mid-third century does not necessarily imply that all

others might be similarly redated." 3 As with most Roman institutions, the

'limitanel' of the third century were a very different organisatlon to the

lirnitanel of the fifth. They were not a militarised peasantry, and until the

term was coined by Diocletlan, they probably did not even think of themselves

as limitanel.

I, Remember that until 394, the ililtanel were wholly 5upplied by the army: Jones 650f, Isaac,'Liaes & LThitanef, 148, concluded that !12/taPei who worked their own land did not appear until themid fifth century,

2, Van Berchem, ,4pie de Oiociitie 10ff, 17ff & l9ffl Jones, LRE 650ff; Isaac, bc, cit,3, Feniress, fiuiidia, 119,

—193-

IX:

It has been argus in some texts that the third century saw the start

of the Roman practice of bringing barbarian tribes into the empire and

settling them under foedus. Unofficial at first, the practise of using

barbarians is seen to h' become increasingly more common, until they began

to supercede the regular Auxilia, so that "the contingents bought from the

Germans under the cloak of a foedus gradually became indispensable".' In

order to determine how accurate a picture this Is, it will be necessary to

review all aspects of the Roman use of barbarians during the century.

The Roman use of 'barbarian' troops, that is troops drawn from outside

the technical limits of the empire, has a long history. Not forgetting that

the original purpose of the Auxilia, as early as the second century BC, was

to incorporate the national characteristics of Rome's allies into its military

pantheon2 , the systematic recruitment of ethnic troops into bodies of numeri

was developed under the Flavians'. Trajan made extensive use of such

Irregulars during his wars4 , but it is with Marcus Aurelius that what has

I, Alfôldi, CAM XIII 218f; Aliheim, Soidatenkai5er (1939), 188 & 204; Boak, Manpower Shortage and

the Fall of the Ro.an Eipire (1955), 97 & 115ff; MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian (1963), ch,8, More

cautiously NOcsy, Pannonia and Upper Hoes/a (1974), ch,6; Speidel, 'Rise of Ethnic Units', ANRU 11.3

(1975), 145ff; De Blois, Pa/icy of 6allienus (1976), 34f,

2, Cheesman, Auxilia of the Roian laperial Aray (1914), 8ff,

3, Southern, 'Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army', Rritannia XX (1989), 131,

4, He maintained an elite force of Moorish cavalry whose native commander, the sheikh Lusius

Quietus, was powerful enough to gain consular office and was eventually disposed of by Hadrian for

political reasons: Speidel, 'Rise of Ethnic Units in the Roman Imperial Army', ANRU 11 . 3 (1975), 212,

He may also have used Palmyrene and German irregulars in his Dacian and Parthian wars: Southern1

'Numeri', 89; Alföldi, CAM XII (1939), 219, Marcus Aurelius also used irregulars in the Marcomannic

ears, most notably Moors, A group of equites Afrorut et Haurorwa e/ectorua is attested under one

Valerlus Maximianus, and a nirnerus Maurorwm Awrelianorwa was raised which must date from Marcus and

not Caracalla as was suggested to Speidel, since the kaiserbeinaae of the latter was Antoniniana:

AE,1956,124; R182042; Southern, 'Numeri', 86 & 93f Speidel, 'Ethnic Units', 210f & n,36,

—194-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati.

been seen as a large-scale incorporation of barbarian tribes Into the empire

is generally thought to have begun.

The reasons behind this are still open to discussion. Finley sounded a

well-argued note of caution against the unthinking assumption of a manpower

shortage, as did Gilllam 1 ; though one should not forget that during the

Marcomannic wars, the empire was still suffering the effects of the great

plague which began in 165 and to which the wholesale employment of

vexillations can almost certainly be linked. This indicates that manpower

was not in great supply2. On the other hand, Mócsy showed that the impetus

for settlement under Marcus Aurelius came not from the empire, but from the

barbarians themselves. He argues that many of the German tribes were

actually fighting for lebensraum within the empire, away from the pressures

of the Lomards, Obil and Vandals which were coming down from the north 2. To

this end, he cites several passages from Dio. The Marcomanni were required

to vacate a small strip of land which they had occupied along the Danube;

contingents of Quadi, Cotini and Naristae were allowed to settle within the

Danube provinces; and even a group of Vandals were admitted into Dacia 4. In

his view: "the settlement of barbarians in a threatened province was

1, Finley, /RS 48 (1958), 160f & Gilliam, 'The Plague Under Marcus Aurelius', A/Phil, 73(196)),

244ff Ro.aii Any Papers (1986), 246ff contra Boak, Manpower S/x'rtage and the Pall of the RoeanEmpire (1955), 97 & 115ff, Gilliam's point that settlement of barbarians within the empire wasnothing new bears reiterating, but despite the size of such settlements, it was never on such a large

scale as that under Marcus: Gilliam, 245 n,71 & 246 nn,72 & 73,

2, For the most recent analysis on the effects of the plague1 cf, Duncan-Jones, Structure andScale in the Roman Econo.y (1990), 71ff; on vexillations, cf, Ritterling, RE 1427 & 1449; Parker, TheRoian Legions (1928), 166; Cf. also chh,VI & II: ('exiJlationes p.138 and Manpower, p,46ff,

3, MOcsy, Pannonia and Upper Ifoesia (1974), 184ff,4 Dio LXXI . 15; 11'1-6 & 13 • 3; 121-2; Mócsy, op. cit,, 189ff,

—195-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati

permitted only when their pacification could be ensured by the very fact of

their admission", and here lies the crux of the matter. Under Marcus

Aurelius, the settlement of barbarians equated almost directly with their

pacification. This was not simply a matter of weakness, The empire was not

being forced to accept a fait accomp1i since Marcus usually permitted such a

settlement only after he had established the empire's position of superiority

by military means. Under Marcus, the barbarians were always supplicants,

usually in defeat, and their settlement was not just a matter of political

expediency (designed to keep the peace), but one of tribute to a victorious

empire.

When settlement was not the question, this tribute could take the form

of contributions to the imperial army. The lazyges were required to provide

8,000 men to the army, and the 5,500 Sarmatians sent to Britain by Marcus

may have been the result of this treaty2 . Similar measures were taken by

Aurelian and Probus after their defeat of the various tribes which invaded

the empire in the late third century. Two thousand Vandals were drafted

into the army in the wake of the great Invasion of AD 270, while Probus Is

supposed to have scattered small pockets of Frankish troops, 16,000 in all,

throughout the empire, as well as sending a group of Burgundlan and Vandal

captives across to Britain. Such contingents, formed into permanent units

of numer'i and vexillationes, performed much the same function as the

national numeri raised by foedus in the late Republic and early Empire, and

I, MOcsy, op. cit, (above n,3), 189,

2, Dio LXXI • 16; Southern, 'Numeri', 88,

3, Vandals: Dexippus 8e11, Scyth, 1 . 2; Zos, 1'46'2 & 48 . 2; Petrus Patridus frag,11 (F/Is, p,126);

Orosius VII . 23 . 4, Probus: Zos, 1 . 68 . 3; S/f4ProL', XIV.7-XV,

-1 Y6-

M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati

their echoes can still be found in the pages of the Notitia Dignitatum1.

While some may have broken faith 3 , others can be seen to have served the

empire well and faithfully3 , Some even volunteered4.

It is with Gallierius that a shift in emphasis can be found. Some time

after 255, he made an alliance with a German chieftain across the Rhine,

whereby the man created a buffer between barbarians and empire along his

part of the frontier, relieving the pressure on that part of the limes5.

Precisely what the terms of this agreement were, Zosimus fails to tell us,

but we do have quite detailed information concerning another such treaty

made circa 258/9 between Gallienus and a Marcomannic chieftain on the

Danube.

The information is confused and coloured by the bias in the sources

against Gallienus, yet it is possible to piece it together to form a coherent

picture. He is depicted as a debauched lecher, obsessed with the love of a

barbarian woman, variously named Pipa or Pipara6 ; and it is from the Epitome

of Victor that we gain the additional information with which we can slot the

whole puzzle into place:

Victor Epitome XXXIII1: Gallienus.....amori diverso pellicum deditus

Saloninae coniugis et concubinae, quam per pacationem con cessa parte

Superioris Pannoniae a patre, Marcomnannorum rege, matr'imonii specie

I, Southern, 'Numeri', 86; Not, Dig, Dc, VI . 22:65:VII . 183 (equites Marcoaanni) XL . 54 & XLII'46-

70 (equites Sariatee (gentiJes)); V . 49 : 198 & 50: 199, YI1 . 38 & XXXIV . 24 (pedifes Marcoianni)

V , 18162=VII . 13 (pedites Heruli); & Or, XXIX • 22 & 24 (pedites Scythici),

2, Alföldi, CAHIll, 299; Zos, I • 48 • 2; Petrus Patricius (rag, 12 (p.188),

3, Zos, 1 . 68 . 3; S/IA Ciauo', IX . 4; Dio LXXI . 16 on which Southern, op. cii,, 88,

4, Dexippus Scytfi, 1 . 2 (frag,6),

5, Zos, 1.30.3,

6, S//A Gail, XXI . 3; S//A Trig, Tyr, 111 . 4; Vict, Cees, XXXIII'6,

—197-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Foederati

susceperat Pipam nomine.1

From his L.iber' de Caesaribus we learn that the man was called Attalus.

Here, he is depicted not as a Marcomannus, but as a German, and it may be

that the whole affair ha8 become confused in the histories with the

agreement on the Rhine mentioned above, and that in fact the two incidents

could be one and the seine. Clarity in this matter is sadly unobtainable.

All we can be sure of is that Gallienus seems to have made some form of

marriage alliance with a barbarian chieftain concerning the protection of the

frontier, which probably involved the ceding of land to the man's tribe. This

has been interpreted as some form of foedus, and there is little else that it

could be. Aitheim would see a policy of incorporating barbarians into the

empire in these moves, but De Blois is almost certainly right In his view

that such moves were made on an ad hoc basis, as circumstance demanded.

However, a subtle shift in emphasis had taken place. The position of

Attalus was not as a supplicant, but as an equal. Perhaps it would be

better to view him as a form of client king, yet even so it was Attalus who

was in the position of strength. The emperor had come to him, not the other

way round.

The reason is not hard to find. With Valerian occupied in the east,

Gallienus had found himself faced with a prolonged Alemannic raid which was

threatening Italy at the same time as the revolt of Ingenuus in Panonnia4.

1, Vict, Epit, XXXIII'l: fiallienus,,,,,was enticed by love different to that of his devoted 'ife,

Salon/na, and took a concubine in the sesbiance of larriage, by the naee of P/pa, for vhoe he conceded

by treaty part of Pannonia Inferior to her father, the king of the Marcocanni,

2, Vict, Cees, XXXIII.6,

3, ickert, RE 'Licinius', 355; A1földi CAM XII I 219; Altheim, Soldatenkaiser (1939), 188 &

204; De Regibus 1 Monarch/a Mi//tare di Gailieno (1939), 22f; Nanni, Inpero di 6allieno (1949), 21f &

26; De Slois, Policy of the (aperor a1Iienus (1976), 4 n,13 & 34,

4, Alföldi CAN XII, 158ff; De Blois, Policy of 6ailienus, 4 & n, 12, who believes the raid was

Marcoannic,

-198-


It is possible that the revolt had been triggered by news of Valerian's

death, which would mean that this burden and the secession of the Gallic

Empire should be added to the list of the emperor's woes 1 . Quite simply, the

emperor could not be everywhere at once. Even with Aureolus acting

independently to put down the revolt of Ingenuus'-, events were moving too

fast for imperial forces to keep pace. The revolt of [ngenuus had been

symptomatic of a deep dissatisfaction inside Pannonia with the emperor's

preoccupations elsewhere. Hot on the heels of Ingenuus' demise came a

second pretender, Regalianus, bearing the same grievances as his predecessor.

These stemmed from a deep-rooted fear of the trans-Danubian tribes, which

had never truly ceased to trouble the empire s. De Blois believes that the

threat of invasion was the spark that ignited both the rebellions at this

time4 . Gallienus could not afford to be continually looking over his

shoulder for the next Pannonian conflagration, nor did he have enough leeway

to mount a trans-Danubian expedition, yet he had to make some move to pacify

the Pannonian populace while he worked to stabilise the empire-wide crisis.

The agreement with Attalus was part of the solution. It was probably a

short-term measure designed to stabilise the situation until he could effect

a thorough reorganisation of the provinces, though it may have had more

lasting consequneces. At any rate, the province remained relatively

untroubled for the rest of his reign.

I, Alföldi, CAHXII I 184ff,2. Zon, 1I.24,

3 Alfoldi, CA/III, 181; MOcsy, Pannonia, 198f ch,V: Auxilia, p,2lff,

4, De Blois, Policy of Gallienus, 4ff

5, Made circa 262, cf, Alföldi, CAM XII, 186 & chh,VI & X Vexillationes, p145 & Viri Militares,p.232 for references,

—199-


De Blois saw in Gallienus' actions a policy of barbarian alliances (albeit

an opportunistic one), and sought to extend it to cover his relations with

Palmyra 1 . However, it seems clear that the situation in the east was not

one of the emperor's making. Gallienus was never in any positon to challenge

the authority of the Palmyrene king, and could do little but cloak the fact

of Palmyra's supremacy in the guise of Roman clientship. The implication of

Roman officials in the assassination of Odaenathus probably reflects the

bitterness of Roman authority towards the situation it was forced to endure.

That it was Palmyra which eventually chose to drop the pretence only serves

to illustrate where the strength lay in the assoc1ation.

The agreements of Gallienus were individual treaties made at a time

when the empire was under its greatest strain. They seem to have been

extraordinary measures in response to equally extraordinary circumstances,

and were probably never intended as permanent or even long-term solutions.

Once the empire had regained its balance, the agreements we see being made

by Gallienus' successors have returned to the position of strength from

which Marcus Aurelius was bargaining. Claudius and Probus are credited with

bringing large numbers of Gothic tribesmen and Vandals onto Imperial soil.

Some are seen to have settled peacefully, while others are depicted as

breaking faith and ravaging the empire4 . Since both events occur equally in

the work of individual ancient writers, we can discount any suspicion of

political bias, though how much later Roman thinking colours their

1, De Blois, Policy of 6i1ienus 34f,2, Zos, 1 . 39; S/IA Val, IV • 2-4, Gail, X'1-8, Trig, Tyt, XV . 2-4 & XXX'6; CISem, II • 3971; BG(J

111 . 946; Alföldi, CANXII, 174ff,3, Zos, 1 • 46 • 2; S/IA Claud, IX • 4-7; S/IA Prob, XV.2-4,4, Zos, 1 • 71 • 2; S/IA Prob, XV1II1-4,

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M,C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Foederati

interpretation of events remains a moot point. It would seem that from the

late second century barbarian migrations, prompted by pressure from the

north and east 1 , brought individual tribes across the borders of the empire

in search of a place to live. Whether they were granted i-eceptio depended

heavily upon the individual circumstances of both tribe and emperor, and

more often than not they were turned back, becoming yet another raiding

party in the catalogue of invasions that colour the third century. Only when

it was to the empire's advantage was such settlement allowed, and at times,

as with all human decisions, the emperor could get it wrong. These

barbarians were seen as another potential source of 'ethnic' manpower, and

were treated as such, yet their recruitment was piecemeal and opportunistic2.

Not even under Gallienus was there any systematic attempt by the empire to

create a body of foederati. That would come later.

I, cf, Alföldi, C/1XII, Cap, III: 'The Barbarian Background'1 96ff.

2, Alföldi, CQH XII, 218 is wrong when he speaks of the lasting effects of barbarians upon the

army, We have seen that Germanic dress (namely trousers) were adopted for reasons of convenience

(ch,IV: Legiones p,lGff), and there is absolutely no evidence for the adoption of any other Germanic

customs during the century, The h'anes of Caracalla may have continued serving as an 'ethnic' unitfollowing that emperor's death, and seem to have retained their privileged status, though this is no

more indicitive of the 'barbarisation' of Roman emperors than the presence of boors within the Guard,

I agree with Speidel that their continuation is more likely than disbandment, but his suggestion that

they returned to Germany and survived there as a unit to be re-recruited by Naximian 50 years later is

too far-fetched to be credible, It is far more likely that they remained within the empire, to be

incorporated into the barbarian auxilia after its creation by Constantine: Speidel, 'Ethnic Units',

226f; Dio LXIVIII . 5, LXIIX . 64 & I.XXX • 45; Her, V . 4 • 8; ,%'f, Dig, Oc, V . 26171 :VII . 65 &

y. 27: 172:VII . 19; On the Moors cf, ch,II: Contra ColitatuR, p63,

—20 1-

PART 4:

TI-i Off icr

M,C.Ibeji, C3 Army

X: VI RI MILl TA RE

The rise of the equites into posts previously reserved for senators is a

phenomenon of the third century which has prompted great debate. So much

has been achieved since Keyes produced his seminal work on the subject' that

few questions can still be asked 0 and even fewer permit answers. All that

remains is to reiterate old arguments and bring together relevant strands in

the tapestry of our understanding; confirming what we do know and

highlighting what we do not. Some aspects of the debate retain interesting

angles of approach. Where enough information survives, I have tried to fill

these gaps. Furthermore, I deemed it useful to combine the evidential

material provided by Keyes, Petersen, Malcus and Gilliam into one homogeneous

whole upon which a full study could be based 2 . Most of the material

tabulated under the title Provincial Governors has been drawn from these

four sources, as well as from the Prosopography of Iones and Mart indale.

Likewise, the analyses of this material merely echo what has gone before.

Only in the analysis of vexillary commands, and the incorporation of duces

into the picture, does this chapter take up threads that have not been

unpicked previously.

As with so much in the third century, a pivotal position is occupied by

the emperor Gallienus. Aurelius Victor, in two celebrated passages, claimed

1, Keyes 1 The Rise of the Equites, Princeton (1915),2, Keyes, op. cit.; Petersen, 'Governors in the C3', IRS 45 (1955), 47-57; Halcus, 'Système

Administratif', Opuscula Rosana 7 (1969), 213-237; Gilliam, 'Governor5 of Syria Code', Roeeii ArmyPapers (1986), 173-190 A/Phil 79(1958), 225-242; all collected in table YM 1: Provincial 6overnors,

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M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares

that he incensed the senators "by the outrage done to their order, since .....

fearing their indolence and wishing to pass power onto the best of the

nobility, he barred the senate from military service and access to the

army. " This 'edict' could have been revoked under Tacit us had not the

senators been so apathetic. As it was, they missed their chance.

In the past, the 'edict' has been taken to indicate imperial antipathy

towards the senate. Gallienus, like Septirnius Severus, was seen to have

resented senatorial opposition to his reign, and sought support among the

equestrian classes. It was thought that he deliberately replaced senators

with equites in key military positions, and even sought to deny the senate a

role in provincial government 3 . Such a view is no longer tenable. A quick

glance at the material compiled by Petersen and Gilliam proves that senators

remained in control of three times as many provinces as those given over to

equestrians by Gallienus4 , while the whole notion of an anti-senatorial

policy has come into question.

From the start, the concept of imperial enmity towards the senate has

been based on shaky foundations, drawn as it was from the anti-imperial

tradition of the histories 5 . These reflected the hostility of the senate,

both contemporary and subsequent, towards an emperor deemed to have

1, Vict, Caes, XXXIII'33-34: ft patres quidee, preeter coesune Rocani orbis ia/ui, stiau/abatproprii ordinis contuielia, quia priaws ipse (Ga/i/anus), iett.' socordiae suae, ie iiperiu. ad opt/sos

nobiliva transferre fur, senutu. ill/flu ye tuft ci adire exercitui,

2, Vici, Cues, XXVII'5-7,

3, Alföldi, CAM XII (1939), 183f; Den Boer, Lou H/nor Rosan Historians (1972), 7Sf; Homo,

'Galijen et la crise', Rev, Mist, (1913), 250ff & 257ff, and 'Privileges administratives du sénat',

Rev, Mist, (1921), 197ff; Jones 1 Later Rouan Lap/re (1964), 24; Nannl, L'iupero di 6'aiiieno, (1949),

51.

4, cf, table YM 1: Provincial Governors and table YM 4: Survey Re5uIfs,

5. Alfôldi, 223ff discusses this at length,

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M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army. Viri. Militares

deprived senators of their traditional rights 1 . As such, they attest the

strength of senatorial feeling against the prince, but they do not naturally

indicate a reciprocal animosity from his person. De Blols has pointed out

that Gallienus enjoyed personal friendships with several senators and drew

around himself a cultured coterie2. In fact, apart from the testimony of

Victor, there is nothing in the histories to substantiate a theory of hatred.

True, Gallienus faced several revolts early in his reign, either by senators

or with senatorial support, but there is no indication in the sources of

purges similar to those of Septimius Severus4.

Even had there been, equestrians would have featured prominently in the

death toll. The idea that the senate opposed the autocracy of the Princeps,

while the equites benefitted from an unholy alliance, is a fantasy belied by

the facts. In a study of the first two centuries AD, Brunt has established

that equites were implicated in as many plots as were senators, and both

classes equally paid the price of failure s. The same is true of the third

century. To illustrate the point, we need look no further than the reign of

Gellienus himself.

1, Victor and the 8/14 vilify Gallienus, while at the same time evincing disdain for the

5enatorial forefathers who forfeited their power, Here they must be voicing the general feeling among

the senators of their day, harking back to lost glories: cf, Ilalcus, 'Système administratif', 215f,

Vici, Cats, XXXIII . 31 & 34 tells of the persecution of Gallienus' family and friends after the news of

his death, a chilling testimony to the anti-imperial feeling among the senators of the day It is

also worth noting that while the Latin (senatorial) tradition generally excoriates the unfortunate

emperor, the independent Greek tradition prai5es him as cultured and humane: cf, Alföldi, bc, cit.

(above, n,5),

2, Dc Blois, Policy of the Eapero 6ailieiws (1976), 58,3, Alföldl, C4/IXII, 184ff De Blois, 82,4, And it is doubtful whether, following these purges, Severus himself had anything more to fear

from the senate, Indeed, the purges themselves were indicative of the dominant position of the

emperor: cf, ch,IV: Legiones, p.86,5, Brunt, 'Princeps and Equites', IRS 73 (1983), 63ff,

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M.C.Ibe.Ji: 03 Army. Viri Militares

Equestrians actually outnumbered senators at the head of the rebellions

which followed Valerian's capture. There can be little doubt about Callistus

'Ballista', prime instigator of the eastern revolt, or about L. Musslus

Aemilianus, the praefectus Aegypti who joined it 1 . The Prefect of Egypt was,

by definition, an equestrian, and it must be significant that Ballista did not

have the prestige to claim the purple for himself, but was forced to rely on

the Macriani. It would seem by this that he was an obscure equestrian who

could only achieve the Praetoriari Prefecture through rebellion 2 . T. Fulvius

Macrianus himself was possibly of equestrian stock. A confusion of titles

are attributed to him, which Alföldi interpreted to mean Quartermaster

General3 . As Jones and Martthdale correctly assumed, he was most likely

designated 'a rationibus', which, according to Pfleuin, was one of the most

prestigious posts in the equestrian cursus. It is worth noting that he

deemed it prudent to pass the purple over himself in favour of his sons, on

the grounds of physical infirinitys.

The situation in the west is more confused. The two Pannonian usurpers,

Irigenuus and Regalianus were probably senators. Ingenuus was definitely the

governor of a Pannonian province6 , and the likelihood is that Regalianus was

the same7 . Epigraphic testimony suggests that Pannonla was ruled by

1, Alfóldi, CAM XII, 17211, Ballista Is known only as a praefecfus who emerged after the

disastrous capture of Valerian to fight a successfull guerrilla campaign against the Persians: S/IA

Va!, IV'4, Trig, Tyr, XII'l; Zonaras XII.23,2, Though it is possible that he was PPO of Valerian: S//A Gall, 1 . 2-3 & 111 . 2, Trig, Tyr, XII,

XIV . 1 & XVIII . 13; Zon, XI1'24,

3, Alfôldi, bc, cit, Eusebius Mist, Fcc!, VII . IO . 5-6; Petrus Patricius Exc, de sent, frag, 159;

S//A Trig, Tyr, XII • 1; Zon, XII.24,

4, PLREMacrianus2; Pflaum, Proc, Eq., 294,5, Alföldi, bc, c/f,; Eusebius Mist, Fcc!, VI1'1O'8-9 Zon, XII'24; $84 Tr/g, Tyr, XII•4-12,

6, Alföldi, 184; Vict, Cacs, XXXIII'2 quei curantei Pannonio S//A Tr/g, Tyr, IX.I,

7, Alfaldi, bc, cit.; S//A Trig, Tyr, 1 . 1 & 9, This refers to dux and ducatiia1 but given the

S//4'5 propensity to borrow terms from its own time, I am disinclined to credit it without independent

support,

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M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares

equestrian praefectl while Gallienus was in power 1 yet this can hardly apply

at the instant of his accession. Regalianus was married to Sulpicla

Dryantilla, the daughter of an important senatorial gens, and is most likely

to have been a senator himself. If this was the case, the province was still

under senatorial control at that time.

No confusion exists over Aureolus, who rebelled in 267 and was possibly

the most favoured and influential of Gallienus' vfrl mi1itares. Yet debate

still surrounds the man in whose name he turned against the emperor: M.

Cassianius Latinius Postumus. Postumus was probably of humble origins and

rose through a military career to an important command in Gaul4 . This

command had obvious military undertones, yet its nature is unclear. Victor

says: barbaris per Gafliam praesidebat; Zosimus calls him &pv and the

Historla Augusta claims he was: Transrhenani limitis dux et Galliae praesess.

He seems to have been subordinate to Silvanus, the tuotor of Gallienus' son

Salonthus, who directed the government of the Rhine provinces in his name.

Drinkwater thinks that he acted as the military counterbalance to SilvanusG,

If this was the case, he is likely to have held a special command, such as

dux Transrhenani limitis, rather than the provincial governorship which

Alföldi and Drinkwater think he possessed. Such a command would have

matched the nature, if not the prestige, of Silvanus' position. On the other

hand, if Silvanus gained influence merely from his post as tutor to

I 111 . 4564; III'3424 1L5545: 111 . 15156; but cf, Petersen, 51 nn,60 & 65 contra.

2, Alfôldi, bc, c/f, (above, n,1),

3, His career as given in PLREureolus shall suffice,4, Eutropius Rrev, IX9,5, Vict, Cues, XXXIII . 8; Zos, I'38'2; Q Trig, Tvr, 1119,

6, Alfôldi, CA/I XII, 185: Drinkwater, The 6uliic (spire, Hi5tor(u 52(1987), 25,

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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Viri Militares

Saloninus, it is possible that Postumus was simply a praeses provinc1ae and

that the former had no official counterweight. A third possibility is that

Postumus was a dux or praeposltus In command of an exercitua campaigning on

the Rhine. This is the option which I favour for several reasons.

First, despite their confusion, the sources are unamimous in their belief

that Postumus held a military command. This command brought him into

conflict with Silvanus over the matter of some booty, an isolated incident

over which Post umus took the side of his soldiers'. The incident was a

catalyst for widespread disaffection with Silvanus' mode of government, and

it was his position as commander of the troops involved in the dispute which

transformed Postumus into the figurehead of the rebellion. In other words,

Postumus was proclaimed Gallic Emperor in opposition to the legitimate

government almost by default. This, at rock bottom, is the general consensus

of the histories, Secondly, the military bias in the material suggests

strongly that Postumus was a career officer. Hints of humble origins and

heavy emphasis on the man's military prowess are the standard indicators of

an equestrian career made in the army. If this was the case, it is highly

unlikely that Postumus would have been made praees of a German province,

since both provinces appear to have remained senatorial until late in the

third century2 . Finally, the sources are completely silent on the nature of

Silvanus' command, other than to name him as the guardian of Saloninus. This

makes me loth to invest him with an important and prestigious official

position against which Postumus could have been the counterwei8ht, though I

1, Alföldi, bc, cit.; Eutropius IX'9; $11.4 Sail, IV . 3, Trig, Typ, II1 • 2-4; Vict, Caes, XXXIII'8,Epit, XXXII'3; Zos, 1.38.2,

2, cf, table YM1: Provincial Goveppors,

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M.C.Ibeji C3 Army. Viri Militares

will concede that both men may have held unofficial influence. In view of

these points 1 I am most ready to believe that Fostumus was an equestrian

officer who held some important military position coinbatting barbarian

incursions on the Rhine. If he was a senator, it can only have been through

adlection (unless we discount Eutropius' statement), and will have followed a

successful career in the army.

All but one of these men rebelled at the start of Gallienus' reign,

providing him with ample reason to distrust equestrians as much as he may

have distrusted senators. Such considerations have prompted some historians

to doubt the credibility of Victor's statement. Arnheim and de Regibus

believe the edict to be a fictional device 1 , while a critique by Malcus has

indicated that the sources Victor drew upon were not entirely trustworthy2.

Victor produced the Historlae abbreviatae between 358 and 36O, and was

heavily influenced by the predjudices of resurgent paganism centred around

the emperor Julian4 . For his earlier history, he used an anonymous source

which he shared in common with Eutropius and possibly the Historia Augusta.

Where these could not help, it seems likely that he filled the gaps himself.

His account is loaded with moral ,judgements culled from his own time, and

makes several elementary mistakes which cast grave doubt on his independent

I, Ce Regibus, 'Decadenza del senato', Aft! Ac, Lig, IX'l (1953), 234ff points out that Victor'sis the only testimony we have of such an edici Arriheim, Senatorial Aristocracy (1972), 37 suggeststhat ii was a device of Victor's to explain gradual changes.

2, Malcus, 'Système administratif', 214ff.

3, He met Julian at Sirmium in 361: Malcus, 315; ed, Dufraigne, livre des Césars (1975), introp,xi,

4, On Julian, cf, Browning, The Eaperor Julia,, (1975), esp, cap, 9, Victor met Julian late in361, and made such an impression that he was appointed preeses Pannoniae SecundaL Browning, 120,

5, On this subject cf, Introduction, p4ff, The common use of a taisergesc/,ichteby Victor andEuiropius seems to me proven, but I am not convinced it was known to the S//A,

6, Malcus, Iocc, citt,—208-


trustworthiness. The 'edict' could be discounted were it not patently

obvious from the epigrephic record that a great change had taken place.

Malcus shows the way forward. He admits that some kernel of truth must

exist within Victor's story, if only to explain the hatred of the senate

towards the emperor, and it was linked in some way to the increasing

importance of the equestrian class. Yet senators still held military

commends under Gallienus, and were never properly excluded from provincial

government with all the military responsibilities that implied 1 . He posits

that Gallienus did not exclude senators from military life, but instead

opened the way for the equestrian class to enter those offices which had

previously been the sole preserve of the senate 2 . The exclusion of the

senate became a de facto affair as senators lost posts for which they no

longer held much competence to the eager, career-conscious equites

(promoted, of course, by the emperor). By the time Aurelius Victor was

writing, the split had become as rigid as law. Gallienus did not pass a

negative edict agathst the senate, but created a positive one in favour of

the equites3.

Eric Birley pointed out long ago that a military career was no longer an

essential prerequisite for senatorial advancement 4 . More recently, de Blols

has added substance to this by establishing a trend in senatorial curricula

I, T, Flavius Postumius Yarus and C, lulius Sallustius Saturninus Fortunatianus were both Jegutus

Jepionis under Gallienus; though it is worth noting that they were simultaneously legatiis AugiI5ti pro

praetore Nalcus, 'Système administratif', 226 & 228, citing VIl'95 = RIB 1764 & ILS 2413. Note also

that praefecti legionis were technically subordinate to the provincial governor: Malcus, 227,

2, Malcus, 216,

3, Ii is possible that he simply employed equestrians without legislating, Nowhere does Victor

explicitly mention an edict, this is simply an assumption of modern historians, Since these governors

were the personal appointees of the emperor, legislation was not a prerequisite of the change

4, E, Birley, 'Senators in the Emperor's Service', PBA3( (1953), 207f,

—209-


away from military posts and into an increasing number of civil appointments,

which may not simply be a trick of the extant material 1 . In essence, it

would seem that most senators held the bare minimum they could get away

with in military terms, and that as the third century progressed, this

requirement diminished. The last pure legatus leglanis was Vitulasius

Laetinianus at Caerleon in the 25062. Two other legati postdate him in the

reign of Gallienus, but both held their posts in conjunction with the

provincial governorship; a point to which I shall return 3. More indicative of

senatorial attitudes were the last senators to hold the military tribunate.

lunius Tiberianus was trib, mu, leg. X Geminae under Decius4, and P.

Balsamius Sabl.nianus was trib. inil. laticlavius circa 2626. Both were minors.

The essential fact to note is that the post of tribunus laticlavius was a

sinecure long before Gallienus came on the scene. Indeed, de Blois lists a

series of inscriptions from the collection of Dessau which show senators

pursuing careers with no military posts whatsoever, most of which predate

the edict6.

By the 250s, therefore, the senate would seem to have abdicated its

military responsibilities in favour of civilian careers. Campbell made the

point that the most prestigious posts in the senatorial cursus had long been

the least active ones militarily. In the second century, Syria, Spain and

1, De Blois, Policy of 6allienus 68ff & 72ff,

2, RIB 334 & ILS 537; leg, leg, II Aug.

3, Varus and Fortunatianu5, given above, p.209 n,1,

4, 111 . 4558 & p.23284°

5, 111.8571,

6, Os Blois, 70 n,197,

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M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Virl. Militares

Britain, relatively peaceful unless the emperor chose to campaign in the

area, were the provinces most sought after by senators1. The real prestige

was to be gained in the Eternal City Itself2. The senate was becoming less

suitable and less enthusiastic for military command. Part of the problem

may have been a steady reduction in the numbers of born senators eligible to

take on available posts. De Blois believes that the pool of senators was

shrinking even as the number of vexillations and other units they were

required to lead expanded3. If this was the case, it will have been another

contributory factor to their decreasing significance in the militia.

This is not, however, the whole story. In the procuratorial service, a

precedent already existed where equestrian officers impinged on areas

technically under the jurisdiction of the senate. By the second century,

procurators were found exercising legal powers within imperial estates4. In

general, this was only fiscal jurisdiction, and while they could usurp extra-

legal powers when dealing with privati or even in criminal cases, such action

was only possible where the case arose out of fiscal claims (disputes

between the fiscus and privati, and hearings over the sequestration of goods

pertaining to capital charges)5. The procuratorial service was expanded by

the Seven, and much of the power mentioned above was given their official

1, Campbell 'Who were the yin silitaresV, .IRS 65 (1975), 22,2, Campbell, 27,

3, De Blois, Policy of Suiiienus, 65f & 68, I am not entirely convinced, As we shall see,equestrians were equally able to command vexillations, even prior to Marcus Aurelius. and 5enators

were never required to lead auxiliary units or praetorian troops, Nor were they required for the new

legions of Septimius Severus, which were placed under the command of equestrian praefect/ cf, below,p216, For the growth of vexx, cf, ch,VI: 'ex/llationes.

4, Millar, 'Imperial Procurators: Further Evidence', H/stan/a 14(1965), 362ff,5, MIllar, locc, c/ft.; Brunt, Roaa,', lipenial T/ieies (1990), 169ff,

-2 11-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. yin. Militares

sanction'. Significantly, appeals in such fiscal cases were directed over the

head of the governor to the emperor himself, though this decision was

reversed by Severus Alexander. Yet, despite the dismantling by Alexander

and Gordian of several Severan measures regarding procurators, their right

to hear fiscal cases seems to have become de Jur.

Of importance here is the timing. Equestrians in the procuratorial

service were operating outside their legitimate sphere of influence long

before these activities were given the sanction of law. When Severus

created a series of new sexagenariate posts, there was no lack of

equestrians ready to fill them 4. The equestrian class was willing and eager

to undertake any job the emperor might provide, arid to exploit it to the

full. In the military sphere it was well suited to the task. Jarrett's work

on Africa has much to tell in this respect, for he has shown that as

military service came to involve more fighting, recruitment of equestrian

officers shifted into the militanised areas. Simultaneously, equites from the

more civilian localities entered the equestrian service at the level of

advocatus fisci and pursued a 'civilian' career5.

A dichotomy was forming, between military men and civilians. Jarrett's

African material emphasises the parallel between the equestrian cursus and

the senatorial in this respect. Where they differ is that senators still had

legitimate areas of non-military advancement, whereas ambitious equites were

ever more forced to rely on the army as their ladder to power. Even as the

1, Pflaum, Les Procuratelr5 Equestres (1950), 90ff; Brunt, Theaes, 171 & 18211,2, Brunt, 176,3, Brunt, bc, cit.4, Pflaum, bocc, cit t,5, Jarrett, 'African Contribution to the Imperial Equestrian Service', Historia 12(1963), 225

—2 12-


proportion of ex-centurlon procurators remained no more than 25% throughout

the second and third centuries, men from the Prinilpilate could realistically

aspire to high office if they remained in the army and proved their worth in

the equestrian cursus militiae 1 , In one celebrated case, a man actually

accepted a demotion so that he could switch to a military career 2 . Men with

military experience were becoming valuable. Campbell tells us of the men

under Marcus Aurelius who were frequently re-posted at times of crisis to

positions on the northern frontier where they had firsthand experience, He

comments on the sense of the move, and we can only concur 3 . In the mid-

third century, the men with the experience were equestrian yin mill tares

I do not want to get bogged down in definitions. That a number of ex-

centurions can be found rising via the Primipilate into posts of military

responsibility is a fact of the third century. They became tribunes,

praefecti cestrorum and preepositi vexillationum. Eventually, they took over

command of certain legions and provinces, and some advanced even further4.

Certain of them gained the title protector, though discussion of its meaning

must waite . They were ambitious, experienced 1 and quite ready to fill the

vacuum left by the senate's indifference. At the same time other equestrian

officers with no record of service in the ranks can be found advancing into

similar posts. Yet even these seem to have pursued a predominantly

I, Brunt 1 'Princeps and Equites', IRS 73 (1983), 48f; Gage, CJasse5 Sociaies (1954), 259;MacMullen, Soldier and CiviIiai 69f,

2, III • 6075; Pflaum, Procuratew's, 261; MacMullen, bc, cit,3, Campbell, ' yin ailitares', 22, In the same vein 1 Severu5 would seem to have posted a

procurator skilled in intelligence work to northern Britain in preparation for the Scottish campaign;

the man eventually became PPO of Caracalla: Rankov, 'II, Oclatiniu5 Adventus in Britain', Britannic IS(1987), 243ff,

4, Pflaum, 'Procurator', RE col, 1278; Domaszewski, Rangondnung (1967), 81; Gage, bc, cit,Nagy, 'Aelius Aelianus', Kilo 46(1965), 339ff; a handful of examples will suffice: Marianus VI•1636

Mucianus 4E1908,259 = 1159479; Volusianus XI'1836 = /151332; cf, also AE1968,413 & PLRE.4ureoius,5, cf, ch,XI: Protectores,

—213-

M.C.Ibe.ii: C3 Army. Viri Militares

military career. Few of the equestrians named in the Provincial Governors

survey give a record of earlier posts held. All who do had seen active

military service, and most had no other posts to speak of 1 . While not yin

militares in the strictest sense of the term, these were military men in that

they exhibited a tacit recognition of the value to be gained by experience in

the army. For these men, a conjunction of circumstances was to make their

services invaluable, for the senate seems to have retreated from military

affairs at precisely the time (and possibly because) the empire entered a

state of virtually endemic warfare2.

The militarisat ion of the equites was a gradual process throughout the

first half of the third century. Its roots must lie partly in the growing

importance of vexillatlons. The tradition that legions should remain under

the command of senators was never a hard and fast rule3 . Experienced

pnimipili would sometimes be called upon to command substantial legionary

detachments. We know of one man who was put in command of nine

vexillations from different named legions, and who later went on to command

an exercitus In Africa under Vespasian 4 . At times of emergency, it seems

that veteran military men were a precious commodity, regardless of their

class. This was never more true than during the wars of Marcus Aurelius.

I, Table YM 1: Statilius Ammianus was preef, dee, 111 . 90 & IGRR III1287; C, Iul,Priscus waspruep, vexx, & praep, leg, prior to becoming proc. prov, vice pracs,, VI • 1638; Aur, Valentinus wastrib, Batavorua, AE,1900 1 169; Flavius Aper was preep, vexx,, 111 . 15156, AE,1936,53,54 & 57 Fl, Val,Constantius was protector et trib,, Excerpt, Pales, I .2 an anonymous preeses ee,', Sup, was Ypruef,a/ce et praef, ye/ic,, VI . 1641; Sabinius Timesitheus was preef, co/i,, In all the above mentionedcases, the entire known career prior to the governorship, both military and civilian, is cited,

2, Dc Blois, Policy of Gallienus, 60ff; CAHXII (1939), chapters 2,6 & 9,3, Saxer, Vexillationen, Ep, $tuo I (1967), 120ff4. C, Velius Rufus, priasus p1/us of Leg, XII Pu/a, and later trib, co/i, XIII 1/rb,, E,1903,368

cf, also X'5829 = 1LS2726; and possibly Y1.3505,

—2 14-

M.C,Ibejl: C3 Army. Viri Militares

Marcu8 relied on vexillatlons heavily. Circumstance had cursed him with

such a chronic shortage of manpower that he was forced to use any means at

his disposal, regardless of the traditional niceties'. He enlisted Italians

into two new legions2, he dragged vexillatlons from all over the empire to

fight his wars and defend his borders3, and in three cases he ignored

precedent to place equestrians in command of legionary forces 4. Nor was

this simply the customary transferral of command into the hands of capable

primipili The men whom Marcus chose were equites from the procure tela.

Two of them, Ti. Plautius Ferruntianus and L. lulius lulianus, had both been

praeIectus alee and tribunus militum In between procuratorial posts, and had

a wealth of military experience5 . The third seems to have been the

Procurator of the province involved, acting vice legati in nominal command of

the unit, though actual command in fact rested with another praefectus alae

named in the same inscription6. The break is clear and dramatic. Marcus

had ceased limiting the command of legionaries to senators and veteran

centurions. Presumably, he had no-one else he could rely on. All his other

commanders must have been tied down. Yet he needed more troops with

reliable men in charge of them. The very range of his actions speaks

volumes for the pressure he was under. Ferruntianus, for instance, was

withdrawn from a Tribunate in Moesia to lead part of III Augusta out of

1, Ritterling, RE 1427 & 1449; Parker, Rosan Legions (1928), 166; cf, chh,V1, IV & V:

Vexillationes p. 138ff, Legione5 & Auxilia2, II1'1980 Dio LV . 24; Ritterling, 13001; Salmon, 'Army and Disintegration', Trans, R, Soc,

Canada 52 III 11(1958), 52,3, 111 . 14433; VI'31856 • AE,I888,66; VI1I'619 = 11,52747; AE1910,l61; AE,1920,45; Parker, 168;

Saxer, 'exiIJationen, 124,4, VI'31856 • AE,1888,66; VIII'6I9 = 1LS2747; AE1910,5,

5, VI'31856 & YII1'619 above,

6, A1910,5 from Villalis in Spain.

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M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. yin Militares

Africa against the Marcomanni! In another instance, a centurlo frumentarius

from Egypt was put in commend of a garrison force in Dalmatia, drawn from

the new Italian legions'. This broke with further tradition, that centurions

(as opposed to primipili) only be placed in command of vexillations from

their own unit2 . Both practices continued under Commodus3.

Marcus had established a new precedent. Members of the procuratorial

service were now eligible for legionary command. The next logical step was

to be taken by Septimius Severus who, on his creation of the Parthian

legions, did not place senatorial legati in command, but instead put them

under equestrian praefectL C. lulius Pacatlanus, the procurator of Osrhoene,

was probably the original commander of the first legion created 4 . He was

well qualified for the post, having served his time in the equestrian tres

militiae ('...militiis equestribus perfuncto...') prior to the procuratio. Above

all else, his appointment must have been a matter of expediency. Severus

wanted to make a settlement of the eastern frontier, but he had more

pressing problems to attend to 5 . Alblnus was massing troops in the west,

with strong senatorial support s . Severus had to respond and, like Marcus

before him, he could not afford to detach any of his available officers to an

I, lIl'1980 ILS 2287; the vexx, were from Legg, 11 Pta ef II! Cor/cor5, the cognac/na of

Marcus' Italian legions, The cognosen of II Tralana was fortis' Webster, Pocan leper/al Arty (1979),

lb.

2, This rule was bent in ju5t one case prior to 161, where an H, julius Cossutus is found making

a dedication to Herculius Saxanus on behalf of units from Yl V/ctr/x (his legion), A Gee/na, IV!!

Pricigenia plus the alae and cohortes attached to them, The whole force was in fact s(Lth) Q,

Acut(io), whose rank is not given: XlII • 7715; 7716 & 7697 (Brohi, Germany),

3, AE,1910,161,

4, XII . 1856 ILS 1353.

5, Miller, CAM XII, 9f,

6, Miller, 10ff,

-2 16-

M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Viri Militares

eastern command. Yet a new legion was under recruitment in preparation for

the future and needed a commanding off icer. Since it had become politically

advisable to relinquish Rome's direct claim to Osrhoene 3, the obvious

candidate for the post was the now redundant, and militarily competent,

procurator of that province.

Once he had made the decision to place the legion under equestrian

command, Severus apparently saw no reason to reverse it when the crisis was

over. Inertia cannot be a full explanation, for the other Parthian legions,

recruited later, were arranged along similar lines. Two of them were placed

in the new province of Mesopotamia, itself governed by an equestrian 4. Yet

the standard assumptions of antipathy towards the senate are not in

themselves entirely satisfactory. As I have argued earlier 6, Severus had

eradicated all active senatorial opposition by AD 198; those who remained

either supported him, were indifferent to him 1 or were afraid of him6. Nor

had the senators yet begun to abdicate their responsibilities, so the whole

answer does not lie here either 7. It must be a complex mix of all these

1, The vast majority can be placed with certainty in command of units against Albinus: X•5178,

5398 & El985,332; AE,1890,82; ILS 2935; PIR2 C 823, Of tho5e who cannot, one was occupied inAfrica with Dacian detachments, cf, AE,1977,858 & YII • 5349,7978; while the other commanded detachments

from Italy against the Parthians in 197 (A1926,79), and was praepositus vexiIlatioIli5 perinthi pergenfibtis,,, prior to this, VI.1408,

2, cf, ch,IY: Leiones for a full discussion of the chronology, The argument is somewhatcircular, due to the sparsity of the evidence, but makes sense in context, It assumes that Plommsen is

correct In his theory that the legion number on XII . 1856 has been omitted because the other two

Parthian legions are not yet in existence; but cf, Murphy, Sep flilus Severus hoe Inscriptions,Philadelphia diss, (1945), 66 for an argument against this,

3, Miller, CAHXII, 10,

4, 111 . 99; VIII'20996 XIV'3626 Dio LXIVIII'13 . 4 all show equestrian commanders of the Parthian

legions: Keyes, Equites, 30ff, For the governor of Mesopoiamia cf, Keyes, 30: Kennedy, 2PE36 (1979),255ff identifies the first known governor as Ti, Claudius Sabutianus Aquila,

5, cf, ch,IV: Legiones, p86,6, Oio LXXV'8 Herodian III . 8'6-8 SM Severus XIII . 1-7; Miller, AH XII, 15,7, It is worth noting that all the men referred to in note I above were senators, Excluding

Pacatianus, only 2 equestrians are know to have recieved extensive military commands from Severus,

both In AD 193: AE,1944,80; A1971,476,

—217-

M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army. Viri Militares

possibilities. We have already seen that Severus expanded the procuratorialz,I

service and gave it a wider range of legal powers (above p). He also

opened up the equestrian service to men from the ranks, granting principales

the right to wear the gold ring'. These were measures designed to give the

equestrian order greater experience of government and increase recruitment

into it. Keyes has established an increase in the use of imperial

procurator'es vice praesidum arising out of Severus' measures, which paved

the way for equestrian praesides later in the century2 and illustrated the

active role equestrians had begun to take in the administration of the

empire.

As Miller put It 3 , Severus set in motion a 'systematic' unification of

imperial administration through the displacement of senators by equestrian

officers, and accelerated a process which had begun in the early Principate4.

His reasons for doing so must have been part fear -- a desire not to return

to the system which had created the chaos of the 190s -- and a partial

reluctance to rock the boat. Equestrians were faring well in the commands

they had been given. More men were required to restore order throughout

the empire after the upheavals of the civil war, and the equites were ready

to hand. Severus was above all a practical man. The practical thing to do

was to make use of them and ensure that there were enough of them to do

the job. The long-term consequences of his actions may never have occurred

to him.

These consequences had a knock-on effect. The procuratorial service was

1, Miller, CAHXII, 16; Birley, 'Severus and the Roman p ray', Ep, Stid, 8 (1969), 75f for a full

discussion of the evidence, The earliest dated instance he cites is 111 . 3237 from AD 212,

2, Keyes, Equite5, 4ff,

3, Miller, 26,

4, For the best dicussion of the earlier part of this process, cf, Brunt, 'Princeps and Equites'

—218-

not exploited to its full potential till the reign of the first 'soldier

emperor'; who had achieved the purple through a prestigious equestrian

career 1 . Keyes showed that the Seven used procuratorial vicar-il sparingly.

Dada had two under Severus and Caracal].a, but Keyes himself warned that

Dacia was a special case2 . Severus Alexander seems to have preferred

senators to equestrians, as did Septiniius Severus In the early part of his

reign3 . In only one case can a Severan procurator outside Dada be found

acting vice praesidis4. Vicar-li caine Into their own following the death of

Severus Alexander5 , Men such as Timesltheus and C. tulius Priscus were

imperial favourites employed extensively throughout the empire 6 . More

ordinary cases of procurator-es vices praesidum underwent an explosion

between 235 and 25O. In the military sphere, no senatorial praepositi

vexillatlonum are recorded after 217, though the use of vexillations

increased6.

Onto this scene came Gallienus. His actions In the five years preceding

his sole reign illustrate an intuitive grasp of the importance of the

I, Maxielnus Thrax, Cf. Ensslin, CIQH XII, Ch, II, 72,

2, Keyes, (quites 5 & lOf, In the third century, Dacia consisted of three 'provinces' under one

governor, Each individual province had a procurator, of which the procurator of Dacia Apulensis acted

vice legati in the absence of the legate,3, Keyes, 5 N9s 1,5 & 6; also Keyes, 7,

4, Keyes, 5 N2 2,

5, Keyes 1 5ff,

6, XIII • 1807; VI • 1638; Keyes, 5 NQs 7 & 11, Timesitheus was a form of financial troubleshooter

used extensively by Maximinus and Gordian III, He was eventually made Praetorian Prefect in 241 and

exercised de facto control over the running of the empire till his death two years later: Ensslin,85ff, Priscus was the brother of the emperor Philip, and recieved appointrients accordingly: Ensslin,

87,

7, Keyes, 6ff, Fully two thirds of his procuratorial material dates after 235, The remaining,

Severan, material has already been discussed in the text above,

8, In chronological order: 11 . 484 ILS 1372; Q(,1978,44O; VI'1638; ILS 8870 I6RR III•481:111 . 3228; AE1934,193 5223; AE,1935,164; E,1936,53,54 & 57 1908,259 ILS 9479 = 1611R I'1496;only the first three date prior to Gallienus, Cf. also ch,VI vexillationes,

— 2 19-


equites. Campaigning in Gaul, he began to draw around himself a circle of

talented equestrian officers capable of independent action, on whom he could

rely to conduct a war successfully in his absence'. Foremost among these

was Aureolus, who proved his worth against the uprisings of Ingenuus and the

Macriani. The circumstances of these uprisings can only have confirmed the

young emperor in his assessment of equestrian prowess. For while the

senatorial revolts in Pannonia were a direct consequence of the chaos caused

by barbarian invasions, rectified only once the usurpers had been

eradicated9 , the equestrian pretenders in Gaul and the east were always

victorious commanders thrust to prominence by virtue of their success.

His 'edict' must have been introduced in the breathing space which

followed these rebellions, for its first direct evidence is the appointment

of an equestrian pr'aeses Arabicae either in 262 or 263. Evidence for Its

Immediate application in the empire is minimal, but very illuminating. Under

Gallienus himself, only four provinces were definitely affected: Arabia, to

which we shall return; Cilicia, which had no legionss; and both the Pannonian

provinces.

The Pannonian material Is fascinating, since it provides a clear

1, Certainly recruited it this time were: Aureolus, SHA Gail, 111 . 3, V . 6 Trig, Tyr, XI'l; Zon,

XII • 24; Alfoldi, 'Usurpator Aureolus', Stud/en (1967), 1ff: Postumus, S//A Trig, Tyr, 111 . 9; Vict,

Cae5, XXXIII . 8; Zon, XII • 24; Zos, I'38'2: and Volusianus, XI'1836 ILS 1332, It is pO5sible that he

also appointed Claudius to a command in Illyricum at this time: S//A Ciawo', XIY'2 & XV'1-2 attribute

this appointment to Valerian, but if they are to be given any credence what5oever 1 the appointee must

have been Gallienus who had control of the Danube at that time; Alfôldi, CAN XII, 181 & 'Krise',

Studie, 361,

2, Zon, XII • 24; S//A flail, 1I6-7; Trig, Tyr, XI . 2, XII'13-14, XIV'l & XV'4,

3, de Blois, Policy of Gallienus, 4f,

4. lunius Olympus in 262 may be senatorial or equestrian depending on the interpretation of ro

6saf--.7,uora'roo q'yqiovoç, Petersen, 48 & n8, Statilius Ammianus was definitely equestrian governor in

263, 1&S'RIII'1287, For a further discussion of Arabian pracs/des, see below, p222f,

5, A, Voconius Zeno, AE,1915,51,

-220-


indication of the piecemeal nature of Gallienus' reform, A plethora of

inscriptions show that the legiones adiutrices came under the command of

equestrian agentes vice legatorum at this time and remained so for the rest

of the century, but there is no positive evidence for a similar takeover of

legions in Pannonia Superior. Simultaneous with this, Pannonia Inferior

seems to have come under the aegis of an equestrian praeses. T. Clementius

Silvius In AD 267, was v(ir) e(gregius) a(gens) v(ice) p&-aesidisP. Petersen

believes he was a procurator acting on behalf of a senatorial legatus pro

praet ore, since he lacked the rank of vir perfectissiinus9 . While

semantically correct, his interpretation misses the point.

Gallienus was using the old procuratorial vicariate as the agent of a

more far-reaching change, just as Severus had used the vexillary command

structure to enable the introduction of praefecti legi on urn. As was the

nature of such reforms, the emperor took whatever was to hand and remoulded

it to suit his own purposes. )ust, as Keyes pointed out, the formula a.v,1.

came to differentiate a ducenariate legionary commander from the lowly

preefectus (castrorum)", so the formula a.v.p. was appropriated to signify an

equestrian officer who had taken over the position of governor5. In the

early years of the change, Gallienus may have simply advanced men from the

procuratorial service into independent positions, in the same way that

I, Comaanders of I! Adiutrix in their probable sequence (with dates, where known) were: e1ianus,

111 . 3529, A1965,9; Marcellinus, 111 . 3424 ILS 545; Frontinus (268AD), 111 . 3525 = ILS 2457

AE,1944,85; Victorinus, 111 . 3426 AE1964,13; Paternianus (283/lAD), III • 3469; Firminus (290AD),

111 . 10406, Aur, Superinus was tpJrtaeJ, leg, I Adi, a, v.1, in 269AD: 111 . 4289 ILS 3656,

2, 111 . 3424 • 115545, cf, also 111 . 10424 & 10492.

3, Petersen, 'Governors in C3' 51 & n,60,

4, Keyes, Equites, 19ff & 36ff,5, Cf. Keyes, 37,

-221-


Severus had advanced the procurator Osrhoenae into the command of I

Farthica1 . It is significant that Silvius has ommitted the term proc(urator)

from his title, when it is to be found in all the Latin examples of

procurat ores vice praesidum provided by Keyes2. As the 'independent

vicariate' gained importance and became more widely accepted, its holders

recieved the rank of viz' perfectissirnus. Eventually, this was all that was

required to differentiate the equestrian office from the senatorial, and the

formula a (gens) v (ice) p (raesidis) was dropped in favour of the more urbane

v (ir) p (e.rfectissimus) p (raeses) p (rovinciaeP.

Returning to the Pannonian evidence, an a.v.p. was also appointed in

Pannonia Superior by Gallienus', but on the semantic grounds above, the v.p.

praeses named in III'15156 cannot have been installed in the lower province

by him. Petersen is playing safe when he dates the man to the early 280ss,

since the term was in use at least a decade earlier. If we are to identify

the man with the L. Flavius Aper who was praepositus vexillationis under

Gallienus s, a date in the 270s would seem equally apposite, especially since

M. Aur. Valentinianus was almost certainly the governor of Parinonia Inferior

at the time of Carinus and Diocletian 7. Valentinianus was a senator. So was

an anonymous praeses pro vinciae of Pannonia Superior sometime in the

1, Cf, above p,216f

2, Keyes, Equites, 5ff,

3, ci', table VM1, There is a definite chronological progression from v.p a, v.p. to v,p,p,p,, as

was noted by Keyes, 37, The term priests seems to have been generic throughout the period,

4, N, Aur, Naximus: 111.4564,

5, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 51 & n65,

6, AE,1936,53,54 & 57, cf, PLREAper 2 & 3 whom I believe to be the same man, He progressed

from v,e, preep, ' (fec et XIII Gei, Gull, in the 260s to v.p. priests Penn, In!, in the 270s, and

finally became PPOof Numerian,

7, 111 . 3418 ILS 3654: v,c, leg, aug, p. pr, (sic,)

-222-


late third century'. These men provide the most tangible, and possibly the

only clear, proof of a reversion to senatorial control in the later third

century2. That this occurred in Pannonia is unsurprising, since it was the

only province containing more than one legion placed under equestrian control

prior to Diocletian 3 . The motive for Gallienus' action needs no deep

investigation. The senatorial guardians of Pannonia had proven both

untrustworthy and incompetent. Pannonia was a key province for the defence

of the Danube and the protection of Italy. It required the competent

military government which experienced equestrians could give it. Therefore,

Gallienus gave it to them.

It is worth reiterating here that Pannonia was the only multi-legion

province to have come under equestrian control until the wholesale reforms

initiated by Diocletlan. According to Campbell, it was the least popular of

the consular provinces because of its military requirements 4. This made it

both the most obvious province to give to viz-i militar'es, and the province

least likely to be missed by senators. Nonetheless, we can see from Victors

that the placing of such a province under equestrian control was offensive

to the senatorial class. Perhaps it was restored to their control by

1, A 1957, 325; A 1959, 204b PLRE aQnonyioiis 55,

2. cf. table VMI, Despite Petersen's arguments to the contrary (50 n,65, & 55), Pannonia does

exhibit a clear reversion from equestrian to senatorial governors, Nacedonia and Dalmatia may also

have reverted, but they depend heavily on the dating of the Anonymous 55 and N, Aur lulius: 11.1938

8565 : ILS 3710, The overall pattern would be least disturbed if the Anon, 55 dated circa 275, but

without corroboration it would be inadvisable to assume this, The circumstances of Arabia are

discussed in the text above; Numidia Is dicussed below p224,

3, cf, table VMI, Germania Superior came under a v.p. praeses in Diocletian's reign: V1•1641

(cf, Petersen, 53); XI1I'5249, Britain had a v.p. praess in 297: AE,1930,114, Since Britain came

under the control of Carausiug In 296, the appointment must have been early in Diocletian's reign,

4, Campbell, bc, cii,

5, Vict, Caes, XXXIII'33-34 & XXXVlI5-7

-223-


Tacitus, though the idea is somewhat fanciful. At any rate, even after

Gallienus, while single-legion provinces were considered fair game for

equestrians 1 the big consular provinces remained sacrosanct.

The situation in Arabia is slightly confused, Before 262, Gallienus

appointed at least one senatorial governor. The praesidium of Vfrius Lupus

is also likely to have been held at this point, and not after 270 as Malcus

believes 1 . Petersen is undoubtedly correct in attributing equestrian status

to the Bassaeus Rufus who governed the province sometime in the 26062,

which establishes a probable, if uncertain, line of continuity for equestrian

officers from 262/3 onwards. So why did Gallierius appoint equestrians here?

Arabia seems to have remained untouched by the depredations of invasion and

civil war in the early 260s. Even the events in Egypt seem not to have

concerned it s . Its legion, III Cyrenaica, had provided vexillations to

garrison Dura Europos, which were presumably destroyed in the seige of 256g.

Perhaps the legion was not brought back up to strength due to manpower

shortages, and it was felt beneath the dignity of a senator to govern the

province. The supposed loyalty of the equestrian class can hardly have been

a consideration, since equestrian officers of Valerian had initiated the

trouble. More personal loyalties may provide an alternative explanation.

1, Coc, Rufinus was 47yqi9v under Sallienus: PLR( Ru/'1nu5 13, Lupus was preetectus un'! 278-80,consul ordinanius 278, pontifex Del Soils post 274 and charged with special judicial missions in theeast, probably under Aurelian, He was therefore pnaees Synlee Coeles sometime before 272, and willhave held his Arabian governorship during the 260s: VI . 31775 ILS 1210; Keyes, Equites, 16f;Gilliam, 'Gov's of Syria', N2 16; but contra cf, Malcus, 'Système administratif', 222,

2, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 48 & n,12, contra FLRE Astur 1, citing 192O,73, who call himBassaeus Astur,

3, Alfãldi, CAM XII, 1731, The Egyptian revolt was put down by a naval expedition under Aurelius

Theodotus,

4, AE,1934,275, 276 & 280; A1937,239; A194O,220 & 240; AE,1948,124,

5, SInce these most likely caused the vexillation In the first place, cf, ch,VI; ('exillationes,6, See above, p.205,

-224-

M.C.Ibeji: 03 Army. Viri Militares

If our chronology is correct 1 , the senator Virius Lupus was Gallienus' chosen

replacement for Coc. Rufinus, who was governor at the time of the Egyptian

revolt. Shortly after, he was moved to Syria Coele, and is the only known

governor of that province for Gallienus. GilUam believes he took up this

post circa 2652, but his praesidium may have started earlier, Is it not

possible that, at the time of the edict, Lupus was moved to Syria where a

trusted senator was needed and was replaced in Arabia by an equally trusted

equestrian?

Numidia presents another problem, and at the same time exposes another

facet of the argument. It has been claimed that the province shifted to

equestrian governors at the very end of Gallienus' reign, and later reverted

to senators. This is based on the identification of a Numidian governor,

Tenagino Probus, with a certain praefectu Aegypti of Claudius II posessing

the same gentiJlcl urn3 . In support, another praeses of the province, an

equestrian called Severthus Aprorilanus, is Linked to Probus through a man

who occurs in both their inscriptions4. Petersen disputes this claim on the

grounds that the governorship of Numidia ranked above that of Egypt at the

times . Yet the evidence he cites can only prove that this was the case from

278 onwards. He is on firmer ground placing Apronianus in the last quarter

of the century due to the terminology used, and is certainly Justified in

arguing that the existence of a man common to both inscriptions does not

1, See above, n, 1,

2, Gilliam, 'Gov's of Syria', N9 16,

3, VlII . 2571 + 18057; E,l936,58; E1941,33; 4E1934,257; Stein, 'Tenagino Probus', Kilo 29

(1936), 237ff; Halcus, 'Système administratif', 222,

4, Severinus Apronianus, YIII'2661 • ILS 5788, linked by Domitius Secundinus to E, 1936, 58,

5, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 54f,

—225-

M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. yin Militares

automatically date them to a similar period 1 . At best, we can date

Aprorilanus to any point following 268, and we simply cannot be certain

whether Probus was an equestrian or a senator.

If he was an equestrian, we have a similar situation to that in Arabia,

but with a different emphasis. Unlike Arabia, the African limes was not at

peace. It had been troubled by Berber tribesmen since the early 250s.

Around 258 the situation became so serious that Gallienus despatched a dux

per Afri cam Numidiam Mauretaniamque to oversee the defence of the

provinces2 . The measure seems to have worked in part, since at some point

after 260 III Augusta had reverted to the control of the provincial legate,

though this man may also have been entrusted with a military portfo1io (in

itself an indication that Gallienus was not averse to placing competent

senators in military positions). We know that once some measure of peace

had been restored in Africa, Gallienus stationed detachments of III Augusta

in Greece'. Tenagino Probus took over near the end of the reign. Could it

be that, like Arabia, once its legion was vexillated Numidia was no longer

thought worthy of senatorial dignity? In that case, we would expect it to

revert to senatorial control when the legion was returned to full strength.

The first such opportunity came after the successful campaigns of Aurelian,

when he could proclaim himself restitutor orbiss, and indeed the next

senatorial governor is attested at this time6 . If the Historia Augusta is to

1, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 55,

2, Pflaum, Carr, Proc. II, 374bis, 905ff; YIII21000 q 1954,136: VIII . 12296 = IL$2774,

3, 41917/18,52; VIII • 2797 ILS 2413 which calls him coies et leg, iig, p,, pr,

4, QE,1934,193; cf, ch,VI: Vexi!lationes p145,5, Hunter coil, QureJian, 8, 100,108,111,112/3,114 ' RICY • 1, Aurellin, 53,288,369,386,6, L, Ovinius Pudens Capella Malcus, 'Système administratif', 222 & n,7; PLRECapeIla,

-226-


be believed, another dux .Zimitis Africani was appointed along with hi.ni1

The position of duces in this new order is a highly important

consideration. The thesis so far has been that, as senators abdicated their

military responsibilities, the emperor was forced to look to the equestrian

order for experienced people to replace them, In militarily delicate

provinces, competent equestrian officers were placed in command arid remained

there until the crisis was over. Elsewhere, the emperor was happy to retain

the status quc and even took account of senatorial sensibilities as long as

the security of the empire was not at stake. Yet the first priority was

always the army. So long as the commander in the area was a capable

officer, the emperor was unconcerned whether he was an equestrian or a

senator and had little stake in which class actually governed the province.

The ideal way to test this theory would be to review the early careers of

every governor concerned, but in this we are frustrated by the evidence, All

equestrians for whom some record survives had military experience, as did

some, but not all senators2 . A quick review of the known dates of

changeover for the provinces provides some general confirmation for the

thesis3 , Yet large areas of the empire were governed by senators despite

military pressures, and all the major provinces, with the exception of

Pannonia discussed above, remained under senatorial control.

If these areas were controlled by duces, then the thesis remains sound,

for the duces will have had overall military control: not In the formally

1, SHA Fin, et a!, 111 . 1, uncorroboraied,

2, Equestrian5: I6RR III1287; 111 . 90;, AE,1900,169: AE,1936,53,54 & 57; 111 . 9860; Ex, Va!, I•2;

VI'1641, Senators: X • 1705: VII95; AE,1957,325; AE,1959,204b, cf, table VN 1,

3, cf, table VII £, and text below,

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M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri Militares

delineated terms of Diocletian, but in more ad hoc, localised measures

tailored to parochial circumstance. We have already seen this in effect for

Numidia under Gallienus, where a dux per .Africara Numidiam Mauretaniamque

dealt with Berber incursions and afterwards handed over military control to

the provincial legate 1 . It will now be necessary to review the rest of the

empire in search of similar circumstances.

By the last quarter of the third century, the eastern provinces had

already undergone major sea changes. Mesopotamia had been established as an

equestrian province from its inception; its circumstances and those of Arabia

have been previously discussed2. In Asia Minor, Cilicia was equestrianised

by Gallienus, while the dual provinces of Pontus et Bithynia and Lycia et

Pamphylia were changed by Probus once his attention was drawn to them in

278. Each conversion, even that of Arabia, was internally consistent with

the priorities of security. Mesopotamia was the new frontline province with

Persia; Arabia's governor, and troops, were transferring to Syria; and the

Asia Minor provinces, though they had no legions, covered the main

thoroughfares over the Taurus mountains and across the Hellespont. In

addition, Lycia et Pamphylia had been the battleground over which Probus had

fought the Isaurian brigands 3. On the other hand Syria, the most important

and prestigious of the eastern provinces, remained a firm senatorial

preserve, even after its reorganisation by Septimius Severus4, since the dux

ripae at Dura-Europos seems to have held a position subordinate to the

1. See above, p.226,

2, See above, pp.217 & 224ff,

3, S/iA Prob, XVI4; Zos, 1.69-70,

3, Keyes, Eqiiites, 14; Petersen, 'Gov'5 in C3', 49 & n,30; AE,1900,128 = .IGRR iii434QE 1915, 53,

4, Syria Phoenice: Petersen, 48 & nn,18 & 19, Syria Coele: Gilliam, 'Gov's of Syria', 176ff,

5, Gilliam, 'The dux ripas at Dura', Roan Any Papers, 23ff.—228-


governor, However, the situation was altered radically in the late 250s by

the destruction of Dura and the rise of Palmyra. Here is where the military

control lay. Odaeriathus of Palmyra had been feted by Valerian following his

rejection by the Persian king, and remained loyal to the former's son during

the revolt of the Macriani 1 . In 261 he assumed military authority in the

east under the auspices of Gallienus, who had little choice but to exploit

his implacable hostility towards Shapor2. The titles Alföldi credits him

with are merely literary devices, though he is UJcely to have been styled

corrector totius Orlentis in the same manner as his son, Vaballathus

Athenodorus, and may have been dux Romanorum since Vaballathus is hailed

with the Greek equivalent3 . For ten years Palmyra lorded over the eastern

provinces, even breaking with Rome after Odaenathus' death, until its defeat

by Aurelian4 . Aurelian originally made little change to the military

situation, placing control into the hands of the praefectus Mesopotamiae,

with a similar title to that of the Palmyrene klngss . He may have scrapped

this arrangement after the sacking of Palmyra, though the loyalty of his man

was never in questions . At any rate, military responsibility seems to have

reverted to the governor of Syria, if not at the end of Aurelian's reign, at

least sometime during that of Probus, While the Historia Augusta must be

overstating when it attributes the ilinitis Oriental.is ducatum to Julius

Saturninus, the man was the governor of Syria and is called inagister

I, CISea, II'3945 ' IGRRIIII031; S//A Gall, 111 . 1-2; S//A Trig, Tyr, XIV • 1, XV'4, & XVIII'l,

2, Alföldl, CAM XII, 174ff; Zos, I'39; S//A Yal, IY . 2-4, Gall, X . 1-8, Trig, Tyr. XY . 2-4 & XXX.6,

3, Alföldl, 175; CiSea, 11 . 3971; B6'1II•946,

4, Alfôldl, 302ff: Zos, 1 . 50-56; Zon, XII • 27; S//A Aur, XXV'2-3, Trig, Ty,', IXX . 2-3; Jer, Chico,

s.c. 273; Syncellus p.721,

5, His title was rector Orienti Zos, I'60'1,

6, Marcellinus stalled the Palmyrenes while warning the e.peror of their revolt: Zos,I'60,

-229-


exercitus or its equivalent in several independent sources 1 . If, as Jones

and Martindale believe, the man was identical to the lulius Saturninus

Fortunatianus who was leg. Aug. pr. pr. of Numidia under Gallienus, his

military competence is unquestioned2.

Illyricuni remained unchanged throughout the century, Moesla staying

under senatorial legati. Da].matia, on the other hand, switched to equestrians

after the death of Aurelian, since Petersen makes a convincing case for

dating the senator M. Aur. lullus prior to 277. Macedonia had an equestrian

governor in 276g . Keyes has shown that Dada remained technically under

senatorial control 1 but was governed largely by imperial procurators5 . This

may have been for similar reasons to those posited for Arabia and Numidia,

with heavily vexillated legions. The anonymous senator believed to have

governed Pannonia Superior, Dalmatia and Macedonia simultaneously is most

likely to have done so around 27415 6 , since the pattern of government is

least disturbed by fitting him here. Why he was given such a widespread

command is unclear. He had some military experience, so the appointment

might be viewed as a form of ducatus. illyricum received personal attention

from the emperor under Gallienus, Claudius and possibly Probus 7 . When the

emperor was elsewhere, a series of eminent duces were deputed to take his

place. Aureolus is said to have commanded an army in Illyricum during the

early 26Os. Marcianus pursued the war in the emperor's name late in 268,

1, SHA Fire eta!, VII . 2; 205, 1 . 66; Jer, Chron, s,a,281; Jord, Roe, p.293; Syncellus p.723,

2, PLRE $etiirnimis 12 & Fortunatianus 6,

3, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 50,

4, AE,1900,169,

5, Keyes, Equites, 101,

6, A 1957, 325; dQE 1959, 204b PLRE Anoflylou5 55,

7, Gallienus, Zos, 1'39'I & 40 • i; fi/M Gail, XII1 . 9; Claudius, Zos, I'43'2 & 45 Zon, XII . 26; S/IA

Claud, vi-Xi; Probus, XII178; Zos, 1.68.2.

8, $114 Gail, III'3 & V . 6, Trig, T,vr, XI'!,-230-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Viri Militares

until he was relieved by Claudiu&. Diocletian was 5ou Muuia'c, probably

under Probus2. No duces were to be found in Illyricum under Aurelian, which

is hardly surprising, since the area remained uncharacteristically quiet

during his reign. This must be a direct consequence of the abandonment of

Dada and the relocation of its remaining troops around Serdica, The

measure so strengthened the Illyrian border that trouble was reduced to

sporadic raids and Aurelian was able to carry the war across the Danube to

the Gothic tribes. Under Gallienus, an Aur. Augustianus was dux lustissimus

charged with guarding the passes into Macedonia 5 . His brief will have

extended into northern Greece as a matter of course, and may have included

preemptive maneouvres into Illyricum. In Achaea itself, a certain

Pan)athenaeus was hegemon under the same emperor, with the task of

fortifying endangered cities 5. Such circumspection was vindicated during the

great naval raid of the Goths in 268/9w. Claudlus campaigned here until his

death5, and the measures of Aurelian in Illyricum seem to have made Greece

secure. The entire area was therefore under imperial control, or that of the

emperor's personal agents, for most of the century's third quarter. Only

once the military crisis had abated were the provincial governors left to

their own devices, and this is approximately the point at which equestrian

praesides were first attested.

1, l965,1l4; Zos, I . 40'l $1/A 6a11, VI . 1 & XIII'lO, Claud, VI . l & XVIII'l,

2, Zon, XII.31,

3, Alföldi, CA/I XII I 1521 & 301; SMQ Au,', XXXIX . 7; Malalas XII, 301: Eutrop, IX'IS,4, Alfôldi, 152; S/IA Aur, XX11'1-2; Orosius VII • 23'4; Eutrop, IX'13'1: Jord, Roe, 290; Aiim, Marc,

XXXI'5.17,5, A11934,193, Cf, ch,VI: Vexillationes, p.145 n,3 for the reasoning behind this,6, SHA 6aII, XIII'6 Zon, XII'26 19111 ed, mm, 5201,7,Zos, 1'43'2 & 46'l,8,Zos, 1.45-46.

—231-


With the possible exception of the anonymous senator mentioned above,

Pannonla was devoid of duces throughout the period. Gallienus set out to

make a thorough settlement of the province's security. Not only did he

'equestrianise' the province, he garrisoned it with vexillations from Britain,

Germany, Dada and Moesla 1 . At the start of his reign, he also came to a

defensive agreement with a chieftain of the Marcomanni 2. His measures were

so effective that apart from an Invasion of Vandals which was summarily

crushed by Aurelian3 , the province was not troubled by serious barbarian

incursions for the rest of the century, though Diocletian may have been

forced to take some preemptive action early in his reign4.

It is difficult to determine when Raetia and Noricum were returned to

equestrian governors, as none of the important inscriptions is securely

dated. The form and content of the known equestrian praesides of Noricurn

suggest a date under Gallienus or his immediate successors 5 . The opposite

is true for the governors of Raetia, whom Petersen must be correct in dating

to the later third century 6 . These provinces were avenues for Alemannic

incursions which penetrated south into Italy, so their defence was a matter

of priority to most emperors7 . Gallienus placed Aureolus in Cisalpina with

jurisdiction over northern Italy and Raetia, specifically to defend the Alpine

passes5 . The pretender, Bonosus, was also dux limitis Retici under either

1, Alfoldi, CAMXII, 214; AE,1935,164; 111.3228,

2. De Blois, Policy of 6allienus 4 & 34; Vict, Cat's, XXXI1I6, Epit, XXX1II1; cf, IX:

Foederati,

3, Dexlppus frag,6 & 7; Zos, I'48; Petr, Pat,, P1/6' IV 188,

4, Alfôldi, CAM XII, 327 & 328,

5, A1955,119; Petersen, 'Bo y 's in C3', 51 & n,69 who disagrees,

6, Petersen, 52.

7, Zos, 1 . 38 . 1 & 481; 51/4 Au,", XVIII, Prob, XVI • t; Alföldi, 299f

8, Vict, Cat's, XXXiii . i7; cf, also Zos, 1 . 40 . 1; Sf14 Gall, IV . 6 & VII . 1, Irig, Tyr, XI•3,

—232-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Viri. Militares

Aurelian or Probus1.

Gaul, Germany and Britain fell out of imperial control for a large

portion of the later third century 1 and their defence under the Gallic Empire

Is a matter for debate elsewhere. Once they had returned to the imperial

fold, they seem to have remained under senatorial control at least until the

280s. Only Germanla Superior has attested equestrian governors, and these

both date to Dioclet Ian2. According to Alföldi, Aurelian left Probus in Gaul

after the surrender of Tetricus, and only moved him when an emergency in

Egypt required hi8 able attention 3. Probus himself was campaigning against

the Germans from 277-8 g. He may have left Bonosus in charge of more than

just the Rhine fleet, for when the man went into revolt, he was only

defeated after a difficult struggle 6 . At any rate, the emperor's German

campaigns had cowed the Transrhenian tribes to such an extent that they

were paying tribute to the Roman Empire6. There was therefore little need

for militarily experienced governors In the short term.

Spain was also part of the Gallic Empire. It was permanently

'equestrianised' by Diocletian, though the only known governor of Beetica was

a v.p.a.v.p. under Florianus and Probus7.

It would seem that the material above upholds the thesis. Where

senators retained control of key frontier provinces, military responsibility

I, S/IA Fin, etal, XIV'2,

2, VI . 1641, ci, Petersen, 'Gov's in C3', 53; XI1I'5249,

3, Alföldi, CAHXII I 316,

4, Zos, 167-68; S/IA Frob, X11I.5-XIV,

5, S/IA Fir., et a!, XY . 1-2; Vict, Cees, XXXVII'3,

6, Alfãldi. 315,

7, Spain1 11 . 4104; Baetica, 11 . 1115 & 1116,

-233-

M.C.Ibeji; C3 Army. Viri Militares

lay in the hands of the emperor or his representatives. This is perfectly

Illustrated in Raetia, where equestrian governors reappeared only once duces

were no longer attested, but in general the situation holds true throughout

the empire. Of particular Interest are those few senators, such as

Fortunatlanus/Saturninus and the Anonymous 55, who were left to their own

devices In militarily delicate provinces. They Indicate categorically that

the emperor was quite prepared to entrust the empire's security to senators,

as long as they had a record of military competence. Malcus must be

correct. Senators were not debarred from military service, they simply lost

interest. In the face of such apathy, Gallienus had only one real choice. He

opened the door to the men capable of defending the empire, and gave

senatorial posts to the yin milit ares. For this he was vilified by the very

class which had let down both empire and emperor in their hour of need. Yet

the history of Pannonia, the achievements of Odaenathus, and the survival of

the empire prove that in his actions he was justified.

-234-

CIbei: C3 Army

Yin militares

TABLE VM 1: PrQ,1ri1 Gcr-

The following lists the changes in provincial governors from the reign ofPhilip till that of Diocletian. Philip provides the starting point sincehe is in several cases the last named emperor to whom a senatorialgovernor can be attested. Governors of uncertain date are inserted inthe most likely position in the sequence where possible, otherwise theyare placed at the end of the sequence. In both cases, they areitalicised. The list follows those given by Keyes, Petersen, Malcus andGilliam. Where information was not forthcoming from those sources, theappropriate secondary source is given. Governors are given by the Romanversion of their name, where this is translated from the Greek, the nameis placed in triangular brackets. The provincial order established byKeyes and Petersen is maintained..

KEYi S - senator, E - equestrian, K = Keyes, P = Petersen, M = Malcus,VM = discussed in this chapter, RUFINUS 13 = PLRE ref.

Arbi: 1 legIon; largely peaceful. Bordered Egypt and ward ofPalmyra 260-272, cf. VM 224f

SOCIAL MILITARY

PERIOD GOVERNOR U1LE LEI. EIPERIENCE REERENCES

253/260 Ad, Aur, Theon leg, Aug. pr, pr, S unknown 111.89,90; k8 P487

Gallienus <Coc, Rufinus>

pnaeses

C, C 1eV S unknown RUFINUS 13

pie 262' Virius Lupus praises $ none fisted P5 .31115 ILS 1210,' VH225

Are a 15ff; P48 M222

262 <lunlus Olympus) sos 6u(__)pocasos E unknown IGRR 111 . 1286; K9; P488

ycpovoç

263 <Statillue Ammianus> 6tciovsoç SnV C)iOii.v E prief, alae IGRR III'1287 111190; K9

P48'1

Gallienus Bassaeus Rufus

praeses E unknown

AE,1920,73; P4812

274 ?(11, Aelianus)'

JJsioijporro (AT% rY £ Unknown

A 1522, 130 & /33; AE

,h'iiov, top I, ., /953, 234/ P48 ''AAVh' 134 6 AEL JANUS 12

278 <Mar/Aur, Petrus>

soc btaa(__] cp, E unknown

IGRR III1324: CIG 4649;

K9: P48'4

post 262 (fuJius Ileraclitus) role 6, E unknown

HERA CLJTUS

Syr-i Cc1; 2 Legions; main target of Persian invasions.Ward of Palmyra. This list follows that given by Gilliam, 176ff. It isincluded as an example of a militarily active major province.Philip? U, Simonius Proculu5 (leg, Aug.) S unknown VI.1520 ILS 1189

lul ianus

-235-

N,CIbeji: C3 Army Yin militare5

(SYRIA COELE CTD)

PERIOD GOVERNOR IB,.Philip <Flavius Antiochus> vp(ca) t, !c,

Decius Atilius Cosuinus y,c, tunc cos,

c,265! Vi,igis Lupus

praes,

275-276 Maximinum

c,278 lulius Saturninus

290 Charisius

plalies

SOCIAL MILITARY

EIPERIENCE

REFERENCES

S unknown

F, Dura 38 ' mv. D,P,27

S unknown P, Dura 97 = mv, D,P,3

S none listed ci, Arabia above,

79 unknown Zos, I'63; Zon, 111.28

S legate III Aug,Zos, I • 66: ci, Numidia

below; SATURNINUS 12;

VM2291

7 unknown Cod, lust, 11.41.9

11.55.1

298 ?Prisosius

pi'aeses

7 unknown 'od, lust, Wl'33'6

Syr— i PhQr1ic: 1 legion; threatened by Persia. Ward ofPalmyra. Earliest equestrian governors known under Diocletian, P48a..

Ci1icL; No legions; main access from east into Asia Minor.Ward of Palmyra.Gallienus <A, Voconius Zeno> ótu powoç ycpav E unknown AE,1915,51; P4922

LdVi t PmpI-iy1±: No legions; threatened by Gothicfleets; Probus campaigned here vs Isauran brigands, cf. VM228.

flrobiis' (Terentius Marcianus) 3 uituorroç 4ycpav E unknown ,2E, /900, 128I6RR IIl131;AE, /915, 5.Z P192'

Pcritt t Bvthirki: No legions; covered access to theHellespont from Asia Minor; threatened by Gothic fleets.

269 <Velleiui Macrinus> rpcaa, xs v apauoo S unknown I6RR 111 . 39, 40:CIG 3747 &

w Z€, 3748; K14; P4929

Aurelian ISilvanus ?( xopç) 79 unknown SILVANUS 1

279 Ad, Casinus Atianus v.p. pr, pr, E unknown K14 P493°

Mdcrii: No legions; threatened by Goths.271/5' Anon, 55, praes, provr, $ ?trib, Ia tic, AE, /957, 825; if, 1959,20db

leg. 17.1 Vict, ANON. 55; ('ff230

276 <Aur, Valentinus> bIcIov%u u cpq qç E trib, AE, 1900, 169; P49

ycpovtaç Batavorum

-236-

CIbeJ1 C3 Army

Yin •ilitare5

Mc:L Irifricr; 2 legions; Lower Danube limes.SOCIAL MILITARY

PERIOD GOVERNOR t.I1L. L1 EIPERIENCE REFERENCES

Aurelian (M, Aur, Sebastianus> T]a(c]vovk)o(ç iç] S unknown IGRR 1 . 591; K12; P56

Tap( x€tU c ] wv s(p]-

Aurellan Anon, 114 leg, Aug. pr, pr, S unknown III14460; K12; P5039

272 Anon, 113 praesem pnov, ? unknown III'1586 P4938

late C3 (Cl, An, Nataliarnis) rpc8, IcP, vrsiT rp, $ unknown ISRR I'582; K12/ P50'°

Dci: 2 legions; Transdanubian province. Most numerous instancesof procuratores vices praesidis prior to senatorial/equestrian transition(K10). Progressively abandoned by Gallienus and Aurelian.23$ 25 Siconiws lulianwi v, c, preeses $ unknown IIIl513; K/a; P50"

D1mti: No legions; hinterland province behind Pannonia andM esia.

247 Cl, Herennianus v,c, leg, Augg, pr, pr, S unknown III10174; P5047

271 5' Anon, 55, prues, provr, $ Ytrib, latic, ,W, /551,325; AE, /959,2011'

277 Aur, Marcianus

280 M, Aur, Tibenlanus

282-284 Flavius Valenlus

Constantius

late C3 N, Aur, Julius

leg, I') i/ic t, ANON, 55,' VM2SO

v.p. praeses prov, E unknown III'8707 Ku; P50'

V.P. praeses prov, E unknown 111.1805 : ILS 5695:Ku; P5049

(,p3p,p, E protector & III'9860; Ex, Va!, 1.2;tribune K11 P505°

praesidi pro v, $ unknown III 1938-8565 : ILS 37101P50

P r i—i r i I ri f r- i r-: 2 legions; Middle Danube 1 .imes, c f.VM 220ff & 232

252 P. Cosinue Felix leg, pr, pr, S unknown P5059

6allienusP L, Flavius Aper v.p. praeses £ praep, vexx, III. 15!56;AE, 1936,53, 51 aV Mac, J XIII & 571 APEP 2 a 3 i; contra

PSI55

267 1, Clementius Silvius v,e, a,v,p, E unknown

c,283 M, Aur, Valentinianus v,c, leg, Aug. p. pr , S unknown

111.3424 = ILS 545, cf,111 . 10424 & 10492; K14;P516°

111 . 3418 = uS 3654; K14;PS'"

-237-

C,IbeJi: C3 Army

Yin militares

P r rr r. i S i p r- i r-: 2 legions; Middle Danube limes, cf.VM 220ff & 232. Eastern barbarian access into Italy.

SOCIAL MILITARY

PERIQO GOVERNOR fILE. QII1 EXPERIENCE REFERENCES

260 Ingenuus S unknown Vict, Caei, XXXIII S//A

Trig, Tyr, IX' I

Gallienus M, Aur, Maximum a,v,p,

E unknown III'4564 K14; P5167

271/5! Anon, 55, praes, provv, S Ytrib, la tic, At, /551, 325 At, /959, 20dbleg, 11) Vict, ANON, 55,' I/M230

Ncr'i_1m: 1 legion; Upper Danube limes. Northern barbarianaccess into Italy. Threatened by Gallic Empire.pne. 260 C, Macninum Declanus leg, Aug. pr, pr, S unknown VIII'2615; P5168

aid/late C3 (N,) Qur, ,,,,flu, v.p. i, V.P E unknown At, /955,119,' ,, , ,LIUS

late C3 Ad, Restutus v.p. agens vices E unknown fl5/69

praesidis

Rti; 1 legion; as Noricum. Main barbarian access into Italy.late C3 Valerius Venustus V,p,,O,p, E unknown 1I1'5862; P52

late C3 Traianus Mucianus' v.p,p,p, £ ,'protector, I1l5185;praep, vexx ci, ILS 9175/ also thispraei, legg, thesis a,00-Mucianus

late ca early Ci Anon, .92 V.p,p,p, £ unknown 111.1137012

290 Septimius Yalentio v,p,p,p, E unknown 111.5810 : ILS 618; P5273

Grmrii Stiprir-: 2 legions; suffered from barbarianincursions. Part of Gallic Empire.

Philip (Q, Caec, Pudensi? legatus pro praetore S unknown XIII.6562; P528°

c,260 anonymous praeses prov, ? unknown XIII'5203; P528'

pre, Dioc, P anonyaous fpraeses proviinciae £ Ppraef, alae PI'1511,' K/i,'6er.aniae Superioris v.p. contra P53

Diocletian Aurelius Proculus v.p. praeses E unknown XIII • 5249; ku 21 ; P5283

G r- m r i I ri f r i r: 2 legions; as Germania Superior.No known equestrian governors.

B1.ic: No legions; as Germanise.pre aid Ca Priscus leg, Aug. pr, pr, $ trib, liii, I I' 1705/ P53'°2(see be/ow)

-238-

CIbei1: C3 Army

Viri militares

(BELGICA CTD)

SOCIAL MILITARY

PERIOD GOVERNOR

Li EXPERIENCE

REFERENCES

pe aid C3 anonyaous

iJeg, Augt,,, $

XI1'5991; P53'°2(see abv)

ritrrii; 3 legions (split by Seven). Part of GallicEmpire.

253/260 Des Sicius hthai v, c, lega tus Aug. pr, pr, S unknown WI' 101,' t'9' P54?O4

262/266 Cc ta viws Sabir,is v, c, praeses n, $ unknown YI1.221:RIB I'605-IL 52519

C, 211? T, P1ev/us Postuaius v, c, leg, $ lega tus (prov, P11. 55; KS,' P51Virus or legion?)

late C3 (/li&rocles Perpetuus praeses S unknown PI'/223

c,297 Aur, Arpagius v.p. prieses E unknown AE11930,114; p54106

H i. p ri i T r r i : 1 leg ion. Part of Ga 111 cEmpire.

259 lAemiltanus ?praeses 75 unknown AEMILIANUS I

279-280 (Allius Maximus) (vic, leg, lur,) S II•3738; K12; p54108

(subordinates to provincial legate)

282 (,,,lus Flaminius (v,c, tur,) S AE,I923,102 & 103; p54108

Pr i scus)

283 M, Aurelius p,p, leg, Aug. pr, pr. S unknown II'4102 ILS 599;

Yalentinianus II41O3; KU; P54

Diocletian lulius Yalens & v,perf, praes, prov, E unknown II4lO4: P5L'°

Postumui Lupercum VALEMS 11 & LUPERCUS 2

Btic: No legions. As Hispania.276 Aurelius lulius v.p. a,v,p. E unknown 11.1115 & 1116; K9' 6 P54

Ni..im1di: 1 legion; tribal incursions, crisis c.258, VM 225fc,260 C, Macrinius Decianus v,c, leg, Augg, pr, pr, S unknown VIIl.2615; K13

Gallienus C, lulius leg, Aug. pr, pr, prov, S unknown AE,l917/18,52;

Sallustius Saturninus Numidiae et leg. III Aug, VIII'2797 = ILS 2413

Fortunatianus 6a11,/ comes et leg, Aug. M228

pr, pr,

268/9 Tenagino Probus r] prov, Nu(midiae 7 unknown VIII'2571 4 18051 M222

Aurelian L, Ovinius Pudens leg, Aug. pr. pr, c,v, S unknown

Capella

-239-

AE, 1936,58; AE,1941,33:

p54 f

M222 7 ; CAPELLA

SOCIAL ILITARY

EXPERIENCE

E unknown

S unknown

E unknown

S unknown

REFERENCES

VII12661 = ILS 5799; P53

P1If'2573, 2574', 2575/

AS, 1503,213; g/3; p55729

VIII '2529 2530, 2643, 4221

4578,7007; K13; p55128

Al, 1509, 210/ K13; P55'3°

MC Ibeji: C3 Aray

Viri militares

(NUNIDIA CTD)

PERIOD GOVERNOR LL1L.

po5t 268 $Everinu5 Api'onhanus v,p,p,p,

post Probus ur, Dioge'ne5 Y.pp,

283-284 N, Aureliui Deciaus v,pp,p,

late C3 Flavius eiius p. v, praesidi prov,Vic torirnis

-240-

II Adiutrix Aur, Frontinus

II Adiutrix Ad, Pate nianus

II Adiutrix Aur, Firiinus

praef. leg, sc, II Adiutricis

Claudianae

praef, leg, II Adiut, a,v,l,

pref, (sic) leg, 11 A(diJ cx

protec tore

Tb1 VM 2:Pr— fct1 Lirizm

(FROM GALLIENUS TO DIOCLETIAN)

LEGION COMMANDER LIILE.

I Adiutrix Aur, Superinus [p]r[ae]f, leg, I Adi, a,v,l,

II Adlutrix P. Ad, Aelianus praef, leg, II Adiut, protector

Gallieni Aug. n, a,v,l,

II Adlutrix Clementius Valerlus praef, leg, prot, Rug, n, a,v,l,

Marcel linus

II Adiutrix T. Flavius 'ictorinui praefetctwsl leg, 1! ild,

Q.hI REFERENCES

269 II1'4289 = ILS 3656

Gallienus III'3529 AE1196519

Gallienus II13424 ILS 545

PGaIlJenu5/ 45 1961, /3: 111.3126,'Claudius ci', Nagy, Act, Arch,

Hung,, 1W! (/965)

268 AE,1944,85 = 111 . 3525 =

ILS 2457

Carinus 111.3469

290 111.10406

III! Ge ma N, Aur, Yeteranus

praef, leg, XIII 8, Gailmenus III'l560 = ILS 3845

Gallenian, (sic)

III Augusta N, Aur, Fortunatus praef, leg, III Rug, Rurelianae Aurelian VIII'2665 = ILS 584

III Augusta Clodiws Honoratus prief, leg, III Aug. 286/293 VI1! .2572 : ILS £S6

IV F/avis aQur, Maxiaianws ,x prae!, leg, elusdea 286/293 111 . 1616 : ILS 2292

I flmnervia Aur, S,,,,us pr(aef) leg, I Mi, 295 XII1'8019

Pa tiuca? Traianu5 ifucianus r,1pov Aqiavoç ,,,,, rJ,avnr late CS I6RR J•1196h Hcrofrortrpsa = AE, /908,259

III! 6eaina saic tan hd-ftxov Icy, lyl late CS = ILS 917168R2 1570

II Trajana sate tan trqov .IJq, fi T#'tsn late CS = Rang,, 185ff,

—24 1-

4urefjaing ililil, Or/entaIls Eastern limes 7 SHA Firm, et al, W!'2;oucatu, deo'it, .Ter, Cron, 2297; lord,ifagister Exercitu5 Roe, 293/ Syncelius 273

Illyriclanos exercitus regens Illyricu. 5Y14 6a11, 111 . 3 & V•6.Trig, Tyr, X1.1,

êov xa ipuii}.siqç Illyricum AE,1965,114; Zos,1'40'I

(& Macedonia) $114 OaiI,V1'l & X1II'lOClaud, VI'l & XVIII.1,

Ioc( Mwstç Moesia ion, I1I•31,

dux iustissimus

C

Macedonia

(. Hoes/a7)

Achaea

AE. 1934. 193

Zon, XII26; 5/14 GaIl,XI1I6; 16 III ed, mm.

5201,

T b 1 VM 3: D ti c(FROM GALLIENUS TO THE ACCESSION OF DIOCLETIAN)

SPHERE OF

rIII.E. INFLUENCE REFERENCES

c,260-261 Sepiiaius Odaenathus (<Corrector Totius Orientis>) Eastern flies Zos, 1.39.1;Sync, $HB p,382(B)

267-272 Vaballathus (Corrector Toiius Orlentis> Eastern flies CiSem, II3971;

Athenodorus epoç'Pwiat.v BGU 111.946

272 Narcellinus (Rector Orientis> Eastern flies Zos. 1.60.1

Aiirelian IIIJJQS Sat W'/7lflUI

Gallienus Aureolus

Gallienus Marcianus

& Claudius

?pp C, 4w', Vii,

Diocletianus

Gallie us Aur, Augustianus

Gallienus (Pan Athenaeus

Gallimnus Aureolus

Probus Bonosus

258/9 N, Cassianius

Latinius Postumus

c,258 N, Cornelius

Octavianus

Aurelian Firmus

cu. per Reetias legionibus

Cisalpina &

praesset

Raetia

Dux limitis Retici Raetia

Transrhenani limitis dux ci Gallia &

Galliae praeses, Gereania ?

v KcXoç pue.v

('Iflh,orcp'ucyoc

barbaris per Ga/lie. prees-ideba t,

dud per Africam Numidiam African 111e5

Mauretaniamque

Dux limitis Africani ideeque African flies

proconsule

—242--

Yict, Cacs, XXXI1I'7;cf, Zos, 1'40'1 & $114

Gall, IV'6 & YII.I,Trig, Tyr, XI'3,

$114 Fin et a], IV•2,

$114 Trig, Tyr, Ill '9:Zos, I'38'2

Vict, Caes, XX1II1'8;

ci, a.150 ion, 1II'24,

Pflaum Cern, Proc, II347bis, 905ff:

V1II'210O0AE, 1954. 136

cf,VIII . 12296: ILS 2774

$114 Pint et ii, 111.1,

Tb1 VM 4: Sirzy R9et11t

Below are the results extrapolated from the preceding tables. They illustratethe general circumstances of each province examined during the century. Aprovince is classed as a frontier province if it was on a limes, and ahinterland province if it was not, but was In a troubled area. Otherwise, it isclassed as peaceful. All governors in Table VM 1 have been included, arid thedate of transition from senatorial to equestrian government is calculated fromthe first equestrian praeses given there, Where an equestrian praefectus isknown for the provincial legion(s), the date of first appearance has been given.

GOVERNORS DATE OF DATE OF

PROVINCE SEN. EQ. Z. IBA1 SECURITY ILEGIONS LEANS. KNOWN DUCES

ARABIA 3 6 - c.262 Hinterid I PaI.yra (260-272); Narcellinus (272)

SYRIA COELE 6 - 2 - Frontier 2 1 Palayra (260-272); Marcellinus (272)

?Saturninus (Aurelian)

CILICIA - 1 - GallienusHinterid 0 - Palmyra (260-272); Narcellinus (272)

LYCIA El PAMPHYLIA - 1 - ?Probus Hinterid

PONTUS El BYTHINIA 2 1 - 279 Hinterld

MACEDONIA 1 1 - 276 Hinterid

NOESIA INFERIOR 3 - 1 - Frontier

DALNATIA 3 3 - 277 Hinterid

PANNONIA INFERIOR 2 2 - Gallienus Frontier

only

PAWNONIA SUPERIOR 2 1 - Gallienus Frontier

only

NORICUM 1 2 - late C3 Frontier

RAETIA - 4 - late C3 Frontier

GERNANIA SUPERIOR I 2 I late C3 Frontier

BEL6ICA 2 - - - Hinterid

BRITANNIA 4 1 - c,297 Frontier

HISPANIA 4 1 - Oioclet'n Peaceful

BAETICA - 1 - 276 Peaceful

NUNIDIA 3 4 1 ?post Frontier

Aurelian

0 -

0 -

o - Augustianus (Gall); Marcianus (268/9)

2 1 Aureolus & ?Augustianus (Gall,);

Marc ianus (268/9); Diocletian (Prob)

o - Aureolus (Gall,)

2 IAd,269

II Ad, Gall,

2 1

I ?Aureolus (Gall,)

I Aureolus (Gall,); Bonosus (Probus)

2

1 Gallic Empire

0

- Gallic Empire

3

I Sallic Empire

I Gallic Empire

0

- Gallic Empire

Aurelian Octavianus (c,258)

Firaus (Aurelian)

-243-

XI: .P.rt ct

Among the various puzzles of the third century, one of the most

intriguing is the growth and evolution of the title Protector. A great deal

of effort has gone into its interpretation, much of which has been obscured

or distorted by a failure to recognise the dynamic nature of the institution

it represented. )ullian believed the prot ect ores to be an imperial guard,

possibly replacing the Equites Singulares'. He was followed In essence, by

Mommsen; though the latter did make a distinction between the early

protectorate and its later counterparts2. A similar distijcti.on was made by

Babut, who, like Domaszewskl, believed that the the protectores had replaced

the centurlonate in the later imperial army3: Domaszewski even went so far

as to claim it formed a collegium with a Princepa Protectorum at its head.

Cooper, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the protectorate replaced

the various special duties and administrative officers of the Principate4,

while the most recent theory was espoused by M. Christol In 1977, who argued

that the title protector was reserved for centurions in the assumed mobile

field army of Gallienus.

Each of these theories essentially views the protectorate as a uniform

structure, formed by Gallienus and fulfilling the same role in the fourth

century as it did In the third. Such a failure to account for the vast

1, C, Jullian, Di protect oribu, it doiesticis, Pail. (1883),2, Mommien, 'Protector.. Augusti', fp/ea, Epig, V (1884), 121ff,

3, Babut, 'Recherchea lur l'orginasation de ii guarde Impériale et sur Ia corps d'officier5 de

l'armée romaine aux IV .t V siêcles', Rev, Mist, 114 (1913), 225ffl and 116 (1914), 225ff,Domaszewskl, Die Ringordriung dci Röiiicben Heere5, ed B, Dobson (1967),

4, Cooper, Thi Third Century Origins of The Hew liperial qr.y (1967), 209.

5, Chriatol, 'La Carriére de Traianus Nucianus,,,,', Chironl (1977), 393ff. 17—244-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Protectores

differences In terminology, status and function of the office has stifled

any real progress In understanding Its complex nature. As I hope to show,

the protectorate of the later third century underwent changes so profound

that in its final form it bore virtually no relation to the institution

Inaugurated by Gallienus. Only by accepting this can new life be breathed

Into an otherwise moribund debate.

The history of the protectorate does not even start with Gallienus. An

inscription from Dalmatla has come to light relatively recently, which reads:

A1979,448: I(ovi) O(ptlmo) M(aximo), T. F1(avius) Pompelus (centuria)

coh (art is) III Alpinorum Ant oninianae cur-am agens (sic) Fab (ius) Amp.

men (sor ?) et Vibius Vibianus protector cos.

I have left the title of Vibius Vibianus deliberately abbreviated, since

It Is the meaning of this and the dating of the inscription which form the

crux of its Interpretation. Until now, the earliest certain record of a

protector was the cursus honorum of L. Petronlus Taurus Volusianus', dating

from 258. However, the Viblanus inscription above seems unequivocally dated

to the early third century by the gentilicium attached to the unit. This can

only refer to Caracalla or Elagabalus, both of whom sufferred the darnnatio

memorlee at the dissolution of their reigns. In the absence of any evidence

to the contrary, it is inconceivable that the unit would claim such an

honorific after the deaths of these emperors. It is true that various

auxilia are known to have used the gentilicia of both Marcus Aurelius and

Caracalla during the reIgn of Septimius Severus, cohors I mifliaria

Hemesenorum Aurelia Antoniniana is one such example; but even this unit

I, XI . 1836 • ILS 1332,

2, A197I,334

-245-

M.C.Ibeii: C3 Army. Protectores

is known to have abandoned the title in 199, and can be found sporting the

ge.ntilicia of Maximinus and Gordian during their respective reigns 1 . The

unit therefore only used these names under the Severan dynasty, which was

attempting to claim legitimacy through association with the Antonines before

it, and was trying to gain the personal loyalty of the soldiers in order to

ensure its continuation.

So the office of protector preceded Gallienus, but in what form? If we

accept, as I think we must, that the terms protector and cos. are linked in

the inscription, then the only feasible reading of the phrase is that of

protector co (n)s (ularis.). Vibianua himself was never a consul, so it would

seem that he was part of the consul's staff, acting as a protector. in the

literal sense of the word as a guardian. The protector consular-is was

therefore a consular bodyguard, and we are fortunate In having a second

inscription, from Apamela in Syria, which may give us a clue to its status:

A.1974,648:(.... . vix(it) ann(i&J XXXXIII m(ensibus) V d(iebus) VIII,

mu (itevit) eq (ues) ann (is) 1111, protector ann (is) 1111, opttiol ann (is)

XIII, (centurio) ann(is) I. Marcia Vivia Crescentine coniux et her-es

mar-ito incomparabill fecit.

Van Rengen, who produced this inscription, believed that it dated to the

Farthiari campaign of Severus Alexander since it was found in the same

sarcophagus as a similar epitaph to one Probius Sanctus, a soldier of Legio

II Farthica3. Yet that legion was also present in the east under Caracalla,

1, AE,1975,701 III'33312. A1974,647.

-246-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores

as well as the eastern wars of Aurelian 1 , so it could equally well date to

either of these instead.

The anonymous soldier is believed to have joined the Praetorian Guard,

serving as an eques for four years, before becoming a protector and

subsequently a centurion, possibly in II Parthica. In this context 1 the title

protector has been explained away as a misnomer for speculator. This is a

very weak argument. For the soldier to have become a speculator at this

point In his career would necessitate a rapid rise in his status, since a

wait of up to 8 years was usually required for an eques to achieve the

of fice2. Furthermore, such an explanation does not take into account the

soldier's thirteen years as an optlo between the protectorate and the

centurionate.

A more feasible explanation must be that he joined the army as an eques,

probably in II Parthica. After four years service, he was seconded into the

officium of the consul as a bodyguard. Having remained a beneficiarius

consularis for another four years, he was promoted to the rank of optio on

his return to the legion. This accorded with his status as a principalis

After a further thirteen years, he had finally worked his way up the

tortuous promotion ladder to the centurionate, only to die one year later.

In this way, one need not resort to difficult arguments that require

extraordinary circumstances to explain what was obviously an all too

ordinary career. One need only accept that, if these two Inscriptions are to

be believed, the protectorate did in fact precede Gallienus, and began as a

grade of principa.Lis presumably added to the Rangordnun during the

1, Though by thu ii.. II Pirthica was being vexillated to provide garrisons elsewhere 1cf,

ch,VI: I4xiIJaiionej p,1L4,2, Durry, Cohortes Prótoriennes (1938), 109,

-247-


elaborations of the Severan period 1 . Indeed, the Vibiarius inscription itself

adds strength to such an interpretation since his fellow trustee in the

inscription was probably a mensor, yet another grade of principalis. The

terminology of the inscription suggests that they were fulfilling an official

obligation in the absence of any next of kin.

The protectorate of this date bore very little relationship to that of

the later third century, though the structure may appear familiar. Any

attempt to link the above material to the protectores mentioned In the Vita

Antonini would be mistaken2 . Here, the Historia Augusta is undoubtedly

attributing to the leones of Caracalla3 a status in proportion to the

bodyguards of his own time; if indeed he is using the word protector for

anything other than its literal meaning. For the true protectores august.4

we must still look towards the actions of Gallienus himself.

The change in status of the protectorate under Gallienus was a marked

one, best illustrated by the change in its terminology. This took the

formula protector Augusti nostri4. The men involved were marked as the

personal protectores of the emperor, to such an extent that Gallienus himself

is specifically named in three of the seven inscriptions which mention the

office.

What this meant to each individual may be deduced from an examination

I, For Severan elaboration cf, Watson, Roian Soldier (ii.4, - .., .., . iufl9 Uo.azeviki,

ed,(1967), 29ff,

2, S//A Carr, V'8 VII'!,3, Named in Dlo LIHX'6'4,

4, To be strictly accurate; AE,1920,108. Victor reads: protector eius, refering to up, caes, P.LJd,,j Sal/len! invictI p11 Iii, Aig, earlier in the Inscription; 1965,!14, Narcianus reads:

,porxrap ro lveiA'qro, hcioro piv PaAAqvov (fltrop), which literally translates into Latin as:

protector invic tI isperi tons nostni Sal/len! A&(us SI),

—248-

M.C.tbeji: C3 Army.Protectores

of their careers. There are only six people we can name with absolute

certainty as protectores of Gallienus. They can be clearly separated

into two distinct classes: those for whom the protectorate was a

stepping-stone on the way to important civil appointments, and those who

remained within the military. Each Is worth looking at In detail, as each

Illustrates both the type of person who could enter the protectorate as

well as the influence this had on their career.

1) L. PETRONIUS TAURUS VOLUSIANUS: X11836 = ILS 1332

Consul in 2612, he rose from the prlinipilate to command the equites

singulares under Valerian and Gaillenus. This puts the last eight posts of

his career between the years 253 and 261, so his rise to high office was

consequently very rapid. From the start, his was an extraordinary career.

His appointment to the equites singu1ares which were usually commanded by a

former tribune of the vigi1es was in Itself exceptlona]. as was his

promotion directly from the praetoriana to praefectus vigilum, possibly In

259. He was made protector Augg. nn. around 257/8, and it Is usually

believed that this title was somehow linked to his trlbunate of I Praetori&.

2) MARCIANUS: AE1965,114

The brief outline of his career given in the inscription suggests that

I, XI'1836 • ILS 1332: L. Pstronio L(uci) f(ilio) Sab(atina tribu) Taw'o Volusiano, v(iro)co(n)s(uiari) ordinari, praef(ecfo) praet(orio) e.(inentissiao) v(iro), prae(ecto) yigiI(ua)p(erfec tis5iso) r(iro), trth(wno) coh(or ti,) prisie prue t(oriae) pro tec t(ori) Aup(us torus)n(os trorus), I tes trib(uno) coh(or tis) 1111 pree t(oriae), trib(uno) cak(or tis) I.! urb(anae), trth(uno)coh(or tie) III vig(uIus), ieg(ionis) A' e S Il/I b'es(inie) pro v(inciae) Panrioniae superiori(s) / S/i(sic) Ieg(ionis) Dacias, prieposito equi Sm singu!arior(u.) Aug(us torus) n(o5trorus), p(riio) p(iIo)

leg(ionis) XX! U/p/se, ccii turioni depute to, eq(uo) pub(Iico), cx V Decur (us), Laur (enti) La vun(a ti)ordo Arre tinorus patrono op f/so,

2, Patti XI 5749. 3, PLRE Volus/anus 6,

4, AE1965,114: A'aPqs TPgqa ro y Jiaoporarov ffa.xiavov, rovpropt ro avc1Rlroc iCOICTOD uavf'a'4Aaovov 4'c(a0roo), rpSBOPYOY zparapitsv xa loexe xas r,sri7Arrqv Aajirportrq 6ppsv ,iqrporoAç0,1s rioroAsç TOY !eols7C ItfpCTQ v xa u rpa' Iy rtrcyEh.aç, lips rapocvroç /'eppo uotJp%Jqevv4ç za, Joyitrro,

-249-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores

Marcianus gained the protectorate whilst in the praetorians, like Volusianus

above. He became one of GallienuB' most trusted generals, and took command

of the Gothic campaign following the usurpation of Aureolus in 2681

3) V17ALIAMJS: 1113228 = JLS 546 2

It has been suggested that this inscription should be revised to read:

Viltallanus (praeflect (us) Aug. n. (somno monlitus v. p. However, the term

preefectus Augusti nostri is a highly unusual one. As the commander of avexillatlon, we would expect Vitalianus to be termed praepositus or dux31

rather than praefectus, which was usually reserved for equestrian legionary

commanders. Under the circumstances 1 the term protector fits the formula of

the inscription more comfortably. On this reading, he was a protector when

in commend of the German and British vexillat ions at Sirmium. Other than

that, little is known about him

4) CLEMENTIUS VALERIUS MARCELLINUS: IU'3424 = 11.3 545

Praefectus of Leglo II Adiutrix acting vice legati, he was succeeded by

Aurelius Front inus by June 268. His protectorate is inextricably bound into

the terminology of the commend, showing that he held the title simultaneous

with the office. He went on to become preeses of Mauretania Tingitana

between 277 and 28O.

I, PLREHarciar,uil; Zosimus I'40 S//A, 6allienusXIII'lO,2, 111 . 3228 • ILS 546: (loh'i Honitorl (piro salute adque incolusitate d(oeini) n(ostri)

6ailleni Aug(usti) et iilitua vexiil(aiiornii) leg(g(iornis) 6Jeraanicianafr(ui) elf Brittanincin(aru.)(jc) (cuja auxilis (clviii t,,,, VII taliar,us (pro flec t(or) Azig(us ti) n(os tn) (praeposli tus v(otui)p(osui t),

3,.The two terms seem freely interchangeable, though oix might imply a higher rank, cf, Tables

Yl-4, p,1541f.

3jPflaum, Carrilnes procuratoniennes,,,, (1960), 919,4, 111 . 3424 • ILS 545: Senio 1ep(eraionls) P(ubLi) tLIc(/n/) 6a/lJieni invicti Aug(usfi),

Cluentuus Silvanus v(ir) c(greguus) a(gens) v(ice) pfraesidis) it Va/enuus /larcellinies praef(ectus)leg(ionis) prof (cc for) Aug(us II) n(os tn) a (geiis) v(ice) I (ega I/), uunicipefsl cx pro vir,cia Rae tias(ol yenunt) l(aeti) J(thentcs) i(enito), Palerr,o ef Arc/iesilao co(n)s(uuibus),

5, PLRE Harcellinus 23,—250-

M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores

5) P. AELIUS AELIANUS: III•3529 and A1965,9

As praef'ectus .legionls a.v.1. II Adiutr1cis his command must follow the

accession of Gallienus as joint emperor in 255, but precedes Marcellinus

above. His career was almost identical to that of Marcellinus, especially if

he was the Aelienus of VflI'21486 (ILS 4495), who was praesea of Mauretania

Ceesariensis prior to 2772.

6) 14. AURELIUS VICTOR: A51920,108

This, the last certain reference to a Gallienic protector, acts as a

complement to the two above. Here we see a preeses of Mauretania during

Gallienus' lifetime referring to himself as a protector Gailleni. This

in cription shows that the title protector was not just linked to the

military commands, but was retained by Its holders on their transfer to

civilian office.

Each of these six protectores was In a position of some responsibility

whilst holding the title under Gallienus. Volusianus was at the top of the

praetorian tribunate, Marcellinus and Aelianus were legionary commanders, and

Victor was the governor of a preetorian province. About Marcianus we cannot

be sure, but it would seem likely that his entry into the protectorate was

at approximately the same juncture as Volusianus. The reference to

Vitalianus is the least informative, since we do not know where in his career

he held the command attributed to him, nor do we know where his career went

1, 111 . 3529: 0(u) Manibus) tesorlac P(ubli) Ael(i) Martial/s q(uon)dai) vet(erani) exfc)(ustode) a(rsorus) leg(ionis) 11 Adi(utricis) patris ci Fla y/ac 4guthes salt/i, hi/us hi/anus

prae(ectus leg(ionis) s(ipra) s(cripfae) protector Aug(usti), parent/bus CdP1551115 regresus ad /uieS

patros f(aciendui) c(uravf I),

4 1965, 9: Herculi 4ug(usto) P. hi/us 4eiiamis prier (cc tus) leg(ionis) 11 4diut(r/ci5)protector Eallieni Aug(usti) n(ostri) a(gens) v(ice) i(egati) v(otus s(oivit) /(thens) s(erito),

2, PLRE 4,1/anus 10, Possibly hi/anus 8 also.3, 4E,1920,108: Oils ptatlr/is deabuique Fortun!aje Reduci pro salute atque incolusitate

d(oaini) n(os In) /'(era ion/i) Caes(anis) P(ubll) Licini Gailieni mv/c I/ tp)ii felt/c/i) 4ug(usti),

H(ircus) 4urei(ius) Victor v(ir) e(gregius) pt(a)eses pro(rinciae) Nauretaniae Caesar/ens/i, protector

c/us, Mnno) prov(inciae) CCIII!!! ,t(alendis) I(anuaniis/uniis/uliis),-251-


from there. If the status of any of the other protectores is anything to go

by, his rank at the time of the command must have been at least the

equivalent of a legionary prefecture. Certainly, it can be argued that the

command of a combined force of German and British legions, with their

auxilia, was more than a run-of-the-mill vexillery appointment.

One other, less certain, inscription might be added to this liBt. It

refers to an anonymous officer in the Guard, who was designated protector

Auggg'. The most likely date for this is 25 9/60, when Saloninus was briefly

promoted to Augustus in defiance of the mutiny of Postumus, and before the

news of Valerlan's capture had filtered back to the west. The terminology

and juncture of the officer's elevation to the protectorate is closest to

that of the Gallienic protectors, making a date that falls within his period

of influence seem the most favourable.

A good deal of information can be gleaned from these careers. First, it

is clear from the Marcellinus inscription, in which the titles of the

provincial governor are set alongside the titles of the legionary prefect,

that the protectorate was a military appointment. Marcellinus is termed

preefectus legionis protector Augusti nostri agens vice 1egati while at the

same time Clementius Silvius, the equestrian governor of Lower Pannonia, is

simply vir egregius egens vice praesidis. The trend is maintained in other

equestrian provinces under Gallienus 2. The only exception is M. Aurelius

Victor, above. Since the protectorate was a military appointment, he is

1, 111 . 3126: 1,,,, trib(wii) coh(ortis)J XI w'banae, trth(uni) coh(ortis) VI praet(oriee) cipro fec tor(ii) Aig(ui torua tri g.) n(o, trorim) patron! spiendissisee civ! Ia Ifs Curic lard ob mnsigne.benivolenizas italuie pont anxeriint, Psi (idler), A further two inscriptions, containing theerasures of dunatic, might be dateable to Gallienus for Just this reason: XI'4082 ILS 4002(Aurelius Faustus). with the formula prot, divini lateris n, (discussed below p. 2zis corecertain than 111 . 8571 1 1985 (Aur, Sabinianus), trib, proi.ectt,.,.,,,,,,,,Jn,, where the erasure mustsurely contain some unit designation (probably Prietorian), possibly followed by .,,Aug.Jn.

2, Coc(c,jus) Rufinus In Arabia, FLaW Rufinu, 13 A, Yoconius Zeno in Cilicia, PLRE Zenon 9 N,Aurelius Maximus In Pannonia Sup,, III'4564,

—252-


likely to have received the title during a military command prior to his

governorship of Mauretania Caesariensia, like Marcellinus and Aelianus after

him. This was probably not a prefecture, since we would expect such an

off ice to be recorded, in accordance with the Marcellinus inscription; and it

may have had sufficiently low status to be missed out altogether. One

should also bear in mind that the nature of the Victor Inscription, which was

an official dedication by the governor of the province to the emperor, was

such that details of his previous career could have been superfluous.

Victor shows that the title of protector was an honorific. It was held

in perpetuity by its recipients, all of whom can be seen to have borne It

with pride. The point is reinforced by the testimonial of Marcianus in which

the title protector is highlighted above all his other achievements. It was

bound into the careers of its holders at various junctures. Aelianus and

Marcellinus received it while holding the equestrian prefecture of 11

Adiutri while the terminology in the cursv.s of Volusianus and the

an nynious preetorian suggests that the grant of protector status was

somehow linked to the praetorian tribunate.

The implication is that under Gallienus the title protector was symbolic,

an equestrian badge of privilege, of which the title was more important than

the duties. Its grant seems limited to equestrian officers who had reached

a certain degree of status within the military career structure. It was not

a blanket grant, since there are at least two instances of legionary

commanders under Gallienus who did not receive it 1 . This in itself Is

L 1, Flavius Postumius Virus was Ji'gitwi Iqionis II Augustas in Britain c,262, PLR( Virus 2

RIB 316 • Vl1'95. Even more convincingly, M, Aurelius Veteranus was Prief(ecfus) Ieg(iens) XIII

6(ea/nae) EaJIieniin(ae) (sic), I1l'1560 • ILS 3845,-253-


important, since it indicates the special significance of the office. Each of

the protect ores was specifically chosen to receive the honour; something

which is strongly indicated by the personal nature of the title, its special

links to the emperor0 and the esteem in which its owners seem to have held

it. The title was therefore a mark of personal recognition from the emperor.

Any duties which it carried must have been symbolic in nature, since it was

held in conjunction with military (and civil) posts of responsibility that

required the recipient's full attention.

The similarity between the title and that of the protector consularis is

hardly likely to have been coincidental. What better way for Gallienus to

honour those men of merit whom he favoured than by making them honorary

beneficiarli of the emperor? Diesner put forward years ago the idea that

the protect ores had existed in some form prior to the sole reign of

Gallienus, but in the absence of any substantial evidence, he was only

prepared to date the institution to the 25061. It would now seem likely

that the roots of the protectorate date even earlier, and that Gallienus

manipulated the already established office of protector consuleris to fit his

own ends.

These were somehow linked with the so-called Edict of Gallienus. Though

the complexities of the edict need not be discussed here, it is necessary to

understand that under Gallienus a great change occurred in which the

senatorial elite surrendered most of their military functions and some of

their civil ones to equestrian control. This change, referred to among

I, Diesner, R col, 1113ff,

-254-


other things as the rise of the yin militares, has been extensively

discussed in a previous chapter, so that only the basic points need be

reiterated here1.

By the mid-third century, the senatorial elite had almost completely

abdicated their military responsibilities in favour of the more lucrative and

prestigious civil posts in the senatorial cureus. The imperial response to

this was to give command of the legions and certain militarily delicate

provinces over to the equestrian classes. This rise of the equestrians had

been occurring gradually throughout the century, but under Gallienus arid his

successors the pace of change was greatly accelerated. By substituting

senators with equestrian agentes, vice praesidis and vice le&ati, Gallienus

streamlined the immutable career structure that had been slowing the rise of

the yin milit ares and opened the way for the able men he needed, both

equestrians and senators, to take over the positions that required their

skills.

It is tempting, here, to view the protectorate as an agent for that

change. At first glance it would seem designed to facilitate the bypassing

of the traditional ordo. Yet the emperor had no need for such a system.

One already existed in the agentes themselves. Moreover, most equestrians

in positions of command under Gallienus were not protect ores. The most

powerful of these was Aurelius Augustianus: Dux Macedonicae Another

example is Clementius Silvius, the a.v.p. of Pannonia mentioned in the

Marcellinus inscription2. These are just two among many. Nevertheless, the

I, Ch.X: V/ri Miiitare

2, AuguBtianus, 1934,)93; Silvius, II1'3424 ' 1LS545, cited on pn,4,

-255-


probable nature of the pro tectores was linked to this change.

It is based upon the assumption that the generals of Gallienus were

protectores themselves: a point impossible to prove or disprove with the

evidence to hand, yet given the nature of those few protectores we know, an

extremely likely one. The key figure here is Marcianua: protector, Praetorian

tribune, dux and general'. He is the only general of Gallienus for whom a

first hand epigraphic career record survives. For him, we do not have to

rely upon the watered-down end distorted testimony of second- or third-

hand literary material. Despite its brevity, his inscription is, at the least,

an uncorrupted source. He was also a highly important man; more important,

possibly, than either Claudius or Aurelian by whom he is eclipsed in the

sources. For it was he who received sole command of the Danube armies, and

was charged with the continuation of the emperor's Gothic war 2. In contrast,

the two later emperors were merely subordinates within the hastily assembled

imperial army which faced Aureolus at Milan3. Since this, the only detailed

record we have for an important general of Gallienus, firmly establishes him

as a protector, it is not beyond the realms of probability that the other

generals were prot ect ores as well. The silence of the sources on this

matter can signify nothing, for the source material is notoriously

uninformative about the early careers of these men. What little they can

tell us is, if anything, positive. The general consensus is that Claudius was

a tribune of some kind at a crucial stage in his career, and that this

I, cf, p.249 above, text & note 4 AE,1965,114,

2, SHA, 6a11, Viii & XIII1O; £'iQ, Claud, YI'i & XViiii; Zos, I'40'I-2,

3, Eutrop, iXiii; SHA, Claud, IV; 5H4 Gal), XV . 3; Vict, Caes, XXXIY • i; Zos, i • ii; Zon, XII'26,

-256-


acted as his springboard to success'. In the period between Gallienue and

Diocletian, six men can be seen to have risen from tribuniclan rank to

positions of relative importance. Five of these were protectores2. The

source material, therefore, provides at least circumstantial evidence that the

great generals of Gallienus held protector status.

The sources are unanimous on only one point concerning the backgrounds

of these men. They all agree that his favourites were of humble origins.

Tradition makes Aureolus a Getan shepherd who worked his way through the

ranks under Valerian to gain a position of great power from that emperor's

sons. Eutropius speaks of Postumus rising through a military career to the

attention of Gellienus4, though like Aurelian and Claudius, his origins are

obscured by his achievement of the purple (albeit through secession). The

imperial careers of the latter two have tended to overshadow their earlier

achievements, making details of their rise difficult to come by. The major

source for both is the Historla Augusta, with its tendency to over-

romanticise, but it seems clear from what little evidence we have that both

were yin mflitares of outstanding ability. Aurelian was a peasant from the

Danube who worked his way up in the armys, while Claudius was perhaps an

Illyrian born in Dalmatia6.

1, SHA, C1ad, X1'9 & XVI . 2; Vict, Cies, XXXIII28; Zon, 11.26,

2, Yoluslanus, XI'1836 ' ILS 1332; Narcianus, A(,1965,114; Tralanu5 Nucianus, 19O8,259 ' ILS

9497 ' I6RR 1 . 1496; Sabinlanus, III • 8571 1985; Harianus, VI . 1636 (non-protector, his career is

discussed below, p,263);Constantius Chiorus, (xcerpfa Palesiana 1.2,

3, Syncellu. p.717; S/IA, Trig, Tyr, X14 Vict, Cees, XXXIII & (pit, XXXII; Zon, III,

4, Eutrop, IX'9'I,

5, Eutroplus and Victor place him In Dada Ripensis, whilst the SHA believes he came from Moesia:

Eutrop, IX'13'1 Vict, (pit, XXXVl; S&Q, Aur, I1I'1-2,

6, S//A, Claud, XIY'2 & XY'1-2, recorded in fictitious letters,

-25 7-


The named protectores of Gallienus also seem to have had humble birth.

Volusianus rose from the centurionate, Aelianus was the sOn of P. Aelius

Mertielis, armorum custos of Leglo II Ad1utrix, and Marcianus rose from

obscurity in the Danube provinces2. About Victor we cannot be sure3, and

Vitalianue is only known from the Inscription bearing his name. Clementius

Valerius Marcellinus is generally believed to be related to T. Clementius

Silvius, praeses of Parinonia Inferior, since they shared a name and appear on

the same inscription as fellow-townsmen from Raetia 4. Whatever the truth of

this may be, the position of the shared name as praenomen in Marcellinus'

case and gentiliciwn of Silvius suggests that Slivius was the senior. His

position as praeses over Marcellinus, merely the legionary praef'ectus,

confirms this. Nothing is known about their earlier status or origins,

except that they hailed from Raetia. Only Marcellinus, the younger of the

two, at the point where his career was taking off, was a protector.

All the men above, for whom we have enough information, shared certain

distinguishing characteristics. They had successful military careers; they

were yin milit ares to a man; and those few for whom the epigraphic record

survives bore the title of protector.

Most illustrative of this is L. Petronius Taurus Volusianus, whose

meteoric rise from the centurionate to the consulate can have taken him no

1, Nagy, 'Aelius Aelianus', Kilo 46 (1965), 339ff,

2. Gerov, 'Narciano', 4t/,enuui 43(1965), 333ff,3, Di Blois believed ho was a native of the Danube provinces 1 and cited Thomasson, 5'tatthaiter I

(1960), 102 n,263, in support of this, However, this seess to me to bear no relevance whatsoever to

Victor's origins, since it ii concerned only with the changing semantics of the title denoting the

governor of Mauretania, cf, DeBlois, 56 & n,147,

4, Huniclpu ex provincia. Raetla cf, PLRE Harcellinus 23,

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M.C.tbeji: C3 Army. Protectores

longer than eight years at most 1 . If Domaszewski is correct, he will have

come to the emperor's attention whilst serving as a liaison officer (centurlo

deputatus), and it is significant that his career started to accelerate soon

after that point2.

The elevation to protector appears late in his inscription, linked as it

is to the most prestigious tribunician rank he achieved. Yet it may have

been received before this 1 applying to several of his earlier posts. As we

have seen, the title was honorific. It could be held by praefecti legionis

and even extraordinary praeposltP. In this case, the title may have been

placed alongside the highest rank to which it had any relevance. The point

is borne out by the inscription of the anonymous praetorian 4, where the

wording et protector Auggg. n. follows the list of tribunates held, Since we

have established earlier that protector status was somehow linked to these

commands, the implication is that it applied to all of them.

Volusianus received his first unusual appointment at the lowest stage in

the cursus where protector is found: that is at the point where he would

usually receive a command as praepositus or preefectus. In his case, he

was made praepositus equitum singuleriurri an unprecedented appointment,

I, cf, p.249 above, text & n.h

2, Do.,, Rangordnwng 104,

3, cf, YI . 1636 and the Yolusianus inscription itself, where the comeand of vexx, Legg, X i XII!!

Gea were held prior to the urban tribunates,

4, 111.3126,

-259-


since the Equ.ites Sinu1ares were usually commanded by a former tribunus

vigil urn'. His second unusual appointment came around 259, when he was

promoted directly from trib. coh, I Praet. to the post of preefectus Vigilwr4

exactly at the stage where the protectorate comes In his inscription. Here

we have a classic vfr inilitaris who rose from the centurionate, and whose

career bypassed the accepted ordo equester at just those points where the

pro tectores of Gallienus are known to have held the title. The coincidence

must mean something. Unfortunately, Volusianus is the only protector of

Gallienus for whom we have a well documented cursus

Therefore we can only hypothes:[se. It Is worth reviewing at this point

what was special about the protect ores We know that they were yin

mflitares yet this does not mark them out, since equestrians had been rising

through the ranks since the Seven. Some of them reached positions of great

importance within the empire, but this is also true of men such as Aurelius

Augustlanus, for whom no trace of the protectorate can be found. Those who

did rise high rose fast, but this is by no means true of all the protector-es.

Victor and Vitalianus disappear without a trace, while the protectorate

commanders of 11 Adiutrix had to wait a decade before they were qualified to

take up equestrian governorships. Only in one respect are the protector-es

unique. All for whom we have adequate information were of humble origin.

Here, if anywhere, is the key to the protector-es of Gallienus. They

cannot have been centurions 1 of any kind, since the office was held in

1, PLRE 'oIuiiJrN1i 6, note c,

-260-


conjunction with praetorian tribunates and legionary commands. The latter

rank and the preesidlum of Victor preclude8 their having been staff officers,

since neither prefects nor governors will have been seconded for such work.

Their distribution, both under Gallienus and his successors, is so random

that no geographical explanation can be put forward, nor is there any

evidence for more than one protector in a given location at any one time,

which severely hampers the likelihood of their having formed a coflegium1.

The title suggests they were some kind of bodyguard, but the few detailed

careers for third century protectores provide no space in which this could

occur.

All the evidence points towards the title being a ceremonial badge of

privilege. Its holder was marked as a beneficlarius of the emperor, to whom

he owed not only the protectorate, but his promotion to high office. Under

Gallienus, the office seems to have been held by men of ability from whom

great things were expected. Of the six certain protectores in his reign,

five are known to have gained ducenariate appointments of the fourth echelon

or above. We know nothing of the sixth due to lack of evidence. All for

whom there is enough background material came from the centurionate. This

means that all the well documented protectores of Gallienus rose from humble

origins to positions of great responsibility within the new equestrian career

structure he had created2.

I, In fact, the only occasion in which more than one protector can be found is attested on thetombstone of on. Claudiui Herculanius, protectoris ,fireiiani eugusti, set up by his brother, anotherprotector aiigusti: 111 . 327, Nicomedla, 27015AD, It may be possible that a collegiuc existed among theprotectorci in the Praetorians, though the argument will stretch no further,

2, Enough ii known only of Yolusianus, Marcianus and Aelianus to provide an accurate outline of

their careers, and since there are extant only six unequivocal protectores we obviou5ly do not have astatistical sample, Despite this, with the inclu5ion of Gallienus' generals, the careers of these men

are strongly indicative of the trend outlined above,

-26 1-


Most of them rose to prominence with great speed. Men like Volusianus

and Marcianus will have benefitted from accelerated promotion to get them

into the commands for which they were most suited. The grant seems to have

been a recognition of ability, a statement that the holder's promise had been

noted and that he was earmarked for promotion as long as he lived up to

that promise. This explains why not all equestrians had protector status,

and why not all protect ores achieved the exalted ranks of the consulate.

Some men, such as Augustianus, would have already progressed through the

ordo equester into positions of importance by the time the protectorate came

into being. Others, of higher status, would not have needed to progress so

far to attain the prestige posts that were their due 1 . Most simply would

not have been good enough to qualify for the title, and only the cream of

those that were would rise to the very top.

Of the 17 known equestrians who achieved a leglonary command or more

Important post In the latter half of the third century without the aid of

the protectorate2, only two achieved the status of Gallienus' favourites.

The ubiquitous Augustlanus was Dux Macedonicae and L. Flavius Aper, the

father-In-law of Numerlan, was Praetorian Prefect 3. Too little is known

about Augustianus to do more than hint at his probable experience, but Aper

was a man of high status for whom anything less than the position he

achieved would have been a considerable snub. It is worth noting that only

1, ag L. Flavius Apr, PLRE Aper 2 & 3,, discu5sed in th. text below,

2, cf, Table P8,3, Augustianu., 4E1934,193 for Apr cf, note 1 above,

-262-


the former held high office under Gallienus.

The sample is, of course, too small to be truly representative. Only two

of the seventeen are known from more than one inscription. However, in the

absence of any other evidence, it is highly suggestive, especially since the

most detailed cursus among them is that of P. Vibius Marianus 1 . In what

would seem a fairly prestigious but typical career, Marianus rose through

the centurionate to become primus pflus of Legio III Gaflica and subsequently

preefectus cast rorum of II Italica. From there, he worked his way through

the tres militiae in Rome, and became primipflaris bis before ending his

career as procurator et preeses Sardiriiae. In the absence of the

protectorate, no unusual or out-of-place commands are found. His career

simply follows the standard ordo equester one step at a time, ending with a

third echelon provincial governorship, less prestigious than the posts

achieved by the prot ect ores. His career ranks among the top two thirds of

our sample.

It would appear that the protectorate, as instituted by Gallienus, was a

symbol of imperial recognition and favour granted to equestrians of largely

humble origin, which marked them out as men to watch. If they did well, its

recipients could expect to achieve the most important posts in the empire.

In doing this, Gallienus began to discriminate not according to class and

status, but according to ability, which would explain the seeming

inconsistencies in his policy towards equestrianised provinces. He did not

care whether the provinces were governed by senators or by equestrians, as

long as they were properly maintained and adequately defended.

Is it any wonder that the militarily defunct senate, faced with such a

I VI.1636,

-263-

tacit acknowledgement of their inadequacies and seeing the usurpation of

some of their traditional responsibilities by upstart novi hornines 1 should

react against this with such hostility?2

Following the death of Gallienus, a fragmentation occurred in

protectorate terminology. The term protector Augusti nostri did not drop

out of use altogether3, but it was overshadowed by a series of new

designations 1 the most common of which were the titles protector ducenarius

and centurlo protector. The change is best illustrated by two important

inscriptions, one for each of the designations above, which must be examined

in some detail.

The first of these comes from Grenoble (Cularo) in Gallia Narbonensis,

and reads:

XII •2228 = .115569: Imp(eratori) caesarW M. Aur(eiio) Ciaudio plo feud

invicto eug(usto) Gerrnanico max(irno) p(ontifici) rn(exirno) trib(uniciae)

potestatis II co(n)s(uil) petr.i patr'iae proc.C?) vexiliationes adque equites

iternque preepositi et ducener(ll) protect(ores) tendentes in Narb(onensi)

prov (inciae) sub cure lul (ii) Pie cidiani v (in) p (erfectissirni) preefect (1)

vigil (urn) devoti nurnini rnalestatlq(ue) elus.

It is a key inscription since, as the first securely datable instance of

the ducenaril protectores, it proves they were in existence immediately after

1, For senatorial snobbishness towards these ci, Millar, Cissis Olo, 161f,

2, Reflected in th. literary tradition, Gallienus is depicted as weak-minded and indolent 1 and

accused of deserting the Roman people: Eutrop, Irev, IX . 11'l, '8aIiieno rea publicaa deserente,.,

Lactantius Oe iop tibus,,,V'5 Orosius Hig t, cdv, peg, VI1 . 22'13, The SH4 reflecting the senatorial

tradition, vilifies him, Victor Cees, XXXIII'31 & 3i tells of the persecution of the emperor's family

and friends by the senate on the news of his death,

3, Two inscriptions, securely daieable to the 270s, illustrate this point: 111 . 327 reads

protectoris #ureI1a pf Aigusfi and III'10488, dated to 279 by Te, Paternus cos,, reads plrotetcf(or)

-264-


the reign of Gallienus.

The phrase vexillationes adque equites item que praepositi et ducenaril

prot ect ores 18 of interest here, since it can go some way towards

Illustrating the position of the ducenarii protectores. The praepositi in the

inscription were surely the commanders of the vexillat.iones adque equites,

and therefore the term ducenarli protectores Is left to stand on its own.

This seems both confirmed and refined by the careful use of the conjunctions

linking these components. Three separate words meaning 'and' are used,

implying that the author wished to make a clear distinction between each

individual component. Furthermore, by placing item que in the pivotal

position he has drawn another distinction; one between the units involved on

one side and their commanders on the other. In the light of this, a fair

translation of the phrase might read: "..the detachments along with the

cavalry, and also their commanders and the ducenarli protect ores... ". The

ducenarli prot ect ores, by this reading, were part of the command structure,

on a par with the commanders of the detachments but somehow differentiated

from them.

A further inscription, the funerary monument of one M. Aurelius

Processanus goes a little way to support this. The man was listed as a

v(iro) e(gregio), ex cent(urione) praet(oriae) cohort Us) VI, prot(ectori)

ducenario'. As an ex centurion of the Guard, he must have progressed beyond

the Primipilate (whether he held it or not), and his status as vii- egregius

confirms this. Presumably, in the absence of any other titles on his

1, XI'837 ' ILS 2178.

-265-

M.C.IbeJl: C3 Army. Protectores

tombstone, he was a protector duce.narius when he died.

Six other inscriptions mention ducenarli who were protectore&, yet they

fall to give any useful Indication as to the function of the office or its

postlon in the Ranordnun. Therefore it Is on the inscriptions above that

we are forced to rely. Taken together, they form a very hazy picture In

which the protector ducenarius was a symbol of status, possessing military

undertones, and equivalent in rank to that of a vexillary praepositus. In

speculating further on the nature of the position we now enter dangerous

territory, since such enigmatic Inscriptions form no sort of basis on which

to mount an argument.

Having made this qualification, we can examine certain references with a

particular terminology that suggest a partial explanation for the term. M.

Aurelius Valerius and Aelius Aellanus are referred to as ducenarius ex

protectoribus3. Both titles were honorary, and it would seem that they were

separate from one another. Indeed, the emphasis of the text suggests

I. cf Table P3,

2. 1 have ignored AE1908,259 : ILS 9479: IGRR 1 . 1496 at this point, since it is not entirely

clear whether Mucianus was a protector ducenarius Line 15 has been restored by Domaszewski, Rang,,p.185 as trpa8, iau. i,orqxr. J Io,x,,vap,, On this reading, the rank of a protector ducenariu5 wasfixed, and ranted above that of both the praefectz,s Jegionis and the trthunu5 praetoriae. However,both the reading, and the inscription as a whole, are untrustworthy and extremely problematic, The

restoration rpsI, r,r, Is Inconsistent with the other praetorian references in the inscription,

which enumerate the cohort to which Nucianus was attached, A more accurate restoration must read

r,s, 'apr, r,ass. This restoration is in line with the previous praetorian references in the

Inscription, By this, I do not mean to argue against Nucianus' being a protector ducenarius, butmerely to highlight that any assumption either way is inadvisable, For Doaaszewski's text of the

inscription and a full discussion of its problematic nature, cf, below p,271ff, Appendix 2 gives my

own recension of the inscription, which I believe best solves most of the problems inherent in its

restoration,

3, 111 . 1805, dated AD 280 by the consulates of Nessala and Gratus, reads ,,,H, Qur(eiius)Valerius vür) p(eri'ectissiivs) ducentariJus ex profectorib(us) JateritsJ diini,,,; 41907,70 =1915,75 • ILS 9478 reads • ,,A.lia aQAstvs 6oq(vapioç) x ltpJarQxropev,,,, He is not to be confused

with P, Aelius Aelianus, protector 6aJJieni augusti,

-266-


that the protectorate was held prior to the ducenariate. It may be that the

term protector ducenarius simply denoted a protector who had become eligible

for the salary of HS 200,000, the traditional qualification for ducenariate

status. Matthews, paraphrasing Mommsen's examination of the term, believed

that it evolved from here until it lost its monetary meaning and became

nothing but a definition of status, completely interchangeable with the title

protector1 . Just how far this argument can be taken, given the paucity of

the material, is debateable.

The Aelianus inscription is alone in providing some direct, though

unsatisfactory, information as to the level of ducenariate rank he achieved.

In discussing it, I shall use the Roman equivalents of the Greek terms

employed, since by default it has universal relevance to the ducenarii

prof ect ores as a whole. His first minor appointment was the sexigenariate

censitor NoricL He then held three procuratela, the last as governor of

Epirus, one of four centenariate governorships identified by Pflaum2. This

is the highest post named in the inscription, and yet the text clearly

entitles him ducenarius. The title is obviously honorary, As such, it cannot

have had any great importance, and can safely be ranked alongside, or even

below, the lowest grade of appointments in the ducenariate. It seems hardly

worth saying that a lowly ex-procurator of Epirus would lack the stature of

a man with four or five preesidia under his belt.

1, Matthews, (spire 01' Aia'ianus (1989), 77 4 n, 19,, paraphrasing Moamsen, Epheaeris Epigraph/ca V

(1884), 12111, *5,8,11,12,14,22 & 39 also notes preceding 449-52, NB: 45 : /LS569, and #11 = ILS

2778, our two main fnscrlpions above,

2, Pflaum, Procurafeuri Equesfres (1950), 235,

-267-


Aelianus was obviously a ducenarius of the lowest level, yet can his

experience be taken as typical of the prot ect ores ducenarli as a whole?

Clearly it cannot. It would be absurd to assume that all ducenaril

protector-es pursued identical careers. Yet there is one man, with a very

different style of career, who can at least support the Aelianus inscription.

Aurelius Sabinianus was a tribunus and protector, possibly under Gallienus'.

He subsequently rose to the position of procurator ducenarius pro vinciae

Dalmatiae, as a vir egregius. Therefore, he can technically be termed a

ducenarius, ex protectoribus, though the phrase was never officially attached

to him. According to Pflaum, the post of procurator Da.Zrnatiae was among the

lower grades of ducenariate appointment 2. This is at least oblique

testimony that protectores ducenarli held some of the lower order posts in

the ducenariate cur-sue. Since pr-a epositus vexillation.is was at best the

third promotion of a ducenarius3, all available evidence places the ducenarli

protector-es on the lower rungs of that career ladder.

If this is a pattern, however circumstantial, and not simply a series of

isolated circumstances, it indicates that the protector-es ducenarli were of a

lesser order than the protectores Gallieni AugustL Among the latter, both

Victor and Marcianus were undeniably protector-es at the pinnacle of their

careers, which in Victor's case provides a direct comparison with the

ducenarli protectores. Pflaum's material4 shows that the praesidium of

I, 1II8571 • 1985, The dating of this inscription is tentative at best, cf, above p.252 n,I,

2, p fjaum, Procuriteurs, 236ff & 276 where he cites Sabinianus himself, N2,351,

3, Pflaum, 284, N2324 is the highest placed ducenariate praep, vex, cited,

4, Pflaum, 285ff,

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M.C.Ibe.Ji: C3 Army. Protectores

Mauretanie Caesariensis was ranked among the fourth echelon of promotions

for ducenar.ii, and on occasion could even rank as fifth level appointments.

This was achieved by Victor, P. Aelius Aelianus, and Marcellinus. Marcianus

and Volusiarius progressed even higher, while Vitalianus quite clearly held a

high grade vexillary command, which puts him on a par with the protectores

ducenari.i. If we take the comparison further, it becomes clear that a

universal downgrading of the prot ect ores occurred after the death of

Gallienus. Very few later pro tectores achieved the status of those men who

mounted the career ladder under this emperor. In the early fourth century a

Vietorinus protector was a vicarius1 . The emperor Constantius I was

protector primurn, exin tribunus, postee praeses Dai.matarum, according to the

Excerpta Valesiana, and the SI-IA claims he subsequently became a dux under

Probus2 . Diocletian commanded the Domestici though what this means is

debateable , and it was he who may have placed an ex-protector, Traianus

Mucianus, in the preesidium of Reetia, though this is uncertain 4. In the

early principete, Raetia had been on a par with Mauretania Caesariensis, but

this seems to have changed in the latter's favour some time in the third

centurr. Finally, certain abbreviated inscriptions have been taken to read

protector, p(raefectus) p(raetorio) on completely unsubstantiated grounds.

They could Just as easily read p (rirni)p (ilariu&, though I personally favour

I, Al889,65,2,Lx, Yal, 1 . 2; SM, ,°rob, XXII•3,

3, Ct, below p.282,4, III'5785, cf, below p.278,

5, Pflaum, Iocc, r/ft,

-269-

M.c.rbeji: C3 Army. Protectores

the reading p(raeses) p(rovinciae)'.

The above is a complete list of all protectores who achieved high office

between the reigns of Gallienu8 and Diocletian. It shows that under

Diocletien, membership of the protectorate may have regained some of its

earlier kudos, but prior to his reign, the only protect ores who achieved

stardom were those who had started their careers as prot ect ores Gallieni

Augusti.

Most illu8trative of this reduction in status is the appearance of the

other common designation in the period: the cent urio protector. Though

several of its occurrences are cryptic in the extreme, a little evidence

survives to help form some picture of its position in the cursus Among

this is our second key inscription: the career record of Tralanus Mucianus.

It is extremely problematic, in places fragmentary, and containing numerous

repetitions. Yet it is cited in modern treatises without exercising the

slightest caution; most recently by M. Christol, who based upon it an

argument for the prot ect ores replacing centurions in the assumed mobile

field army . It contains a wealth of detail -- almost too much -- and

cannot be ignored, but requires minute end sceptical examination before any

conclusions can be drawn from it. The version here is the original

I. aurelius Severus, VI'3238 ILS 2208, protect, pr, pr,; lulius Spectatus, X1II'7535a, prof. p.

p. PLRE Severus 18 disagrees with the original reading in the text above and cites this as the only

instance known of a protector pr(aefectoru.) pr(aetoro), It reads Spectatus 2 as p(riii)p(ilarzus).It Ii my opinion that the two Inscriptions are abbreviations of the same title, Since they are both

thumbnail descriptions of the men's Clreer5, the expansion pr(aeses) pr(ovinciae) does not seem out of

place, despite the lack of a specified province, For a similar thumbnail description, cf, Flavius

lulianus, 111 . 8741, reading cx protectore it cx praepositus with no mention of the unit commanded,For Spec titus, however, I will concede that p(ric/)p(//arius) could be an equally valid reading,

2, Christol, 'Traianus Mucianus', Cbironl (1977), 393ff, cf, also Cooper (1967), 189ff. and deBlois (1976), 46 for other recent citations,

-2 70-


reading given by DomaBzewski. The line breaks have been preserved. My own

interpretation differs somewhat 1 . The inscription comes from Tralana

Augusta (Stera Zagora), In Thrace, which was the man's home town2. Its date

is debeteable.

IGRR I •1496 = ILS 9479 = A.g1908,259 = IGBR 1112 1570. (cf. also vonDomaazewski, Rangordnung (1967), LVIII-LIX, 185ff):Tpatcrov Mouxtavov Sotx(rv-rpwv)aTpeuaa'pEvov ypir (&7 Kov-xopS(trjvauiv) xai v Aey(uvL) fi I7crpG(Lxr), br,rcr xt)p'r(r1c)

(rJpcxt rip (uç), 8oxa'r Coy), (xaiovrcrpov) irpoxvopa5 As(un.oc) ' ! ' p(viç), (xaiovicrpXov) youA(av),

(xcrrovvt2p%ov) np(o-Jixr (opa) oip (avix w.vv), xat (xcnovixzpov) 7rpor (spcwpa) pr (zç)

rp&rLi1 (ptac),(xJa rpLvx 171cr 71por(rptopv), ffpELJ.Lo71(IActplov) (xcrl.7 x wvtgcrvta'J öLEp%opeWA)v ir(porx to-i(pv, triap(ov) AEy(tawoç) 8 Aa(urç), cr(rperrryovJ

10 tAey. < KAJaV5(Lcrç) xai 5 Aa(urç), (tp8. BtyouA.i(rp$. opP.i vp8(ouvov) Al(fliovp(vøv, 71per1ffoctovJftav ,rrxA g vi urpa (u1ofpEwv 71EJChvJ(xat tnirev McrJu(pv xcni 'Oupoi7vv, x(crLJ(71peruroaitov raw BplrJr(ovoiv) xci irAxxi.(opaw)

15 (rpfl. 7rpalr. nporqxt.J 5ouxtvap (vov), rctEp-JtX0V AEyiawoç ......rrJpacxvtcz v Mecro&o-)frapic, apov Ae-y. yJ Tp(ivic), uvpaiq'yo(vJI .... xcii w (v) rcrAiv o-'rpcereufo—J(pEva)v reav xci i'nirka (v) Mcwpv xci b(c,-i

20 (poqwv, tirapxov Ae.ly (itvoç) B Tpcxicv (ç), crrpfrz-i(riyov Aey. c A?au& xci) S Aa$ (icc) xcv. B(pirr.J[xci wA xztopaw npiaEjzvtcr ev 9p(axiJI .7 xci c'pervLixx ......II I auvov ircr(Aiv ......I

25 xci raAiv Acx9ovrcr .....C

sic rrv uinipeotav ..... (q cwtov .....narpi EDtu(xcoci.

Almost half of the appointments mentioned in the inscription are either

unusual or controversial. Christol's examination of these is at times

I, ci', above, p.266 n,2 for a revised restortion of line 15, A complete, annotated version of my

own reading can be found in App,2: 'Traianus Mucianus',

2, t' ahoJ urpiç,, ci', 1,26,

-271-


brilliant, but his Interpretation of their meaning fails to convince.

He is probably correct in dating the start of the man's career to the

last years of the emperor Gallienus, and In identifying the hand of the

Praetorlan Prefect, Heraclian, in its advancement 1 . However, by his own

argument, the agent of that change cannot have been the centurionate of XIII

Gemina as he believes, but must have been entry into the evocat4 from which

the appointment to cent urio protector legionis XIII Geminae will have been

the natural consequence. As he himself shows, a position in the evocati

often acted as a springboard into the ceriturionate 2. It matters little that

for some this move was a dead-end 3, since for Muciarius it was patently not

the case. Therefore, service in the evocati was the starting point for

Mucianus' advancement, and it Is here, not in the centurionate of Xlii Gemina,

that the intervention of Heraclian must be placed.

If Mucianus was an evocatus just prior to the murder of Galllenus4 , he

will not have become a centurio protector until the accession of Claudius,

tying in neatly with the advent of the protector ducenarius. This would

suggest that the centurlo protector was introduced by Claudius, which seems

I, Chrjstol, 'Traianus Mucianus', 397ff, The existence in Traiana Augusta of two dedications by

a Nuclanus, one to Heraclian, and one to his brother, N, Aurelius Apollinaris, strongly suggests that

Nucianus was a beneficiary of the Prefect's patronage: 168R 11I 1568 & 1569,2, Chrlstol, 399: '.,ceux-ci (the evocati) eta/eat les soidats les plus aptes a's is garnison a's

Roie, qui pouvaient, i l'issue de Jeur teaps a's service none!, poursuivre une carniêre iii service dii

prince en occupant des functions três vaniCes, souven t upon tan tes, et par fois seas recoasencar mebelie carniêne dans Is centurions is puis les pastes de confiance, ' Also Ourry, Cohortes pretoniennes(1938), 117ff; E, Birley, Rosan Britain and f/ic Rosan Arty (1953), 104ff; Dobson & Breeze, 'RomeCohorts and the Legionary Centurionate', (pig, Stwd, 8 (1969), 101 & 105,

3, ChrIstol, 400: Julius Nartialis conspired against Caracalla because of this, Cassius Dio

LXXVIII52; S/iA, Car, viii; Herodian IV'13, Also Dobson and Breeze, op. cii,, 106; Breeze, 'Careerstructure,,,', ANRYII'l, 439,

4, Christol, 398, dates IGBR 1112 1568 & 1569 above to the year 267, when Gallienus was involvedin his Gothic campaign,

-272-

M.C,IbeJi: C3 Army. Protectores

most likely. Technically nothing militates against its introduction by

Gallienus; but the vast difference in the type of personnel who received the

office, and in the terminology it employed, seems more explicable if viewed

as a reorganisation of the protectores by his successor. The appearance of

the protector ducenarius and the centurlo protector at just this point cannot

be merely coincidental.

As a centurio protector, Muclenus appears to have benefitted from the

title in much the same way as the protect ores Ga11ien4 but on a more

mundane scale. Dobson and Breeze noted that those who progressed from the

evocati usually went in one of two directions. Either they entered the

legionary centurionate, where they remained; or they were promoted into the

garrison of Rome, through which they progressed to the Primipilate1.

Mucianus was unusual in doing both.

Beginning as cent urlo protector legionis XIII Geininae, he was then

centurio protector vigi.lum, centur.io protector urbanicianus and centurio

protector cohortis V praetoriaa Much has been made of the lack of unit

numbers for the cohortes vigilurn and urbanae. Pflaum believed this meant

the posts were not effective, and Christol argues that they were sinecures

designed to keep Mucianus within the field army while rising through the

cursus. However, as the career of Volusianus illustrates 3, the emperor had

no need for such convoluted measures, If he wanted to bypass the natural

ordo for a particular favourite, he simply did so. I also find it very

difficult to believe that the emperor would concern himself so greatly

I, Dobson and Breeze, locc, citt, (above),

2, Pflaum, 168R 1112, 42; Christol, 'Traianue Mucianus', 401,

3, XId836 ' /LS)332; discussed in detail above on pp.249 & 258ff,—273-


with the career of an individual NCO, since even the favoured Volusianus had

to progress beyond the Primipilate before Gallienus started to take a hand

in his career.

Yet we should not discard Pflaum's hypothesi8 out of hand. The very

fact that Mucianus was marked as a protector indicates patronage of some

sort. The most likely patron in this case is Heraclian. Mucianus' later

career suggests that he had entered the centurionate very young, since he

held in all twenty-one posts after his evocatlo of which only the first six

preceded the Prirnipilate. The urban appointments are unusual in not having

unit numbers attached to them 1 , and the simplest explanation is that they

were fictional posts. While the emperor may not have needed to preserve the

niceties of the career structure, perhaps the Preetorian Prefect did. Yet

this suggests that the centurlo protectorate was under his jurisdiction, for

which there is not a shred of evidence 2. If anyone was hoping to preserve

the niceties, it is more likely to have been Mucianus or the inscriber

himself, Ironing out the percieved incongruities in the inscription. However,

it is worth noting that at one other point, and maybe a second, the

inscription lacks unit numbers where they might have been expected3,

1, cf, Pflaum, bc, cit,; 111 . 3126 & Xl'1836 ' ILS 1332 are already cited examples of the usual

terminology for the urban cohorts, though these are of tribunician rank and not centurions, Could it

be that the urban centurionate did not follow the same conventions? It seems unlikely,

2. Though it is worth noting that the protectores of the later empire came under the authority ofthe various lagistri ai1itia in whose districts they served: Haldon, Byzvitine Praetorians, 130,

3, ,,sr,s,a' ipor,, discussed below in the following paragraph, The title r,i, At$)oeptvevJ,

might also require a unit number, though not enough is known of the Liburnae to be sure, Domaszewski,Rangodmin 189,

-274-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Protectores

indicating a certain amount of sloppy workmanship,

The next appointment of Mucianus was that of ,rpvxurct rpo. Domaszewski

read this to mean 7tLXLJt porOptopciw), and was under the assumption that

a coflegium of protectores existed among the praetorians, with a princeps

protectorum at its head 1 . This has been unanimously refuted, and the more

logical reading IrpLvxiira' rrpoi(tperoper) put in its place2. Christol would like

to interpret this as (cent urlo) pri.nceps protector, arguing that the post of

princeps preceded the Primipilate on occasion 3. It is a perfectly reasonable

explanation, as long as one accepts that the next post in the cursus must be

primus pilus. However, Christol does not want Mucianus to be a primus pilus,

since this would remove him from the field army, and argues that the Greek

npeipot. should be completed rpsLpovr(tthpIov)4. This alters nothing, since

irpEIporr lJ. QLOV is simply the Greek equivalent of prirnipilaris, and the

primipilaris was nothing more than a man who had been a prim us pilus5.

Therefore, in the natural order of things, Mucianus should have become a

primus pilus', at which point he must either have been a (cent urlo) princeps

1, Oomasewski, Raiigordning, 188,2, Babut, 'la garde impêriale,,,', Rev, Hisi, 114 (1913), 244 n,4 Keyes, Equites, 43f n,16

Pilaus, 168R 1112, 42; iii cited in Christol, 'Traianus Nucianus', 403f nn,30-41,

3, Christol, 404, citing XI'5215 1LS2650,

4, Christol, op. cit., 405, The priaipiiares were a corps of veterans who could be seconded tothe emperor and important commanders on campaign; Domaszewski, op. cit., 116f; Durry, cchortespritoriennes, 21f; Dobson, '.,,Primipilaris in the Roman Army,', ANRU 11 . 1, 399ff; all cited in

Christol, 405 n,44,

5, Dobson, op. cit., 396ff,

6, Dobson and Breeze, 'Rome Cohorts', 106f,

-275-


protector et primus pilus 1 , or a primus pilus protector et primipi1ar1.

The one post we cannot reasonably omit is the Primipilate. The Greek sits

most comfortably with the former interpretation, for which Christol himself

provides the perfect Latin parallel in XI5215. However, it is worth noting

that an example of a primipilaris protector exists In AE,1954,135 from Aioun

Sbiba in Algeria.

At this point, just as he was rising above the hierarchy of a career

soldier into the wider vistas of the equestrian cursus honorum, Mucianus

'passed out' of the protectorate4 . This was a complete departure from all

that had gone before in two fundamental ways. First, it meant that Mucianus

left the protectores earlier than any of his predecessors is known even to

have joined them. Secondly, his very leaving established that the

protectorate was no longer a permanent office. In effect, Mucianus had

become ex pro tectoribus.

These waters are muddy. It is possible that the terminology on most

protectorate inscriptions is simply imprecise, and that by protector the

formula ex protectoribus is intended. Yet with regard to the early

protectores this does not entirely convince. By the late third century the

terminology had become undeniably sloppy. Under Diocletian the terms

1. Greek: ,'svxau ror(roa) (irs) ipsjio,(sov),2, Greek: ravA1ia ror4'xroa) (tvs) rpcsj'o,(a'pov),3, XI . 5215 ' ILS 2650: ,,,cent, frui, subpriricipi peregrinorua adsfato et prinicip etpriiipiio

Jig, V/I 6ei, ph (sjc) Ii!,,,4 Line 81: ...ix rev t..,..) äiticopcv&v itporqrropav.,,

-276-


protector, protect or-i, ex protect ore and ex protect on bus seem freely

interchangeble'. However, it bears repeating that under Gallienus all known

protectores were protectores Augusti nostri and even in the post-Gallienic

period, the terminology remained reasonably precise. One was either a

protector, or ex protectoribus. Only the anonymous primipilaris of Aloun

Sbiba2 was protectorL On the other hand, the existence of two ducenaril ax

pro tectoribus does suggest that the title of the protectores ducenari.i was

not entirely fixed. A progressive deterioration in the mode of address for

prot ect ores seems to have occurred, such that more than one term for a

specific situation had come into use a decade after the death of their

founder.

An alternative explanation is available. It is possible that a division

ocurred within the protectorate after the accession of Claudius, creating on

the one hand the cent un ones prot ect ores and on the other protect ores

ducenarli By this argument, the two ducenarii ex protector-thus would be

centurions who had advanced to ducenariate appointments after mustering out

of the protectores while the other protector-es ducenaril would still be in

the protectorate. However, a couple of inscriptions confuse the issue. Our

man from Aloun Sbiba held at least one other post as a protector

following his elevation into the Primipilate. He is supported by M. Aurelius

'1I ' i'io; , g0z sTJ.L ri I-i$-iqr' e ia. au ; ?.Zi.

2, A195i,135 mentioned above, p276,3. 111 . 1805; AI907,70,

-277-


Processanue, who Wa8: ...ex cent(urione) praet(oriae) cohort(is) VI

prot(ectori) ducenario... 1 . The term protectori here has a pivotal position,

where it could apply either to the centurionate or to the ducenarlate or to

both. If it does apply to both, it provides a link between the centuriones

prof ect ores and their ducenariate counterparts. Failing this, on the

strength of these two Inscriptions we must exercise caution, since they

indicate that not every centurio protector left the office on passing the

Primipilate.

The ex pro tectoribus career of Tralanus Mucianus was a confused and

repetitive hotch-potch of appointments. As such, it cannot be viewed as

typical. In certain cases, he seems to have held the same extraordinary

commands more than once2 . On other occasions, he was the praefectus

legionis of at least three, and maybe four, separate legions 3. It is not

even certain whether he held all the usual urban tribunates, and he

definitely did not hold them in succession 4. It is clear, however, that while

his employment was wide-ranging, it was not getting him very far. The most

prestigious post he is thought to have achieved was that of praeses

provinciae Rae flee5 . This was at best a third echelon appointment, and herein

I, XI'837 • ILS 2778,2, fffll7y0V 1q', K4aol, its I •a$,, lines 9-10 & 20-21; frparI'o rev iaAsv trr,otccQopcvaY

icev its tllceY Map.v its Jrpoqvev, lines 11-13 (where Doe, has wrongly restored ,pai,ocirov inplace of fr,arqyov) & 15-20; urpa'ryoy rev Bpsrr, its epic, lines 14 (wrongly restoringipi'sioairov again) & 21-22,

3, Legio III 6eaina, line 17; Leglo 11 Tralana, line 20; and an unspecified legion inMesopotamia, lines 15-li, He was also iiapx, 4cj, 6 AiI, on line 9, but this was more likely to havebeen as praefecus castrorue than as priefectus Jegionis a, i', I,, assuming of course that the two postswere not identical,

4, rps, 8yovi, and rpsB, dpB, on lines 10-11 are sensible restorations by Doaaszewski, giventhe context, They are separated from the praetorlan tribunate (also a restoration, line 15) by threeextraordinary commands,

5, 111 . 5785, Line 23 of our inscription might be restored as apftvtra'Pasrsiç,-278-


11e8 the importance of the Mucianus inscription. For all its foibles, it

clearly thdicate8 that a man who started as a centurio protector might gain

rapid and preferential promotion up to the Primipilate, but could still only

hope for a mid-level appointment in the ducenariate cursus, despite having

held a multiplicity of equestrian posts prior to this.

Several problems remain. It is not clear whether Mucianus occupied so

many positions due to competence or incompetence, and his obvious pride in

his achievements militates neither way. By this coin, it is impossible to

tell whether his final promotion was above or below the norm for his class.

Comparison with the ducenerli protectores puts it on a par with their best

achievements, and opens another can of worms. As an ex centurlo protector,

was Mucianus a protector ducenarius, or had he left the protectorate

completely? The question has already been discussed above, with no

satisfactory conclusion. Since the qualification ex protectoribus obviously

meant something to its holders, and since Mucianus so fortuitously ended his

career at the same point as most ducenarii prot ect ores, I am inclined to

believe that he was one, and that a protector ducenarius was simply a member

of the protectorate 'club' who had gained ducenariate status. In the absence

of further evidence, the point must remain debateable.

It is clear, though, that sometime, probably under Claudlus, the

protectorate was downgraded to come into the reach of centurions. We can

guess that Claudius was responding to pressure from below. Those brilliant

few who were brought into the officer ranks by Gallienus must have acted as

beacons beckoning to the mass of less fortunate NCOs who saw this as a new

way forward. With Gallienus deed, Claudius may have seen an expansion of

the protectorate as an easy means to several ends. On one hand, it improved

his standing with the centurions, who were a key to controlling the army,

-279-

M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Protectores

irate at the murder of their commander'. In addition, it was a sweetener to

the Senate 1 with whom he wanted friendship2, since by downgrading the

protectorate in this way, it diminished the prestige of the appointment and

relegated the privilege it accrued to advancement within the centurionate as

opposed to within the equestrian cursus. This must have distanced the

emperor from the protectorate in some way, even if it did not go so far as

to place its administration into the hands of the Praetorian Prefect. By

doing this, it depersonalised the protectorate and removed the cabal, of

which he had been a part, that had decided the previous emperor's fate. It

may not be coincidence that no protectores Augusti are extant from the reign

of Cleudius.

Whether these thoughts passed through the emperor's mind is a moot

point. Yet any one of them is a valid reason for the reorganisation of the

prot ect ores. On the whole, this was a downward move, destroying the elite

nature of the protectorate but retaining some of the mystique. Men were

now proud to call themselves protector who had not even equalled the lowest

achievements of the title's pioneers. In many cases, protector was the only

achievement engraved upon their epitaphs3.

Under Diocletian, a few men appear holding offices equivalent to those

of the average protector Gall1eni Viatorinus was the most successful of

these, as vicerius Divit (i)e ch)sI (s). Aurelius Flrmthus became praef. leg. II

Adi. ex pro tectore, and Flavius Julianus was heralded as ex protectore et ex

I, los, 1 . 11; M4, 6a11, IV'3,2, Alfoldi, CARX! (1939), 191.

3. cf, Tables P3 4,

-280-


praeposito1 . The bias of the sample against pre-Diocletianic examples may

be circumstantial. At the same time 1 it is worth noting that even If

Mucianus were to ignore his two Urban centurionates and hold each of his

promotions for just one years he would still only just be eligible for an

appointment as praefectus leglonis by 2842.

In equating the term ex protectore alongside the term ex preeposito,

lulianus' reference reinforces the suspicion that there was now a definite

point at which one ceased to be a member of the protectorate; though the

proliferation of terms in the period makes it Impossible to tell when that

was. Considering the material discussed above (p.V'), it seems likely that

the point was not fixed in any definite way. The tenacity with which people

held on to their association with the office is testimony to its continuing

importance9.

The notion of a split in the protectores, with regard to ducenaril and

centuriones, has already been discussed and cautiously discarded. Yet at

some point in the fourth century a split did occur between the protectores

and a new corps entitled protectores domestici The domestici of the late

empire were, as the title implied, a corps of protector'es stationed at court.

Their duties seem originally to have been as guards or aides to the emperor,

and by dint of their privileged position, they came to have a higher

1, Viatorinus, Al889,65; Firminus, 111 • 10406; lulianus, III'8741, insecurely dated, All have

been discussed above, p.269,

2, This somewhat frivolous statistic assumes that he held his first centurion's post in 270, and

achieved both Urban tribunates, Vhile his career is indubitably abnormal, it is still the only

'Protectorate' career froa the Claudio-Aurelianlc period which terminated in a reasonably prestigious

ducenarlate appointment, Even under the most auspicious circumstances, that appointment still dates

to Diocletian,

3, cf, T!: '. p.2.7? .i. I.

-28 1-


status than that of the ordinary protector-es and guard unitsl. They are

generally assumed to have come into being some time after 3502.

This date may be somewhat late, if a furierary monument from Moesia

Inferior is to be credited. The monument, erected by one M. Bitianus

prot(ector) domes(ticue) in memory of his mother and father, was discovered

by Dobrusk at Comakovci (Bulgaria), and has been tentatively dated in the

PLRE to the late third or early fourth century. This is the only

attestation I can find to the domestici at such an early date, discounting

the literary references to Diocletian, which are surely apocryphal 4. Given

the dubious nature of its date, I am disinclined to give it credence

With the exception of the above, little can be said about the

pro tectores of Diocletian that has not been said before.

There remains one other protectorate designation which requires

di cussion. The title protector divini later-is appears three times in the

corpus, with complete disregard for period but otherwise conforming

absolutely to the patterns described above.

Aurelius Faustus is termed prot. divini lateris Aug. n. in a dedication to

an unknown emperor found at Ocriculum in Umbrias. Given that the emperor's

name has been erased, and the term is a permutation of the pr-ot. Aug. n.

I, Haldon, lyzantine Praetorlans (1984), 134ff: Jones, Later Rotan Eapire (1964), 636ff,2, Haldon, 130,

3, Qobrusk, $bornik 18, 798; AE,1902,141 111 . 14412'; PLRE H. Bitiarnis, presumably on the5trength of 0obrusk's report,

4, Victor Caci, XXXIX'I, doa'eg ticos regeiis Zon, XII'31, ouiç doucorixa $/M, Carl, XIII'l,doiesticoi twic regentea, All must be extrapolating from their own period, and knowing thatDiocletian was a protector assume that he was in command of the doaesticl,

5, XI'4082 • !LS4002,

—282-


formula, it seems most probable that the subject of the dedication was

Gellienus.

M. Aurelius Valerius, v.p. ducen(ar-iJus ex protectorib. lateri(sJ divi.nl

paid for the restoration of the public baths at Naroria (Dalxnatia) in AD 280;

dated by the consulate of Messala and Gratus1.

Aurelius Malor, ex protectoribus divini later-is, erected a monument to

his dead wife at IJipiana in Moesia Inferior, sometime during the reign of

Diocletian, though the dating is unsure2.

The only thing special about any of these is their terminology. The

phrase protector divini .Zateris seems to highlight the guardian's function of

the office. Perhaps the addendum divini later-is differentiated between the

ordinary protector, holding an independent command simultaneous with the

ff ice, and the actual bodyguards of the emperor, the 'protectors of the

divine flank' who were required to attend his person and quite literally

watched his back. Unfortunately, this seems exactly what the protector-es

domes tici were created to do. Even discounting the possibility that the

domes tici were in existence under Diocletian, which would have generated two

identical offices under different names, it seems unlikely that the they

would have been created to replace the protector-es divini later-is.

Considering the preoccupation of the Dominate with the trappings of office,

the divinity of the household and the adoratici3, what would effectively be

the renaming of the grandiloquently styled protector-es divini later-is as the

rather more mundane protector-es domes tici seems Increasingly less probable.

I, 111.1805,2, ,Q(,198),731,3,Jones, LR 636ff,

-283-

M.C.Ibejl: C3 Army. Protectores

A simpler explanation is that the term protector divini .lateris was the

full title of the original Gallienic office. The short form protector was

usually used on inscriptions and official documents for reasons of space, and

the somewhat cumbersome longer form was only used by those of a pedantic

nature, with enough money and space to Include it.

We have now reviewed the full corpus of material concerning the early

prot ect ores. Few definite conclusions can be reached, but it is possible to

make some general comments.

It would seem that Diesner was right in assuming that the protectorate

preceded Gallienus, though it dates even earlier than the 250s and can have

resembled the protectores Augusti in structure only, perhaps solely in name.

What began as a grade of principalis may have been converted by Gallienus

into a beneficiarius of the emperor. The process was linked in some way to

the rise of the yin m.LZit ares, and was probably a badge of privilege for

humble equestrians in whom the emperor had a personal Interest. Certainly,

the pro tectores Gallieni had no common feature other than humble origins in

those for whom an origo can be deduced. Those who had the ability rose to

great prominence as provincial governors and generals. Voluslanus, perhaps

the greatest of them all, achieved the consulate after becoming praefectus

prae t orb.

The nature of the office was radically altered by Claudius. Opening it

up to centurions seems to have been a deliberate move to reduce the

importance and permanence of the position. Until Diocletian, no protector

gained the heights of the great men who had held the title in its heyday.

The resurgence of the protectores under that emperor was probably less a

matter of policy than a function of the career structure. Lacking the

-284-


helping hand of the emperor, any protector who rose through the centurionate

during the 270s was unlikely to have progressed far along the equestrian

cursus by 284. Dobson was of the opinion that without imperial favour few

primipilares attained procur'atela within twelve years after the Primipilate1.

Therefore no amount of preferential treatment within the ceriturionate was

going to make a centurio protector of Claudius eligible for high office

before the reign of Diocletian.

At fir8t an honorific for privileged yin militares, the term must have

fulfilled the same sort of function for centurions after its downgrading by

Claudius. This would explain why not all centurions in the last quarter of

the century received the title, since it remained a badge of privilege, to be

earned by those worthy of it. Whether it still denoted imperial patronage is

a moot point. It seems to have retained something of its original aura of

influence, since in the latter part of the century people were still aping

the forms that had gone before, though with far less precision. By this

time, the office had become institutionalised, but was a pale reflection of

the original creation. At some point, it became a guard unit, possibly with

the creation of the protectores domes tici and gradually lost all resemblance

to the office of Gallienus, so that by the sicth century it was simply one of

the many scholee within the Paletinate2.

Yet one need not follow its history quite so far to illustrate its

dynamic nature. Even under Diocletian, the protectorate resembled the

institution created by Gallienus in superficial terms only. The office was

1, Dobson, 'Primipilaris' 425 & nn,80 & 144,

2, Haldon, 8yzantine Praetorians, 130ff,

-285-


no longer permanent, its terminology no longer precise. In form it more

closely resembled the protectores ducenarli of Claudius than the protect ores

Augusti of his predecessor. No more than fifty years had passed, yet any

attempt to di8cern the nature of the original protectores from the examples

found under Diocletian would be doomed to failure. Only by identifying each

individual phase of their evolution, end examining these phases as discrete

entities, can the complicated and confusing nature of the protectores finally

begin to unravel.

-286-

mABL.E P 1:

G11irii AL&lti Mc,tri

N. . C. Ef. P. Th. E. CAl 11 BL Il. E. .VI. Q.B EQUESTER

Aelianus -----------p praes, Maur, Caesariensis

Marcellinus -----------p praes, Maur, Catsariansis

Marc Linus ------------ 600 xai ,rpavAa'riir

Victor ------------praes, Maur, Caes, prot.

CV]italianus --------_______________________

REFERENCES

111 . 3529; gE,1965,9

111 . 3424 1LS545

1965, 114

4E 1910,108

III3228

Volusianus x x 2 x - x x p - - praef, vigilum; PPO; cos, X1•1836 = ILS 1332

arn, --------x p - - II1•3126

7 Sabinimnus ---------?p - - proc. duc, Dalmatia 111.8571 = 1985

NOTES.

1, As (ptaepos)itus rexx, itgg, 6ari, et, Brit,, he is •ost likely to have held the command at any point within thisbracket, though he could have held it earlier: cf, App,2: 'Traianus Mucianus',

2, praepoiitus equitue singiilarior(u&, This is his first extraordinary command: PLRE Voiusianus 6,

p fIrs attestation of protectorate; x post attested; 9 post uncertain,

M miles eques; C centurio; PP primus pilus; PC praef, coh,; TM = trib, uil,; PA praef, alae CAS praef,

castrorum; TV ' trib vigilum TU = trib, urb,; TP = trib, praet,; PB primus pilus bis; AVL = praef, leg, a,v,1,

-287-

Claudius

Ma cianus

Postu us

TABLE P 2:TI-i Gr r- 1 c f G 111 ri t.i

NAME

Aureolu

Aurellan

N. . E. PC. t. EA. C.I LL BL I. Ei i& ATTESTED MILITARY APPOINTHENTS

x -----------dux exercitus in Illyricum vs rebels;

hipparch; dux Alpium

- - - x - - ? 1 7 - - hipparch of cavalry from Danube exercitus detache

to fight Aureolus at Milan

- - - - x - - ' I I - - I dux Illyrici

x - - 60D( xai rrpac7Aar7ç

I dux/praeses in Gaul

KEY:

p fi m attestation of protectorate' x ' po5t attested 7 post uncertain,

N ' miles iques, C ' cm tu lo PP • primus pilus; PC z praef, coh,; TN : trib, .i,; PA = praef, alae; CAS praef,

castroru ' TV ' trib vigilu.; TV • tub, urb,; TP tub, praet,; PB primus pilus bis; AVL = praef, leg, a,v,l,

-288-

Florus

Hatena

Pate rnus

Processa us

Roaanus

Valerius

TABLE P 3:Di-iri I Prct ct cr

NAN

Aellanue

E. E. I. A. 1 I. IJL If. Et .VL QR.EQUESTER REFERENCES

censitor Norici 1907, 70 = !L$94

proc. in Italia; proc. argent, Pann,

proc. Epirus; ducenarius ex protectoribus

prot, ducEen,] AE1964,256

pro(t,) duc, 111.6439

ducenario protE V'5833

- 1 ----------ye, prot, ducenario X1'837 ILS 2778

protector ducenarius XII.2576

ducenarius ex protectoribus 111.1805

lateris divini

NOTES.

I v iro gregio s cent(urione) prut(orae) cobort(s) WI prot(ec tori) ducenario,

p fIre attestation of protectorate; x • post attested; ? = post uncertain,

ii lee eques, C centu lo, PP • prisus pilus, PC praef, coh,; TN = trib, .11,; PA praef, alae; CAS = praef,

castroru., TV ' trib, igilu. TU trib, urb, IP = trib, praet,; PB = pri.us pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a, v.1,

-289-

NN

Cons tans

Kalandinus

axi sinus

Mucianus

Rosanus

anon,

rABLE }' 4:Cr2t LiFi Pt X

M. . E. P. Itci a a ia EB. A'& RDC1 EQUESTER

- -----

- ------

2p 3p - - - 4 1 1 5- 6 7 V.P. praes, Raeiia

- -----------

7p p 8

REFERENCES

X1I1'8291

111.10509

1919 74

IQRRI . 1496 = ILS

94792 A19O8,259

1658 1112 1570; als

111.5785

XIII'8273

AE1954 1 135

NOTES.

I ii 1e5 Ccb, I ConcordIen5m 5 leg, II Par thica', eqiies cob, VII Praetoriae, e roca tus,2, cenfurio protector leg. XIII 6einae, cob, Vigilut, cob, Urbaniciani ef co/i, V Praetoriae,3, (centuno) princeps protector et prisus pilus, cx protector/bus,4. pracl, leg, IV Flav,ae, praep, legg, VII Claudiae et IV Flay/ac,5, trib, Liburnorui praep ped. et eq. Haur, et Osrh,, praep, Butt, et explor,, fr/b, cob, P Praet,6 pract. leg, agens in Hesop,, prae!, leg, 1111 6e., a, v, I,, praep, ped. e t eq. flaur, e f Osrb,, praci', leg, II It,,praep, Iegg, VII Cl, et Iv Fl,, praep, Sri ft. ef explor,7, centu,io IV Fl, et protect on ilea ceinturilo leg, 111 A, lid tpraep,J a/ac Parthorutal,8, The top of the inscription has broken, leaving: ,. , ,,,,,,Jil protec(fori1

p firs attestation of protectorate; x = po5t attested; ? = post uncertain,

N •iles/eques, C ' centurio; PP primus pilus: pc = praef, coh,; TN trib, iii,; PA praef, alae; CAS praef.

castroru.; TV trib, vigilum; TU trib, urb,; TP = trib, praet,; PB primus pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a,v,l,

—2 90-

TABLE P :Pr-t t cr Di cc1 t I ri

ef. . II. aa. A1 IiL L If. EL . TITLE/ORDO EQUESTER REFERENCES

Firiinui -----------p ex prot(ectoribus) 111.10406

Viatorinus ------------protector/vicarius divit- ,qE, 1889 65

(i)e(n)sl(s)

p • hr. attestation of protectorate; x post attested: ? • post uncertain,

• alles/aques; C centurio; PP • primus pilus; PC ' praef, coh,; TM trib, iii,; P praef, alae; CAS praef,castroru.; TV • trib, vigIlus; 1(1 ' trib, urb, IF • trib, praet,; PB prisus pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a, v.1,

-29 1-

TABL.E P 6:o t i-i r pr-c, t t c, f r- wi-i m c, m

c - r- r- r- ci i r s I s,

N. C. E. E IN. Fl CA. tIL UL If. Fl YL. QBDQ. EQUESTER

Conitantlus C P? I - - 1 1 7 - - praes, Dal.atia; dux;

imperator

Dioc lea

comiander of the doiesticiimperator

REFERENCES

SHAProb, XXII'3;

(xc, Va!, 1.2

Vict, Cues, XXXIX'l,Zon, XII.31;

$H1q Car, XIII.1

Herodes

1 ----------- cx protec(toribus)

iQE19O7,48 IGRR

1.1481

Severus

protector pr(aeses) p(rov,?) V1.3238

Spec titus

x I Ip III'7535a

•., , tivlua

- I ----------cx protectoribus V1'32945

kOTES

I, ,,,, ii ro cx protecloribus (centurio) classis Rabennatiiia,

p • fin, attestation of protectorate; x • post attested; 1 post uncertain,

• illes/eques; C • centunlo; PP • prl.us pilus; PC • praef, coh,: TM • trib, iii,; PA • praef, alae; CAS praef,castroru.; TV trib, vlgllia TU • trib, urb,; TP • trib, praet,; PB • pri.us pilus bis; AVL praef, leg, a,v,1,

-292-

Augustlinu. ------------dux Nacedonica

Deciaus -----------princeps peregrinorum

v.p. praes, Numidia

Flavianus I -----------vp praes, Numidia

Frontinus x

- x x - - - x x x x x - proc.; praes, Sardinia

praes, Pannonia Sup,

V. p. praes, Arabia

Plarlanus

Plaxisus

Olyipus

mABL.E P 7:Ncr—prct tr-t Eq tx-1ri

. 250-284.

. C. Ef. E.C. IN. E& CA. IiL II IE. EB & QRQ. EQUESTER

REFERENCES

Aniinus -----x ------praes, Arabia

OGI 614; 111,90;

IGRRIII'1287 Syri

6 (1925), 2321,

Aper ------------ v,e, praep, V Nac, et XIII

PLREAper 1 & 2;

Ge.,; PPO

11I'15156: A1936,

53, 54 & 57,

AE 1934,193 inferre

PLREDeci.us 1

VII1'2481, 4325 &

17970; AE,1916,18 &

21

41,1944,85 = III'32

1L2457

VI' 1636

111.4564

IGRRI1I1286; Syn

39(1952), 312,

Paternianus -----------x 111.3469

Silvius --------- - v,e, praes, Pannonia Inf, 111.3424 !L$545

Superinus -----------X 111.4289 !LS3656

Synforlanus ------( 2 1 4 1934, 193

Veteranus -----------x 111.1560 ILS 3845

Ael, Victorinus ------------p,v,(sic) praes, Numidia 41,1908,240

Fl, Victorinus -----------x 1II'3424 = A1964,

Zeno ------------ v.p. praes, Cilicia 4E1915,51,

KEY:

p fir. attestation of protectorate; x = post attested; 7 : post uncertain,

N • .iles/eques; centurio; PP primus pilus; PC • praef, coh,; TM trib, mil PA praef, alae; CAS = praef,castroru.; TV trib, vigilum; TU = trib, urb,; TP trib, praet,; PB pri.us pilus bis; AVL = praef, leg, a,v,l,

-293-

M.C.Ibeji. C3 Army

Grir 1 C 1 L11 cri

XII: VI R TU IL.L. YRI CI AL.LIIJI

It has become a truism of third century studies that the empire was

saved by virtus Illyrici.

As the empire tottered towards destruction, a caste of officers emerged

which was given access to power by the reforms of the emperor Gallienus, and

which by its military genius brought the empire back from the brink. These

officers were distinguished by humble Illyrian origins and almost exclusively

military careers. Quite why the Illyrian soldier emperors should have been

able to achieve what their predecessors had not has never been adequately

explained. Instead, their success has been cloaked In woolly terms such as

genius Illyrici and virtus IllyricZ founded upon a firm assumption of the

military excellence of Illyrian soldier stock1.

The Genius Illyrici Is displayed as a new revelation of Roman patriotism, Roman virtue and Roman

self-sacrifice -- as was only Just, for It was Illyricum that restored the unity of the Empire,2

Such assumptions are founded upon sand. The Illyrian soldier emperors

were as human, as vulnerable and as prone to error as any of their

predecessors, end to date the rise of their caste to the second half of the

third century is blatantly to ignore those less successful Illyrians who had

gone before. Both Maximinus Thrax and Decius were of Illyrian stock, though

neither of their reigns is covered In glory 3. One can partially duck the

I, AlfOldi, CA/I XII, 193 & 2001: Altheim, So/daterikaiser (1939), 265ff esp,275f1 & 286ff; DcBlois, Policy of Gallienus (1975), 86 & 207; Williams, Diocletian and the Rosan Recovery (1985), 24;G, Brauer, The Age of the Soldier Esperors (1975) takes this assumption to extremes,

2, Alfôldl, op, cit,, 200,

3, PuRl 619; Enselin, CAHXII, 72ff: Alfôldi, CAHXII, 165ff,-294-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici

accusation by maintaining that Declus was not of humble origin, but there

can be no such excuse for Maximinus. Even after 250, the number of

Ulyrians whose reigns can be measured in months equals those who are

lauded as the saviours of the empire. True, some had great success in the

short time allotted them, but what of Quintillus, or the hapless Numerian1?

How many of the short-lived emperors and usurpers whose power-base was in

Danube provinces, both before and after Gallienus, came from the same

Ulyrian stock as Claudius, Aurelian, Probus or Diocletian? Even these

restorers of the empire had their own fair share of problems. It is worth

remembering that of them all, only Diocletian managed to last more than five

years.

Virtus Illyrici is not in itself an adequate explanation for the recovery

of the empire, military or social. Too many exceptions, or possible

exceptions, abound for it to be seen as the all-embracing panacaea some

would have us believe. The question must be asked: what is it that

distinguishes Claudius, Aurelian, Probus (and possibly Carus) from their

contemporaries end their predecessors that enabled them to pave the way for

Diocletian to create the Tetrarchy?

Historical accident is no more adequate an explanation than virtus

Iflyrici itself. The cycle of plague and disaster which had been ravaging

the empire since AD 240 did not let up at this point, on the contrary it

removed Claudius Gothicus from the empire's service2. That this was the

last recurrence of the great plague will have been little solace to Aurellan

as he strove to reunite a sundered empire; for who could tell that this

1, Alfoldi, C4HXII, 192; Mattingly, CAHXII, 3221,

2, Zos, I46 . 2; $114 C1ud, XII'2-3 ci, ch,II: /fanpciver, p.52,

-295--

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici.

would be the case, and how could such knowledge have mitigated its immediate

effects? The absence of plague In the mid-280s may go some way to explain

why Diocletiari was able to maintain the stability that had been created, but

cannot explain how that stability came about. The cycle of warfare had

certainly not let up. Claudius was immediately faced by an Alemannic

invasion of Italy and was embroiled for the rest of his reign in an

interminable Gothic war 1 . As if the reconquest of Palmyra and the Gallic

empire were not enough, Aurelian was faced with another invasion of Italy 60

traumatic that it prompted the fortification of Rome itself, and he also had

to deal with Vandals on the Danube2. Probus fought Franks in Gaul, Vandals

and Goths in Illyricum, Isaurians in Asia Minor, usurpers in the West and was

assassinated as he turned his attention eastwards 3. The end of each reign

was punctuated by a series of vicious civil wars, as minor players Jockeyed

for position4. The situation had not become any easier than in earlier

decades: with the restoration of the empire as an added burded it had in

some respects become more difficult.

Therefore, it is in the individual abilities of these emperors, their

virtue I11yrici. that the empire's salvation must be found. Yet this genius

would have availed nothing if it was exercised in isolation. The third

century abounds with measures that came to naught due to their abandonment

by later emperors. Caracalle discarded all his father's work In Scotland the

minute he was dead; the excesses of Elagabalus and the caution of Alexander

1, Alfóldi, CAMXII, 156; Vict, Epit, XXXIY'2,2, Hatiingly, CAM XII, 298ff,3, Nattingly, op. cit., 314ff,

4. op. cit., 192, 311ff & 321ff,

-296-

M.C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici

sacrificed all the loyalty to their house carefully nurtured by the early

Seven; and Philip the Arab abandoned all of Gordian III's gains in Persia by

rushing back to Rome in his bid for the purple'. These are the most blatant

examples, yet the whole of the century is permeated by more subtle

variatione on the theme2.

The distinguishing factor of virtus Illyrici is one of continuity. This

is what marked its success. Unlike the emperors who preceded them, the

successors of Gallienus seem to have had a unity of purpose, a concordance

of ideas, which was to serve the empire well. Though not an Illynian,

Gallienus himself should be included in the list, for it is his reign and his

reforms which created the climate in which virtue Iflyr'ici could flourish.

He gathered around himself a group of able soldiers in whom he placed his

trust and with whom he could formulate and enact the revolutionary changes

which were to save the empire. The career structure was streamlined to

bring able men to the fore. Those able men were given command of new

units, cavalry, permanent vexillations and strategically vital provinces. The

most able of them were gathered around the emperor, forming an entourage of

highly skilled generals who can almost be seen as a general staff. Whether

they helped the emperor to formulate his ideas of defence, or whether they

were simply indoctrinated into them does not really matter; it is enough to

know that men like Aureolus, Claudius, Aurelian and Marcianus were an

integral part of the great military upheaval which occurred at this time.

From this group of men were to come two emperors with very similar

I, CAWXII, iii; 56 & 71; 88,

2, Such as the withdrawal froc the Saharan Atlas under Bordian, or the events on the Pannonian

frontier following the reorganisation under Caracalla, cf, ch,Y: Auxilia, pp.112 & 118,

—297-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici

methods of defence, the latter of whom was to pass on these concepts to his

protegé, Probus. Taken together, the reigns of Gallienus, Claudius Gothicus,

Aurelian and Probus span a period of some twenty-six years (c.255-282), a

quarter of a century interrupted by less than eighteen months of interregna,

during which it is possible to see some form of continuity in defensive

thought.

I have very deliberately been avoiding the term 'policy', since to talk in

terms of defensive 'policy' would be highly misleading. De Blois has argued

convincingly that the majority of Gallienus' defensive measures were ad hoc

responses to threats 88 and when they arose, and owed little or nothing to

forward planning 1 . This is certainly true from a geographical and temporal

standpoint. Major access routes were fortified and garrisoned only when

their vulnerability became apparrent. Equestrians came to the fore because

senators were no longer doing their job. Cavalry and permanent vexillations

speak more of stretched resources than of grand strategy. Yet behind these

mea ures there runs a very strong concept of what was needed to defend the

empire, and of the paramount importance of that empire. Defence-in-depth

may not have been a 'grand strategy' in Luttwak's sense2, but it was an

ideology which can be found firmly ingrained in the reactions of Gallienus

and his 8uccessors. Other revolutionary concepts were equally strongly held.

The rise of the equestrians may not indicate imperial antipathy towards the

Senate, but it would be a foolish historian who missed the strong belief of

these soldier-emperors in the worth of the equestrian class. The continuity

J. Di Blois, Policy of &ilienui 32,2, Lutiwak, 6rand $tategy of the Roian Eapire (1976), ch,3, 127ff,

-2 98-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Virtus I1].yrici

is there, but it is not a continuity of policy, it is a continuity of concept,

of ideas and belief. No system was followed; each emperor responded fluidly

to the circumstances of his time. Yet the manner in which they responded

was remarkably similar, and followed patterns laid out during the formative

reign of Gallienus.

Continuity of thought is hard to prove. Who can say that, in their

continued use of the equites, Claudius and Aurelian were continuing and

refining an idea which they had helped to formulate, rather than simply

poaching a good idea from an earlier reign? We know that Aurellan had

first hand experience as a cava]ry commander, and there is some

circumstantial evidence that the Milan garrison continued to include cavalry

during his reign, perhaps even into the fourth century 1 . Unfortunately,

Zosixnus omits to describe the battles fought by Probus in anything but the

sketchiest of details, and though we might see shades of' Aurelian in the

methods used to defeat the Burgundians, the evidence for cavalry in his

reign can hardly be termed as conclusive 2. Claudius' rapprochement with the

Senate and his downgrading of the protectores might be seen as a direct

contradiction of this supposed continuity. Yet we have seen that he had

alternative motives for the move, and the protectorate did not lose its

importance, though Its status was reduced. It has already been noted that

friendship with the Senate does not automatically mean enmity towards the

I, Two coma expounding virius equii(d) come from the ilan-Ticinum mint under Aurelian: R.ICV.1

Aur, 100 & 115, A nuierus Iiliafarwa in Transpadanum was commanded by an exarchos which Fiebiger

identified am a Junior cavalry officer of the later Roman empire, though a si;nifer and a centurlo are

also mentioned: V . 5823, 7000 & 7001; Fiebiger, RE 1552,2, Zom, l'68, Probum, outnumbered, split the barbarian force by luring some across the river,

Later, he attacked the barbarians as they retreated from the empire, Does this indicate that he was

harassing them with the cavalry?

3, cf, ch,XI: Proiectoresp,279f,

-299-

M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici

equites. Equestrians did not stop being praesides on the death of

Gallienus'.

Despite such ambiguities, it is still possible to identify the same

concept of empire, and similar ideas for the defence of that empire, in the

actions of Gaflienus and his successors. Even Gallienus, who was forced to

accept the de facto shrinkage of his empire, can be seen to have striven for

its restoration to the best of his restricted ability. He pursued the

reconquest of the Gallic Empire almost to the point of his death, and was

preparing to return Palmyra to the fold, only to be forestalled by the

massive Gothic invasion of AD 2672. The expedition of Placidianus indicates

that Claudius also, swamped as he was by invading barbarians, had not given

up entirely on the Gallic Empire3 The reconquering fervor of Aurelian and

Probus has never been in doubt. None of this should be any more surprising

than the indications in their day-to-day defence of the empire that these

emperors were using identical techniques.

Among such techniques was the pattern of fortification initiated by

these men. The limes facing the most active enemies was strengthened

wherever it was necessary, and all major routes of access into the hinterland

commonly used by invaders were fortified and garrisoned. This was not an

overall policy of empire-wide defence, it was a series of knee-jerk reactions

to circumstances in which the knees all jerked the same way. While Gallienus

strengthened the defences of northern Italy, Pannonia and Macedonia; Aurelian

and Probus fortified the Gallic hinterland and Rome 4. Perhaps the best

I, cf, ch,X: Viri Militates,

2, Alfôldi, CMXII, 117 & 186,

3, Aflöldi. op, cii,, 192; XI1'2228 ' uS 569,

4, ct, ap 3: 4ttasted 6arrisons and fortifications of the C7,

-300-

1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.

15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.

25.26.

27.28.

29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.

r°........

I1çJ V

MAP 3: ATTESTED GARRISONS AND FORTIFICATTONS. AD 253-c.284

0 Gallienus o Aurelian 0 ProbusGallic Empire V Uncertain late C3

•AFort

• U A Leg. garr, 90 Fort ifd city

Med lolanurnVeronaColonia AggripinaAthensNicaeaPoetovioSirmiumLychri idusMontanaAquilelaCenabum AurellanaDivioSainarobrivaRornaBurdigalaLiberchies (pre 275)Taviers (pre 275)Braives (pre 275)luliacum (late C3)Heidenberg (late C3)Villerthaus (post 270)Rigomagus (post 275)St. Laurent (c.259/275?)Mandacher Egg (c.260)VindonissaVemana-Betmauer(pre 283)Baisweil (260/273)Rostrum-Nemav lee(270/283)Ratiara (259/268?),Oescus (259/268?)Transmarlsca (259/268?)Durostoruin (259/268?)Troesmls (259/268?)SttlrmenkopfCeesaromagusAgedlnicuinQuadriburgiumFanumBagacumLiesen Ich

kucrcI' r114

I

0

0

SOURCES FOR MAP 3: De Blois, Policy of 6aliienus 36 n,58; von Petrikovits, IRS 61 (1971), pp.180-219;

Saxer, Vexillationen, N2s 102-105 & 107; Sesion, Dioclêtien, p,130 II1 • 12376: V . 3329 & 5869;VII1 • 22765; X11I • 8261; ILS 544 6730 & 8923; 16R8 111.39.

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici

indication that the impetus came fom the mind of Gallienus lies in the Gallic

Emperor, Postumus, another one-time subordinate of Gallienus, whose pattern

of fortification matches and anticipates that of his Illyrian successors.

That such actions were not obvious, despite the barbarian incursions of the

earlier third century, is proven by the fact that they did not begin until

Gallienus came to the throne. Even the permeable frontiers of Africa in the

early third century were largely garrisoned on the periphery, with the legion

at Lambaesis acting as an anchor point'.

The actions of Gallienus and his successors in the Balkans are

especially interesting. The gradual abandonment of Dacia and the relocation

of its troops strengthened not only the provinces on the Lower Danube, but

Pannonia as well. Gallienus had established a dux iustissimus in the passes

to guard Macedonia, and charged a certain (Pan)athenaeus with the task of

fortifying endangered cities. The whole Moesian border was fortified in the

later third century, and Aurelian even took the war across the Danube into

the lands of the Gothic tribes 2. In part, these measures were pre-emptive.

Aurelian must have aimed to cow the Gothic tribes before he turned his

attention eastwards towards Palmyra. Whether Gallienus established his

measures prior to AD 267 is unclear, but would seem likely, since he can

hardly have found the time to so so afterwards. Similar pre-emptive measures

may have been undertaken by Probus in Gaul if the sources can be believed3.

These emperors were also using strikingly similar methods of gaining the

additional troops they needed. No new auxiliary units are to be found after

AD 253, except in the lists of the Notitia Dignitatum. Instead, their place

1,ci, ch,V: uxi1ia, p,llOfi,2, ci, ch,X: Viri MiJItres p.231 for refs: cf, also Nap 3,

3, Nattingly, CAHXII, 315; Zon, XII29; S/IA Prob, XIIl . 8 & XIV; Orosius YII'24,

—30 1-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici

has been taken by units of equites and barbarian troops. When the various

units of equites came into use is almost impossible to tell 1 , but we have

plenty of indications that barbarian auxilia, though not termed as such until

the reign of Constantine, were probably introduced throughout the later third

century. Altheim believed that Gallienus attempted to recruit contingents of

Heruli around 267, when their king, Naulobates, was possibly made consul2.

Claudius is argued by Alföldi and Ensslln to have admitted Germans into the

regular Auxilia, which while it takes things too far does not discount his

recruitment of barbarian irregulars 3. We saw in an earlier chapter that

Aurelian and Probus made extensive use of barbarian troops4. Much of what

the sources have to say are couched in terms more readily associated with

the later Roman empire, yet there is a great deal of independent

corroboration between them, and it is clear from the Notitia that barbarian

units were in existence by the late fourth century. With this in mind, I

think it is fair to say that talk of barbarian recruitment by the successors

of Gallienus was not entirely a figment of historical interpolation.

The reign of Gallienus was a turning point. Shabbily depicted as a

debauched tyrant by a vengeful senatorial tradition5 , he worked tirelessly to

create the conditions by which the empire could be restored and its defence

secured. Outmoded institutions were discarded, and a series of radical

reforms took their place. Though probably intended to do no more than meet

1, cf, ch,VIl: Equites,2, Altheim, So/datenkaiier, 188; Syncellus p,717 (B); Jordanes Ada Gothica XXIII

3, CQH XII, 219 & 379, There ii no evidence fo an influx of barbarian auxiliaries at this time,but the use of barbarian nuieri would fit into the emerging pattern; cf, chY: Auxii.ia,

4, Cf, ch,IX: Foederati,

5, cf, ch,XI: Protectores, p.264 n2,

-302-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici

the needs of the moment, they were comprehensive enough to sow the seeds of

the future. The incorporation of cavalry into the military pantheon gave the

army enough flexibiltiy to deal with the diverse challenges of Palmyrene,

Goth and Gaul1 . Defence-in-depth allowed the empire to ride the hammer-

blows of continuous invasion, and the use of irregulars provided it with the

manpower with which to strike back 2. Yet it was in restructuring the

officer corps, freeing the equestrians to rise swiftly to positions of great

reponsibility3, that Gallienus did the empire his greatest service. For in so

doing, he inculcated those who were to succeed him with the methods needed

for the empire's defence.

Virtue Iflyrici was virtue Gelileni. The Illyrian soldier-emperors did

not succeed simply because of their military prowess. Their actions counted,

as the actions of earlier emperors had not, because when each individual

died, another able commander imbued with the same vision of how to restore

the empire rose to replace him. That vision had its roots in the entourage

of Gallienus. Three emperors rose to prominence through his efforts,

refining their ebilitieB in his company4. One rebelled against him. The

others killed him. It was a sad end for a remarkable man.

Yet his epitaph can be found In the single-minded purpose of his

successors. Imperial life expectancy had not improved; the purple was still

a death shroud; yet those few remarkable individuals able to stamp their

personality onto their reigns were now doing so in the same mariner, and with

1, ci, chh, III & VII: 'onira Coal Ia tut & (QuiteS,2, ci, chh,VI, V & IX: 'exi!iationes, 4uxllia & Foederati,3, ci, chh,X & XI: 'iri Ni/hares & protectores,4, Posiumus (Gallic Emperor 259-268); Claudius Gothicus (268-270); Aurelian (270-275),

-303-

M,C,Ibeji: C3 Army. Virtue Illyrici

the same aims. Eventually, their concerted efforts were to create a stable

platform upon which one of their number could stand to guide the empire

away from the abyss. A humble Illyrian, a vir militaris and even a

protector, the young Diodes was as much a product of the reforms of

Gallienus as any of his predecessors'. We must leave the proper evaluation

of his work to other commentators, though it would seem that he built

extensively upon foundations firmly embedded within the third century2 . By

the time of Constantine (an undeniably brilliant son of Illyricum), the empire

had been steered past its crisis, largely thanks to the Illyrian clique of

which he was a scion.

Once the door to power had been opened to them, the Illyrian generals

worked hard to keep it in their hands, for they truly believed in virtus

I11yrici arid felt themselves best suited to govern the empire. Such

jealous guardianship of privilege had as much to do with the

di proportionate number of Illyrians in high office as did the experience and

skill of the Illyrien soldier stock. The Illyrici worked together to restore

the empire, though they may have done so in the spirit of healthy

competition. A combination of factors - unity of purpose, the loyalty of

the soldiery, a streamlined career structure -- all came together with

genetic brilliance to create the phenomenon of Illyrian genius. Whether the

Illyrians would have succeeded without them, and just how much these factors

1, For Diocletian's origins and early career cf, PLRE Diocletian Se5ton Lliociátien et iiTtrarchj g (1946), 38ff; Jones LRE cap,2; Williams, Diocletian and the Rotan R&overy (1985) 26ff &237 n,20,

2, On Docletian's militiry reforms cf, Van Berches, L Arise ile Dictclêtjen ,, (1952) pt 1Jones, LRE cap 17; Luttwak, Stand Strategy, cap,3 Williams Dxletian and the Roaaii REcer$cap, 7,

—304-

M,C.IbeJi: C3 Army. Virtus Illyrici

were brought about by the Illyrici themselves, is a matter for conjecture.

Here, it is enough to say that if Diocletian and Constantine can be seen as

the crowning examples of virtus Illyrici, Gallienus can be called its adoptive

father.

-305-

M. C. Ibeji. C3 Army

Appridi

APPENDIX 1

TI-a AritLqti Liz cf Vtiti

Up until now, I have studiously avoided any mention of the antlqua legio

of Vegetius, but since Parker's ingenious article of 1932 1 , it would be

inexcusable to write a discussion of the army in the third century without

some reference to it. Modern scholars have always been highly sceptical of

the Epitoma Rel Mil1taris but until recently they have still felt obliged to

give it some credence2. However, the most current orthodoxy is inclined to

reject Vegetius' epitome as en unreliable source for the military composition

of the empire

Vegetius was probably writing some time in the late fourth century, or

early fifth century. Two independent termini are the proclamation of

Arcadius a Augustus in AD 383, mentioned in the text, and a copy of

Vegetius produced some time in the fifth century4 . The epitome is extremely

harsh on Gratian, indicating that he was a sore subject at the time.

Vegetius was a comes arid a vir inlustris, prompting Jones and Martlndale to

believe that he was possibly a finance minister of Theodosius s. Having

1, Veg, II'6; Parker, 'The Antiqua Legioof Vegetius', CQ26 (1932), 137ff.2, watson, Roian $oidie, 26f; Birley, 'Severus & the Roman Army', 68f; Cooper, Origin chill,

36ff who put forward the ingenious argument that it was written as a set of proposals for reform,

3, I am indebted to Dr Nicholas Mimer for sharing with me his knowledge on the Epitoia RelIfilitaris, prior to the publication of his new english translation of Vegetius, with commentary, Muchof what I have to say below is based upon our discussions, though any errors in interpretation are

mine alone,

4, Goffart, 'The Date and Purpose of Vegetius' De Re Hhlitari', Traditbo 33(1977), 65ff; Barnes,'The Date of Vegetius', Phoenix 33 (1979), 254ff,

5, PLRE, Rena tus,

-306-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Appendix 1

written the first book of the epitome independently, he was invited by the

emperor to produce a series of books, which were written as a polemic

against the military. His sketchiness shows that he was not an antiquary,

interested in the details of the antique .Zeglo, but was rather a commentator,

drawing on ancient sources to learn lessons for the present. In particular,

his constant harpthg on the value of citizen troops was most likely an

indirect attack upon the large numbers of barbarian troops of his day, about

whom it was not yet circumspect openly to speak Ill.

Vegetius names some of his sources in two places 1 , and Mimer has

established a highly probable pattern of progression from these. Possibly

starting with the De Re Miiitar.i of Cato the Elder in the second century BC,

his sources may have progressed through Celsus, Frontirius, and some middle

imperial epitome not named, to Paternus. His own epitome is so sketchy and

full of innacuracies tht he probably did not have the originials of these

before him, and it seems likely that he was in fact using a source derived

from Paternus.

That his material dates as far back as the second century BC is

indicated by the confusion he exhibits between the antique leglo and the

ancient republican legions. Throughout, he implicitly carries over

organisetions and assumptions used by Polybius and Livy. At one point, he

talks of soldiers wearing just the breastplate of a cuirass because they

cannot afford chainmail. At another, he talks in terms of manipular

formations, and even mentions hastati and principes though even here he

1, Veg, 1'8: Cato the Elder, Celius, Frontinus, Paternus and the constitwtiones of Augustus1

Trajan and Hadrian; Il • 3: Cato, Frontinus and a/il coipIres,

—307-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army. Appendix 1

confuses the order1.

On the whole, the entiqua leglo of Vegetius does not seem to be

something that existed in reality. When one considers that the size of the

antiqua leglo would have required something in the order of an extra 1,500

men for each legion, at a time when emperors such as Septimius Severus,

Gallienus and Probus were going to extraordinary lengths in search of

resources for the defence of the empire, it seems inconceivable that the

institution could have been introduced. While Parker may be partially

correct in assuming that Vegetius intended to illustrate the legion of the

later third century2, no credence should be given to its description.

1, Veg, 1 . 20; Polyb, VI • 2314-16; Livy VII1'8 . 9-13, ilner also refers to Veg, IIl6 & 11I14,

and coepares Veg,III'20, p.106,6-i with Cato, Re ifulit,, frag,10,

2, Parker, 'Qntiqua Legio', liGf,

-308-

APPENDIX 2

Tri riti Mi.jc j riti

Below is a recension of the career inscription of Traianus Mucianus,

followed by en annotated cursus taken line-by-line. Much of what is said

here is a summary of the discussion to be found in Chapter XI: Protectores

p.27 1ff.

IGRR I1496 = IL.S 9479 = A1908,259 = IGBR 1112 1570. (cf. also von

Domaszewsld, Rangordnung (1967), LVIII-L.D(, 185ff): Tralana Augusta(Stare Zagora), Thrace.

Tpctavov Mouxtavov 5oux (ivaptov)atpctEuOaLEvov v ptr E&] Kov-xop8(t1vatv) xa'. v Xy(uvt) I1cp8(tx), tmrrca xpt(1c)

(i]pattp (taç), oxxt (ov), (xarovtc*pXov) npotiptop5 X€y(uvoc) ly IEJL(tvflç), (xawvtapXov) apot(rxtopa) tyouX(av),

(xa'tov'wpXov) icp[o-]

trxt(opa op avuuavov), xat (xatovtapXov) npot (1xopa) xp"icrcp[at]t (aptac),

[x]ai. nptvxtita npot(xtopa) (xat) lrpEto7t(tXov) Exat] x uvEnavtc*] 6tEpXo,.L Evv ItEpocixto-][p@v, h]cxp ov) XEy (tvoç) 5 Xa (taç), a(tpatryo']

10 [X€y. KX]au5(taç) xai. 5 Xc(taç), (tpt. BvyouX.?](cptP. otp..] tpt(ouvov) At[]oup[vv, atpatyov](rev iraXtv] arpatECu]o[pevv itE]tv][xat liLn€av Mx]u(pov xat] 0aportvv, x(at](atatr'yov v Bpvr]t(ovv) xc*'. pat(opv)

15 (pt. XP'• ... Epatt.] 5ouxrvcp(tov), citaEp-][ov Xytvoç ... flcp8. 7 it]pcxavrcc v MEao(no-](iaita, btap ov X€y. ty] Fci (tvc), atpa'rlyo[v][ .... xcxt] t(v) nc*Xi.v atpatEu[o-](vv nv xa*. trnt]Ec(v) Mcrupcv xat 'O[a-]

20 (povv, apxov Xeiy(tci'voç) B Tpatav(c), citp(a-](iyyov Xcy. KXau5. xczt] S Xa(tcç) xai. Blpvrc.]

[xat 7LXpacop4v np]aavta v 8p[axr'][ I xat &pav[ rcx CPcv tac 7]

( I autou ita[Xtv ......]25 xcxl. iaXtv Xaovta .....

IEtc '(flV uti1ptav (r autou ITrwrptç

CURSUS1,2 ailes coh, (II Concordzenhid: Oomaszewski's argument that this unit was raised from Concordia

In Italy seems sensible, however It is unlikely that it was stationed there under Philip as he

maintains cf, ch,YI: VexiIJationes p,145f,-309-

1,31,41,4

1,51,5

1,61,61,7

1,71,9

1.10

1.101.11

1,111,12

1,14

1,15

M.C.Ibe,ji: C3 Army

Appendix 2

ellis leg, If Par t/,icae,eques coh, VII Praetoriae,evocatus,' The dedications in 168R 1112 1568 & 1569 to Heraclian & his brother by a ucianu5 inTraisna Augusta suggest that Mucianus was a beneficiary of Heraclian's patronage, It so, theservice In the evocati acted as a springboard to the centurionate, so the intervention of thePraetorian Prefect is best placed here as opposed to the centurionate of XIII Gem, as Christolbelieves; Christol, 'Traianus Mucianus', Chironl ( 1977), 397ff;cinturio protector leg, XIII 6esinae, On the leaning of centurioprotectorcf, ch,XI, p,270ff,centurio protector co/i, Vigliwe; Pflaum and Christol believe this and the next post weresinecures, due to the lack of unit numbers, It may be that they were fictional posts, added tothe cursus at this point because the lack of them was unusual, The other alternative is sloppyworkmanship; Pflaua, 168R111 2 , 42; Chrl5tol, op. cit.. 401,centuric protector co/i, (/rbanicianl,centurio protector co/i, V Praetorlae,(centurio) princeps protector it prisu, piliis: Following Christol, who shows that the post ofpririceps preceded the Primipilate on occasion, Contra Christol, the post of prisus p1/us cannotbe avoided at this point; Dobson, AAWVII'l, 399ff; Dobson & Breeze, (p. Stud, 8(1969), 106f;Christol, 404, XI'5215 1LS2650; AE,1954, 135),iv protectoribus, Literal translation 'and coming out of all the protectore?,praei'ectus (castroru.) leg, IVPiaviae: This is the standard promotion for pri.Ipilerescf,Dobson, ANRW, 413ff, Coming here, separated by the Rome tribunates from his other legionaryappointments, it seems certain to be the expected praefectus castrorue appointment, as opposed toan early appointment to practectus legionis a, v.1,,praepositus (vexx ) iegg, VII Claudice it IPflaviae,' Note the unusual use of the Greekc(1ps%qov] In place of mpattoctwv),tritinus vigilu. ?, See below, next post,trthunus g,irbapjcjanj 1: These two urban tribunates fit the CWPSII5 here, but are uncertain,especially sinc, little room is left for unit numbers once again, Perhaps Hucianus only held oneof them replacing the other with the extraordinary pruepositus commands which follow, If 50,

th. command could be expanded to read: ra8, 'a,r, t,, I 8iyovAev or Oopkvszia'vov, Therestoration as it stands is Domaszewski's,trthunus Lthurnarua A unit drawn from the galleys, according to Domaszewski, Rangordnung, 189,praepositus senioria peo'itu. it equitut Haurorue it Oshroenoru.; The Greek crpsri'ov retainscontuinuity throughout the inscription, especially since it is used on line 17 with reference tothe same co mand, The itiniores flauri are known from YIII'20996 ILS 1356, It seems they, toowe e commanded by an ex-tribune of the Urban cohorts before he progressed to the Praetorians,praeposifus 6'rittonu. it exploratoru.' This may be the nuierus Britt onus Lunensiuei which wascommanded by a praepositus Brit(tonu.) it expl(oratorue), However, this man was a centurion ofVIII ,ugusta (XIII'6526), which seems a significantly lower rank than flucianus, Anotheralternative is the joint command of the nuierus Brittonu. and the exploratores GerianIclaniDi vitiensiva always named together on the same inscription, These occupied the fort atNiederbeber in Ge ania Superior until AD 260 (XIII'7749 & 7753; cf, also XII1'6814), Since itis known Mucianus commanded this unit in Thrace (below, 1,21), they may have moved there, It is,of course, possible that the unit is not known from any but this inscription,tritiiws co/i, (,,)Praetor,ae, A preferable reading to Domaszewski's trib, praef, protect,,since it follows the pattern of the other praetorian references in the inscription and retainsthe unit number,

1,15 ducenarius,1, 16 praefectus legionis age,is in Mesopotacia,' Almost certainly one of the Parthian legions since

these were commanded by praefecti Jegionis a, v, I, from their inception,1,17 prasuectus legionis XIII 6esinae a, v, 1,' XIII Gemina came under the command of an equestrian

prafectus during the reign of Gallienus: 111 . 1560 = ILS 3845, M, Aur Veteranus,1, 18 pruefec tus seinorus pedi tue et equi tue Ifauroru. it Os/iroenoru.: This is the first of three

repeat commands in the inscription, Close examination of their wording will show that the-310-

M.C.IbeJi: C3 Army

Appendix 2

commands were exactly similar 1 th. only exception being that Nucianus seems to have held the

second two repetitions as one Joint exploratory command, when one considers the effort required

to carve these repetitions 1 they cannot simply be discounted as an error, Therefore it would

seem that Muclanus Interspersed his legionary appointments with returns to his earlier

extraordinary commands,

120 praef,ctus leg, II Traianae, The Egyptian legion had traditionally been an equestrianappointment; Keyes. Rise of the (qwtes, 18,

1,21 priepositus (vexx,) legq, VII Claudiuc it Flaviae et Brittornis et expioratoru. agens inThracia,' The term thix might be preferable here to preepositus. but it remains essentially avexitlary command,

1,23 praises provinciae Ruetiac?.' A Mucianus is attested In charge of Raetia by 111.5785,1.26 origone Traianae Augustue,' 6reek: . a-ho. ,,, rarpiq, Since the in5cription comes from Traiana

Augusta, and a Mucianus native to that town is known from I68R 1112 1568 & 1569 the restorationseems almost certain,

—311-

ADDENDUM

A recent article by L. Okamure, 'The Flying Columns of the Emperor

Gallienus: 'leglonary' coins and their hoards', Roman Frontier Studies 1989,

Limes Congress XV, ed. V.A. Maxfield & M.J. Dobson, Exeter (1991), pp.387ff

appeared too late to be incorporated into the main body of this thesis, Yet

some of the points he makes are of sufficient interest with reference to my

chapter on Vexiflationes for some general comments to be made.

He suggests that the reverses of RIC V2, 96-97, bearing the legends

lxxx were a die-engraver's mannerism for 'II et XX', referring to the British

legi ns stationed at Sirmium during Gallienus' reign (III3228). This

provides a modicum of corroboration for the obvious deduction that these

legions must have been in Sirinium by AD 259, in order not to have been

abs rbed into the Gallic Empire (cf. ch.VI, p.145).

Of greater importance are his comments on the V P(ia) V F(idelis)

othage di ussed by Maria Alfoldi. The rarity of these coins has prompted

some commentators to suggest that they were struck in error, or that the

whole V P. V F. to VII P. VII F. series was struck simultaneously as one

large donative. Either of these theories further invalidates Alföldi's

already shaky theory that they were struck at specific times to pay specific

vexillations (cf. ch.VI, p.147).

On the other hand, Okamura makes the point that these coins were

discovered in hoards limited to the western empire (Galllenu& sphere of

influence in the division by his father), and, with one exception, they were

not found in the permanent bases of the legions they specify. This may well

be indicative of the permanent vexillation of the legions, which is not

seriously in doubt, but it no more proves the existence of comitatus-style

-3 12-

M.C.Ibeji: C3 Army

'flying columns' than did Alföldi's original observations. Indeed, since the

coins were discovered in hoards scattered throughout the western empire,

their distribution will be more indicative of easily penetrated weak points

along the frontier, prompting civilian abandonment, than of the proximity of

a permanent 'field army'. Logically, the 'field army' will not have arrived

until alter the penetration had occurred; ie., if its inherent logic is to be

maintained, the cause of the burial and abandonment of the coin hoard must

needs precede the arrival of the 'field army'. Therefore, it should not be

urprising that such hoards are rarely found in the vicinity of legionary

fortresses, with their heavy concentrations of troops, since such

str ngpothts were the least likely points of barbarian penetration.

Since the coinage of 259 lists every single legion from the Rhine and

Danube, including II Parthica and the Praetorians, it is more likely to have

been a general issue, minted to pay all the legions named, than a specific

issue de igned to pay only parts of these legions. The accident of their

di covery is almost certainly more a function of civilian despair than It is

f military vexillation.

-3 13-

M,C.Ibeji. C3 Army

Bi bi irp1-iy

CQ

Ep. Stud.

Ephea. Epig.

FGH

FHG

Ge . Schrift.

HAC

IG

IGBR

IGRR

Abbr'.rit ic,ri

AE

AIPhil.

ANRW

BAR

BGU

CAH

CIG

CIL

ISem.

C d. Ju t.

L'Année Epigraphique: Revue des publications epigraphiquesrelatives a l'antiquite romaine ed. R. Cagnat et al., Paris(1888-

American Journal of Philology

Aufeteig und Niede.rgang der rdmischen Welt II • 1-3, ed. I.Vogt, Berlin/New york (1974 & 1975)

British Archaelogical Reports

Aegyptische Urkunde.n aus den staatllchen Museen zu Berlin:Griechische Urkunde,n Berlin (1892)

Cambridge Ancient History, vols XI & XII, Cambridge (1936 &1939)

Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. A. Boecithius, Berlin(1843)

Corpus Inscription urn Latinarum + supplements, ed, T.Mommsen et al., Berlin (1863-1986)

Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum

Codex Just ininanus, Corpus luris Civilis vol. II, ed. P.Krueger, Berlin (1929)

Corpus luris Civilis vols 6 & 7, trans. S. P. Scott, NewYork (1973)

Classical Quarterly

Epigraphische St udien

Ephemeris Epigraphica

F. .Tacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Ristoriker, Berlin(1923-

C. MUller, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, vols 111-V1Paris (1851-1870)

T. Morninsen, Gesammelte Schriften

Bonner Historia-Augusta-Colloqulum

Inscriptiones Graecae ed. Preuss, Berlin (1873)

Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae, ed. G. Mihailov(texts to all references can be found in Christol, Chiron7, (1977))

Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes, ed. R.Cagnat et al., Bretschneider edn. Rome (1964)

ILS Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae ed. H. Dessau, Berlin (1892)

IRT The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania, edd. J.M. Reynolds &J.B. Ward-Perkins, Rome & London (1952)

JRS Journal of Roman Studies

-3 14-

M,C.Ibeji: C3 Army

Bibliography

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P&P Past and Present

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PIR Prosopographia Imperil Romani

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SHA Scriptores Historiae Augustae

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ZfN Zeitschrift für Numisinatik

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E. Cary, Dio's Roman History, Loeb Classical Library, London& Harvard (1969)

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Herodian C.R. Whittaker, Herodien, Loeb Classical Library, London &Harvard (1969)

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Syncellus L. Dthdorf, Georgius Syncellus, SI-/B XX, Bonn (1829)

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F. Pichimayr, Sexti Aurelii Victoris: Epitome de Caesaribus,Teubner edn. (1970)

* L. Dindorf, Ioannis Zonaree: Epitome Historiarum, Teubner

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G ffart, W.

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