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]64 CHAPTER 4

should let independent

considerations

determine

which

theory

of

mind

is the most

plausible.

To be sure,

this

leaves

intact

the

philosophical

problem

concerning

mental

causation.

If the

best

theory

of

mind

tums out

to

be

one

or

another

version of

physicalisl-as

seems

overwhelmingly

likely

to

be

the

case-{hen

that theory inherits

the task of accounting

for MC.

The

arguments

from this

chapter suggest some

weaknesses

of

two

standard

versions

of

physicalism,

and they

point

out various

pitfalls

to

be

avoided

in

such

an account.

But the

arguments

stop short

of showing

that these weaknesses

are ineliminable

or the

pitfalls

unavoidable.

There is more

philosophy

to

be done.

Further

Readings

The

Humean

(Regularty)

Approach to Causation

Beauchamp, Thomas,

and

Rosenberg,

Alexander.

1981.

Hume

and

the Problem

of Causation. New

York: Oxford University

Press.

Hume,

David.

173911964.

A Treatise on

Human Nature.

New York: Dutton.

Book

I, part

III, sec. l-.

174811977.

An Enquiry Concerning Human

Understanding.

Indianapo-

lis:

Hackett.

Sec. 7,

pp.

39-53.

Other

Approaches and

Generul Interest

Beauchamp,

Thomas.

1971.

Phitosophical

Problems of

Causation

Encino,

CA:

Dickenson.

Brand,

Myles,

ed.

1976.

The Nature

of

Causation. Urbana:

University

of

Illinois

Press.

Salmon, Wesley.

1984. Scientific Explanation

and

the Cawal

Structure

of

the

Ll/orld.

Pinceton: Princeton

University

Press.

Dualist

Approsches

to

Mental

Causation

Broad,

C.D. 1980.

The

Mind and

lts

Place

in

Nature. London:

Routledge

and

Kegan

Paul.

See

the

chapter

entitled

The

Traditional

Problem of

Boy'and

Mind.

Physicatist

Appro(tches

to Mental

Causafion

Dretske,

Fred.

1988.

Explaining Behavior:

Reasons in a

llorld

of

Canses.

C'

bridge:

MIT

Press.

'TENTAL

CAUSATION

165

Heil,

John,

and Alfred Mele, eds. 1995. Mental

Causation.

Oxford:

Oxford

Uni-

versity

Press.

Anomalous

Monism and Token Physicalism

Davidson,

Donald.

1970.

Mental

Events. Reprinted

in Davidson

1986.

1986. Essays

on Actions and Events.

Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

-

1993a.

Thinking

Causes.

Reprinted in Heil

and

Mele

1995.

Type Physicalism

Kim, Jaegwon.

1989.

The

Myth of

Nonreductive Materialism.

Proceedings

from

the American Philosophical

Association. 63.

1993a

Can

Supervenience Save

Anomalous

Monism?

Reprinted

in

Heil

and

Mele

1995.

Sosa,

Emest.

1984. Mind-Body

Interaction and Supervenient

Causation. Mid-

teest

Studies

in Philosophy

9:

27 1-33.

1993.

Davidson's

Thinking

Causes.

Reprinted in Heil

and

Mele

1995.

:'il