Grayling vs Craig

8/3/2019 Grayling vs Craig

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GRAYLING VS CRAIG

CRAIG: Thank you and good evening. Im very grateful to the

Oxford Union for the privilege of debating here this evening on

this most important topic and I thank you for your warm welcome.Im also grateful as well for Professor Graylings participation

in the event this evening, and I trust that our discussion

tonight will not only be an intellectual exercise for you but

will also be a significant help in your own personal, spiritual

journey.

Now when we ask whether belief in God makes sense in light of

tsunamis, were posing in a provocative way the problem that,

traditionally, philosophers have called the problem of evil.This problem is undoubtedly the greatest obstacle to belief in

God. When we consider the depth and the extent of suffering in

the world then it makes it hard to believe in God. Maybe we

should just all become atheists.

But that would be a pretty big step to take. How can we be sure

that God does not exist? Maybe theres a reason why God permits

all the suffering in the world. Maybe it all fits in to some

grand scheme of things that we can only dimly envision, if atall. How do we know?

Well, despite the undeniable emotional impact of the problem of

evil, Im persuaded that as a strictly rational, intellectual

problem it does not constitute a disproof of the existence of

God. Let me explain why.

Traditionally, atheists have claimed that the co-existence of God

and evil is logically impossible. That is to say, there is no

possible world in which God and evil both exist. Since we know

that evil exists, the argument goes, it follows logically that

God does not exist. It is this version of the problem of evil

that professor Grayling recently defended in his debate with

Keith Ward in The Prospect.

So, according to the logical version of the problem of evil, (the

two statements on your hand-out):


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(A) an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God exists

and

(B) evil exists

... are logically incompatible.

The difficulty for the atheist, however, is that statements (A)

and (B) are not, at face value, logically inconsistent. Theres

no explicit contradiction between them. If the atheist thinks

they are implicitlycontradictory then he must be assuming some

hidden premises that would serve to bring out the contradiction

and make it explicit.

But, what are those premises? Well, the atheist seems to be

assuming two things:

(1) If God is omnipotent then he can create any world that he

desires

and

(2) If God is omnibenevolent then he prefers a world without evil

over a world with evil

The atheist reasons that: since God is omnipotent he couldcreate

a world without evil, and since he is omnibenevolent he would

prefer a world without evil, therefore if God exists, evil cannot

exist.

This version of the problem of evil has been seriously undermined

by the incisive critique of the philosopher Alvin Plantinga.

Plantinga notes that the atheist must show that both of the

critical assumptions (1) and (2) are necessarilytrue in order

for the argument to be logically valid. But, Plantinga argues, if

it is evenpossible that human beings have free will then (1) and

(2) are not necessarily true.

Take assumption (1). If free will is possible then its false

that an omnipotent God can create just any world that he desires.

Gods being omnipotent does not imply that he can do logical

impossibilities (such as, make a round square or a married

bachelor). But it is logically impossible to make someone freely

choose to do something. Thus if God grants people genuine

freedom, to choose as they like, then its impossible for him to

determine what their choices will be. All he can do is create the


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circumstances, in which a person is able to make a free choice,

and then so to speak stand back and let him make that

choice. Now what this implies is that there are worlds which are

possible, in and of themselves, but which God is incapable of

creating. Philosophers say that such worlds are not feasible for

God. So the first assumption made by the atheist, (namely, that

an omnipotent God can create any world that he desires), is not

necessarily true.

Now this is important because, for all we know, in every feasible

world where God creates free creatures some of those

creatures freely choose to do evil. Thus its possible that every

world feasible for God, which contains free creatures, is a world

with sin and evil. And, therefore, the atheists argument on

this ground alone is invalid.

But what about the second assumption? That if God is

omnibenevolent then he prefers a world without evil over a world

with evil? Again, such an assumption is not necessarily true.

The fact is that in many cases we allow suffering to occur, in a

persons life, because we have some morally sufficient reason for

permitting it. Im reminded of a remark once made by C.S. Lewis:

What do people mean when they say Im not afraid of God becauseI know that he is good? Have they never even been to the

dentist?! [some audience laughter] God may permit suffering in

our lives in order to achieve some morally sufficient,

overriding, end. Thus, even though God is omnibenevolent, he

might well have morally sufficient reasons for permitting pain

and suffering in the world. Consequently, the second assumption

of our atheist friends is also not necessarily true. The

argument is, thus, doubly invalid.

The bottom line is that atheists have not been able to show that

either of their key assumptions is necessarily true, which they

must do in order to sustain the claim, that the co-existence of

God and evil is logically impossible. The atheist who makes this

claim has unwittingly shouldered a tremendously heavy burden of

proof which no-one has been able to sustain.

Now, Plantinga argues that we can go even further than this. Not

only has the atheist failed to prove that God and evil areinconsistent, but we can on the contrary prove that God and


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evil are consistent! In order to do so, all we have to do is

provide some proposition that is compatible with Gods existence

and which entails that evil exists. And the following is such a

proposition (on your hand-outs):

(C) God could not have created a world that had so much good as

the actual world but had less evil, both in terms of quantity and

quality, and moreover God has morally sufficient reasons for

permitting the evil that exists.

So long as this proposition is evenpossible, it shows that God

and the evil in the world are logically compatible.

In summary, the atheist who champions the logical version of the

problem of evil, bears the burden of proof to show that there is

no possible world in which (A) and (B) are true. That is an

enormously heavy burden which has proved to be unsustainable.

After centuries of discussion, contemporary philosophers

including virtually all atheists and agnostics have come to admit

that the logical problem of evil has been solved. In the words of

the prominent philosopher William Alston, It is now

acknowledged, on almost all sides, that the logical argument from

evil is bankrupt.

Now perhaps Professor Grayling would retreat, at this point, to

the position that while the co-existence of God and evil are

logically possible, nonetheless, its highly improbable So,

given the evil in the world, its improbable that God exists.

This probabilistic version of the problem, however, faces

insuperable difficulties. Let me just mention three, this

evening:

Number one: were not in a position to assess, inductively, the

probability that God lacks morally sufficient reasons for

permitting the evils that occur. The atheist seems to think that

if God has morally sufficient reasons, for permitting the evils

that occur, then these reasons should be obvious to us!

But, theres absolutely no grounds for that assumption. The

transcendent God sees the end of history from its beginning and

providentially orders history so that his purposes are ultimately

achieved through human, free decisions. In order to achieve his


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ends, God may well have to put up with various evils along the

way. Evils, which appear pointless or unnecessary to us, within

our limited frame of reference may be seen to have been justly

permitted within Gods wider frame of reference. We simply have

no idea of the natural and moral evils that might be involved in

order for God to arrange the circumstances, and free agents in

them, necessary to some intended purpose; nor can we always

discern the reasons why such a provident God might have for

permitting some evil to enter ourlives.

To say this, is not is not to appeal to mystery, but rather

to point to the inherent cognitive limitations that frustrate

attempts to say, on inductive grounds, that its improbable that

God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting some

particular evil.

Ironically, in other contexts, atheists recognize these cognitive

limitations. One of the most damaging objections to utilitarian

ethical theory, which says that we should always act so as to

maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number of

people, is that it is quite simply impossible for us to estimate

which action we might perform will ultimately lead to the

greatest amount of happiness in the world. Because of ourcognitive limitations, actions which appear disastrous, in the

short term, may redound to the greatest good; while some short

term boon may prove to issue in untold misery. Once we

contemplate Gods providence, over the whole of history, then it

becomes evident how hopeless it is for limited observers to

speculate on the probability of Gods having morally sufficient

reasons for the evils that we see. Were simply not in a good

position to assess such probabilities with any confidence.

Secondly: Christian theism entails doctrines that increase the

probability of the co-existence of God and evil. The atheist

maintains that if God exists then its improbable that the world

would contain the evil it does. But if the biblical God exists

then its not, in fact, so surprising that evil exists. Thus,

evil is not so improbable on Christian theism. For, according to

Christian theism, the chief purpose of life is not happiness but,

rather, the knowledge of God.


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One reason the problem of evil seems so difficult is that people

naturally tend to assume that if God exists then his purpose, for

human life, is happiness in this life! Gods role is to provide

a comfortable environment for his human pets.

But, on the Christian view, this is false! We are not Gods pets,

and the goal of human life is not happiness, per se, but rather

the knowledge of God which, in the end, will bring true and

everlasting human fulfillment. Many evils occur in life which may

be utterly pointless, with respect to the goal of producing human

happiness, but they may not be pointless with respect to

producing a deeper knowledge of God. Because Gods ultimate goal

for humanity is the knowledge of himself, which alone can bring

eternal happiness to people, history cannot be seen in its true

perspective apart from considerations pertinent to the kingdom of

God. It may well be the case that natural and moral evils are

part of the means God uses to draw people into his eternal

kingdom.

Moreover, Gods purpose is not restricted to this life but spills

over, beyond the grave, into eternal life. When God asks his

children to bear horrible suffering in this life, it is only with

the prospect of a heavenly joy and recompense that is beyond allcomprehension. And the longer we spend in eternity, the more the

sufferings of this life shrink, by comparison, to an

infinitesimal moment. The person in heaven looking back would

say, no matter how awful his pain, no matter what he suffered, I

would go through it a million, million times over to know this

joy! Thus, if Christian theism is true, the existence of evil is

not so improbable.

Number three: relative to the full scope of the evidence, Godsexistence is probable. Probabilities are relative to ones

background information. Thus, with a probability argument, we

always need to ask, improbable with respect to what? Now, apply

this principle to the probabilistic problem of evil: the atheist

says Gods existence is improbable..., but with respect to

what? To the evil in the world? Well, if thats all you consider,

for your background information, then I think its hardly

surprising that Gods existence would appear improbable relative

to that alone. But thats not the interesting question.


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The interesting question is whether Gods existence is improbable

relative to the full scope of the evidence. And the Christian

theist will insist that we consider not just the evil in the

world, but rather all the evidence relevant to Gods existence.

Now, obviously, I dont have time to discuss it here but, in my

published work, Ive written extensively in defense of various

arguments for the existence of God. Im convinced that even given

any improbability that evil throws upon Gods existence, Gods

existence is still quite probable on the basis of the evidence.

In any case, it would be premature to conclude that Gods

existence is improbable unless one has examined and weighed all

the relevant evidence.

In conclusion, then, neither the logical nor the probabilistic

problem of evil constitutes a justification of atheism. The

rational man is well within his rights in thinking that the

existence of God makes sense. Even in light of tsunamis.

[Applause]

[Back to Top]

Opening Statement A.C.Grayling:

Before we began our debate I said to Professor Craig that I was

prepared to concede victory this evening, to him, in the matter

of ties. Hes got a much more handsome tie than Ive got on

[audience laughter]. I wore this one because as the, as the

token, or what a theist would call an atheist because I also

dont believe in fairies and so on, I prefer to be an afairy-ist I thought Id better wear a sort of fairly sober tie on,

in order to appear to be a bit more respectable and [inaudible,

then slight audience laughter].

Im tremendously impressed, by the way, at the number of you

present here on a Friday evening, in Oxford! I think things must

have changed since I was an undergraduate here [audience

laughter] there must be fewer facilities. But at any rate Im

delighted to see you all.
http://www.bethinking.org/suffering/bill-craig-vs-a.c.-grayling-debate-transcript.htm#Tophttp://www.bethinking.org/suffering/bill-craig-vs-a.c.-grayling-debate-transcript.htm#Top


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Let me just begin with a remark about the tsunami which, as you

know, killed several hundred thousand people among them small

children and elderly people a great majority of them were not

Christians they were people of other faiths and all faiths I

suppose and of no faith. So that I suppose one would need an

assumption to the effect that the, that the deity, if he she or

it caused it or countenanced it or wasnt able to stop it,

nevertheless it would have in some sense to be the same deity

for all those people, and if there is a greater good envisaged in

the event then it would have to be one that is somehow captured

in very different forms in these different faiths.

And I leave that point hanging in the air because I think its

something that we need to bring up a bit later on remembering

that there was a competition between the faiths! After all, a

Christian will tell you that the founder of that religion said I

am the way, the truth and the life, no-one comes to the Father

but by me, which seems rather bad news for very many of the

people who were swept away by that grave wave.

Still, lets begin at the beginning:

We have to wade our way through a number of, ifs before we getto the point that we need to discuss tonight: ifthere are

supernatural entities or phenomena in the universe, and by that I

mean things that dont fall into the category of frogs and clouds

and galaxies and human beings and so on subject to description

in terms of natural laws and the rest so ifthere are

supernatural entities or phenomena in the universe, and if these

supernatural phenomena are in some way active If they, if

theyre agents and lets just, for grammatical simplicity,

talk in terms of one such thing, call it (X) for the moment; if(X) is an agent that is, can do things and in some way, react

to the facts in the universe and if, further, that supernatural

entity is not merely an agent but also an intelligent one has

intelligence and if, yet again its not merely intelligent but

also interestedin this bit of the universe with we, people, in

it; then we need to ask ourselves the question, What, if

anything, can be inferred about the nature of, such an entity (if

we allow ourselves so many, ifs) from the evidence that we have

available to us?


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So if, if theres a supernatural entity which is intelligent and

interested in this bit of the universe, what can we say about

what that entity might be like, on the basis of what the world

seems like to us? And were remembering here that the evidence

includes tsunamis and childhood cancers and things like that.

And the answer would have to be something like this: at first

blush, at any rate before the theologians get to work on us

it would seem that that intelligent and interested agency, in

the universe, would have to be either malevolent or, if not

impotent, then only quasi-potent.

Okay, so malevolent we could understand: the fact that the Old

Testament is full of suggestions that if you were a Midianite orsomeone like that, then the deity might indeed be reasonably

malevolent to, towards you.

So, but if not malevolent then, then not omnipotent, because ...

constrained in some way in its power to lessen the suffering that

is experienced by the creation with which it, to which it stands

in some relation.

But the answer to that second point is to say Well, maybe it is

benevolent but its omnipotence is not exercised in a way that

would ensure a reduction of the amount of suffering that there

is, in the universe, because it has a purpose a greater purpose

that the suffering should, in some way, subserve.

Now both those points were made by Professor Craig in his

presentation and he was talking about the hidden assumptions

made, by the person who doesnt believe in fairies and so on, if,

(1) if God is omnipotent then he can create any world that he

desires and he disputed that assumption and thats the point

that Ive just raised about quasi-potence or lack of potency

and the second one about Gods benevolence, that if God is

omnibenevolent he prefers a world in which evil doesnt exist,

and he raised a point in connection with that too.

And you will notice that the points actually dont sit quite

consistently with one another because the answer, that he gave to

the first point, is so God is not quite omnipotent because there

are some things that he cant do. For example, he cant do


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logically impossible things well, we know that already because

he cant eat himself for breakfast and that kind of thing but

what he also cant do is to create a world which has free will in

it (required, incidentally, so that we can answer problems about

the existence of moral evil in the world remembering that if

there is a God who is a creator of the world, and is responsible

ultimately for everything that happens in it, then hes

responsible for murder and rape and the rest of it and so in

order to block that consequence we have to think in terms of the

creation parts of the creation, anyway, thats us having free

will). So hes not quite omnipotent is the derogation from that

point.

But, as for the omnibenevolence, well, hes willing to let

suffering occur in the world for a greater good. And that if only

we could see sub specie aeternitatis what that greater good is,

then no matter how great the suffering, say of grief, of loss, of

terror, of being faced with an unkind or cruel nature no matter

what the experience of suffering might be nevertheless it

subserves some, some greater good. And we cant see what that is

because we have finite minds. Now, I just mention in passing, to

leave to one side for discussion, the thought that invoking the

finitude of our cognitive powers our inability to see what that

great good might be is, as it seems to me, a very helpful and

convenient argument for the theologian; because once one pulls

the curtain of mystery across things then, of course, one can say

and believe anything.

But the inconsistency between the two points is this: if you

derogate somewhat from Gods omnipotence, then youre in effect

saying that he cant in a world which contains free will,

agents and so on he cant have prevented the degree of

suffering that is present in the world.

The second point: hes, nevertheless, willing to let suffering

occur for a greater good. So, if you think that suffering is

necessary for a greater good, then and you permit it to happen

then the implication seems to be that you coulddo something

about not letting it happen, but since youve got this greater

good in mind, you, do let it happen.


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beings in it and which doesnt have pain and suffering in it.

Whats the logical inconsistency there?

What the theologian has to argue, in response to that point, is

that the world could not, could not notice the strength of themodality there, that actually occurs in statement (C) that God

could not have created a world with as much good as this world

contains, unless it contained the degree of evil, of natural evil

that it has in it.

Now why should one accept that? If one accepts that God is

genuinely omnipotent, then he could create a world which

maximizes the good and minimizes or perhaps dispenses

altogether the pain and suffering. One could imagine, forexample, him creating a world which was entirely intellectual.

After all, although many of our agonies are intellectual ones I

mean, some of us are coming up to schools in four weeks time and

are being subjected, at the moment, to the most terrible

intellectual cruelties most of the suffering that people think

of in the world... lets take the form of physical suffering:

then we think about deprivation at one end and at the other end

the excruciating pain of certain kinds of illnesses; or the

terrible emotional pain of grief and loss and fear. Why is itthat those things should be centrally, or essentially, required

for a world to have as much good in it as this one does?

Or, arguably of course, this world doesnt contain as much good

in it, as there could be, given that the quantum of suffering in

the world is as it is.

Remember this also, that some of the natural evils that occur in

the world do so as a result of ouragency. For example, our

effect on the environment and our spreading of diseases one to

another and the rest. And so that there is a complex relationship

between the two kinds of evil that go on in the world: moral and

natural. And if the natural evil that exists in the world is,

somehow, ruled by a deity for a greater good, then the

instrumental action of moral evil, in the world, would have to be

willed by that deity too and wouldnt just be an artefact of

our having free will.


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So my thought is this: once you have taken the long route through

a whole series of suppositions thinking that the world might

contain a certain sort of entity and this entity, might have the

right kind of character, to understand and appreciate our

emotional and sensational lives, and might be interested in some

way in those emotions and sensations then the question, if you

really, reallywanted to accept that view then the question

arises, with great urgency, as to what kind of being that could

be, consistently with the way the world in fact is?

And its very interesting to notice that, in the development of

thinking about the relationship that individual human beings have

with their world with a world containing the possibilities of

suffering and the rest there have been dramatic, dramatically

different conceptions of that relationship. For example, in the

medieval period, Contemptus Mundi literature was, a great feature

the Da Vinci Code of the day it was the book that told you

that the world was a veil of tears and suffering, and that all we

had to do was endure and pay your tithes and you would,

eventually, get to heaven.

And what followed that period in the renaissance was a re-

discovery of the joy and the beauty of the world and thepossibility, the pleasure, in the world and a re-focusing of

attention by human beings on things that are immanent things

that are here in the world, and a desire to maximize the

pleasure and enjoyment that came from understanding that world,

from appreciating the beauties in it and from adding to them. A

world, in other words, where The Good was conceived as lying in

things that spoke to the emotions and the sensations of human

beings.

Well, according to a theory which has it that suffering is some

part of the production of the greater good, there would have to

be questions asked about the degree of consistency between the

conception that the renaissance thinkers had about The Good and

that conception about the need that the world has for there to be

suffering and pain in it. And anybody who takes the sort of

position that I do, whos very sceptical about the idea that

there are supernatural agencies intelligent enough and

interested enough in us to know about us, that we can suffer and

enjoy, that we can feel fear and that we can feel joy


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anybody... any beingwho had that conception of us, would have to

be quite conscious of the effect that its agency had in respect

of what we regard as being in our interests and for our good.

So, in that, when we pose the question is it reasonable tobelieve that there could be a deity and I think, we notice,

that our concept of God is a very capacious one which has to do

with a great number of different traditions and definitions of

what such a being could be, but when we ask that question

generally, generally speaking we think an almighty and all-

loving deity.

And can it be reasonable to think that the universe is governed

by, even contains, such a thing? And I think the answer has tobe: not.

Thank you.

[Applause]

[Back to Top]

Rebuttal William Lane Craig:

Well thank you, Professor Grayling, for those interesting remarks

in response to my opening statement. Youll remember that I

distinguished between two versions of the problem of evil: the

logical version and the probabilistic version. And I suggested

that the logical version is no longer defended today; that it has

been given up because its been recognized that the atheist

cannot sustain the enormous burden of proof this involves. But,

so far as I could understand Professor Graylings position in his

opening speech, hes sticking by the logical version of theproblem of evil despite that, hes going to maintain it.

Now he said that, Looking at the world, we would conclude the

deity must be either impotent or malevolent. But to say that is

to assume precisely those two hidden assumptions, namely that:

if God is omnipotent he can create any world that he desires,

and if hes omnibenevolent he would prefer a world without evil

over a world with evil. And so if the response is not to be

question-begging we need to see some argument on behalf of those


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two premises, and youll remember I suggested that those cannot

be proved.

First, if free will is even possible, it follows that an

omnipotent God cannot create every world that he might desire.Now Professor Grayling responded by saying, Well, Doctor Craig

youre qualifying divine omnipotence, on your view God is not

quite omnipotentand I want to protest against that and say

thats not at all accurate. Historically, divine omnipotence has

always been defined in terms of Gods ability to do whatever is

logically possible. The only philosopher that I know of, who

thought God could do logical impossibilities, was Rene Descartes.

But everyone else has always said: omnipotence means the ability

to do whatever is logically possible. But Gods inability to

make a round square or a married bachelor is not an inability on

Gods part because there is no such thing as a round square, or a

married bachelor. Those are just self-contradictory combinations

of words that have no referent. So God can do anything; anything

that is logically possible!

And, as I say, it is logically impossible to make someone freely

do something, and I dont think that Professor Grayling grasped

the difference between a possible world and a feasible world.There arepossible worlds, logically, where everyone always

chooses to do the right thing. But those worlds may not be

feasible for God because if God created the agents in them, in

the circumstances envisioned, the agents might choose differently

might go the wrong way. So that given that its logically

impossible to make someone freely choose to do something, not

every logically possible world is actualisable by God only

feasible worlds. And therefore this is no qualification of divine

omnipotence to say, there are worlds that God is incapable of

creating.

Now, if you do want to go with Descartes and say, Well, Gods

omnipotence means he can do the logically impossible, well, then

theres no problem of evil at all! Because God can bring it about

that he exists, and that evil exists, even though these are

logically incompatible with each other! [some audience laughter]

So, if you go that route, youve completely dissolved any problem

of evil.


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Now, what about the second assumption, that God prefers a world

without evil, over a worldwithevil? And I suggested that if we

have morally sufficient reasons for permitting pain and suffering

then sometimes we do allow it. Now, here, Professor Grayling

says, but a father wouldnt allow his children to suffer so

terribly. I want to say a couple of things here: first, the

father analogy is terribly misleading. We must not compare God to

a human father when it comes to moral responsibility, because

they are so different. God we have a moral obligation to

worship God, but any human father who demanded worship from his

children would be egomaniacal. So that the relationship between a

child and his human father is completely different from our moral

obligations toward God. Moreover, a human father doesnt have

certain rights vis--vis his child, that God has toward us: God

is our creator and sustainer the author and giver of life. A

human father doesnt have the right to take the life of his own

child, but if God wanted to take my life this evening, thats his

prerogative. It is in his hands when I live and when I die. So

the moral obligations between a father and his child are utterly

different from Gods relationship with us.

But, in any case, the point remains unrefuted: even the human

father will sometimes permit suffering, in the life of his child,

because of a morally sufficient overriding reason. He wouldnt

permit, perhaps, terrible suffering. But if he has a morally

sufficient reason, hell permit it. And it is possible that God

could have morally sufficient reasons for permitting horrible and

terrible suffering in this world. And as long as thats even

possible, the atheist has failed to shoulder the burden of proof

to show that this second assumption is true.

And its so important for us to remember here, its not the

theist who bears the burden of proof here. Its the atheist who

is claiming that (A) and (B) are logically incompatible. Its the

atheist who bears the burden of proof to show that these hidden

assumptions are true. All I have to do is simply undercut them by

saying, Well, its possible that theyre not true. The atheist

must prove theyre necessarily true and, until he does that, he

cant carry his case.

But remember I said we can go a step further: we can actually

prove that (A) and (B) are logically compatible with each other,


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on the basis of (C)! (C) doesnt even need to be true! As long as

its justpossiblytrue, it proves that there is a possible world

in which God and Evil co-exist, and I didnt hear any response

from Professor Grayling to that point.

In short, the Logical Problem of Evil is just not defended

anymore in the philosophical community. Peter Van Inwagen, in the

Philosophical Perspectives of 1991, writes:

It used to be widely held that evil was incompatible with the

existence of God. That no possible world contained both God and

evil. So far as I am able to tell, this thesis is no longer

defended.

So let me just simply, in the interests of debate, go on to the

probabilistic problem, even though Professor Grayling didnt

discuss it. I suggested three reasons that the probabilistic

problem of Evil faces insuperable difficulties:

First, that were not in a good position to assess these

probabilities inductively. In a very important article in

Philosophical Perspectives of 1991, William Alston in a classic

article on the evidential problem of evil lists six cognitive

limits on us that make it, in principle, impossible for us to

judge that God doesnt have not have morally sufficient

reasons for permitting the evil in the world. Let me list these:

Number one: lack of data. Our ignorance of the distant future, or

the distant past; our ignorance of the ultimate constitution of

the universe, the secrets of the human heart.

Two: complexity greater than we can handle. For example, trying

to understand different systems of natural law in which

different laws of nature operate we have no clue about what

systems are available to God.

[Three]: the difficulty of knowing what is metaphysically

possible. How do we know what logically imaginable worlds are

actually metaphysically possible?

Four: our ignorance of the full range of possibilities. We dont

know how these are restricted.


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Five: our ignorance of the full range of values. That is to say

there may be unknown goods, that God brings about, that we are

not even aware of.

And six: the limits of our capacity to make well-considered valuejudgements. That is to say, to be able to compare different

possible worlds with a view toward determining which world would

be the best.

Now, in my opening speech I gave an illustration of just one of

those cognitive limits, namely: our lack of data. And I

illustrated this from utilitarianism. We have no idea, when an

action is performed, whether it will ultimately produce great

happiness or great disaster, and therefore utilitarianism iswrong in saying that an action is right or wrong based on its

consequences because we dont knowthe ultimate consequences.

But let me give another example from current science: in chaos

theory, scientists have been able to show that certain

macroscopic systems are highly sensitive to the tiniest

perturbations. The flutter of a butterflys wing, in a jungle in

west Africa, can set in motion forces that will eventually issue

in a hurricane over the Atlantic Ocean. And yet no-one, lookingat that little butterfly, would be able even in principle to

predict such an outcome.

Another example from popular culture: in the movie Sliding Doors,

with Gwyneth Paltrow, we see how a young woman is rushing into

the underground to catch a subway train and just as she

approaches the train, the doors begin to slide shut. At that

point, the film splits in two, and one half of the film narrates

her life as it would have happened if she had made it through the

doors. The other half of the film shows what would happen to her

if the doors closed before she got there. And whats interesting,

in this film, is the one life turns into happiness, success,

everything she does is great; whereas the other life goes from

bad to worse, disaster, failure, misery... all because of this

one seemingly trivial incident of catching those sliding doors.

Moreover, whether she got through those sliding doors was based

upon whether her path was momentarily blocked, on the steps, by a

little girl playing with her dolly on the handrail. And, of


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course, what the movie doesnt show is that little girls

playing, with the dolly on the handrail, was also contingent upon

for example how many, how quickly she buttoned her blouse

when dressing for school that morning; or how much muesli her

mother put in the bowl how long it would take to eat breakfast

or whether her father had to stop to tie his shoe on the way

into the underground. You begin to see that these contingencies

result in simply unpredictable situations.

But heres the really interesting part of the film: its the

shock ending. At the end of the movie you suddenly discover

that, in the life in which everything is going hunky-dory and

just super, shes suddenly killed in a car accident and her

life comes to an end. Whereas in the miserable, unhappy life,

that life turns around and it turns out that that is the really

good life after all.

This illustrates, I think, so poignantly how were simply not in

a position to judge when things come into our life that God

does not have a morally sufficient reason for permitting it.

William Alston concludes:

We are simply not in a position to justifiably assert that Godwould have no sufficient reason for permitting evil. And if that

is right, the probabilistic argument from evil is in no better

shape than its late, lamented, logical cousin.

Second: I suggested that Christian theism increases the

probability, of God and evil in the world, because Gods purpose

in the world is not happiness, but the knowledge of himself to

bring people freely to salvation. Well, how is God doing on this

job? In 1990 some fascinating statistics were released, from the

US Centre for World Mission, plotting the number of committed

Christians in the world toward non-Christians in the world. in

the year AD 100 there were 360 non-Christians for every committed

Christian in the world; by AD 1000 there were 220 non-Christians

per committed Christian in the world; by 1900 there were 27 non-

Christians for every committed Christian in the world; by 1989

there were only 7 non-Christians for every committed Christian in

the world.


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God is building his kingdom down through history, and it is not

at all improbable that natural and moral evils are part of the

means which he uses to bring people into his kingdom and to give

them eternal life and everlasting happiness in comparison to

which, the sufferings of this life will diminish to infinitesimal

proportions.

[Applause]

[Back to Top]

Rebuttal A.C. Grayling:

Well thank you, thank you for that and, thank you to Professor

Craig too: its a very, very long time since Ive heard a sermon.

My first point is that one always finds oneself in a difficulty,

in this kind of a situation which I find myself at the moment, me

being someone who is the token atheist here. Because I say, begin

by saying: Okay, okay, just suppose that theres a profoundly

improbable, you know, idea that there is some being out there in

the universe that has these properties of being, you know,

interested in us and aware and understands our situations, so

on... just suppose that there is such a being. Then, and then you

trot out your memory and I used to have to go to chapel every

morning at the school that I went to and Ive vague memories

of Almighty God to whom all things are known, all things are

possibleand so on, and so Id think, Oh well, okay, this

supposed being is going to be omnipotent and he loves us and hes

our father, and all the rest of it.

And then I find, when I have debates with theologians, that

thats not whats meant at all! In fact, the goalpost the

divine goalpost keeps moving, every time you say anything about

this what such a being would have to be like you find that

thats not whats meant!

So, so when I say, you know, that we either create God in our

image or he is, hes created us in his image and so on, then our

best understanding of what that relationship would be with a

creator who cares about us, and all that is a fatherly

relationship (except I, as a father, tend not to drown my

children all that often and so on) you know that that attempt to


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try to get some grip on the moral realities here, I find, is a

misleading analogy. So, we flounder because the goalposts do

move all the time.

But, still, lets do our best:

Possible... a logically possible world may not be a feasible

world. Now, I can understand that a logically possible world

might not be a desirable world. It could be logically possible

that God could there could be a God and that God could create

free-willed beings and also that theres no natural evil in that

world. But Professor Craig said that thats not feasiblefor

God. I... (this is slightly jigsaw-puzzled because Ive got to

keep several pieces going at the same time) we have to rememberthat we dont have a great deal of knowledge about Gods nature

so bear that in mind but we know enoughto know that its not

feasiblefor Gods purposes that, although its a logically

possible world in which there is free will but no natural evil

thats not feasible for God.

But I find the distinction between logical possibility and

feasibility so fine and subtle a one, that I dont actually see

it. I can see a distinction between logical possibility anddesirability, but I dont see the difference between possibility

and feasibility.

Then, Professor Craig talked about God having morally sufficient

reasons for suffering. Thats a fine-sounding phrase: morally

sufficient reasons for suffering. And that, you know, even if we

dont know what it is and were here once again behind the veil

of ignorance nevertheless we could take, on trust, the thought

that being drowned in a tsunami, or dying painfully of cancer or

something, would be good for us in some way but we dont know

what way that is and we simply have to believe it.

But remember, that the discussion were having at the moment is

is it reasonable forus to believe that, in a world which

contains tsunamis and childhood cancers and the rest, that there

could be a being, at least, of great power, at least who

understands and has some concerns for our feelings and attitudes

and so on?Whether... whether its reasonable to believe that

there could be such a being. And I am suggesting that there is a


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kind of incoherence in the idea of a being, with anything like

the traditional attributes of God, and a world with the kind of

world that we do in fact occupy.

Professor Craig says that there are three shortcomings to theprobabilistic version of the argument from evil. And, by the way,

I should just mention that Professor Craig says that the current

authoritiesin the field say that nobody now takes the Logical

Problem of Evilseriously. Well, long before that happened,

people had stopped taking seriously the Argument from Authority,

which is as you know a logical fallacy. So the fact that

people that the theologians are not taking arguments

seriously, doesnt seem to me a refutation of it.

But, having left that one aside, the Probabilistic Problem of

Evil: Were not in the position to assess, inductively, the

probability etcetera etcetera.So this is an appeal to our

finitude and our ignorance, so we dont know what those morally

sufficient reasons would be.

Second point: Christian theism entails doctrines that increase

the probability of the co-existence of God and evil. Well, as I

say, if you look at, if youre going to look at it from aChristian perspective if youre going to look at it from the

point of view of the Canonical Gospels where we are told that

God is almighty, that he is our Father(we say Our Father in

Heavenand so on) that he can do all things, that he cares about

the least sparrow; he also says by the way also for those of

you who are about to do schools, take no thoughtfor tomorrow

(you dont have to revise and so on)! He says all these very

comforting things which give us if were going to start at a

Christian perspective, at any rate a picture of the deitywholly inconsistent with the idea of natural evil in the world

unless we accept that there is some enormouslygreater good

thats going to be subserved by some of these terrible sufferings

that are experienced in this world and well just get you to

take on trust the fact that there is that greater good, but we

dont know what it is.

And finally, Professor Craig says that relative to the full

scopeof the evidence, (not just the evidence of evil in theworld but all the evidence that there is), that Gods existence


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is probable. I would have thought that taking the full scope of

the evidence into account, about this world of ours, would have

made the probability that there is a supernatural being of some

kind, in this universe, infinitesimally... the probability

infinitesimally small.

One last thing: Professor Craig talks about, the defeater of

the utilitarian argument residing in the fact that we dont

really know what the ultimate consequences are going to be of our

actions. I can know what the, you know, medium-term consequences

are going to be: the difference between giving you an ice cream

and kicking you on the ankle I can tell that the one is going

to probably be more pleasant for you than the other! So,

generally speaking, of course, when were being utilitarian

about our actions we go by our best lights and by whats most

likely in the course of our experience, and so on.

And what one doesnt want to do is to suffer paralysis of moral

action by butterfly effect! You see, if I thought... Im just

about to do something just about to give you an ice cream and

I think to myself, God! Id better not do that, you know,

because this could cause a storm over the Atlantic, well, you

know, [audience laughter] or some dreadful... some greatdisaster will happen, and, you know, everything is so

contingent that youd best not do anything at all! Well, of

course, the fact of the matter is that, in this world of ours,

our understanding of human nature and the human condition is

pretty rich and good on the whole for all our purposes. Remember

what John Watts said in the preface to his essay, he said, The

light that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our

purposes. And generally speaking, as I say, were much more

confident that ice creams are better than kicks on the ankles!

So, from that point of view, I think our grasp of moral realities

isextendable to this idea, this debate that were having, about

whether its reasonable to think that a world such as ours might

have something that rather blurrily approximates to one or

another of the conceptions of a deity, even though... even though

its very hard to pin down just quite what that might be.

This is not intended to be a commercial break but I might justmention a recent book of mine in which I set forward an argument


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among my other arguments about these matters; where I talk

about the perfumed smokescreenwhich lies between the ordinary

believer who goes to church and is told that, God is a Father

who cares for you and he holds you in this hand and you need have

no fear and that all is for the best in this, indeed, best of

all possible worlds(as were told) and the theological

sophistication, in both senses of the term, of the arguments

which try to show us that, despite appearances, despite the

facts, despite the realities of our existence in this world and

our confrontation with how hard and harsh the world can be

nevertheless, fundamentally and ultimately, its all for our

good.

Professor Craig said that, from the point of view of Christian

theology, happiness is not the point. The point is not for you to

be happy, at least, in this life. There is a posthumous

dispensation in which you will know ultimate satisfaction and

fulfilment and joy. So there is a blank cheque: just if you can

endure if you can accept if you would keep your faith despite

the contrary evidence, then you can have a reasonable hope that

in this future dispensation you will be happy.

So happiness isthe ultimate end, although its not ourhappiness: its not a happiness of ice creams and sunshine but,

well, not quite sure what it might be... endless hymn singing or

some, some alternative, at any rate, to what we normally take to

be the happiness in this world.

But I, but I think, remember that our point is about, about

reasonableness: its not my task, as someone who doesnt

believe in the existence of supernatural agencies in the

universe, to disprove the existence of such things. Thats not mytask. Nor is it my task to prove that the universe is only a

natural realm. My task is merely to say that on any of the

traditional understandings of the notion of the deity, of such a

supernatural being even the most minimal one which just

requires of it, that if it had any degree of insight and of

appreciation of ourperspective of things is it reasonable to

believe that there could be such a being? And also that such a

being could have any influence at all on what happens to

creatures like us, in this universe. Is it reasonable to believe


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in such a being, consistently, with the facts of the world as

they are around us? And I say, I say not.

But remember that, again, to take a cue from Professor Craig

there: that, thats a point made about the existence of naturalevil in the world, but one could generalize it and say from the

point of view of the total scope of the evidence, the

reasonableness of believing such a thing diminishes to zero.

Thank you.

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Grayling vs Craig

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