HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan

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Loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-process

high-tech industries in Taiwan

Chien-Chung Chen a Tzu-Chi Wang b Lu-Yen Chen c Jie-Huei Dai a Chi-Min Shu a

a Process Safety and Disaster Prevention Laboratory Department of Safety Health and Environmental Engineering National Yunlin University of Science and Technology

123 University Rd Sec 3 Douliou Yunlin 64002 Taiwan ROC b Department of Chemical Engineering Chinese Culture University 55 Hwa-Kang Rd Yang-Ming-Shan Taipei 11114 Taiwan ROC c Department of Emergency and Resources National United University 1 Lienda Rd Miaoli 36003 Taiwan ROC

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history

Received 13 August 2009

Received in revised form

23 April 2010

Accepted 25 April 2010

Keywords

Accidents

Chemical disasters

Emergency response

Loss prevention

Safety management

a b s t r a c t

Industrial safety has noticeably improved in recent years in Taiwan Despite these improvements

however serious accidents including explosions chemical releases and 1047297res have still occurred in

companies such as the Fu Guo Chemical Company (2001) Sin Hun Chemical Company (2005) Motech

Industries Inc (2005) and Nanpao Resin Co (2010) These accidents resulted in great loss of life and

property and further caused demands for improvement Chemical disasters usually result from the

combination of several mistakes or gross carelessness and are seldom caused by a single episode To

ensure the safety of operating handling and storing chemicals as well as to prevent chemical disasters

one must take many critical points into account such as techniques manufacturing processes operators

chemicals and emergency response In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are higher

than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety management methods and regulations

appropriate for high-tech companies have been generated We studied the current status of the indig-

enous loss prevention protocols based on the safety management of petrochemical and chemical-process

high-tech industries in Taiwan

Crown Copyright

2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved

1 Introduction

Highly developed industrial technology has not only resulted in

great advances but also in the expansion of the complexity and

scale of chemical processes resulting from the development of

process technologies in the chemical industries such as thin 1047297lm

transistor-liquid crystal displays (TFT-LCD) light emitting diodes

(LED) photovoltaics and semiconductor-related industries

However the harm from chemical disasters caused by machine

breakdowns operational mistakes poor design and mismanage-

ment among others has steadily increased (Chang Chang Shu ampLin 2005 Wu Shyu Yet-Pole Chi amp Shu 2009) In retrospect

serious 1047297res explosions and chemical release accidents that have

happened in recent years in Taiwan have been disastrous For

example on May 18 2001 a 6-ton reactor at the Fu-Kao Chemical

plant located at an industrialized park in the northern part of

Taiwan exploded due to a violent runaway polymerization reaction

of a batch production of acrylic resin Due to the lack of a proper

emergency relief and disposal system on the reactor the1047298ammable

chemicals were released and blanketed the entire process area The

catastrophic explosion leveled the plant and other nearby plants

including 16 high-tech companies The shock wave was so violent

that thousands of windows within a 500 m radius were shattered

(see Fig 1) Roughly 100 people were injured from 1047298ying glass and

several were hospitalized Fortunately the Fu-Kao workers were

able to escape in time and there were no deaths (Kao amp Hu 2002)

The second infamous example of an accident from a gross safety

violation was a 1047297re at Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE)

which was a global leader in the integrated circuit (IC) packagingindustry On May 1 2005 its semiconductor packaging and testing

facilities were ruined by a 1047297re in its substrate plant in Chungli

Taiwan (see Fig 2) The facilities were not in operation at the time

of the 1047297re although some operators working overtime were on the

premises In total several 1047297re1047297ghters 1047297ve ASE employees and two

employees of outside contractors suffered minor injuries and had

to receive medical attention The1047297re had spread tothe third 1047298oor of

the eleven-1047298oor building and higher 1047298oors were spoiled by smoke

The losses from the 1047297re were expected to be enormous including

rebuilding costs as well as $19 million USD per month in lost

capacity Clients were also signi1047297cantly hampered by this accident Corresponding author Tel thorn886 5 534 2601x4416 fax thorn886 5 531 2069

E-mail address shucmyuntechedutw (C-M Shu)

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e w w w e l s e v i e r c om l o c a t e j l p

0950-4230$ e see front matter Crown Copyright 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved

doi101016jjlp201004006

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538



this may have resulted in remunerative compensation or even the

causation of clients shifting orders to ASErsquos competitors In

summary the damages were anticipated to reach $320 USDmillion

which is a huge loss for any company to take (Taipei Times 2005

The China Post 2005 The Epoch Times 2005)

The third example happened on January 8 2010 In this case

a huge blast with a mushroom cloud occurred at 248 pm at the

Nanpao Resin Co The 1047297re after a couple of explosions was not

extinguished until the following dawn (see Fig 3) Roughly4298 m2 of production and warehouse space was subsequently

destroyed Additionally Taiwan Steel amp Iron Co its neighbor was

partly damaged The accident took place at the cumene oxidation

tower in which a 1047298uid leak was identi1047297ed in the broken recycling

line A lack of a buffer zone at the bottom of the recycling line

resulted in the leaking followed by an unidenti1047297ed ignition source

The 1047297rm is one of the major producers for cumene hydroperoxide

(CHP) and dicumyl peroxide (DCP) in Taiwan Because of the severe

damage the plant was shut down fenced off and dismantled

The various indirect losses from these accidents are inestimable

including equipment repairs delay in plant re-commissioning loss

of market share and increases in insurance costs (Muniz Peon amp

Ordas 2007)

According to the annual reports of occupational disasters pub-lished by the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) Executive Yuan Taiwan

the industries that have greater opportunities of having a chemical

disaster or accident are involved in the manufacturing of chemical

products or chemical materials are high-tech electronic industries

(semiconductors TFT-LCD and printed circuit board-related

sectors) and participate in the manufacturing and repair of elec-

trical and electronic machinery These three types of industries are

classi1047297ed as chemical-process industry In Figs 4 and 5 the data

collected from 2004 to 2007 show that 60 out of 156 1047297re and

explosion accidents and 419 out of 605 harmful substance contact

disasters occurred in these industries

As far as economic development is concerned these industries

are key sectors in Taiwan In 2007 the output value of all

manufacturing in Taiwan was approximately $485 billion USD

Among thesepetrochemical industries were about $52 billion USD

and the high-tech electronic industry was worth $119 billion USD

Therefore the output value of the chemical-process industries was

more than one-third of all manufacturing industries in Taiwan If

these accidents continue to occur they will damage the local

economy and adversely affect the international reputation of

Taiwan (Chen Wu Wang amp Shu2008LinTseng Wu amp Shu 2008

Tseng Liu Chang Su amp Shu 2008)

Countries all over the world have their own ways of preventingand coping with the serious detrimental effects resulting from

chemical disasters For instance in 1992 the OSHA of the USA

promulgated the Process Safety Management standards for

manufacturing highly hazardous chemicals to regulate companies

that handle large quantities of dangerous chemicals In Taiwan the

Labor Inspection Law was launched in 1993 of which Articles 26

and 38 state that dangerous workplaces of petrochemical indus-

tries including sites of manufacturing handling and use of

dangerous or hazardous materials and sites for manufacturing

agricultural chemicals should be approved or inspected by the

labor inspection authority It is expected that the establishment of

safety management systems in dangerous workplaces will help

identify and correct de1047297ciencies in the application of safety tech-

niques However there is no single management system that can beused to totally eliminate the risk of all accidents (Beatriz Manuel amp

Camilo 2007 Crowl amp Elwell 2004)

In the last two decades there have been various scales of

chemical disasters occurring in the chemical-process industries in

Taiwan Accordingly we considered and investigated the current

status of loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-

process industries in Taiwan

2 Current status of loss prevention in the petrochemical

industries in Taiwan

In chemical plants except for several well-known foreign

companies (egE I du Pont de Nemours and CompanyBASF andthe

DowChemical Company) and large domestic companies (eg Taiwan

Fig 1 The Fu Guo Chemical Company 1047297re and explosion of 2001 (Kao amp Hu 2002 The Center of Environmental Safety 2001 )

C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538532



Fig 2 The Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc 1047297re of 2005 (The Epoch Times 2005)

Fig 3 The Nanpao Resin Company explosion in January 2010 ( The Epoch Times 2010)

C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 533



Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) United Microelec-

tronics Corporation (UMC) China Petroleum Corporation (CPC)

Formosa Plastic Co (FPC) and AU Optronics (AUO) Corp) that have

established comprehensive safety systems the medium and small

indigenous chemical 1047297rms in Taiwan are still administered in tradi-

tional ways Although the manufacturing process is fast and the

product quality is well maintained safety issues are often neglected

or are lacking for a variety of reasons (Guidelines for Hazard

Evaluation Procedures 2008)

The CLA the authority of industrial and occupational safety in

Taiwan investigated labor safety and health counseling with

medium and small chemical plants from 2004 to 2006 In total 190

plants participated in this project which was categorized based on

the following safety issues

21 Process safety information

Most plants had basic protocols on accidents when they were

originally established However about half never updated the

information or reevaluated the potential hazards when process

parameters equipment or raw materials were altered This led to

two consequences

a Due to neglecting the safety issues associated with new tech-

niques and new reagents or insuf 1047297cient safety equipment in

plants and to a lack of professional analysis to completely

ascertain the risk during the process poor operation control or

improper storage was possible

b Although the equipment may have been regularly replaced the

piping and instrumentation diagrams (PampIDs) were not revised

on a regular basis This situation led to unforeseen risks for the

personnel engaged in the maintenance of equipment due to the

unknown equipment conditions

New knowledge from external safety information such as

recently launched laws and regulations emerging safety tech-

nology and updated chemical information among others has been

rapidly conveyed to each company through various means like

seminars assistance counseling and inspection because authori-

ties now pay much more attention to chemical hazards This

external safety information is accepted by most companies but the

practical act of carrying out the required actions varies depending

on the human resources and level of safety awareness in the plants

22 Process hazard analysis

Most medium and small companies considered the processhazard analysis as preliminary hazardrecognition Therefore safety

management emphasized the safety equipment in coping with

speci1047297c hazards Only a few companies systematically analyzed the

operating steps and safety procedures such as sequence 1047298ow

pressure temperature composition and facility breakdown for

accident prevention

Older plants unlike newer ones have not updated safety

requirements and lack subsidiary safety devices for temperature and

pressure control or monitoring devices to prevent overheating and

alarm devices to monitor maintain and control plant safety If the

systems have not experienced an accident for a long time they may

believe their plants are safe and that there is no problem with the

facility or the safety management system in place This complacency

is how many out of control accidents happen Therefore it isimportant to carry out systematic process safety analyses like

a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) or failure modes and effects

analysis (FMEA) to study how to protect the operating unit from

accidents with the current equipment (Bernatik amp Libisova 2004)

23 Operating procedures

Eighty percent of the plants have already formulated complete

standard operating procedures (SOPs) for their major processes

However in most cases they are not properly carried out The SOPs

for safety issues are usually only a formality for real tasks and are

not routinely updated in many plants Operators often perform

their assignments based on experience so that the SOPs are

different from real operating procedures Consequently newoperators or apprentices are often confused and this creates hidden

hazards (Meel et al 2007)

24 Management of process change

Management of process change is often the most neglected

aspect of process safety management in plants In Taiwan pro-

cessing research and development is of a high standard which

means that the process parameters and raw materials are contin-

uously tested and modi1047297ed in plants In addition unregulated

pipelines and devices are often replaced by established methods

but some management of process changes have not been

established

0

10

20

30

40

50

6

31

18

36

11

47

25

42

2006 200720052004

N u m b e r s o f f i r e a n

d e x p l o s i o n a c c i d e n t s

Year

All manufacturing sectors

Chemical process industries

Fig 4 Proportion of 1047297re and explosion disasters in chemical-process industries in

Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection 2004 2005

2006 amp 2007)

0

40

80

120

160

200

N u m b e r s o f h a r m f u l s u b s t a n c e s c o n t a

c t d i s a s t e r s

105

160

152

197

97

131

65

117

2006 200720052004

Year



Fig 5 Proportion of the harmful substance contact disasters in chemical-process

industries in Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection

2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)




25 Training

Plants with potential risks and chemical hazards should plan

necessary staff training in basic safety knowledge The necessary

safety knowledge differs depending upon the characteristics of the

plant However all personnel must be well trained to understand

the hazardous character of the chemicals being used and the basic

concepts of preventing disasters and emergency response

According to our investigation over 60 percent of the training

done in chemical-process plants that have taken part in the assis-

tance project was disquali1047297ed This was because of less-than-

capable trainers the incorrectness of the training courses long

intervals between training sessions the lack of approval and testing

of trainees and the use of workers without proper training The

most common mistakes that could be averted by proper training

are unintentionally misusing protection equipment unknowingly

using non-1047298ameproof tools in a classi1047297ed 1047298ameproof area and

storing incompatible chemicals in the same location

26 Contractor management

Although most plants have some system for managing

contractors hazard awareness in satellite-af 1047297liated organizations isnot normally well managed The basic reason for contractor

management regulations is that the safety systems are not well

executed in over 50 percent of the plants An example of this would

be not conforming to speci1047297c regulations in the use of hot work

permits or the failure to use 1047298ameproof tools Therefore high risks

associated with improper contractor management are inevitable

27 Incident investigation

Incident investigation is very important for all levels of industry

According to the accident iceberg theory for each severe accident

many near misses and minor incidents with similar causes occur

The level of accident severity in small and medium chemical plants

is higher than in many other industries but the implementation of incident investigation in small and medium chemical plants is

typically inferior to other sectors Investigations were carried out

completely in only 56 percent of chemical plants involved in the

study To prevent severe accidents from happening again incident

investigations should be strengthened in plants in the process

industries (Basso et al 2004)

28 Hot work permit

Hot work permits have received much attention in chemical

plants that have a high risk for 1047297re andor chemical release Despite

this attention it has been shown that 8 percent of chemical plants

never controlled hot work whereas only 60 percent controlled it

completely Hot work was not governed completely in theremaining approximately 30 percent probably due to lack of

awareness of ignition sources such as uncontrolled vehicles

29 Mechanical integrity

The number of accidents that occur due to equipment break-

down or wear has increased yearly since 1994 This reveals that

due to lack of appropriate maintenance and repairs the equipment

is gradually deteriorating in manufacturing plants The common

mistakes are electrical equipment deterioration 1047298ameproof

equipment having lost its protection pipelines being broken safety

equipment being broken or malfunctioning safety relief valves not

functioning properly and maintenance records and documents

being neither veri1047297

ed nor current Although the authorities audit

and check these plants the 1047297xes are delayed to try to get the work

done hurriedly in order to make a pro1047297t This is a common

phenomenon in the small and medium chemical plants studied

Fig 6 is a radar chart that presents the proportion of the process

safety management implementations carried out by small and

medium chemical plants that joined this assistance project

3 Current status of loss prevention in chemical-process

high-tech plants in Taiwan

The chemical-process high-tech industry such as semi-

conductor TFT-LCD LED and photovoltaic fabrication is the

dominant economic lifeline in Taiwan Because the processes are

complicated and many of the chemicals used are toxic highly

1047298ammable or explosive (Tables 1e3 show the characteristics of

common chemicals and specialty gases in the high-tech industry)

high-tech manufacturing buildings are all built to the highest

standards of safety Moreover the newest regulations and safety

management methods are introduced to avoid accident occurrence

(Hirano 2004 Reyes amp Beard 2008) Yet even though the high-

tech industry has been developing for nearly three decades inci-

dent information and experience is lacking (Rotaru et al 2008)

Although every plant apparently has faultless safetyequipment andsafety management toxic gas and chemical leaks or 1047297re accidents

frequently occur in Taiwan The current status of loss prevention

programs in high-tech plants in Taiwan is described as follows


Due to suf 1047297cient human resources and complete safety systems

in high-tech plants the process safety information seems abun-

dant complete and impeccable All information such as material

safety data sheets (MSDS) equipment information and PampIDs is

intact and updated periodically However this new industry uses

a variety of toxic and exotic chemicals Therefore many chemical

characteristics are unknown or occasionally intentionally ignored

bringing imminent danger or long-term health threats to the workenvironment (Rigas Konstandinidou Centola amp Reggio 2003)


Most high-tech plant buildings fall within the de1047297nition of

a dangerous workplace Because they use many kinds and large

Fig 6 Proportion of the implementations of the process safety management regula-

tions carried out by small- and medium-sized chemical plants in Taiwan (Chen Lin

Wu amp Shu 2006)




quantities of chemicals they must follow the regulations mandated

by the CLA in Taiwan to assess the process safety for a dangerous

workplace However these assessments are only for restricted

chemical processes and equipment so the regulations do not

encompass the entire process

Furthermore most of the high-tech plant buildings have

established occupational health and safety assessment systems

(OHSAS 18001) and they obey the requirement to carry out peri-

odic risk assessment The depth and width of the risk assessmenthowever depends on the experience and ability of the assessment

staff Moreover according to the trends of the high-tech industry in

Taiwan incident and minor loss information is treated as con1047297-

dential making accessing and learning from it very dif 1047297cult for

anyone in other plants

Proprietary processes and operating procedures are complex

and loss prevention information is exclusively shared within high-

tech plants so it is very important for the staff at a particular plant

to have the ability to conduct their own independent risk assess-

ment The hidden hazardthat failsto be identi1047297ed is always the key

to a subsequent accident (Suardin Mannan amp Halwagi 2007)


To meet the request of international organizations for stan-

dardization (ISO) high-tech plants have all established required

SOPs However because the equipment is so precise and intricate

and the procedures are so minute and complex it is dif 1047297cult to

encompass all the safety procedures in the SOP Besides operators

do not always follow the guidelines and the SOPs are not always

suitable for their processes points which are usually ignored

leading to accidents in these plants

34 Management of change (MOC)

Parameters and processes for equipment maintenance are

changed frequently and procedures for MOC are not always

elaborated on in high-tech plants Therefore industrial safetystaff does not always know of the changes to the usual process

parameters Because the alterations are often too frequent and

complicated to be recorded it is not clearly de1047297ned what should

be announced or accessed for the hazard More than half of all

1047297re and chemical release accidents occur because the MOCs are

not well implemented

35 Emergency planning and response

The emergency response plan in high-tech plants is usually

developed for ideal conditions If a large-scale accident occurs it

becomes dif 1047297cult to address by the procedures and organization inthe emergency response plan Because the occurrence and evolu-

tion of an accident cannot be predicted the emergency response

plan should not put emphasis on the response 1047298ow but on the

principles of treatment of the victims of a disaster of evacuation of

the requirements for shutting down the gasliquid supply and of

the requirements for transferring the command in a timely manner

By instituting and training employees on well-developed plans

fatal accidents due to mistakes made by the staff during an emer-

gency response can be avoided One example of this type of acci-

dent was the 1047297re that resulted from a silane cylinder leak that

happened at one photovoltaic fabrication plant in Taiwan

36 Employee participation

Practically there may be up to a thousand employees in a single

high-tech plant and they likely have an educational background

that is higher than those in other industrial sectors Having

employees participate in safety work or risk-reducing safety

measures depends on the safety awareness of senior managers and

organizations (Shaluf Ahmadun amp Shariff 2003)

Whether or not the organization or upper management places

a strong emphasis on safety can often be discovered by checking

the relationship between plant production and the annual plans in

the plants The high-tech industry has a market cycle When plants

are operating at full capacity many shorten the duration of annual

shutdowns or prolong the period between shutdowns to catch up

with orders and all employees participate in the work to increase

production All of these circumstances can result in accidents

37 Training

High-tech plants should follow sound training protocols with

extraordinary diligence However because of the nature of the

high-tech profession some problems might occur such as

whether an instructor is competent whether teaching materials

are adequate and whether employees follow the program to

receive the training One common fault is that the training which

is supposed to be done by a knowledgeable engineer is instead

done by an apprentice or inexperienced engineer because the

advanced employee cannot leave their position for too long It is

dif 1047297cult to estimate the damage caused by these insuf 1047297ciently

trained personnel

Table 1

Characteristics of common corrosive chemicals utilized in high-tech companies

(Urban 2006)

Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH

HCl Etching 5 ppm e

H3PO4 Etching 1 mgm3 100 ppm

H2SO4 Etching 1 mgm3 80 ppm mgm3

HF Etching 3 ppm 20 ppm

HNO3 Etching 2 ppm 100 ppmTMAH Photo e e

TLV-TWA threshold limit valueetime weighted average

IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health

TMAH tetramethylammonium hydroxide

Table 2

Characteristics of common solvents used in high-tech companies (Pohanish amp

Greene 2003 Urban 2006)

Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits

Ac eton e Phot oet chi ng 750 ppm 20000 ppm 25e128

IPA Photoetching 400 ppm 20000 ppm 2e12

HMDS Photo e e 07e31

Photoresist Photo e e e

IPA isopropyl alcohol

HMDS hexamethyldisiloxane

Table 3

Characteristics of common specialty gases used in high-tech companies (Carson amp

Mumford 1995 Urban 2006)


AsH3 Implant 005 ppm 6 ppm 45e78

BF3 Implant 1 ppm 100 ppm e

B2H6 Deposition 01 ppm 40 ppm 08e88

SiCl2H2 Dif fusion 05 ppm e 41e99

PH3 Implant 03 ppm 200 ppm 16e

98BCl3 Implant e e e

SiH4 Depositio n 5 ppm e 14e96

SF6 Etching 1000 ppm e e

NF3 Etching 10 ppm 2000 ppm e





Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in

Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which

various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in

advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and

leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless

operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant

caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another

plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment

reagents resulted in a chlorine leak


Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed

cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident

investigations is closed not only between one business and

another but also between subsidiary companies in the same

business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the

problems of important questions being evaded and intentional

concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In

the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were

unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make

incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident

occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would

initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and

proposing prevention measures for future operation

310 Compliance audits

Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety

management The industrial safety staff usually perform the

primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the

secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can

be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of

many different technologies and departments so most industrial

safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize

The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore

many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections

being illegally bypassed are often not discovered

311 Pre-startup safety review

The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through

a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular

production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency

shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into

production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent

production demands

312 Hot work permit

A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech

companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor

management of hot work permits These hot work permits however

should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might

cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal

source)


Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech

companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom

caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion

4 Conclusions

Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or

medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively

improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able

to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of

each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from

the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For

example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain

levels of safety management can be provided with thorough

assistance regarding safety management However those having

inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary

assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct

knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks

The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted

on the basis of their individual needs

In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are

higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety

management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech

companies have been generated and implemented However it

is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think

carefully about how to completely identify understand and control

potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes

Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties

that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole

range of stages in manufacturing

Acknowledgments

The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow

Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and

suggestions

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analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e

222




Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077

Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127

Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68

PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons

Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28

Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109

Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284

Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521

Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve

inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90

Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews

The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC

The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm

The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http

wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor

Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08

2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response

plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399

Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press

Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727




this may have resulted in remunerative compensation or even the

causation of clients shifting orders to ASErsquos competitors In

summary the damages were anticipated to reach $320 USDmillion

which is a huge loss for any company to take (Taipei Times 2005

The China Post 2005 The Epoch Times 2005)

The third example happened on January 8 2010 In this case

a huge blast with a mushroom cloud occurred at 248 pm at the

Nanpao Resin Co The 1047297re after a couple of explosions was not

extinguished until the following dawn (see Fig 3) Roughly4298 m2 of production and warehouse space was subsequently

destroyed Additionally Taiwan Steel amp Iron Co its neighbor was

partly damaged The accident took place at the cumene oxidation

tower in which a 1047298uid leak was identi1047297ed in the broken recycling

line A lack of a buffer zone at the bottom of the recycling line

resulted in the leaking followed by an unidenti1047297ed ignition source

The 1047297rm is one of the major producers for cumene hydroperoxide

(CHP) and dicumyl peroxide (DCP) in Taiwan Because of the severe

damage the plant was shut down fenced off and dismantled

The various indirect losses from these accidents are inestimable

including equipment repairs delay in plant re-commissioning loss

of market share and increases in insurance costs (Muniz Peon amp

Ordas 2007)

According to the annual reports of occupational disasters pub-lished by the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) Executive Yuan Taiwan

the industries that have greater opportunities of having a chemical

disaster or accident are involved in the manufacturing of chemical

products or chemical materials are high-tech electronic industries

(semiconductors TFT-LCD and printed circuit board-related

sectors) and participate in the manufacturing and repair of elec-

trical and electronic machinery These three types of industries are

classi1047297ed as chemical-process industry In Figs 4 and 5 the data

collected from 2004 to 2007 show that 60 out of 156 1047297re and

explosion accidents and 419 out of 605 harmful substance contact

disasters occurred in these industries

As far as economic development is concerned these industries

are key sectors in Taiwan In 2007 the output value of all

manufacturing in Taiwan was approximately $485 billion USD

Among thesepetrochemical industries were about $52 billion USD

and the high-tech electronic industry was worth $119 billion USD

Therefore the output value of the chemical-process industries was

more than one-third of all manufacturing industries in Taiwan If

these accidents continue to occur they will damage the local

economy and adversely affect the international reputation of

Taiwan (Chen Wu Wang amp Shu2008LinTseng Wu amp Shu 2008

Tseng Liu Chang Su amp Shu 2008)

Countries all over the world have their own ways of preventingand coping with the serious detrimental effects resulting from

chemical disasters For instance in 1992 the OSHA of the USA

promulgated the Process Safety Management standards for

manufacturing highly hazardous chemicals to regulate companies

that handle large quantities of dangerous chemicals In Taiwan the

Labor Inspection Law was launched in 1993 of which Articles 26

and 38 state that dangerous workplaces of petrochemical indus-

tries including sites of manufacturing handling and use of

dangerous or hazardous materials and sites for manufacturing

agricultural chemicals should be approved or inspected by the

labor inspection authority It is expected that the establishment of

safety management systems in dangerous workplaces will help

identify and correct de1047297ciencies in the application of safety tech-

niques However there is no single management system that can beused to totally eliminate the risk of all accidents (Beatriz Manuel amp

Camilo 2007 Crowl amp Elwell 2004)

In the last two decades there have been various scales of

chemical disasters occurring in the chemical-process industries in

Taiwan Accordingly we considered and investigated the current

status of loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-

process industries in Taiwan

2 Current status of loss prevention in the petrochemical

industries in Taiwan

In chemical plants except for several well-known foreign

companies (egE I du Pont de Nemours and CompanyBASF andthe

DowChemical Company) and large domestic companies (eg Taiwan

Fig 1 The Fu Guo Chemical Company 1047297re and explosion of 2001 (Kao amp Hu 2002 The Center of Environmental Safety 2001 )




























two consequences


























accident prevention





























established

0

10

20

30

40

50

6

31

18

36

11

47

25

42

2006 200720052004



Year





2006 amp 2007)

0

40

80

120

160

200



105

160

152

197

97

131

65

117

2006 200720052004

Year





2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)




25 Training




































28 Hot work permit























































Wu amp Shu 2006)






































































37 Training











trained personnel

Table 1


(Urban 2006)


HCl Etching 5 ppm e








Table 2










Table 3

























































production demands

312 Hot work permit






source)





4 Conclusions

























Acknowledgments



suggestions

References













222




















































two consequences


























accident prevention





























established

0

10

20

30

40

50

6

31

18

36

11

47

25

42

2006 200720052004



Year





2006 amp 2007)

0

40

80

120

160

200



105

160

152

197

97

131

65

117

2006 200720052004

Year





2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)




25 Training




































28 Hot work permit























































Wu amp Shu 2006)






































































37 Training











trained personnel

Table 1


(Urban 2006)


HCl Etching 5 ppm e








Table 2










Table 3

























































production demands

312 Hot work permit






source)





4 Conclusions

























Acknowledgments



suggestions

References













222















































two consequences


























accident prevention





























established

0

10

20

30

40

50

6

31

18

36

11

47

25

42

2006 200720052004



Year





2006 amp 2007)

0

40

80

120

160

200



105

160

152

197

97

131

65

117

2006 200720052004

Year





2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)




25 Training




































28 Hot work permit























































Wu amp Shu 2006)






































































37 Training











trained personnel

Table 1


(Urban 2006)


HCl Etching 5 ppm e








Table 2










Table 3

























































production demands

312 Hot work permit






source)





4 Conclusions

























Acknowledgments



suggestions

References













222




























25 Training




































28 Hot work permit























































Wu amp Shu 2006)






































































37 Training











trained personnel

Table 1


(Urban 2006)


HCl Etching 5 ppm e








Table 2










Table 3

























































production demands

312 Hot work permit






source)





4 Conclusions

























Acknowledgments



suggestions

References













222






























































































37 Training











trained personnel

Table 1


(Urban 2006)


HCl Etching 5 ppm e








Table 2










Table 3

























































production demands

312 Hot work permit






source)





4 Conclusions

























Acknowledgments



suggestions

References













222





































































production demands

312 Hot work permit






source)





4 Conclusions

























Acknowledgments



suggestions

References













222


















































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HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan

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