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Democracy Assistance in the MiddleEast and North Africa: A Comparison
of US and EU PoliciesDANIELA HUBERDepartment of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
ABSTRACT This article compares US and EU efforts at democracy assistance in the MiddleEast and North Africa. Although the substantive content of what the US and the EU view asthe type of democratic institutions to promote does not differ greatly, some puzzling variationsare found in the area of funding party development and decentralization, a balancedtop-down/bottom-up versus a top-down approach and slightly different thematic foci. Theactors use similar implementation methods, but have differing approaches to partnership.
Since the 1990s, international democracy assistance (DA) is advancing as animportant feature of democracies foreign policies. The DA of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) worldwide rose from US$106
million in 1990 to US$830 million in 2003 (Finkel et al., 2006: 26) while the
spending of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
rose from ECU76 million in 1995 to e132 million in 2006 (EC, 2006a: 11). In 2001,
the total spending of the EU and its member states on democracy assistance reached
approximately e900 million per year (Youngs, 2003: 128).
Democracy promotion had its first roots in the ideas of President Woodrow
Wilson, who declared that [t]he world must be made safe for democracy (Wilson,
1917). With the backup of the democratic peace theorem, however, it seems to be
not only driven by Wilsonian ideas, but also by the very security interests of
democracies in the long run. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in 1998: It
is not only the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do.1 President Clinton wasthe first US president to put democracy promotion into the heart of his foreign policy
of engagement and enlargement (Clinton, 1995). The EU states declared in the
provisions on a common foreign and security policy in the founding treaty of the
EU the Maastricht Treaty that [t]he objectives of the common foreign and
1362-9395 Print/1743-9418 Online/08/010043-20 q 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13629390701864836
Correspondence Address: Ms Daniela Huber, Kfar HaStudentim, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 97880,
Israel. Email: [email protected]
Mediterranean Politics,
Vol. 13, No. 1, 4362, March 2008
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security policy shall be: . . . to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of
law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (European
Community, 1992: Title V, Article J.1.2).
Democracy promotion employs different instruments including military means,
political conditionality or democracy assistance. This article focuses on the latter, as
despite the increasing national and international budgets assigned to DA, systematic
research about it is still lagging behind. Nonetheless, Carothers (2003, 2004)
provides detailed accounts of democracy assistance for the US and Youngs (2001a, b,
2004a) for the EU, specifically also for EU efforts in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA)2 (Youngs, 2004b; Gillespie and Youngs, 2002).US and EU efforts at
democracy promotion are briefly compared by Hullen and Stahn (2007), Kopstein(2006), Youngs (2001a: 4652) and Whitehead (1986).3 To the knowledge of the
author, there is no work, however, that compares US and EU democracy assistance on
the basis of an extended empirical study and this article will thus fillthis research gap.
The leading question is what the DA of the two biggest actors the US and the
EU looks like. This is further broken down into three central questions: What is
promoted? How is it promoted? Who is promoted? With the help of the
corresponding indicators of substance, method and recipient countries, the DA
policies of the US and the EU will be analyzed and compared for the MENA from
the beginning of the 1990s until today.
Since the end of the Cold War MENA has been of increased political relevance for
Western democracies and their democracy assistance efforts in this region are
growing as a result. The US supports democratization in the MENA countries mainly
through the Democracy and Governance Unit of USAID (USAID DG), the StateDepartments Human Rights and Democracy Initiative (HRDF) and its Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). In the case of the EU there are numerous initiatives of
the individual member states. As the common programmes through the European
Commission represent the lowest common denominator, those programmes will be
analyzed as representative for the EU. If, however, the practice of the single member
states deviates obviously from the common policy, this will be mentioned separately.The European Commission promotes democracy through the European Instrument
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
This study proceeds in the following steps: after an elaboration of the term
democracy assistance and the development of a methodological framework, the
democracy assistance policies of the US and the EU will be described and analyzed.
The conclusion compares the policies and presents further perspectives for research.
What is Democracy Assistance?
The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the
programmes of the US and the EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section
will therefore outline the actors comprehensions of the term and the (however
insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of
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the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a
methodological framework.
The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as
technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded
governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and
support democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable
to citizens. These efforts also include promoting democratic transitions in
countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote the rule
of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a
competitive political process, a free and independent media, stronger civilsociety and greater citizen participation in government, and governance
structures that are efficient, responsive, and accountable. (USAID, 2005: 4)
Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:
These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal
suffrage, free election, multiparty structure, equality of access to political
activity, participatory decision making); human rights (including adherence
to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights
Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of
speech and of assembly, effective operation of human rights monitoring); and
the rule of law (including an independent and effective judiciary, transparent
legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and publicadministration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC
2003a: 10)
The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest
to the understanding of this article: Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary
purpose, not the secondary or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipientcountries. It does not therefore include economic and social aid programs
(Carothers, 2000: 188). In addition, two further characteristics of democracy
assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy
promotion: first, it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of
foreign policy as opposed to negative measures such as sanctions or even military
means.4 Second, it represents an active instrument, as the democracy promoter takes
measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political conditionalityimplies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts.
Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments.
Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively
and actively initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening
democracy, as well as human rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts
for differing DA policies depending on the level of democratization in a recipient
country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to consolidating
or delegative democracies. Democratization is the process of transition from
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a non-democratic to a democratic political system. The term human rights is includedin the definition, as the actors understand it as an important part of their democracy
assistance. Democracy is understood according to Robert Dahls concept of
Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and participation. This
concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough
for different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that
DA is more than electoral assistance.
On the basis of these definitions, the three leading questions to compare US and
EU democracy assistance are: What is promoted? How is it promoted? Who is
promoted? To answer these questions three indicators are set up: substance, method
and recipient countries.
Substance can analyze either the subject matter of what the US or the EU claim
they intend to promote (e.g. rule of law) or the actual screws of a recipient political
system that they in fact try to turn in order to achieve this objective (e.g. supportingpublic prosecutors). This article focuses on the latter, as it shows the actual practice
rather than the conception. A political system consists of different interacting
institutions: in the state sphere there are the state institutions, which encompass the
executive, judicative and legislative, as well as local authority (decentralization).
Also formal rules and procedures such as the constitution and elections belong to
this category. Between the state and the private sphere stands political and civilsociety. Political society looks at political parties or political societies (such as in
Bahrain in face of the absence of political parties). Civil society is the realm of
organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-
supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared
rules (Diamond, 1999: 221). It stands between the private sphere and the state and
includes the media, but excludes economic society, which is the profit-making
enterprise of individual business firms (Diamond, 1999: 221). This section alsocovers civic education. As civil society is very diverse topic-wise, democracypromoters can set different thematic priorities here, which will also be analyzed.
Additionally, this section examines the balance of the three spheres that receive
DA: a bottom-up approach tries to initiate or assist democratization through the
support of civil society, whereas a top-down approach focuses on the reform of state
institutions. Funding of political society stands somewhat in between. Some
programmes cut through the categorization of state institutions, political society and
civil society. Elections and decentralization, for example, can be supported by pure
Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments
Explicit instrumentsImplicitinstruments
Positiveinstruments
Democracy assistance (active instrument),positive political conditionality(passive instrument)
Classical developmentaid
Negativeinstruments
Negative political conditionality, namingand shaming, military action
Military action
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technical assistance, but the programmes usually also include civic education in case
of elections, or cooperative civil society municipality work in case of
decentralization. The same is true of assistance for parliaments, whose support can
embrace the strengthening of parties as well.
Method looks at the way DA is implemented. Firstly, this section can cover the
modus operandi of the implementation process of a project from its creation through
to its accomplishment. The usual path of a project is best described by the term
external project method, which was introduced by the American researcher
Carothers (2003: 257). It refers to a way of implementation in which the aid provider
assesses what the country needs in order to become a democracy, an aid project is
designed or the provider asks for local proposals and funds are then given tointermediary groups from the DA-providing country that carry out the project and
work with local partners in turn. Therefore, a project runs through different stages
with diverse actors: (1) the democracy-promoting agency that decides what to
support; (2) the project designer, which can either be the democracy-promoting
agency itself or local actors, who offer projects that correspond with a predetermined
subject area; (3) the implementation partner, who can either be from the providing or
receiving country, or an international partner.
Secondly, this section will also cover an evaluation of the qualitative approach of
the democracy promoter, which can be based on partnership with or against the will
of a recipient country. Promoting democracy against the will of a government
is impossible for projects affecting state institutions and difficult for projects
allocated to political or civil society the latter also depending on the stage of
liberalization of the recipient country. Furthermore, a project can be against the willof a government, but favoured by (parts of) the society of the same country. As this
is hard to measure, a better indicator for partnership is the establishment and
institutionalization of platforms for dialogue that can be set up at different levels.
They can be located at the state level (ministers, senior officials, parliamentarians,
judiciaries), in political society or civil society. A further focus is their degree of
institutionalization, which is asserted by the number of meetings per year. Inaddition, those platforms should be related to the democracy promotion efforts
either directly by discussing democracy or human rights related questions or
indirectly through the strengthening of networks.
The indicator for the who-question is recipient countries, as the other possible
actors (state institutions, political society, civil society, project designers and
implementers) are already covered by the substance and method indicators. The
indicator recipient countries examines three topics: (1) the countries that receive DAand the countries that do not, (2) the amount of DA that they maintain and therewith
the focus countries and (3) the criteria according to which DA is distributed.
The programmes will be screened on the basis of these indicators. This is less
important for USAID DG, HRDF and EIDHR, which are pure DA initiatives, but
more important for MEPI and EMP/ENP, which are not purely DA initiatives. This
study, however, only looks at the DA part of the latter. Information and data about
the programmes are drawn from the information that the US and EU provide on their
homepages, as well as from interviews with officials and experts.
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US Democracy Assistance Policies
The US promotes democracy in the Middle East through USAID DG, HRDF and
MEPI. In 1994 under the Clinton administration, the Democracy and Governance
Unit of USAID was established. Democracy and governance assistance represents
5.8 per cent of total USAID assistance, with a rising tendency (Finkel et al., 2006: 31).
Democracy assistance through the USAID DG in the MENA area covered US$1.94
million in 1990, started to grow under Clinton in 1994 at the time of the Oslo peace
process, fell again with the Bush administration and is rising considerably since
11 September 2001 and the second Iraq War. In 2003 it constituted US$188.93 million(and US$830 million for all regions respectively) (Finkel et al., 2006: 26, 31).
The HRDF was launched in 1998 and is supervised by the Bureau of Democracy,Human Rights and Labour of the State Department. Funding rose from US$8 million
in 1998/99 to US$48 million in 2005/06 (US Department of State, 2004a, 2005).
MEPI is a presidential initiative which was established in 2002 as part of President
George W. Bushs ForwardStrategy for Freedom to bolster democracy and reform in
the Middle East and to fight terrorism. It is based at the State Department. Its structure
was strongly influenced by the results of the Arab Human Development Report 2002
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and also mirrors the EUs
regional initiative EMP.5 It consists of four pillars: political, economic, education and
womens empowerment. The budget in the years 20022005 amounted to US$293
million (US Department of State, 2006a). The administration usually requests more,
which is not approved by Congress with the argument that the programme is not
detailed enough and overlaps with USAID programmes.
Substance
Whereas the much smaller HRDF programme follows a bottom-up approach, MEPI
has a top-down approach. Wittes and Yerkes (2004) find that almost 71 per cent of
MEPIs funding went to Arab governmental agencies and officials and only 18 percent
to American or Arab non-governmental organizations (NGOs). USAID DG follows a
rather balancedbottom-up/top-down with a recent trend towards a top-downapproach:
between 1990 and 2003 51 per cent of all funding in MENA went to civil society,
40 per cent to state institutions and 9 per cent to political parties and elections6 (Finkel
et al., 2006: 36); between2004 and2006 27 per cent went to civil society, 58 per cent to
state institutions and 15 per cent to political parties and elections (USAID, 2006a g).
This substantial increase in funding state institutions instead of civil society
cannot be explained by the reconstruction of state institutions in Iraq. Even withoutIraq, 37 per cent went to civil society, 53 per cent to state institutions and 10 per cent
to political parties and elections (USAID, 2006a, cg). According to an experienced
US practitioner and decision maker in the field,
USAID embraces civil society capacity building as an alternative strategy in
cases where there is a lack of political will for reform among central decision
makers. When political will is deemed to exist, USAID tends to focus its
efforts on bolstering state institutions, as is now evident in Iraq.7
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State institutions programmes, for example, included in the justice sector the trainingof Iraqi judges on judicial independence, rule of law, the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, current European law on human rights, and anti-corruption
initiatives, run by the US Department of Justice in 2004/05 (US Department of State,
2004b: 190). In the legislative sector, the capacity of the Palestinian legislature to
propose legislation, formulate policy and monitor the executive was nurtured
(USAID, 2006f: 1). Election support in Iraq totalled US$59.175 million for the
elections of the Transitional National Assembly, the Governorate Provincial Councils
and the Kurdistan Regional Assembly. For the Constitutional Referendum and the
Permanent National Council programmes provided for voter education, domestic
observers and technical assistance (USAID, 2006b: 12). For the Palestinian
presidential, parliamentary and local elections technical assistance and equipment like
ballot boxes and paper were provided, as well as international observation. The
programme also covered voter education and information campaigns.The vast majority (87 per cent) of the USAID DG state institution share, however,
went to decentralization and local government (USAID, 2006ag). The figures
remain the same when Iraq is not included. The new trend to support
decentralization in general development aid in recent years seems to have spilled
over to democracy assistance. This is also remarkable, because the European
Commission as we will see later hardly funds decentralization in its DA
programmes. Examples of decentralization activity include the capacity building
of local administration in Iraq which included projects such as the strengthening of
Figure 1. USAID DG in MENA by sector, 20042006. Source: USAID, 2006a g(programmes are allotted to the three sectors according to the definitions given by the author).*Civil Society also includes some social infrastructure, health, basic education, and professional
training programmes.
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fiscal and administrative management and leadership training (USAID, 2006b:
12). Similarly, local government in Lebanon received support concerning the
standardizing procedures for municipalities, the training of municipal staff and
officials, as well as the strengthening of administrative and financial capabilities of
municipal unions. There were policy dialogue trips between Lebanese municipal
officials and US counterparts, especially of women officials, encouragement of
citizen participation in municipalities, and training for the Lebanese parliament to
work with municipalities (USAID, 2006d: 12).
Party development is part of the election support of USAID DG, but there are also
special programmes, conducted by the HRDFs main contractor the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED). The NED, for example, worked with the twoparty institutes, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which received approximately
US$11 million in 2004 for party development in Iraq. They set up resource centres
with computers and basic material and offered campaign and poll-watcher training
for parties (NED, 2006). MEPI trained young Egyptian party members to employ
democratic practices inside the parties and to participate in domestic election
monitoring (US Department of State, 2006b,c).
Civil society programmes include strengthening of independent media, trade
unions, business associations, as well as of women, inter-religious dialogue and
human rights. Also supported were grassroots programmes. Sample programmes
were support for Egyptian media for the promotion of local, decentralized media,
business development of private media, advertising markets and support of media
legal reforms (USAID, 2006a: 12). MEPI strengthened Egyptian womens NGOnetworks to increase their influence on regional government policies; a womens
leadership network with women from business and civil society was established and
trained in leadership. In 2002/03 USAID funded an Arabic version of Sesame Street
to promote inter-religious tolerance (US Department of State, 2003: 136). In Iraq,
strengthening civil society concentrated on human rights, anti-corruption, women,
minority rights, professionalization and independent media. A NGO resource centrefor training and technical assistance was established. A further focus was to involve
citizens in their local communities (USAID, 2006b: 12).
Method
Funding is channelled through US organizations in the above-mentioned external
project method(Carothers, 2003: 257). US agencies either directly design projectsor determine subject areas for local proposals. There are also grassroots programmes
through the embassies and the NED to allow responsiveness to the regions needs.
The typical implementing partners include the NED, the two party institutes IRI
and NDI, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the American Center
for International Labour Solidarity (ACILS), American Bar Association/Central and
Eastern European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), research and policy institutes like
Freedom House, universities, the Catholic Relief Service and also for-profit
development consulting groups (USAID, 2006g).
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There are hardly any platforms for inter-regional US MENA dialogue from
USAID DG except for some visitors programmes for municipal and governmental
officials who travel to the US. HRDF does not provide platforms for dialogue
and only has a few very weakly institutionalized regional forums like a forum of
Muslim political leaders with commitment to democracy or a network of democrats.
MEPI the US partnership initiative does not have an institutionalized platform
for governmental meetings, or for political or civil society dialogue, except for the
USMiddle East University Partnership. There are some weakly institutionalized
regional projects such as the Arab Judicial Forum or the Femmes du Monde Arabe et
dAmerique Reunies pour Entreprendre.8
Recipient Countries
USAID claims to give assistance according to strategic importance, commitment to
democratic process and likely effectiveness (USAID, 2005: 7). Similarly, HRDF
supports regions and countries that are geo-strategically critical to the U.S. (US
Department of State, 2005). Recipient countries of USAID DG assistance in MENA
at the moment are: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian
Territories and Yemen. Leading USAID DG per capita recipients were Iraq, Jordan,
and the Palestinian Territories.
Figure 2 shows that DA of USAID focuses on countries in conflict that are
additionally of geo-strategic importance for the US (Iraq, Palestinian Territories) or
on frontrunners in respect to liberalization such as Jordan. MEPI also includes
countries of the Gulf such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia and thusimportant strategic partners. Not included in any DA are Libya and Syria so-called
rogue states in the period under study. Crucial criteria thus indeed seem to be
strategic importance and to some extent the level of democratic development.
Figure 2. USAID DG recipients in MENA, 20042006 per capita. Figures from USAID,2006ag; CIA World Factbook, 2006.
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EU Democracy Assistance Policies
The EU promotes democracy through its European Initiative for Democracy and
Human Rights (since 2007, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights), the Barcelona Process also called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and
the European Neighbourhood Policy. The initiation, aims, institutional set-up and
instruments, as well as the funding of the programmes differ.
The EIDHR was initiated by the European Parliament and was set up in 1994. The
Barcelona Process was primarily an idea of Spain and the founding conference of
the EMP was held during the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU in 1995.The European Neighbourhood Policy was an idea of various people from the
Commission (like Romano Prodi) and from member states (such as the foreignministers of Great Britain and Sweden, Jack Straw and Anna Lindh). The Commission
then suggested the Wider Europe Policy in 2003 and the ENP in 2004, which were
both approved by the European Council and became EU policy.
The programmes also have differing aims: in contrast to the EMP and ENP, the
EIDHR is set up only to foster democracy and human rights and it does not need the
agreement of the host governments for its actions, but mainly deals with civil society
directly. It is a thematic programme that complements the geographical programmes
of the EU. The EMP is destined to strengthen the bilateral and multilateral relations
between the EU and the Mediterranean countries and to foster economic as well as
political reform in the latter. Thematically it consists of three baskets: the political
and security chapter, the economic and financial chapter and the social, cultural and
human chapter. The Regional Strategy Paper for the years 20072013 presents three
priority objectives, namely justice, security and migration, a sustainable economic
area and socio-cultural exchanges. The foremost aim of the ENP is to consolidate a
stable and secure neighbourhood for the EU and to complement the EMP in
promoting political and economic reform.
Institutionally, all three programmes are supervised by the European Commission
and belong to the portfolio of the Commissioner for External Relations and the
European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. EIDHR is located at
the EuropeAid Cooperation Office as part of the thematic operations. It was
institutionalized in 1999 with its own budget, run through a reform in 2006/07 like all
Commission assistance programmes and received its own legal base. The EMP is part
of the EUs external relations with third countries. It has a bilateral dimension with the
association agreements, which cover the contractual relations and are legally binding,
and a multilateral dimension, which manifests itself in the common conferencesand programmes. The European Neighbourhood Policy is an EU policy with a
geographical focus on the eastern and southern neighbourhood of the EU. Its key
instruments are the bilateral Action Plans, which set out the reform priorities,
are mutually agreed between the EU and the partner country, but do not contain
commitments about funding. Those assistance issues are laid down in the CountryStrategy Papers and then in more detail in the National Indicative Programmes.
Countries that successfully implement the reform agenda are bound closer to the EU,
which is a positive conditionality approach and an answer to the flaws of the EMP.
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So, the programmes use different instruments to achieve democratization or political
reform. Whereas the EIDHR is a DA instrument, the EMP and ENP not only use DA
but alsopolitical conditionality. Thelatter instrument will not be analyzedin thispaper.
Funding of the programmes differs considerably: the EIDHR is much smaller than
the EMP and ENP: in 1995 the EIDHRs budget started with ECU75.96 million per
annum (European Commission, 1995: 40) and it has since reached e132.125 million
(European Commission, 2006a: 11). The main financial instruments of the EMP to
financially and technically support the reform process were the European
Investment Bank with a volume of e6.4 billion in 20002007 and the MEDA
funds (until 2007). MEDA I (19951999) had a budget ofe3.4 billion and MEDA II
(20002006) had a volume ofe5.4 billion (European Commission, 2006b). Until2007 funding of the ENP was also channelled through MEDA II. In 2007, ENPI
replaced MEDA and other assistance programmes. For the period 20072013 it has
a budget ofe12 billion (European Commission, 2007a).
Substance
As seen above, the civil society programme the EIDHR is much smaller than the
state capacity-building programmes EMP and ENP. Therefore, in contrast to the
balanced US approach, the EU follows a top-down approach. As to the state capacity-
building projects of the EMP and ENP there is no complete account of numbers
available, but generally it can be said that most money related to DA goes to the
modernization of police, justice, administration and, to a lower degree, elections. For
example, programmes in support of judicial reform in Morocco targeted ethicalstandards, transparency, independence and efficient dispute settlement. The
computer systems, databases and filing of courts were improved (European
Commission, 2000: 15). Through its 2005/06 National Indicative Programme the
human rights awareness inside Moroccan state institutions was strengthened by
training of officials and monitoring through NGOs (European Commission, 2005b:
30 32). The region-wide MEDA Justice, Freedom, and Security Programme from
Justice and Home Affairs in the framework of the Action Plans totalled e155.2
million in a time period of 20032006 (European Commission, 2004b: 68). Its
Justice Project targeted the creation of an inter professional community of
magistrates, lawyers and clerks in the framework of an open and modern justice
service, strengthening the rule of law and the effective implementation of human
rights (European Commission, 2004b: 3). The Police Project aimed at respect for
human rights and tried to align reference texts with international standards. Electoralassistance generally focused on the Palestinian Territories. From 2003 until today
election assistance and observation for the Palestinian presidential and legislative
council elections has totalled e17 million (EIDHR, 2006b). There were also missions
to Lebanon in 2005 and Iraq in 2004 (EIDHR, 2006c).
None of the EU programmes had a project in the area of party development.
According to a representative of the EIDHR unit of the European Commission, the EU
keeps away from party funding, as this is too political, but is right now thinking about
some way of conducting it.9 Member states, however, do have projects in this area.
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Germany, for example, supports parties through its party foundations. Also,
Whitehead (1986: 26) points out that Western European parties, in contrast to US
parties, carry out something resembling international diplomacy on their own
account, and . . . actively support fraternal parties in other parts of the world. He
especially mentions the Socialist International in this respect. Party development
assistance from Europe is located in the party domain rather than in the state domain.
The EIDHRs civil society programmes cover topics such as media, women and
human rights, particularly also the fight against the death penalty, torture, racism and
xenophobia. A region-wide programme, for example, promoted independent
journalism and responsible and free media by means of seminars, the development
of codes of conduct, resource handbooks and safety kits for journalists. A campaignfor the eradication of female genital mutilation was financed in Egypt, as well as a
programme for the amelioration of prison conditions through monitoring of prisons,
collecting complaints, publishing reports, and provision of legal assistance to
prisoners. In Israel there was a project to educate the Israeli public and policy makers
about respect for human rights in times of emergency through advocacy training of
human rights activists, distribution of materials, educational forums, and lobbying.
Another project sought to enforce international humanitarian law by providing legal
assistance to Palestinians (EIDHR, 2006d).
Method
The EIDHR also works with the external project method and has three methods of
implementation: the Macro Projects are managed by the Commission, exceede300,000 and are chosen through global calls for proposals inviting applications
from European or local NGOs and authorities. Micro Projects are managed by the
Commission Delegations, do not exceed e100,000 and are selected through local
calls for proposals to support local NGOs in third countries (EIDHR, 2006a). The
latter are supposed to be especially responsive to local civil society. The Targeted
Projects are destined for special objectives of the European Commission and carried
out by international or regional organizations and national authorities. Whereas the
micro-projects are directly implemented by local partners, the main share of the
macro-projects is carried out by European contractors who in turn might work with
local partners. The only genuine exception was the macro-projects in Israel, the
majority of which were led by Israeli NGOs probably due to their capacity to fulfil
the selection criteria of the EU.
The EMP and the ENP also use the external project method, but programmes aregenerally agreed upon with the recipient governments beforehand, as both are
programmes for state capacity building. Whereas the beneficiaries of those
programmes are mainly governments, the contractors are usually European (who in
turn might work with local contractors).10
In terms of regional platforms, the EIDHR only has a few forums: one platform is
the EUIranian human rights dialogue, which was established in 2002, continued
until June 2004 and was suspended afterwards by Iran. There were approximately
two meetings per year with a round-table discussion, followed by a restricted
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officials meeting where the EU was represented by the EU Troika and Iran by
officials of the government, judiciary and parliament. Civil society representatives
were included in the round table discussion. Themes of discussion were, for
example, in 2003 freedom of expression and the right to development and in 2004
standards of human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the two International Covenants on Human Rights (Council of the EU, 2004:
4546).
Another regional forum that received EIDHR funding was the Mediterranean
Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democratization at Malta University, which is a
postgraduate programme for senior officials in government or penal institutions,
NGOs, womens rights activists, lawyers, journalists and business graduates(European Commission, 2004a: 8).
The EMP, which is based on an integrative and consensual approach, clearly
stands out as most developed in terms of institutionalized regional platforms: on the
governmental level there are the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of foreign
ministers where progress in the three chapters is discussed. The topics human rights
and democracy are part of the political and security dialogue. There were seven
meetings since 1995. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee meets quarterly, is made
up of senior officials, discusses questions related to the baskets and prepares the
ministerial meetings (European Commission, 2006c).
On the parliamentary level, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly
(EMPA) was established in 2004 to replace the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary
Forum. It has 240 members, half of them European, half Mediterranean. It consists
of four committees: the Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights;the Committee on Economic and Social Affairs and Education; the Committee on
Improving Quality of Life, Exchanges between Civil Societies and Culture; and
the Committee on Womens Rights. In addition, there are several working groups.
The EMPA meets in March every year in varying cities (European Parliament, 2007).
On the civil society level, the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum has the objective to
strengthen the voice of civil society in the Barcelona Process and to act as atransmission belt. Participants come from the whole Mediterranean region and their
interests range from human rights, development, women, transparency, culture and
trade unions to environmental questions. So far, it has met ten times. There is also the
EuroMesco Network of foreign policy institutes and the Euro-Mediterranean
Information and Training Seminars for Diplomats. The latter is run by the
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies in a semi-annual cycle. The main
objective is to learn aboutthe EMP, butalso about EU institutions and decision making(EuroMed, 2006). The Tempus programme was expanded to the Mediterranean region
to develop inter-university cooperation and modernize the higher education systems in
the region (European Commission, 2005a: 18). A further platform is the Euro-
Mediterranean Youth Platform, which was established in 2003 to bring young people
together. Furthermore, in 2004 the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for
the Dialogue between Cultures was founded to promote dialogue and to familiarize
citizens with the EMP.
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Recipient Countries
The EIDHR has two geographical scopes: the country level and the regional level. The
biggest share of funding goes to Israel and the Palestinian Territories: between 1996
and1999Israel (16percent) andthePalestinian Territories (20per cent) received36 per
centof allEIDHRfunds forMENA;calculatedper capita,together theyreceivedalmost
80 per cent of all funds (Karkutli and Butzler, 1999: 33; CIA World Fact book, 2006).
In 2002 the EIDHR started to define geographical priorities. So called focus
countries were selected according to state and civil society capacity, nature of the
political dialogue, complementarity with other EU and EU member state
programmes and a worldwide geographical balance. Selected countries in MENA
between 2002 and 2004 were Algeria, Israel and the Palestinian Territories and
Figure 3. Distribution of EIDHR funds for MENA, 1996 1998 by country per capita.Figures from Karkutli and Butzler, 1999:33; CIA World Factbook (2006).
Figure 4. Distribution of MEDA funding by country. Figures from EC (2004c: 1).
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Tunisia. Holden (2005: 207), however, points out that this policy was widely
criticized, as key countries and NGOs were excluded from assistance. The
concentration on focus countries was lifted again in 2004 and all Mediterranean
countries except for Libya have been included since.
The EMPs Mediterranean partner countries include Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
Libya has an observer status. Turkey has special status as it also is an accession
country. Although Yemen does not belong to the EMP or ENP, there has been a
cooperation agreement between the EU and Yemen since 1990. The main recipients
of aid are Morocco, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories, Tunisia and Jordan.
The European Neighbourhood Policy addresses all neighbouring states of the EUto the East and the South. From the MENA these include Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia. So
far, Action Plans have been signed by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the
Palestinian Territories and Tunisia.
All in all, similar to the US, the EUs priorities for DA are also set by strategic
considerations and commitment to liberalization: Figure 3 shows that the main share of
EIDHR aid for the MENA countries targets Israel and the Palestinian Territories an
area with a conflict in the direct neighbourhood of the EU. The EU might see DA as an
indirect step towards solving the conflict. The ENP with its positive conditionality
approach provides privileges to the (economic) frontrunners, whereas the Barcelona
Process claims to have an inclusive approach, but also concentrates on (economic)
frontrunners. All three initiatives focus on neighbouring countries; the Gulf countries,
except for Yemen and in very rare cases Bahrain andSaudi Arabia, do not seem to havebeen of high priority for the EUs DA so far.
Conclusions
Clearly, the similarities between the programmes dominate the broader picture. All
initiatives are supporting the same set of institutions: they train judges, public
defenders, prosecutors, and parliamentarians. Thematically they generally support a
similar set of NGOs dealing with topics such as human rights, women or the media.
Both have country programmes, as well as a comprehensive regional programme.
The latter even resemble each other. Both use the external project method and
leading aid recipient countries are determined by their strategic status, as well as
their commitment to liberalization.
By looking in further detail, however, one can find quite striking differences.In contrast to the US, the EU does not have a party funding programme. The European
parties or party foundations do have such programmes, though. This pattern repeats
itself in the next difference: the US channels the majority of its state institution funding
into decentralization, whereas the EU hardly funds this. EU member states, however,
often fund this area.11 There seems to be a (sometimes maybe unintended) division of
labour between the European Commission and the member states or member states
actors in DA. Especially in the case of party funding, the EU might prefer to leave this
politically controversial topic to actors such as European parties or party foundations.
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Other reasons for the division of labour might be the comparative advantage that other
actors hold, e.g. knowledge and already existing relations. Recently, the EU has been
making an effort to improve the efficiency of European development policy and
developed a code of conduct on the division of labour (European Commission, 2007b),
which calls inter alia to concentrate support on those sectors, in which the respective
donor has a comparative advantage.
Another difference is that the US has a rather balanced top-down/bottom-up
approach with the biggest programme USAID DG being quite balanced, but with a
recent tendency towards a top-down approach (see Figure 1). The EU (and in general
also the EU member states), in contrast, clearly follows a top-down approach with
the biggest programmes EMP and ENP mainly engaging in state capacity building.12
Also content-wise there are some slight differences: the US promotes religious
freedom and sometimes includes business-related projects, whereas the EU fights
for the abolition of the death penalty, and against torture, racism and xenophobia.
Quite remarkable is that the EUs EMP stands out in its partnership approach with
many comparatively highly institutionalized platforms.13 This might on the one
hand just be a question of time, because the EMP was launched in 1995 and MEPI in
2002. On the other hand, the EU has an advantage, as it can project and replicate its
own institutional set-up, as Bicchi (2005) argues. Furthermore, the EU seems to
work slightly more with local actors than the US. An experienced American expert
and practitioner in the field suggested that
the US has more stringent standards for financial accountability, which local
groups frequently do not have the organizational capability to meet. Recently,however, USAID has made a higher priority for its US grantees to strengthen
the capacity of their local partners and the trend points to an increasing work
with local grantees.14
The descriptive material of this article, as well as the puzzling divergences found,
could be the basis for further research. Besides, more descriptive research could coversuch categories as sustainability, responsiveness to special needs and developments in
the recipient countries or the concrete effectiveness of programmes. Little or no
research has been done in these fields. In addition, the implementation method was
only examined on a general level and deeper research could usefully be conducted
here, especially with case studies in the region. All in all, like the field of research,
democracy promotion itself still seems to be in a state of flux with ideas and paradigms
circulating among politicians and researchers across the Atlantic.
Notes
1 23 March 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on President Clintons trip to Africa promoting
trade, human rights, and democracy (quoted from Smith, 2000: 85).2 MENA in this study includes the Arab States of the Maghreb, Mashreq and the Golf, as well as Israel.
The US and the EU varyingly also include Turkey and Iran, and sometimes even Pakistan or
Afghanistan in their definitions of the region.
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3 Further literature on democracy promotion in general includes a few articles and books that deal with
EU democracy promotion (inter alia Borzel and Risse, 2004), US democracy promotion in the Middle
East (Dalacoura, 2005; Dunne, 2004), the impact of democracy promotion (Knack, 2004; Finkel et al.,
2006; Scott and Steele, 2005), and the motivation and emergence of democracy promotion (Cox et al.,
2000).4 The terms positive and negative are not seen as value-laden terms here, but rather as synonyms for
carrot and stick.5 On could also claim that MEPI and the EMP both resemble the Helsinki Process with the three baskets
1) security, 2) economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation and 3) cooperation in
the humanitarian field.6 Support for political parties is included in the category elections. There are no separate numbers
available.7
Interview with American expert, July 2006.8 United Women of the Arab World and of the US for Business.9 Interview with official from EIDHR unit, July 2006.
10 A project to support the reform of Algerian justice, for example, worked with the Cooperation
Technique Belge (BE), Atos Origin (BE), Universite Pierre Mendes France (FR) and the Institut
International de Paris la Defense (FR) (EuropeAid, 2006).11 Assistance for decentralization is often part of good governance, rather than democracy promotion of
the EU member states. Those two areas of assistance often overlap in their means, but have different
aims: good governance promotion is administration rather than democracy oriented.12 Nau (2000) suggests that this difference is due to the development of democracy in the US and Europe.
He claims that democracy in the US came before and during the development of the state, whereas in
Europe, the state and with it the executive branch developed before democracy did (Nau, 2000: 147).13 Hullen and Stahn (2007), however, criticize that the cooperative approach of the EU limits its scope of
action in democracy promotion.14 Interview with American expert, July 2006.
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