© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation
Improving Efficiency in
Assembly, Integration, and Test
Jeff B. Juranek
Corporate Chief Engineer’s Office
25 October 2017
Approved for public release. OTR-2017-01044.
i
Abstract
The Aerospace Corporate Chief Engineer’s Office (CCEO) conducted an Assembly, Integration & Test (AI&T) Efficiency
Study to gain insight and an understanding of why AI&T routinely suffers significant schedule delays related to inefficient
operation. The study was undertaken as a result of customer concerns related to recent space vehicle AI&T activities that
drove major schedule slips and cost increases on the program critical path. This effort was focused on studying Class A
selected programs since 2000. Five areas of research were conducted, including: 1) defining what constitutes assembly,
integration, and test for space vehicles; 2) a data analysis of space vehicle AI&T cycle time durations, 3) a comprehensive
literature search on AI&T methods; 4) a benchmarking study of other industries to learn what innovative best practices
companies use to become more efficient in their assembly and test operations; and 5) defining what drives AI&T efficiency
/inefficiency.
The Corporate Chief Engineer’s Office would like to acknowledge the co-author and lead technical contributor for the
AI&T Efficiency Study: Charles P. Wright; Environments and Test Assessment Department; Engineering Technology
Group.
This work was funded by The Aerospace Corporation’s Corporate Chief Engineer’s Office in support of its mission to
develop, codify, and promulgate best practices, tools, and processes across national security space.
Acknowledgments
3© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Introduction
– Why We Test
– Key Terminology
– Defining Assembly, Integration, and Test
• Key Observations
– Program Schedule Analysis
– Contributors to Schedule Slips: Design
– Contributors to Schedule Slips: Workmanship
– Contributors to Schedule Slips: Space Vehicle Accessibility
– Contributors to Schedule Slips: Late Deliveries
– Contributors to Schedule Slips: Late Cycle Escapes Detected in AI&T
– Embedded Waste in AI&T
• Summary of Key Observations
• Summary of Key Recommendations
Outline
4© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Introduction
Improving Efficiency in Assembly, Integration, and Test
5© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Demonstrate requirements have been meet
• Demonstrate flightworthiness by detecting and correcting anomalous behavior before
flight
• Ensure survival of launch and operating environments
• Decrease mission risk
• Test Strategies
– Development (Proof of design concept + Development of manufacturing processes)
– Qualification (Demonstrate 6σ design margins)
– Protoqualification (Demonstrate 3σ design margins)
– Acceptance (Demonstrate workmanship, functionality and performance)
– Flightproof (Protoqualification levels + Acceptance durations for dynamics)
• Common Test Objectives
– Design verification (Qualification and Protoqualification testing)
– Margin demonstration
– Workmanship screening
– Performance to specification
– Acceptance test validation
Effective testing is key to program and mission success
Why We Test
6© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Definition of assembly, integration, and test (AI&T):
– Start of AI&T is when a completed bus structure and/or payload structure is assembled together,
harnesses installed, and ready for unit integration
– Conclusion of AI&T is shipment of the space vehicle to storage or to launch site
• Efficiency: A measure of the ratio of actual hours worked compared to the total hours
worked.
• Value Stream: All of the process steps, both value-added and non-value added, required
to complete a product from beginning to end. Value stream mapping (VSM) is a Lean
technique used to document, analyze and improve the flow of information or materials
required to produce a product for a customer. VSM documents the current state and
future state of a process after the process flow has been improved by eliminating the
inherent waste in both non-value added and value-added steps.
• Waste: Any activity, task, or time element which does not add value to the product and
creates inefficiency in the system. The 7 traditional wastes are: 1) defects; 2) excess
inventory; 3) over-production; 4) waiting; 5) excessive motion; 6) transportation; and
7) over-processing.
• Value (from the customer’s perspective): Performing a build or verification task one-time.
No consistent definition for the Start of AI&T; and no consistent definition of Value
Key Terminology
7© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Defining Assembly, Integration, and Test (AI&T)
Start of AI&T
Units
provided by
Supply Chain
Units
provided by
In-house Mfg
Bus Module
& Propulsion
Integration
Bus
Module
Integration
Bus
Subsystems
Integration
Payload
Module
Integration
Payload
Module
Test
Payload
Module &
Antenna
Integration
Bus &
Payload
Integration
Baseline
Integrated
Systems
Test (BIST)
EMC/EMI
Test
Install
Deployables
(Build 1)
Alignments
CheckDeployments
Test
Prep &
Move SV to
High-Bay
Acoustics
Prep
Acoustics
Test
Separation
/Shock Test
Prep &
Move SV to
High-Bay
Leakage
Test
Alignments
Check
Remove
Deployables
Prep &
Move SV to
TVAC
TVAC
Prep
TVAC
Test
Post-TVAC
Functional
Tests
Prep &
Move SV to
High-Bay
Leakage
Test
Install
Deployables
(Build 2)
Deployments
Test
EMC/EMI
Test
(Optional PIM)
Final
Integrated
Systems
Test (FIST)
RF
Compatibility
Test
Factory
Confidence
Test
Mass
Properties
Test
Prep for
Shipment
or Storage
Launch
Operations
Start of Single-line Flow
AI&T Stop
Integrated
Payload
Test
Bus
Module
Test
Subsystems
• Thermal Control Subsystem
• Attitude Control Subsystem
• Command & Data Handling Subsystem
• Electrical Power Subsystem
PIM – Passive IntermodulationEMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Compatibility/Interference TVAC – Thermal VacuumRF – Radio Frequency
8© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Key Observations
Improving Efficiency in Assembly, Integration, and Test
9© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Perception exists that “AI&T is inefficient” and “AI&T is the major cause leading
to cost overruns”
Greater than 50% of the vehicles experienced more than 2X their planned AI&T duration
Program Schedule Analysis
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P20P19
Source: AI&T Efficiency Study, TOR-2015-01412, 9 January 2017
Note: Start dates based on planned schedule at critical
design review (CDR); completion dates are actuals.
10© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Many design escapes are preventable with the right set of reviewers and having a robust design review process with incremental reviews
• Root cause of design escape varies
– Inadequate design review (60%)
– Inadequate analysis (30%)
• In 19 of 21 test cases that didn’t have a fully-
tested Engineering Model (EM), the designers
indicated that issue would have been found had
they utilized a fully-tested EM
– Provides the most robust validation method to flush-
out inadequate analysis and packaging issues
– A fully tested EM prior to CDR drives early
discovery, demonstrates compliance while maturing
the Design Review data products
• Reviewer skillset implicated in cause of
inadequate design reviews (72%)
– Not getting help; not the right persons; not raising
issues
– Mixed technology units require multi-discipline
SMEs
– Skillset of Government team should be
supplemented with FFRDC oversight
Contributors to Schedule Slips:
Design
Source: Design Review Improvement Recommendations, TOR-2015-02545, 29 May 2015
11© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Anomalies during AI&T contributed to a 33-month schedule slip on SV1
Contributors to Schedule Slips:
Workmanship
Nonconformances
SV1 – 869SV2 – 686SV3 – 501
Vehicle Level Nonconformances by SV Number
Nu
mb
er
of
No
nco
nfo
rman
ces
Significant amounts of waste contributes to schedule slips
Sourc
e:
Aero
space I
nte
rnal
Stu
die
s
12© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Failed components at space
vehicle-level required access
hole to be cut in load-bearing
structural panel to remove and
replace (R&R)
• This is what poor Design for
Accessibility looks like – no
way to access electronic
components
• Space vehicle design created
access constraint
Contributors to Schedule Slips:
Space Vehicle Accessibility
Notional Space Vehicle(Access hole depicted is representational not actual)
Example of Design for Accessibility Requirement:
“The spacecraft shall be designed such that remove and replace of any unit does not require disassembly of the primary structure, removal of harnesses, or removal of other units.”
Poor space vehicle accessibility resulted in 6-month slip in AI&T
13© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Contributors to Schedule Slips:
Late Deliveries
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1-4 5-8 9-12 13-17 18-22
Nu
mb
er
of
Un
its
Weeks Late to AI&T Need Date
NASA Program≈ 80% of Units delivered 9-22 weeks Late to AI&T Need Date
Units delivered late to AI&T cause planned schedules to “go out the window”
Sourc
e:
Aero
space I
nte
rnal
Stu
die
s
14© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Study of 350 space vehicles since 2000 showed 12% see thermal vacuum
(TVAC) retest
Contributors to Schedule Slips:
Late Cycle Escapes Detected in AI&T
Eliminating TVAC retests rests on stronger Unit design and screening
Source: Mission Assurance Implications of Space Vehicle Thermal Vacuum Retest,
TOR-2017-01693, 5 June 2017
15© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Embedded Waste in AI&T
Current
Baseline
Traditional Approach:
Attack value-added tasks (e.g., Eliminate environmental tests)
Lean Approach:Minimize/eliminate process waste
Recent focus has
been here …
75% Lead Time Reduction
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6
Lean Metrics
• % Reduction in Lead Time
• % VA time vs. NVA time
• Spaghetti Diagram (travel distances)
• Facility Space (square footage)
Install
Units
ReworkWait
Late HW DeliveryTest
Failure
TestTVAC
TestClose-out
Move
SV
Chamber
Downtime
Acoustic
Test
30% VA
time
Install
UnitsTest
Test
TVAC
TestCO
Acoustic
Test
Optimized
State
Process Re-engineered
Wait2nd TVAC
TestWait
4
Move
SV
Focus should be
here!
70% NVA
time
Test
Mo
ve
Mo
ve
Wa
it
Test
Value Stream Analysis
1. Eliminate late hardware deliveries from in-house/external suppliers
2. Eliminate workmanship errors (rework) – fix quality to be repeatable
3. Eliminate design flaws (test failures) – increase test rigor
4. Minimize SV moves – collocate activities outside chamber/work cell
5. Eliminate chamber downtown-time – increase preventive maintenance
6. Minimize wait times
7. Eliminate TVAC retest (2nd TVAC)
8. Reduce installation and close-out steps durations
9. Perform tests in-parallel with other tests (whenever safely possible)
898
VA
NVANon-VA
(Waste)
Value Added
Legend
This is how you Lean … Baseline – Current
Process Improvement – Improved State
Process Re-engineering – Optimized State
Ideal State
16© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Key Observations and
Key Recommendations
Improving Efficiency in Assembly, Integration, and Test
17© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Six significant issues associated with schedule overruns during assembly,
integration and test (AI&T) phase:
1. AI&T schedules at critical design review (CDR) are routinely unexecutable – flawed
baseline schedule is used to measure later schedule performance
2. Flight hardware design escapes detected in AI&T strongly drive schedule slips
3. Flight hardware workmanship issues detected in AI&T strongly drive schedule slips
4. Late delivery of flight hardware/software/GFE/GSE strongly drives AI&T schedule
slips
5. Thermal vacuum retest – 12% of studied vehicles see more than one TVAC test
6. Significant amounts of waste exists (errors in procedures, test set-up/facility, test SW
database errors, etc.)
Key Observations
GFE – Government Furnished Equipment GSE – Ground Support Equipment TVAC – Thermal Vacuum
18© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
• Require schedules in the RFP response and at CDR account for AI&T
inefficiencies to improve realism
• Strengthen design and review processes to minimize escapes into AI&T
– Require frequent incremental design reviews in addition to milestone reviews
• Require “Design for Accessibility” as a key design requirement to reduce
delays due to lack of space vehicle accessibility
• Fix design, workmanship, and software problems in manufacturing and in the
supply chain (NOT in AI&T) to eliminate late deliveries
• Strengthen unit and lower level test programs to screen-out problems before
delivery to AI&T to minimize impact of late cycle escapes
– Add board/slice thermal pre-conditioning
– Use highly accelerated life testing (HALT) on new development units
• Increase focus on the identification and elimination of waste – require value
stream mapping and Lean metrics
Key Recommendations
RFP – Request for Proposal CDR – Critical Design Review
19© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
References
1. “Design Review Improvement Recommendations,” TOR-2015-02545, The Aerospace Corporation, 29 May 2015.
2. “Assembly, Integration, and Test (AI&T) Efficiency Study,” TOR-2016-01412 (Restricted access), The Aerospace
Corporation, 9 January 2017.
3. “Mission Assurance Implications of Space Vehicle TVAC Retest,” TOR-2017-01693, The Aerospace Corporation,
5 June 2017.
20© 2017 The Aerospace Corporation NDIA 20th Systems Engineering Conference, October 2017
Biographies
Mr. Juranek has more than 32 years of experience working on Air Force, IC, MDA, NASA and commercial space programs.
He is currently a Project Leader Sr. in the Corporate Chief Engineer’s Office at The Aerospace Corporation. Prior to working
at The Aerospace Corporation, Mr. Juranek worked as a Department Manager in Systems Engineering and as a Section
Manager of Space Reliability Engineering at Raytheon Space & Airborne Systems. Additionally, he also spent part of his
career at Boeing Satellite Systems (formerly Hughes Space and Communications) where he gained experience as both a
production manager and an IPT Lead for xenon ion propulsion systems power supply manufacturing and test. During this
time he also worked in Product Effectiveness, and spent time working with parent company General Motors/Delco
Electronics to assist in bringing the Lean production philosophy to satellite manufacturing. Mr. Juranek started his aerospace
career at Hughes Aircraft Radar Systems Group in 1985 working as a manufacturing engineering planner, and was a graduate
of the Hughes Manufacturing Technology Rotation Program. Mr. Juranek holds a B.S. in Industrial Technology from Iowa
State University, as well as a M.S. in Quality Assurance from California State University, Dominguez Hills.