Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20 Download by: [CAPES] Date: 25 October 2016, At: 12:39 Journal of Strategic Studies ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20 Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation Fintan Hoey To cite this article: Fintan Hoey (2016) Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation, Journal of Strategic Studies, 39:4, 484-501, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1168010 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1168010 Published online: 21 Apr 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 583 View related articles View Crossmark data
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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20
Download by: [CAPES] Date: 25 October 2016, At: 12:39
Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Securityand Non-proliferation
Fintan Hoey
To cite this article: Fintan Hoey (2016) Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence:Security and Non-proliferation, Journal of Strategic Studies, 39:4, 484-501, DOI:10.1080/01402390.2016.1168010
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1168010
Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Securityand Non-proliferationFintan Hoey
Department of History, Franklin University Switzerland, 6924 Sorengo, Switzerland
ABSTRACTTo an observer, Japan’s approach to nuclear weapons can appear confusedand contradictory. The only country to have been attacked with nuclearweapons is variously described as a pacifist and non-nuclear nation and as aproliferation threat. These widely varied and conflicting conclusions are under-standable given that conflicting messages are sent by senior figures. HoweverJapan’s stance is in fact a coherent, if not uncomplicated, response both to itssecurity needs and to domestic public opinion. However, the security providedby US extended nuclear deterrence underlines and enables this approach. Thekey policies and decisions were taken in both Washington and Tokyo betweenChina’s first nuclear test (1964) and Japan’s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1976). How the United States came to offer this additionalsecurity guarantee to Japan and how Japan came to rely upon it underscorethis complex stance and are crucial to understanding a longstanding andongoing security arrangement and source of stability and security in northeastAsia.
‘U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remainan essential complement to Japan’s defense capabilities in ensuring thedefense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region’.1
The realization of a world free of nuclear weapons is the essential conditionto ensure Japan’s national security since Japan renounced its nuclear optionby joining the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). At the same time, Japan, as theonly nation that has suffered atomic bombings, has a humanitarian respon-sibility to the international community to advocate the total elimination ofweapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons.2
1‘Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment forthe Future’, 29 October 2005, US Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2005/d20051029document.pdf.
2Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy’, 4th edn,http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamph0812.html, 38.
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‘I don’t think Japan needs to possess nuclear weapons, but it’s importantto maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce anuclear warhead in a short amount of time … It’s a tacit nuclear deterrent’.3
Japan’s nuclear weapons policy is a complex tapestry of apparentlycontradictory elements as reflected in the varying policy pronouncementsquoted above. There’s the reliance on America’s extended nuclear deterrent(END), the acknowledgement of its role in both Japan’s own security andthat of the region, and the close US–Japanese cooperation in recent years toenhance the deterrent’s credibility and Japan’s involvement in its conven-tional aspects.4 There’s also the high-minded commitment to and responsi-bility for global disarmament and non-proliferation from the only country tohave experienced the apocalyptic effects of nuclear warfare. Finally there’sthe increasingly open acknowledgement of a latent deterrent, i.e. the main-tenance of the ability to develop quickly a nuclear deterrent. In fact thesethree disparate elements form a coherent, if complex, posture. The centralpillar, however, is the reliance on the US END. Even the high-flown rhetoricon disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs document quoted above isquickly followed by the statement that ‘nuclear weapons still exist and …they serve as a deterrent’.5 In April 2013 Japan’s permanent representativeto the Geneva Conference on Disarmament declined to endorse a jointstatement urging that nuclear weapons never be used in any circumstancegiven Japan’s reliance upon the US END.6 Furthermore, Japan can maintain alatent or tacit deterrent (as outlined in the above statement by formerdefence minister Ishiba Shigeru in 2011) rather than a fully developed onebecause of the security guaranteed by the US END. Moreover, END wasoffered by US policy-makers concerned about the global proliferation ofnuclear weapons states (NWSs) as a means of ensuring that Japan did notdevelop its own nuclear weapons.
In the context of the gulf between Japanese public opinion, which islargely ill-disposed towards nuclear weapons and security hawks at the elitelevel eager to push back against this ‘nuclear allergy’ the END offered andcontinues to offer a neat and practical solution. It keeps nuclear weaponsaway from view and from public consciousness while also acting as aguarantor of Japan’s security and a deterrent against nuclear attack and/or
3Ishiba Shigeru quoted in Chester Dawson, ‘In Japan, provocative case for staying nuclear: some saybombs’ potential as deterrent argues for keeping power plants online’, Wall Street Journal, 28October 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203658804576638392537430156>.
4On recent joint efforts to buttress the deterrent see Brad Roberts, ‘Extended Deterrence and StrategicStability in Northeast Asia,’ National Institute for Defense Studies, Visiting Scholar Paper Series, no. 1, 9August 2013, <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf>.
5Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy’, 39.6‘Japan refuses to back statement against A-bombs’, Japan Times, 26 April 2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/26/national/japan-refuses-to-back-statement-against-a-bombs/#.U8OeUPmSySo>.
blackmail. The US END has a major stabilising influence in the alliance and inthe region as a whole. It avoids placing Japan and is neighbours in anawkward ‘security dilemma’ over the implications of an independentJapanese deterrent. This neat solution is not without challenges, however,since successive Japanese governments have felt it necessary to conceal thetrue nature of Japan’s facilitation of America’s nuclear strategy. The provi-sion of and reliance on the END was not the only option open to Japaneseor American policy-makers. As this article describes, other alternatives, ran-ging from an independent deterrent to nuclear-sharing options, were ser-iously explored in a crucial period from 1964 (when China successfullyexploded a nuclear device) to Japan’s ratification of the NPT in 1976. Inaddition the intersecting elements of the negotiations over the reversion ofOkinawa and US anti-proliferation policy were brought to bear on thisquestion. Understanding the decisions taken in this period is crucial tounderstanding one of the key and enduring elements of US security policyin Northeast Asia and its continued importance.
The scholarly literature on Japanese security and the potential for anindependent deterrent can be divided into two schools of thought. Onestresses the inevitability or at least strong likelihood that Japan will match itseconomic power with military power, including the development of anindependent nuclear option.7 The other notes how Japan’s peculiar history –as the only country to date which has been attacked with nuclear weapons –and its longstanding ‘nuclear allergy’ preclude that option from ever beingan option.8 There is also a body of scholarship that condemns Japan’s‘nuclear duality’, that is, the espousing of anti-nuclear sentiments whilesimultaneously relying on America’s extended deterrent.9 However, thiscomplex and paradoxical position is both understandable and necessarygiven Japan’s unique history and its security concerns. Other works point tothe importance of the END, amongst other factors, in preventing Japan from
7Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs NJ:Prentice-Hall 1970); Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’,International Security 18/2 (1993), 44–79. See also Selig G. Harrison (ed.), Japan’s Nuclear Future:The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace1996).
8Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in postwar Japan (IthacaNY: Cornell University Press 1996), 128–29; Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: NationalSecurity in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1998); Robert Johnson,‘Japan Closes the Nuclear Umbrella: An Examination of Non-violent Pacifism and Japan’s Vision for aNuclear Weapon-Free World’, Asia–Pacific Law and Policy Journal 13/2 (2012), 81–116. For a recentinterpretation of Japanese political culture as ‘defensive realist’ rather than pacifist see Paul Midford,Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford CA: StanfordUniversity Press 2011).
9See, for example, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘The Atomic Shadow on Japanese Society: Social Movements,Public Opinion and Possible Nuclear Disarmament’, paper presented at research workshop onAustralia–Japan Civil Society Cooperation for Nuclear Disarmament, Nautilus Institute, RMITUniversity, Melbourne, 18–19 September 2009, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Morris-Suzuki.pdf>.
developing an independent deterrent.10 Although this is crucial, the END ismore than a non-proliferation tool and should also be seen as an integralpart of Japan’s security policy. Recent historical studies, drawing on anexpanding pool of available primary sources, have highlighted the innerworkings of Japanese policy-making and how various options were fullyexplored and a complex set of decisions taken.11 This article follows on fromthese historical studies and argues for the centrality of the END – whichshould be understood as an important aspect of both American security andnon-proliferation policies – in Japanese strategic calculations and alliancepolicy.
Postwar Japan: ‘Nuclear Allergy’ and ‘Massive Retaliation’
Japan’s experience with nuclear energy pre-dates the attacks on Hiroshimaand Nagasaki in 1945. During the Second World War the Japanese militaryattempted to harness the power of the atom to develop both explosivesand propulsion systems. The lack of a sufficient industrial base or supplies offissionable material ultimately stymied these advanced programmes.12
Japanese public opinion took on a decidedly anti-nuclear disposition inthe post-war era both because of the experiences of atomic warfare andbecause of the panic engendered by the Lucky Dragon incident (when thefishing boat of that name suffered radioactive contamination from a US testin Bikini Atoll) in 1954.13 Despite this, since the end of the post-war occupa-tion Japanese conservative leaders have attempted to push back againstthis ‘nuclear allergy’ and argue that Japan ought to make use of nuclearpower and even arm itself with nuclear weapons. Such a tactic was notwithout risk, however. In 1956, following a public outcry, future PrimeMinister Kishi Nobusuke was forced to backtrack from his statement thatJapan could possess tactical nuclear weapons without violating the post-war‘peace’ constitution.14 Just as risky was the facilitation of US forward
10T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons(Montreal: McGill–Queen’sUniversity Press 2000), 37–61; Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Why Japan Won’t Go Nuclear (Yet): Internationaland Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan’, International Security 31/4 (2007), 67–96.
11Kurosaki Akira, Kakuheiki to Nichibeikankei – Amerika No Kakufukakusan to Nihon No Sentaku [Nuclearweapons and US–Japanese relations: America’s nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy and Japan’schoice] 1960–1976 (Tokyo: Yushisha 2006); Ayako Kusunoki, ‘The Sato Cabinet and the Making ofJapan’s Non-nuclear Policy’, Journal of American–East Asian Relations 15 (2008), 25–50; Yuri Kase, ‘TheCosts and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report’,Nonproliferation Review 8/2 (2001), 55–68.
12Walter E. Grunden, Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science (Lawrence:University Press of Kansas 2005), 48–82. ‘Japan Came Close to a Wartime A-bomb’, New Scientist 147/1988 (1995), 4; Glenn Davis, ‘Japan scientist breaks silence on bomb’, United Press International,19 July 1995, <www.lexisnexis.com>.
13John Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?: United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan,1945–1960 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2005), 150–59.
deployment of nuclear weapons at bases around the world. Although thegovernment publicly and regularly expressed opposition to the presence ofnuclear weapons on its territory – in deference to public opinion – seniorofficials were well aware that they had no way of halting such deploymentsunder the terms of the US–Japanese alliance. In a minimal acknowledge-ment of public opinion the US military stopped short of deploying nuclearweapons to the Japanese home islands. Placing nuclear weapons onJapanese soil was judged unwise, since this could have undermined thepolitical dominance of pro-US conservatives with potentially disastrousresults for America’s hegemony in the region should the anti-allianceJapanese Socialist Party take power. However, between 1955 and 1965Japan was host to an ‘impressive infrastructure’ of strategic weaponsminus their nuclear materials and nuclear-armed warships regularly calledat Japanese ports.15 No such qualms existed with regard to the Bonin andRyukyu Islands. The US retained full administrative control over these terri-tories following the restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 1952. Okinawa,the main island of the Ryukyu chain and the ‘keystone of the Pacific’,became a crucial base area for conventional forces and nuclear weapons.The tiny islands of Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima of the Bonin (or Ogasawara)chain were also used to store weapons to resupply nuclear submarines.16
Given its freedom of action in these territories compared with the limitationsplaced on bases on the Japanese home islands the US military was loath tolose its position and successfully resisted any attempt to restore adminis-trative rights to Japan until the late 1960s.17 Indeed these limitations werecodified by the re-negotiated US–Japanese alliance of 1960, which gaveTokyo a veto over the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory.Significantly, in a secret codicil Tokyo agreed to turn a blind eye to visitsby nuclear-armed ships to Japanese ports, since these were ‘a legal inch’from Japanese territory.18 Kishi’s high-handed manner in forcing the re-negotiated treaty through the Diet led to his resignation and his successor,Ikeda Hayato, adopted a more conciliatory approach and stressed economicgrowth over military matters. A cancer diagnosis forced Ikeda out of office in
15Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr. ‘Where They Were’, Bulletin of the AtomicScientists 55/6 (1999), 26–35; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, ‘Where TheyWere: How Much Did Japan Know?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56/1 (2000), 11–13, 78–79. Seealso Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), ‘History of the Custody andDeployment of Nuclear Weapons (U), July 1945 through September 1977’, February 1978, Office ofthe Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, FOIA Requester Service Center, <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/306.pdf>.
16Norris et al., ‘Where They Were: How Much Did Japan Know?’17John Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, 138.18‘Description of Consultation Arrangements under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security withJapan’, ‘Summary of Unpublished Agreements Reached in Connection with the Treaty of MutualCooperation and Security with Japan’, c. June 1960, National Security Archive, Nuclear Vault, NuclearNoh Drama, docs 1 and 2, <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb291/>.
1964 and he was succeeded by Satō Eisaku, Kishi’s younger brother, whowould play a crucial role in formulating Japan’s response to US extendeddeterrence.
Satō and the Nuclear Umbrella
Just weeks before Satō became prime minister, China successfully tested anuclear device. China’s membership of the nuclear club put intense pressureon the Japanese government to find an appropriate response to this poten-tial new threat. For Satō, at least at the outset of his tenure, the solution wassimple. As he told US Ambassador Edwin Reischauer, ‘if [the] other fellowhad nuclear [weapons] it was only common sense to have them oneself’.19
These sentiments were in line with an earlier US intelligence estimate thathad noted that Satō was ‘hot for proliferation’.20 An alarmed Reischauerinformed his superiors that the new prime minister was ‘less judiciouslycautious’ than his predecessor and would need ‘more guidance and educa-tion’ to divert him from this perilous course.21 The embassy had previouslyadvised that as a result of the Chinese nuclear test Japanese leaders neededto be reassured of the credibility of US deterrent power in Asia and thePacific.22
By the time Reischauer’s message arrived in Washington, policy-makerswere attempting to devise responses both to China’s likely nuclear test andto the expected effect on the further proliferation of nuclear weaponsaround the world. Washington was divided over the nature of the problemand the optimal solution to the dilemma of a marked increase in thenumber of NWSs. On the one hand there was an almost fatalistic sensethat further proliferation was inevitable and that standing in the way ofallies such as West Germany and Japan would only serve to alienate andenrage them. Moreover, having allies take a proactive stance regarding theirown defence was to be welcomed. On the other extreme there were thosewho stressed that any proliferation, even among allied or friendly countries,would ultimately be destabilising and would make conflict more likely. MoreNWSs would also mean a relative decline in US power.23
19Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of Defense, 29 Dec. 1964, Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1964-68, vol. 29, part 2, Japan (Washington, U.S. GPO, 2006), doc. 37, 55-57.
20Quoted in Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and strategy in America’s atomic age (Ithaca:Cornell UP, 2012), 88.
21Telegram from the US Embassy in Japan to the Department of Defense, 29 December 1964, FRUS,1964–68, vol. 29, part 2, Japan, doc. 37, 55–57.
22Airgram from the USEmbassy in Japan to the Department of State, 4 December 1964, FRUS, 1964–68,vol. 29, part 2, Japan, doc. 35, 48.
23Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II tothe Present (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2010); Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft:History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 2012), 75–103.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 489
In an attempt to find a middle path between these two extremes anumber of multilateral options for the sharing of nuclear weapons wereput forth. The best known and most advanced of these was the US plan for aMultilateral Force (MLF) for NATO countries. This was primarily designed togive West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]) a role in its ownnuclear defence without alarming the Soviet Union or the FRG’s neighboursin Eastern (and indeed Western) Europe.24 In the aftermath of China’s test asimilar scheme for Asia was mooted in Washington as a way to preventChina’s neighbours from acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Dean Rusk,the Secretary of State, supported this scheme and at different times alsosupported Japan and India developing their own deterrent capabilities.25
Vice President Hubert Humphrey told Japanese Foreign Minister Miki Takeothat it ‘would have a good effect in Communist China if you had a hand onthe [nuclear] umbrella to be sure the rain doesn’t come down on you’.26
Exploratory plans were drawn up by the Defence Department to put such ascheme into effect.27
These plans were still in the air when Satō had his first meeting withPresident Lyndon Johnson in January 1965. Johnson assured him that theUnited States, in line with its commitment to Japan’s defence under theMutual Security Treaty, would protect Japan from any form of attack in lightof the China’s nuclear test.28 This verbal guarantee of an extended deterrenthas been subsequently and regularly reiterated.29 However, it was as muchan assurance of protection and defence as a way of dampening Satō’senthusiasm for an independent deterrent. When this private assurancecame to light many years later, former defence secretary RobertMcNamara told Japanese journalists that the US government’s motivationhad not been to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan but to prevent itfrom developing its own nuclear arsenal.30 Indeed, at the end of his time inWashington, Satō noted that his views on a Japanese deterrent were
24Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 75–103; Frank Costigliola, ‘Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany and “the End of theCold War”’, in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds), Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), 173–210.
25Memorandum of Conversation, 23November 1964, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 11, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington: US GPO 1997),doc. 50, 122–25.
26Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security File, Special File, Japan. Box 250 [2 of 2], Memorandumof Conversation, Humphrey–Miki, 13 January 1965.
27Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defence McNamara, ‘Possible Responsesto ChiCom Nuclear Threat’, 16 January 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, Japan, doc. 76, 144. See also NationalArchives, College Park, MD, US, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Records of theAmbassador at Large, Llewellyn E. Thompson, 1961–70, Thompson Committee, 1964, Lot 67D2,Box 25, John T. McNaughton to Llewellyn Thompson, 20 November 1964.
28Memorandum of Conversation, 12 January 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 29, part 2, Japan, doc. 41, 70.29Kase, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization’, 6330‘“Nichū sensō nara kaku hōfuku o” Satō shushō, 65 nen hōbei tokini’ [Prime Minister Satō, on U.S. tripin 1965 asked for U.S. nuclear retaliation against China in the event of a Sino-Japanese war], AsahiShinbun, 12 December 2008.
490 FINTAN HOEY
‘personal’ and did not reflect official policy. It has been suggested that Satōonly mentioned the prospect of Japanese proliferation so that Americanofficials would make an offer of nuclear protection.31 While there may wellbe an element of truth to this, it is clear that Satō was consistent at theoutset of his premiership in speaking (at least in private) in favour ofacquiring nuclear weapons. To be sure his views on this would changeover his tenure as prime minister.
US policy on non-proliferation also underwent a marked shift through1965 and 1966. Nuclear-sharing plans failed to come to fruition for tworeasons. Firstly Moscow, and its Eastern bloc allies, resolutely refused tocountenance any scheme that would equip West Germany with nuclearweapons. Furthermore, neither Britain nor France, two powers with inde-pendent deterrents, had shown much enthusiasm for the project. Facedwith the resolute opposition of its adversary and less than lukewarm sup-port from its allies, Washington was unwilling to press the point and theMLF proposal was dropped, which had a knock-on effect for the mooted‘Asian MLF’. Furthermore, the Johnson administration decided instead tovigorously pursue a global policy of non-proliferation, having concludedthat further proliferation, whether among friends or foes, was anathemaboth to US interests and to the prospects of world peace. As a result the USfound common ground with the Soviet Union in taking up the IrishResolution on non-proliferation and presenting a draft NPT to the UN’sEighteen Nation Disarmament Commission. Both superpowers favouredthe treaty since it ensured they would each remain one of the world's fewnuclear armed powers.32
The Three Non-Nuclear Principles
Curiously, this significant policy departure by Japan’s main ally and the providerof its nuclear deterrent did not bring about a radical change in Japan, whereelites and policy-makers continued to weigh nuclear options. However, themood began to shift away from contemplating an independent Japanesedeterrent towards reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. One factor was publicopinion. The Japanese public had remained opposed to even limited rear-mament and to the alliance with the United States. There was also significantopposition to an independent deterrent,33 though it should also be noted that75 per cent felt it was highly likely (if undesirable) that Japan would
31Royama Michio and Kase Miki, ‘Former PM bluffed on Japanese nukes’, Mainichi Daily News, 6 August1999, 1.
32Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 75–103; Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, 251–84.33Kase, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization’, 57.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 491
eventually go nuclear.34 This implies that, though an independent deterrentwas unpopular, most Japanese refused to completely rule it out as a possibility.In any case Satō faced a difficult challenge in raising the ‘defence conscious-ness’ of the Japanese public. This was tied to his quest to secure the reversion ofOkinawa to Japan. Any movement on negotiating its retrocession was con-tingent on guarantees that the US could continue to make full use of its basesthere. In order to ensure this, and spurred on byWashington, Satō undertook topersuade the public of the importance of the defence relationship with theUS and to attempt to normalise discussions of matters relating to defence.
It was, somewhat ironically, in this context that Satō made a state-ment that has come to be viewed as an important addition to Japan’spost-war non-militarist stance. Speaking in the Japanese Dietin December 1967, shortly after his second summit conference withJohnson, which was dominated by Okinawa, Satō attempted to normal-ise Japan’s possession of defensive military power in the form of its SelfDefence Forces. Perhaps in an attempt to blunt the expected protestsfrom the opposition benches Satō announced that Japan would notproduce, possess, or permit the introduction into its territory of nuclearweapons. Collectively, these were termed the ‘Three Non-NuclearPrinciples’.35 Satō was speaking off the cuff but it is likely that he hadcome to accept that the Japanese people would not accept an inde-pendent deterrent. In a private outburst he expressed his frustrationwith trying to provide for Japan’s defence while faced with an anti-nuclear popular consensus. ‘I should just declare that Japan needsnuclear weapons and then resign,’ he announced in the presence of ashocked aide. While he may still have favoured an independent nucleardeterrent for Japan he recognised that this would be political suicide.36
However, he soon came to realise that he had gone further on theThree Non-Nuclear Principles than he should have, since the non-introduction pledge struck at the heart of the ability of the US toprovide its extended deterrent. He soon had two of his senior aideswrite a major policy speech in which he reaffirmed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (it by then being too late to take them back) andadded global disarmament, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and,crucially, reliance on the US nuclear deterrent as the principles of
34Yasumasa Tanaka, ‘Japanese Attitudes towards Nuclear Arms’, Public Opinion Quarterly 34/1 (1970),34–35.
35Satō, Lower House Budget Committee, 11 December 1967, Kokkai Kiroku [Record of the NationalDiet], <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp>.
36Entry of 26 January 1968 in Kusuda Minoru, Kusuda Minoru Nikki, Satō Eisaku Sōri Shuseki Hishokan No2000 Nichi [Diary of Kusuda Minoru: 2000 days as Prime Minister Satō Eisaku’s private secretary], ed.Makoto Iokibe and Wada Jun (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha 2001), 159
Japan’s nuclear policy.37 These so called ‘Four Pillars of Nuclear Policy’were subsequently affirmed as party policy by the ruling LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP). Satō’s attempt to cure Japan of its ‘nuclearallergy’ by this process actually backfired and solidified anti-nuclearsentiment.38 Moreover, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (and not theFour Pillars) were later adopted by the Diet as a resolution. Satō himselfcame to regret articulating the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, particularlythe ‘non-introduction’ pledge, telling US Ambassador U. Alexis Johnsonthat they were ‘nonsense’, though he was quick to state that Japan didnot plan to develop nuclear weapons.39
Japan’s ‘1968/70 Internal Report’
Satō directed the Cabinet Research Bureau to commission a highly secretstudy on the feasibility and advisability of Japan developing a nuclearweapon. Its conclusions, found in the ‘1968/70 Internal Report,’ are crucialto understanding the conceptual framework behind Japan’s decision-making process with regard to nuclear weapons, particularly given thepaucity of archival material available to researchers (this report was leakedto the press).40 Given this lacuna in available source material it is difficult toknow the exact effect or influence this report had on official thinking.However, its conclusions – particularly on the importance of the extendeddeterrent – echo the Four Pillars and Japan’s subsequent decisions overnuclear weapons are in line with the report. The study looked at thetechnical and political aspects of the problem. Its authors concluded thatJapan was technologically capable of developing a viable warhead anddelivery system, though the lack of an appropriate test site was highlightedas a major challenge. Another significant drawback was the report’s findingsthat Japan’s small size and high population density made the deployment ofa credible second strike capability – essential for deterrence – uncertain. Onthe domestic political front the report noted that the strong opposition ofthe public to nuclear weapons presented a major stumbling block. Crucially
37Kei Wakaizumi, Tasaku Nakarishi Wo Shinzemuto Hossu [I should like to think this was the best courseavailable] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju 1994), 141.
38Kase, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Nuclearization’, 59–60. See also Glenn D. Hook, ‘The Nuclearization ofLanguage: Nuclear Allergy as Political Metaphor’, Journal of Peace Research 21/3 (1984), 259.
39U.A. Johnson to Department of State, 11 January 1968, FRUS, 1964–68, Japan, document no. 140,314, footnote no. 2.
40‘Kaku Kaihatsu Kanō Da Ga Mottenu’ [Able to develop but will not possess nuclear weapons], AsahiShinbun, 13 November 1994. See also Kase, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Nuclearization’. A separatestudy was carried out by the Japanese Defence Agency in 1970 during the directorship of NakasoneYasuhiro and came to similar conclusions. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku: Rekishi Hōtei no HikokuToshite [Reflections: Defendant in the Court of History] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2004). 234–35. See alsoReiji Yoshida, ‘Japan considered developing nukes: Nakasone,’ The Japan Times, 19 June 2004,<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/2004/06/19/announcements/japan-considered-developing-nukes-nakasone/#.Vv1GIPl97IU>.
the report made a strong case that the US nuclear umbrella was the bestoption for Japan’s security, since it was the option least likely to provokeJapan’s neighbours and worsen the overall security situation or inflame publicopposition. The report rejected as unwise the notion of following France’sexample of developing an independent deterrent. It characterised DeGaulle’sforce de frappe as a vanity project; a failed attempt to recapture lost glory andprestige rather than one designed to ensure protection. In fact, given itsmembership of NATO, France possessed a small nuclear umbrella under alarger American one. Nor was Japan’s position directly comparable toFrance’s, since Japan was in the more complicated position of facing twonuclear-armed adversaries, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR.Moreover, an independent Japanese deterrent would be a destabilising forceand could potentially be viewed as a threat in Washington as well as inMoscow and Beijing. A related point (not dealt with by the report) is theintense alarm with which Japan’s other neighbours would have greeted aJapanese bomb. Indeed, when Satō embarked on a goodwill tour of neigh-bouring countries he pointedly assured his counterparts that Japan would notgo nuclear.41 Given these conditions and constraints, extended deterrencewas the ideal solution to Japan’s nuclear security requirements. However,facilitating the nuclear umbrella would prove an onerous task for Tokyo asthe negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa would demonstrate.
Okinawa Reversion
By 1969 the political mood in Japan and in on Okinawa was clamouring forreversion and US policy-makers largely recognised that agreement had to bereached in the short term on the reversion of the Ryukyu chain.42 The newlyinaugurated Nixon administration was prepared to deliver on reversion but asignificant stumbling block was the question of nuclear weapons onOkinawa.43 The US military was opposed to the loss of its freedom of actionin the region and the Pentagon’s support was essential for a settlement to becompleted.44 Though officially a closely held secret, the presence of nuclear
41Memorandum of Conversation, 14 November 1967, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 29, part 2, Japan, doc. 104,227–32.
42Memorandum from the Country Director for Japan (Sneider) to the Assistant Secretary of State forEast Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy), 24 December 1968, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 29, part 2, Japan(Washington: US GPO2006), doc. 138, 310–13.
43Richard M. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, California, USA, National Security Council Files, VIP Visits,Box 925, National Security Decision Memorandum 13, Policy toward Japan, 28 May 1969.
44Author’s interview with former defence secretary Melvin R. Laird, 7 August 2007. See also Dale VanAtta, With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace and Politics (Madison: University of WisconsinPress 2008), 291.
494 FINTAN HOEY
weapons on the island was, as Satō put it, ‘international commonknowledge’.45 With regard to the US military retaining its nuclear weaponson the island, Satō maintained an open-minded and non-committal ‘blankstate’ in hopes that the intense desire of the Japanese people to see theirterritory reunited would outweigh their aversion to the placement of nuclearweapons on Japanese territory. It was not to be, however, and Satōwas forcedto abandon his blank state and publicly commit to non-nuclear reversion.46
This placed the Japanese negotiators in the awkward but not impossibleposition of seeking the removal of these weapons while simultaneouslyensuring the ongoing credibility of the extended deterrent. The example ofthe reversion of the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands in 1968 offered a potentialsolution. As stated, these tiny volcanic islands had been used to store nuclearweapons intended to resupply submarines in the event of a major war break-ing out. When the islands reverted to Japanese control the US withdrew itsweapons but simultaneously concluded an agreement with Japan allowingthem to be reintroduced in an emergency situation.47 However, Okinawapresented a far more valuable asset to America’s nuclear posture in EastAsia. Okinawa was home to a huge array of nuclear weapons and thereforeits role in nuclear strategy was far more important than resupplyingsubmarines.48 The development and deployment of submarine-launchedballistic missiles (SLBMs) offered a potential solution. SLBMs were far lesssusceptible to an enemy first strike and made it possible for the US tomaintain an effective nuclear deterrent without the need for forward nuclearbases on Japanese territory.49 In spite of these developments, the JapaneseForeign Ministry was aware that the price for the removal of nuclear weaponsfrom Okinawa would be the right, as in the case of the Ogasawara Islands, toreintroduce them in an emergency. The Ministry’s American Affairs Bureauproduced a remarkable draft secret agreement whereby Japan would give astrong indication that it would react favourably to a request by the United
45Takashi Oka, ‘U.S. officers cling to Okinawa bases: fear Japan will limit their use after reversion’,New York Times, 7 April 1969, 11; Satō to Upper House, 17 March 1969, Kokai Kaigi Roku [Record ofthe National Diet], <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp>.
46Satō to Upper House Budget Committee, 10 March 1969, Kokai Kaigi Roku [Record of the NationalDiet], <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp>; Shimoda Takesō, Sengo Nihon Gaikō No Shōgen: Nihon wa kōshitesaiseishita [Testimony of Japan’s postwar foreign policy: Japan’s rebirth] (Tokyo: Gyōsei MondaiKenjyūjo 1984), 177; Tōgō Fumihiko, Nichibei Gaikō Sanju Nen: Anpo, Okinawa to sonogo [Thirtyyears of US–Japanese diplomacy: US–Japan Security Treaty, Okinawa and aftermath] (Tokyo: ChūkōBunko 1982), 172.
47Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affaris(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk, 23 March 1968, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 29, part 2, Japan (Washington:US GPO 2006), doc. 118, 268–70.
48Norris et al., ‘Where They Were: How Much Did Japan know?’; Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Atomic Energy), ‘History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U)’.
49Nicholas E. Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.–Japanese Relations(College Station: Texas A&M University Press 2000), 169; ‘Summary Prepared by Drafting Committee’,Japan–US Kyoto Conference, January 1969, copy in National Archives and Records Administration,College Park, MD, Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File, 1967–69, POL 19 RYU IS, box 2459.
States for the reintroduction of nuclear weapons onto Okinawa in a time ofheightened tensions. While this was certainly produced in the context ofeasing the path towards the reversion of Okinawa, it should also be stressedthat it reveals a deep concern with ensuring the credibility of the nuclearumbrella.50 In addition Togo Fumihiko, the Director of the American AffairsBureau, produced an internal thinkpiece in the run-up to the summit compar-ing Japan’s position to that of Canada, whose government had dropped itsopposition to the placement of nuclear weapons on its territory in order touphold the extended deterrent relating to its territory.51 Ultimately, however,the draft agreement was never used, since both Satō and Nixon preferred tokeep such high-level clandestine nuclear agreements between themselves anda small number of trusted aides. For his part Satō preferred not to include awritten agreement on reintroduction, since if this were ever to be made publicthe political consequences would be catastrophic. Tellingly, he remarked toProfessor Wakaizumi Kei, his private emissary to the White House, that such awritten agreement was unnecessary, since any Japanese prime minister wouldcertainly accede to such a request in order to ensure Japan’s protection.52
Ultimately Nixon was not prepared to overrule his military chiefs who wanteda commitment in writing, and a secret ‘Agreed Minute’ to the JointCommuniqué (which announced that agreement had been reached on thereversion of Okinawa) was drafted by Wakaizumi and Kissinger and signed bySatō and Nixon.53 This nuclear diplomacy over the reversion of Okinawa iscrucial to understanding the role and place of extended deterrence, since itillustrates the lengths that Japanese officials were prepared to go in order toensure its credibility despite the adverse political consequences that would becaused by it being made public.
Nuclear ‘Free-Handers’
Japan faced another major set of decisions regarding its approach to nuclearweapons with the NPT. It might have been expected that Japan would be anearly and avid supporter of the NPT given its unique history as the only
50Gaikō Shiryōkan [Diplomatic Archive of Japan], Tokyo, Okinawa Henkan Kōshō [Okinawa ReversionNegotiations], H-22, CD 13, 0611-2010-00794_02, 108, Bei Ikka (America Section, First Department),Draft Record of Conversation, 20 October 1969.
51DAJ, Okinawa Henkan Kōshō [Okinawa Reversion Negotiations], H-22, CD 13, 0611-2010-00794_02,117, ‘Kaku chozō ni Kansuru Jakkan No Mondaten’ [Some Issues pertaining to nuclear storage], 14November 1969.
52Kei Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.–Japan OkinawaReversion Negotiations, ed. John Swenson-Wright (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press 2002), 196.
53Satō’s son Satō Shinji passed this copy to the Expert Committee of the Problem of the So-called‘Secret Agreements’ [Iwayuru ‘Mitsuyaku’ Mondai Ni Kansuru Yūshikisha Iinkai] which was taskedwith investigating this and other Cold War era secret agreements; see Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 January2010. It is marginally but not substantially different to the copy reproduced in Wakaizumi’s memoir:Wakaizumi, Tasaku Nakarishi Wo Shinzemuto Hossu, frontispiece.
496 FINTAN HOEY
country to be attacked with nuclear weapons. However, despite wideacceptance in Japanese officialdom of the logic and necessity of the USEND and Japan’s signature on the treaty in 1970 a significant amount ofopposition emerged in parliamentary, military,and diplomatic circles to theloss of Japan’s freedom of action. Senior naval officers pushed for nuclearweapons to augment their ships’ firepower. However, they were not able toovercome the argument, which had also been made in the 1968/70 Report,that Japan’s high population density and small area put it at a distinctstrategic disadvantage and cast doubt over the credibility and usability ofits weapons which would undermine their utility as a deterrent.54 Nor werethey able to enlist the support of US officials. During a visit to Japan byDefence Secretary Melvin Laird a press leak, seemingly by nuclear hawks inthe Japanese Defence Agency (JDA), suggesting US support for an indepen-dent deterrent received broad condemnation and not the hoped-forsupport.55 Moreover, a JDA study concluded that the lack of a suitabletest site rendered a Japanese nuclear weapons programme unfeasible.56 Asmall number of so-called ‘free-handers’ within the LDP remained opposedto signing away forever its rights to nuclear weapons. They were supportedby the nuclear power industry, which feared industrial espionage arisingfrom International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. However, once thesefears had been overcome the free-handers lost a powerful ally and ratifica-tion eventually went ahead in 1976.57 The free-handers were joined by alarge number of diplomats who also thought it unwise to permanently forgoan independent deterrent. For example in a policy-planning meeting withtheir West German counterparts Japanese diplomats openly discussed thepossibility of cooperating on a joint weapons programme. The overture wasill timed, since by this juncture Bonn had rejected as unwise the pursuit ofnuclear ambitions and embarked on a rapprochement with Moscow.58
54These arguments were cogently presented by Kubo Takuya, a senior JDA analyst, in his influentialtract, ‘Bōeiryoku Seibi no Kangaekata’ [A framework to consider defence capabilities], 20 February1971, Nihon to Sekai Database, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.O1J.html:. See also NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1970–73, DEF 4 JAPAN–US, box 1753, ‘TelephoneConversation with [redacted], Japanese Defense Agency’, 11 September 1971.
55See Fintan Hoey, ‘The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful Challenge to Japan’sDefense Policy, 1969–1977’, Journal of American–East Asian Relations 19/1 (2012), 71–73.
56Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku: Rekishi hōtei no hikoku toshite [Reflections: defendant in the court ofhistory] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha 2004), 234–35.
57John E. Endicott, ‘The 1975–76 Debate over Ratification of the NPT in Japan’, Asian Survey 17/3(1977), 275–92.
58See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘“Kaku” o motometa Nihon’ hōdō ni oite toriage raretabunshonado ni kansuru Gaimushō chōsa hōkoku-sho’ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs archival investigation regarding ‘The Japan that possesses “Nuclears”’broadcast], <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokoku/>. Taka Daitoku argues that the will-ingness of these and other elites to countenance and pave the way for an independent deterrentmakes Japan a ‘virtual’ nuclear state with only a ‘detached attachment’ to the NPT. Taka Daitoku, ‘AStrategy of Detached Attachment: Japan’s “Realistic” Approach to the Emerging NPT Regime, 1968–1976’, paper presented at The Making of a Nuclear Order: Negotiating the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty conference, Center for Strategic Studies, ETH Zurich, 1 March 2014.
However, rather than arguing for the development of an independentdeterrent in the short term, what both these diplomats and the free-handers were advocating was akin to a strategy of ‘nuclear hedging’.59
Such a strategy of latent or tacit deterrence, i.e. not possessing nuclearweapons but maintaining the ability to quickly develop them should theneed arise, is largely a rhetorical one in the Japanese case, since significant,though not insurmountable, legal and political barriers remain to convertingits nuclear power and space exploration capabilities into a warhead anddelivery system.60 In any case this peculiar kind of ‘latent deterrent’ is madepossible by the fact that Japan remains safeguarded by America’s deterrentpower.
Conclusion
Indeed Japan’s entire response to the thorny issue of nuclear weapons – itsdisavowal of an independent deterrent, its activities in favour of globaldisarmament, its paradoxical (though not contradictory) status as a non-nuclear state, its ‘rhetorical’ nuclear hedging – is made possible by theextended deterrence provided by the United States. Along with the US–Japanese alliance it has remained a key component of the regional securityarchitecture for decades. The process by which Japan came to adopt thisstrategy was not easy or inevitable and Japan’s policy-making processeswere affected by a number of factors. These include public opinion andquestions of national prestige, American security and non-proliferation poli-cies, and official perceptions of Japan’s security needs. What made Japan’sdecision possible was extended deterrence. Without this key addition toAmerica’s security guarantee Japan would have faced a much more danger-ous security environment following China’s successful nuclear test in 1964and might have had to cross the nuclear Rubicon and incurred all thenegative reactions – both foreign and domestic – that this would haveentailed. Instead Japan was able to forge a middle path between the totalrenunciation of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the development ofan independent deterrent, on the other. Taking this line ensured that a greatdeal of upheaval – mass protests at home, heightened global and regionaltension – was avoided. Despite significant changes in recent decades, notleast of which have been the end of the Cold War and China’s leaps ineconomic and military power, Japan’s current security environment is similar
59On such approaches see Ariel Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited’,International Security 27/3 (2002), 71; Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, ‘Japan’s NuclearHedge: Beyond “Allergy” and Breakout’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and TravisTanner (eds), Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle: National Bureau ofAsian Research, 2013), <http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/85865>.
60Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Why Japan Won’t Go Nuclear (Yet)’.
to that of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, as now, it was faced with a rogue andunfriendly neighbour bent on arming itself with nuclear weapons. (Whereonce it was the PRC now it is North Korea that presents a potential threat.)Japan’s nuclear strategy has remained consistent, something not readilyapparent from the conflicting statements made by Japanese officials rightup to today regarding non-proliferation and the hedging strategy of a latentdeterrent. At the core of Japan’s approach has been the reliance on theextended deterrent which has been a source of stability and continuity forJapan and for Northeast Asia over the long term. However, in an increasinglymultipolar and uncertain world it is essential that the credibility of extendeddeterrence is retained and enhanced by Washington.61 The success or failureof this will strongly influence whether Japan continues its traditional postureor embarks on a more adventurous course.
Acknowledgements
Thanks are due to Christian Osterman, Joseph Pilat, Leopoldo Nuti, Christine Leah,Chelsey Wiley, the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project at the WilsonCenter, Washington, the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and SocialSciences, the Japan Foundation, and the many librarians and archivists for theirassistance.
Notes on contributor
Fintan Hoey is an assistant professor of history at Franklin University Switzerland anda research associate at the UCD Humanities Institute. He was previously aGovernment of Ireland doctoral scholar at University College Dublin and held aJapan Foundation Japanese Studies Fellowship at Rikkyo University Tokyo. He haspreviously published on Japanese defence policy, and his research interests centreon US–Japanese relations and nuclear weapons history. His monograph, Satō,America and the Cold War, explores US–Japanese relations during the premiershipof Satō Eisaku (1964–72) and was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015.
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