Japan und Heidegger: Gedenkschrift der Stadt Mebkirch zum 100. Geburtstag MartinHeideggers by Harmut BuchnerReview by: Gregor PaulMonumenta Nipponica, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter, 1990), pp. 492-494Published by: Sophia UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2385389 .Accessed: 24/11/2013 14:00

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492 Monumenta Nipponica, 45:4

Japan und Heidegger: Gedenkschrift der Stadt MeJikirch zum 100. Geburtstag Martin Heideggers. Edited by Harmut Buchner. Jan Thorbecke, Sigmar- ingen, 1989. 282 pages. DM 45.00.

EVER since Tanabe Hajime visited Heidegger in 1923, Japanese proponents of Zen and the Kyoto School have been interested in his philosophy, and have maintained close personal relations with Heidegger and his German followers. On the other hand, Heidegger and his disciples felt attracted by Zen and the Kyoto School. This mutual sympathy resulted from philosophical affinities such as their common belief in the importance of ontology, especially the notion of nothingness, and the shared metaphysical aversion toward modern technology.

The present book offers comprehensive and interesting historical information about how Heidegger's philosophy was received in Japan. Ohashi Ryosuke's article on the first encounters of Tanabe, Miki Kiyoshi, Kuki Shuizo, and Watsuji Tetsuro with Heidegger, and Yuasa Yasuo's piece on Miki's and Watsuji's reception of Heidegger, are extremely informative. The articles show that these Japanese philosophers did not just accept Heidegger's ideas, but reacted critically to them.

For instance, commenting on Heidegger's first speech as president of Freiburg Uni- versity in 1933, Miki remarked, 'Restore the power of logos and the right of reason!' (p. 28). A similar passage is quoted by Yuasa on p. 67. He points out, 'In Miki's view . . , Heidegger did not take rationality seriously enough and put too much em- phasis on irrational pathos' (p. 69). Watsuji criticized what he considered Heidegger's neglect of the social status of man and the role that space plays in the shaping of man's life.

Tanabe's reservations become especially clear when we read both of his articles. In his 1924 essay on Heidegger's 'phenomenological turn', the first article ever on Heideg- ger's existential ontology and phenomenology, Tanabe was already emphasizing that humans are social beings. In his critical discussion of Heidegger's first speech as presi- dent of Freiburg University, Tanabe maintained that Heidegger's way of thinking 'necessarily denies academic freedom', that Heidegger underrated rationality, and that a philosophy such as Heidegger's that regards Schicksal, fate, as more powerful than reason, was dangerous. Thus Tanabe, Miki, and, to a certain extent, even Watsuji criticized Heidegger from markedly rational points of view. All credit to Ohashi and Yuasa for clearly bringing this to light, and to Harmut Buchner for including Tanabe's article on Heidegger's speech.

Another piece of information probably still new to many German readers is that it was Kuki who in 1926 first introduced Heidegger's philosophy to Sartre. Also welcome, at least for German students of Heidegger, is the translation of Yuasa Seinosuke's report on Heidegger's lectures, Introduction to Academic Studies, 1929, of which no German text exists. The same applies to Buchner's report on the Japanese edition of Heidegger's works.

In addition to newly written articles about the reception of Heidegger in Japan, former essays by some famous Japanese philosophers that document this reception, letters from and to Heidegger, and notes made by Japanese visitors during their dis- cussions with him, Buchner has also included introductions that Heidegger wrote for Japanese translations of his works, photographs, and a comprehensive and useful bibliography, compiled by Kozuma Tadashi, of Japanese translations of Heidegger

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BOOK REVIEWS 493

and Japanese editions of his works in German. Many of the articles and texts have been translated into German for the first time and with an admirable accuracy.

It is largely due to the influence of Heidegger and his school that Zen and the Kyoto School became the dominant, if not the sole, topic of German books, articles, and sym- posia on Japanese philosophy, and that Germans willing to listen have been repeatedly told the following notions that are now, once more, conveyed by the articles in Japan und Heidegger. These notions have shaped the German view of Japanese philosophy more than any other factor.

1. Japanese thought discards rationality and logicalness and even denies the validity of the tertium non datur. In his article on Nishida and Heidegger, pp. 39-61, Elmar Weinmayr again uncritically uses this mystifying notion (p. 45).

2. In Japan, man and nature are regarded as 'one'. Yuasa Yasuo's claim that 'Eastern art does not contradict nature' (p. 74), reflects this idea. Tsujimura Koichi even maintains that the Japanese have been Naturmenschen from time immemorial, that is, they have always revered nature and lived in accord with it (p. 160). In a letter to Heidegger dated 1963, Kojima Takehiko wrote, 'We Japanese feel geborgen [pro- tected and comforted] by the embrace of nature' (p. 219; see also p. 173).

3. ['True' or 'real'] Japanese philosophy originated only with Nishida Kitaro, who has been repeatedly called der Erzvater japanischer Philosophie, or 'the founding father of Japanese philosophy'. Buchner (p. 13), and Weinmayr, quoting a statement by Nishitani Keiji (p. 41), repeat this claim.

4. Japanese thought is something distinctively 'Eastern', almost inconceivably different from Western or European thought. The present book abounds in phrases that contrast East and West, thus suggesting fundamental cultural distinctions that in fact do not exist. Weinmayr speaks of 'a European way of thinking . . . that elevated the tertium non datur to the highest law for all reflecting about . . . reality' (p. 45). He also speaks of 'the viewpoint of European logicalness' (p. 57). He does not take into ac- count that in the fourth century B.C. the Later Mohists developed a logic basically equivalent to Aristotelian syllogistic theory. Among other fundamental logical laws, the Mohists explicitly formulated the tertium non datur. Furthermore, Indian logic is equivalent to European logic in all relevant aspects. Finally, ever since the Nara period Japanese Buddhist scholars have been engaged in logical studies. In 781, Zenju wrote a commentary on a work that introduced and explained Dignaga's theory of logic. In all probability this theory was influenced by Aristotelian syllogistics. Thus, as early as in the eighth century, fundamental logical notions that are equivalent to corresponding Aristotelian notions, were known, accepted, and studied in Japan.

I dwell on this point because it is of utmost importance. If we use terms such as 'logical' in their normal sense, that is, as referring to structures that accord with fun- damental logical laws, then there is no difference between Eastern, Western, Euro- pean, or Indian logic. To employ them in a way that excludes this meaning, however, is confusing. Hence, terms such as 'logical' are unsuitable to describe fundamental differences between cultures. There are no cultures that discard, neglect, or continu- ously and consciously violate logical rules, for such cultures could not survive. As to the history of philosophy in Japan, philosophers such as Ito Jinsai and Ito Togai argued as logically and rationally as any Westerner.

In his discussion of Watsuji, Yuasa Yasuo speaks of an 'Eastern mind' and con- fronts 'Eastern and Western art' (p. 74). Particularly unfortunate is his reference to a

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494 Monumenta Nipponica, 45:4

Western dualism between mind and body, since this dualism is even stronger in Indian philosophy and religion, for example, the Bhagaviwdgfta. Nishitani, too, repeatedly speaks of East and West, although his usage of 'East' actually refers only to certain Buddhist schools. In his report on a conversation with Heidegger in 1953, Suzuki Daisetsu approvingly tells of Heidegger's view that 'in the West, one separates the subject from the object . . . , while one has no such interest in the East' (p. 170).

In his article 'Martin Heideggers Denken und die japanische Philosophie' (pp. 159-66), a speech given in 1969, Tsujimura uses the term 'Japanese philosophy' in a mystifying way. He contrasts it with the expression 'philosophy in Japan', which he rejects as unimportant and uninteresting. He emphatically speaks of 'a definition of the essential nature of Japanese philosophy, and the need for, and predicament of, an essentially Japanese philosophy' (p. 160). According to Tsujimura, 'Japanese philosophy originates from the fundamental source of the [Japanese people's] own spiritual tradition', particularly the alleged Japanese conception of nature.

According to scholars such as Suzuki, Tsujimura, and Tezuka Tomio, the interest that Buddhist schools and the Kyoto School take in ontology, particularly in such no- tions as being and truth ('truth' taken as an ontological rather than an epistemological notion), and the way in which these schools explain being and truth, is a distinctive and original feature of Japanese and Eastern thought.

I have always found this view most unconvincing. First, prior to the introduction of Buddhism in China and Japan, questions of truth did not play an important role in thought there. Second, the emphatic interest in truth is shared by many Western tradi- tions. Third, it is this very interest in truth and ontology, and the similarity of such ontological notions as ku (sunyata), mu (nothingness), and zettai mu (absolute nothingness) on the one hand, and Nichts (nothingness) on the other that led to the conviction that there are fundamental commonalities between the Kyoto School and Heidegger.

In sum, Buchner, Weinmayr, Yuasa, Nishitani, Tsujimura, Suzuki, Tezuka, and Kojima repeat in their articles some of those dreadful prejudices about philosophy in Japan that have shaped the German picture of Japanese philosophy for many years. In doing so, they show little awareness of what philosophy should or, at least, could be, namely, a critical exploration, discussion, and presentation of ideas. Without acknowledging and employing the fundamental rules of logic, nobody could survive. Philosophers such as Ogyui Sorai, Ito Jinsai, and Nishi Amane explicitly argued against the so-called unity of man and nature (ten jin g6itsu). Scholars such as Kuikai, Hayashi Razan, and Ito Jinsai were philosophers, and, by every standard, originators of Japanese philosophy. There are probably no significant cultural differences between 'East' and 'West'. When all this is neglected, then one need not wonder that, except for a few japanologists, the four prejudices will continue to remain strong in Ger- many.

For anyone interested in Heidegger, the Kyoto School, and the reception of Heideg- ger in Japan mainly from the viewpoint of the history of thought, this book offers com- prehensive, important, and readable information. But what is said about Japanese philosophy and cultural in general should be read very critically.

GREGOR PAUL Karlsruhe University and Osaka City University

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Article Contentsp. 492p. 493p. 494

Issue Table of ContentsMonumenta Nipponica, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter, 1990), pp. 391-508Volume InformationFront MatterThe Very Idea. The Notion of Ideogram in China and Japan [pp. 391-411]Arts of War in Times of Peace. Swordsmanship in Honch Bugei Shden, Chapter 5[pp. 413-447]Mokkan. Wooden Documents from the Nara Period [pp. 449-470]Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 471-474]Review: untitled [pp. 474-476]Review: untitled [pp. 476-477]Review: untitled [pp. 478-480]Review: untitled [pp. 480-482]Review: untitled [pp. 482-484]Review: untitled [pp. 485-486]Review: untitled [pp. 487-489]Review: untitled [pp. 490-491]Review: untitled [pp. 492-494]Review: untitled [pp. 495-497]Review: untitled [pp. 497-499]Review: untitled [pp. 499-501]Review: untitled [pp. 501-504]Review: untitled [pp. 504-506]Review: untitled [pp. 506-507]Review: untitled [pp. 507-508]

Back Matter