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Prof. Prof. AndreyAndrey KostogryzovKostogryzovMoscow, Russia, RIAMC [email protected]@gmail.com , , www.mathmodels.netwww.mathmodels.net
INNOVATIVE INNOVATIVE APPROACH APPROACH
TO ANALYZE QUALITY TO ANALYZE QUALITY AND RISKSAND RISKS
AgendaAgenda1. The main changes in system standards (turn to system
engineering)2. Analysis of practice to provide system quality and safety
(for industrial, fire, radiating, nuclear, chemical, biological, transport, ecological systems, safety of buildings and constructions, information systems)
3. The way to purposeful rise of quality and safety for any system (identical input for mathematical modeling, uniform accessible models, probability of success and risk of failure in process development as results of modeling, dozens examples for different systems, fast analytical report in 3 minutes through Internet)
4. The original mathematical models and software tools as a brain of the offered innovative approach (based on the theory of random processes, system analysis and operation research)
5. Examples of forecasting system operation, interpretations of results, recommendations (for understanding acceptable probability levels of quality and risks in different spheres)
1. The main changes in 1. The main changes in system standardssystem standards
(turn to system engineering)(turn to system engineering)
The main problems The main problems in the field of system and in the field of system and software engineeringsoftware engineering ((interdependedinterdepended))
The problem of risks in The problem of risks in system life cycle system life cycle
(ISO/IEC15288, 16085, (ISO/IEC15288, 16085, Regulations etc.)Regulations etc.)
The problem of The problem of quality management quality management ((ISO/IEC15288,ISO/IEC15288, 9001, 9001,
10017,11462 10017,11462 etc.)etc.)
The problem of The problem of software quality software quality
(12207, 9126, 12119, (12207, 9126, 12119, 15504,15939 15504,15939 etc.)etc.)
The problem of information The problem of information systems operation quality systems operation quality
((GOST RVGOST RV 51987 51987 etc.)etc.)
The problem of The problem of information information
security (security (17799,17799,15408, 15443 15408, 15443 etc.)etc.)
The problem of The problem of system reliability system reliability
(IEC 300(IEC 300--1,2,3 1,2,3 etc.)etc.)
The problem of The problem of ““human factorhuman factor””(13407, 18529 (13407, 18529
etc.)etc.)
Point 1. There are objective needs for system analysis and optimization quality and risks
Point 2. Today processes and systems operation are Point 2. Today processes and systems operation are the main objects for analysisthe main objects for analysis
Example from ISO/IEC 15288
What about the objects for system analysis?What about the objects for system analysis?
2. Analysis of practice to 2. Analysis of practice to provide system quality and provide system quality and
safetysafety(for industrial, fire, radiating, nuclear, chemical, biological,(for industrial, fire, radiating, nuclear, chemical, biological,
transport, ecological systems, safety of buildings and transport, ecological systems, safety of buildings and constructions, information systems)constructions, information systems)
Method 1. The chord is longer, when its middle lays in a circle entered in a
triangle. The radius of this entered new circle is equal to half of radius of
an initial circle. Hence, the area of the entered circle is ¼ of the area of
an initial circle
Point 3. One problem can be solved by various correct methods, but results can essentially differ!
Let’s remember paradox of Bertrand J.L.(book “Calcul des probabilites”, 1889)
Simple problem. To find probability of that at random chord is longer than the party of the equipotential triangle entered in a circle
by areaP = ¼
by archesP = 1/3
by radiusP = 1/2
Method 3. Let's choose a random point on radius of a circle and we
take a chord which is perpendicular to this radius and passes through the
chosen point. Then the chord is longer if the point lays on that half of radius which is near to centre. P=1/2
Method 2. Triangle tops divide a circle into three equal
arches, and the casual chord is longer if it crosses this triangle, i.e. the required probability is equal 1/3
All results are correct but difference is 100%
Point 4. Generally risk estimations from one sphere do not use in other spheres because of methodologies for risk analysis are different, interpretations are not identical
As a result of analyzing practice approaches to safety(to industrial, fire, radiating, nuclear, chemical, biological, transport, ecological
systems, safety of buildings and constructions, information security)
Conclusion 1
For the spheres of industrial, fire, radiating, nuclear, aviation safety in which already there were numerous facts of tragedies - requirements to admissible risks are expressed quantitatively at probability level and qualitatively at level of necessary requirements to the initial materials, used resources, protective technologies and operation conditions
Point 5. The methods for quantitatively risk analysis are not created. The term “Admissible risk” can not be defined because of one depend on methods. Experience from other spheres is missing
Conclusion 2
For the spheres of chemical, biological, transport, ecological safety, safety of buildings and constructions, information security, including the conditions of terrorist threats – requirements to admissible risks are set mainly at qualitative level in the form of requirements to performance.It means impossibility of risks predictions and correct decisions of synthesis problems to substantiate preventive measures against admissible risk
General situation for todayPoint 1 Point 2 Point 3 Point 4 Point 5
Special models of Institutes (R&D)
and Critical Systems
Models of
Universities
The existing approach (everyone solves
the problems how can)
Resume1. All organizations need
quantitative estimations, but only some part from them uses modeling complexes
2. Used models are highly specialized, input and calculated metrics are adhered strongly to specificity of systems
3. Existing modeling complexes have been created within the limits of concrete order for the systems and as a rule are very expensive
Summary1. Analysis of quality and risks is carried out mainly at qualitative level with
assessments “better or worse”. Independent quantitative estimations at probability level are carried out for specially created models
2. Admissible risks in different areas of the application are not comparable. In general case optimization of risks is not carried out by solving classical problems of synthesis
3. Wide training is impossible
…
3. 3. The way to The way to purposeful rise of quality and safety for any for any
systemsystem(identical input for mathematical modeling, uniform (identical input for mathematical modeling, uniform accessible models, probability of success and risk of accessible models, probability of success and risk of failure in process development as results of modeling, failure in process development as results of modeling, dozens examples for different systems, fast analytical dozens examples for different systems, fast analytical
report in 3 minutes through Internet)report in 3 minutes through Internet)
prove the probability levels of «acceptable quality and admissible risk» for different systems in uniform interpretation,
create technics to solve different problems for quality and risk optimization, provide access for wide use and training
What is the offered way to improve essentially this situation?
From standard processesconsider
Generalproperties
of the processesdeveloped in time line
create universalmathematical models
and software tools
approve the models on practice examples
optimization ofquality and risks
It is important to support system making-decisions in quality and safety and/or avoid wasted expenses in system life cycle
Expected pragmatic effect from application
Generalproperties
of the processesdeveloped in time line
Example 1 of considering
general properties for Risk analysis
The illustration of system protection against dangerous influences
- time between the neighboring diagnostics;
- a required period Treq of permanent secure operation; - as minimum, there is two diagnostics during a required period Treq (the illustration of Treq middle); - a required period Treq has ended after the last diagnostic; - a dander source has penetrated before the next diagnostic; - a dander source has not penetrated into system; - a penetrated dander source has activated before the next diagnostic; - a penetrated dander source has not activated before the next diagnostic
t
Cases: 1 2 3 4 5 … …
Industrial safety
Fire safety
Radiating, nuclear safety
Chemical, biologicalsafety
Ecological safety
Transport safety
Safety of buildings and constructions
Information securitysecurity
etc.etc.
System processes directs on maintenance ofsystem integrity (including risk-processes)
Generalproperties
of the processesdeveloped in time line
Random processes of information gathering and processing, control and monitoring, threats development,
restoration of integrity are general
In all cases effective risk management
for any system is based on:
1) uses of materials, resources, protective
technologies with more best
characteristics from the point of view of
safety, including integrity restoration
2) rational application ofsituation analysis,
effective ways of thecontrol and monitoring
of conditions and operativerestoration of integrity
3) rational application of measures for risk
counteraction
Generalproperties
of the processesdeveloped in time line
General properties of the processes in time line. Formalization of an
unauthorized access with due regard resources value considering period of
objective value (POV)
Example 2 of considering
general properties for analyzing information
systems operation Quality
Interacted systems
Subordinate
systems
SYSTEM
T he g eneral purpose of o peratio n:
to m eet requirements for providing reli able and t imel y
producing com plete, vali d and conf idential informat ion
for i ts following use
Information syst em
Users
Purposes
Requirements to
information system
Use condi tions
O perated objects
Higher systems
Resou rces
Sources
Generalproperties
of the processesdeveloped in time line
Required information quality (ideal)
Reliable, timely, complete, valid andconfidential information
Used information(reflecting the potential threats realization)
non-confidential
non-actual
due to random errors missed during checking
with hidden distortions as aresult of unauthorized accesses
with hidden virus distortions
due to random faults of staff and usersincomplete
non-produced as aresult of system's
unreliability
untimely
due to processing intolerablemistakesdoubtful
INFORMATION SYSTEM
Hardware / Software
Users
Systems operation support, including information access, integrityand confidentiality providing
Operation service,check-up and control
Calls (t) Results (t+δ) Otherinformationsystems and
users
Operatedobjects
Real events andobjects of system'sapplication domain
. . .
t-∆
t-∆ t-∆…
Source 1
Source N
t-∆…
t t…
t t…
Datacommuni-
cation,check-up,
processing,storage andproduction
Datacommuni-cation,check-up,processing,storage andproduction
Data base
…
t-∆ … t-∆
… t-∆t-∆
required quality
The general purpose for any information system
Interacted systems
Subordinate
systems
SYSTEM
The general purpose of operation:
to meet requirements for providing reliable and timely
producing complete, valid and confidential information
for its following use
Information system
Users
Purposes
Requirements to information
system
Use conditions
Operated objects
Higher systems
Resources
Sources
The role of methodology in system life cycleThe role of methodology in system life cycle
4.4.The original mathematical The original mathematical models and software tools as models and software tools as
a brain of the offered a brain of the offered innovative approachinnovative approach
(based on the theory of random processes, system analysis (based on the theory of random processes, system analysis and operation research)and operation research)
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--11from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--22from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--33from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--44from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basic
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--55from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basicbasic
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--66from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--77from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--88from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
Some mathematical models and their proofsSome mathematical models and their proofs--99from the book “APPLICABLE METHODS TO ANALYZE AND OPTIMIZE SYSTEM PROCESSES” —
Moscow: “Armament. Policy. Conversion”, 2007, 328 p. – www.mathmodels.net
etc.
basic
basic
basic
You can receive it on www.mathmodels.net
The methodology to The methodology to support an assessment of support an assessment of standard system processes standard system processes according according
to ISO/IEC 15288 is implemented in software toolsto ISO/IEC 15288 is implemented in software tools
The offered 100 mathematical modelsThe offered 100 mathematical models
Agreement ProcessesAgreement ProcessesModeling Complex for Selecting a Suitable Supplier Modeling Complex for Selecting a Suitable Supplier ““AcquisitionAcquisition””
Modeling Complex for Assessing the Execution of the AgreeModeling Complex for Assessing the Execution of the Agreement ment ““SupplySupply””
Enterprise ProcessesEnterprise Processes
Modeling Complex for Enterprise Environment Modeling Complex for Enterprise Environment Management Management ““Environment ManagementEnvironment Management””
Modeling Complex for Investment Management Modeling Complex for Investment Management ““Investment Management Investment Management ””
Modeling Complex for System Life Cycle Processes Modeling Complex for System Life Cycle Processes Management Management ““Life Cycle ManagementLife Cycle Management””
Modeling Complex for Resource Management Modeling Complex for Resource Management ““Resource ManagementResource Management””
Modeling Complex for Quality Management Modeling Complex for Quality Management ““Quality ManagementQuality Management””
Project ProcessesProject Processes
Modeling Complex for Project Planning Modeling Complex for Project Planning ““Project PlanningProject Planning””
Modeling Complex for Project Assessment Modeling Complex for Project Assessment ““Project AssessmentProject Assessment””
Modeling Complex for Project Control Modeling Complex for Project Control ““Project ControlProject Control””
Modeling complex for decisionModeling complex for decision--making process making process ““DecisionDecision--makingmaking””
Modeling complex for risk management Modeling complex for risk management ““Risk managementRisk management””
Modeling complex for configuration management Modeling complex for configuration management ““Configuration managementConfiguration management””
Modeling complex for information managementModeling complex for information management““Information managementInformation management””
Technical Processes
Modeling complex for stakeholder requirements definition Modeling complex for stakeholder requirements definition ““Requirements DefinitionRequirements Definition””
Modeling complex for requirements analysis Modeling complex for requirements analysis ““Requirements analysisRequirements analysis”
Complex for architectural design Complex for architectural design ““Architectural designArchitectural design””
Modeling complex for evaluation human factor Modeling complex for evaluation human factor ““Human factorHuman factor ”
Modeling complex for system implementation Modeling complex for system implementation ““ImplementationImplementation””
Modeling complex for system integration Modeling complex for system integration ““IntegrationIntegration””
Modeling complex for system verification Modeling complex for system verification ““VerificationVerification””
Modeling complex for system transition Modeling complex for system transition ““TransitionTransition””
Modeling complex for system validation Modeling complex for system validation ““ValidationValidation””
Modeling complex for system operation Modeling complex for system operation ““OperationOperation””
Modeling complex for maintenance process Modeling complex for maintenance process ““MaintenanceMaintenance””
Modeling complex for disposal process Modeling complex for disposal process ““DisposalDisposal””
5.5. Examples of forecasting Examples of forecasting system operation, system operation,
interpretations of results,interpretations of results,recommendationsrecommendations
(for understanding(for understanding probability levels of acceptableprobability levels of acceptable quality quality and admissible risks in different spheres)and admissible risks in different spheres)
Some examples concerning Environmental and Sustainable
Energy Technologies
АнализАнализ рисковрисков вв опасномопасном производствепроизводстве
Input: a frequency of essential events - to 100 conditional events at 1h, there are no more 1 % of potentially dangerous events. Speed of semantic interpretation of event makes about 30 sec. Frequency of errors of the dispatching personnel and failures of software of SCADA-system is 1 error in a year
Example 1. Estimation of risk of inadequate interpretation of events by the dispatcher for 1 hour, 8 hours (one shift),
1 month, 1 year and 10 years of operation of SCADA-system
Such levels of risks for SCADA-systems can be recognized as acceptable
Example 2. The forecast of efficiency of counteraction measures to risks for 2 years and 15 years in pipes manufacture and use
1st measure – QMS at the supplier;
2nd measure -production quality check by all recommended kinds and methods of control within a year and improvement of times in 3 years;
3rd measure – the control by SCADA-system;
4th measure - remote sounding with preservation of efficiency within the days, carried out once a week;
5th measure - annual local inspections with preservation of efficiency within a month;
6th measure -integrated inspections of 1 times in 5 years with preservation of efficiency within a month;
7th measure -electrochemical protection of pipelines and means of telemechanics
-----------------------------1st measure – QMS
at the supplier;2nd measure - the
control by SCADA-system; 3rd measure –
helicopter inspection and regular radiographic methods of the analysis with preservation of efficiency within the days, carried out once a week;
4th measure -annual local inspections with preservation of efficiency within a month;
5th measure -integrated inspections of 1 times in 5 years with preservation of efficiency within a month;
6th measure -electrochemical protection of pipelines and means of telemechanics
The sample of the level of acceptable risk for other systems!Different measures are comparable by forecasted risks!
Example 3. Estimation of ecological safety of a regionRisk to lose ecological safety of
region within 5 years
1-st technology(old) provides processing of tests
and delivery of results of theanalysis within 3 days. Errorshappen 1 time in half a year.
In case of deviations a long of integrity restoration is a week
2-nd technology(modern) with use of IT
provides operative processing
within several minutes, about one error at 2 years,
integrity restoration is about one day
(Supervision stations: 1st category, 2-nd category)1 2
1
2
22
2
1
1 1
0.56
0.92
0.37
0.93
0.10
0.49
0.09
0.48
The operational effectiveness of stations of 1st
category at modern
technology of monitoring is high: risk no
more than 0.1 (!)
More frequent quality control of sea waters is recommended - to level of
frequency of the control stations of 1st category (the risk decreases with 0.5
to 0.3 and more
The increase of mean time between mistakes is recommended (the risk
decreases with 0.5 till 0.28 and more)
Duration of the control from 0.5 to 2 days influences insignificantly!
More frequent threats twice increases risk from 0.5 to 0.6
Mean time between mistakes
Time between control
Duration of the control
Frequency of threats
Points of supervision of 1st category are intended for quality Points of supervision of 1st category are intended for quality control of sea waters in coastal areas. The control is 2 times acontrol of sea waters in coastal areas. The control is 2 times amonth on reduced and once a month under the full program. month on reduced and once a month under the full program. Points of 2nd category are intended to control sea waters in Points of 2nd category are intended to control sea waters in areas of the high sea for researches of seasonal and annual areas of the high sea for researches of seasonal and annual variability of impurity of sea waters. The control is 5variability of impurity of sea waters. The control is 5--6 times a 6 times a year under the full programyear under the full program
1-ST COMPONENT – IDEAL BOILER-HOUSES, 2-ND -CENTRAL THERMAL POINT AND ELEVATED BOILER ROOMS; COMPONENTS FROM 3-RD TO 8-TH ARE HEATING MAIN BEAMS,
9-TH COMPONENT CHARACTERIZES THE TIME BETWEEN DAMAGES OF ALL NETWORK OF THE HEAT SUPPLY
Example 4. Estimations of ideal system of the centralized heat
supply during a cold season (214 days)
For ideal system mean time For ideal system mean time between failures is about 3 years!between failures is about 3 years!
Probability of reliable Probability of reliable heat supply is heat supply is 0.830.83
It is ideal It is ideal (unachievable (unachievable
maximum)maximum)!! 0.8325287h
On the moment of failure the probability of reliable heat supply
is 0.008
Estimations of existing system of the centralized heat supply
Mean time between failure is 93 hours (one failure in 3 days)
Probability of reliable heat
supply is 0.014
0.01493h
WITHOUT RESERVATION OF BEAMS OF THE HEATING SYSTEM
62 h 0.008
Mean time between
failures is 62 hours!
AS A RESULT ALL THE SAME
ZERO !!!
WITH RESERVATION OF BEAMS OF THE HEATING SYSTEM
1-ST COMPONENT – IDEAL BOILER-HOUSES, 2-ND -CENTRAL THERMAL POINT AND ELEVATED BOILER ROOMS; COMPONENTS FROM 3-RD TO 8-TH ARE HEATING MAIN BEAMS,
9-TH COMPONENT CHARACTERIZES THE TIME BETWEEN DAMAGES OF ALL NETWORK OF THE HEAT SUPPLY
Probability of reliable heat supply is 0.44
Probability of reliable heat supply is 0.035
Comparative estimation of variants of improvement of heat supply system
0.035
variant 1
variant 2
CostCost
variant 3
0.44
0.44
0.98
The most preferrable variant!
BUILDING OF NEW HOUSES WITH INDIVIDUAL HEATING ALLOWS TO
PROVIDE THE RELIABLE HEAT SUPPLY WITH PROBABILITY 0.98
CostCost
CostCost
1-ST COMPONENT – IDEAL BOILER-HOUSES, 2-ND -CENTRAL THERMAL POINT AND ELEVATED BOILER ROOMS; COMPONENTS FROM 3-RD TO 8-TH ARE HEATING MAIN BEAMS, 9-TH COMPONENT CHARACTERIZES THE TIME BETWEEN DAMAGES OF ALL
NETWORK OF THE HEAT SUPPLY
Basic feature:Basic feature:
unlike a land unlike a land problems of safety problems of safety should be resolved should be resolved
by own strength by own strength directly in the sea as directly in the sea as
remoteness from remoteness from coast and, probably, coast and, probably,
ice conditions for ice conditions for northern areas northern areas
exclude the help from exclude the help from the outsidethe outside
Typical structure
Example 5. Analysis of vulnerability for oil and gas systemsExample 5. Analysis of vulnerability for oil and gas systems--1 1
8 h. 1 day 1 week 1 month 1 year
0.000006 0.00002 0.0002
0.01
0.0008
Risk of erroneous analytical conclusions from the gathered on-line information and as a
consequence non-undertaking or undertaking inadequate countermeasures within only
a few business hours is very high!
Really
Optimisticallyas a result of decreasing mistakes
Input for modeling is according to data of a special public relations department of FBI
0.86
Estimation of the analysis process
Analysis of development of terrorist dangers in the external conditions similar to emergency danger
0.99980.89
0.39
0.07
Risk increases from 0.01 to 0.9998
owing to insufficient degrees of
recognition the terrorist
threats
Risk of uncontrollable development of a situationfor conditions of emergency danger
Risk of uncontrollable development of a situation for conditions of terrorist dangers
8 h. 1 day 1 week 1 month 1 year
0.390.18 0.18
0.860.97
0.02
Example 6. Model of threats, barriers against unauthorized access
System data
Characteristics of the Communication Subsystem
Characteristics of the means of gathering, storages and displays
It is required to predict quantitatively the level of information security for month and year and
to reveal bottlenecks
CommunicationSubsystem 2
Subordinatedenterprises -Subsystem 3
Means of gathering,
storages anddisplays -
Subsystem 3
HHeadead hholdingolding --ssubsystemubsystem 11
For safe system operation it is expedient, that all subsystems were strong equally. In an investigated exampleimplemented monitoring and control are ineffective. The technology of maintenance of information security in
case of emergency is necessary
Prediction of information security and revealing bottlenecksMean time of safe operation (h)
Probability of providing system securitywithin a month without monitoring and control within a month with monitoring and control
within a year with monitoring and controlwithin a year without monitoring and control
without monitoring and control
with monitoring and control
0.96 0.96
0.89
0.830.90
0.91
0.960.99917575 17533
59453544
867214
481267688 6579
0.67 0.67
0.400.29 0.43
0.47
0.85
0.99
Mor
e at
49.3
tim
es
mor
e at
1.86
tim
es3rd subsystem is
the most bottleneck in system! Narrow links
are means of gathering, storages and
displays of data
more at 112.8 times!
Within a year somecases of
overcoming ofbarriers are quite
possible
Within a month safe will be provided with probability 0.9 (i.e. it is figurative if scenarios of threats repeat 100 months about 90
months from them information security will be provided)
monitoring
For many years rare year will do without
safety infringement
are not effective!and control
Implemented
The general mean time of safe
operation will be more low, than only for the most critical link (3rd subsystem)
for system
For system
Subsystems1
1 12
2 2
221 3 31 1
33 3
32For system For system
for system for system
For 1st subsystem monitoring of 10th barrier is effective!
1st and 2nd subsystems
areaproximatelysafe equally
What about the modeling through Internet?
The offered approach to
mathematical modeling
standard processes through Internet
Resume1. Input (different
characteristics of time, frequency and expenses for standard processes) are identical. Models are based on the theory for random processes. As consequence –metrics are understandable, these are probabilities of successful development of processes or risks of failure2. Services through Internet
are more cheaper, than calculations by existing way
1. All organizations receive access to quality and risks analysis on uniform mathematical models according to requirements of system standards and taking into account experience and admissible risks for systems in different spheres2. Training is accessible to all connected to Internet
Service through
Detail analytical
report (50-70 pages) in 3 minutes Differences
-focus on requirements to system standard processes;-universality of initial data, metrics and the mathematical models, allowing an estimations and forecasts for given time;-support of decision-making process through Internet
Objective needs and preconditions for perfection of quality and risk management (1)
Methodology and supporting software tools (2)
Examples for different spheres of applications (3)Modeling through Internet (4)
From a pragmatical filtration ofinformation to generation of the proved ideas and effective decisions
INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ANALYZE INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ANALYZE QUALITY AND RISKSQUALITY AND RISKS
Scientific Publications and PresentationsScientific Publications and Presentations19941994
19919966
19919999
The models and software tools have been presented at seminars, The models and software tools have been presented at seminars, symposiums, symposiums, conferences and exhibitions since 1989 in Russia, conferences and exhibitions since 1989 in Russia, Australia, Australia, Canada, France, Canada, France,
Finland, Germany, Kuwait, Finland, Germany, Kuwait, the USAthe USA
-- 20052005
Thanks for your attention!
Prof. Prof. AndreyAndrey KostogryzovKostogryzovMoscow, Russia, [email protected]@gmail.com , ,
For more details and onFor more details and on--line system analysis with line system analysis with presented mathematical model: presented mathematical model:
www.mathmodels.netwww.mathmodels.net
INNOVATIVE APPROACH INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ANALYZE QUALITY AND RISKSTO ANALYZE QUALITY AND RISKS