This is a matter of how sentences interact with each other.

Frege’s account is a certain theory of meaning Russell’s proposition are the bearers of truth

and falsity, language is a vehicle for expressing one’s thought, rather than a social institution participation in which extends one’s cognitive reach

A given proposition will be true under such and such conditions and false under so and so conditions, there is nothing else to meaning for Russel.

In twentieth century theory of meaning of a term is determined by how it is used, e.g : how to verify an instance or how to use it in inferences.

To understand a theory, one has typically to learn a set of theoretical terms and how they function together.

Knowing the meaning of each term requires knowing what the others mean and knowing how to use them in internal and external inferences. Meanings of those terms consist in their interactive conseptual roles.

The meanings of terms and statements are determined by the interconnections of all other terms

Gilbert Harman (1973) argued that we think in language

Hartry Field proposed that propositional attitudes are grounded in sentential attitudes certain internal states so “x believes that p” is to be understood as having the deeper structure “x believes* sentences and “ s means p”. Here “ believes* “ designates a sentential attitude as does “wants*” etc.

These are relations between a thinker and an internal sentence.

Cognitive capacities are as systematic as our mastery of a natural language.

Thoughts have constituent structure so there must be a language of thought.

Jerry Fodor (1975, 1981) asserted that we do think in language but not in the language we speak.

There is a language of thought called mentalese which is independent of and more basic than natural language.

Carruthers said that our conscious thoughts are in a natural language.

People’s reporting that they think in ordinary language, together with other empirical facts.

Fodor (1998) expresses skepticism about whether what we instrospect is adequate to explain what we think

A central problem is the ambiguity of the sentences we encounter in our conscious thinking, especially their syntactic ambiguity.

For instance: Everyone loves someone This sentence has two meanings Fodor furthermore asserted that thought

needs to be ambiguity free and so must a language of thought be

Thought is language-like but does not involve a language in the foregoing sense.

Thought that incorporates such concepts would still be systematic and have constituent structure.

Thoughts, concepts, linguistic meaning are constituted socially.

Many abilities depend on having learned them from others

Hillary Putnam pointed out that the references of one’s words are often determined by what others refer to by them

We implicitly intend certain words to refer to what the established users of that word refer to.

They are sometimes called “experts” when they have unusual or specialized knowledge

The arithmetical (+), plus is determinate in its meaning:

57 + 68 = 125 The use of (+)____ correct According Kripke: here we have a skeptical

problem, (+) nothing constructive is needed, needless to say not everyone accepts this

For Kripke’s wittgenstein, we must bring in the social background, it is socially established and becomes assertion condition for the favored answer