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Critical Issues in Organization Science: A Dialogue

Author(s): John M. Jermier and Stewart R. CleggSource: Organization Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 1-13Published by: INFORMSStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2635067.

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Our first Crossroads piece ("From Quicksand to Crossroads: An Agnostic Perspectiveon Conversation") was an essay on conversation between organizational scientistswritten by Walter Nord and Ann Connell. It was published in Vol. 4, No. 1, February1993, pp. 108-120. The second contribution, by Zenger and Hesterly, was entitled"The Myth of a Monolithic Economics: Fundamental Assumptions and the Use ofEconomic Models in Policy and Strategy Research," and was published in Vol. 4, No.3, August 1993, pp. 496-510. It was a response to the Hirsch et al. paper:"Collaboration or Paradigm Shift? Caveat Emptor and the Risk of Romance withEconomic Models for Strategy and Policy Research (Vol. 1, No. 1, 1990, pp. 87-98).In this third offering, we present an interesting and wide-ranging interview withStewart Clegg conducted by John Jermier. The idea for this particular interviewemerged during a conversation John and I had in the Spring of 1992. The concept ofa Crossroads section of Organization Science recently had been established by ArieLewin and Dick Daft, and I was beginning to explore possible contributions to thesection. Jermier conducted the interview at the National Academy of ManagementMeetings in Las Vegas in August 1992. Several shorter conversations between Cleggand Jermier took place in ensuing months. The final transcript was reviewed andedited to produce the version that follows. In his introduction, Jermier describes thethemes and focus of the interview. We hope the interview will prove to be anintriguing read and that it will lead to some lively discussion of Clegg's ideas andopinions. Letters, commentaries and other written responses to the interview arewelcome.

PeterJ. Frost

r i t i c a l I s s u e s n rganization Sc i enceDialogue

John M. Jermier Stewart R. CleggCollege of Business, Universityof South Florida, 4202 East FowlerAvenue,

BSN 3403, Tampa, Florida 33620-5500Faculty of Business and Technology, Universityof WesternSydney,P. 0. Box 555, Campbelltown, NSW 2560, Australia(Philosophy of Social Science; Critical Theory;Power inOrganizations;New Forms of Organization)

This is a very interesting time to be a student oforganization science as the most fundamental ques-

tions are being raised about the nature of both organi-zations and science. In a recent editorial essay, Daftand Lewin (1993) reframed OrganizationScience's mis-sion by emphasizing its commitment to serve as amedium for communicating understanding of theparadigm shifts occurring in organizations. While not

1047-7039/94/0501/0001/$01.25Copyright C) 1994. The Institute of Management Sciences ORGANIZATION SCIENCE/VO1. 5, No. 1, February 1994

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JOHN M. JERMIER AND STEWARTR. CLEGG Crossroads

denigrating the role that normal science work can playin promoting this understanding, they reaffirmed Orga-nization Science's commitment to publish work that isunderwritten by alternative research philosophies, thatuses creative methods, and that is presented in- nnova-tive formats. During this lengthy conversation withStewart Clegg, we explored several philosophical andtheoretical issues relevant to developing alternativeapproaches to organization science.The interview had two general purposes: (1) to elicitnew critical perspectives on conventional organizationsand mainstream organization theory in light of the callsto rethink Marxist, feminist, and other essentialist,"emancipatory" frameworks; and (2) to reflect uponthe field of organization science as it points towardsocial processes, namely organizations and science, thatno longer exist in the meaningful sense that oncedefined, bounded and even constrained them. Ourdiscussion about critical organization theory quicklyturned to Foucaultian and neo-Foucaultian concepts ofpower and then to some of the difficulties involved inconducting research aimed at developing a critical,emancipatory science of organizations. Our discussionof changing organizational forms and changing defini-tions of scientific work highlights some of the chal-lenges and opportunities ahead as we face up to thelimitations of the knowledge-producing traditions weprobably have relied too heavily upon.I chose Stewart Clegg for this interview for severalreasons. One of the most important reasons is that histheoretical work on organizations has always addressedthe big questions. Equally important is that in much ofhis work he has surfaced certain kinds of shared as-sumptions that many organization theorists have noteven known to question. For example, in CriticalIssuesin Organizations (1977), he and David Dunkerley cutthrough the taken-for-granted assumptions in conven-tional organization theory, posing as problematic theabsence of topics such as capitalism, feminism, the roleof the state, and power and ideology. In Organization,Class and Control (1980), they provided a comprehen-sive critique of mainstream organization theory andbegan developing theoretical linkages between organi-zations and the political economic context. With thepublication of Class, Politics and the Economy (1986),Organization Theory and Class Analysis: New Ap-proaches and New Issues (1989), Capitalismin Contrast-ing Cultures (1990), and Modern Organizations (1990),the macro scope of his approach to comparative orga-nizational studies became clear. And, of course, in TheTheory of Power and Organizations (1979) and Frame-works of Power (1989), his critical reviews of the litera-

ture on power in organizations and societies providedboth a synthesis of the vast multidisciplinary work inthis area as well as new directions for developingalternative models of power. This brief sampling ofClegg's work suggests that he is a prodigious andsubstantial scholar, but also that he has used a keensense of what is fundamental in social theory and sociallife in developing his contributions to thinking aboutorganizations. For this reason, he has earned a reputa-tion as a bold and provocative intellectual figure anideal subject for an interview intended to stimulatethinking about foundational issues.In person, Stewart's erudition and passion for criti-cally examining ideas are obvious. But, so too are hishighly personable manner; his fascination with popularand countercultures (also see Boje 1993); and his self-mocking, postmodern man, national identity-crisis syn-drome (few communicate with, travel to, and reside inas many places in the world as does Stewart).In 1991, Stewart and I had a conversation while hewas in Tampa that raised another interesting pointrelevant to this interview. In reflecting on his appoint-ments in the School of Humanities at Griffith Univer-sity and as Professor of Sociology at the University ofNew England (both in Australia), Stewart said that, attimes, he felt like a "marginal man" vis 'a vis theEuropean and North American organizational andmanagement theory spheres of ideas. He made it clearthat the sense of marginality came more from thenature of his appointments than from residing in Aus-tralia.

Of course, his contributions to the development oforganization science and his continuing immersion inthe field's dialogues and debates prevent taking thelabel of "marginal man" literally. But, there is a sensein which deeper awareness of the dominant culture'sunrecognized assumptions and biases can be gainedbest by beginning analysis in the margins and thencrossing boundaries (see Harding, 1991 for a discussionof "standpoint epistemology"). There are many aspectsof Stewart's academic and personal biography that fitthe positive image of a "boundary crosser": one whoappreciates both difference and the way boundariesare more bridges and membranes than they are barri-ers (cf. Rosaldo 1989, Conquergood 1991). These fac-tors may have something to do with Stewart's successin identifying the field's "symptomatic silences" (cf.Althusser and Balibar 1968, 1977, pp. 83-90). In anycase, as I imagine will be clear from the interview textto follow, Stewart has been able to turn whatevermarginalized moments he may have experienced to hisown and to the field's advantage.'

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JOHN M. JERMIER AND STEWART R. CLEGG Crossroads

lReferencesAlthusser, L., and E. Balibar (1968), Reading Capital, Old Woking,

England: Gresham Press; (1977, 2nd Ed.)Boje, D. M. (1993), "On Being Postmodern in the Academy: An

Interview with Stewart Clegg," Journal of Management Inquiry,2, 191-200.

Conquergood, D. (1991), "Rethinking Ethnography:Towards a Criti-cal Cultural Politics," Communication Monographs,58, 179-194.Daft, R. L. and A. Y. Lewin (1993), "Where Are the Theories for

the 'New' Organizational Forms? An Editorial Essay," Organi-zation Science, 4, i-vi.

Harding, S. (1991), Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking romWomen'sLives, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Rosaldo, R. (1989), Culture and Truth: The Remaking of SocialAnalysis, Boston, MA: Beacon.

John:One thing I am hopingto do in this interview,Stewart,is get your opinionsabout the statusof the varietiesofcritical heory,particularlys these relate to contempo-raryorganizations nd the developmentof organizationscience.With all the changes n the world, many socialtheoristsseem to be distancing hemselvesfromMarx-ist frameworks.But, wheredo people turn for intellec-tual structure o work through deas that are based inradical concerns, even radical passions and values?Probably, he people who have been known for theirwork in critical organizationtheory have not aban-doned their values, their passions, their radical con-cerns,but what are the ideas, the concepts, the frame-works they are moving toward? I noticed that youbeganto studyFoucaultmore carefully n the early tomid-1980s?How did your critical thinkingdevelop asyou interpretedFoucault?Stewart:It shows first in my article "RadicalRevisions," pub-lished in Organization tudies (1989).The title was apun. It was to be read not only as "radicalrevisions"but also as "revisionsof a radical"and "revisionsby aradical.""Radical Revisions" not only swam againstthe current of Marxism,but also was a significantrevisionof my views. It was about saying, "Look, Ithink the approach o powerin my past work has beenflawed in some respects." The key purpose of thepaperwas to arguefor a point of unificationbetweentwo streamsof earlierwork.If Power, Rule andDomi-nation had focused upon relationsof meaning n orga-nizations and Organization, Class and Control and TheTheory of Power and Organization had focused uponrelationsof production n organizations,what I soughtto do in "RadicalRevisions"was to arguethat organi-zations should be seen as sites of both relations of

meaning and relations of production, as arenas ofradicalcontingency.Foucault'sworkstimulated his.John:The Foucaultian nfluencein the paper is very appar-ent. But,Foucault'sapproachs a little opaque.In fact,it seems that Foucault provideda metaphorof power,but did not articulatevery specificconcepts.His viewis, of course,usefulin manyways,but do you see it as aradicallynew wayto think about power?Has Foucaultthoroughlyreconceptualizedpower? I don't think hiswork has influencedNorth Americanorganizationhe-orists' thinkinganything lose to the level that it has inEurope and other places in the world.You see manypeople readFoucaultandcome awaysaying:"interest-ingmetaphor,but I don'tknowwhereto go fromtherein theorizingpower."In yourview, what are some ofthe key ideas thatcome from Foucault?Stewart:What I found interesting in Foucault was the non-essentialismin his analysisof power. One thinks ofhow, in his earlier work,the fixing of truth and false-hood is a resultof regimesof truth,while in the laterwork t is tied to moreconcreteinstitutionalanalysisofdifferentialregimes of penology, for instance. How-ever, I think it's not Foucaultbut one of my favoritesociologists,ZygmuntBauman,who does the best jobof working rom Foucaultiananalysis o termsthat aremore applicable or organization heorists.He does itfirst in a book called Memoriesof Class which is anhistoricalanalysisof the formationof classsociety.Hebrings out sharplythe features of regimes of disci-plinarypower premisedupon many minute forms ofroutinization f procedure,or discipline.Incidentally,think that it wasthis that firstmademe appreciate hatFoucaultcould be read as a Weberian.Foucault,I amconvinced, inds his Weberianismwhere Weber foundso much of his: in Nietszche. Although Foucault in-sisted that he was not very Weberian,I don't agree.There are many interesting commonalitiesbetweenWeberandFoucault,aswell as the evidentdifferences.In Memories of Class, Bauman contrasted verygraphically he idea of routinized disciplinarypowerwith the notion of sovereignpower by drawingon ametaphor romErnest Gellner.He talksof the feudalstate as a dentistrystate, a state that specializedininfrequentbut painfulextraction.The feudal notion ofpoweradequateto this task is coercive,intrusive,vio-lent, veryoften doing somethingto the bodyor to theperson, but doing it infrequently.The contrastis be-tween that and a powerthat doesn'tneed to intervene

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because it's so routinized, it's so structured, it's soembeddedin the institutional iber of everyday ife inorganizations, n hospitals, in bureaucracies, n thestate, and so on. That view of power is very differentfrom that which has been predominant n the litera-ture.If you look at the mainstreamdiscussionof powerinsociologyandpoliticalscience,andalso in organizationtheory, there is a series of variants on models ofsovereignpower.Power s attributed o some sovereign,subjector agency.If the theorist is a Marxist, t is thecapitalistclass.If they are elitist theorists, t is a rulingelite. If they are resourcedependencytheorists, it isthose who control resource dependencies, or, if theyare strategic contingencytheorists, it is those whocontrolstrategiccontingencies.In each case the effortis to try to trackpower down to concrete individuals.For organizationtheorists, this is somewhat bizarrebecause what they rarely look at is the structureofrelationsof domination orwhatmanytermauthority),ratherbeggingthe issue of legitimacy hat alwayshier-archicallyprefigures he scene in which power gets tobe represented.Very few writers look at this. Somegive an account of how it is historicallyconstituted.This is rare. If you look at the resourcedependencymaterials,as far as I'm aware, there is no explicitdiscussion of the hierarchicalstructuringof power.Again,as far as I'maware, here isn't such a discussionin the traditionof strategiccontingenciestheory. It istaken for granted. I take these as perhaps the twopredominanttraditions in the organizational powerliterature.In studyingpower, Foucaultis important or severalreasons. First, because he dispels some errors andmisconceptions hat arise from the labor process de-bate. He stands as a corrective o a whole generationof Marxianinspired work that fetishizes the labourprocess and capital. Baumanobserves this clearly inMemories f Class.Capitalistsdidn'tsit down andthink,"Aha, we have a problem of controllingthe laborprocess" and then come up with a set of solutionsadequateto the task. Whatthey did, as institutionalisttheorysuggests o us they would,wasmimetically daptsolutions that were already present and available intheir immediateenvironment.Foucault'saccount stresses the role of the prisonand disciplinarymechanisms as the source of thesemimeticsolutionsto too great an extent because he isfocusing on the prison and punishment.As AlfredKeiser and Theodore Assad have made clear, monas-teriesand the military as Dandekkerhas also stressed)were probably he most important ites of institutional

innovation for subsequent organizational mimesis.Again,Weber had somethingsimilarto say,of course.After Foucault, the functioning of power is notsomething hatcan be tracked imply o somesovereignsubjectthroughcontrol of resources,whether they beresource dependencies,strategiccontingencies,rulingclass control of capital or ruling elite control of keypositionsin the bureaucratic pparatus. n fact, poweris muchmoreembedded n the interstices hat normal-ize androutinizeeverydayife in organizationshroughperformanceappraisals,audits, selection mechanisms,promotionprocedures, enuremechanisms.One is nottrying o describewho has the powerso much as to askwhere is the power, what is the power? It's a verydifferentconceptionof power,one that I came to thinkof as starting rom differentpremises.John:AlthoughFoucaultordinarilywouldnot be thought ofas a structuralist,most of your summaryof Foucaultsoundsvery much in concertwith an argumentdevel-oped by Blau and Schoenherr,Americanorganizationtheorists who wrote The Structure of Organizations(1971).This argumentwas takenfurther by a politicaleconomist, Richard Edwards, in Contested Terrain(1979).They do a lot withrulesandargue thatthe newforms of power reside in the institutionalizationofbureaucratic ules.It's not a personalface, it's all doneimpersonally, in the rules. The way you interpretFoucault,it makes it sound like these are all institu-tionalizedmechanisms.AlthoughFoucaultviewspoweras dispersedinto capillary orms,perhapssome of hisemphasis is not that dissimilar from Blau andSchoenherr,or Edwards. That is, if you take disci-plinarypracticesas rule-governed, n a general sense,and argue that all rule-governedpracticeshave struc-turalqualities to them.Stewart:I'm not sure about this. There is a Weberianconnec-tion. Foucault's ocus on disciplinarymechanisms s atone level a Weberian ocus,but, interestingly, ne alsofinds a similar focus in Gramsci, a Machiavellian.Gramsci is one of few writersbefore Foucault,withWeber and Marx,who writes about the way in whichpower literally nscribes tself on the body of the per-son in organizations.Do Blauand Schoenherrdo this?Weberwrites about the widespreadadoptionof Scien-tific Management, about how it nurtures a newpsycho-physicalpparatusn the employee, n thework.It producesa new disciplineof the body. Gramsci,afew years later, makes much the same remarkswhen

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he is talkingabout"Americanism nd Fordism" n hisPrison Notebooks. Much of Marx's account in Capital,with the materialtaken fromthe "Blue Books" of thegovernment actory inspectors,is a literal account ofthe violencedone to the humanbeing andbody by theemerging actory system of earlyindustrialcapitalism.Foucault'sconception of power is also veryembodied.There are those sorts of commonalities.There are other things that Foucault does that areimportant.First, he says that the concept of ideology sdead. If you have a concept of ideology, it's a concep-tion of that which is false, one that requires hat therebe something that is true. Foucault implies that thismeans that the conceptof ideologyis always mplicitlycoupled with that of science. There is that which isscience and that which is ideology.He resistsapplica-tion of the category of ideology as it ordinarilyhasbeen understood. Again, in terms of debates aboutpower, that seems a very importantpoint to make. Itdoesn't suggest that there is some kind of sovereigntheoretical or political point or sovereign organiza-tional mechanism that will enable one to say this isideologically orrect and that is ideologically ncorrect;that this is politically rue and that is politicallyuntrue.I doubt there are grounds on which one can makethose statements with the facility with which they areso often made. The implicationsof these views forMarxianapproaches o power are that the attributionof interests to classes(or other collectiveactors)by ana priorimodel of what objective nterests are is some-thingthat is neithertheoreticallynor empirically egiti-mate. Once you pull away the cornerstoneof classeshaving essential interestsand of interests being eitherexpressedor denied, then, as I arguedin Frameworksof Power,one pulls awaythe cornerstoneof the wholeedificeof Marxismand Marxian heory crumbles.John:Now, when you move away from class structure,Stewart, does that mean that you're willingto acceptalternative tructures f stratification ndidentity suchas race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age oranother category) as equally important in organiza-tional analysis?That is, what is the basis for thinkingthroughproblemsof structureand domination n orga-nizations?Stewart:I think it's an empiricalmatter what the structuresofdominationmightbe in organizations.However,havingsaid that it is difficultnot to see the significance f classrelations,defined through relations of production.It

takes a particular nalyticalblinkerednessnot to recog-nize the significanceof the differentiallydistributedownershipand controlof those aspects of productionrelations that Marxtermed the "means," and Weberthe "methods,"of production.WhileMarxfocused onthe relations of powerWeber's focus was on relationsof knowledge.It is not a choice of one or the other:analysis should be of relations both of power andknowledge.Weber and Marxwere analystsof both organizationand class relations. Where do you find class relationsbut in organizations?That unity of focus disappearedafter them and it seemed to become easier conceptu-ally to separate class relations from organizationrela-tions. The fusion is there in Weber, it's there in Marx,with his analysisof the labor process, but it disappearsafterward.In organizationsociology, with few excep-tions, researchers tend not to concentrate on thatfusion.This is true not just of the analysisof organiza-tions,but also the analysisof class.John:How is it possible, then, to proceed with critique ifnone of the categories have any valid grounds n theirown right?Stewart:I don't think it's possible to proceed with a critiquethat assumes that it knows the answers before thequestionshave even been posed. This is whatso muchcritiquehas been. Critique s so often a claimto speakfrom some ground of privilege about the nature ofreality, the nature of phenomena. Again, I thinkFoucaultwith his insistence that we should hear thevoices in the local and specific situations, that weshould attend to the specificsituationsratherthan beseekinga sovereignpower that orchestrates hese situ-ations, was correct. I think he warns us against thatimperialist notion of critique, even in its reflectedmirror mage,where it functionsas a critiqueof impe-rialism.To the extent that the notion of critiqueallies withessentialistpositionsof one kindor another,I thinkweshould abandonthat notion of critique.I don't thinkthere is any groundfrom which one could presumetotell anotherpersonthat what they believe or think orarticulate as their world-viewsare "false" by someyardstickof theoreticalcoherence,or theoreticalposi-tion immune o empirical est. I think it is verydifficultto arguethat there is ever any transcendentethical ormoralpurposefor achievinga principledwayin whichthe social scientist, qua social scientist, should pre-scribe a stancetoward the big issues of life.


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John:Let's see if we can make this a little more concrete.Supposewe go into an organizationand we observewhat appearsto the researchers o be people in sec-ondary abormarket-type obs exposedto manyof thetraumasoften associated with the nature of that em-ployment.Supposewe observeclosely detailed(maybeeven punitive and oppressive) supervision,rigidlyen-forced rules, monitoredbreak times (bathroom andotherwise),hazardousworkingconditions, capriciouswork assignments,minimumwage pay and irregularemployment,andmanythings ike this. If the people inthat setting do not voice disapprovalwith theircircum-stances, should the organizationtheorist who is re-searching his settingfeel comfortableconcluding hatthere is no critiqueor interventionpossible or neces-sary?Stewart:I can only answer this one indirectly.The historiesofvarious institutional arenas and their discoursessug-gest that for the best of ideologicalmotivespeople arecapableof the worst of politicalaction. I thinkWeberwas correct when he said, not exactlyin these words,but literallytranslatingthem into the terms of yourquestion, that if you want the comfort of certain cri-tique, of an absolute ethical standpoint, go and joinone of the many churchesout there. There are thou-sands of them, many diverse brand-identities,andthey'll be only too glad to haveyou andthey'lltell youwhat to do and they'lltell you what to thinkand whatto critiqueandwhat not. Shoparound.That'sprobablythe most appropriateanswer I can give. My answertothatquestionis that whatmaylook like the well-inten-tionedreformismof an enlightenedsocial scientist at aspecific time may subsequentlybecome seen as thecreation of just another form of disciplinarypowermechanism.There is anothersubstantial ssue in your question,isn't there? It's the Habermasianssue of whether,inany situation,there is a genuine or a false consensus?But, that is an issue that only makes sense from thegroundof a problematic hat assumesthatsomehoworother someone is able to arbitratebetween them. Thequestion assumes that. Habermas has constructed anideal type that is empiricallya considerabledistancefrommostformsof discourse hatwe might encounter.That is the point of doing it. It makes it a very idealspeech situation.Realistically, n concrete empiricalsettings, peoplewill put up with a greatdeal as they tryto better theirlife-chances,not because they don't know any better,

or are deluded, but because they see no more agree-able alternativeunder the prevailing tructuralcondi-tions and see no realistic way of transforming hoseconditions.However,I seek to avoidjudging from thegroundof theoreticalabsoluteswhat's deologicallyandpolitically correct. I don't in any conscience see whyone would want to or wouldchoose to ally with intel-lectualpositionsthat could even admitthat as a possi-bility.What if you're horriblywrong and the voice ofreason that you thoughtyou heard turned out to bewrong? It happened to Heidegger and to a wholegeneration of German"criticaltheorists." The right-wing ones, like Schmidt,didn't all flee to the UnitedStates. Some embracedHitlerand fascism.There is anotherway, I think. The consequencesofspecific theories and policies can be displayed muchmore effectivelyby comparativeanalysis han by theo-reticalabsolutism.Thatwasthe point of our argumentsin Class, Politics and the Economy. It isn't just that weprefersocialto liberalor illiberaldemocracy-it worksbetter, empirically, n terms of macroeconomicout-comes, such as rates of unemployment.Of course,thisis where ethics come in. It is an ethical questionwhetheror notyouwantyourtheoreticalandempiricalconcerns to focus on this matter or that matter, onfighting inflation first or combating unemployment.These empiricalmatters will not necessarilychangepeople's politicalpreferences,but at least they makeclear what the corollaries,consequences and implica-tions of those preferences are. So ethics enter theformulationof the questions,their answering,and theprocess of advocacy.What I oppose is the use ofanalysis hat masks its ethical stance with the guise oftechnicallyneutral rationalityand then advances itsconclusions as if there were no alternative.Fight theTINA ["there s no alternative"]endency.In addition,what I want to do, very much, is to avoid a situationwhere I wouldclaimto speakfor the voice of anotherwithanyauthority:hat seems an ethically ndefensiblething to do. I wouldn't want others to representmyinterestswithout consultationor to tell me what myinterests are. Similarly, wouldn't want to do that toothers.In the extreme,this discussionmayseem arcane,butit has great relevance for our area. The history oforganizational heory is littered with examples. Themostobviousexample s Mayoand the developmentofthe counselling nterview.He gaveit scientificcredenceby rooting it in the work of the Swiss clinician,Dr.PierreJanet.HumanRelations was regardedby manyas a beneficial and liberaltypeof intervention nto thedespotism of work. Today we may see things differ-


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ently. Mayo developed human relations as a therapeu-tic cooling out of the worker, a way of not listening tothe accounts that the worker proffered or of systemati-cally reconstructing them and representing them interms other than those in which they were produced.Certainly, lots of fine people with good liberal idealsand motives have embraced many aspects of that pack-age, have developed them in lots of ways and havedeveloped a whole battery, an arsenal, of human rela-tions techniques and practices. The TQM movement,as something that seems dedicated to the production ofan autopoetic subject, is a contemporary case in pointof these kinds of interventions. A new kind of reflexiv-ity, a totally reflexive loop fashioned on a one-dimen-sional human subject, constantly regarding themselves,their labor processes, their products and practices,from the singular auspices of zero defects as a dis-course organizationally implanted into them On theone hand it seems rather a liberal intervention, remov-ing the need for external surveillance, but replacing itwith this new form of neurotic subjectivity. It hasrather an authoritarian impulse, I think, because of itsone-dimensionality. From the perspective I have, Iwouldn't see these as any kind of liberation. They'rejust another part of the network of power within whichwe get framed, literally and punningly. So, in a way,not to make those kinds of critiques or not to recom-mend those kinds of interventions is not so much anabdication of responsibility as an acknowledgement ofdue modesty, a responsible disinclination, an academicscrupulousness about the occupational risks of hot-gospelling Elmer Gantry's selling a Holy Grail. There,two excellent movies in one mixed metaphorJohn:So this emerging view of power and control, and per-haps even domination, seems totally dependent on theidea that unless the voices in the local settings speakclearly of injustice, or human pain and suffering, orinjury, the person who is trying to understand thissetting would stop short of critique and advocacy ontheir behalf. And this is because there is no possibilitythat people are ideologically manipulated?

Stewart:Well, not necessarily. One may be involved in someforms of comparative analysis. By contrasting a specificorganizational setting with another specific organiza-tional setting, one can show the consequences of dif-ferent arrangements. It may be that the most usefulform of critique simply is generating accounts thatdemonstrate the range of empirical differences that

may occur. I think that we have to hold back from anyposition that says that by the action of the theorist wecan somehow bring into being a repressed utopia. Ifyou could somehow get rid of the mechanisms ofdistortion, of domination, of repression, of the non-ideal speech situation, whatever categories you use,transparency and freedom would otherwise be there.One interpretation of history seems to suggest thatevery time somebody has claimed to speak in the nameof some other subjects, they've usually been framed upat best and fatally damaged at worst.John:So let me see if I understand. We make comparisons.These can be very detailed and rigorous empiricalstudies. From research such as this, we may find dif-ferences among groups in terms of, say, disadvantageand advantage. Now, where do you go with that kind ofinformation? You document, let's say, radical differ-ences in income and status inequality, substantive com-plexity and control of work, freedom from surveillance,exposure to physical hazards, or discrimination. Whocan benefit from information such as this?Stewart:Well, it depends. Everybody has different ways of do-ing these things. What I do is write books, and I writearticles, and I teach using the books and the articles. Iknow other people teach using some of the books andarticles as well. The way I use them is to set up debatesbetween students as to what they see as feasible anddesirable. I try to get them to see what some implica-tions are of what they think is feasible. It's very inter-esting to have a group of students, with several womenin the room, for instance, talking about Japanese man-agement. There is a dawning realization that if you're awoman in the Japanese model, you are not going to gettoo far: it's not necessarily the best way to go, despiteeverything that you may have heard. I think that can beliberating. It enables people to find their voices. You'renot telling people what to think. You're simply using arange of differences to try to develop debates that havepolicy implications.My interest in teaching my students is much less interms of focusing upon organizational design in theprescriptive way in which many of our colleagues wouldchoose to focus. I'm more interested, I guess, in tryingto get students to think critically, comparatively, aboutissues of organizational design and to get them to seewhat some corollaries, consequences and implicationsare of various ways of institutionally framing design.One way of doing that is by using comparative materi-als wherever possible.


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John:On the theme of comparative esearchstudies and thepossibility of advancing new forms of organizingthrough comparativework, let's talk about Europeanapproaches o organization tudies.Stewart:Well,I think the possibilityof distinctively"European"approaches eallygrew out of the realizationby severaleminent Europeanorganization heorists of the 1960sthat theyonlyever met each other at AmericanSociol-ogy Association conventions. This was both a littlecrazy and somewhat imperialistic.Why should theirintellectualinteractionsbe mediated through anothercountryand its institutions?However,I don't think asingle approachor somethingrecognizably European"ever emerged. European organization theory is anenormouslyheterogenous entity which changes everytime there is an EGOS colloquium.From one EGOScolloquium o anotherthere will be continuities.Thesecontinuitiesare given mostly by the autonomouswork-ing groups. It's heterogenous theoretically,so thereisn't a single Europeansocial theory of organizations,any more than there is a single American one. Thereare manydifferentkinds ust as there aremanydiffer-ent kinds anywhereelse in the world. Some of themare very similarto some of those that you'd find inNorth America. Some of them may have differentemphases.WhatEurope offers is a terrificopportunityfor people to relateacrossnational,cultural, inguistic,intellectual, and institutional traditions and frame-works. So its plurality, hrough ts cross-nationalbasisas a regularfora, is what provides it with its greateststrength.Forexample, he Nordiccountries, n particu-lar were influenced by the work of Emery and Tristand Trist and Thorsud and have long had a focus onorganizationsn terms of Tavistocksocial engineering,a form of progressivesocial tinkering of a reformistkind. In the Scandinavian ountries, however, there isalso a strong Stanfordconnection with the StockholmBusinessSchool, the CopenhagenSchool of Business,the Universityof Bergen, particularly rom Jim Marchand the MarchSchoolof administrativeationalityandfoolishness.These havebeenvery nfluential. n Francethere are several separate and very diverse researchgroups. Britain is characterizedby a high degree ofdiversityalso. Some of this maps easily on the U.S.scene, like the Aston studies andthe kind of work thatgoes on aroundstructural ontingency heory.Some ofit is distinctlydifferent.Perhapsmore people in theBritish context are less fixated on the notion of theorganizationand of organization heoryand are more

inclinedto see organizationsas settingsin whichtheydo social research.I think thatwouldbe true of manypeople aroundthe laborprocess debate, for instance.The labor process debate seems a peculiarlyBritishinstitution n that it's something hathastakenplaceinBritain for about ten years or so, producingmuchmaterial that has been very widely discussed in theEnglish speaking world, except for North Americawhere I don't think there has been a great degree ofdiscussionof it. I know that you, John, are an excep-tion. The labor process concerns,for obviousreasonsthat have to do with its criticaltheory ineages,are notsomething that one finds widely represented in theU.S. scene. It is interesting hat the best known NorthAmericanexponentof it is an ex-Britishanthropologistfrom the Manchester chool,MichaelBurawoy.A great degree of diversitycharacterizes he sceneand I am reluctant to generalize. From a researchpoint of view it is much easier to do comparativeresearch, especiallywithin the context of evolvingEu-ropeanCommunitynstitutions,because these institu-tions have fundingagenciesspecifically oncernedwiththe way in which different kinds of institutionalar-rangementsstructuredifferent kinds of organizationaloutcomes acrossthe nationalsettings.From this thereis a strong relevanceon policy related issues, publicpolicyand socialpolicy.There is also a problemof thehegemonic definitions of what appropriate researchinto these should be that has been achieved by theeconomicsdiscipline,but that is anotherstory.John:The point being that much organizationtheory hasbeen Angloin natureand we'reonly starting o see thelimits of the peculiarexperience,in world terms, thatproducedthis Anglo-American loc.Stewart:We don't have a worldorganization heory.Whatwehave is an organization heory that is principally,butnot wholly, rooted in the soil, the institutions,theculture,the rhetoric,the vocabulary,he discourse,ofthe United States as the dominantEnglish languagenation. There is not just one set of voices in the U.S.Obviouslythere are many, but U.S. influence is ex-treme. There isn't a single world organization heoryand I don't see how there ever could be one. Partofthe fabric that sustainsorganizationalife, what culti-vatesit, is in the literalmeaningof the word,"culture."The greatdiversityof cultureshouldhavesome impactuponthe waythatorganizations et to be seen andgetto be done. Whenone thinksabout the richnessof the

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methodological possibilities that organizations as cul-turally produced phenomena offer, the actuality of thepractice of their investigation is impoverished... notjust in comparative cultural terms. For example, wehave very little work that focuses upon the symboliclandscapes that are artifactually pervasive and presentin organizations. The hotel that we are sitting in has acacophany of sound and light in what would be apeaceful foyer in most other hotels that I've ever beenin outside Las Vegas. The most immediately materialthing about this hotel is its cultural symbolism.John:Formulate that a little more specifically if possible?Stewart:Well, I think the people who have come closest arethose involved in the Standing Conference on Organi-zation Symbolism, SCOS, in Europe. There is an excel-lent book by Pasquale Galgiardi that contains a collec-tion of papers from various SCOS colloquia. I think itdoes a great job of opening some of these aspects ofthe field. One exercise that I did with a group ofstudents recently was to get them to describe theirorganizations to me. They started off by telling meabout their organization charts. I said no, describethese organizations to me, please. What does it looklike as you walk up to the door? What's the door like?Is there a lobby, is there a foyer, what does it look like?What is the physical presence of the organization?Another thing, if you open a geography text, a bookor an article in geography, there are usually lots ofdetailed photographs and maps of the terrain, becauseit helps our understanding. When was the last time youopened an organizations book and you saw lots ofpictorial representations of organizations. Not graph-ics, but actual pictorial representations? If you aretalking about the artifactual reality of organizations,then that kind of data, that kind of evidence, is enor-mously important. The camera is an enormously pow-erful research tool but I don't see it used very much byorganization and management theorists.John:What about the paint brush?Stewart:The paint brush too, yeah, organizations in picturesand paintings. We've a wealth of data that we couldbegin to go with. Also cinema. One study that I thinkwould be fascinating, would be to look at the changingrepresentations of organizations historically in the lifeof the cinema. There are striking images that one could

obviously deal with. The two most potent ones formodern organizations are probably Chaplin's "ModernTimes" and Fritz Lang's "Metropolis," the classic Ger-man abstract expressionist movie. There are many otherkinds of organizational representation as well.I was watching one of my favorite films again theother night for about the seventh or eighth time, thegreat Sergio Leone's "Once Upon a Time in the West,"a remarkable film on many levels, including its genreintertextuality. A large part of the narrative concernsthe building of a frontier community, Sweetwater, theconstruction of its fabric. It's about the train. It'salmost Chandlerian in its narrative structure. The trainis opening up new markets, new forms of life and anew epoch centered on domesticity and consumption,represented in the character played by Claudia Cardi-nale. An old epoch is dying, a new one being born.Perfect for the "strategy/structure" argument. It isalso a great film...John:A second thing I would like to do in this interview,Stewart, is explore some more general philosophicalissues that are relevant to developing a science oforganizations and organizing. This is a very interestingtime to be a student of organization science as themost fundamental questions are being raised about thenature of both organizations and science. Somethingthat has crossed my mind often, especially lately, is thatthe field of organization science points toward socialprocesses and social practices, namely organizationsand science, neither of which exist in the meaningfulsense that once constrained, bounded and definedthem. At the margins they are in the process of radicaltransformation. Take the concept of organization, forexample. We have networks, we have information tech-nology and computers, remote work stations, and areascending to a level of spatial disarticulation previouslynever achieved. Perhaps the essence of organizationsdoesn't even exist in the way that we thought before, inconcrete material forms. How do you theorize ade-quately an organizational world that is changing likethis? Today, what is an organization?Stewart:In Scotland, in the most remote part of the Orkneys,there are people who have chosen to live in crofts whocontrol through their computer terminals the flow oftraffic in the shipping lanes in Hong Kong. I'm not surethere is any singular necessity attached to the category"organization" anymore. However, discursively, if wecontinue to talk about something called organization,


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then we're constituting it as existential, as existing. Yet,this is to say that discursively we continue to constituteit in very many changing ways. Some of the verymany changing ways in which we constitute it, in whatGiddens calls the "double hermeneutic," have an im-pact on the ways in which agents out there in the worlddo their jobs, actually go about doing organization.Organizations are historically constituted, they'rehistorically evolving, they're socially constructed andthey're socially changing all the time. In our analyticabstractions we fix various more or less pervasive rep-resentations of them, that get fixed discursively forperiods of time. They become the predominant path-ways to understanding. However, no concept of socialreality is eternal. We're not dealing with the solidunchanging material world that some of us might thinkour natural science colleagues and the other facultiesdeal with. We're dealing with a matter that is muchmore fluid. It is much more unstable and uncertain,not in the sense of being chaotic, because many organi-zations achieve the status of highly routinized phenom-ena-that is a way in which we recognize some ofthem. But it's a kind of rolling routinization. There isroutinized drift and change and transformation....A central metaphor has to be of organizations not assolid stable matter, not as things that are recurrent,eternal, essential verities, not as things that are fixedcategorically once and for all, but as entities that aresocially constructed and socially changing. And, thechanges interconnect dialectically with the kinds ofrepresentations and observations that people like usare involved in making. Organizations are the effect, inpart, of an ongoing conversation. They're a discursiveeffect of the kinds of conversations that go on insideorganizations, go on between organization theories andorganizations, go on between organization theories andconsultants, consultants and corporations, governmentsand organizations, employee bodies and organizationsand a myriad of other bodies. To have the notion thatthere is something out there that is like a piece ofmasonry that a professional licensed mason whom wecall an organization theorist can chisel and design untilit's perfect, well, it seems to me to be nothing so muchas part of a self-aggrandizing professional project. Itbears very little relationship to the way in which orga-nizational phenomena ordinarily and discursively getconstructed. It may build a bridgehead against somemore imperialist disciplinary tendencies, such as theeconomists, in the Business School world of socialscience. It is not evident that the views that I amadvancing here would be fashionable in many Business

School contexts. There the notion of theorist as analo-gous to a doctor often is proposed. But, of course, thisis a misguided analogy. One's liver, as far as one isaware, may have a problem if one regularly abuses it,but it does not give literal "voice" in the decisionprocess one has concerning what to consumer or not toconsumer until such a stage as the damage is done.The medical metaphor for organization and manage-ment theory founders on an unwarranted organicism.John:Prior to a session yesterday, I heard a colleague talkingabout this issue of the reality of organizations. Shemade reference to Karl Weick's view (or at least a viewhe might not be too far from) in suggesting that theorganization leaves when the people leave on the sub-way at night. Any comments?

Stewart:Well, it does some of both things. Certainly someaspects of some organizations leave when the peopleleave on the subway at night, but they come back towork the next day and usually they haven't radicallychanged overnight. They carry the same sorts of disci-plinary mechanisms, the same sorts of institutionalframing with them, which produce the very materialroutines that we experience as a reality of the organiza-tion. The truth of the matter lies in neither positionentirely. A very good example of that is to look atorganizations that have been constructed fromblueprints in the most adverse kinds of contexts andsituations. The establishment of monasteries for in-stance, particularlyin colonial situations, as Jon Miller'swork demonstrates, is a very good example. There wasplenty of documentation about how to go about settingup a Jesuitical institution. So it could be done even inthe most adverse and inhospitable ecological and socialclimates. A climate where you're literally under siegeby the surrounding population; nonetheless it could bedone through the usual ways in which organizationsmake systematicity. Through procedural manuals,through rules, through routines, through disciplinarymechanisms that are both tangible and real and writtendown and formal and some of which get instilled intothe very fiber, what the monks called the soul, of theirmembers. In that respect I think those organizationsare no different from organization today.Remember Etzioni's categories, the different kindsof organization power and compliance structures, andthe model of structural balance across the diagonal?Much of recent organization theory, particularlyof the


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more evangelical kind, the sort of stuff that sells well inthe marketplace, looks to be a concerted attempt tomove the calculative/remunerative relationship to onethat is more moral and remunerative. The employeegets pushed toward having a moral relationship withthe organization. One thinks of the literature by Dealand Kennedy on Corporate Cultures, of Ouchi's The-ory Z, of Peters and Waterman's In Search of Excel-lence. The whole excellence literature is a very inter-esting example of the phenomenon. Now that moralcommitment is something that can walk out of theoffice door but, according to this genre, if you're suc-cessful in creating it, it walks onto the subway in theevening and right back in the next day. Such theoryseeks to provide the conditions for its own truth.John:The other aspect of organization science that seems tobe in radical flux is the very meaning of science itself.In fact, one of the reasons Organization Science cameinto existence was to provide an outlet for work under-written by alternative social philosophies and researchparadigms. This is reflected in the journal's editorialstatement: "The term "Science" in the journal's title isinterpreted in the broadest possible sense to includediverse methods and approaches. The editors believethat creative insight often occurs outside traditionalresearch approaches... ." At this point, for many peo-ple, it does seem that structural functionalism and thevarieties of positivism are not supplying the kind ofcomfort and compelling definitions of the nature of thesocial world and social research that they once did.Stewart:Well, they're not necessarily abandoned. Many col-leagues, probably a majority, continue to work within aframework that is primarily functionalist. The assump-tions that they make about the nature of the phenom-ena and how to appropriate knowledge of those phe-nomena are only loosely constrained by what criticswould often call logical positivism. I think that it isimportant not to use those words in derogatory ways.Where a problem presents itself is in the suppositionthat in doing organizational research, or any other kindof research, one is necessarily in possession of a royalroad to truth. All other approaches, all other ways areheretical, should be excommunicated, not given tenure,kept outside the prestigious academies or whatever thedisciplinary mechanisms are. There is a sense in whichone is expected to knuckle down to orthodoxy, like itor not. But, we do live in a pluralist world, intellectu-

ally. In the academy, in organization theory, the reso-lute claims to articulate theoretical perspectives thatwould be anathema to forms of functionalist analysisare well established. The piper is at the gates of a newdawn of scientificity where what counts is only whatcan be counted has already been sidelined. The gatesare wide open. The hordes are already inside the gatesand it's too late to shut them. However much thepuritans might want to exclude those voices, the voicesare there and I don't think they're going to go away.There is a question of politics. The plurality and thespread of other ways of addressing organizations is nowvery rich. It is part of the diversity of the field. It's partof what makes it continue to be a more interestingplace in which to work than I think it was twenty oreven ten years ago. Twenty years ago I don't thinkthere were many dissenting voices; they were verymarginal. I know. I think that there are more now, tosuch an extent that it's not clear where orthodoxy isany longer. I think we should point to the highly pluralnature of the ways in which we approach organiza-tional theorizing. We should take a pragmatic orienta-tion toward it. For some kinds of issues, for some kindsof questions, some kinds of methods and some kinds oftechniques are probably going to do the job best.Partially, this is because of the nature of the questionsthey ask. Other traditions will use other techniques andask other questions. Some insights come from all ofthese, I think.John:I don't imagine that your conclusion from this wouldbe that because we have and want pluralism, we can beassured that all approaches are equally productive orthat all researchers working within all approaches aregoing to be equally productive in their contributions. Itseems we still must attempt to establish good standardsin each research tradition within each of the paradigms.These standards should allow us to differentiate thebetter and exemplary work from that which is not asgood. Without this, there would be no coherent re-search enterprises or even programs and it seems ourresearch would be plagued by tremendous inefficien-cies.Stewart:Yes, I think that is absolutely right. A problem is if thecanon of legitimacy of one tradition becomes the gate-way or conduit through which all must pass. Thatmeans then that if the journal, Organization Science, istrue to its masthead, there is a sense in which it must


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be dealing with the postmodernist conception of whatconstitutes science. That is a conception of science thatis not just rooted in any one set of empirical proce-dures, any one set of techniques for collecting andmanipulating data, any one set of theoretical categoriesfor conceptualizing and organizing that data, any oneset of theories for generating issues in terms of debate.There is no reason why the term science should notbe as appropriate to these changed conditions as itappeared to be to conditions of more ideological con-sistency that might have prevailed once upon a time.Just as the nature of social reality is something that isconstructed, that shifts and changes by the things peo-ple do, so science changes. Science is what scientistsdo. It's not what Popper or some other philosopher ofscience tells them they should do. One thing thatcomes through very clearly from those empirical stud-ies of science that sociologists have made, people likeLaw and Callon and Latour, is this: they establishedthat what scientists do and what scientists say they doand what philosophers of science say they should doare very different phenomena. I have colleagues at theUniversity of Bath, for instance, which has been partic-ularly strong in the empirical sociology of science, whohave succeeded in revising the conditions under whichthe science curriculum is taught in the Science Facul-ties in the University. There has been reformationthrough the insights of the empirical sociology of sci-ence. If sociologists are able to do that kind of reformin the Science Faculties, I don't see why we can'tachieve the same kinds of reform in the Organizationand Management Theory curriculum.We have a bizarre situation. We have defenders of a"scientific" faith, or at least an "orthodoxy"who use aPopperian creed that is clearly nonscientific, moralisticand prescriptive. They presume to uphold a standardthat claims to be value-free and scientific, yet the termsthat raise this standard conform to none of the thingsthat the standard claims to license. Organization the-ory suffers and sustains forms of foolishness in thephilosophy of science with a vengeance that is scarcelycredible in the context of the claims that advance it.The empirical reality of a natural science's practice andthe practice of natural scientists is not one informed bysuch moral philosophy. It admits of very much morecontingent, local and situational considerations, muchless than the paradigm totalization that we might think.In some areas of social science, such as organizationtheory, there are theorists who work with the intellec-tual equivalent of the Inquisition on the grounds ofprocedures that are hardly more scientific than those

that once determined hereticism. Amazingly, they claimscientificity in consequenceJohn:Is there a commonality between Popperian falsifica-tionism and the pluralists or the postmodernists or thedeconstructionists? Certainly, there are radical differ-ences among these philosophies, but a parallel seemsto be that for none of them is the project of buildingand developing theories and other systematic thoughtstructures ever finished.Stewart:That is a good insight and one that I had not thoughtof before. There are obviously differences. Popper'sview is, as Lakatos clarified it subsequently, that thehard core slowly accumulates. I guess what the post-modernists would suggest is that there is probably notjust a single hard core that is accumulating, but aplurality of diverse hard cores, each of which is seekingto configure intellectual, theoretical and empiricalspaces in its own image. Organized science is a battle-ground. We've known this much at least since Watsonand Crick's account of the double helix. If that is trueof molecular cell biology, it's equally true in organiza-tion theory and any other field of social science and itsapplication.In our social science, we are doing what people do inorganizations every day. That is we try to use whatevercapacities and resources we can recruit to ourselves;we try to configure the terrain in which we operate insuch a way as to enable these capacities and resourcesto be mobilized. We seek to enroll and recruit othersto the designs that we make. The problem is, of course,that they're all doing the same thing, and that is whatmakes social life so complex, so messy, so nasty attimes, and so interesting. Social science is no differentfrom everyday life, only it produces involvement in itsgames that is more collective and public than in manyother spheres of activity.John:To me, the deconstructionism movement and approachto science has a lot in common with the reflexivesociologies of the 1930s, such as the work ofHorkheimer and Adorno and other members of theFrankfurt School. Particularly in that both deconstruc-tionists and the early critical theorists focus on whatone is silent about when one writes, what is taken-for-granted and unstated.


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Stewart:The procedures of deconstructionism I take to be theuncovering of the auspices, the grounds, of any possi-ble discourse, not only the presences but also theabsences. This is to show the foolishness of any claimsto foundationalism. One deconstructs the discourse orthe text by opening up a plurality of interpretationsrather than closing it through a singularity. It is amatter of demonstrating how what is said and not said,

what is hidden and what is revealed, gives substanceand life to what is present.2Endnotes1 Another part of this interview, which is focused on aspects ofStewart Clegg's academic and personal biography, will appear as achapter in a book by Peter Frost and Susan Taylor entitled Rhythmsof Academic Lives (Sage 1995, in preparation).2The authors would like to thank Sharon Keefer for transcribing theinterview and for other help in preparing the manuscript.


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Lectura 39

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