PART IV ADMISSION TO PRACTICE20 CASE DIGESTS

IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO (former Bar confidant)

FACTS:

Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.1. Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking.2. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing.3. Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).4. Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.

RULING:The court disbarred Lanuevo has no authority to request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court.

He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He does not a have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees.Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his license.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents.

FACTS: BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.

Respondent court required the BOI and petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue

Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

Motion to dismiss was denied.

Filed certiorari.

PETITIONER: argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court

PRIVATE RESPONDENT: maintains that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

RULING:

It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals

Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P. 129 of unclogging the docket of this Court to enable it to attend to more important tasks

Less concerned with the decisions of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights.

The question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

Dismissed.

IN RE CUNANAN94 PHIL. 534FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.Section 1 provided the following passing marks:1946-195170%1952 .71%1953..72%1954..73%1955..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.

ISSUE:Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized.

They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

Kuroda vs. JalandoniG.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:

That the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes) That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a party in interest in the case.

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional.

Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and otherinternational jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war.The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER, petitioners,vs.JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of Manila, respondents.

FACTS:

Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, filed with said court a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. N-1963 and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent Judge Amador T. Vallejos, against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal capacity and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging two (2) causes of action

The first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the defendants, and the second, for the payment of his services as legal counsel for the corporation

Under the second cause of action, plaintiff after reproducing the pertinent averments in the first cause of action, among which is the averment that he is a judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, further alleged that on October 13, 1968, both defendants entered into a contract of personal and professional services with him under the terms of which he was to head defendant corporation's legal department with the condition that he should render such services only after his office hours, "even into the dead wee hours of the night and wherever such services would not run in conflict with his duties as Judge"; that in consideration of such services, the defendants undertook to pay him a yearly salary of P35,000.00 from the date of the contract, but where a case shall have been settled in and out of court, and defendants shall have won or saved money because of such settlement, he shall be paid by way of commission ten percent (10%) of the amount involved in the litigation and/or settlement; that, pursuant to said contract, he has rendered legal services as head of the legal department of defendant Omico

Filed a motion to dismiss1. Improper venue2. Lack of cause of action. It was agreed that the plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation, the same is illegal, void and unenforceable, plaintiff being a judge of the Court of First Instance who is prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court from engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar

While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the court because defendants had not yet presented to the court the required proof of service, filed a petition to declare the defendants in default and to allow him to present his evidence ex parte

While defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending before the court because the defendants had not filed yet their reply to the opposition as they had not received a copy thereof, plaintiff Catolico filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment, alleging, among other things, that said judgment had already become final and executory because the defendants failed to have the order of default lifted

Denied

The court appointed the City Sheriff of Manila, herein respondent Leonardo Alcid, to execute said writ of execution.

Acting Executive Sheriff Dominador Q. Cacpal served a notice of garnishment to the defendants, together with a writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge.

Because of the impending execution of the judgment by default which they believe to be illegal, defendants, on July 25, 1974, filed with this Court the instant petition praying, among other things, that respondent Judge be restrained from commanding the City Sheriff of Manila, or his duly authorized representative, to execute the decision

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss said petition on the ground that the remedy of certiorari and prohibition is no longer available to the herein petitioners, inasmuch as they had already perfected their appeal.

ISSUE: whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default, in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment thereon.

RULING:

To Our mind, what is decisive here is that plaintiff had sufficient notice of the time and place of the hearing of the motion to dismiss.

We notice the ambivalence with which the respondent Judge applied the rules. Thus, while he was unduly strict regarding the requirements of notice of hearing to the defendants, he was, at the same time, unduly liberal with respect to the plaintiff. For instance, plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration did not contain any notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, or even the address of the plaintiff who signed personally said motion. Notwithstanding the absence of these data, respondent Judge readily granted the motion. Then there is plaintiff's motion for immediate execution of judgment pending appeal.

There is, moreover, the consideration that the challenged judgment seeks to enforce a contract which is patently void because it is contrary to law and public policy. The contract of professional services entered into between private respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted private practice of law and in contravention of the express provision of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited Rule was promulgated by this Court, pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of the Court of First Instance.

This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest.

Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to the Bench of the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position.

It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a contract, whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is considered inexistent and void from the beginning.

RE: REMEDY

The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule is properly, though not exclusively, available to a defendant who has been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity.

It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in default is differently situated from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former irreparably loses his right to participate in the trial, while the latter retains such a right and may exercise the same after having the order of default and the subsequent judgment by default annulled and the case remanded to the court of origin.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the default order, judgment and writ of execution rendered by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963 are hereby set aside, and the respondent Judge is ordered to hear and decide the motion to dismiss the complaint, taking into account Our foregoing opinion. The temporary restraining order is made permanent, with costs against private respondent.

People v. Simplicio VillanuevaG.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965PAREDES, J.:

FACTS:Simplicio Villanueva was charged with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused invoking Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients."

ISSUE: WON City Attorney Fule was engaging in private law practice.

HELD:NO. The Court believes that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONCEPCION DIA-AONUEVO v. MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO, ALBAYA.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975MUOZ PALMA, J.

FACTS:

Respondent, incumbent Municipal Judge of Tabaco, Albay, faces this administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge on two counts: (1) engaging in the practice of law, and (2) failure to return promptly to complainant, Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo, the money deposited with him.

Complainant, Dia-Aonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest of a certain parcel of riceland. This property was the object of a deed of sale executed by the other co-owners owning only one-third undivided portion of the property and acknowledged before the respondent, Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, as ex-officio notary public. Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay the vendee. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00 for which he issued a receipt. Respondent sent a letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer. A complaint was filed for the annulment of sale of real property and redemption with damages. This complaint was prepared by "Eligio R. Berango & B.B. Bercacio & Ass." as counsel for the plaintiffs, with Eligio R. Berango signing the complaint.

During the pendency of the civil case, complainant, in need of money, asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw P1,500.00 from the P3,500.00 she had deposited with him but no action was taken by respondent. The verbal request was followed by several letters advising Judge Bercacio that complainant was withdrawing the amount of P3,500.00. Eliciting no response, filed the present complaint.

ISSUE: WON respondent engaged in the practice of law.

HELD:

Respondents actuations fall within the definition of practice of law. The active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Aonuevo manifested as follows: (a) He gave Mrs. Aonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and her co-owners with regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong; (b) He accepted from Mrs. Aonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses; (c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs. Aonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the land in question; (d) When his attempts at an out-of court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4591, for which he was issued a receipt for docket and legal research fees; (e) He was present together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc.

Hence, respondent violated the Circular issued by the Secretary of Justice in relation to Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides that no Municipal Judge shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Respondent Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio guilty as charged, and hereby suspend him from office for a period of six (6) months effective immediately upon finality of this decision, with the warning that commission of other acts unbecoming of a Judge will warrant a more severe penalty from the Court.

ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN v. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO., INC., NEGROS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and NICOLAS CONCEPCIONG.R. No. 46396 September 30, 1939LAUREL, J.

FACTS:Respondents, operating automobile lines, engaged the professional services of the petitioner, who was then a law practitioner in the City of Manila. The employment was for the purpose of obtaining the suppression, reduction and refund of certain toll rates on various bridges along the line operated by the respondent transportation companies. Petitioner took steps to obtain first the suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and also the refund of P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province of Occidental Negros. After various conferences, the provincial board, with the conformity of respondents president, adopted a resolution reducing the tolls. The provincial board also refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected from the Visayan Rapid Transit Company, Inc., and the Negros Transportation Company, Inc., said amount to be applied to future payments for tolls by said companies. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents have been benefited with an economy of P78,448 for every eighteen months.

ISSUE:WON acts performed by petitioner constitutes practice of law.

HELD:

Yes. We have noted in the beginning that the services here were rendered in a case of an administrative nature. But that does not alter the application of the proper rule professional services, to prepare and advocate just claims for compensation, are as legitimate as services rendered in court in arguing a cause to convince a court or jury that the claim presented or the defense set up against a claim presented by the other party ought to be allowed or rejected. Parties in such cases require advocates; and the legal profession must have a right to accept such employment and to receive compensation for their services; nor can courts of justice adjudge such contracts illegal, if they are free from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness. Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative and did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results to his clients. It is clear that for these services the petitioner is entitled to compensation, and the only question is the reasonable amount to which he is entitled.

Facts and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation of the petitioner is P7,000, deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280 which the petitioner had already received.

RENATO CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSODG.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991PARAS, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

It was established that after graduating from College of Law (UP) and having hurdled the bar (1960), respondent has worked in the following:1. Law office of his father;2. World Bank group as Operations Officer for about 2 years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank (1963-1970);3. Meralco group as Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank (Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970);4. Services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer (since 1986);5. NAMFREL As Secretary-General (1986) and later National Chairman (1987);6. He also claimed to have worked with the underprivileged sectors, and was also a member of the Davide Commission as well as the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE:WON respondent possess the requirement of 10 years practice of law.

HELD:

Yes. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment.

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:1. First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems2. Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty.3. Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations.

The organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:1. Preventive Lawyering.2. Managerial Jurisprudence.3. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

Petition dismissed.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978CASTRO, C.J.

FACTS:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. The said Resolution was pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

The authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:WON mandatory membership in the IBP is violative of a lawyers constitutional right.

HELD:

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power."

The provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court

ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner,vs.HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondent.

FACTS:

Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of the Philippine Bar.

A petition in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false, to wit:The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of Misc. Case No. 2968 of this Court show that you prepared and/or caused to be prepared a verified petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of Vicente Calongo, alleging therein as grounds therefor, "That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate was lost by the herein petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in spite of the diligent search of the aforesaid title, the same could not be found and is therefore now presumed to be lost

Petitioner denying the material averments of respondent Judge's letter and explaining the circumstances under which he prepared the aforementioned petition.

Respondent Judge had his letter filed and docketed as Adm. Case

Respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against petitioner.

Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.

RULING: We find petitioner's contentions without merit.

The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by acts of misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.

It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers.

Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to promote the purity of the administration of justice.

Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not applicable to the investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation themselves, subject to another and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the lawyer

JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners,vs.HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.

FACTS:

Jose Alcala (now deceased) and his wife, Avelina Imperial, filed this present petition for disbarment against respondent Honesto de Vera, a practicing attorney of Locsin, Albay, who was retained by them as their counsel in civil case

Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross negligence and malpractice: 1) for having maliciously and deliberately omitted to notify them of the decision in civil case 2478 resulting in the deprivation of their right to appeal from the adverse judgment rendered against them; and 2) for respondent's indifference, disloyalty and lack of interest in petitioners' cause resulting to their damage and prejudice.

RESPONDENT: asserted that he notified his clients of the decision in question and that he defended complainants' case to the best of his ability as demanded by the circumstances and that he never showed indifference, lack of interest or disloyalty to their cause

The trial court rendered judgment rescinding the contract of sale, on the ground that the vendee Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of lot 1880 it being in the possession of a certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers who have been occupying the land for a number of years.

Respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed to inform his clients of the judgment against them. A sheriff came to complainants' house to serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Totally caught by surprise, Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of case

Spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against Atty. Honesto de Vera for having failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of which they lost their right to appeal from said decision.

Not content with having filed case 2723, complainants instituted this complaint for disbarment against their former counsel.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent notified his clients, the complainants herein, about the decision in case 2478

RULING:

We agree with the Solicitor General that there is sufficient evidence on hand to prove that respondent neglected to acquaint his clients of the decision in case 2478.

The evidence shows that when he was told about the sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala immediately inquired from the trial Court the reason for the writ of execution and it was only then that he was informed that a decision had been rendered, that his lawyer received a copy thereof since April 19, 1963, and because no appeal was taken the judgment became final and executory

The second issue that has to be passed upon by the Court is neither the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. On this issue, the Court finds that the plaintiffs cannot recover damages from defendant Atty. Honesto de Vera. No evidence has been presented that they sustained damages of the decision. Neither it has been shown that the decision is not supported by the facts and the law applicable to the case. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled to damages because of the failure of Atty. Honesto de Vera to inform them of the decision.

An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Fallible like any other human being, he is answerable to every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. Moreover, a party seeking damages resulting from a judgment adverse to him which became final by reason of the alleged fault or negligence of his lawyer must prove his loss due to the injustice of the decision. He cannot base his action on the unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposition of the injustice of the decision

True it is that petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or pecuniary damage by the failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. It is no less true, however, that in failing to inform his clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment"

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client's being adequately and fully informed and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired (Oparel, Sr. vs. Aberia Adm. Case No. 595, July 30, 1971). As it happened in this case, because of respondent's failure to notify petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, the latter were entirely caught by surprise, resulting in shock and mental and emotional disturbance to them, when the sheriff suddenly showed up in their home with a writ of execution of a judgment that they never knew had been rendered in the case, since their lawyer, the respondent, had totally failed to inform them about the same.

We concur with the above-quoted observations and add that the correctness of the decision in case 2478 is no ground for exonerating respondent of the charge but at most will serve only to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of malice, deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in his failure to give timely notice of the decision in question.

Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did not result in any material or pecuniary damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We are not disposed to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's career as the extreme penalty of disbarment.

Although respondent's negligence does not warrant disbarment or suspension under the circumstances of the case, nonetheless it cannot escape a rebuke from Us as we hereby rebuke and censure him, considering that his failure to notify his clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.

SEVERELY CENSURE.

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,vs.HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. "

RULING:

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense.

The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case.

On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

ORDER THAT DISALLOWED THE APPEARANCES IS SET ASIDE.

HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.LABOR ARBITER ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN, private respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant and received basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well.

Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.

A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor.

In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner, dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that petitioner has the power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four standards in determining whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship.

Ramos vs. Rada [A.M No. 202 July 22, 1975]

Facts:Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte

He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:

Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government

Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on December 15, 1972 as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation.

His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the administrative complaint against Rada which was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973.

Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested permission to accept appointment.

It was not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties as administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.

Issue:Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII

Held:Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission) of Sec 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII and meted a penalty of reprimand.

The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment his income, and to award premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and without forseeable detriment to the Government service.

His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure a written permission from proper government authority.

REPRIMANDED

ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., vs ELMO S. ABAD

Abad Santos, J.:

Facts:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. On July 23, 1979, Prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, he paid his Bar Admission Fee, Certification Fee and also his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondent was included as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar.

While waiting for his turn to take his Oath as a member of the Bar, he was made to sign his Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza (Clerk of Court SC), told him that Chief Justice, the Hon. Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to him about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to his Answer to Uy's Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told him that he had to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of his Lawyer's Oath was further suspended.

Believing that with his signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and his Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Supreme Court did not order for the striking of his name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, he paid his membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Respondent was included as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar.

He was again assessed by the IBP for his 1981-1982 membership due and other assessment for which he also paid. Abad also had a Certificate of Membership in the IBP as well as a Certificate of Membership of Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the IBP.

Issue:WON practiced law without being previously admitted to the bar

Held:Yes. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court.

Penalty: Fine= 500 payable within 10 days; In case of failure to pay= 25 days imprisonment.

CARMEN E. BACARRO vs RUBEN M. PINATACANGuerrero, J.:FACTS:This is an administrative complaint charging Ruben M. Pinatacan, with moral turpitude and depravity, and lack of proper character required of a member of the Bar.

Complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent fell in love and became engaged while they were studying at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City; that when she became pregnant as a result of their relationship, respondent abandoned her and never fulfilled his promise to marry her

Pinatacan denied that: 1.) he was the father of the child, 2.) he promised to marry her; and that 3.) he cohabited with her. He claimed that his relationship with complainant cooled down when he applied for a direct commission with the Philippine Constabulary on January 1971. He returned to Manila and stayed there for the greater part of March, 1971, for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but in June of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never again returned to Cagayan de Oro City.

The case was referred to the Judicial Investigator but upon Bacarro's request, she was allowed to present evidence. The respondent failed to attend the hearings by the City Fiscal.

In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following facts: After about a year of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on March 17, 1967 while they were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first sexual intercourse on March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City where they stayed for about a week. They returned to Cagayan de Oro and respondent left complainant allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and make the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage. Respondent came back in May, 1971, but only to inform complainant that they could not get married because of his parents' objections. When complainant told respondent that she was pregnant, he told her to have an abortion. Complainant refused and they had a quarrel Thereafter, she did not see or hear from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December 4, 1971. Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time that she had a relationship with respondent. In July, 1973, she brought the child with her to see respondent in Cavite City and the latter promised to support the child. However, respondent did not make good his promise of support so complainant went to see him again, and once more respondent made several promises, all of which were never fulfilled, until he finished his law course and married a singer by the name of Annie Sarabillo.

The SC required respondent, "as proof of his sincerity and good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil registrar's office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie." Respondent complied.Respondent argued that based on the evidence adduced by complainant and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out to bar him from taking the lawyer's oath. The Court's Investigator, Atty. Victor Sevilla, agreed with respondent.

ISSUE:WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath

HELD:

Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. Considering that respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, the SC held that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. But he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her and brought her to another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion When complainant refused, he deserted her. Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child born out of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent merely made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On top of all these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by complaint.

These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's character and are indicative of his moral delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment and retribution enough

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO vs SEVERINO G. MARTINEZBengzon, C.J.:

FACTS:Martinez charged Diao with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education, namely: a.) High School Training; and b.) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

Diao admitted the first charge but he claimed that although he left high school in his 3rd year, he entered the US Army service and passed the General Classification Test which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma. As to the 2nd charge, he claimed that he obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Issue:WON Diao is qualified to be a member of the barHELD:No. This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education.

The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

Penalty: Strike name from the roll of attorneys, and return of his lawyer's diploma.

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATHPadilla, J.:

FACTS:Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. He was one of the eight accused in the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites. The 8 pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On June 18, 1993, Argosino was granted probation. On April 11, 1994, discharged from probation. On April 14, 1994, filed a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. On July 13, 1995, SC issued a resolution requiring Argosino to submit evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character. In compliace therewith, Argosino submitted 15 certifications/letters executed by 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, 6 members of religious orders. Argosino also submitted that a scholarship foundation was established for RAUL CAMALIGAN, the hazing victim. On September 26, 1995, SC required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer. Atty. Camaligan stated that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

ISSUE:WON Argosino may be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

HELD:YES. In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath.

Fernando Collantes vs Vicente RenomeronPER CURIAM:

Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latters irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the registration of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondents Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (now the Land Registration Authority). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial.

Issues: WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his malfeasance as a public official

Held:

Yes, a lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule 1.03).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.

Penalty: DISBARRED

PART V LAWYERS DUTIES TO SOCIETY10 CASE DIGESTS

G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR,petitioners,vs.FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar,respondent.ESGUERRA,J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of is a respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court. As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo and a case for damages arising from the same incident. Montecillo was acquitted and the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo P500 as moral damages, P200 as compensatory damages and P300 as attorney's fees, plus costs.Francisco Gica appealed to the CFI of Cebu, presided by Hon. Santiago O. Taada, which upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the CA. CA reversed the decision of the CFI of Cebu and ruled in favor of petitioner Gica It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of CAs decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the RPC on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that CA allowed itself to be deceived. CA denied the MR and it observed that the motion insinuated that it rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second MR, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."CA noticed that notwithstanding its admonition Atty. Del Mar reiterated his threats, and that CA, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days why he should not be punished for contempt of court.On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that CA could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing CA of the course of action he would follow. CA fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139. SC upheld the resolution and that the Judicial Consultant of SC was directed to circularize all courts about the order of CA suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages, trying to hold them liable for their decision. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review oncertiorariof the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time r