Mercedes Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez vs Judge Gregorio Lantin 24 SCRA 219 Legal Ethics Counsels Assertiveness A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so he issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock approximately worth P17k. Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction are contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that If there was delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened to be more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned. ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused. HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. In Re: Vicente Almacen 31 SCRA 562 Legal Ethics A Lawyers Right to Criticize the Courts Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution. This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic. ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion. On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for

reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely. Teodoro Chavez vs Atty. Escolastico Viola 196 SCRA 10 Legal Ethics A lawyer shall do no falsehood In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing a petition against Teodoro Chavez where he sought to have the Alvendias be declared as bona fide lessees in a land controversy. Said petition was dismissed because of nonappearance by the Alvendias. In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an original registration of title over the same land in controversy in 1966. In said application, Atty. Viola insisted that his clients were the true owners of said land because they acquired it by sale from Teresita Vistan way back in 1929. Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola. Chavez said that because of the conflicting claims that Viola prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the Bar. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Viola is in violation of the Lawyers Oath. HELD: Yes. Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which one. Worse, he offered no explanation as regards the discrepancy. A lawyer owes honesty and candor to the courts. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Atty. Viola was suspended for 5 months. Santa Pangan vs Atty. Dionisio Ramos

93 SCRA 87 Legal Ethics Lack of Candor by a Lawyer Proper name to be used by a lawyer

In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos. ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct. HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.

PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. ANGELO KING, KEN SUY WAT JOSE FERRER, JR., QUINTIN CALDERON, FE SARINO and DOMINGO K. LI, respondents. Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner. Simeon C. Sato for respondent Domingo K Li. Syquia Law Offices for respondents King, Ken Suy Wat, Calderon and Ferrer, Jr. GANCAYCO, J.: The rule on service of summons in this jurisdiction is too well-known. In civil cases, the service of summons on a defendant is made by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. 1 Such service of summons may be made at the defendant's dwelling house or residence or at his office or regular place of business. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself. However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 2 It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service maybe resorted to. The impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute." Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. 3 The application of the foregoing rules is the issue in this petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV No. 03386 entitled "Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank vs. Mercantile Financing Corporation, et al." dated January 27, 1987, and its resolution dated April 22, 1987. 4 The facts are undisputed. Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and private respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code 5 which provides as follows: Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.-Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons. Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents at the 4th Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, Makati, Metro Manila, which is the stated office address of MFC in the complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot Jr. who acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private respondents. This is so recited in the certification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San Juan dated May 11, 1983. On May 24, 1983, the law firm of Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed a motion for extension of time to file a responsible pleading and/or motion to dismiss. The said motion was signed by Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones as counsel for the defendants. The motion was granted in an order dated May 26, 1983 giving the defendants an extension of twenty (20) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the responsive pleading and/or motion to dismiss. On June 13, 1983, said counsel for defendants filed a motion asking for a suspension of the action for a period of sixty (60) days on the ground that there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement of the case between the parties. The motion was denied. On June 27, 1983, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in default for failure to file an answer. This motion was granted in an order dated June 29, 1983. On July 14, 1983, the parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a compromise Agreement for the approval of the court. It reads as follows: 1. The defendants propose to pay, jointly and severally, then account with the plaintiff as of June 15, 1983, in the sum of P707,500.01 with 20% interest per annum as follows: P100,000.00-on or before July 18, 1983 100,000.00-on or before August 30, 1983 100,000.00-on or before September 30, 1983 100,000.00-on or before October 30, 1983 100,000.00-on or before November 30, 1983 100,000.00--on or before December 30, 1983 100,000.00-on or before January 30, 1984. 2. Except those mentioned above, the plaintiff has no more claim against the defendants. 3. The plaintiff agrees to the proposal of settlement offered by the defendants provided that in case the latter fail to pay, jointly and severally, two or more successive monthly installments, the plaintiff is entitled to secure from the Court a writ of execution for the collection of the unpaid account of the defendants. 6

On July 18, 1983, a decision was rendered by the trial court approving the said Compromise Agreement and enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and conditions embodied therein. Partial payments were made under the compromise judgment. Upon failure of private respondent to make the other payments, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. The trial court granted the motion on December 16, 1983. On January 16,1984, counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification" thereby seeking a correction of the compromise judgment on the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. On January 17, 1984, said counsel filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement" attaching thereto a copy of the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC of July 6,1983 showing that he was the attorney-in-fact of MFC only, and praying for the correction of the judgment, accordingly. The motion for clarification was denied on January 20,1984. On January 24, 1984, the Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motion to set aside the decision dated July 18,1983, the Compromise Agreement and the writ of execution dated December 21, 1983 on the ground that there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address of the corporation was not their address as they were no longer connected therewith; that Atty. Aragones had no authority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement; that they were not served copies of the decision of the court; that they learned about the same only when it was being executed; and that they did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the subject transaction. On January 26,1984, private respondent Domingo F. Li filed a petition for relief from judgment with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction alleging therein that there was no service of summons upon him and that Atty. Aragones was not authorized to represent him or to enter into the Compromise Agreement. After an opposition to said motion was filed by the petitioner, the lower court denied the same in its order dated April 6, 1984. Separate motions for reconsideration filed by the private respondents were also denied on May 4,1984. Thus, private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, reiterating that there was no service of summons upon each of them as service of summons was made at the address of the firm with which they had severed connections; that the counsel of record of MFC has no authority to represent them in the case and in the Compromise Agreement; that they have not ratified the same by a partial payment of the compromise judgment; and that they were no longer connected with MFC at the time they were sued. In due time, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on January 27, 1987, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: In view of the foregoing, the other errors assigned by the appellants need not be resolved: Wherefore: (1) the decision dated July 18, 1983 approving the compromise agreement rendered by the lower court as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto as against appellants Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon, Jose Ferrer, Jr., and Domingo Li are hereby SET ASIDE; and (2) the case is remanded to the court of origin which is hereby ordered to direct proper service of summons on the aforesaid individual appellants at their respective correct addresses and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law. SO ORDERED. 7 A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by petitioner was denied by the appellate court on April 22, 1987. Hence, the instant petition predicated on the following grounds: (A) THAT THE CASE AT BAR (a) PERTAINS TO (AN) APPEAL FROM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT DATED APRIL 6,1984, DENYING (i) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT' FILED JANUARY 25, 1984, AND (ii) MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KING SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON and JOSE FERRER, JR. and (b) DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY APPEAL FROM TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED JULY 19,1983 APPROVING THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. (B) THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELY IGNORED THE BASIC QUESTION OF WHETHER (a) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K. LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 25,1984, and (b)'THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION' FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KENG SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON AND JOSE FERRER, JR., WERE FILED OUT OF TIME. (C) THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE SUED AS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF MFC WERE PROPERLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS. The petition is devoid of merit. Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of summons must be observed in that summons must be served personally on private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering it to them. The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal service of summons was effected. The office address of the corporation as indicated in the complaint does not appear to be the office address of private respondents as they were no longer connected with the corporation then. Personal service of summons should have been made on them at their residences as shown in the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriff effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant Manager of MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as above stated private respondents were no

longer connected. Such substituted service is not valid. There was no compliance with the requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal service and a failure to effect the same before substituted service could be resorted to. As the private respondents have not been duly served with summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons. It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC and private respondents, sought an extension of time to file an answer or a responsive pleading, and a suspension of the proceedings pending a possible settlement of the case; that thereafter, he signed a Compromise Agreement in behalf of MFC and private respondents which was submitted to the court on the basis of which a compromise judgment was rendered; that said judgment was partially complied with but upon default in the payment of the balance, a writ of execution was sought from and granted by the trial court; and that it was only then that Atty. Aragones informed the court that he committed an oversight in having filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of private respondents when it was only MFC which hired his services. If Atty. Aragones was duly authorized to appear in behalf of the defendants, his voluntary appearance in their behalf by the filing of the aforementioned pleadings and the Compromise Agreement would constitute a waiver of the defect in the service of summons. However, the lack of authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when he produced the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC to the effect that the authority of said counsel was in behalf of said corporation only and not in behalf of the private respondents. Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of the private respon dents without their authority, the same is null and void in so far as they are concerned. By the same token, the compromise judgment is also null and void as to private respondents. The ruling of the lower court that the motion to set aside the judgment and the petition for relief from judgment were filed beyond the reglementary period is untenable. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 8 One last word, Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the performance of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case. He represented himself to be the counsel for the defendants including the private respondents not only in the motions he filed but also in the Compromise Agreement he submitted. It was only after the writ of execution of the compromise judgment was being enforced that he perked up by saying that he committed an oversight and that he was not authorized by the private respondents to represent them as counsel, much less in the Compromise Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. To say one thing today and another tomorrow is a transgression of this imperative. Counsel should be made to account before his peers. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an appropriate administrative investigation, report and recommendation on Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones who holds office at the 9th Floor of the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 210 FACTS: Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception practiced in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the introduction of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer of Title subscribed and sworn in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Carranza claimed that he took no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the said falsehood, whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for lack of prudence and meticulous take on the matter, and as it had caused unnecessary delays in the administration of justice. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood committed in court. HELD: YES. Respondent was reprimanded. RATIO: There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursued by the respondent in introducing the document that turned out to be false. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reminded that the lawyers oath is one impressed with utmost seriousness and should not be taken lightly. In its decision to issue reprimand, the respondent is warned that a more severe penalty will be imposed if the offense of the same character is repeated again. MANUEL Y. MACIAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. UY KIM, ANDRES CO, NEMESIO G. CO, NICASIO G. CO, MANUEL SOSANTONG and RELIABLE REALTY CORPORATION, defendants-appellees. Petitioner in his own behalf. J. Natividad & Associates for respondent. MAKASIAR, J.:p Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for review by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance, alleging that he filed on May 5, 1969 a complaint dated April 30, 1969 for the annulment of a deed of sale, reivindicacion and damages against respondents docketed as Civil Case No. 76412 and assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided over by Honorable Jose L. Moya, wherein he averred: (1) that he is a beneficiary of the estate of Julian Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings No. 57405 before Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance and also a beneficiary of the estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance. In Special Proceedings No. 63866, he appealed from the order dated December 27, 1967 appointing Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator to the Supreme Court, which appeal was docketed as G.R. No. L-29235; (2) that he has been named as special administrator of the estate of Rosina in Special Proceedings No. 67302 originally assigned to Branch VI but later transferred to Branch VIII and consolidated with Special Proceedings No. 63866 but the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII dismissed said Special Proceedings No. 67302 in an order dated February 20, 1967, which he also appealed to the Supreme Court and docketed as G.R. No. L-28054; (3) that to protect his interest as such beneficiary in the estates of Rosina and Julian, he caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49877/ T-158, 49878/T-158, 49879/T-158, 49880/T-158, 49881/T-158 all issued in the name of Rosina covering five adjacent lots in Tondo, Manila; (4) that in an order dated April 16, 1969 (p. 73, rec. of L-30935), Judge Manuel P. Barcelona presiding in Special Proceedings No. 63866, authorized respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator of Rosina's estate, upon the latter's motion, to sell the real properties of the estate for the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes, realty taxes of the estate and expenses of administration; (5) that respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz negotiated for the sale of the aforesaid lots with the Reliable Realty Corporation, which was willing to buy the properties for P400,000.00 provided the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles covering said lots is cancelled; (6) that upon motion of respondent Vito Cruz, Judge Manuel Barcelona in Special Proceedings No. 63866 ordered the cancellation of the said notice of lis pendens in an order dated April 15, 1969 (Schedule "C" of petition, p. 43, rec.); (7) that respondent Vito Cruz executed a deed of sale over the aforesaid properties in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation, organized by respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nicasio Co, Nemesio Co, and Manuel Sosantong, and respondent Judge Manuel P. Barcelona issued an order dated April 24, 1969 approving the said deed of sale (Annex "A" and Schedule "B" of petition, pp. 38-47, rec.); (8) that thereafter T.C.T. Nos. 49877, 49878, 49880, and 49881 were cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. Nos. 96471/T-757, 96472/T-757, 96473/T-757 and 96474/T-757 were issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of respondent Reliable Realty Corporation; (9) that the aforesaid orders of April 16, 1969 and April 24, 1969 were issued without due notice to petitioner and without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge in Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the reason that he had been divested of jurisdiction of said proceedings by reason of his appeal therein in G. R. No. L-29235, (p. 32, rec.); (10) that on April 30, 1969, he caused the filing of a notice of adverse claim on the properties covered by T.C.T. Nos. 96471, 96472, 96473 and 96474 (p. 34, rec.); and

(11) that he spent at least P10,000.00 in his efforts to protect and defend his hereditary interests in the estate of Rosina; and prays for judgment (a) declaring the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots as null and void, (b) directing the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of Reliable Realty Corporation, (c) declaring that the aforesaid five lots as his distributive share in the estate of Rosina as well as directing the register of deeds of Manila to issue in his name new transfer certificates of title, and (d) sentencing private respondents jointly and severally to pay him P10,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees plus legal interests on all said values. Private respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong filed a motion to dismiss (Appendix "B", pp. 44-50, rec.) appellant Macias' complaint in Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the suit; that the complaint states no cause of action; that there is another action of the same nature pending in court; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to prosecute the present suit; and alleging specifically that:

(1) Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case since the subject matter involved properly belongs exclusively to and is within the competence of Branch VIII and Branch IV before which courts Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405 are pending and petitioner's alleged claim of beneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina depends on a recognition thereof by the probate court in said Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405;

(2) that upon the face of the complaint, the same does not contain a cause of action; because Branch X, which

is coordinate with Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, under the existing jurisprudence has no authority to annul the questioned orders issued by Branch VIII, aside from the fact that he appealed to the Supreme Court from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII dismissing Special Proceedings No. 67302 which was then pending before Branch IV and subsequently transferred to Branch VIII (L-28054), from the order denying Macias' claim of beneficiary interest in Rosina's estate and appointing respondent Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator of the estate of Rosina in the same Special Proceedings No. 63866 (L-29235; Annex "A", pp. 51-60, rec.) as well as from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch IV also denying Macias' petition for relief from the order approving the partial distribution of the estate of Julian and denying his motion for the removal of Vito Cruz as administrator and appointment of herein appellant in his place (L-28947; Annex "B", pp. 61-65, rec.);

(3) that petitioner Manuel Macias is not a real party in interest; because he is not the beneficiary, nor legatee nor creditor, much less an heir, of Rosina. He bases his alleged interest in the estate of Julian who died intestate on June 15, 1964 solely on the latter's memorandum to his sister Rosina wherein he hoped that his sister Rosina will, after his estate is settled, give at her convenience to petitioner Manuel Macias the sum of P500.00; to Faustino A. Reis and Severino Baron the amount of P10 000.00 each; and to Dominador M. Milan and Vicente D. Recto P1,000.00 each. The said memorandum is not a will. Unfortunately, Rosina died on September 14, 1965 without being able to comply with the memorandum of her brother Julian. Since petitioner has not been declared an heir or legatee of Julian in Special Proceedings No. 57405 nor of Rosina in Special Proceedings No. 63866, he has no legal standing to file the present action. The aforesaid motion to dismiss was followed by supplement alleging that since the buyer, the Reliable Corporation, has a distinct personality from those of its incorporators, there is no cause of action against private respondent Uy Kim, Nemesis Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong, its incorporators.

Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion for intervention in said Case No. 76412 dated June 4, 1969, reiterating the ground of the motion to dismiss advanced by the other private respondents as aforestated and emphasizing that this petition for relief from judgment seeks the nullified classification by the Presiding Judge of Branch X of the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866 dated April 15 and April 24, 1969, as admmitted by petitioner's motion in praying that this Case No. 76412 should not be assigned to Branch IV or Branch VIII as his petition seeks to nullify the orders of Presiding Judge Manuel Barcelona of Branch VIII in said Special Proceedings No. 63866 (Annex "B", pp. 96-97, rec.). Petitioner-appellant filed his opposition dated June 14, 1969 to the motion to dismiss of respondents Reliable Realty Corporation and its incorporators as well as to the motion for intervention filed by respondent Vito Cruz. In an order dated June 30, 1969, Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya of Branch X sustained the motion to dismiss and forthwith dismissed plaintiff's complaint herein in Civil Case No. 76412 but denied the prayer of the motion to dismiss for cancellation of the notice of adverse claim, which petitioner-appellant caused to be annotated on the titles issued in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation, from which order petitioner-appellant Macias interposed his appeal, and accordingly filed this petition for review on certiorari. Herein respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong filed on December 12, 1969 their motion to dismiss the instant petition on the ground that Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint, for the said Branch X is without authority to review the decisions of Branch IV, a coordinate branch of the Manila Court of First Instance; that petitioner-appellant is not a beneficiary, heir or creditor of the estate of Julian or Rosina; and that petitioner-appellant had already appealed the order of Judge Barcelona of Branch VIII authorizing and approving the sale of the lots in favor of

respondent Reliable Realty Corporation respectively dated April 16 and April 24, 1969 (Annex "A" pp. 94-95, rec.), which appeal is now pending before this Court in L-30935 (pp. 87-97, rec.; pp. 4, 15, appellant's brief; emphasis supplied). In a manifestation dated and filed on December 19, 1969, respondent Vito Cruz adopted in toto as his own motion to dismiss and/or answer, the motion to dismiss dated December 12, 1969 filed by the principal respondents (p. 102, rec.). Petitioner-appellant filed on December 19, 1969 an opposition dated December 18, 1969 to the motion to dismiss (pp. 104-108, rec.). In Our resolution dated January 23, 1970, the motion to dismiss petition for review and certiorari was denied (p. 123, rec.). In a manifestation dated February 13, 1970, private respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong adopted as their answer their motion to dismiss filed on December 12, 1969 (p. 133, rec.). The appealed order of respondent Judge Jose L. Moya, dated June 30, 1969, reads: It appearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in Branch VIII of this Court Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson; that the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary title of her estate; that the sale of the lands forming part thereof which the plaintiff desires to annul was approved by this Court in Special Proceeding No. 63866; that aside from praying for the annulment of the sale, the plaintiff also seeks a declaration that the lands sold constitutes his distributive share of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson's inheritance; and that the plaintiff has appealed to the Supreme Court from the order approving the sale, and it being settled that the jurisdiction to annul a judgment or order of a branch of the Court of First Instance is vested exclusively in the branch which rendered the judgment or issued the order and that any other branch, even if it be in the same judicial district, which attempts to do so, exceeds its jurisdiction (Tuason v. Judge Torres, 21 S.C.R.A. 1169, L-24717, December 4, 1967), and it being unquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a deceased person and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the court or branch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement (Branch VIII) in this case; and finally the Supreme Court having already acquired jurisdiction by reason of the plaintiff's appeal, no subordinate court should attempt to pass upon the same question submitted to it, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant is granted and the complaint is dismissed. The prayer in the motion to dismiss for the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim which the plaintiff caused to be annotated on the titles to the lands on account of the present action is denied as the only question raised by a motion to dismiss is the sufficiency of the complaint filed in the action. (Appendix "F", p. 78, rec.). The pretense of herein petitioner-appellant is without merit and the foregoing order appealed from should be sustained. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending. This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus: ... The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to two or more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay. xxx xxx xxx The provision of section 602, giving one court exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, was not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant, but in the public interest for the better administration of justice. For that reason the parties have no control over it. 1 On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, delegate or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties, ... . 2

This was reiterated in Maningat vs. Castillo, 3 thus: ... The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. (See articles 74 to 91, inclusive, Rules of Court.) In order to settle the estate of a deceased person it is one of the functions of the probate court to determine who the heirs are that will receive the net assets of the estate and the amount or proportion of their respective shares. ...

It is not disputed that the orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in his complaint against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII of the same court. Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the branch of the court of first instance that first acquired jurisdiction over the case retains such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other branches of the same court of first instance or judicial district and all other coordinate courts. Thus, in the 1970 case of De Leon vs. Salvador, 4 Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, ruled: The various branches of a Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with the respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments, by means of injunction. 5 In the words of Mr. Justice Fernando, also in behalf of the Court, "any other view would be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful orders. ... This is to preclude an undesirable situation from arising one, which if permitted, as above pointed out, would be fraught with undesirable consequences, as already indicated, for the bench, no less than for the litigants. To such an eventuality, this Court cannot give its sanction. 6

Appellant claims that his action in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance, is not for the annulment of any judgment or order of Branch VIII of said Court and that nowhere, either in the prayer or in the body of his complaint, does he seek for the annulment of any order of Branch VIII (p. 8, appellant's brief). This pretension of appellant is belied by paragraph 8 of his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 alleging that the order dated April 15, 1969 directing the register of deeds of Manila to cancel the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by the appellant on the titles covering the five (5) lots and the order dated April 24, 1969 approving the deed of sale were both issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866, without due notice to and hearing of appellant; and further belied by paragraph 9 of the same complaint alleging that the acts of the buyers of the aforesaid five (5) lots in causing the cancellation of appellant's notice of lis pendens in obtaining the registration of the deed of sale, in procuring the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles over the five (5) lots in the name of Rosina, and in securing new transfer certificates of title in the name of defendant Reliable Realty Corporation, are all null and void ab initio, because (1) of the pendency of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235 for said appeal divested the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of any jurisdiction in Special Proceedings No. 63866 to sell the properties in question notwithstanding the order of April 24, 1969 approving the deed of sale, (2) the orders dated April 15, 1969 and April 24, 1969 directing the cancellation of appellant's notice of lis pendens and approving the deed of sale may not be registered as they have not become final and will not become final by reason of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235, and (3) he was not notified of the petition to sell any portion of Rosina's estate (pars. 8 & 9, Appendix "A", pp. 30-34, rec.). It is patent that by the aforesaid paragraphs 8 and 9 of his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X, appellant impugns the validity of the aforementioned orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866. Furthermore, in his motion to the Honorable Executive Judge of May 5, 1969, appellant averred that he filed his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 to nullify and set aside certain orders of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866 over the testate estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson and prayed that said Case No. 76412 should not be assigned to either Branch VIII or Branch IV (Annex "A", pp. 21-22, appellant's brief). Said motion could not refer to orders of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona other than the aforecited orders of April 15, 16, and 24, 1969 in Special Proceedings No. 63866. This appellant impliedly admits on pp. 3-4 of his reply brief which is further emphasized by his statement that the only purpose of his motion dated May 5, 1969 was "to keep the action away from possible prejudgment by the abovementioned branches of the court below (referring to Branch IV and Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance)." But even without considering paragraphs 8 and 9 of appellant's complaint and his motion dated May 5, 1969 in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X, his prayer in the same complaint for the nullification or rescission of the deed of sale covering the five lots in question cannot be decreed without passing upon the validity of the orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866 cancelling his notice of lis pendens authorizing the sale and approving the sale. And, as heretofore stated, under the rules and controlling jurisprudence, the Presiding Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance cannot legally interfere with, nor pass upon the validity of said orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, which court, as the probate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue thereof. Appellant's insistence that in Civil Case No. 76412, he seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate of the decedent Rosina, all the more removes the said case from the jurisdiction of Branch X; for as heretofore stated, the distribution of the estate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. He must therefore seek his remedy in the same probate court Branch VIII which is hearing Special Proceedings No. 63866, instead of filing a separate civil case in Branch X. Moreover, his petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in G.R. No. L-30935, entitled Macias vs. University of Michigan, et al., wherein he questions the validity of the aforesaid orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in

Special Proceedings No. 63866, amply covers the same subject matter and seeks substantially the same relief as his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 and the present petition (see pars. 26, 28, 30-40, and the prayer in this petition, pp. 13-34, rec. of L-30935). . Appellant himself states that the decision in the three cases he filed with this Court namely, G.R. Nos. L-29235, L-28947 and L-30935 will answer the question whether he has legal interest in the estates of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson and Julian A. Wolfson (pp. 21-22, appellant's brief). The cases he cited, as correctly contended by appellees (Lajom vs. Viola, et al., 73 Phil. 563; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Rodriguez vs. Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 665; and Quion vs. Claridad, L-48541, January 30, 1943, 2 O.G., No. 6, June, 1943, p. 572, 74 Phil. 100), are not applicable to and therefore do not govern the instant case, because the actions therein were filed by the preterited heir or legatee or co-owner long after the intestate or testate or partition proceedings had been closed or terminated. In the case at bar, Special Proceedings No. 63866 is still pending in the probate court Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance where appellant should present, as he has in fact presented, his alleged claim of legal interest in the estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, which claim, if valid, will certainly entitle him to all notices of all petitions, motions, orders, resolutions, decisions and processes issued and/or promulgated by said probate court. There is no order by the said probate court terminating or closing Special Proceedings No. 63866. However, in the recent case of Guilas vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, et al., 7 WE reiterated the rule: ... The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-61). Even in the case of Quion, etc. vs. Claridad, et al., supra, invoked by appellant, WE ruled that the intestate proceedings, although closed and terminated, can still be reopened within the prescriptive period upon petition therefor by a preterited heir. The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is unduly burdening the courts. Coming from a neophyte, who is still unsure of himself in the practice of the law, the same may be regarded with some understanding. But considering appellant's ability and long experience at the bar, his filing identical suits for the same remedy is reprehensible and should merit rebuke. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and the appealed order is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. Let this be entered in his personal record. Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concur. Castro and Fernando, JJ., took no part. Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Garcia v Francisco TOPIC: Legal Ethics, CPR FACTS: Garcia, et. al leased a parcel of land to Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee was represented by Atty. Francisco. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and reconveyance with damages (docketed as Q-89-2188) but was dismissed by the trial court. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee but Lee answered alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of case Q-89-2188. This allegation was rejected by Judge Bautista. On October 24, 1989, Atty. Francisco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista and Garcia, et. al (such is violative of the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order). On November 13, 1989, Judge Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed. Lee did not appeal. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. Petition was denied. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, through Francisco again, he filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in the unlawful detainer case and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. On July 2, 1990, Garcias group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals. Garcia then filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. Then, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors but was denied. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in the unlawful detainer case. Such dismissed but again Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco transgressed with the Code of Professional Conduct HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Franciscos cause was without merit. Atty. Francisco abused his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. SUSPENDED for 1 year Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez 166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law. Paragas vs. Cruz Facts: In asking for reconsideration of the Courts dismissal of his petition for certiorari in the present case, counsel for the petitioner, Atty. Jeremias Sebastian, used derogatory expressions against the dignity of the Court in the language of his motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sebastian is administratively liable for his actions/language. Held: The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration penned by the counsel of the petitioner are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful and he is hereby guilty of direct contempt of court. As remarked in People vs. Carillo: Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require.

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents. D E C I S I O N KAPUNAN, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and damages. The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952. Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where there is an order for partition but there is no showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was registered in the Register of Deeds. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Korte Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as follows: Rtcspped a) Hermogenes Olis - lot 1639-A b) Pascual Olis - lot 1639-B c) Bartolome Maglucot - lot 1639-C d) Roberto (Alberto) - lot 1639-D Maglucot e) Anselmo Lara - lot 1639-E f) Tomas Maglucot - lot 1639-F.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo. Sdaadsc After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively)[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] as indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot, respondents predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in fact, who commenced the action for partition.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an approved partition against the other co-owners who claim that there was one.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]

The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows: Missdaa WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against

the defendants ordering the latter: 1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and deliver the possession of the same to

Plaintiffs; Slxmis 2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees; 3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual damages representing the amount of

unpaid rentals up to the time they actually vacate the premises in question; Sclaw 4. To pay the costs.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639. Slxsc

Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following reversible errors: I IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946; II IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE DEFENDANTS

IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D, HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;

III IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND

AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE;

IV IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY

SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE;[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]

Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot."[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondents acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]

For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently confirmed the same.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Third, they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]

After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, we find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952. Scslx Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record."[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine whether indeed there was partition. Slx In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real

estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and executory and cannot now be disturbed. Mesm The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]

However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court are not binding.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the commission.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof. This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties " to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the parties. Calrky Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan. Kycalr The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later. From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that said court was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop, said court ordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the parties therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no showing that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their possession of the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan. Kyle It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] It follows that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long time. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan. Exsm In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary, and the

adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance of benefits, which arises when a party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his own.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]

The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point by presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma were for the payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable that the parties would be unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are tax declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily verified this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades. The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Msesm Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] And where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to him whose name it bears.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]

Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unless partition is shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition. Esmso Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] As originally conceived, registration is merely a species of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the parties.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] Requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that recorded instruments exist and are genuine.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]

It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. In Espina vs. Abaya,[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] we declared that an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal,[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] reiterated in Tan vs. Lim,[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif] this Court has ruled, thus: On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce oral partition

when it has been completely or partly performed. Esmmis Regardless of whether a parol p