Loc goc rev

Loc Gov Reviewer, 1st Sem, 2005-2006 ABG

Reviewer on the Law on Local Governments

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

II. NATURE AND STATUS

Municipal Corporation- A body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants for the purpose of local government thereof. Established by law partly as an agency of the state to assist in the civil government of the country but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the city, town, or district which is incorporated.

Elements:1. Legal corporation or incorporation;2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality is known

and in which all corporate acts are done;3. Inhabitants constituting the population;4. Territory within which local civil government/ corporate

functions are exercised.

Nature/ status1. Subordinate branch of the government of the state;2. Exercises delegated branches of government

1. Municipal Corporation Proper- Refers to incorporated cities, towns, or villages invested with the power of local legislation;

2. Quasi-Municipal Corporation- Quasi-corporation, operates directly as an agency of the state to help in the administration of public functions.

Tests: 1. Voluntary/ involuntary nature of the corporation2. Existence/ nonexistence of a charter3. Whether the purpose of the corporation is solely as a

governmental agency or one for self-government

Purposes of municipal corporations:1. Serve as an agency/ instrument of the state in carrying on the

functions of government which the state cannot conveniently exercise.

2. Act as an agency of the inhabitants of the community in the regulation of municipal franchises and public utilities promotion, management, of local affairs, maintenance of water system, ferries, wharves, etc.

Municipal Corporation- Applies to incorporated villages, towns and cities; with power of local administration.

Public Corporation- Broader term, established for purposes connected with the administration of civil/ local government

Sec. 15. Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.

Dual Nature of Municipal Corporations1. Public/ Governmental- Acts as an agent of the State for the

government of the territory and the people within the municipal limits. Exercises a part of the sovereignty of the state by delegation.

2. Private aspect- Acts in a similar category as a business corporation, doing functions not strictly governmental or political. Stands for the community in the administration of local affairs, beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its government powers are conferred.

Quasi- Municipal CorporationsPublic corporations created as agencies of the state for a narrow/ limited purpose. Not possessed of powers/ liabilities of self-governing corporations. Generally relate to matters of state as distinguished from municipal concerns.

Vilas v City of Manila

FACTS: 1571: A municipal corporation was established and known as the Ayuntamiento de Manila. 1894: The city government was reorganized, it had the power to incur debts for municipal purposes, to sue and be sued. 1901: The present incorporating act was passed, Act 183 of the Philippine Commission. The petitioners in this case were creditors of the City of Manila prior to the American occupation. The City of Manila argued that its charter has no reference to obligations/ contracts of the old city; that their case is analogous to a principal and agent, where the sovereign gets changed, the city, as agent of the State, could no longer be held accountable for debts of the previous sovereign.

ISSUE: WON notwithstanding the cession of the Philippines to the US, followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the US. YES.

RATIO: A municipal corporation has two powers: Governmental and Private. Municipal laws that regulate private and domestic rights continue in force until abrogated/ changed by the new ruler. Only laws of a political character are totally abrogated/ changed by the new ruler. The property rights relinquished by Spain are limited to those which belong to the public domain. It did not affect property which belonged to the City of Manila as a municipal corporation. Absent any express legislative declaration, there is no reason to suppose that reincorporation intended to permit an escape from the obligations of the old city.

Lidasan v COMELEC

FACTS: 18 June 1966: President signed HB 1247 into law—RA 4790. It created the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The officials were elected in 1967. However, 12 barrios were in Cotabato and not in Lanao del Sur. COMELEC adopted a resolution that Dianaton shall be composed of the areas enumerated in RA 4790. The Office of the President recommended to the COMELEC that the statute be suspended pending correcting legislation. COMELEC issued another resolution that only an declaration of unconstitutionality could it stop implementing the law. Lidasan argued that it is unconstitutional for violating the one bill one subject rule.

ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional for violating the one-bill one-subject rule. YES.

RATIO: No bill may be enacted into law should include more than one

subject. Congress must refrain from conglomeration of different subjects. The title of a bill must be couched in such a language sufficient to notify the public of the import of the single subject. A change in the boundaries of 2 provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality.

The principle that only the unconstitutional portion of a statute should be invalidated and the constitutional part must remain does not apply here. The explanatory note of the bill from which this statute originated expressed that the envisioned municipality would be self-sufficient. This of course includes the 21 barangays, and not the 9 barangays that would be left if the valid portion would be allowed to continue. Factors affecting the independence of a municipality include population, territory, and income.

III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Constitution, Article XSec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 3 The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local

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government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, elections, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers, and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of said local units.

Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan and political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

Tan v COMELEC

FACTS: BP 885 was passed or “An Act Creating the Province of Negros del Norte.” The petitioners in this case wanted to stop COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite. The petitioners were residents of Negros Occidental. The BP provided that the plebiscite was to be conducted 120 days from the approval of the Act and that the President was to appoint the first officials.

The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional and contrary to statute. The Constitution states that no province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The LGC set as a standard that a province must have at least 3,500 square kilometers as its territory. The Solicitor General argued that BP 885 enjoys a presumption of legality and that the question is moot since the province of Negros del Norte had already been proclaimed.

ISSUE: WON Negros del Norte was validly created. NO.

RATIO: Two political units would be affected in case of a division of a province—the parent and the proposed province. The Constitution commands that “affected units” be considered in a plebiscite. The Court noted that the case of Paredes v Executive Secretary, which involved the creation of a new municipality where the parent unit was not involved, could not be considered as a precedent. That case involved a barangay while this case involves a province. Almost half of the sugar plantations would be dismembered form the parent province and some of its most important cities.

The SC also considered the new province as lacking in the territory requirement since the land mass of the new territory was only 2,856 square kilometers. The Court rejected the suggestion of the Solicitor General that even the area of the EEZ should be considered in determining the territorial requirement.

San Juan v Civil Service Commission

FACTS: 28 March 1988: The position of Provincial Budget Officer was vacated. 18 April 1988: Governor informed Director Abella of DBM that he has appointed Dalisay Santos as acting Provincial Budget Officer. Director Abella then recommended that private respondent, Cecilia Almajose be appointed as PBO given that she is a Certified Public Accountant. The Governor protested on the ground that the DBM Undersecretary is not authorized to appoint the PBO. According to EO 112, the governor has the power to recommend nominees to the position of PBO.

ISSUE: If the governor appoints an unqualified person to the position of Provincial Budget Officer, can the DBM Secretary appoint another one? NO.

RATIO: The phrase “upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned” must be given a mandatory application pursuant to the State policy of local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang, and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The contention of the CSC that the recommendatory power of the governor is merely directory is wrong. The Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states that the DBM has the right to fill the vacancies if none of the nominees meets the requirements is baseless.

Pimentel v Aguirre

FACTS: The petitioners in this case seek to annul section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372. It requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non personnel expenditures. They also seek to stop Section 4 which withholds a portion of their Internal Revenue Allotment by 10%. AO 43 was issued by Pres. Estrada when he assumed office. This reduced the amount withheld to 5%. The petitioners argued that the president would in effect exercise the power of control over LGUs.

The Solicitor General contended that this was issued to alleviate economic difficulties, that the AO merely “directs” LGUs to reduce their expenditures and that the 10% withholding is only temporary.

ISSUE: WON the sections of the AO are unconstitutional.HELD: The “request” for a reduction in expenditures is legal. The withholding of the IRA is illegal.

RATIO: Decentralization involves the devolution of national administration, not power, to LGUs. The decentralization of power involves the abdication of political power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The policy setting in our country still lies with the president and with congress. The LGUs, however, still have fiscal autonomy. They have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their share in the national tax. The withholding is equivalent to a holdback, no matter how temporary. The wordings of the law is clear that it shall be “automatically released.” The formulation/ implementation is subject to consultation with the appropriate public agencies, private sectors, and LGUs.

Before the President can interfere with fiscal matters of LGUs, the following must be present:

1. Unmanaged public sector deficit;2. Consultation with presiding officers of the Senate and the

House, and the various local leagues;3. Recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG, and

DBM; 4. Must not be lower than 30% of the collection of the national

IR taxes of 3rd fiscal year preceding the current one.

IV. CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Nature1. Essentially legislative2. Exclusive/ unlimited3. Can’t be delegated

Essential Requisites1. Territory- contiguous2. Population3. Charter- invests people with power of local government

By prescription- Existence presumed if exercised powers claimed by a community, with knowledge and acquiescence of legislature, without interruption.

De Facto Municipal CorporationsCorporation that exists in fact although not in point of law as

there is a certain defect in some essential feature of its organization. 1. Valid law authorizing incorporation;2. Attempt in good faith to organize it;3. Colorable compliance with the law;4. Assumption of corporate powers.

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Attack against validity- May not be attacked collaterally, it may be challenged by state in a direct quo warranto proceeding. However, if it is an absolute nullity, it is subject to collateral attack. De Jure corporations cannot be attacked.

Alvarez v Guingona (1996)

FACTS:- HB 8817 entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of

Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago” was filed in the lower house.

- A counterpart of the bill was filed in the Senate, SB 1243. - The Senate conducted public hearings after HB No. 8817 was

transmitted to the Senate. - Petitioners contend that RA 7720 is unconstitutional since:

o The Act did not originate exclusively from in the House as mandated by Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

o Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Sec. 450 of the LGC for it to be converted into a component city.

- The petitioners argued that the income of an LGU does not include the IRA. The average annual income of Santiago was more than P20M. It is reduced to only P13M, however, if the IRA is excluded from the computation.

ISSUE: WON RA 7720 should be declared unconstitutional for the two reasons cited. HELD: NO. RA 7720 is constitutional.

The acquisition of resources necessary to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions is effected through the vesting in every LGU of:

1. The right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;2. The right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such

share being in the form of Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs); and

3. the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.

- The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and National wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the LGU and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the LGC and its implementing rules and regulations.

Income- all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU.

- DOF certified that the municipality had an average annual income of at least 20M for the last 2 consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.

Sec. 450 (c) of the LGC provides that “the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.” IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income.

Cawaling, Jr. v COMELEC

FACTS: 16 Aug 2000: Pres. Estrada signed into law RA 8806: An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon…16 Dec 2000: COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the municipalities 17 Dec 2000: Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon

Cawaling filed this petition for certiorari, which challenged the law on the ff grounds:

1. The plebiscite was conducted beyond the 120-day period from the approval of RA 8806, violating Sec. 54 of the LGC;

2. It violates Sec. 450 (a) of the LGC which requires that only “a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city;”

3. It contains two subjects: Creation of the City of Sorsogon and the abolition of the two municipalities.

ISSUE: WON RA 8806 violated the Constitution and the LGC. NO.

RATIO:- The phrase “A municipality or a cluster…” is not a criterion

but just one of the modes by which a city may be created. Sec. 10 Art. X of the Constitution allows the merger of LGUs to create a province, city, municipality, or barangay in accordance with LGC standards.

- The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a merger of existing LGUs is recognized under the Consti so long as it complies with the standards set by the LGC.

- In response to Cawaling’s argument that there is no “compelling reason” merge the two municipalities, the Court stated that it could not pass upon the wisdom of RA 8806;

- The word “approval” in Sec. 54 of RA 8806, which should be read together with Sec. 65 thereof, could only mean “effectivity” as used and contemplated in Sec. 10 of the Code.

- The law was first published in 25 Aug 2000 issue of TODAY. The publication of the law was completed on 1 Sept 2000, which should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite.

- COMELEC: Since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect.

- As to the failure of the COMELEC to conduct an intensive info campaign, the Court said that no proof was presented by the petitioner to substantiate his claim. There is the presumption that COMELEC regularly performed its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.

Pelaez v Auditor General

FACTS: From 4 Sept to 29 Oct 1964, the Prez, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 of the Rev. Admin Code, issued Exec. Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities;

- On 10 Nov 1964, Pelaez filed this prohibition proceeding against the Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Eos and/ or any disbursement by said municipalities.

- Pelaez argued that the EOs are void since Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA 23701 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

- Pelaez contended that since 1 Jan 1960, barrios may not be created except upon Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected

- Since the Prez, under the new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he even create a municipality which is composed of several barrios?

- Gov’t: new municipalities can be created without creating new barrios, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality.

ISSUE: WON the EOs should be declared null and void ab initio. YES.RATIO:

- Where the power to fix such common boundary, in order to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature—involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

- Although Congress may delegate to another branch the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that the law be:

o Complete in itself—set forth the policy to be executed

o Fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable

1 Sec. 3 of RA 2370: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

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- Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these requirements of a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law.

- The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one eminently legislative in character.

- The power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Such control does not include the authority either to abolish one executive department or bureau or to create a new one.

- The alleged power of the Prez to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus, or offices.

Municipality of Candijay, Bohol v CA (1995)

FACTS: The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia. The trial court ruled for Candijay but this was reversed by the CA. The CA found that the plans submitted by the two municipalities are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between the petitioner and the Muncipality of Mabini. The CA ruled that in cases of equiponderance of evidence, the courts must find for the defendant.

The petitioner raised the ff issues before the SC:1. The CA improperly applied the rule on equiponderance of

evidence;2. The respondent municipality does not have a juridical

personality since it was created under a void executive order; and

3. the challenged decision throws them back again to their controversy.

ISSUE: WON a municipality, created under a void executive order, can be considered as not having a juridical personality in light of the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. NO.

RATIO: The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of the respondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949) during the proceedings in this case. After presentation of evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent from presenting evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO 265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the RAC constituted an undue delegation of legislative power to the Prez.

The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead of the Municipality of San Andres, and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. Various governmental acts through the years all indicate the State’s recognition and acknowledgement of its existence. Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should be considered a regular, de jure municipality.

According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” “Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.”2

Municipality of Jimenez v Baz

FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258.

2 Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, Sr.

The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.

The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim.

ISSUES:I. WON Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES.

II. WON RA 7160 Sec. 442(d) is invalid since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities. NO.

RATIO:I. Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation:

1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged;

2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the municipality; and

3. the fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5 th

class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House.

In this case, the following factors are present:

1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned.

2. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc.

Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that “municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental.

II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban.

V. ALTERATION AND DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Power to alter/ dissolve:1. Fixing, altering, changing boundaries of municipal

corporations2. Dividing a municipal corporation- 2 or 1 separate municipality 3. Merging or consolidating 2 or more municipalities into 1. 4. Annexing one municipality to another. 5. Repealing its charter.

Effects of annexation/ consolidation:

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1. On the legal existence of territory annexed—Dissolves annexed territory, under its jurisdiction;

2. Laws/ ordinances of annexed corporation subject to all laws/ ordinances by which annexing corporation is governed;

3. Right of officers/ employees of annexed consolidated territory to continue to hold their office. Terminate official relation with offices.

4. Title to property—Acquire title to property without compensation. But, if it forms part of municipality, provide for payment.

5. Debt/ obligations—Assumed.

Effects of division of municipal corporation:1. Legal existence of original corporation extinguishes corporate

existence of original municipality. 2. Property/ powers/ rights: Divided- each municipality acquires

title to the properties, powers, rights, and obligations falling within its territorial limits.

VI. PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENTS

Padilla v COMELEC

FACTS: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2312 pursuant to RA No. 7155 which created the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. 15 Dec 1991: A plebiscite was held in the barangays comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Only 2,890 favored the creation of the new municipality while 3,439 voted against it.

The Governor of Camarines Norte sought to set aside the plebiscite on the ground that it should not have been conducted since the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution reverted to the ruling in Paredes v Executive Secretary and that Tan v COMELEC is no longer controlling.

ISSUE: WON the term “political units directly affected” only comprises those areas in the proposed LGU and not those from the mother LGU. NO.

RATIO: The deletion of the phrase “unit or” in Sec. 10 Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution has not affected the ruling of the SC in Tan v COMELEC.

During the 1986 Con Com:Mr. Davide: “I precisely asked for the deletion of the words

“unit or” because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate in the plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted “in the political units directly affected,” it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation have a right to vote. The phrase “political units directly affected” contemplates the plurality of political units which would participate in the exercise.

Miranda v Aguirre (1999)

FACTS: 5 May 1994: RA 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. 14 Feb 1998: RA 8528 was enacted, amending RA 7720. It changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of this RA since it lacked a provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The respondents raised the defense of standing and the political question doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units.”

ISSUE: WON a reclassification of a city from an independent component city to a component city requires a plebiscite. YES.

RATIO: The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the material change in the political and economic rights of the LGU directly affected. The consent of the people is required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power. The changes are substantial. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have to be shared with the province. There would be a reduction in their IRA.

When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose. There is no reason why the same should not be done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their city. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward so long as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affected.

Tobias v Abalos

FACTS: RA 7657, “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong” was signed into law on 9 Feb 1994. 10 April 1994: A plebiscite was held in Mandaluyong where the “yes” votes won. Petitioners filed this case arguing that RA 7675 violated the “one subject-one bill” rule since the law allegedly contained two different subjects:

1. Conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and2. Division of the congressional district of San Juan/

Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners: The seconds subject is not germane to the subject matter of RA 7657. Moreover, the separation of the two units has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. The division was not made pursuant to any census. There should have been a plebiscite on RA 7657 on the part of the people of San Juan.

ISSUE: WON RA 7657 should be declared unconstitutional for the reasons given by the petitioners. NO.

RATIO: The creation of a separate congressional district is but a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. The present limit of 250 is not absolute. The Consti clearly provides that the House shall be composed of not more than 250 members, “unless otherwise provided by law.” It means that the present composition of Congress may be increased if Congress itself so mandates.

The contention that the people of San Juan should have been parties to the plebiscite is wrong since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary to it.

VII. GENERAL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Technology Developers v CA (1991)

FACTS: Petitioner made and exported charcoal birquette. Pablo Cruz, the acting mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, ordered that it fully stop the operations of its plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

- The letter asked Mr. Manese (plant manager) to bring several documents3 with him to the mayor’s office. Petitioner sought to secure the documents but its request to obtain a mayor’s permit was not entertained.

6 April 1989: Cruz ordered that the plant be padlocked without any prior notice on the petitioner.

- Petitioner asked for and obtained a writ of preliminary injunction against the acting mayor.

- In the hearing of the MR, petitioner’s counsel failed to attend. The provincial prosecutor submitted the following evidence:

o Investigation report of the petitioner made by Marivic Guina recommending that the

3 Building permit, mayor’s permit, Region III Pollution of Environment and Nat Res Permit, etc.

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manufacturing process and raw materials used by the factory produced fumes that are hazardous to health so the company must shut down until the proper air pollution device is installed.

o Signatures of residents complaining about the pollution.

o Letter addressed to Gov. Pagdanganan complaining about the smoke.

- The lower court set aside the injunction it earlier issued. That decision was sustained by the CA.

ISSUE: WON the local executive may deny the application for a business permit by virtue of his police power. YES. RATIO: The matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its actions shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be shown that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.

“No mayor’s permit was secured. Although the matter of determining whether there is pollution that requires control/ prohibition is addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control/ avoid injury to the health of the residents. The action of the mayor was in response to complaints made by the residents of the area. The closure was made after due investigation. The permit the petitioner obtained had already expired and it did not exert any effort to extend its permit.”

Concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health of the people from the deleterious effects of environmental pollution.

Chua Huat v CA (1991)

FACTS (GR 63863, the 2nd of 2 cases in this decision):14 Sept 1972: Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. requested Romulo del Rosario (city engineer of Manila) to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. 17 Nov 1982: Officials issued notices of condemnation addressed to the petitioners. It stated that the bldgs were found to be in dangerous condition and are therefore condemned. It also said that the notice is not a demolition order since it is still subject to the approval of the mayor. The orders were based on the inspection reports made by Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City Engineer. 19 Jan 1983: Civil Engr Romulo Molas (pvt practitioner) certified that although old, the bldgs are still structurally sound and have a remaining economic life of at least 8 years. 22 Feb 1983: Petitioners formally protested against the notices. 22 April 1983: Gamboa, one of the petitioners, was informed of a demolition order for one of the structures. 6 July 1983: Mayor confirmed the condemnation orders so demolition orders soon followed.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners may avail of certiorari to question demolition orders issued by the City Engineer of Manila. NO.RATIO: Petitioners failed to show the elements needed for certiorari to prosper.4 The power to condemn buildings in Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the bldg official (Sec. 206, PD 1096).

Sec. 275 and 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of Manila provide:275. Deterioration and Defects.—All buildings or parts of buildings which show defects in any essential parts shall be repaired and put in safe condition at once, or if the deterioration be greater than fifty per centum of the value of the bldg, as estimated by the city engineer, they shall be removed. 276. Condemnation Proceedings.—Whenever in the judgment of the City Engineer any bldg has been damaged by any cause to such an extent as to

4 1) A body that acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and 2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

be dangerous for use, he may condemn the same. If the owner of the bldg is unwilling to abide by the condemnation order, he may formally object within 7 days. The mayor shall hear the owner and his experts and decide the case on the evidence presented. If the mayor confirms the city engineer’s action, the owner must remove the bldg w/in 15 days from date of notification. If the owner does not comply, the bldg shall be removed at his expense and the city shall recover from him.

Sec. 215 of PD 1096 (Nat’l Bldg Code) also states that when any bldg is found dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation, or demolition, depending on the degree of danger to life, health or safety. There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case. The orders were made after thorough ocular inspections which showed that the bldg had defects of up to 80%. The act of the Mayor in approving the condemnation was also done in accordance with law. The petitioners submitted their protest 3 mos after notice, contrary to the 7-day rule prescribed by the city ordinance. Petitioners also failed to exhaust administrative remedies since PD 1096 provided for an appeal to the Secretary of the Ministry of Public Works and a request for a reinspection of the bldg., something the petitioners failed to do.

Binay v Domingo (1991)

FACTS: 27 Sept 1988: Petitioner Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60.

The resolution provided for a burial assistance program where qualified beneficiaries (to be given P500.00) are bereaved families whose gross monthly income does not exceed 2 thousand per month. It will be funded by the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury.

Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. The municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. When it was referred to the COA, the resolution was disapproved.

COA: There is no relation between the objective sought to be attained under Res. No. 60 and the alleged public safety and general welfare of the people of Makati. Moreover, it is not for a public purpose. It only seeks to benefit a few individuals.

The Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 243 which reaffirmed Res. No. 60. However, the program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. YES.

RATIO: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

A valid delegation may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the corporation, and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.

The inferred powers are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms.

Police power- power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and is commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, and convenience as

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consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the public needs.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

No violation of equal protection clause in classifying paupers. They may be reasonably classified.

Tatel v Municipality of Virac (1992)

FACTS: 18 March 1966: Residents of Barrio Sta. Elena complained against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of Mr. Tatel due to the smoke, obnoxious odor, and dust emitted by the machine. The Municipal Council of Virac appointed a committee to investigate. It found that the neighborhood was crowded as there were narrow roads and that this showed that the warehouse was a fire hazard in the area. 22 April 1966: Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac, declaring the warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code. Tatel’s MR was denied, he then filed this petition for prohibition.

Council: Tatel’s warehouse violated Ordinance No. 13 which prohibited the construction of warehouses within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios.

Tatel: The Ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 13, in prohibiting the construction of warehouses in densely populated communities, is a valid exercise of police power. YES.

RATIO: Municipal Corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers to carry out the objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause of the Admin Code.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact. Ordinances are required to be:

1. In accord with the Constitution or any statute;2. not be unfair or oppressive;3. not be impartial or discriminatory;4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;5. must be general and consistent with public policy, and6. must not be unreasonable.

Ordinance No. 13 meets these criteria. The ordinance regulates the construction of warehouses located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses wherein inflammable materials are stored and not the construction of a warehouse per se. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy that what has been conceived by the municipal government.

Judge Tamin v CA (1992)

FACTS: 24 September 1990: Municipality of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, represented by its mayor (Domiciano Real) filed a complaint denominated as “Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and Damages” against respondents Medina and Rosellon. It alleged that the petitioner municipality is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 5,894 sq meters; that it was reserved for a public plaza under Pres. Proc. No. 365; that during the incumbency of Mayor Isidro Real, Sr., the municipality leased an area of 1,350 sq meters to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes. It also stated that the defendants paid rentals until 1967, but that they refused to pay after that period; that the national government had allotted funds for the construction of a municipal gym but that it could not continue due to the presence of the buildings of the defendants. They

argued that the funds might revert back to the national government and such would result to “irreparable damage, injury, and prejudice” to the municipality and its people who are expected to derive benefit from the accomplishment of the project.

The petitioner judge granted a writ of possession with the ancillary writ of demolition, justifying it by applying the rule on eminent domain.

Even before Proclamation No. 365, the land was the subject of cadastral proceedings before another branch of the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. One of the claimants in this case is Medina who traced his ownership as far back as 1947 when he allegedly bought it from a Subanan native.

ISSUE: WON the municipality may order the demolition of private property despite the pendency of cadastral proceedings that shall ultimately settle the question of ownership.

HELD: NO. But that is immaterial now since the buildings have already been demolished. Petition dismissed. TC ordered to require the petitioners to put up a bond to be determined after a hearing on the just compensation due to the private respondents in case the demolition of their buildings is adjudged illegal.

RATIO: The legality of the occupation by the private respondents in this case is still to be resolved in the cadastral proceedings. If Medina is declared the owner of the land, then he is entitled to just compensation for the precipitate demolition of their buildings. The issuance of a writ of possession and writ of demolition by the petitioner judge in the ejectment proceedings was premature. What the petitioner should have done was to stop the proceedings in this case and wait for the final outcome of the cadastral proceedings. However, the demolition of the buildings is now fait accompli.

The complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for abatement of a public nuisance. A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality.

Patalinhug v CA (1994)

FACTS: 17 Nov 1982: Sangguinang Panlungsod of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 363 (Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City). It provided that funeral homes must be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches, and other institutional buildings. Upon approval and certification of zoning compliance by the zoning administrator, the building officer issued a building permit in favor of Patalinghug for the construction of the Metropolitan Funera Parlor at Cabaguio Ave.

Residents of Barangay Agdao complained that it violated the ordinance since it was within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia Chapel and several residential structures. The Sanggunian found out that the nearest residential structure (owned by Mr. Tepoot) was only 8 INCHES to the south.

Despite such findings, petitioner continued with his construction. Private respondents then filed a case for declaration of nullity of a building permit. The trial court dismissed the complaint saying that the residential buildings and the church are more than 50 meters from the funeral parlor. Mr. Tepoot’s place, according to the court, should not be considered a residential establishment since its lessee is engaged in the laundry business. The CA reversed the trial court and ruled that Tepoot’s land is a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration.

ISSUE: WON the declaration of an LGU that an area is a commercial zone is a valid exercise of police power. YES,

RATIO: The question of whether Mr. Tepoot’s bldg is residential or not is a factual determination which appellate courts should not disturb. The testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot’s bldg was used for a dual purpose: dwelling and for business. While its commercial

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aspect has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry equipment, its use as a residence was not fully substantiated.

The findings of the trial court is supported by the fact that the Sanggunian declared the area as commercial or C-2. Once a local gov’t has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of the vicinity was declared through ordinance, the respondents have failed to substantiate their arguments that Cabaguio Avenue was still a residential zone. The declaration of an area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in a locality. Persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens to secure the general welfare of the state.

Tano v Socrates (1997)

FACTS: 15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside the city from 1993-1998. 22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It authorized officers to inspect cargoes containing live fish and lobster that are shipped out of Puerto Princesa. The purpose of the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required mayor’s permit issued by their office. 19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 yrs. The respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all the fishermen, marine merchants, and shippers of the entire province of their only means of livelihood.

The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SC arguing as follows:

1. It deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, violating Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied; ie. Mayor had absolute authority in issuing the permit.

3. The Ordinance took away the right of the fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways.

The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of the Provincial Government’s power under the general welfare clause (Sec. 16 of the LGC). The Ordinance, they argued, only covered live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms and excluded those not dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 years. The court must also distinguish between catching live fish and selling it live and those who have no intention at all of selling it live.

ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise of powers under the LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment are a valid exercise of the police power of a municipal corporation. YES.RATIO: Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC “shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community. The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees, or charges for their use. The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the LGU and its inhabitants. The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable to this is devolution. One of these powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. The term “municipal waters” includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r] LGC).

Two principal objectives of the Ordinances:1. Establish a “closed season” for the species of fish covered

therein for 5 years (This falls within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters);

2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and the province from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities (this falls within the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate there to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which harm the environment.

Cabrera v CA (1991)

FACTS: 19 Sept 1969: Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158 which closed the old road leading to the new Capitol Bldg of the province and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per the survey of the Highway District Engineer. Deeds of exchange were executed under which the province conveyed to several persons5 the portions of the closed road in exchange for their own respective properties on which was subsequently laid a new concrete road.

1978: Part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner’s house was planted to vegetables in 1977 by E. Alejandro. Anselmo Peña, who bought Vargas’s share, also in the same part of the road, converted it into a piggery farm.

29 December 1978: The petitioner filed a complaint for “Restoration of Public Road and/ or Abatement of Nuisance…” He argued that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the province in its governmental capacity and that it is therefore beyond the commerce of man.

Cabrera: Resolution No. 158 is not an order for a closure of the road but an authority to barter. A public road could not be subject of a barter without a prior order of closure. The closure of the road has injured him since they can no longer use the old road in going to the old capitol bldg but must instead pass through a small passageway.

ISSUE: WON the provincial board can order the closure of a road and use/ convey it for other purposes. YES.RATIO: Resolution 158 clearly says that “it is hereby resolved to close the old road.” The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from RA 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Admin. Code. RA 5185, Sec. 11 (II) (a): A municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, etc. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which said other property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed. While the cases on this subject dealt with city councils and not provincial boards, there is no reason for not applying the doctrine announced therein with respect to the closure of provincial roads. This authority is inferable from the grant by congress of the funds to the province for the construction of provincial roads.

Dacanay v Asistio (1992)

FACTS: 5 Jan 1979: MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets as sites for flea markets. 10 Jan 1979: EO No. 135 was issued by Acting MMC Mayor Virgilio Robles; the Caloocan City Flea Market Authority was established;The Caloocan City mayor opened 7 flea markets in their city. One of the streets designated was “Heroes del ‘96” where the petitioner lives. The road was considered “the most viable and progressive, lessening unemployment in the city and servicing the residents with affordable basic necessities.”1987: Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan, had the stalls demolished. Stall owners filed an action for prohibition against the City, the OIC Mayor, and the City Engineer.

5 Bagadiong, Alcala, Latorre, Tolentino, Alejandro, Vargas, and Reyes.

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Trial Court: Heroes del ’96, V. Gozon, and Gonzales Sts. Are of public dominion.

1. They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts;

2. Cannot be acquired by prescription;3. Not subject to attachment and execution;4. Cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.

LGC provides that the City Engineer shall “prevent the encroachment of private bldgs and fences on the streets and public places. The Charter of the City of Caloocan grants the City Engineer similar powers. Asistio then became the mayor. He did not pursue Martinez’s policy of clearing the city streets. Dacanay then filed a complaint in the Ombudsman. Ombudsman: There is an omission of an act which ought to be performed, in clear violation of RA 3019.

ISSUE: WON public streets or thoroughfares may be leased or licensed to market stall holders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution passed by the Metro Manila Commission. NO.RATIO: The disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. It may not be the subject of lease or other contract. As the stall holders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases are null and void for being contrary to law. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community. The EO issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del ’96 Street as a vending area contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use.

Petitioner and general public have a legal right to the relief demanded.Respondents have the corresponding duty to clear the streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.Mandamus is proper.

Macasiano v Diokno (1992)

FACTS:13 July 1990: Municipality of Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, GG Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Ext., and Opena Streets located at Baclaran and the establishment of a flea market thereon. It was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2 which authorized the use of certain streets within metro manila for vending areas under certain conditions. 20 July 1990: MMA approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of Pque subject to some conditions.6

20 Jun 1990: Council authorized Mayor Ferrer to contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, and management of the flea markets. 8 Aug 1990: The municipality, and respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement for the management of the vending areas. 13 Sept 1990: Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent, ordered the destruction/ confiscation of the stalls;23 Oct 1990: Pque and Palanyag filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus. Trial Court: upheld the validity of the Ordinance.

ISSUE: WON an ordinance or resolution issued by a municipal council authorizing the lease and use of public streets as sites for flea markets is valid. NO.

RATIO: The areas are local roads used for public service and are considered public properties of the municipality. These properties are under the absolute control of Congress.Local governments have no authority whatsoever to control the use of public properties unless specific authority is given by Congress.

6 That the streets are not used for vehicular traffic; that it is not opposed by a majority of the residents in the areas; that the 2 meter road to be used as a flea market be distinctly marked, that the time of vending be designated; and that the use shall be temporary.

The authority given by the LGC to close roads should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.

424 Civil Code: Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general is outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU to private persons.

Closure: comply with due process; must be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. Once withdrawn from public use, it then becomes patrimonial property. Only then can the LGU use or convey it for any purpose for which other property belonging to the LGU might be lawfully conveyed. The municipality also failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the MMA. The exercise of the powers of LGUs should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community.

MMDA v Bel Air Village Assn., Inc. (2000)

FACTS: Bel Air Village Assn. (BAVA) is the registered owner of Neptune St. in Makati. Oreta (MMDA Chair): Wrote the BAVA president to ask for the voluntary opening of Neptune St.

MMDA: claims to have authority to open Neptune St. to traffic since it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public.

ISSUE: WON the MMDA can order the opening of a subdivision road to public traffic absent an ordinance from the concerned LGU. NO.

RATIO: The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting or policies, installation of a system and administration. Nothing in RA 7924 grants it police power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been given any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of LGUs, nothing in RA 7924 empowers the MMDA to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare.”

MMDA is not an LGU or a public corp. endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” since it requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in the Sangalang case. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of PD 824 shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. MMDA Chair: appointed by the president. LGUs: Prez only exercises supervisory authority;

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune St., its proposed opening by MMDA is therefore illegal.

City of Manila v Arellano College (1950)

FACTS:Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 provides:"Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or any other entity or person at a rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent per annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and municipalities."

CFI: This provision empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action, which seeks to condemn several parcels of land having a

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combined area of 7,270 square meters and situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON the expropriation of the area is proper. NO.RATIO: Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests involved are of considerable magnitude.

The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and unsanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemics, crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general.

"In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, endless conflicts between landlords and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order.

Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefit. But measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private character of the intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. The land in question has cost the owner P140,000.

Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is weaker for the condemnor. In the first place, the land that is the subject of the present expropriation is only one-third of the land sought to be taken in the Guido case, and about two-thirds of that involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding. In the second place, the Arellano Colleges' land is situated in a highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons who are not bona fide tenants. Lastly, this land was bought by the defendant for a university site to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for schools of higher learning.

While a handful of people stand to profit by the expropriation, the development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake.

City of Manila v Chinese Community of Manila (1920)

FACTS: 11 December 1916: City of Manila presented a petition in the CFI asking for the expropriation of certain lands for it to construct a public improvement (extension of Rizal Avenue). Comunidad de Chinos de Manila, Tambunting, etc: each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchers and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. City of Manila: Once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when

the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use."

The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority may be exercised. From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right of eminent domain may be exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed."

Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners. Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find that the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question.

ISSUE: WON the courts can inquire and hear proof as to the existence of the prerequisites needed in eminent domain proceedings initiated by LGUs.

RATIO: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law

When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon an-issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts.

It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for

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some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.

However, if the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public.

There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain and a decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular case.

The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain

The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.

The ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the taking of the property. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case.

Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority.

The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property. Since the city of Manila is only permitted to condemn private property for public use and since the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public cemetery already devoted to a public use, the city of Manila cannot condemn a portion of the cemetery for a public street.

Province of Camarines Sur v CA (1993)

FACTS: 22 December 1988: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

"WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center, and other progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;”

Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally

fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

Province of Camarines Sur: claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.

Solicitor General: Under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

ISSUE: WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementor of the agrarian reform program. NO.RATIO: Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.

It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial

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relation to the public use. There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower.

Municipality of Parañaque v VM Realty Corp. (1998)

FACTS: Pursuant to SB Res. No. 93-95, the Municipality of Pque filed on 20 Sept 1993 a complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corporation over 2 parcels of land. The purpose was to alleviate the living conditions of the poor by providing homes through socialized housing projects.

The RTC of Makati issued an order giving it due course. It authorized the petitioner to take possession of the property upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.

VM Realty: It failed to state a cause of action since it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160.

Parañaque: A resolution substantially complies with the requirements of the law since the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for the “purpose of bestowing authority on the LGU through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.”

ISSUE: WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect as an ordinance so as not to deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action. NO.RATIO: The power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress. An LGU may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.” (See Sec. 19 of RA 7160 which provides that an LGU through its chief executive may exercise the power of eminent domain through an ordinance)

Requisites for the exercise of the power of eminent domain:1. An ordinance enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings;

2. Exercised for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec. 9 Art. III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws;

4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated but that it was rejected.

Ordinance- A law. It has a general and permanent character.Resolution- Merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. Temporary.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise the power through a resolution, it would have said so. Article 36, Rule VU of the IRR which requires only a resolution could not prevail over the law.

Complaint does not state a cause of action—In a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. WON those allegations are true is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion.

Res judicata is present in this case since VM Realty is a successor in interest of Limpan Investment Corp. The principle of res judicata cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. This right should be absolute and unfettered even by prior

judgment or res judicata. The ruling in this case that Pque could not exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings once the legal requirements are complied with.

City of Cebu v Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (2002)

FACTS: 17 September 1993: City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the parcels of land of respondents for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose. The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786,400. Petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.

Respondents: The purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the property at its fair market value if it wanted to, just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. Finally, respondents alleged that they have no other land in Cebu City.

23 August 1994: Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.

14 December 1994: The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners' report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation. More specifically, it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 square meters but the actual area to be expropriated is only 478 square meters. The remaining 315 square meters is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.

On 16 August 1996, the commissioners submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot No. 1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December 1996. 6 Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new valuation.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE: WON just compensation in eminent domain cases commenced by an LGU should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. NO.RATIO:

In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court because (1) the trial court decided the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be fixed by commissioners appointed by the court; (2) petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to the commissioners' report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation of the 1,624-square meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was based; and (3) the determined just compensation fixed is even lower than the actual value of the property at the time of the actual taking in 1994.

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Eminent domain is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor.

In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.

The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith.

Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioner's assessment.

Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.

Hagonoy Market Vendors Assn v Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan (2002)

FACTS: 1 October 1996: Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted Kautusan Blg. 28 which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. It was posted from November 4-25, 1996.

November 1997: Petitioner's members were given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January, 1998.

8 December 1997: Petitioner's President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance.

Municipality: The ordinance took effect on 6 October 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner's appeal, made over a year later, was already time-barred.

Secretary of Justice: Dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. The date of effectivity of the subject ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in October 1996, after the required publication or posting has been complied with, pursuant to Section 3 of said ordinance.

ISSUE: WON the appeal in this case is already time-barred. YES.RATIO: The appeal with the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which provides: “That any question on the constitutionality or legality of

tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax, fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings.”

An appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996.

The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections.

Petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be counted not from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its members were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of the approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the approved ordinance was not posted. In petitioner's two (2) communications with the Secretary of Justice, it enumerated the various objections raised by its members before the passage of the ordinance in several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. There is no evidence to prove petitioner's negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted as required by law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with.

Estanislao v. Costales (1991)

FACTS: 13 January 1982: Sanggunian of Zamboanga City passed Ordinance No. 44; it imposed a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured, and/or bottled within the city. 3 December 1982: Finance Minister sent a letter to the Sanggunian suspending the effectivity of the Ordinance as it allegedly contravened Sec. 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. 5 December 1990: Lower court found that the tax imposed by the Ordinance is not among those that the Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code, but upheld its validity, saying that the Finance Minister did not act on it w/in 120 days from receipt of the petition. Finance Secretary appealed.

ISSUE: WON an ordinance that imposes a tax on the output or production of a business is valid. NO.RATIO: The authority of the City is limited to the imposition of a percentage tax on the gross sales or receipts of said product which, being non-essential, shall be at the rate of not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the softdrinks for the preceding calendar year. The tax imposed is based on the output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized by the Local Tax Code.

According to Sec. 19 and Sec. 23 of the LTC: A city may impose, in lieu of the graduated fixed tax prescribed under Sec. 19, a percentage tax on the gross sales for the preceding calendar year of non-essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding two percent and on the gross sales of essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding one percent.

Pepsi Cola v. Tanauan: Inapplicable here since it involved a different law, the Local Autonomy Act.

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The Ordinance did not become valid by the inaction of the Finance Minister. It only remains in effect if the minister did not comply with what is due him.

Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia, Rizal (1991)

FACTS: Petitioner PPC manufactured lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product with its refinery plant in Malaya, Pililia, Rizal. Sec. 142 (NIRC of 1939): Manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. PD 231: Local Tax Code: Municipality may impose taxes on business, except those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits, and/ or wines…Finance Secretary: Issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73: It directed all LGU treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing or dealing in petroleum products subject to specific tax under the NIRC; and Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73: Instructed treasurers to stop collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinance enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code on 1 July 1973.

Municipality of Pililia imposed Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 (Pililia Tax Code)3 June 1977L PD 1158 was enacted, it imposed specific tax on refined/ manufactured mineral oils and motor fluids. In enforcing the Ordinance, Pililia filed a complaint against PPC for collection of several taxes from 1979 to 1986. PPC: Prov. Circular No. 26-73 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the NIRC and that it also covers all ordinances.

RTC of Tanay upheld the legality of the ordinance.

ISSUE: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees considering Prov. Circular No. 6-77; and mayor’s permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Pililia, based on the Ordinance.

HELD: Pililia can only enforce collection from 1976 to 1986 and not those before 1976.

RATIO:Admin regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. The framers of PD 426 intended to terminate the effectivity of the provincial circulars.

The exercise of LGUs of the power to tax is ordained in the present Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition would amount to restricting their power to tax by mere admin issuances.

Mayor may not waive the payment of the mayor’s permit and sanitary inspection fees.

Local tax code does not provide for prescriptive period for collection of local taxes. Art. 1143 of the Civil Code governs. Action for obligation created by law prescribes within ten years from time right of action accrues.

Floro Cement Corporation v. Gorospe (1991)

FACTS:Municipality of Lugait (Misamis Oriental) filed a complaint for collection of taxes against Floro Cement Corporation. The taxes are “manufacturers” and “exporter’s” taxes for 1 Jan 1974- 30 Sept 1975 amounting to P161,875.00 plus 25% surcharge. They based it on Municipal Ordinance No. 5, passed pursuant to PD 231; and Ordinance No. 10.Floro: Not liable since the plaintiff’s powers to levy fees on “Mines, Mining Corporations and Mineral Products” was limited by Sec. 52 of PD 463. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources granted us a certificate of tax exemption for a period of 5 years.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance Nos. 5 and 10 apply to petitioner Floro Corporation notwithstanding the limitation provided for in Sec. 5(m) of PD 231 and Sec. 52 of PD 463. NO.RATIO: Municipality’s power to levy taxes on manufacturers and importers is provided in Art. 2, Sec. 19 of PD 231: Municipality may impose a tax on business except those for which fixed taxes are provided for in this Code.

Cement is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. It is the result of a definite process—crushing of minerals, grinding, mixing, etc. Its minerals had already undergone a chemical change before cement reaches its saleable form.

The power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty. Its relinquishment is never presumed. The exemptions mentioned in Sec. 52 of PD 463 only refers to machineries, equipment, tools, for production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The manufacture and export of cement do not fall under it since it is not a mineral product.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. Court of Appeals (1992)

FACTS: 14 March 1977: Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 9: solicited 1% donation of the palay threshed from the thresher operators who will apply for a permit to thresh. The proceeds will fund the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Bldg of the municipality.

Petitioner Lope Mapagu (treasurer) prepared a document for signature of all thresher/ owner/ operators who applied for a mayor’s permit.

Private respondent Jurado tried to pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher operators but it was refused on the ground that he did not sign the agreement to give 1% of the palay he produced.

Jurado filed for an action for mandamus with the RTC to compel the issuance of the mayor’s permit and license. He filed another petition for declaratory judgment against the resolution for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure.

CA: Mayor Tuzon and Treasurer Mapagu are liable to pay P20T as actual damages and P5T as moral damages. As for the Resolution, it was passed by the Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers granted by the 1973 Constitution which provided that each LGU shall have the power to create its own source revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.

Sec. 29, PD 231: The barrio council may solicit money, materials, and other contributions from private agencies and individuals.

ISSUE: WON a resolution imposing a 1% donation is a valid exercise of the taxing power of an LGU. No Ruling.RATIO (some comments): The Court did not concern itself with the validity of the Resolution since the issue was not raised in the petition as an assigned error of the CA. The measures have been sustained in the challenged decision, from which the respondent has not appealed. The implementing agency made the “donation” obligatory.

If it is to be considered as a tax ordinance, it must be shown to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. It would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure, its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the requisites for publication of ordinances in general.

Drilon v. Lim (1994)

FACTS: Justice Secretary: declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In Manila’s petition for certiorari, the Manila RTC sustained the ordinance. It also declared Section 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional since it vests in the Justice Secretary the power

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of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.

Justice Secretary: It is constitutional and the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the LGC had indeed not been observed.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional for granting the Justice Secretary the power of control over LGUs. NO.RATIO: Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinances and to revoke them if it does not pass the set standards. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did not set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce it as unwise or unreasonable. All he said is that it is illegal.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion , order that the act be undone or redone by his subordinate or even decide to do it himself.

As regards the procedural requirements, they have all been observed as correctly found by the trial court. Notices of the pubic hearings were sent to the interested parties, the minutes are there, and they were published. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinances as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. Although the text was not translated and disseminated, this requirement applies to the approval of local dev’t plans and public investment programs and not to tax ordinances.

Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals (1992)

FACTS: Benguet Provincial Assessor: Assessed real property tax on the bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declaration Nos. 8471 (1985) and 10454 (1986). The tax exemptions of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 of PD 745 was withdrawn by PD 1955. Benguet Corp.: Appealed the decision to the LBAA of Benguet. CBAA: held that the bldgs of petitioner used as dwellings were exempt from real property tax pursuant to PD 745. LBAA: affirmed taxability of the bunkhouses. On appeal, CBAA held the exemption was withdrawn so petitioner should have applied for restoration of the exemption with the Fiscal Incentives Review Board.

Benguet: LGUs don’t have any authority to levy realty taxes on mines pursuant to Sec. 52 of PD 463 and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code. Sol Gen: Benguet is estopped from raising the question of lack of authority as it was never raised before.

ISSUE: WON respondent assessors may validly assess real property tax on the properties of petitioner considering the proscription in the Local Tax Code and the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 against imposition of taxes on mines by local governments;WON the real tax exemption granted under PD 745 was withdrawn by PD 1955. YES. YES.

RATIO:(1) The provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources Dev’t Decree of 1974 (PD 463) and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code are mere limitations on the taxing power of LGUs; they are not pertinent to the issue before the SC. They cannot affect the imposition of the real property tax by the national government.

Although LGUs are charged with fixing the rates of real property tax, it does not follow that they also have the authority to determine WON they can impose the tax.

It is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs are required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in the enforcement of the real property tax code. The delegation of taxing power is not even involved since the tax has already been imposed and the LGUs are just mandated to enforce it.

(2) If the SC were to sanction the interpretation of Benguet, then necessarily all real properties exempt by any law would be covered, and there would be no need for congress to specify “Real Property Tax Code, as amended” instead of stating clearly realty tax exemption laws. The intention is to limit the application of the “exception clause” only to those given by the Real Property Tax Code.

National Development Corporation v. Cebu City (1992)

FACTS: NDC is authorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural and other enterprises needed for economic development. 10 August 1939: President issued Proclamation No. 430 which reserved Block No. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu City, consisting of 4,599 square meters, for warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. NWC was succeeded by NDC.

1940: A warehouse with a floor area of 1,940 square meters was constructed on it. 1948: Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the land and the warehouse. NDC paid under protest. Cebu: Taxable since no law grants NDC exemption from real estate taxes. NDC, as recipient of the land reserved by the President, is liable for payment of ordinary taxes. They have ceased to be exempt under the Assessment Law when the government disposed of them in favor of NDC. The SC has also used the standard of “use” of property rather than “ownership” as basis for real estate taxability.

NDC: The Assessment Law exempts properties owned by the Republic from real estate tax. Board of Assessment Appeals v. CTA & NWSA: Properties of NWSA, a GOCC, are exempt from real estate tax since the law applies to all government properties whether held in a proprietary or governmental capacity.

ISSUE: WON a public land reserved by the president for warehousing purposes in favor of a GOCC, as well as a warehouse subsequently erected thereon are exempt from real property tax. YES as regards public land.

RATIO: To come under the exemption in Article 3, it is important to establish that the property is owned by the government or by its unincorporated agency, and once government ownership is determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or government purposes, becomes immaterial.

As regards the warehouse constructed, a different rule should apply since the exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands made by preemptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and these are taxable by the state. Consequently, the warehouse constructed on the reserved land by NWC, indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic. Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax payments collected by Cebu should be refunded to NDC.

Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara (1992)

FACTS: Tarlac Enterprises owned certain properties: parcel of land, ice drop factory, machinery shed, machinery of diesel elect. sets, etc. The Municipality of Tarlac assessed taxes in the amount of P532,435.55. It set the auction sale of the private respondent’s properties to satisfy the real estate taxes due.

Tarlac Enterprises admitted the demands for the payment but refused to pay it on the ground that it was exempted under Sec. 40 par. (g) of PD 464 in relation to PD 551. RTC of Tarlac: dismissed the complaint filed by the Province against Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. for collection of real property tax. Respondent must just pay the 2% franchise tax.

ISSUE: WON Tarlac Enterprises is exempt from the payment of real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of PD 464 in relation to PD 551 as amended. NO.RATIO: The SC did not agree with the lower court that the phrase “in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature” in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of PD 551 expressly exempts private respondent from

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paying real property taxes. Said proviso is modified and delimited by the phrase “on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale” which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in view of the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated items have no relation to, and are entirely different from, real properties subject to tax.

There is also no merit in the respondent’s contention that the real properties being taxed, the machinery for the generation and distribution of electric power, the bldg housing said machinery, and the land on which said bldg is constructed, are necessary for the operation of its business of generation, distribution and sale of electric current and should be exempt from taxation. The lower court erred in exempting the private respondents from paying real property tax on its properties enumerated in the complaint.

Casiño v. Court of Appeals (1991)

FACTS: Casiño owned the Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum. He was the licensee of a cockpit.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 49 which classified certain areas of the city as residential zones (it included Block 125, the location of the Coliseum). The classification led to the cancellation of Casiño’s license to operate. 13 August 1985: Res. No. 378 reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. When it was transmitted to the mayor, he returned it within 10 days, without any action, stating that his approval was not needed since it did not involve a disposition of city funds.

Mayor Lugod (succeeding mayor) issued to petitioner the permit to operate a cockpit dated 2 April 1986. This was renewed a year later. Pvt. Respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc: Protested the operation of the Coliseum before the Phil. Gamefowl Commission. The PGC did not issue any certificate of registration! PGC OIC: Suspend the operation of the cockpit. GGI: Resolution No. 378 is invalid. Ordinance No. 49 was therefore not amended. The mayor’s permits are null and void for violating the PGC rules. Petitioner: The ¾ requirement is ultra vires and was just a formal requirement.

ISSUE: WON the PGC controls the Coliseum with respect to cockfights. YES.WON the mayor’s permits are null and void for not obtaining the ¾ votes in passing Resolution No. 378. YES.

RATIO:Resolution No. 378 failed to comply with the votes needed for its validity. In the enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the LGC is undisputed. However, under Sec. 6.44 of the ordinance, it is specific regarding amendments. When there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect only such cases within its language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. Block 125 remains classified as a residential area.

No registration certificate was issued by the PGC.7 It was a condition precedent to the granting of a mayor’s permit. PGC did not grant such certificate because the cockpit was not constructed within the appropriate areas of the city as prescribed in its zoning laws.

Gamboa, Jr. v. Aguirre, Jr.

FACTS: August 1995: Negros Occidental Governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the duration of the former’s trip abroad. When the

7 Rules and Regulations of the PGC state that: Sec. 6. Cockpits shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or ordinances; Sec. 12. All cockpits in the Philippines shall register with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission not later than September 30, 1981. No cockpit shall be allowed to operate without the proper registration certificate being secured annually, not later than January 31.

SP held its regular session, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside in view of his designationas Acting Governor. Seven members of the SP voted to allow the petitioner to continue presiding while 4 voted against it.

22 Sept 1995: Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition.

ISSUE: WON an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, may continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Although the issue is already moot given the expiration of the terms of office of the parties, the Court answered with a NO.

RATIO: Sections 49(a) and 466(a)(1) of RA 7160 provide that the Vice Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to that, he becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of “permanent vacancy” therein. In case of a temporary vacancy, he shall automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Governor. It is true that in this case, the Vice Governor only “acts” and does not “become” the governor.

A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for the purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. Unlike the old Code where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief Executive but also the presiding officer of the local executive body, the new Code delineated the union of the executive-legislative powers in the provincial, city and municipal levels except in the Barangay. The Governor is no longer a member of the SP. Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.

Garcia v. COMELEC

FACTS: Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 (1993): It agreed to the inclusion of the municipality as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with RA 7227.

24 May 1993: Petition was filed with the SB to annul PK 10. Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission. Petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of 1991, soliciting the number of signatures needed to repeal the resolution.

The Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the SB, E. de Leon, wrote the COMELEC requesting a denial of the petition for local initiative as the exercise “will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.”

6 July 1993: COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative since its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

ISSUE: WON a resolution can be the subject of a local initiative. YES.RATIO: The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subject of a local initiative. The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted RA 6735. Thus, section 3(a) includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislation.8 When Congress enacted RA 6735, it intended resolutions to be the proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. The LGC of 1991 dealt with local initiative and did not change or limit its scope.

8 Sec.3. Definitions; (a) “Initiative” is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; anda.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.

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Sec. 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with subjects that can be taken up in a local initiative. It cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong in SSEZ has far reaching implications. The petitioners were also denied their right to due process.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC

FACTS: 13 March 1992: RA 7227 was enacted (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992); it provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone. 24 Nov 1992: US Navy turned over the military reservation to the government. April 1993: Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10, expressing its concurrence, as required by Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the SSEZ. It was then submitted to the OP.24 May 1993: Respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et. al. filed a petition with the SB of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10 and asked for several conditions precedent before Morong joins the SSEZ.

The SB acted on it by promulgating PK 18, requesting Congress to amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Unsatisfied, the respondents resorted to their power of initiative under Sec. 122 par. B of the LGC of 1991.

6 July 1993: COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. 1 Feb 1995: President issued Proclamation No. 532, defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ18 June 1996: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845: Adopting a calendar of activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinances passed by the SB of Morong. It included a referendum day.

27 June 1996: COMELEC promulgated the Res. No. 2848 which provided the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal KB 19 of the SB of Morong. 10 July 1996: SBMA filed this action contesting the validity of Sec. 2848 on the argument that COMELEC is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in scheduling a local initiative which seeks to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10. WON the local initiative seeks the amendment of a national law. YES. UNANSWERED. Premature.RATIO: The process started by private respondents was an initiative but COMELEC made preparations for a referendum only. Not once was the term “initiative used in the resolution. Congress differentiated the two:

1. Initiative- power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

2. Indirect initiative- Exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

3. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for that purpose.

Initiative is resorted to by the people directly either because the lawmaking body fails or refuses to enact a law, ordinance, resolution, or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing.

Under Sec. 13 of RA 6735: local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses to do so within 30 days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents collect the required number within the period granted by the statute, the COMELEC shall state a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the LGU.

While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the lawmaking body. The process and voting in an

initiative are more complex than in a referendum where the voters simply write either “yes” or “no” in a ballot. There is a need for the COMELEC to supervise an initiative more closely especially if the proposal is lengthy and complicated. On the other issue, the Municipal Resolution still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law.

Ortiz v. Posadas

FACTS: 7 out of the 13 members present, including the president, of the municipal council of Tabaco, Albay, voted in favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning cockpits, and 6 members voted against the ordinance, with 3 members absent. It is contended that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all the members of the council.

ISSUE: WON an ordinance passed by a majority of the members present and not by a majority of all the members is valid. Ordinance No. 25 is void.RATIO: The law is clear, it needs only application.

The ayes and noes are taken upon (1) the passage of all ordinances, (2) all propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and (3) any other proposition, upon the request of any member. The same idea is carried into the next sentence. For the passage of (1) any ordinance or (2) any proposition creating indebtedness, the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary. Other measures prevail upon the majority vote of the members present.

Sec. 2224 of the Administrative Code, requiring in mandatory language the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council for the passage of any ordinance, whether or not an ordinance creating an indebtedness, an ordinance passed by less than that majority is invalid.

The basic idea of the legislative body is to make impossible the approval of ordinances or of propositions creating indebtedness by minority votes of municipal councils at meetings hastily called.

V. Perez v. De la Cruz

FACTS: 8 Jan 1968: During a private conference held at the office of the petitioner Perez, with 7 councilors and the vice-mayor of Naga present, the matter of selecting the secretary of the municipal board of the city as well as the chairmen of the various standing committees came up for discussion.

At the indication by the 4 Nacionalista Party councilors of their desire to vote for a particular person as secretary of the board and to hold the chairmanship of the committee on markets for one of them, vice-mayor Perez expressed her intention to vote, in the deliberation of such matters, to create a tie vote and to then exercise her power to break such deadlock.

10 Jan 1968: in another conference, Perez reiterated the same intention to vote twice.

Respondents: We are entitled to relief of restraining the vice-mayor from voting on legislative matters and acts/ proceedings of the board. The vice mayor is not a member of the board but only its presiding officer, that as such, he cannot vote except in case of a tie.

5 March 1968: Liberal councilors passed an amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the Naga municipal board granting the chairman thereof the right to vote as a member, and as presiding officer the right to vote again in case of a tie.

ISSUE: WON the vice mayor, besides being a presiding officer of a municipal board, is also a member thereof? Can he vote twice, to create a deadlock and then to break it? NO. NO.RATIO: There is nothing in RA 305 (Charter of Naga City) that provides that the vice mayor is a member of the municipal board. The position of vice mayor was not even provided for, as the city treasurer was designated as the “acting mayor” in case of the absence of the mayor.

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It is true that RA 2259 created the post of vice mayor, but it did not provide that he shall be considered a member of the city council or municipal board.

Quiem v. Seriña case is not at point, since in that case, by express legal mandate, the vice mayor of CDO city was made a member of the board.

In the absence of any statutory authority constituting the vice mayor as a member of the municipal board, in addition to being the presiding officer thereof, we cannot read into the law something which is not there.

The rules of procedure of the municipal board of Naga City exclude the chairman from voting except in case of a tie vote.

The mere fact that the vice mayor was made the “presiding officer” did not ipso jure make him a member thereof.

By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings.

VIII. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Homeowner’s Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of Manila

FACTS: 21 Dec 1963: City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 4841.9 The petitioners challenged this and the CFI declared it illegal and void ab initio. CFI: The power to declare a state of emergency exclusively pertains to Congress. There is no longer a state of emergency which justifies the regulation of house rentals. It limits the use of private properties.

ISSUE: WON a municipal ordinance that controls the increase in rent for an indefinite period is a valid exercise of police power. NO.RATIO: The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. The exercise of police power is subject to a qualification, those found in the Bill of Rights. It must be reasonable. If the demands of the public welfare are brought about by a state of emergency, the interference upon individual rights must be coextensive and coterminous with the existence thereof.

Since emergencies are temporary, the regulations promulgated must also be temporary.

A law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means t tide over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a “definite” period of time, the length of which must be “reasonable,” in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount.

The powers of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the National Government cannot escape the inherent limitations to which the latter—as the source of said powers—is subject.

Morata v. Go

FACTS: 5 August 1982: Victor Go and Flora Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against petitioners for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00.

Petitioners: It must be dismissed because of the failure of the complainants to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by PD 1508, as well the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties.

The judge denied the motion to dismiss.

9 An Ordinance Regulating Rentals of Lots and Building for Residential Purposes: It prohibited lessors and sublessors from increasing the rental to an amount in excess of the proportion, percentage-wise, in the increase of the assessed value of the land leased or subleased. If only a portion of the land is leased or subleased, the proportionate value of the leased premises shall be the basis for determining the maximum rental to which the same may be increased. As regards buildings, owners were prohibited from increasing the rentals to an amount beyond 10% per annum of the assessed value of the bldg leased and the land on which the bldg stands.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper; WON the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. NO. YES.RATIO:The conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by PD 1508 as a precondition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

Section 6 of PD 1508 is clear: Conciliation is a precondition to the filing of a complaint. The law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon.

The Lupon of each barangay has the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of disputes except in some specified cases.

The law makes no distinction with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level.

By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected leaders of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided.

It is designed to discourage the indiscriminate filing of cases in court.

To say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of its objective.

If it was the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would have said so.

Circular No. 22 issued by C.J. Fernando: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law: Judges were directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions, or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.

Uy v. Contreras

FACTS:Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the 2nd F of a bldg located in Makati. She operated a beauty parlor. 15 April 1993: Sublease contract expired but petitioner was not able to remove all of her movable properties. 17 April 1993: Argument between petitioner and Atayde when the former sough to withdraw her remaining movable properties from the premises. It was followed by a scuffle between the petitioner and Atayde and her employees. 21 April 1993: Respondents were examined for alleged injuries inflicted by petitioner. 23 April 1993: Respondents filed a complaint with the brgy captain of Valenzuela, Makati. 11 May 1993: Office of Prov’l Prosecutor of Rizal filed 2 informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner.

Petitioner: filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they didn’t comply with PD 1508 (prior referral to Lupon)Judge: At this stage, the accused already waived his right to a reconciliation proceeding before the barangay given that the two parties are residents of different barangays. The offense occurred in Makati, and the offense is about to prescribe. The complainant may go directly to court where the complaint is about to prescribe and be barred by the statute of limitations. Respondents: Prior referral is not applicable since they are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities.

ISSUE: WON a complaint that is about to prescribe is exempted from PD 1508. NO.RATIO: The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by PD 1508, but it is now under the LGC. PD 1508 was expressly repealed.

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The revised katarungang pambarangay law has 3 new significant features:1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal cases to

offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 suffers from ambiguity when it states that the prescriptive periods “shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary.” What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of the complaint is unclear. Accordingly, in Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the SOJ, the phrase “the complaint or” is not found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon. Such suspension shall not exceed 60 days.

The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking such proximity as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts.

Although PD 1508 has already been repealed, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable.

Since the slight physical injuries charged were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period would have expired 2 mos after. However, its running was tolled by the filing of the respondents’ complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela on 23 April 1993, and automatically suspended for a period of 60 days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation is reached, a certification to file action is issued, the respondents would still have 56 days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense.

Wingarts v. Mejia

FACTS: John Wingarts and Ophelia Wingarts filed three letter complaints against Judge Mejia of the MTC of Pangasinan. These complaints were an offshoot of 3 criminal cases decided by the judge and involving Wingarts and Col. Munar. John Wingarts was charged with malicious mischief and grave threats.

In the admin complaint relative to the malicious mischief case, the judge was charged with malicious delay in the administration of justice. The judge was also charged with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for issuing an arrest warrant against Wingarts despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation. The case was later on dismissed and indorsed to the barangay official concerned. The 3 rd case involved a charge of rendering an unjust decision.

Judge Mejia: I believed that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a certification from the barangay captain was given to him.

ISSUE: WON the judge properly issued the warrant of arrest without the required compliance with the KP law. NO.RATIO: The judge is liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of the criminal case despite the legal obstacles thereto. Under Art. 408 (c), offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00 require prior barangay conciliation. The crime of grave threats punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code falls within the purview of that section.

Had Mejia observed the mandate of the law, he could have remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the warrant of arrest against the accused.

Corpuz v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Alvarado and Corpuz: 2 tenants of Lorenzo Barredo.Barredo: Decided to sell his property to the tenants in May 1988. Alvarado and the other lessees executed an “Affidavit of Waiver” granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase it. Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. A tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.

October 1991: Corpuz demanded that Alvarado vacate the room that he was occupying since the children of the former needed it for their own use.

Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer for recovery of possession of the room occupied by Alvarado.

Alvarado: The affidavit was forged; the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.

The MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room. The RTC reversed the ruling of the MTC.

ISSUE: WON the case should be dismissed because of the general averment of Alvarado that the case was not referred to the Lupon. NO.RATIO: The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. The only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto.

Since the petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the issue of ownership, Refugia applies:

The inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. However, it could not resolve the issue of ownership.

As regards the non-referral to the Lupon, the SC was not persuaded.

Dui v. CA: The failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense.

The answer of Alvarado reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation.

The proceeding in PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties.

Petition was granted, the MTC decision was reinstated.

Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo

FACTS: Atty. Salomon of the Bonifacio Law Office charged Judge Bellosillo of the MTC with ignorance of the law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and Partiality in connection with a civil case.

2 Apr 1996: An order was given referring the ejectment case back to the barangay for concilation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached.

When Salomon asked about the order, he was required to submit the minutes of the hearings. He complied but no action was taken. It took a year from the time of the filing of the complaint for the judge to order that summons be served on the defendants.

OCA: found Bellosillo either ignorant or negligent in referring the case back to the barangay despite the presence of a valid Certificate to File Action. It also faulted him with disregarding the Rules on Summary Procedure by calling for a preliminary conference, directing the defendants to submit their Comment, and failing to render judgment within the reglementary period.

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ISSUE: WON the requirements of the LGC on the lupon were complied with. NO.RATIO:The records reveal that such Certification was improperly and prematurely issued. It showed that no personal confrontation took place before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. It was reflected in the minutes submitted by the complainants.

The first hearing was dated 16 Feb 1999 and yet the CFA was issued on 1 March 1996.

The barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case.

Supreme Court Circular No. 14-93 provides:In case mediation efforts have proven to be unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate, or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay, the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance of the CFA but must constitute the Pangkat Tagapamayapa before whom the conciliation proceedings should be held.

Mendova v. Judge Afable

FACTS: 18 Feb 1998: Mendova filed with the Office of the Brgy Chairman of Poblacion, San Julian, Eastern Samar, a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada.

Bgy Chairman Quintua, in his Certification, confirmed such fact. Pangkat Chairman Cabago also certified that the case was set for hearing but that the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. 4 May 1998: Complainant filed with the MCTC of San Julian a similar complaint. 3 Nov 1998: Judge dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. “Complaint in this case dated 20 April 1998 was filed with this Court on 4 May 1998…. The alleged offense took place on 15 February 1998. From the date of the commission of the alleged offense, more than two months have elapsed… Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that light offenses prescribe in 2 months.”7 July 1999: Mendova filed with the OCA an admin complaint against the judge. He alleged that the judge did not apply the provisions of the LGC which state in Sec. 410 (c) that while the dispute is under mediation, the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary. Provided, however, that such interruption shall not exceed 60 days from the filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay.

Office of the Court Administrator: Judge is guilty and recommended a P3,000.00 fine.

ISSUE: WON the judge in this case should be deemed administratively liable. NO.RATIO:An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available. The complaint in this case did not bother to file a motion for reconsideration of the judge’s decision. The instant administrative complaint is premature. In this case, the records fail to show when the complainant received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The undated certification he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on several dates, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

When he filed on 4 May 1998, until the dismissal of the case on 3 November 1998, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the BCFA.

He cannot fault Judge Afable for dismissing his case based on prescription.

While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance of the law. It can only be an error in judgment.

Muñez v. Ariño

FACTS: 26 December 1989: Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur, summoned Muñez to his office for conference respecting a land dispute which Muñez had with one Tirso Amado.

27 December 1989: Since Muñez failed to attend, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him.

The warrant was served by CFC Caballes and Cpl. Limayan. No investigation was conducted afterwards.

Muñez filed a complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Ombudsman as well as an admin complaint for violation of the Constituion, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.

After PI, the Ombudsman filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against the mayor in the MTC of Loreto. The case was later on assigned to Judge Ariño after the 1st judge inhibited himself.

Irisari: Quash the information, the acts did not constitute a crime under the law. Under Sec. 143 (3) of the former LGC, mayors were authorized to issue arrest warrants.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found him guilty of misconduct and abuse of authority and suspended him for 8 months.

DILG: Reversed it and held that the warrant was actually just an “invitation or summons.”

The respondent judge reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case.

ISSUE: WON the judge should be held administratively liable. YES.RATIO: The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements:

1. Offender is an officer of the executive branch;2. he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any

order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.

These elements were alleged in the information. What he issued was a warrant of arrest. The defense that the former LGC allowed mayors to issue an arrest warrant will not prosper. This provision has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.

Ponsica v. Ignalaga: No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct PI, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the LGC has been abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing warrants of arrest or search warrants may be exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” found in the counterpart provision of the 1973 Constitution.

Greater Balanga Dev. Corp. v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan

FACTS: A parcel of land located in Bo. San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, was registered under a TCT in the name of petitioner. Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family, which donated to the municipality the present site of the Balanga Public Market. The disputed land lies behind the market.

1987: Petitioner conducted a relocation survey of the area. It found out that certain portions of the property had been usurped by the municipality which had tolerated the construction of shanties and market stalls while charging fees and entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area.

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11 January 1988: Petitioner applied with the Office of the Mayor for a business permit. Mayor Banzon issued Permit No. 2729, granting the petitioner the privilege to operate as a real estate dealer/ privately-owned public market operator” under the name Balanga Central Market.

19 Feb 1988: Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12 annulling the Mayor’s permit issued to petitioner and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit. Mayor Banzon then issued EO No. 1, which revoked the permit.

13 July 1988: Petitioner filed this petition seeking to reinstate the mayor’s permit. It argued that there was no ground for its revocation since it had not violated any law or ordinance.

The Municipality replied by saying that the petitioners violated an ordinance when it failed to disclose the true status of the area and when it failed to secure separate permits for its two businesses (Balanga Revenue Code).

ISSUE: WON the mayor’s permit initially issued was properly revoked. NO.RATIO: The authority of the mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit had been granted.

The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in the application form itself. Revoking the permit, however, because of a false statement in the application form cannot be justified under the quoted provision.

There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed, and petitioner did not make any false statement in the pertinent entry.

The application for 2 businesses in one permit is not a ground for revocation. Their Code does not expressly require two permits for the conduct of 2 or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. The powers of municipal corporations must be construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt must be construed against the municipality. Assuming arguendo that the lot in question was actually one of those awarded to the plaintiffs, and the TCT of petitioner is spurious, this still does not justify the revocation of the Mayor’s permit.

The records reveal that the Sanggunian did not establish or maintain any public market on the lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the market beside it. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.

Although the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions for their issuance or revocation, the “anxiety, uncertainty, and restiveness” among the stallholders and traders could not be a valid ground for revoking the permit of the petitioner. The manner of revocation also violated the petitioner’s right to due process.

Lim and Garayblas v Court of Appeals

FACTS:Policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work permit for its staff for the year 1993. 7 December 1992: Bistro filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition against Lim. Lim issued a closure order on Bistro’s operations effective 23 January 1993.

Lim: The power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses as

provided for in Sec. 11 (1), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Sec. 455, par. 3 (iv) of the LGC of 1991.

Bistro: The Charter and the LGC do not grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by Bistro of the conditions of its licenses and permits.

ISSUE:WON a mayor may order the closure of a nightclub absent any violation of the conditions for the granting of its license.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:It is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the power to suspend or revoke these licenses. However, this power is premised on the violation of the conditions of these licenses and permits.

The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers.

Mayors have no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating them.

It violated Ordinance No. 7716 which prohibits police raids and inspections. The proper LG officials include the City health officer or his representative and the City treasurer.

The regulatory power of MCs must always be exercised in accordance with law. Lim’s exercise of the power violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.

Abbas v. COMELEC

FACTS: The Tripoli Agreement took effect on 23 December 1976. It provided for the establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines and enumerated the 13 provinces comprising the areas of autonomy.

1987: New Constitution was ratified, it provided for regional autonomy. Art. X Sec. 15 provides the ARMM and the CAR.

1 August 1989: RA 6734 was enacted.

ISSUES:1. WON RA 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement.2. WON RA 6734 is unconstitutional as it does away with the

required plebiscite.

HELD: As to No. 2, it is constitutional.

RATIO:As regards the Tripoli Agreement, it need not be discussed by the Court to resolve this case.

The law refers to the Constitution and it indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements.

Under the Constitution and RA 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and citi4es where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.

The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region.

This majority must be of each unit. If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite, they would have so indicated. It can be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.

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What the Constitution requires is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as the individual constituent units.

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments.

Pandi v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:9 August 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the DOH of the ARMM, issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

The same memo also detailed Dr. Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato.

15 September 1993: Lanao del Sur Governor Mutilan issued Office Order No. 7 designating Saber as OIC of the IPHO-APGH Lanao del Sur.

12 August 1993: Sani filed a complaint with the RTC of Lanao del Sur challenging his transfer to the DOH ARMM Office in Cotabato, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH Lanao del Sur.

5 October 1993: Saber filed a quo warranto case claiming that he is the lawfully designated OIC of the IPHO-APGH.

29 October 1993: Pres. Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM.

ISSUE: WON an incumbent provincial health officer can be assigned to another province and if so, who can order such assignment; who can designate the OIC in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur; and who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur—the Governor, the Regional Governor, or the ARMM Secretary of Health?

HELD/RATIO:The Court of Appeal’s reliance on Sec. 478 of the LGC as Provincial Governor Mutilan’s authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Sec. 478 which provides that “The appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal governments,” is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint them.

As Regional Secretary of Helath, Macacua was, as of 6 Nov 1993, the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM.

The Regional Secretary, by virtue of EO 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Helath of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM.

The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant.

Macacua, therefore, had the authority on 6 Nov 1993 to designate an OIC in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer.

After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation.

Ordillo v. COMELEC

FACTS: 30 January 1990: People of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766.10

The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the Region was approved only by a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city mentioned. Sec of Justice: Ifugao can legally constitute the CAR. 8 March 1990: Congress enacted RA 6861 which set the elections in the CAR. Ordillo: The SC must declare COMELEC Res. No. 2259 as null and void. It must restrain the respondents from implementing AO 160. It must also declare EO 220 constituting the CEB and the CR Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted and duly ratified. There can be no valid CAR in only one province since the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

ISSUE: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CAR can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region. NO.

RATIO:

Art. X Sec. 15 of 1987 Constitution:There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.

Even RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having 2 sets of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same area.

There will be two legislative bodies: the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao.

This must be distinguished from the Abbas case in that it laid the ff rule: What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as the individual constituent units.

IX. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

Abella v. COMELEC

FACTS:Three people are contesting the governorship of Leyte:

1. Adelina Larrazabal—obtained the highest number of votes in the 1 Feb 1988 election and was proclaimed but was later declared by the COMELEC to lack both residence and registration qualification for the post of Governor;

2. Benjamin Abella—obtained the 2nd highest number of votes but was not allowed by the COMELEC to sit as governor after the disqualification of Larrazabal;

3. Leopoldo Petilla—Vice Governor of Leyte.

Abella was the official candidate of the LP. Private respondent is the wife of Emeterio Larrazabal (disqualified for lack of residence). She filed her own COC in substitution of her husband. Her candidacy was

10 An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region

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challenged for alleged false statements in her COC regarding her residence.11 It was alleged that she was a resident of Ormoc City like her husband. The COMELEC dismissed the petition and referred it to its law department on the ground that it was a violation of an election offense. The SC set it aside and directed the COMELEC to determine the residence qualification of Larrazabal.

3 Feb 1989: COMELEC upheld the challenged rulings of the provincial board of canvassers.

COMELEC: Lifted its TRO against her proclamation while the hearings in the disqualification case continued.

14 Feb 1991: 2nd Division disqualified Larrazabal as governor. It also denied Abella’s proclamation as governor.

ISSUES: WON Larrazabal is qualified to run as governor. NO.WON the prohibition against the city’s registered voters electing the provincial officials necessarily means a prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. YES.

RATIO: Arts, 68 and 69 of the Family Code are at point.12 Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of abode.

In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte, in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession, or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considered herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga is not present here. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. Despite the petitioner’s insistence, the evidence shows that her supposed cancellation of registration in Ormoc and transfer to Kananga is not supported by the records.

Sec. 12 Art. X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. “shall not be qualified and13 entitled to vote in the election of the…”

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

FACTS:22 January 1988: Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

League of Municipalities of Sorsogon: filed a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the US in 1983.

Frivaldo: I was naturalized, but I sought such citizenship only as a protection against Marcos. I returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help restore democracy. Nottebohm: Citizenship acquired for reasons of convenience only. I could not have repatriated myself since the Special Committee on Naturalization had not been organized yet. My oath in my COC that I was a natural born citizen amounted to a sufficient act of repatriation. My participation in the congressional elections divested me of US citizenship under US law.

SolGen: Frivaldo was not a citizen and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as a US citizen. His election did not cure this defect since the people of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the LGC, and the Omnibus Election Code.

11 They alleged that Larrazabal was neither a resident nor a registered voter of Leyte as required by Sec. 42 of BP 337. 12 68. H & W are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. 69. H & W shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other… for valid and compelling reasons…13 The conjunction and refers to two prohibitions: running and voting.

ISSUE: WON Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as governor of Sorsogon. NO.RATIO:Nottebohm: Irrelevant since it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. If Frivaldo really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA 473 and PD 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by repatriation, or by naturalization.

His alleged forfeiture does not concern us. Frivaldo should have tried to acquire naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure.

Labo v. COMELEC

FACTS: Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio on 20 January 1988. A petition for quo warranto was filed by private respondent on 26 January 1988 but the filing fee was only paid on 10 February 1988, or 21 days after his proclamation.

Labo asked the SC to restrain the COMELEC from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is WON the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the quo warranto case against him was not filed on time.

Lardizabal: He filed it ahead of time. It was only on 8 February 1988 that the COMELEC treated his petition solely as a quo warranto and redocketed it. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.

COMELEC: No direct proof that the petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to the country in 1980.

CID: Took into account the official statement of the Aussie Government through its consul in the Philippines that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976.

ISSUES: WON the quo warranto petition was filed on time. WON Labo is disqualified. WON the person who obtained the 2nd highest number of votes may replace the winning candidate that was found ineligible.

HELD: YES. YES. NO.

RATIO: The fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. Publication is still necessary despite an “immediately upon approval” clause as regards its date of effectivity.

Labo did not question the authenticity of the evidence nor does he deny his acquisition of an Australian passport. Res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Labo became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized through a formal and positive process. He was not even a qualified voter because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio under Sec. 42 of the LGC.

The people of that locality could not have changed the requirements of the LGC and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Philippines to preside over them as mayor of their city. The respondent who filed the petition cannot replace the petitioner as mayor. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

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Topacio v. Paredes: It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC

FACTS: This is the 2nd time the SC was asked to rule on the citizenship of Labo, Jr. Labo believed that he is a Filipino citizen and so he ran for mayor of Baguio in the 1992 elections. Ortega filed a COC for the same office.

Labo: He is a Fil citizen. Alleged that there was a lack of trial on the merits and lack of due process in the first case and that he can prove his citizenship. In Vance v Terrazas: It was held that in proving expatriation, an expatriating act and an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by preponderance of evidence. No finding was made by the CID or the COMELEC as regards his specific intent to renounce his Fil citizenship.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code “operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding” and that it allows Labo’s proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held. NO.RATIO:The fact remains that Labo has not submitted in this case any evidence to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in canceling his COC.

Sec. 72 if the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA 6646. The COMELEC can now legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so in this case where Labo failed to present any evidence to support his claim.

Labo’s status has not changed in this case. He was disqualified for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. Up to this point, the Special Committee on Naturalization has not yet acted on the application of the petitioner for repatriation. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not amount to automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship.

The rule is the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The exception to this rule is if the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. There is a waiver of the validity and efficacy of their votes in such a case.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

FACTS:20 March 1995: Juan Frivaldo filed his COC for Governor in the 1995 elections. 28 March 1995: Raul Lee questioned the COC and moved for Frivaldo’s disqualification. Frivaldo’s MR was unacted upon so he was voted for during the elections. Lee was proclaimed although Frivaldo got the plurality of votes. Frivaldo: He took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen on 30 June 1995. COMELEC: Annulled Lee’s proclamation and proclaimed Frivaldo as the governor-elect.

ISSUE: Who should be the rightful governor of Sorsogon?1. Juan Frivaldo—Obtained the highest number of votes in 3

successive elections but who was twice declared disqualified to hold office due to his alien citizenship but who now claims to have reassumed his lost citizenship through repatriation.

2. Raul Lee—2nd place in the canvass but who claims that the votes cast for Frivaldo should be considered void; that the

electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots and that legally, he secured to most number of valid votes; or

3. The incumbent Vice Governor, Oscar Deri, who obviously was not voted directly but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a “permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred.”

SUB-ISSUES: 1. WON the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal. If yes,

did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship to qualify him to be proclaimed and to become Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect?

2. WON Frivaldo’s judicially declared disqualification for lack of Fil citizenship is a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for governor.

3. WON COMELEC had jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that it is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo-warranto case.

4. WON the proclamation of Lee was valid.5. WON COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in preventing

Frivaldo from assuming the governorship.

HELD: FRIVALDO.

RATIO:1. Frivaldo had proved that he has acquired Philippine

citizenship by repatriation under PD 725 and that he took his oath of allegiance on 30 June 1995. There is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and that was not successfully rebutted by Lee. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship, the very day the term of office of governor began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed. The LGC requires that an official be a registered voter, it does not require him to actually vote. The SC also held that the repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on 17 August 1994. The legislative intent in PD 725 was to give it a retroactive operation.

2. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. A person may subsequently reacquire, or lose, his citizenship.

3. The Constitution has granted the COMELEC ample power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective, provincial officials.

4. There was insufficient evidence presented to show that the people of Sorsogon knew in fact and in law the alleged disqualification. Frivaldo should be the one proclaimed.

5. The claim in the 5th issue is now moot and academic as the resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the COMELEC.

Mercado v. Manzano

FACTS:Ernesto Mercado, Gabriel Daza III and Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of Makati in the 1998 elections.Manzano got 103,853 votes, Mercado garnered 100,894 and Daza acquired 54,275 votes. Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he was a US citizen.

COMELEC: Granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the COC of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC, persons with dual citizenship

COMELEC en banc: Manzano was qualified to run for vice mayor. The BOC then declared Manzano as the winner.

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Sec. 40 (d) Those with dual citizenship. Congress commanded in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.

ISSUE: WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification. NO.RATIO:Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.

Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual’s volition.

Art. IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution states that “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

In including this section, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 Section 40 (d) and in RA 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the disqualification.

It should suffice if, upon the filing of their COC, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By filing a COC when he ran for this post, Manzano elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. His COC contained the following statement: “I am a Filipino Citizen—Natural-Born.”

Coquilla v. COMELEC

FACTS: Coquilla was born in 1938 of Filipino parents in Eastern Samar. He resided there until 1965 when he joined the US navy. He was naturalized as a US citizen. From 1970-73, he visited the Philippines while on leave from the navy. Even after his retirement from the navy in 1985, he remained in the US.

15 October 1998: Coquilla returned and took out a residence certificate. He continued making trips to the US. He applied for repatriation under RA 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. It was approved in 2000 and he took his oath as a citizen.

21 November 2000: Petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. It was approved.

27 February 2001: He filed his COC stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years.

5 March 2001: Respondent Neil Alvarez, incumbent mayor of Oras, sought to cancel the COC on the ground that Coquilla made a material misrepresentation in the COC since he had only been there for 6 months since he took his oath as a citizen.

Coquilla won in the election with a margin of 379 votes. He was proclaimed mayor of Oras.

19 July 2001: COMELEC cancelled the COC on the ground that he failed to comply with the residency requirement. The number of years he claimed to have resided in Oras since 1985 as an American citizen before 10 November 2000 cannot be added to his actual residence to cure the deficiency in days, months, and year to allow him to run for an elective office.

ISSUE: WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Easter Samar at least one year before the elections held on 14 May 2001. NO.RATIO:

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or “legal residence.” That refers to a place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). Coquilla lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the navy.

Residence in the US is a requirement for naturalization as a US citizen. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship in 2000, he did not acquire his legal residence here. His registration as a voter of Butnga in January 2001 is not conclusive of his residency as a candidate since Sec. 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election.

Caasi v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:The petitioners in this case argued for the disqualification of Merito Miguel for the post of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in 1988 on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the US, not of Bolinao.

Miguel: Admitted to the holding of a green card but denied that he is a permanent resident of the US. He allegedly obtained it for convenience that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical exams and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, having voted in all previous elections there.

COMELEC: Possession of a green card does not establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

ISSUES: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US; YES. 2. WON Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the US prior to the local elections on 18 January 1988. NO.

RATIO:Green card: Stated that Miguel was a resident alien. In his application, he wrote that he intended to stay permanently. Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating; the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.

As a resident alien, Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the US.

Sec. 18, Article XI of the Constitution which states that “any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law” is inapplicable to Miguel since he acquired such status prior to his election as mayor.

Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to him: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

The records are bare of proof that he had waived his status before he ran for election as mayor of Bolinao.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for office for at least one year at the time of filing of the COC is one of the qualifications. Miguel did not possess that since he was a permanent resident of the US and he resided in Bolinao for only 3 months after his return to the Philippines.

Marquez v. COMELEC

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FACTS: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for governor of Quezon in the 1992 elections filed a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution of the COMELEC which dismissed his quo warranto case against Rodriguez, the winning candidate in their province, for allegedly being a fugitive from justice.

Marquez: At the time Rodriguez filed his COC, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before an LA court.

ISSUE: WON a “fugitive from justice” must be a person who has been convicted by final judgment. NO.

RATIO: Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term “fugitive from justice” to refer only to a person “who has been convicted by final judgment” is an inordinate and undue circumspection of the law.

The COMELEC in this case did not make any definite finding on WON, in fact, Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” since the quo warranto case was outrightly dismissed. This case must be remanded to the COMELEC.

Rodriguez v. COMELEC

FACTS: Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon in the 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed governor.

Marquez challenged the victory by arguing that Rodriguez left the US where a charge is pending against him before the LA Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for his disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.

COMELEC: … “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition finds support from jurisprudence and may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

ISSUE: WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. NO.RATIO:The definition of “fugitive from justice” indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction.

Rodriguez’ case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the LA Court and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost 5 months. It was impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant a the time he left the US, What prosecution was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US?

The “law of the case” doctrine forbids the Court from crafting an expanded re-definition of “fugitive from justice.”

The legal rule in the Marquez Decision must govern the instant petition. The Court specifically refers to the concept of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main opinion of Marquez which highlights the significance of an intent to evade. In Marquez, the Court ruled that “A ‘fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.”

Dela Torre v. COMELEC

FACTS: Rolando Dela Torre sought to nullify two decisions of the COMELEC in the disqualification case filed against him:6 May 1995 Resolution: Disqualified him from running for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the 1995 elections based on Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC.14

14 Sec. 40. Disqualifications—(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment within two years after serving sentence.

The COMELEC ruled that the petitioner was found guilty of violating PD 1612 or the Anti-Fencing Law. 28 August 1995 Resolution: Denied the MR and the COMELEC denied the contention of the petitioner that the probation granted to him suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences that flowed from it.

ISSUES: WON the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude; WON a grant of probation affects the applicability of Sec. 40 (a). YES. NO. RATIO:Moral turpitude has been defined as: an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

The Court is guided by the general rule that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, the Court admitted that this guideline is inadequate in providing a clear-cut solution. WON a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

Moral turpitude is deducible from the 3rd element of the crime: The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object, or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

The same underlying reason holds even if the “fence” did not have actual knowledge, but merely “should have known” the origin of the property received.

Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which is a crime of moral turpitude subsists and remains unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. A judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.

Magno v. COMELEC

FACTS: Montes filed a case for the disqualification of Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the 2001 elections on the ground that he was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 4 counts of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the RPC.

Petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on 5 March 1998.

7 May 2001: COMELEC granted the petition citing Section 12 of BP 881.

BP 881 explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude after 5 years from the service of the sentence.

Magno: Direct bribery does not involve moral turpitude. He also cited the LGC which states in Sec. 40 that a person who was sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude, or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence.

Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor.

ISSUE: WON Magno was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections. NO.

RATIO: Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law.

Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. It can be inferred from the third element of bribery. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen.

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In David v COMELEC, the SC declared that RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitely provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. Sec. 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office.

It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Sec. 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualification of candidates for local posts, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail.

Although the crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of 5 March 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro in the 2001 elections.

Lingating v. COMELEC

FACTS:3 May 2001: Petitioner filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Pagadian City a petition for the disqualification of respondent Sulong pursuant to the LGC which disqualifies from running for any elective local post “those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.”

Sulong previously won as mayor of Lapuyan in 1988. He also won in 1992 and in 1995.

Lingating: During Sulong’s first term in 1991, he was administratively charged with various offenses and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.

Sulong: The decision has not become final and executory. I filed a motion for reconsideration and such is still pending.

Sulong was voted for in the elections and was subsequently proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

1 August 2001: COMELEC declared Sulong disqualified. Any person removed from office by reason of an administrative case is disqualified from running for any elective local office.

Provincial Secretary: Issued a certification that the decision in the case has not become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992.

COMELEC en banc reversed the earlier decision.

ISSUE: WON respondent was found guilty in the administrative case. NO.

RATIO:The rule that an elective local officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position does not apply where the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finding a local mayor guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds has not become final.

Where there was failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve a local official’s motion for reconsideration before the elections, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for said official that after all he is disqualified, especially so where at the time of the election, the decision sought to be reconsidered had been rendered nearly ten years ago.

There is no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of.

Flores v. Drilon

FACTS:Under Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227, Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo was appointed Chairman and CEO of SBMA.

The petitioners claim that this is against Sec. 7, Art. IX-B of the Constitution which states that “no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

ISSUE: WON Gordon’s appointment pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution can be sustained.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo, to other government posts (Chairman of the Board and CEO of SBMA). Since this is prohibited by the Constitution, the law is unconstitutional. The fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.

Even though Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or the primary functions of his office, it cannot be determinative of the constitutionality of RA 7227 for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.

The phrase “shall be appointed” shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of mayor of Olongapo. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

Galido v. COMELEC

FACTS:Galido and Galeon were candidates for mayor in the January 1988 elections in Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.

Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC. The court upheld the proclamation of Galido by a majority of 11 votes. The COMELEC reversed the RTC ruling. It was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. Galido went to the SC to challenge this COMELEC decision alleging grave abuse of discretion in its appreciation of “marked ballots.”

ISSUE: WON certiorari can be used to challenge a final order of the COMELEC in a contest involving elective municipal officials. YES.

RATIO:The fact that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are final, executory, and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

Article IX (A) Sec. 7 of the Constitution states “Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

Rivera v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Juan Rivera and respondent Juan Garcia II were candidates for the local elections in 1988.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor by a majority of 10 votes. Garcia filed an election protest. The trial court found for Garcia.

Rivera appealed to the COMELEC. It sustained the judgment of the RTC. Garcia commenced to discharge the functions of Mayor of Guinobatan.

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Rivera filed this petition seeking the annulment of the COMELEC en banc decision.

Garcia: The Constitution declares that decisions of the COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials to be final, executory, and not appealable.

ISSUE: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective local officials, being final and executory and not appealable, preclude the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. NO.

RATIO:The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving local elective officials are final, executory, and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

The SC has closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and found that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, 14 ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia’s favor were overruled by the Commission en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots. The appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations.

It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations.

Borja v. COMELEC

FACTS:Capco was elected vice mayor of Pateros. He became mayor upon the death of the incumbent Cesar Borja. During the next term, he ran and was elected mayor and was again reelected. On his third attempt to get elected, petitioner Benjamin Borja challenged his candidacy on the idea that he would have already served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms by 30 June 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term.

ISSUE: WON a vice mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three term limit. NO.

RATIO:To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy in the Constitution—the other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people.

In considering the historical background of Art. X Sec. 8 of the Constitution shows that the members of the Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.

Not only historical examination but textual analysis supports the ruling that this provision contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. If an official is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated or is removed from office—the vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law while the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. The Representative serves a term for which he was elected.

It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC

FACTS: Romeo Lonzanida was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio prior to the 8 May 1995 elections. In May 1995, he ran and was proclaimed winner. It was contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest. COMELEC resolved the case in favor of Alvez.

11 May 1998: Lonzanida again filed his COC for mayor. His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a case for disqualification against Lonzanida.

Lonzanida: Only served for two consecutive terms and that his assumption to office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials since he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.

ISSUE: WON the term of a person who gets disqualified after proclamation is included in the counting of the three consecutive term limit. NO.

RATIO:Conditions for the application for disqualification:

1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post;

2. and that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers, he is only the presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.

Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

Adorneo v. COMELEC

FACTS:Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the 2001 elections. Talaga was then the incumbent mayor.

Talaga was elected mayor in 1992. He was reelected in 1995-1998. In 1998, he lost to Tagarao. In the recall election of 12 May 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until 30 June 2001.

Adormeo: Talaga was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms violating Sec. 8 Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON Talaga served for 3 consecutive terms as contemplated by the Constitution. NO.

RATIO:The ruling of the COMELEC that private respondent was not elected for three consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Socrates v. COMELEC

FACTS:

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2 July 2002: 312 out of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a preparatory recall assembly.

The PRA was convened to initiate the recall of Victorino Docrates who assumed office as mayor on 30 June 2001.

PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. COMELEC then gave due course to the resolution and scheduled a recall election.

23 August 2002: Edward Hagedorn filed hi COC for mayor in the recall election.

17 August 2002: Adovo and Gilo filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn from running on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for 3 consecutive terms.

ISSUE: WON a candidacy in a recall election is included in the 3-consecutive term rule. NO.

RATIO:The SC is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous.

The intent of Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and under Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule; Involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a 4th term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons:

1. A subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms;

2. The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.

The winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the fill term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office.

Osmeña v. COMELEC

FACTS:This petition calls for the determination of the validity of RA 7056, “An Act Providing for the National and Local Election in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning in 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor.”

ISSUE: WON the law is constitutional. NO. RATIO:RA 7056, which provides for the holding of desynchronized election, is violative of the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized national and local elections in the second Monday of May 1992.

The term of office of the local elective officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by the Constitution at 3 years. The incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988. Their term would have expired on 2 February 1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of 30 June 1992. The reason for this is to synchronize the national and local elections. On the other hand, RA 7056 provides for 2 separate elections in 1992.

The legislature cannot extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the Constitution has in effect fixed the term and the day on which the official term shall begin.

Menzon v. Petilla

FACTS:16 Feb 1988: Since no Governor had been proclaimed in Leyte, Luis Santos (LG Sec) designated the Vice Governor, Leopoldo Petilla, as Acting Governor of Leyte.

Menzon, a senior member of the Sanggunian, was also designated by Secretary Santos to act as Vice Governor for Leyte.

ISSUE: WON the appointment of Menzon was valid. YES.RATIO:

In the absence of any contrary provision in the LGC, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, empowering the President to make temporary appointments in case of any vacancy in appointive positions, may, in the best interest of public service, also be applied in case of vacancy in the position of Vice-Governor, as in this case.

The appointment of the petitioner is in full accord with the intent behind the LGC. Here is no question that Sec. 49 in connection with Sec. 52 of the LGC shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice Governor. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Dept. Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.

Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, has no power to appoint petitioner, at the very least, petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.

Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar

FACTS:Two persons are claiming the same position in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar by virtue of separate appointments extended to them by the same authority. The first appointment was replaced by the second appointment, which was subsequently withdrawn to reinstate the first appointment, but this was later itself recalled in favor of the second appointment.

It arose when Luis Capito died in office and petitioner Agustin Docena was appointed to succeed him.

On 27 November 1990, Socrates Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Luis Santos, to the post already occupied by Docena.

ISSUE: WON Docena is the proper appointee who can serve for the unexpired term. YES.

RATIO:From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on 19

November 1990, it was intended to be permanent, to fill the permanent vacancy caused by Capito’s death. As such, it was to be valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member, who was entitled to serve “until noon of June 30, 1992,” in accordance with Article XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution.

The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES, as per certification of the provincial secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner’s appointment had already been complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar.

Docena’s appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of

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the deceased predecessor’s term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed in the LGC. These could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.

De Rama v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:Upon his assumption to the post of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado de Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees.

He alleged that the appointments of the employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Article VII, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution.15

Some of the employees filed a claim for payment with the CSC alleging that de Rama withheld their salaries.

The CSC denied de Rama’s request for the recall of the employees: In the absence of any showing that these appointments were defective in form and substance, nor is there evidence presented to show that they were issued in contravention of law or rules, these are deemed valid and in effect.

ISSUE: WON the appointments are valid.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.

Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the position in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. It is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position.

It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the CSC law and regulations.

David v. COMELEC

FACTS:As barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, petitioner Alex David filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of barangay elections scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.

COMELEC opposed the petition while the SolGen agreed with it.

In another case, the Liga ng mga Barangay QC Chapter filed a petition seeking to declare the following as unconstitutional:

1. Sec. 43 (c) of RA 7160: Term of office of bgy officials shall be for 3 years;

2. COMELEC Res. Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of holding of the elections;

3. Budgetary appropriation of P400M for the cost of the elections.

ISSUE: WON RA 7160 which shortened the term of office of barangay officials constitutional.

15 Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:The intent of the legislature is to limit the term of barangay officials to only three years.

RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. Legis posteriors priores contraries abrogant.

RA 6679 requires the votesrs to elect seven kagawads and the candidate who gets the highest number of votes becomes the punong barangay. The LGC, however, mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman.

There is a clear incompatibility between the provisions of these two laws so the earlier one must be deemed to have been repealed.

The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service.

Petitioners are also estopped from pursuing their petitions. Following the petitioner’s own theory, the election of Petitioner David was illegal since they were elected under RA 6679.

Alinsug v. RTC-Negros Occidental

FACTS:Petitioner, Zonsayda Alinsug, has been a regular employee of the municipal government of Escalante.

She received an order from the newly proclaimed mayor detailing her to the mayor’s office.

She absented herself from work allegedly to attend to family matters. She asked the permission of the personnel officer but not of the mayor.

Mayor Ponsica suspended Zonsayda for one month and one day for simple misconduct.

Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for damages and TRO against the mayor and the municipal treasurer, alleging that it was an act of political vendetta.

She filed a motion praying that the answer be disregarded since the respondents were sued in their official capacities so they should have been represented either by the municipal legal officer or by the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as provided for in the LGC.

ISSUE: WON the respondents can be represented by a private counsel.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when it is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city in the province.

The key to resolving this issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought.

When moral and/or exemplary damages are claimed, a mayor may hire a private counsel to defend him at his own personal expense.

A public official, who, it the performance of his duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, and his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability. All the foregoing considered, we hold that the respondents were not improperly represented by a private counsel, whose legal fees shall be for their own account.

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Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:The petitioners in this case seek the nullification of the resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed their petition for having been filed by a private counsel.

ISSUE: WON a private counsel may represent a municipality if the provincial fiscal refuses to handle its case.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:The CA is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no

authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the municipality. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled. The RAC provides: The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the SC or in cases where the municipality or district in question is the party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any of the political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. A special attorney may be employed by its council in this case.

Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province of municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.

In this case, there is nothing to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified. Hence, the appearance of herein counsel is without authority of law.

The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. The council should have requested the SOJ to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the fiscal who declined to handle such case.

Ramos v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:Petitioners Ramos, Perez, and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association filed a petition to declare the nullity of two municipal ordinances and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed by the Municipality of Baliuag.

Atty. Romanillos appeared as counsel of the municipality. The petitioners sought to disqualify Romanillos. Atty. Romanillos argued that he was the collaborating counsel of the provincial fiscal, Atty. Regalado.

ISSUE: WON a private counsel may collaborate with a provincial counsel.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:None of the exceptions is present here. It may be said that Atty. Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in this case. The order of the trial court stated that Atty. Romanillos entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial attorney. This collaboration is contrary to law and should not have been recognized as legal.

The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize the latter’s representation of the municipality.

Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own, and neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers.

Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigation, in the interest of substantial justice, however, a municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it provided (1) that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided that no compensation in any guise is paid therefore by said municipality.

Salalima v. Guingona

FACTS:Petitioners seek to annul and set aside AO No. 153 issued by the Executive Secretary approving the findings of fact of the Ad Hoc Committee which held that the petitioners are administratively liable for disregarding the law in several cases, abuse of authority, oppression and abuse of authority, and negligence.

The petitioners argued that the challenged AO is an oppressive and capricious exercise of executive power.

ISSUE: WON the AO is valid.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts to, or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action.

There is no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeds six months and the unexpired portion of the elective official’s term of office where the suspension imposed for each administrative offense does not exceed six months and there is an express provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office.

The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, and the grant under the LGC of 1991 to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations.

Where the province buys the delinquent properties sold in a public auction to satisfy unpaid real estate taxes and penalties, the municipalities entitled to taxes on said properties may be considered co-owners of such properties to the extent of their respective shares in the real property taxes and the penalties thereon.

Public officials could not be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.

Artieda v. Santos

FACTS:In 1988, ten administrative complaints were filed by various city officials against Ganzon, elected mayor of Iloilo, on different grounds.

Respondent Secretary Santos issued three separate orders of preventive suspension against Ganzon, each to last for 60 days.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of his third and fourth suspension orders.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:If simultaneous service of two suspension orders is allowed,

this would work in favor of the local elective official as the balance of his third preventive suspension would, in effect, be reduced from 46 days to

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17 days. It will be recalled that, in the main decision, noting that successive suspensions have been imposed on Mayor Ganzon, the SC stated that what is intriguing is that respondent Secretary has been cracking down on the mayor piecemeal, apparently to pin him down ten times the pain, when the Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort.

The LGC provides that in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.

Espiritu v. Melgar

FACTS:It was alleged that Mayor Melgar assaulted Ramir Garing, boxing and kicking him on different parts of his body and that he was ordered arrested and detained in the municipal jail without filing any charges against him.

The Sanggunian required Melgar to answer the charges.

Governor Espiritu preventively suspended him pursuant to a recommendation made by the Sanggunian.

ISSUE: WON the suspension of Mayor Melgar was validly done.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:The privincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal Mayor of Naujan at any time after the issues have been joined when any of the following grounds exist:

1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent has committed the acts complained of;

2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence.

Mayor Melgar’s direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature.

Since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the TRO and therefore has already ben served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.

Aguinaldo v. Santos

FACTS:Petitioner Aguinaldo assails the decision of the Interior Secretary dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan on the ground that his power has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner was charged with disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution for the acts he committed during the coup.

ISSUE: WON the power of the Secretary to dismiss a locally elective official has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:Re-election renders administrative case moot and academic.

Except for criminal acts committed, a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.

Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a LGC which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, then it cannot be said that BP 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 48 (1) of BP Blg 337 grants the Secretary the power to appoint local government officials in case of incumbent’s removal from office.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required before the petitioner could be suspended or removed from office. Petitioner in this case is not being prosecuted criminally under the RPC, but administratively with the end view of removing him as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan for acts of disloyalty to the Republic.

Reyes v. COMELEC

FACTS:Renato Reyes was the incumbent mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.

26 October 1994: Administrative complaint was filed against him by a Dr. Manalo.

It was alleged that he exacted and collected P50,000 from each market stall holder in the municipal public market, that certain checks issued to him by the DILG were never received by the municipal treasurer and that he took 27 heads of cattle from the beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared the cattle for seven months.

De Castro sought Reyes’ disqualification as candidate for mayor. Petitioner was voted for in the next elections. He was later on disqualified by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: WON the disqualification was proper.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:Any agreement to delay service of a decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in administrative cases is illegal. The law makes it mandatory that copies of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall immediately be furnished to respondent and/ or interested parties.

The filing of a petition for certiorari does not prevent a decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.

When the elections were held on 8 May 1995, the decision of the SP had already become final and executory. To arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.

Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole

FACTS:Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against the respondents in this case with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas.

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These public officials of Mandaue City were charged with violating RA 3019, Article 170 and 171 of the RPC, and RA No. 6713.

They challenged the power of the Ombudsman to suspend them alleging that the LGC deprived the Ombudsman of the jurisdiction to try, hear, and decide the admin case of local officials since the power is now vested in the Office of the President.

ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman is bereft of jurisdiction to hear administrative cases against local officials.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:There is nothing in the LGC that indicates that it has repealed the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. Repeals by implication are not favored. Every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws.

Not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard.

Any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or finding of the Ombudsman may only be entertained by the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Grego v. COMELEC

FACTS:31 October 1981: Basco was removed from his post as Deputy Sheriff.

He ran as a candidate for Councilor in Manila during the 1988 elections. He won.

He sought re-election in the 1992 elections. He won but was besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls. Basco ran and won for another term after that.

His opponents challenged the third election. The Manila BOC proclaimed Basco as the duly elected councilor. He immediately took his oath of office.

ISSUE: WON Basco should be removed from office as a result of an administrative case pursuant to the LGC that took effect in 1992.

HELD: No.

RATIO: Sec. 40(b) of the LGC does not have any retroactive effect.

A statute, despite the generality of its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events, or matters which transpired before its passage.

Under PD 807, the former Civil Service Decree, the term reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position—a public officer administratively dismissed then was not therefore barred from running for an elective position.

The use of the word “may” in RA 6646 indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive.

Absent any determination of irregularity in election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is mandatory and ministerial for the Board of Canvassers to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.

A possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions:

1. The one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified;

2. The electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.

Joson v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:Private respondents filed with the OP a complaint charging Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority, alleging that he barged into the session hall of the capitol, kicking the door, chairs, and threatening them for resisting the approval of a loan of P150M from the PNB.

The complaint and the notes were sent to Secretary Barbers. Joson filed a motion for a formal investigation but it was denied by the DILG noting that submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings.

ISSUE: WON the suspension of Joson was improper.

HELD: YES. RATIO:The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the disciplining authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local officials. AO 23 delegates this power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.

This is not undue delegation, what is delegated is the power to investigate and not the power to discipline.

An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused:

1. Right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;2. Right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against

him; and3. Right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production

of documentary evidence.

Petitioner’s right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against local elective government officials are not similar to those against appointive officials.

Pablico v. Villapando

FACTS:Some SB members filed a complaint against Alejandro Villapando, mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.

It was alleged that Villapando entered into a consultancy agreement with Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections, falling within the 1 year prohibition under Art. IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

1 Feb 2000: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found him guilty and imposed the penalty of dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal on erring local officials.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:

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An elective local official may be remove from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. It may be decreed only by a court of law.

The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124(b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC, insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being against the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the LGC.

The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it in good faith.

Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.

Conducto v. Monzon

The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct committed during a prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. The rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases.

Evardone v. COMELEC

FACTS:Felipe Evardone was the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected in the 1988 local elections.

14 February 1990: Apelado, Aclan, and Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar.

COMELEC issued a resolution approving the recommendation of Sumbilla, Election Registrar of the municipality.

Evardone: The COMELEC erred since the petitioner was denied due process. The COMELEC also erred since the Resolution is null and void for being unconstitutional. Since there was, during the period material to the case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials. There is therefore no basis for the resolution and the recall proceeding is premature.

ISSUE: WON Res. No. 2272 is constitutional.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:The Constitution, Article XVIII, Sec. 3 provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with it shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. RA 7160, specifically repeals BP 337. But the LGC will take effect only on 1 January 1992. The old LGC is still applicable to the present case.

The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a local official.

Whether the electorate of the municipality has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It is valid and has legal effect.

Garcia v. COMELEC

FACTS:11 May 1992: Petitioner Enrique Garcia was elected governor of Bataan.

1 July 1993: Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the SB of the 12 municipalities of the province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcial.

A resolution was passed for the recall of Garcia on the ground of “loss of confidence.”

ISSUE: WON Sec. 70 of RA 7160 allowing a preparatory recall assembly is unconstitutional.

HELD: No.

RATIO:To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits; all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law.

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.

The LGC of 1983 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local elective officials.

The LGC of 1991 provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall assembly.

There is nothing in the Constitution that remotely suggests that the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding.

Membership of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level is not apportioned to political parties.

Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a political question.

Paras v. COMELEC

FACTS:Danilo Paras is the Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won in the last regular election in 1994.

A petition for his recall was filed by registered voters of the barangay.

COMELEC: Approved the petition and set the recall election on 13 November 1995.

29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition. The Commission deferred the election to December 6.

Paras filed with the RTC a petition for injunction. TRTC dismissed the petition.

Paras: No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. It is now barred since the 13 January 1996 falls within one year from the SK election on the first Monday of May 1996. Since the SK election is a regular local election, he could not be recalled.

ISSUE: WON the SK elections bar the recall election of a barangay official even if it falls within one year before the SK election.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:If the SK election which is set by law to be held every 3 years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase “regular local election,” then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LGC.

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The Constitution requires an effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum. A statute must be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.

It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the LGC to construe “regular local election” as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

Angobung v. COMELEC

FACTS:Petitioner won as Mayor of Tumauini, Isabela in the 1995 elections.

September 1996: Petitioner received a copy of a petition for recall.

COMELEC RO: Recommended the approval of the petition for recall signed by other qualified voters to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters. COMELEC en banc issued the assailed resolution.

Angobung: The resolution was signed by just one person in violation of the 25% minimum; It scheduled the recall election within 1 year from the Barangay Elections.

ISSUE:WON a petition for recall signed by just one person is valid.

HELD: No.

RATIO:The issue in Sanchez was not the questioned procedure but the legal basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its rule-making power in the alleged absence of a statutory grant.

In Sanchez and Evardone: The COMELEC-prescribed procedure of allowing the recall petition to be filed by at least one person and then inviting voters to sing said petition on a date set for that purpose was never put to issue.

Sec. 69(d) of the LGC: Expressly provides that the recall of any elective municipal official may be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the LGU concerned.

The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates a recall proceeding.

The phrase “petition of at least 25%” is used and the law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25%; rather, the petition must be “of” or by, at least 25% of the registered voters.

Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of 25% of the registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

SC: Cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much lesss, the filing thereof by just one person.

Recall must be pursued by the people, not just one disgruntled loser or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, it will only serve to sitabilize a community and disrupt the running of government.

Malonzo v. COMELEC

FACTS:Malonzo won over Asistio in the 1995 elections.

7 July 1996: 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and SK chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, met and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of PRA Res. No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.

Malonzo: There was inadequate service of notices to the members and the PRA must be the one to initiate recall proceedings and not the Liga ng mga Barangay.

ISSUE: WON the recall process was validly initiated.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:Factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantial attack on its validity.

The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the PRA.

Petitioner’s insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga, is misplaced. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the PRA, the majority of whom met and voted in favor of the resolution for his recall.

Claudio v. COMELEC

FACTS:11 May 1998: Jovito Claudio was elected mayor of Pasay City.

May 1999: Chairs of several barangays gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Claudio for loss of confidence.

19 May 1999: At the residence of Mr. Lim, several chairs formed an ad hoc committee to convene a PRA.

29 May 1999: 1,073 members of the PRA composed of chairs, kagawads, and SK chairs of Pasay, adopted Res. No. 01, S-1999 to initiate the recall of Claudio for loss of confidence.

2 July 1999: Petition for recall was filed accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor.

Claudio: The signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned; the convening of the PRA took place within the 1 year period; the election case filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in the SC, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of Claudio should first be decided; and the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 SK officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.

COMELEC: Dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:(1) On the word “recall”Sec. 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. Sec. 69

provides that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters… Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. The term “recall” in par. (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition

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of recall with the COMELEC or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a petition for recall.

The limitations in Sec. 74 apply only to the exercise of the power to recall which is vested in the registered voters. People v. Garcia: Holding of a PRA is not the recall itself.

As long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be judged on the performance prematurely. To construe the term recall as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and assembly of its members.

(2) Whether the phrase “Regular Local Election” includes the election period for the regular election or simply the date of such election.

There is a distinction between election period and campaign period. To hold that it includes the entire period would reduce the period to eight months. Such an interpretation would devitalize the right of recall.

(3) Whether the Recall Resolution was singed by a majority of the PRA and duly verified.

Yes. Although the term “attendance” appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake. It is more probable to believe that it was signed to signify their concurrence to the recall resolution.

Mendez v. CSC

FACTS:7 June 1984: Then Acting Register of Deeds of QC Vicente Coloyan filed an admin complaint against petitioner, a legal research assistant in the QC Office of the City Attorney for Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for allegedly tearing off a portion of TCT from the registry book and then pocketing it.

QC Mayor dismissed it for insufficiency of evidence.

Coloyan appealed to the MSPB which reversed the decision and found him guilty with the penalty of dismissal.

CSC affirmed it on appeal.

ISSUE: WON Coloyan is a party adversely affected by the decision allowed by law to file an appeal.

HELD: No.

RATIO:It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in a manner and in accordance

Macalincag and Carlos v. Chang

Under Sec. 41 of PD 807, designation of the replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the preventive suspension.

BP 337 provides for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer.

The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the Department of Finance. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue the preventive suspension order. More specifically acting Sec. of Finance Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing that order.

Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan

The power to discipline is specifically granted by Sec. 47 of the Admin. Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies, and

instrumentalities, provinces, and cities. On the other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by the Omnibus Rules to the secretary of a department, the head of an agency, LGU, the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.

In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side; Due process is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.

Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges filed against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.

A public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.

Javellana v. DILG and Santos

FACTS:Atty. Erwin Javellana was elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Divinagracia filed an Administrative Case against Javellana for continuously engaging in the practice of law without securing authority from the Regional Director of the DILG. It also alleged that Javellana filed a case against Divinagracio for “Illegal Dismilssal and Reinstatement with Damages.”

ISSUE: WON Javellana properly engaged in the practice of law.

HELD: No.

RATIO:LGC, Sec. 90. Sanggunian members may practice their

professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. Provided, that sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not: Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official.

The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government.

By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute the claims against Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memo Circular No. 74-58 prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, is such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

X. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

Local Governments are subject to legislative control. This is limited by the Constitution.

Constitutional limitations:1. Protect private property;2. Previously entered contracts must not be impaired;3. Uniform laws4. Limitations depending on nature of rights and powers

exercised by the municipality.

BASCO V. PAGCOR

FACTS:Petitioners sought to annul PD 1869 on the ff grounds:1. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a 3 rd person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees;

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2. It intruded into an LGU’s right to impose local taxes, violates local autonomy;3. Violates equal protection clause since it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling;4. Violates the trend of Cory government to veer from monopolistic and crony economy.

PAGCOR: Given territorial jurisdiction over the entire country. It was to centralize and integrate all games of chance.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 13 par. 216 of PD 1896 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees and WON it violates local autonomy.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.

PD 1869: Enacted to provide funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to close government scrutiny.

The City of Manila is a mere Municipal corporation and has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”

The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can grant Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions and even take back the power.

The City’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise, licenses, or permits” was withdrawn by PD No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.

Only the National Government has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of gambling.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers, it also exercises regulatory powers.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency of the government. Being an agency of the government, it must be exempt from local taxes, otherwise, it might be impeded or subject to the control of a mere local government.

This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.

GANZON V. CA

FACTS:Mayor Ganzon was charged with 10 complaints which included abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.

Initial hearings were set and conducted at the RO of the DILG in Iloilo City. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on 11 August 1988 to last until 11 October 1988 for a period of 60 days. Another 60-day preventive suspension was imposed on the Mayor for the prima facie evidence found to exist in the case of Erbite. The 2nd PS was not enforced due to a TRO.

16 Exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder, from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether national or local.”

Ganzon filed a prohibition case against the DILG Secretary in the RTC of Iloilo. He was given another 60-day suspension.

Ganzon: DILG denied him due process, that the Secretary had been biased against him. He has no authority to suspend or remove him. 1987 Constitution no longer gives the President the power to suspend/ remove local officials.

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Ganzon: The deletion of “as may be provided by law” is significant since the power of the President is provided by law and no law may provide for it any longer.

ISSUE: WON the Secretary of the local government can suspend and/or remove local officials.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:Despite the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission signifies local autonomy from Congress.

The Constitution did nothing more insofar as existing legislation authorizing the President to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

Legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. “Supervision” means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. “Investigating” is not inconsistent with “overseeing.”

In cases where the Court denied the President the power to suspend/ remove, it was not because it did not think that the President can not exercise on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere.

The sole objective of a suspension is simply “to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses” or to keep him off “the records and other evidence.”

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. Suspension is temporary, it may be imposed for no more than 60 days. A longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable.

CITY OF CEBU V. NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY

FACTS:The City of Cebu filed an action for declaratory relief to prevent NAWASA from taking over the ownership, control, supervision and jurisdiction over the Osmeña Waterworks System, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 8 of RA 1383.

Cebu: This deprives us of our property rights in the Osmeña Waterworks System without due process of law and just compensation.

NAWASA: They system had always been under the control and operation of the National Government, its transfer to NAWASA was within the competence of Congress; it was public property and within the absolute control of Congress; granting that it was patrimonial, there was proper and just compensation provided in the law.

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TC: RA 1383 is unconstitutional in so far as it vests NAWASA ownership over the system without just compensation.

ISSUE: WON RA 1383 is constitutional in vesting in NAWASA ownership of the OWS without just compensation.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:RA 1383 provides that the net book value of the properties of the government owned water works systems shall be received by the Authority in payment for an equal value of the assets of NAWASA. All the properties of the OWS are transferred to NAWASA in exchange for an equal value of the latter’s assets. However, nothing concrete is said as to what assets are to be traded on the part of NAWASA.

The OWS was established out of the $125,000.00 loan extended to the municipality by the US, payable within 30 years. Cebu applied for and obtained a certificate of public convenience from the PSC. The System owned properties which are estimated to be worth P10,000,000.00. The system pays all who pay the charges. It is open to the public (in this sense it is public service), but upon the payment only of a certain rental (which makes it proprietary).

The police power is not without limitations, there is the constitutional prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE V. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

FACTS: Before its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province.

12 October 1936: Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting it into a city. Sec. 50 provided that:

“Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price fixed by the Auditor General.”The properties consisted of 50 lots and some buildings

covered by TCTs in the name of Zamboanga Province.

1945: Zamboanga Province capital was transferred to Dipolog. 1948: RA 286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave making it the new capital. 1949: Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General fixed the value at P1,294,244.00.1952: RA 711 was approved in dividing the province into Z. del Norte and Z. del Sur. Sec. 6 provided that the funds and assets of the province shall be equitably divided upon the Auditor General’s recommendation.

1955: Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations: 54.39% for Z. del Norte and 45.61% for del Sur. CIR was allowed to deduct 25% of the internal revenue allotment for the city for the quarter ending 31 March 1960.

17 June 1961: RA 3039 was approved providing that all assets of the former province of Zamboanga located in the city of Zamboanga are transferred to the city free of charge.

Finance Secretary ordered the CIR to stop further payments.

ISSUE: WON RA 3039 is constitutional for depriving Z. del Norte of property without due process and just compensation. WON congress can appropriate the properties in this case. HELD: YES, qualified. NO.

RATIO:The validity of the law depends on the nature of the properties. If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.

If it is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation.

This controversy is more along the domains of Municipal corporations. It results then that Z. del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City the former’s share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature. The share cannot be paid in lump sum, except at to the money already returned to the City.

Applying the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites—a total of 24 lots—since these were held by the former province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. But the law cannot be applied to deprive Z. del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.

MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. INC. AND PAGCOR

FACTS:PAGCOR decided to open a casino in Cagayan City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties and equipped it to be used as a casino.

This was met by opposition from various sectors in the locality. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted Ordinances No. 3353 and 3375-93 which prohibited the operation of gambling casinos within the premises of the city.

ISSUE: WON local governments are empowered to suppress all forms of gambling, including PAGCOR-sanctioned ones.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by PD 1869.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.

Tests for a valid ordinance:1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.2. It must not be unfair or oppressive.3. It must not be partial or discriminatory.4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.5. It must not be general and consistent with public policy.6. It must bot be unreasonable.

Under the rule noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, the SC held that since the word “gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

Implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of PD 1869. On the contrary, PAGCOR is mentioned as a source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, RA 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the DOJ and RA 7648 providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis.

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This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, the illegal and those authorized by law. The ordinances violate PD 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national law making body.

The basic relationship between the national legislature and the LGUs has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:MERALCO operates 7 steam boilers. As fees for the inspection of the boilers, plaintiff paid the National Government several amounts. Upon the demand of the city, plaintiff also paid several amounts as fees for the inspection of the boilers by the City Engineer.

This is a suit to recover the sum of P4,630 which plaintiff paid to Manila as inspection fees of its steam boilers, in accordance with the provisions of the City Ordinances.

MERALCO: Such provisions have been repealed by subsequent legislation, CA 696 (provides that the Secretary of Labor shall fix and collect reasonable inspection fees).

ISSUE: WON the power to levy inspection fees on steam boilers is still lodged in the City of Manila.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:

There was no repeal. The City’s power to tax steam boilers could not have been affected by the Department of Labor’s power to regulate or inspect them: One is taxation, the other is regulation.

The power of inspection of the Labor Secretary does not conflict with that of the City authorities, since the former is related to the “safety of laborers and employees” while the City is not limited to such purposes, but is related to the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the City, particularly of the neighborhood where the boilers are located.

In the opinion of judicial authorities, there is nothing “inherently obnoxious in the requirement that a person engaged in a business shall have two licenses, one issued by the state and another by a political subdivision or public corporation.”

As to the rates, if the City’s power is merely to regulate, then that is material. However, the City also has the authority to tax steam boilers. There is every indication that herein charges were collected under both the power to tax and the power to regulate. The name fee is not conclusive—taxes are often called fees.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CA

FACTS:RA No. 4850 created the “Laguna Lake Development Authority.”

PD 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 due to the concern for the rapid expansion of Metro Manila, the towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with the current and prospective use of the lake.

The Authority was granted special powers: “… the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permits for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management, and to collect necessary fees…shared between

the authority and other government agencies and political subdivisions…”

EO 927 was enacted which further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named the towns, cities, and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna Bay Region.”

RA 7160: LGC of 1991. The municipalities in the region interpreted the provisions to mean that the new law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges in their municipal waters since the law provides:

“Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore in accordance with the provisions of this Section.”

Municipal governments then assumed authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of this occasion to establish fishpens and cages to the consternation of the Authority. It increased the occupation from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995.

The Authority issued a notice that all fishpens and structures erected without a permit from the Authority shall be demolished. This was challenged in the courts by the different operators.

ISSUE: Which agency of the Government—the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region—should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

HELD: The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA.

RATIO:The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically repeals the charter of the Authority.

The charter of LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. The enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the authority to proceed with its mission.

“Laguna de Bay cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water…”

The power of local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. The power of the Authority to grant permits is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the region. It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive and the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers. The charter which embodies a valid exercise of the police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees since there is a sharing mechanism in place.

MONDANO V. SILVOSA

FACTS:Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao.

27 February 1954: Complaint was filed with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing Mondano of raping Caridad Mosenda and concubinage for cohabiting with Caridad in a place other than the conjugal dwelling.

6 March: Compliant was indorsed to provincial governor for investigation and report. Governor issued AO No. 8 suspending Mondano from office.

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Mondano: asked for prohibition to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the hearing of the case against him.

Respondents: Invoked Sec. 79 (c) of the Admin Code which clothes the department head with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his juisdiction…” Villena v. Secretary: Upheld the power of the Secretary to conduct at its own initiative investigation charges against local elective municipal officials.

ISSUE: WON the Secretary of the Interior has the power to investigate and suspend a municipal mayor (same power of control over bureaus under his department) stemming from a charge of rape and concubinage.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:Constitution: President shall have control over all the executive departments… exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law…

Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction but he does not have the same control of local governments.

Supervision: Overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Control: The power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

The authority of the Department Head over persons under his department does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.

The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated in Sec. 2188 of the Admin. Code, since rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute “neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office.

HEBRON V. REYES

FACTS:This is a quo warranto case involving the Office of the Mayor of Carmona, Cavite. 1951: Elections were held, petitioner Bernardo Hebron, and respondent Eulalio Reyes, were elected mayor and vice mayor. Hebron continued to discharge such functions until 1954.1954: Letter was received from the OP suspending him until the termination fo the admin proceedings against him. Eulalio Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal investigated the charges. Hebron instituted this case on the ground that Reyes was illegally holding the post and that his term as mayor was about to expire.

ISSUE: WON a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic, may be removed or suspended directly by the President, regardless of the procedure set forth in the Admin Code. HELD: The procedure prescribed in Sec. 2188 to 2191 of the RAC, for the suspension and removal of municipal officials is mandatory. The procedure is exclusive. The Executive may conduct investigations as a means only to ascertain whether the governor and the board should take such action. Suspension in this case was null and void.

RATIO: President has no inherent power to remove or suspend local elective officials.

2188: Governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers for offenses involving maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. 2189: Trial by municipal board. Preventive suspension shall not be more than 30 days.

2190: Provincial board then acts by dismissing the charges or by forwarding to the Interior Secretary the record of the case. 2191: Renders a final decision within 30 days. No final dismissal is made until recommended by the Secretary and approved by the President.

Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor. When the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. In this case, Hebron was suspended in May 1954. The records of the investigation were forwarded to the Executive Secretary since 15 July 1954. The decision has not been rendered as of 13 May 1955. The continued indefinite suspension cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the Admin Code.

Since the powers given to the Presidnet in addition to his general supervisory authority, the application of those powers to municipal corporations—insofar as they may appear to sanction the assumption by the Executive of the functions of the provincial governors and boards—would contravene the constitutional provision restricting the authority of the President over local government to “general supervision.”

If there is any conflict between Sec. 64(b) and (c), 79(c) and 86 of the Admin Code, and 2188 and 2191 of the same code, the latter, being specific provisions, must prevail. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor directly without any opportunity on the part of the provincial governor and the provincial board to exercise the administrative powers of both under sections 23188 and 2190 of the AC, cannot be adopted without conceding that said powers are subject or repeal or suspension by the President. This cannot be done without legislation. If neither the Secretary not the President may disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board, passed within its jurisdiction, because such would connote the assumption of control, it is manifest that greater control would be wielded by said officers of the national government if they could either assume the powers vested in said provincial board or act in substitution thereof, such as by suspending municipal officers, without the admin proceedings prescribed in the AC.

The power of the president over LGUs is limited to general supervision and this is unqualified so it applies to all powers: corporate or political.

GANZON V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of admin complaints filed against him by city officials in 1988, on various charges.

An investigation was conducted. Amidst two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon filed an action for prohibition against the Interior Secretary in the RTC of Iloilo.

Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Ganzon for another 60 days, the third time in 20 months.

Ganzon: DILG denied me due process of law and the Secretary had been biased against me. He does not have the power to suspend and remove local officials. 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise the power of suspension over local officials. The deletion of “as may be provided by law” is significant since the power of the President is “provided by law” and may no longer be provided by law in the present set up.

ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest Congress of its right, or the president of his prerogative to provide admin sanctions against local officials. The Constitution did not intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations.

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Investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser power than altering. In several cases, the Court denied the President the power to suspend/remove because the law lodged the power elsewhere and not because the Court thought the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power.

The Secretary acted under Batas Blg . 337, Sec. 62-63.

Sec. 63: Preventive suspension may be meted out by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is…

The successive 60-day suspension imposed on Ganzon is different. The sole objective of suspension is to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation. Under the LGC, such cannot exceed 60 days. Imposing 600 days of suspension is to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity.

Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide.

Ganzon may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no logner be suspended for the offenses he was originally charged.

GANZON V. KAYANAN

FACTS:25 August 1956: Ernesto Rosales filed a complaint against Ganzon (Iloilo Mayor) with the President alleging violent acts during his work as a radio broadcaster.

13 September 1956: Executive Secretary designated respondent to investigate the complaint.

24 September 1956: Ganzon questioned the authority of the President to order his investigation.

ISSUE: WON the President has the authority to order the investigation of a city mayor as regards an administrative complaint and to take disciplinary action against him if he is found guilty.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:The pertinent provisions are found in Sec. 64(b) and (c) of the Admin Code.

(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials…(c) To order… an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service…

Constitution: Sec. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices…

It may be clearly inferred that the President may remove an official in the government service “conformably to law.”

It cannot be disputed that in this case the President is vested with the authority to order the investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, and such being the case, the petitioner cannot now contend that the designation of respondent as the official to investigate him by Rosales has been done without the authority of law.

It cannot be inferred that the power of supervision of the Prez over local officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

As to the cause, considering that the position of mayor of a chartered city may be fairly compared in category and statute with that of a provincial

governor, we are of the opinion that the former, by analogy, may also be amenable to suspension and removal for the same causes as the latter, which causes, under Sec. 2078 of the Admin Code, are: Disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, and misconduct in office.

Considering the allegations in the complaint to the effect that petitioner took advantage of his public post as mayor in committing acts of violence and intimidation upon respondent to stop his radio program, the SC held that the acts constitute misconduct in office for which he may be ordered investigated by the President within the meaning of the law.

XI. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS

XII. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

LGCSEC. 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.

San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan

FACTS:A public bidding was held by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, for the lease of its municipal waters.

Resolution No. 46 was passed by the council awarding the concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to Bartolome San Diego.

The contract stipulated that San Diego would be the exclusive lessee to erect fish corrals for five years with an annual rent of P26,300.00. This annual rental was reduced by 20% upon petition by San Diego. The Council extended the lease for another five years with the condition that San Diego would waive the privilege to seek reduction of the amount of rent which was to be based on the original contract.

1952: Municipal Council, now composed of a new set of members, adopted Resolution No. 3, revoking Resolution No. 222. The Resolution extending the lease period was also revoked.

San Diego: Resolution No. 3 is unconstitutional.

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Naujan: The resolutions authorizing the original lease contract, reducing the lease rentals and renewing the lease are null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law (no public bidding).

TC: Upheld the validity of the lease contract.

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 3 is null and void for revoking Resolution No. 222.

HELD: No.

RATIO:Sec. 2323 of the RAC: Requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery is ranted to a private party, the same shall be given to the highest bidder.

The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud, and corruption. The original lease contract in this case was awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the extension of the term of the lease have been granted without a prior public bidding.

Statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of any contract already executed in compliance with the law where such amendments alter the original contract in some vital and essential particular.

Since the period in a lease is a vital and essential particular to the contract, its extension, which was granted without the requisite public bidding, is not in accordance with law.

It is not an impairment of the obligation of contract since the constitutional provision on impairment refers only to contracts legally executed. Legally speaking, there is no contract abrogated since the extension contract is void and inexistent. Public biddings are held for the best protection of the public and to give the public the best possible advantages by means of open competition between bidders.

The reduction of the rentals by 20% of the original price is also null and void since it is a substantial alteration of the contract, making it a distinct and different lease contract which requires the prescribed formality of a public bidding.

Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos

FACTS:August 1949: Municipality of Malolos called for bids for the supply of road construction materials to repair the roads of the municipality.

Rivera’s bid was the lowest. The acting municipal treasurer informed Rivera that the contract had been awarded to him.

It was stipulated that for the sum of P19,235 the petitioner was to furnish and deliver 2,700 cubic meters of adobe stone and 1,400 cubic meters of gravel. Rivera complied with this.

Rivera was not paid so he requested that the sum be included in the appropriations for the incoming year 1950-51 since the fiscal year 1949-50 had already expired.

Municipal Treasurer: Informed the petitioner that the Council agreed to put said amount as standing obligation of the municipality authorizing payment and authorizing the Treasurer to pay as soon as funds are available.

16 October 1951: Council passed Resolution No. 68 ratifying the bidding called by the treasurer for the supply of construction materials.

14 August 1955: Deputy Auditor General denied the petitioner’s claim on the ground that there was no sum of money appropriated to meet the obligation incurred before the execution of the contract, as required by Sec. 607 of the RAC, and that the contract is void; and that even if a sum was appropriated, the alleged deliveries could no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor of Bulacan or his representative.

Rivera: Cited Sec. 2165: Municipalities… endowed with faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law. It shall be competent for them… to contract and be contracted with…”

ISSUE: WON the Auditor General validly denied the claim of the petitioner.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:Sec. 7 Par. 2 of the RAC: Requires that before a contract involving the expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into or authorized, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into such contract that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditures on account thereof, and a contract entered into contrary to these requirements is void.

Sec. 584-A of RAC: The provincial auditor or his representative must check up the deliveries made by a contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully and validly entered into and where there is no check up to show actual delivery, the Auditor General is not duty bound to pass and allow in audit the sum claimed by a contractor.

The Motor Vehicle Law invoked by Rivera merely allocates 10% of the money collected under its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the different municipalities in proportion to the population, as shown in the last available census, for the repair, maintenance, and construction of municipal roads. This alone is not sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse part of the percentage collected under the law for the purpose of paying the petitioner’s claim.

Rivera v. Maclang

FACTS:19 August 1949: Malolos called for bids for furnishing and delivering materials to be used in the maintenance and repair of barrio roads.

Appellant won in the bidding and the contract was signed by the appellant and by defendant-appellee Carlos Maclang in his capacity as Municipal Mayor. Rivera delivered gravel and adobe stones valued at P19,235.

16 October 1951: Council of Malolos passed a resolution approving the contract. The price was not paid.

Rivera asked for the help of the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission which referred it to the General Auditing Office. The office turned down the claim.

GAO: Contract was void since no money had been appropriated to meet the obligation prior to the execution of the contract as required by Sec. 607 of the RAC.

SC: Indicated that a remedy existed in Sec. 608 of the Code.

Rivera: Filed this action in his personal capacity pursuant to said provision.

Trial Court: Dismissed it stating that since in the previous case, the contract was declared null and void by the SC, it cannot produce any legal effect for which thereafter no recovery can be made.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper and WON Maclang can be held liable in his personal capacity for the liability to Rivera.

HELD: No. Yes.

RATIO:This action is against defendant-appellee in his personal capacity based on Sec. 608 of the RAC: A purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.

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The liability of Maclang is personal, as if the transaction had been entered into by him as a private party. The intention of the law in this case is to ensure that public officers entering into transactions with private individuals calling for the expenditure of public funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action by those assuming to represent it.

Palafox, et al v. Province of Ilocos Norte

FACTS:Sabas Torralba was employed as driver of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte detailed to the office of the District Engineer.

30 September 1948: While driving his truck in compliance with his duties, he ran over Proceto Palafox, father of appellants, killing him in the process.

He was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence.

Having reserved the right to file a civil action, the heirs later began this proceeding against the employer province, the District Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer,a nd Torralba.

ISSUE: WON the province can be made to pay monetary compensation for an injury caused by its employee in the performance of his regular function involving governmental activities.

HELD: No.

RATIO:1903 Civil Code: To attach liability to the State for the negligence of Torralba, a declaration must be made that he was a special agent and not one upon whom properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion.

Merrit v. Government of the Philippines: This ruling may not be made since the driver was not a special agent of the Government.

The principle applies to the Insular, as distinguished from the provincial or municipal governments.

If the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate functions, the government is not liable.

The construction of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.

Mendoza v. De Leon

FACTS:The Municipal Council of Villasis Pangasinan revoked the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission.

The plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the defendants in this case, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.

Mendoza filed an action for damages against the individual members of the council.

ISSUE: WON the council members can be held personally liable for the damages suffered by the lessee.

HELD: Yes. Under the evidence of record, that there is no manner of doubt that this pretext was absolutely without foundation and as there was therefore no occasion whatever for rescinding the contract, the defendant councilors are liable personally for the damages suffered by Mendoza.

RATIO:

The Municipal Code confers both governmental and corporate powers upon municipal corporations. For the exercise of the former, it is not liable to private persons. Its liability to them for the wrongful exercise of the latter is the same as that of a private corporation or individual.

Officers and agents of MCs charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial, are not liable for consequences of their official acts unless it can be shown that they acted willfully and maliciously, with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.

The officers of municipalities charged with the administration of patrimonial property are liable for mismanagement of its affairs as are directors or managing officers of private corporations, not for mere mistakes of judgment, but only when their acts are so far opposed to the true interest of the municipality as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests.

The defendant councilors regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege to the plaintiff for two years. After continuous user of a little more than one year, they forcible evicted him on the pretext that he was not operating the ferry leased to him.

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme

FACTS: 16 December 1965: A passenger jeep driven by Barnardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Manandeg and owned by Velasquez and a dump truck of the municipality, driven by Bislig collided.

Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

11 December 1966: Compliant for damages was filed by the pvt respondents against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. The defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

By virtue of a court order, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants.

Municipality: Alleged lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

ISSUE: WON the respondent court validly found the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its employee.HELD: NO.

RATIO:The judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."

Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does

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not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.

The test of liability of the municipality for torts depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity: They exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets."

Palafox, et. al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte: "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."

Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

Fernando et al v. Court of Appeals and City of Davao

FACTS:7 November 1975: Bibiano Morta: Market master of the Agdao Public Market, filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer’s Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao.

An invitation to bid was issued to several parties and Bascon won in the bidding. 22 November 1975: Bidder Bertulano, with 4 other companions, were found dead inside the septic tank.City Engineer: Investigated and found that the victims entered the tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. The tank was found empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.

The cause of death was asphyxia caused by the diminution of oxygen in the body below normal conditions. The lungs of the victims burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste in the tank.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by ordering the City of Davao to pay damages. The CA reversed itself upon a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON Davao City is guilty of negligence in this case and if so, WON that negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims. HELD: No.

RATIO:Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demanded, whereby such other person suffers injury.

2176: A person who by his omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under 2179 that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. While it may be true that the city was remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the tank, the city immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service.

The absence of any accident was due to the compliance of the city with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the

septic tank. Hence, the toxic gases from the waste matter could not have leaked out because it was air-tight.

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public.

An accident such as toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the city opened the tank. The failure of Mr. Bertulano to exercise prudence was the proximate cause of the accident.

When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and sill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The accident which befell the victims who are not in any way connected with the winning bidder happened before the award could be given. Considering that there was yet no award and order to commence work on the tank, the duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise the work could not have started.

The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from the market master or any of the guards goes against their good faith.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:14 March 1977: SB of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 9. It provided for the compulsory donation of 1% of the palay threshed by the operators to finance the construction of a Sports and Nutrition Center.

Private respondent Saturnino Jurado did not comply with it so the mayor refused to give him a license to operate.

Jurado: Mayor and treasurer liable! Art. 27: Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners are liable in damages to the private respondent from having withheld the mayor’s permit and license due to his refusal to comply with Resolution No. 9.

HELD: No. RATIO:The purpose of Art. 27 is to end the bribery system. Official inaction may be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service.

The provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. The erring public officer is justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or damage the complainant has sustained.

In this case, it has not even been alleged that Mayor Tuzon’s refusal to act on the respondent’s application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery. It cannot be said that the mayor and the treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit to Jurado.

The respondents were not singled out and the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality. The petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution. In the absence of any judicial decision declaring the resolution invalid, its legality would have to be presumed.

The respondent could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging it in court to relive him of his obligation to “donate.”

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Torio v. Fontanilla

FACTS:21 October 1958: Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159: It resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the Town Fiesta Executive Committee.

It organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as chairman. P100 was appropriated for the construction of 2 stages: for the zarzuela and the cancionan. Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage.

The zarzuela entitled Midas Extravaganza was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan. Fontanilla, one of the performers, died because the stage collapsed and he got pinned underneath.

Municipality: It performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions for which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of its agents.

ISSUE: Whether the celebration of a town fiesta is an exercise of a municipality’s governmental or public function or one of a proprietary character.

HELD: Proprietary.

RATIO:If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty, no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, as long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.

With respect to proprietary functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.

Sec. 2282 of the Admin Code simply authorizes the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta for whatever purpose is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a state policy.

The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment is not a conclusive test.

The basic element is that it is governmental in essence. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, the municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence17 of the officers of the municipality.

CA: Found and held that there was negligence. Only P100 was appropriated for the two stages and the posts and braces were only made of bamboo.

The performance was a donation offered by the respondents, and that when the Municipality accepted it, the participants in the stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality, through its “Committee” would build a stage strong enough to support the performance. The Councilors did not directly participate in the construction of the stage so they could not be held liable.

Teotico v. City of Manila

FACTS:27 January 1958: While attempting to board a jeepney, Genaro Teotico fell inside an uncovered manhole on P. Burgos Ave. His left eye got

17 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done; 2180: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

injured, he suffered contusions, abrasions, and allergic reactions (due to the anti-tetanus shot) because of the accident.

He filed a case against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasure, and chief of police.

Manila: Sec. 4 of RA 409 applies, stating that the City shall not be liable for damages to persons arising form the failure of its officers to enforce the provisions of any law, or from their negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

ISSUE: WON the city of Manila can be held liable for the injuries of Mr. Teotico.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:2189: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control and supervision.

The Civil Code and not the Charter of Manila applies in this case. It is true that insofar as territorial application is concerned, the Charter is a special law. However, as regards the subject matter of the provisions, the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription. Sec. 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof. 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets” in particular.

The Article requires that the province, city, or municipality have either “control or supervision” over the street. The authority of Manila over the streets has neither been withdrawn nor restricted by any law.

The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Ave. is under the control or supervision of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with its maintenance, is a question of fact which was resolved by the CA in the affirmative. It is not subject to the review of the SC.

Abella v. Municipality of Naga

FACTS:Naga ordered the closing of a part of a municipal street which ran between the public market and the plaintiff’s property, and used the closed thoroughfare to expand the market.

Several kinds of constructions were allowed by the municipality along the sidewalk of the plaintiff’s property depriving the plaintiff’s property of access to P. Prieto Street, retarding her reconstructions.

The CFI of Camarines Sur sentenced the City of Naga to pay the appellee P300 damages resulting from the closing of a municipal street.

Naga: We acted thru our police power and it was “prompted to preserve the peace and good order of the community and the general welfare.”

ISSUE: WON the City can be held liable for damages resulting from the closure of a municipal street.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:The City was not charged with any unlawful act, or with acting without authority.

The basis of the lower court’s decision is Sec. 2246 of the RAC which provides that no municipal road or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby.

That Concepcion Abella was economically damaged, the stipulation of facts admits, and that the indemnity assessed is within the bounds of the damages suffered, there is no dispute.

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The damages seem to be nominal judged by the description of the plaintiff’s interests adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street into a market.

Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo

FACTS:The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land which the council appropriated for widening the street.

CFI of Iloilo: Municipality must pay the amount.

Iloilo was unable to pay due to lack of funds. Tan Toco had a writ of execution issued against the property of the municipality. The sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol car, the police stations on Mabini Street, and in Molo and Mandurriao, and the concrete structures and lots used by several markets.

The provincial fiscal filed a motion praying that the attachment be dissolved (this was granted).

ISSUE: WON municipal properties are exempt from execution.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:2165 AC: Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by and through their respective municipal government in conformity with law. It shall be competent for them… to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with…”

The AC does not specify the kind of property that a municipality can acquire.

343 Civil Code: Divides the property of provinces and towns into those for public use and patrimonial property. Provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, drives and public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns, are property for public use.

All other property possessed by said MCs is patrimonial and shall be subject to the provisions of the Civil Code.

It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, needed for governmental purposes, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The reason for this is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted.

The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public use of the municipality be exempt from execution.

Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:20 May 1986: Action for eminent domain was filed by the City of Makati against the properties of Admiral Finance, Home Bldg System, and Arceli Jo. The appraised value of the property was P5.3M.

Private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This was issued and a notice of garnishment was served upon the manager of PNB Buendia branch. However, the sheriff was told that a hold code was placed on the account.

Makati: Garnishment must be lifted! The manner of payment in expropriation proceedings should be done in installments.

The Municipality later discovered that PS Bank consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/ purchaser. PSB and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement where they agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings.

Trial Court: Approved the compromise and ordered the release of the balance of the appraised value of the property. Makati: On appeal, alleged that it has two accounts with the PNB: One for the expropriation of the property, another for statutory obligations and other purposes.

ISSUE: WON the funds in the second account can be the subject of execution.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:The funds deposited in the second PNB account are public funds and the settled rule is that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statue.

Absent a showing that the MC of Makati passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due, less the sum of P99T deposited in the first account, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the second account.

Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and its corresponding disbursement.

In this case, the RTC decision is not disputed by Makati. For 3 years now, the city enjoyed possession and use of the property notwithstanding its failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation.

Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila

FACTS:12 August 1964: VD Isip, Sons and Associates entered into a contract18

for the construction of a new city hall with Pasay City represented by Mayor Cuneta.

The contractor proceeded with the construction. It spent P1.7M for the initial stages of the work, out of the total contract price of P4.9M. Pasay only paid P1.1 for this initial stage, leaving P613T immediately due.

16 May 1968: Contractor sued for specific performance with damages.

25 February 1969: Municipal Board of Pasay enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the Compromise Agreement19 and authorized then Mayor Claudio to represent the city. Pasay still failed to pay.

9 July 1969: An application for and notice of garnishment were made upon the funds of the Pasay City Government with the PNB.

Pasay: It’s premature, the 90-day stipulation has not yet expired; the obligations were reciprocal, the contractor has not yet set up a new performance bond; and Sheriff can’t garnish trust funds of the city.

TC: Contractor complied substantially, garnishment must proceed.

ISSUE: WON the PNB account can be garnished to pay for the remaining debt of the city.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:

18 The contractor shall advance the needed amount for each stage, to be reimbursed by the city before the contractor proceeds to the next stage. The city shall also reimburse the contractor for the cost of the work completed as estimated by the city engineer for each stage before proceeding to the nest. 19 The contractor shall submit and file a new performance bond in proportion to the remaining value of the unfinished work. The contractor shall finish the building within 1 year from the approval of the agreement. That Pasay City shall remit the amount advanced by the contractor.

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2028: A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.

A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public order, public policy… is a valid contract.

2041:One of the parties to a compromise has two options:1.Enforce it; 2. Rescind/insist on original demand

It is true that all government funds deposited with the PNB by any agency of the government remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy. However, since an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the amount of P613T, then this case is covered by the exception.

Having established that the compromise agreement was final and executory, the Court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the Court no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The parties to the compromise contemplated a divisible obligation needing a performance bond in proportion to the uncompleted work. The city was initially content with a mere 5% bond, it is strange for it to suddenly demand a 20% bond. The premium of the bond will be sizeable and will eat up the contractor’s profits. The submission of the bond was not a condition precedent to the payment to the plaintiff. The P613T has already been collected through execution and garnishment and the contractor already finished some stages of the construction. The argument that it is reciprocal is already moot.

Municipality of Paoay v. Manaois

FACTS:Manaois obtained a judgment against the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte and a writ of execution against the defendant municipality was issued.

The Sheriff attached and levied upon the following: (1) P1,712.01 in the Municipal Treasury representing the rental paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the defendant municipality;"(2) About forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different persons by the Municipality."

26 July 1949: Municipality filed a petition asking for the dissolution of that attachment or levy of the properties above-mentioned arguing that they are for public use.

1938: The municipal council of Paoay approved a resolution confiscating said six fishery lots on the ground that a certain Duque failed to comply with the terms of the lease contract. Municipality awarded the lease of the same lots to Manaois, him being the highest bidder.

Manaois paid P2,025 as rental for the said lots for the year 1939. However, when Manaois and his men tried to enter the property in order to exercise his right as lessee and to catch fish, particularly bañgos fry, he found therein Duque and his men who claimed that he (Duque) was still the lessee, and despite the appeal of Manaois to the Municipality of Paoay to put him in possession and the efforts of the municipality to oust Duque, the latter succeeded in continuing in his possession and keeping Manaois and his men out. Manaois brought an action against the Municipality of Paoay to recover not only the sum paid by him for the lease of the fishery lots but also damages.

ISSUE: WON the properties in this case can be subject to attachment and levy.

HELD: Not all of them.

RATIO:Properties for public use held by municipal corporations are

not subject to levy and execution. The reason behind this exemption extended to properties for public use, and public municipal revenues is that they are held in trust for the people.

If it is patrimonial and which is held by a municipality in its proprietary capacity, it is treated as the private asset of the town and may be levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule applies to municipal funds derived from patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held that shares of stock held by a municipal corporation are subject to execution.

The fishery or municipal waters of the town are not subject to execution. They do not belong to the municipality. They are property of the State. What Paoay holds is merely a usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code.

It is based merely on a grant, more or less temporary, made by the Legislature. The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as a matter of public policy, may, at any time, repeal or modify said section 2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns and open these marine waters to the public. Or the Legislature may grant the usufruct or right of fishery to the provinces concerned so that said provinces may operate or administer them by leasing them to private parties.

All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its property through execution.

Another reason for this prohibition is that the buyer would only buy the rights of the municipality. All that he can do is rent out to private individuals the fishery rights over the lots after public bidding. This, he must do since that is the only right granted by the legislature. It is anomalous since a private individual would be forced to conduct a public bidding. It will also deprive Paoay of income.

The right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its municipal waters, particularly, the forty odd fishery lots included in the attachment by the Sheriff, is not subject to execution.

But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. It may be profitable, if not necessary, to distinguish this kind of revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses and market fees are provided for and imposed by the law, they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of municipal corporations. In fact, the real estate taxes collected by a municipality do not all go to it.

In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about forty in the municipality of Paoay, mentioned at the beginning of this decision are not subject to execution. However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots let out by the municipality of Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and the attachment made thereon by the Sheriff is valid.

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