Mondolfo, Rodolfo_Evidence of Plato and Aristotle Relating to the Ekpyrosis in...

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Evidence of Plato and Aristotle Relating to the Ekpyrosis in Heraclitus

Author(s): Rodolfo Mondolfo and D. J. AllanSource: Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1958), pp. 75-82Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181631 .

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Evidence

f

Plato and

Aristotle

relating

to the Ekpyrosisn

Heraclitus1

RODOLFO

MONDOLFO

HE double problem

whether

in passages

of

Plato

the theory

of

a

periodical

conflagration

of

the world

is denied

to Heraclitus,

and

whether

in

passages

of

Aristotle

it is attributed

to

him,

is of

unquestionable

importance

as

part

of the vexata quaestio

whether

Hera-

clitus

really

maintained

that view or not. And

from one point

of

view

the

weightier

aspect

of

the double

problem

is

that

concerning

Aristotle's

testimony.

For

although

in

his

interpretations

he perhaps

often

distorts

other people's

theories,

as

H.

Cherniss

especially

has shown

(Aristotle's

Criticism

f

Pre- SocraticPhilosophy,

Baltimore,

193

5),

yet,

as is

acknowled-

ged

by

Cherniss himself,

'he

had

the

books

of these

men

[the

pre-

Socratics]

presumably

in their complete

form,

while

we only

have

fragments.'

And let us

add that

where Heraclitus

is

concerned,

Aristotle

himself

declares his full

and direct

knowledge

of the text,

when

he

states

in the

Rhetoric,

1047

b I I

foll.,

that the sentence

he

quotes

was

found at the beginning of the book, and gives it as an example of faults

of style by

which the whole

work

was marked. Although

then there

is

today

a

tendency

among

critics to

deny

to ancient

witnesses

previously

considered

as

unimpeachable

authorities any

direct knowledge

of

the

texts (here

cf. J. B.

McDiarmid,

Theophrastus

n the

pre-Socratic

Causes,

Harvard Stud.

in Class. Phil.

LXI

(X953)),

we

need

not contemplate

in

Aristotle's

case a doubt of the same

kind as has been expressed

by

G.S.

Kirk in

regard

to Plato,

when he says that it

may

be suspected

that

Plato

did

not know

as many

authentic aphorisms

of Heraclitus

as

we

do

(NaturalChangen Heraclitus,

MindN.S.

(i

9

S

)).

In general,

it

would be

erroneous to

think that our ancient

witnesses

have no

more real

knowledge

of

their philosophical

predecessors

than

is shown

in

their explicit

citations.

Besides

the fact which Kirk himself

acknowledges

(Heraclitus,

The

Cosmic

Fragments,

Cambridge

(i 954)

p. I5),

that

for obvious

reasons

they

cite

only as much

as serves

the

purpose

of their

discussions,

we

must take

account

of

numerous

allusions not accompanied

by

the name

of the

author

alluded

to,

so that they may

pass

unnoticed,

and an attentive

study

is needed

in order

to

detect them.

This applies to Plato as a witness for Heraclitus; and it is interesting

1

English

translation

by D. J.

Allan.

1

7s







to note that

in

this way

some supposeddifferencesbetween

his evidence

and that of Aristotle, which have been held to show the unreliability

of both,

can be eliminated. When for instance Baiimker

(Problem er

Materie,p.

22)

followed

by Cherniss

op.cit.

380,

observed

that Plato

summarizes

Heraclitus's teaching in the

phrase

nirvroc

-t

and thought

that he nowhere made mention

of the

doctrine of the elemental fire,

uponwhich

Aristotle on his

side lays great stress, he was

failing to take

account of

an

allusion

in

the

Cratylus,13 bc, to a certain

person 'not

easy to understand'who

declares immutablefire to be

the substance n

which the

law

(&Mxtov)

f universal movement is visibly embodied;

and which pervadesall thingsin order to govern them,and must there-

fore

also be Xe7OTMTOV

oC

Taxztaov,

i.e., must

have

characteristics

which Aristotle likewise

attributes to the Heraclitean

&pXn

n de anima

4oga' But

if in this point

we

can cancel

an imagineddifferencebetween

the testimony

of Plato and

Aristotle,

it

is otherwise

in

regard to the

cosmic cycle

and

periodicalreabsorption

of

the world

in the universal

appJ,

where the

difference

seems

to

persist

for

anyone

who admitsthat

Aristotlereally

attributes

this

to

Heraclitus

while

Plato

denies it

to

him.

The passage

n

which

the

denial s

thought

to be

expressed,

and Heraclitus

and Empedoclesseem to be distinguishedfrom one another, is Soph.

242 d;

both

philosophers

are

said

to

have

affirmed

that

reality

is

both

manifold

and

one,

and

maintains

tself

through

strife and friendship;'

but

whereas

one

(Heraclitus)

asserts this in

the sense that 'that which

diverges

s

always

converging',

the

other

(Empedocles)

asserts

it

in

the

sense that

two

phases

alternate a state of

tinity

and

friendship of

the

opposites,

due to

the

action

of

Aphrodite,

and one of separation

and

enmity,

due

to Strife.

This

has

been

interpretedby

Burnet,

Reinhardt

et

a],

as

-a

clear

acknowledgement

that

the

cosmos for

Heraclitus

has

a

permanenceor eternity which would exclude any cyclic alternationof

opposite

states,

such

as

is

essential

to

the

doctrine of

Empedocles,

and

would consequently

also

exclude

any phase

of

simnultaneous

total

reabsorption

of

things

into

Fire.

Yes,

but

this

interpretation

fails

to

take

account

of a

fact which

was

alreadypartly

recognized

by Zeller,

that

this

'coming

together

of

the

divergent' (and divergence

of

the

convergent,

because

it is

really

both)

which Heraclitus

lays

down as

a law

for the

mutual

relation

of

the

I

This

interpretation

of Cratylus1

2-13 which 1 put forward

n an article of

19g3

(Dos

Textosde PlatonsobreHeraclito

Notas y estudiosdi filosofia,Tucuman)s indicatedalsoby

G. S.

Kirk,

Heraclitus,

The CosmicFragments,p.

363 sq., independently,

since he did

not

know my article.

76







multiple

distinct

things

which compose

the cosmos, is

also affirmed

by

him to be inherent in the-Fireitself. The Fire is, in and throughitself,

a unity

of opposites,

a

discord

amid concord,

a

war andpeace,

a harmony

and internal conflict;

in this capacity

it generates

the

cosmic multi-

plicity of opposites

n incessant

strifeyet

at the same

time for ever

bound

together.

Even

supposing,

then,

that Heraclitus

did admit an

alternation

of contrary phases

(distinction,

leading

to

the

cosmos,

and universal

conflagration),

there

would

remain

permanent

within them

both alike

one reality,

a converging-divergent

r

diverging-convergent.

In Empedocles,

however,

this at

no

point occurs,

for his cosmic

cycle,

abstractly reduced by Plato to two opposite phases, unfolds itself in

reality

in

four;

two

extremes,

the total

mixture

of

the elements

and

their

complete

separation,

and two intermediate

phases, or

phases of

partial

mixture

and

distinction.

In

the former

of these, mixture

is con-

stantlydeclining,

while

distinction

is

on

the

increase,

while

in the

latter

an

opposite

process

prevails.

Now each of the two extreme

phases

is

characterizedby

the exclusive

presence,

within

the massof elements,

of

only

one

of

the

two

opposing

forces: Love alone

in

the

unity

of the

Sphaeros,

trifealone

n

the

total

separation

f

the

four elements;

the

op-

posite force beingon eachoccasionthrustout andbanished.Hencein one

of

these

two

phases

there

is

only

a

convergence,

and in the other only

a

divergence,

of the

elements.

Nor

again

n

the two intermediate

phases,

in

which

the

opposite

forces

are both

present

and confront

one

another,

is

there

any

'divergent

which

converges',

because

the

question

here

is not

of

tendencies intrinsic

to

the

element

and

essentially

linked to

one

another,

but of two

forces

which

are-mutually separate,

and both

extrinsic

to

the elements

upon

which

they operate.

This is the real difference

between

the

two

doctrines,

which

Plato

brings

to light only in part,andwhich does not in fact necessarilyrequire

him

to exclude

from Heraclitus

the

idea of a cyclicalchange;

since

even

in

the phase,

if

there

is one,

of

reabsorption

of the cosmos into

the

uni-

versal principle

(fire), there

would

be

a

divergence

of

the

convergent

and convergence

of the divergent,

no less

than in the

opposite

phase.

And

precisely

for

that reason

Aristotle,

who

is

not,

like

Plato,

studying

convergence

and divergence

and

asking

whether

this is a

relationship

of unity or

separation,

but

looking

to the

cycle

of

alternating

ormation

and

destruction

of the cosmos,

can

attribute that

cycle

to Heraclitusand

Empedocles

equally

and in

this

aspect

assimilate them

to

one another,

without

thereby coming

into

conflict

with

Plato,

who

was opposing

them

to

one

another

from

a differentaspect.

77







Aristotle

says

in

De

caelo,

279

b: 'All (the

natural philosophers)

say

that

(the cosmos) comes into being; but some hold that it comes into being

perpetually,

as

do all

things

whatsoever

that are constituted

by

nature,

whereas

others

say

that it

is

found

alternately first

in one state

and

then

in

another,

so

that

a

destruction

occurs;

and

that

this

(rotation)

is

perpetually

repeated,

as

Empedocles

of

Acragas

and Heraclitus

of

Ephesus

declare.'

At

a

later

point (28oa)

Aristotle

explains

that

in this rotation

it is

the

dispositions

of

the

cosmos,

and not

the universal

cosmic reality,

that

come into

being

and are

obliterated,

since the sum

of

corporeal

reality

persists

for ever

either

in the one form

or

in the

other;

however,

this

observation in no way weakens his previous attribution of, the cosmic

cycle

to

Heraclitus equally

with Empedocles.

This alternation

of phases

is,

in

the

quoted

passage,

assigned

to

the

cosmos

or

heaven

in its

totality,

and

not to

individual

things;

hence

the

dissolution

which

is mentioned

cannot be

other

than

a total

reversion

to

the

universal

principle,

which

for

Heraclitus

is fire.

In this

De caelo

passage

fire

is,

indeed,

not explicitly

named

in

contrast

with the

cosmos;

Aristotle

does,

however,

name

it in

Physics

2oSa,

literally reproduced

in

Metaph.

I

o67

a,

in a

form

which

has

opened

the

way

to

divergent

interpre-

tations and arguments. The proposition which Diels-Kranz, Walzer, and

Mazzantini

cite

in their

editions

of Heraclitus,

when

isolated

and

torn

from its

context,

says:

cladep

'Hp&xXsL-6q

Cp7JaLv

&7rVToc

yWeaOocL

IXoTE

7ip,

and

this

was translated

by

Zeller

'as, according

to

Heraclitus,

everything

will

one day

become

fire' ( es

werde

alles

dereinst

zu Feuer

werden .)

(cf.

Zeller-Nestle

I,

7 Aufl.,

p.

867).

Zeller

emphasized

the

fact that

Aristotle

said

bcrvonz

the

totality

of things

taken

simultaneously

and

comprehensively),

not

simply nacvro

all things,

even

though consider-

ed

successively

one by one);

but

Burnet

opposed

this on the

ground

that

there

is no

difference

of

meaning

between

these expressions,

and that

if

Zeller's

translation

was

correct,

we ought

to

find in the text

of Aristotle

the

future

(yev'acaOocc)

not

the

present

(y[vsaOot).

On this

second

point,

Burnet

was

certainly

right;

but the error

in

Zeller's

translation,

that of rendering

the

verb

in

the

future,

was

dependent

on

the

interpretation

of

the

nOT'

as a

reference to

a

unique

future

moment

('one

day,

once,

finally'),

whereas the

use of the

present

indicates

that

it is

employed

by

Aristotle

in its

other sense

whereby

it

refers

to

a

repeated

fact ('sometimes,

from time

to

time,

at certain

moments'),

just

as when

it is used

to

describe the

alternation

of distinct

moments

(Oro'

v

.v

.

7tOTr

...a -

'sometimes

...

but

sometimes',

78









is fire.

Further,

this

is

thoughtby

him to be periodicallyrepeated(noT')

not to be accomplishedonce only at some futuremoment.

An important

objection,

however,

to the

traditionalnterpretation has

been raisedby H. Cherniss,

op. cit.

P.29,

note io8.

He observes

that the

proposition

concerning Heraclitus

cannot be rightly understood

apart

from

the context to

which it

belongs,

and

this

is devoted to the

refu-

tation of

material monism,

which

lays down some single principle or

element

and deduces therefrom he genesis

of all

things, or of

the cosmos.

This,

Aristotle says, fails

to

take

account of the

fact that every change

proceeds

from

one contraryto its opposite,

and for this, as is explained

alsoin Degener.332a

6

sq., at leasttwo oppositeprinciplesarerequired.

Aristotle, therefore,

if he intends to

deny

the

possibility

of generating

the cosmos

from a single

principle, can hardly

say that it is impossible

for the universe -r6no

)or totalityof things(ak &7tcavrxc)

o be transformed

into a single principle,

but on the contraryneeds

to say that it

is impossi-

ble for

such a

principle,

whatever

its

nature, (fire,

in

the

case

of

Hera-

clitus),

to

be

transformed

nto

things

in all their multiplicity.Even gram-

matically,

Cherniss

adds,

this

inversion

s neccessary,

since the sentence

begins

with the

proposition:

xopl'

yocp

oi

7

4rpov dlvat

TLC'UT@v

('excludingthe view that one of these elements is infinite') where the

subject

is

clearly

rtL

oc.&Cv, and

the

same

's st urc-v must be kept

as

subject

in the proposition which follows,

whence rbo xv must

form part

of

the

predicate;

and thus in the

third proposition

it must be inferred

that

the

subject is sugp

(the particular

'n

ai&rCv

n which

Heraclitus

believes)

while

&7avorx

orms part of the predicate.

The translation of the

whole sentence

must thus be: 'For,

excluding

the

view

that

any

one of

these elements

is infinite, it is impossible

that

any of

them should be,

or should come to be, the

universe, even if this

is

finite,

in

the way

in which Heraclitus says

that fire is sometimes

converted

into the totality of things.'

While

Kirk subscribes unconditionally

to

this

thesis of Cherniss's

(Op. cit.

32I-2),

the objection

was raised by A.

Maddalena (Sulla

cosmol.

ionica da

Talete

ad

Eraclito, Padova,

(I940) p.

i49),

that the effect of

this

construction

and

sense

is

strained,

as is also the analogy between

the

different

propositions,

and

that

the

subject

coming after the predicate

is

in

a

strange position.

His

objection

however considers only

the gram-

matical

argument

used

by Cherniss,

and not his

other argument based

upon

the

significance

of the whole

Aristotelian polemic in this

passage.

Material monism is incapable

of explaining the

coming-to-be

of

the

cosmos,

and for this purpose a plurality

of elements is necessary,

owing

80







to

the

fact that

every

change passes

between

a

pair

of

opposites.

Now

it maycertainlybe observedthat Aristotle is in this criticism failingto

take

account

of the

fact that

the Heracliteanire,

according

to

Heraclitus

himself,

has opposition

included

in it; it

was just this important

aspect

of

the

doctrine

which

Plato had

stressed

in

Soph.

242 d, e,

whereas

Aristotle

here

passes

over it.

But,

in

any case,

'a

single

element

cannot

be

transformed

into

all things'

appears

a more

natural

criticism

than

'all

things

have not

the

capacity

to transform

themselves

into a

single

element.'

It might, however,

be

thought

that,

since Aristotle

has declared

that

for

the early philosophers

the principle

and

element

of real

things

is that

of which they are composed, out of which they arise, and into which

they

are

resolved (Metaph.

13, 983b

6

sqq.),

to

say

that the universe, or

totality

of things,

cannot

be

merged

into a

single principle

is in a

manner

equivalent

to saying

that

they

cannot

arise

from

it;

the two

assertions

complete

and confirm

one

another.

Thus,

even

given

the usual

translation,

the

sentence

could

be fitted

into the argument

which

aims

at

demon-

strating

that

material

monism

is

unable

to

give

an

explanation

of

reality.

Nevertheless,

it is

extremely probable

that Cherniss's

correction

is right.

But

it does

not

seem to

me to

justify

the conclusion

he draws

from

it

when he says that this eliminates the alleged Aristotelian testimony in

favour

of

the

inclusion

of

the world

conflagration

in Heraclitus's physics.

To me,

on

the

contrary,

it seems

that

that

testimony

remains

and

in

a

sense emerges

all

the

stronger.

Surely

the

statement

that 'Heraclitus

declares

that sometimes

(7rTz')

fire

transforms

itself

into

the

totality

of

things',

cannot

refer

(as

the

interpretation

adopted by

Cherniss

assumes)

to a constant

and

continuous

process

of

partial

changes

which, being

in

counterpoise

with

changes

of

opposite

tendency,

maintain

for ever the

permanence

of the

cosmos.

So long as the cosmos is maintained, the process of change of fire into

particular

things

is

not

being

fulfilled

merely

sometimes,

but

constantly

and

uninterruptedly;

and it is not

being

fulfilled

for

all

things

together

(&7rMToav,

r

TO

sv),

but

,at any given

moment,

for some things

and

not

for

others,

since

it is

always

accompanied

and

counter-balanced by

inverse

processes,

belonging

to those

things

which

are on

the

road

back

towards

transformation

into

the

principle.

To

say,

as Aristotle

does

say,

I

Thus,

Zeller (Zeller-Nestle

1,

868) does expressly

say:

'Aristotle

says

that it

would

be im+possible

or the whole

cosmos either

to consist

of a single element,

or to

be

resolvedinto one, as would be the case if, followingthe notion of Heraclitus,all things

became

fire.'

Zeller

is in these words attributing

o Aristotle

a

complementary

phrase

quite

justifiably

added by

himself.

B I







that sometimesire

changes into the totality

of things, would

have

no

meaningif there were not an implied contrastwith other imes n which

the inverseprocess

is being

accomplished.Aristotle opposes

the universal

principle

(fire)

to the cosmos generated

by it, and saysthataccording

to

Heraclitus he former

is transformed

nto the latter;

but he does not

say

that

this occurs once only (osoo),

but that it occurs

repeatedly or

sometimes

(7oC6). Now once such a

transformation

as been fulfilled,

it

could

not possibly occur afresh

unless as a pre-condition

there inter-

vened

an

inverse

transformation,hat

is, the return

of the cosmos to

the

universal

principle.

The repetition, therefore, which is indicatedby the 7rore' nd by the

present

tense

of

the verb,

necessarily mplies a

cyclical process;

and, if

in the

first

phase

of this cycle the totality

of

fire

is

engaged

n becoming

the

totality of the cosmos,

the oppositephase

can only be one

in

which

the

totality

of things (6r`=av'a

nd

t6

7cFv,

Phys.

2oga

and

Metaph.

o67a;

cosmos

or the

heaven according

to

De

caelo

279

b) turns

back

into the

universal principle.

Assuming

Cherniss'scorrection,

the assertion

that

there

is

a

return

process,

of the cosmos

towards

ire is, indeed, implicit,

but

yet

appears

o be necessarily

entailed.

In conclusion, therefore, it seems to me that it can be admittedthat

Aristotle

precedes

the

Stoics

in

attributing

to Heraclitus the

doctrine

of

the

periodical

world-conflagration.

Yet his

testimony

does

not

therefore

come into conflict

with that

of

Plato, if

it is agreed

that

he,

when

he

ascribes

o Heraclitus

he

belief

in

the

perpetuity

of a

'divergent-

which-converges',

was

indicating

a

concept

which the Ephesianphiloso-

pher

applied

alike

to

fire

and

to

the

cosmos,

and which he

thus

applied

to

the

cosmos precisely

because

he

applied

it

to the

fire

from

which

the

cosmos

is

derived,

and

with which it

is

identifiable.

When

we

have

thus excluded an irreconcileableconflict which would invalidateboth

the

testimonies, that

of Aristotle

-

in which, alone of

the two,

the

conflagration

s

mentioned

-

retains

the

full

weight

which

properly

belongs

to

it

because

of

his undoubted knowledge of

the

Heraclitean

text;

inasmuch

as in this

instance his business

was

not

to interpret

an

assertion,

but to

recognize,

or fail

to

recognize,

its occurrence

in

the

author

cited.

Buenos

Aires

MAY

19 57

82

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