Monetary Policy under Flexible Monetary Policy under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Thailand’s ExperienceInflation Targeting: Thailand’s Experience
2
ReferencesReferences
Mishkin, Frederic S. (1999): “International
Experiences with Different Monetary Policy
Regimes”, National Bureau Of Economic Research,
Working Paper 6965.
McCauley, Robert N (2006): “Core versus Headline
Inflation Targeting in Thailand”, Paper prepared for
Bank of Thailand’s international symposium on
“Challenges to inflation targeting in emerging
countries”, Bangkok, 13-14 November 2006.
3
OverviewOverview
Four Monetary Policy Frameworks
Inflation targeting framework in Thailand
Challenges ahead and policy issues
4
Monetary policy ultimate objectivesMonetary policy ultimate objectives
Price stability
Long-term growth and full employment
5
Monetary policy frameworkMonetary policy framework
Exchange Rate Targeting
Monetary Targeting
Inflation Targeting
No explicit announcement (Just-do-it approach)
6
Exchange rate targetingExchange rate targeting
Pros
Low inflation (for developing
countries)
Stable environment for trade
& investment
Monetary discipline
Cons
Under free capital mobility,
no monetary policy
independence
Crisis-prone
Losing competitiveness
7
Success of exchange rate targetingSuccess of exchange rate targeting
Synchronize economic cycles with anchor
currency economy
Appropriate level of exchange rate
(no macroeconomic imbalance)
8
Monetary targetingMonetary targeting
Monetary as policy anchor
MV = PQ
Conditions for success
Stable relationship between money and economic
variables (growth & inflation)
Ability to control monetary targets
9
““Just-do-it” approachJust-do-it” approach
Pros
Flexibility
Cons
Lack of transparency
discipline
Need credibility before
adopt
No explicit announcement for policy anchor No explicit announcement for policy anchor
10
Why monetary policy was revised?Why monetary policy was revised?
1. Switch from fixed to a floating exchange rate regime
– need for a new nominal anchor
2. Rapidly changing world economic and financial
environment
3. Growing public awareness of information and news
4. Previous monetary policy not clearly defined
11The search for a new nominal anchor The search for a new nominal anchor consistent with flexible exchange rate regimeconsistent with flexible exchange rate regime
-3
0
3
6
9
12
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-15
0
15
30
45
60
Exchange rate
Headline inflation
Change of the exchange rate regime% Baht/USD
12
Features of appropriate monetary policyFeatures of appropriate monetary policy
1. Clear principles and framework
2. Transparent and examinable, consistent with good
governance rules
3. Decisions based on sound principles, avoiding personal
judgment, and easily communicated to the public
4. Clear responsibility and accountability
5. Promotion of long-term economic development
6. Strengthening of credibility for the central bank and
Thai economy
13
General principles of ITGeneral principles of IT
Transparency
AccountabilityIndependence
To build up
credibility
14
II. Inflation targeting frameworkII. Inflation targeting framework
in Thailandin Thailand
15
Current frameworkCurrent framework
Policy goal: Price stability
Policy target: 0-3.5% quarterly average core inflation rate
0.5 – 3.0% since January 2010
Policy instrument: 1-day bilateral repurchase rate
Policy tool: Macroeconomic Model (BOTMM)
Responsibility: Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
Communications policy: Inflation Report, press
conference
16
Policy goal: price stabilityPolicy goal: price stability
Price stability is the overriding objective, in support
of sustainable long-term growth.
Policy widely understood and agreed upon.
Clear, credible, and consistent.
Cooperation and regular consultation between BOT
and the government (under the new BOT Act).
17Choice of inflation measure to targetChoice of inflation measure to target
(Core inflation)(Core inflation)
CPI excluding some items that
cannot be influenced by
monetary policy, and retaining
sufficient price information
Core inflation has less variation
but on average is close to
headline inflation in the long run
Targeting core inflation is the
control of long-run inflation
such that monetary policy does
not have to accommodate
supply shocks
Percent
Before IT
1986 Q1 -2000 Q1
Headline Core
Mean 4.66 4.59
Volatility (S.D.) 2.17 1.68
18
Policy target: core inflationPolicy target: core inflation
… based on prices of goods and services in the
CPI basket but excludes raw food and energy items:
Rice and cereal products
Meat, poultry, and fish
Vegetables and fruits
Eggs and milk products
Benzene and diesel
Cooking gas and electricity
19Choices of items excluded Choices of items excluded
from core inflation for the case of Thailandfrom core inflation for the case of Thailand
Weight Mean S.D.
Food 38% 4.6 1.73
Raw food 16% 5.3 1.66
Energy 6% 5.6 1.61
Controlled price 6% 5.4 1.74
Indirect tax 9% 5.2 1.43
Raw food and energy 22% 5.3 1.35
Headline inflation 100% 5.5 1.85
Sample 1993:01 - 1999:12
20Core inflation closely tracked headline Core inflation closely tracked headline
inflation in the long runinflation in the long run
-4
0
4
8
12
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Headline - Core
Core CPI
Headline CPI
% YoY
IT since May 2000
21
Target point or range (0.5 - 3.0%)Target point or range (0.5 - 3.0%)
Relatively low in comparison with past inflation
Consistent with inflation trend of Thailand’s trading partners
and structure of the Thai economy
Chosen target range enhances export competitiveness and l
eads to currency stability
Does not pose constraint on economic recovery
Cushions temporary economic shocks and minimizes need
to adjust monetary policy frequently
Criteria in choosing the inflation targetCriteria in choosing the inflation target
22Policy instrument:Policy instrument:
1-day bilateral repurchase rate1-day bilateral repurchase rate
The use of 1-day bilateral repurchase rate as the key
policy rate is expected to:
provide a transparent monetary policy signal.
provide a framework for a more effective transmission
mechanism.
23Transmission mechanism Transmission mechanism of monetary policyof monetary policy
Time Horizon (8 Quarters)
24
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Movements in policy rate (RP1D)Movements in policy rate (RP1D)
% p.a.
Interbank
RP 1D
25
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
RD3M
% p.a.
MLR
Monetary policy transmission mechanismMonetary policy transmission mechanism
Policy rate
26Policy tool:Policy tool:
Macroeconomic model (BOTMM)Macroeconomic model (BOTMM)
Represents relationships between key variables in
Thai economy.
Covers 4 main economic sectors (real, government,
external, and monetary) and price indices.
Analyzes the impact on the economy from
various exogenous shocks and policy changes.
27
Components of macroeconomic modelComponents of macroeconomic model
28Macroeconomic model :Macroeconomic model :
Policy optimizationPolicy optimization
Minimize Loss Function :
Where = The difference between
forecasted inflation and targeted inflation at
time t
= The difference between
forecasted output and potential output at time t
Subject to the macroeconomic model
),(0 y
it
n
i itLMin
])()()[2/1(),( * 2* 2 yyrgyLtttt
*t
yyt*
29Using optimal control Using optimal control
to assist decision makingto assist decision making
Models &
Optimal Control
Economic Condition
Results
Decisions
Put in quantitative
formInterpretation
IntuitionMonetary Policy
Discretion
Monetary Policy Rules
Policy Makers’ Judgement
30GDP growth forecastGDP growth forecast adjusted for risk factors adjusted for risk factors
(as of January 2008)(as of January 2008)
Remark: The fan chart covers 90 per cent of the probability distribution
Annual percentage change (%)
2
4
6
8
10
Q12005
Q12006
Q12007
Q12008
Q12009
2
4
6
8
10
31
Probability distribution of the GDP growth forecastProbability distribution of the GDP growth forecast
(Unit: per cent)
Probability
2007 2008 2009
Old(Oct 07)
New(Jan 08)
Old(Oct 07)
New(Jan 08)
New(Jan 08)
< 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.1
4.0 – 4.25 3.6 0.0 1.0 0.7 2.7
4.25 – 4.5 43.3 0.5 3.5 2.9 5.5
4.5 – 4.75 48.9 40.3 8.7 8.0 9.4
4.75 – 5.0 4.2 58.2 16.1 16.1 13.7
5.0 – 5.25 0.0 0.9 21.9 23.0 16.7
5.25 – 5.5 0.0 0.0 21.7 23.0 16.9
5.5 – 5.75 0.0 0.0 15.4 15.8 14.2
5.75 – 6.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 7.3 9.8
6.0 – 6.25 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.3 5.5
6.25 – 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.5 2.5
> 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.2
91.7 93.4 80.8
92.2
98.6
32Core inflation forecastCore inflation forecast adjusted for risk factorsadjusted for risk factors
(as of January 2008)(as of January 2008)
Annual percentage change (%)
Remark: The fan chart covers 90 per cent of the probability distribution
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Q12005
Q12006
Q12007
Q12008
Q12009
-1
0
1
2
3
4
33
(Unit : Per cent)
Probability
As of April 2003 As of July 2003
2003 2004 2003 2004
< 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 – 0.5 17.0 0.0 100.0 9.1
0.5 – 1.0 83.0 0.3 0.0 89.4
1.0 – 1.5 0.0 19.8 0.0 1.5
1.5 – 2.0 0.0 64.5 0.0 0.0
> 2.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0
84.3
100.0 98.5
Compare the probability of Compare the probability of core inflation forecastcore inflation forecast
34
Benefits of fan chartsBenefits of fan charts
What are the benefits of having fan charts?
MPC can voice their opinions.
MPC can signal risk clearly.
MPC can judge beyond the model.
Helps shape public expectations of GDP growth and
inflation.
35Responsibility:Responsibility:
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
MPC consists of 7 members (of which 4 are from
outside)
MPC meets 8 times a year with pre-announced
schedule– Assess recent economic conditions and outlook
– Set the direction of monetary policy
– Approve the Inflation Report
36
Data
Policy formulation processPolicy formulation process
MPC meets 8 times a year
Policy rate decision
Policy implementation
Forecast of output growth and inflation
Press release
3 senior officials from BOT
and 4 external members
Inflation Report
37Communications policy:Communications policy:
Inflation ReportInflation Report
Clear monetary policy stance
MPC press conference after each meeting
Quarterly Inflation Report
Monetary policy information dissemination through:
– http://www.bot.or.th
– Publications
– Public symposiums and workshops
– Visits to educational and financial institutions
38
Inflation Report 2008Inflation Report 2008
39
III. Challenges aheadIII. Challenges ahead
40
Challenges aheadChallenges ahead
Choice of policy target
Exchange rate management under IT
41Divergence between core and headline inflationDivergence between core and headline inflation
seems to be persistseems to be persist
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Core Inflation
1.7
5.3
%YoY
Headline InflationMar 08
43Development of inflation: Development of inflation:
Adoption of IT (May 2000) to presentAdoption of IT (May 2000) to present
Before IT After IT
Percent1986 Q1 -2000 Q1 2000 Q2 – 2008 Q1
Headline Core Headline Core
Mean 4.66 4.59 2.59 1.02
Volatility (S.D.)
2.17 1.68 1.60 0.76
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000Q2 2001Q3 2002Q4 2004Q1 2005Q2 2006Q3 2007Q4
Core Headline
%YoY
Upper Target for core inflation
Before IT: Average of core is close to average of headline. However, core is less volatile, making it a better candidate in reflecting underlying inflationary pressure.
After IT: Prolonged Divergence
– Energy and raw food prices are no longer temporary supply shocks. Changes in the demand and supply structures of these commodities are persistent. Nature of shocks are different.
44Trend of energy and raw food are different Trend of energy and raw food are different
from that of core from that of core 24m moving Index
(2000M5=100)
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
1986M12 1990M12 1994M12 1998M12 2002M12 2006M12
CORECPICPI ENERGYCPI RAWFOOD
Difference in trends especially after 2003 onwards implies that exclusion of energy and raw food results in loss of information on underlying trend
A prolonged break down in the relationship between headline and core inflation that would persist for some time to come
Start IT
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
HCPI_PREIT Kernel CORE_PREIT Kernel
Den
sity
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
HCPI_POSTIT Kernel CORE_POSTIT Kernel
Dens
ity
Headline and CorePre- IT (1986M1 – 2000M4)
Headline and CorePost- IT (2000M5 – 2007M12)
Bumps caused by oil control during
2004-2005
45Structural change in the demand and supply of oil Structural change in the demand and supply of oil
implies that price could rise furtherimplies that price could rise further
Change in Demand Change in Supply
High demand with limited production
capacity of bio-fuel
Increases in investment in commodities
Supply less sensitive to price
OPEC continues to dominate market
Geopolitics Weather Investor Speculation
Oil price likely to rise
Higher volatility
More likely to overshoot and remain high
Lower ability to absorb shocks
Higher probability of shocks
46
Higher demand from China and
IndiaBio-fuel production
Limited capacity to increase supply
Raw food prices likely to rise further
Lower ability to absorb shocks
Higher probability of shocks due to global warming
In the same spirit, raw food prices could In the same spirit, raw food prices could
also rise furtheralso rise further
Low and declining ratio of stock to
use
Change in Demand Change in Supply
47
What next for Thailand?What next for Thailand?
Given the above analysis, it is clear that raw food and energy
would play a more significant role in driving inflation
dynamics, going forward.
It is also clear that other IT countries have moved away from
core inflation.
Therefore, core or headline inflation??
What is the target and how wide is the band (present: 0.5 -
3.0%)?
The length of period for calculating the inflation rate (present:
quarterly)?
48Main considerations for monetary policy in ThailandMain considerations for monetary policy in Thailand
at present under the inflation targeting framework:at present under the inflation targeting framework:
The BOT’s inflation targeting framework has meant that domestic price stability remains the number one priority for monetary policy
How much weight should be given to economic growth?
– In practice, much weight given to growth, particularly during the “hambuger” crisis
– Policy rate reduction for four times during December 2008 and April 2009, from 3.75% to 1.25%
– “Flexible inflation targeting” policy
49Main considerations for monetary policy in ThailandMain considerations for monetary policy in Thailand
at present under the inflation targeting framework:at present under the inflation targeting framework:
At the same time, in the context of increased financial flows into the region, the BOT’s has to prevent excessive exchange rate volatility
The BOT has prevented volatile capital inflows from disrupting the domestic economy through
– sterilized intervention to prevent excessive appreciation of the exchange rate
– restrictions on speculative capital inflows (of various degrees)
– liberalization of capital outflows to allow more balanced financial flows
50
Considerations in managing the exchange rateConsiderations in managing the exchange rate
Short-term Authorities can intervene to slowdown rapid changes in the
exchange rate, providing time for the real sector to adjust
Longer-term
Prolonged intervention would prevent the exchange rate
from acting as an automatic stabilizer for the economy
Prolonged intervention is unable to keep the real exchange
rate undervalued in the longer-term, as the market will lead
to an adjustment in prices, namely the nominal exchange
rate
51
The exchange rate is allowed to move in accordance with market forces, under the following conditions:
The BOT’s exchange rate management The BOT’s exchange rate management
The level of FX volatility does not disrupt the real economy
The exchange rate helps maintain competitiveness, as measured by the Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), which takes into account currencies of major trading partners and competitors, using third market weights (and not just the bilateral THB/USD exchange rate)
The exchange rate is in line with economic fundamentals, as it could otherwise lead to the buildup of imbalances
52
Challenges to monetary policy are fundamentally stemmed from
the impossible trinity framework as there are limitations to
maintain policy objectives given different economic settings
FX Stability
Capital MobiliityInterest rates (i)
autonomy
- Gap
Y - Gap
The Impossible TrinityThe Impossible Trinity
53
Financial imbalancesFinancial imbalances
Financial balances in 7 areas are also monitored
to safeguard economic and financial stabilities
– External sector
– Household sector
– Corporate sector
– Financial institutions
– Financial markets
– Real estate sector
– Fiscal sector