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1 IN THE 7TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURIrOTTNTY O F C TA Y - DIVISION 2 Bounty QpCOUNTY OF CLAY - DIVISION 2W i l li a m D u f f , ) CASE N O . 07CY-CV06125

Plaintiff, )) ACTIONv. ) FOR TRESPASS, AND) TRESPASS ON THE CASE

OFFICER WHXIAM FRAZIER, (SERIAL 3092) )AND )

OFFICER ALAN ROTH (SERIAL # 4090) ) VERIFIEDDefendants. )

PLIANTIFF INVITES THE COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE September 12, 2007To wit;The Subject matter being adjudicated in this case is specific to plaintiffs individuallyheld Right ofLiberty and Right to own property. Recently, defendants have injected, by way of their motions todismiss, an additional right of action as subject matter here to be adjudicated; Plaintiffs Right tocontract. All of which, plaintiff declares are Rights of Action belonging to Plaintiff. The controversyarises from Defendants and their agent's insistence upon regulating these rights of action;

1. The attempted regulation upon plaintiff1 s right of action arises from Plaintiff s presence on thepublic right of way with his property (auto) without;

a. State permission in the form of State Driver license;i. Defendants make the statutory claim plaintiff "must" have a State issued Driverlicense, however, Defendant fails to provide this court with competent evidencethat said State Statutory Claim is superior to Plaintiff's Right of action to be onthe public right of way with his property where no claim of injury attends.ii. Conversely, plaintiff offers City of Chicago v. Collins et al., Supreme Court ofIllinois. 175 111. 445, 51 N.E. 907 (Oct. 24, 1898).

b. State permission in the form of State issued license tags;I

1 The license in the latter-named case is designed to operate upon those who hold themselves out ascommon carriers, and a license may be exacted from such as a proper exercise of police power; but noreason exists why it should be applied to the owners of private vehicles, used for their individual useexclusively, in their own business, or for their own pleasure, as a means of locomotion. Farwell v. City ofChicago, 71 III. 269; Joyce v. City of East St. Louis, 77 111 . 156; Chy of Collinsville v. Cole, 78 111. 114; Chyof St. Louis v. Grone, 46 Mo. 575; Livingston v. City of Paducah, 80 Ky. 657; City of Covington v. Woods(Ky.) 33 S.W. 84 A license, therefore, implying a privilege, cannot possibly exist with referenceto somethingwhich is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride and drive over thestreets of the city without charge and without toll, provided he does so in a reasonable manner.

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And now

- *I H)i. (see la(i))c. State mandated commercial contract for automobile insurance;i. All insurance companies will not sell automobile insurance to anyone who does

not consent to and use the State Driver License. As such, having automobileinsurance, while generally being a good idea which plaintiff would have were itpossible. However, being impossibility, the law could not expect it.

d. An automobile (they call a "motor vehicle") that Attorney Generals office now claims;is purchased fraudulently Even though Plaintiff lias entered into evidence in this case acopy of the bill of sale ceding "all Right, Title and interest of every kind" in thatautomobile to Plaintiff. And to which Plaintiff now adds, a copy of the certified checkused to purchase said property (see exhibit Z attached hereto), complete with sellersname and assignment, as further evidence of said ownership.

From this analysis of the issues, it is becoming apparent there is possibility of a fraud being perpetratedsomewhere in this controversy. But is it the Plaintiff that is perpetuating it? Or is it the people in Stateoffices, whom the Attorney General is really acting to protect, who have devised or are perpetuating ascheme designed and implemented into Missouri Statutes that serves to severely diminish the peoplesRight to Liberty and to own and use Property, which the State could not ordinarily restrain, all thewhile generating fines and fees for State Revenue out of what would otherwise be the practice ofpeople enjoying the fruits of their Liberty and property, free from restraint by the State? It should

2come as no surprise, given the path plaintiffs proof is taking us; Plaintiff sees fraud in the latter andnone in the former.

SUMMARYIn their official capacities, defendants can act only in accordance with powers granted by the peopleagainst plaintiff upon subject matter that comprehends an injury plaintiff has done or by some form ofcontract plaintiff has consented to. Plaintiffs papers filed in this case state expressly he does notconsent to any such contract, and certainly not an adhesion contract as defendants are intimating exists.

Statutes are claims of authority that represent rebuttable presumption of law. Plaintiff has more thanrebutted the statutory presumption being subordinateto plaintiffs Right of Action. Defendants do notassert that plaintiff has injured anyone. As such, only one possibility remains that would lend anycredibility at all to defendants claims, to wit; The state of Missouri possesses an ownership interest in

we don't know fo r sure because it is not clearly stated in statute or in practice and it is not stated clearly in an y contract

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the 1996 Buick sufficient to decide its use and disposal. If this were the fact, an d what defendants arehiding behind in their assertion of statute, even if it were true, that fact would provide no authority fo rdefendants to pu t their hands on plaintiff or bind and imprison him. They have NO authority to do sounless an intentional injury is comprehended, (see4th amendment)

Lets assume for a mom ent that it is so. The man that sold the 1996 Buick to plaintiff believed heowned all right, title an d interest of every k ind in the auto. How do we know? He stated it on the billof sale (see exhibit B). That would suggest the State has NO interest sufficient to support the statutedefendants claim applies here. W hat could make the statut e apply to all m otor vehicles without theowners of the property know ing it? How about this scenario;

W hen an auto is manufactured, its Statement of origin (MSO) is evidence of all right title andinterest in that property (fact). The State com es along and forces the manufacturer, over w hich thestate wields undu e power and influence4, and/or its dealers to turn over the MSO to the state upo nsale to one of the people (fact). Then the state transfigures and transforms the auto into a "MotorVehicle" up on which the S tate issues the bu yer a "Certificate of Title"(fact). All of this is donewithout a clear disclosure to the buyer. All the buyer sees is the certificate of title. The sellerassures the buyer they are the proud new "Owner" of the car. The buyer provides the fullconsideration to the dealer for the property (car)(fact) but the State took ownership of the buyer'sproperty and issued the buyer a certificate of title as recognition for the buyers right to possess anduse it. W hat ju st happened there? B efore we discuss that lets look at a legal definition ;

FRAUD, TO DEFRAUD, torts: Unlawfully, designedly, andknowingly, to appropriatethe property of another, without a criminal intent.

FRAUD, contracts, torts: Any trick or artifice employed by one person to induce anotherto fall into an error, or to detain him in it, sv that he may make an agreement contrary tohis interest. The fraud may consist either, first, in the misrepresentation, or, secondly, in theconcealment of a material fact. Fraud, force and vexation, are odious in law. Booth, RealActions, 250. Fraud gives no action, however, w ithout damage; 3 T. R. 56; and in m attersof contract it is merely a defence; it cann ot in any case constitute a new con tract. 7 Vez.211; 2 Miles' Rep. 229. It is essentially ad hominem. 4 T. R. 337-8.

3 if yo u ask 100 people if they own their car, 99.99% will say they do.4 The Manufacturer is a State created Corporation and therefore subject to State Regulation, (fact)

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100 o Fraud avoids a contract, ab initio, both at law and in equity, whether the object be101 to deceive the public, or third persons, or one party endeavor thereby to cheat the102 other. 1Fonb. Tr. Equity, 3d ed. 66, note; 6th ed. 122, and notes; Newl. Cont. 352;103 1 Bl. R. 465; Dougl. Rep. 450; 3 Burr. Rep. 1909; 3 V. & B. Rep. 42; 3 Chit. Com.104 Law, 155, 806, 698; 1 Sch. & Lef. 209; Verpl. Contracts, passim; Domat, Lois Civ.105 p. 1, 1.4,t.6 5s.8, n. 2.106107 Undisclosed to the buyer and by force upon the seller, a third party (The State) stepped into the108 contractual proceedings between the buyer and seller and took the value of the property without109 providing any consideration thereto and without the express knowing and voluntary consent of the110 buyer. The buyer, happy with "their" new property pays for it in lull and then,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, The State,111 with its new prize bounty enacts statutes, to:112113 Force the buyer, in excess of the full price of the property, to pay a sales tax, annual114 property tax etc.;115 Force the buyer, in excess of their belief in their foil ownership of the property, to follow116 every "good idea" State statute enacted for the use and disposal of that property, wherever it117 is.118119 Why? Because the state claims an ownership interest in the property. It doesn't openly12 0 claim this. The State does it by subterfuge through its "use statutes'0. As here in this case121 when defendants claim that it is against the statute to buy or sell a "motor vehicle" without122 assigning the title (certificate of title), what they are saying is, we own it, and it can only be123 bought or sold according to our rules.12412 5 The scenario I just provided is not an analogy, it is a reality, it is unassailable in fact and in law. It is126 fact, this is what is being done and that fact clearly identifies the fraud that is apparent in this case.127 Plaintiffs dealings with the previous owner do not comprehend fraud by either party thereto.128 Plaintiffs choice not to be party to the fraudulent actions of the corporate State of Missouri is a choice129 Plaintiff, in his sovereign dominion over his own private domain, does as of Right to Liberty and130 Property, that being superior to the State Interests being adjudicated here, be they just or be they131 fraudulent. Plaintiff has no duty to perpetuate fraud. Neither do the office holders herein consumed.132133 Plaintiff, recognizing the fraud by State agents, purchased the 1996 Buick, took the fraudulent134 certificate of title and extinguished it as the property entered plaintiffs domain. Plaintiff correctly

5 In Missouri, many such statutes are located in RSMo chapter 300.

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)owns all right title and interest of every kind in said property and defendants, by force of arms, in anarmed criminal action did trespass upon plaintiffs domain, and steal plaintiffs Liberty and property inhis Body, his Right of Action, and in his 1996 Buick and personal property therein. Defendantsexcuse: Criminal enforcement upon a civil matter arising out of a fraudulent act of the State ofMissouri.

Even the Missouri Supreme Court declares all of the acts, complained of by defendants, as being"CIVIL" in nature (that can only mean contractually) and the only reason offenders are tried undercriminal rules is that the prosecution has a higher burden of proof attendant to the fines imposed.There is, and there can be, no authority that would support defendants trespasses upon plaintiff andplaintiff is due the remedy sought here.This court, and the magistrate designated generally to hold it, are now fully informed of the fraudsuborned by defendants and their attorneys and the injuriesthat is causing plaintiff. Both the court andthe magistrate have a duty to seek a remedy against these state actions, just as plaintiff is doing in thisaction. To ignore the duty is to vacate the office of trust.

WHEEFORE, this plaintiff, demands this court issue the orders previously entered in this case, withpreceape to the clerk for writ of execution thereof, on the seal of the 7 th Judicial Circuit Court ofMissouri, and without further delay and for all other considerations and support due this plaintiff.

> a t ew f f i hPlaintiffCc: W i l l i a m Duff to: wdd@williamduff.com,William Frazier and Alan Roth to: 1001 NW Barry Rd. PlaceKansas City, Missouri C/O KCMO Police Department - North DivisionEMILY A. DODGE Assistant Attorney General at; a.g@ago.mo.gov andemily .dodge(o).ago.mo. aov

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