Motor Mechanization Program of the Red Army during the Interwar Years

8/7/2019 Motor Mechanization Program of the Red Army during the Interwar Years

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.&BSTRACT (,Mumu200WeorW .TT-; i ntI for'mrl1 v lassified materials, traces the course of themotor-i z;L.i on irnd inechani zati on of thhe Red Army during the decadeof ! h', n ti e ri,,l,.n-thi rlies.-.

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.44i THE MTOR~jHANIATIONPROGRM.F IERDARMY

SOVDIET

OFFICE e 4WFort Leavenworth,_

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THE MOTOR-MECHANIZATION PROGRAM OF TH E RE D ARMYDURING TH E INTERWAR YEARS

Colonel David M. GlantzSoviet Army Studies OfficeU. S. Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

March 1990

This article presents the.views and opinions of theauthor and should not be construed to represent.those of th e U. S. Department of th e Army or th eU. S. Department of Defense.

APPROVED -,ORPUBLIC RE!EASE-DISTRMUTTON IiNLIf --.


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IntroduictIoi

"The Soviet Union emerged from the Russian Civil War united underLenin's Bolshevik Party but facing immense problens of reconstructingnational institutions to suit a socialist mold. As the nationformulated economic policies to salve the wounds of -ar (the NewEcono-ic Policy) and polit ical programs to to consolidate its power, italso addressed the critical question of national security, specificallya program of military reconstruction to establish a military instrumentto suit the socialist nation and guarantee its future survival. WhileComnissar of War, X. V. Frunze, articulated a basic program fo r a new"Unified Kilitary Doctrine,= other military theorists began what wouldbecome a Soviet penchant for the study of future war. Their intent wasta fashion an effective modern military force and a conceptual frameworkwithin which it could operate.

During the 1920s military necessity promnpted the Soviets to define anew theoretical real= within military science, which they termed=operational art." During that decade a host of military theo.eticlansand practitioners of war pondered questions arising from First World Va rand the Russian Civil War operations, many of the same questions Western"theoreticianswere addressing. First and foremost among those questions

?orwas how to break the tactical scalenate of positional war, which hadproduced on the Western Front four years of bloodletting devoid of mjoroperational successes. European prewar military theorists hadpostulated that strategic victory could be achieved by winning one grand n

ity C..., nd/o

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victory early in war. Further, they believed that wholesale initialtactical successes could produce rapid strategic victory.

The events of 1914 to 1918 proved that belief to be false. Thecrushing weight of firepower facing Firs t Vorld War armies inhibited3mbility and denied the participants strategic success until theysuccumbed to exhaustion produced by a war of attrition. The Soviets,however, experienced a different phenomenon in their Civil Var. Duringthat three-year struggle, the vast spaces of Russia and the paucity ofboth forces and heavy weaponry permitted mobile operations to occur instark contrast to what had occurred in the European Wbrld War.

During the early 1920s, the Soviets analyzed their World War andCivil Var combat experiences and concluded that the complexity of modernwar had negated the meaning of the older definitions regarding levels ofwar.' Basically, the Soviets reasoned that strategic success in War

could no longer result from the planning and conduct of tacticaloperations. In the future, an intermediate level was required--a levelof war the Soviets came to call operational. They Judged that onlycumulative operational success a,-hieved by successive operations couldproduce overall strategic victory on the battlefield.

This view had emerged by 1924 from the minds and pens of manytheorists, bu t it was the ex-Tsarist officer, A. A. Svechin, who gave it

- clearest definition in his 1927 book Stral.egia. [Strategy]. Svechinwrote, Olorsally the path to final [strategic] aims is broken up into a

S - series of operations subdivided by time and by more or less sizeable-L -- pauses, comprising differing sectors of a theater of war and differing

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sharply as a consequence of different intermediate aims.. 2 Vithin thecontext of these successive operations, Svechin defined the operation as"that act of war during which struggling forces, without interruption,are directed into a distinct region of the theater of militaryoperations to achieve a distinct interm-diate aim. 3 Looking at thelower end of the spectrum of combat, Svechin concluded, "Operationalart, arising from the aim of the operations, generates a series oftactical missions." Thus a coherent structure emerged governing th econduct of war-OTactics makes the steps from which operational leapsare assembled, strategy points out the path.=G Svechin's practicaldefinition was a comprehensive one which has withstood the test of tineand closely resembles current Soviet definitions.

Once the Soviets accepted the validity and importance of operationalart as a precondition fo r strategic victory, they were confronted withanotler dilemma, of devising methods and forces to conduct operationalmaneuver, which they realized was key to achieving operational success.This requirement posed distinct problem fo r the Red Army of the A920sand prevented the Soviets from developing a mature operationalcapability overnight. The Red Army of the 1920s was a Ofoot and hoofaarmy of infantry and cavalry forces lacking both the firepower andstrength to sustain deep operational maneuver.

Between 1929 and 1936 Soviet military theorists worked out thetheoretical basis of, first, a tactical concept of deep battle [IglubkiihoL] and, then, an operational concept of deep operations [(gubakalaoperat]liaJ. Parallel to this theoretical work, the forced

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industrialization of the Soviet economy began to produce weaponry andequipment necessary to create a Red Army force structure capable ofconducting operational maneuver--nawely a mechanized and armored force.&The ensuing notor-mechanization program of the Red Army propelled Sovietmilitary concepts and forces into a new techniological age.

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IbTowarda De&R axtlThnaia Context

Soviet military strategy in the 1920s, derived from the experiencesof the First Vorld Var and the Civil War, concluded that future wa rwould begin with extensive maneuver operations, it would occur over vastregions, and it would consume huge economic and human resources. S. S.lauenev, Red Army commander from 1919 to 1924, wrote:

in spite of all victorious fights before the battle,th e fate of th e campaign will be decided in the verylast battle-interim defeats will be individualepisodes.... In the warfare of large modern armies,defeat of th e enemy results from th e sum of continuousand planned victories on all fronts, successfullycompleted one after another and interconnected intime. 7Kauenev rejected the possibility of using a grand strategiLc stroke

to win quick victory in war (such as the Schlieffen Plan). Instead, he

argued, "the uninterrupted conduct of operations Is th e main conditionfo r victory. e Tukhachevsky, drawing upon his experiences along th eVistula in 1920, concluded that *the impossibility, on a modern widefront, of destroying the enemy army by one blow forces th e achievementof that end by a series of successive operations.0 V. K.Triandafillov, in his 1929 work, lh . Character of. Qration. of . !oernArinip echoed and further developed Tukhachevsky' s view of future warand concluded that only successive operations over a mouth's time to adepth of 150 to 200 kilometers could produce victory. Triandafillovintroduced the concept of using tanks supported by air forces to efftct

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penetration of the tactical enemy defense and extend the offensive intothe operational depth. 9

By 1929 the theory (but not yet the practice) of successiveoperations was fully developed. The front, as a strategic entity, wouldaccomplish missions assigned by- he High Co~nmnd. It would unite allforces in a theater of military operations and would attack alongseveral operational directions faxes] to achieve overall strategic aims.The width of a front*-, offensive zone was 300 to 400 kilometers, and itsdepth of operations was 200 kilometers. ,o This view of strategicoperations persisted into the 1930s and forced Soviet military theoriststo seek an answer to the question of how to implement Triandafillov'sviews and escape the specter of attrition warfare. The evolution of anew level of war seemed to provide the tentative theoretical answer-thelevel of operational art.

The tendency in the 1920s to conceive of successive cperations asthe focal point fo r operational art resulted from the level oftechnology within the Soviet Union in general, and the equipmentprocessed by the Red kray In particular. Industrial backwardness andthe lack of a well-developed arnaments industry dictated that theSoviets rely on infantry, artillery, and horse cavalry to conductoperations. Hence, an optimistic view postulated that a front couldattack in a 300 to 400-kilometer section to a depth of 200 kilometers,while an army, the basic operational large unit designated to operate aspart of a front or on a separate operational axis (direction], couldattack in a sector from 50 to 80 kilometers wide to a depth of 25 to 30

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kilometers. It could also conduct a series of consecutive operations aspart of a front offensive. Each operation would last fo r 5 to 6 daysand would entail a relatively slow rate of advance of 5 to 6 kilometersper day. Already, by 1929 the Soviets planned to increase that rate of"advance to 25 to 30 kilometers per day by following Triandatillov'srecommendations to introduce tanks and mechanized vehicles into theforce structure."

The 1929 Field Ragulan. (Ustav], which declared that future warwould be one of maneuver, developed the theory of successive operationsa step further by injecting the idea of motorization and mechanizationinto concepts for future offensive operations. 12 The Ustay enunciatedthe aim of conducting deep battle [gnb]kii Dn!] to achieve success inpenetrating the tactical depth of enemy defenses by the simultaneous useof infantry support, tanks and long-range action tanks cooperating withinfantry, artillery, and aviation forces. This would also produce acapability to conduct more rapid operations. In 1929 deep battle wasbut a promise whose realization depended on economic reforms andindustrialization. Xoreover, deep battle was only a tactical concept.

Soviet tactics of the 1920s were governed by a series of newregulations issued between 1925 and 1928, the provisions of which werederived from Civil Var and the First World Var experiences, with dueconsideration given to advances in weaponry.- The regulations emphasizedmneuver war, the meeting engagement, attack on a defending enemy, anddefense in a war of maneuver. Group tactics of the later Civil Waryears persisted whereby combat formations were organized into groups of

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subunits echeloned in depth instead of in skirmish lines. These groupswould penetrate the enemy defense in separate sectors and then mergeinto a commn battle front.

General tactics emphasized the combined-arms nature of battle. TheTnfantZ Combat Regulation, ai 1272 and the Field Regulation. 0 19292prescribed that offensive infantry combat formations consist of a shockgroup (2/3 of the force) operating on the main direction of attack, anda holding group (1/3 of the force) deployed on a secondary direction. Areserve (of up to 1/9th of the force) was to accomplish unanticipatedmissions, and firing groups of artillery would provide support. On th edefense the first echelon consisted of the holding group (2/3 of theforce) and the shock group or groups deployed in the depths (in secondechelon) with the task of counterattacking and destroying penetratingenemy units.

Rudimentary tactics fo r the use of the fledging armored forces firstappeared in the 1&28 Proz ona. Instmctinns fr= the Conbat Uge oTanks and were reprinted in the 1929 Ustay. 12 Initially, tanks, inconjunction with artillery, would only provide support for infantry.Direct support tanks (1 to 3 platoons) would be assigned to riflebattalions. Forward-echelon tanks (a freely maneuvering group of 1 to 2tank companies) would fight independently in tactical contact with eachfirst-echelon rifle regiment- (out of fire and visual contact) in orderto suppress or destrcy enemy artillery, forward enemy reserves, commandposts, communications centers, or other objectives. Infantry attackingwith armor support could advance without pricr conduct of an artillery


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preparation. Tank reserves of the division connander, If available,would operate as a separate echelon of long-range acton tanks todevelop success into the taciical depths or to replace depleted supportunits. These rudimentary tank tactics i.ould soon improve, and th eintegration of armor into combined arms formations would accelerate inthe 1930s as a virtual industrial revolution swept across the SovietUnion.

Notor-Wc]haniya n Programs P 1.Because Soviet tank production in the 1920s was extremely limited,

ouly a handful of tank units were formed, and virtually all of thesewere classified as "experimental.0 Between 1920 and 1922, the singletank factory in Moscow produced sixteen tanks, which were then assignedto the 7th Tank Detachment, subordlnate to the High Conand. 1' Thatdetachment participated In ceremonies on Red Square. Measures to expandthat rudimentary-armored force matured slowly. In October 1924 th eSoviets organized the 3d Separate Tank Regiment, consisting of a cadreand a training battalion with 356 men and 18 tanks.'s The followingyear the Soviets abolished the regiment and, in its stead, created twoseparate 30-tank battalions, one heavy and one light, each with threeconpanies of ten tanks. In 1927 these battalions again formedregiment, which was supplemented by six armored car battalions (withAROF-15 armored cars) and about thirty armored trains. 1"

Serial production of the new XS-l tank armed with a 37 na gun and.achLie gun and the BA-2? armored car provided adequate levels of

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submitted a report in January 1927 identifying two tank regiments(designated the 1st and 2d) and containing a critique by the ChiefInspectorate RU Ed Army] of recent training. The report noted, gThetank has not yet been allotted a fixed role in the Soviet battlescheme.0 Over-reliance by infantry on the tanks produced inordinatetank losses, which were further compounded by high mechanical breakdownrates. Anti-tank artillery was particularly effective against tanks,and, although morale and training in the tank units was particularlyhigh, persistent signal and radio probieme inhibited effective comn-ndand control and coordination with the infantry, even in peacetimemagneuvers.2o

A more detailed report prepared by the U.S. attache in Riga in April1927 provided a detailed organization of the 3d Separate Tank Regiment,which took part in the 1926 fall maneuvers. The regiment consisted of acadre battalion with two tank companies of five tanks each, aninstructional battalion with tito heavy companies, totaling eight tanks,a signal detachment, workshop, guard platoon, and various logisticaldetails. '

A December 1928 attache report confirmed the existence of the 1stTank Regiment at loscow, together with the 3d Armored-Auto Battalion[Diizon]. The sane report, however, noted, OThere is contradictoryinformation as to the station of the 2d Tank Regiment in the LIDELeningrad iilitary District], but no confirmatory data has beenreceived so far.0 Similarly, the report noted that the 8th and 13thArmored-Auto Battalions were stationed in the Belorussian lilitary

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District (the latter as part of 3d Cavalry Corps).= Other reports in1928 echoed the Soviet araored regulations issued that year.

Thus, prior to 1930 the formation of tank and mechanized units wasextremely limited, and these easures represented but a first smnll steptoward motor-aechanization. Vhile tank forces would be subordinate tothe reserve of the High Caunnd to increase the striking power of rifleformations," they would be added to cavalry forces to enable them tobetter perfora the exploitation function.2 These neasures did,however, represent a promise of more significant developments in th efuture.

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military strategy in the 1930s, in part because, at least until 1940, itfocused Soviet attention on the offensive to the detriment of defensiveconcerns. Soviet strategy considered the defense a valid form ofmilitary operation and emphasized activity [actlInost'] and the use ofcounteroffensives. Iuch attention was devoted to the nature of theinitial period of war and the requirements of strategic leadership inwartime. The Soviets recognized that a surprise attack by hostilepowers was possible. In this regard, they believed that, unlike th epractices of earlier wars, forces of the covering echelons (on th eborders) could undertake an offensive of their own against the enemybefore the completion of main force strategic deployments or undertakedefensive measures to cover the main force deployment. By the Soviets'ow n admission, military strategy:

did not devote adequate attention to the developnent ofdefensive operations on. a strategic scale... questionsof repelling an unexpected attack by previouslyfully-mobilized enemy forces as well as the overallproblem of the initial period of war under changingconditions were not properly worked out. lo t all ofthe correct theoretical principles worked out by Sovietmilitary science with respect to military strategy werepromptly taken into account in the practical work orincluded in regulations.2,'

This was an easy admission, considering what happened in 1941. Toprovide strategic leadership in armed conflict, a special organ similarto the Civil Var-period Council of Labor and Defense would be formed aswell as a Stavka [HQ] of the High Comand [VGK].

Operational art, developed as a level of war in the 1920s, blossomedinto the most creative area of Soviet military art in the decade of th e

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thirties, largely due to technological and industrial developments andthe theoretical work of a host of imaginative military theorists. Th eimpact of new weaponry, first felt in the tactical realm, by the Uid-thirties affected the operational level. In essence the prouise of th e1929 Field. EggUlatlan.to achieve deep battle was realized.

The most important aspect of Soviet military science in the 1930swas the full development of the concept of deep battle and the emergenceof the concept of deep operations. The deep operation, a form of ccmbataction conducted by operational large units:

consisted of simultaneous. attacks on the enemy defensewith all means of attack to the entire depth of th edefense; a penetration of the tactical defense zone onselected directions and subsequent decisive developmentof tactical success into operational success by meansof introducing into battle an echelon to developsuccess (tanks, motorized infantry, cavalry) and thelanding of air assaults to achieve rapidly the desiredaim. 2s

The theory of deep operations represented a qualitative jump in the.development of operational art, and it offered a total escape from theimpasse of Vorld Var I positional warfare. Its implementation dependedentirely on the Soviet ability to construct a viable armored andmechanized force.

The theory of deep operations evolved out of the earlier theory ofdeep battle, which Tukhachevsky, Triandafillov, A. I. Egorov and othershad formulated at the end of the 1920s. These theorists concluded thattlie appearance of new weapons (long-range artillery, tanks, aircraft)and types of forces (tank, air assault, mechanized) would permitcreation of more maneuverable forms of combat and ease the problem of

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penetrating a tactical defense. Early experimentation with deep battletechniques occurred in. the Volga, Kiev, and Belorussian militarydistricts, and, as a result, in February 1933 the Red Army gave officialsanction to deep battle in itS ?r-nils nal Instructlons a&. ZhIGrznl~at oL D Batle2r-. New and more explicit instructionsappeared in March 1935, and the F il ggUJ.a.ion. EUst~ai of 1936 madedeep battle, as well as larger-scale deep operations, established tenetsof Soviet military art. While deep battle focused on the tacticallevel, that is combat by units within an army, deep operations focusedon operational-level combat involving fronats and armies alike.

The theoretical basis of deep operations, field tested in militaryexercises in the mid-thirties, was established by 1936 and described inthe RXgjuitn. of that year as:

-simultaneous assault on enemy defenses by aviation andartillery to the depths of the defense, penetration ofthe tactical zone of the defense by attacking unitswith widespread use of tank forces, and violentdevelopment of tactical success into operationa.isuccess with the aim of the complete encirclement enddestruction of the enemy. The main role is perforkdby the infantry and the mutual support of all types cfforces are organized in its interests. 2 7

The heart of deep operations involved the use of an operationalformation consisting of: an attack echelon; an echelon to developsuccess; reserves; aviation forces; and air assault forces, alldesignated to achieve tactical and operational success. Deep operationscould be conducted by a single front or (according to views of the latethirties) by several f supported by large aviation forces. By this

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"time the Soviets considered a front to be an operational-strategic largeunit (earlier it had been considered only a strategic large unit).

Fronts, conducted the largest-scale deep operations by employingsuccessive army operations to penetrate enemy defenses along convergingaxes in order to encircle and destroy enemy man forces. Successfulpenetration of an enemy defense required considerable overallsuperiority in forces and creation of high force densities inpenetration sectors. Development of the offensive into the operationaldepths required use of mechanized and cavalry corps, front reserves, andair assault landings in the enemy rear. To conduct deep operations, afront had to consist of:

3-4 shock armies1-2 standard armies1-2 mechanized, tank or cavalry corps15-30 aviation divisions.2

Fronts could attack in a sector 250 to 30 0 kilometers wide against.objectives at a depth of 150 to 25 0 kilometers and deliver the mainattack in a sector of 60 to 80 kilometers. Force densities of onedivision per 2 to 2.5 kilometers, 40 to 100 guns per 1 kilometer offront and 50 to 100 tanks per 1 kilometer of front would result. Afront operation would lazt 15 to 20 days with an average tempo ofadvance of 10 to 15 kilometers per day fo r infantry and 40 to 50kilometers per day fo r mobile forces.29 Vithin the front the attackechelon would consist of strong shock and combined-arms armies, and th eechelon to develop success would be composed of mobile groups formed

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from tank, mechanized and cavalry corps. Aviatiou groups and reserveswould support th e fronts.

Aries , as operational large units, could operate within a front orindependently along a separate operational. direction. Armiesparticipating in deep operations on front main attack directions wouldconsist of;

4-5 rifle corps1-2 mechanized or cavalry corps7-9 artillery regiments7-8 a ir defense artillery battalions2-3 aviation divisions (in support).ao

The army attack echelon, consisting of rifle corps reinforced by tanksand artillery, would advance in a sector 50 to 80 kilometers wide withits main strength concentrated in a penetration sector 20 to 30kilometers wide to penetrate the tactical enemy defenses to a depth of25 to 30 kilometerd. The echelon to develop th e penetration, an armymobile group of several mechanized or cavalry corps, would complete thepenetration of the enemy's tactical defense or attack after penetrationof the enemy's second defense belt to develop tactical success intooperational success to a depth of 70 to 100 kilometers. 31 The Sovietsexercised deep operation concepts in maneuvers in the Kiev, Belorussian,Moscow, and Odessa military districts in the mid-thirties.

Theoretical work on operational-level defense focused on thepreparation and conduct of army defensive operations. An army coulddefend a sector of 80 to 100 kilometers to a depth of 60 kilometers.32However, as was the case with the strategic defense, by the Soviets' ownadmission, prior to 1940 their fixation on th e offensive caused to o

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By Soviet count, by January 1933 this amounted to over a five-foldincrease in mechanized forces; which now comprised 9. 1 percent of totalRed Army strength. On 1 January 1934 Red Army mechanized forcesincluded two mechanized corps, six mechanized brigades, six tankregiments, twenty-three tankette battalions, and thirty-seven separatetank co=panies in rifle divisions and fourteen mechanized regiments andfive mechanized battalions in cavalry forces. Most of these units were,however, at less than fifty percent of full establishment strength.

Although contemporary observers of the Soviet military are skepticalabout or ignorant of these developments in the 1930s, Westernintelligence reports closely tracked the progress of the Soviet motor-mechanization program. By early 1930 'Distribution of Troop= [Order ofBattle] reports from attaches had identified the 2d Tank Regiment atLeningrad and an additional regiment at Moscow. No mention was made,however, of the experimental mechanized brigades. A subsequent _reportfrom Warsaw in March 1932 assessed the pace of motor-mechanization;identified three tank regiments (36 tanks each), without providinglocation; and provided details on four new motor-mechanized brigades asfollows:

1st Brigade (3 regiments) at Noscow2d Brigade (2 regiments) at Leningrad3d Brigade (2 regiments) in the Ukraine4th Brigade (2 regiments) possible at Smolensk 4".

-" These units corresponded to the Soviet tank regiments forming in early1932 at those locations. The report described a brigade organization

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lgrSe numbers of tanks, which are echeloned in leading, advancedaccompanying, and accompanying (DD, DPP, and II.P) groups, it is possibleta annihilate simultaneously the whole depth of th e hostile first line[zone] of defense (5-6 kilometers)."" When assesing how tacticalsuccess could be exploited, to what depths, and by what means the reportstated, =The criteria for determining the depth of a simultaneousstrategical operation is with the Soviets the range of action ofmechanized units, light and medium aviation, and motor transportation(on an average up to 100 kilometers from the line of departure)."17 I=conclusion, the attache added the following JYote by the NilitaryAttache," which was a prophetic warning to his superiors:

"In contrast to most of th e Continental armies whichcling tenaciously to the lessons learned in th e World War,th e Red Army tries to break away from the conservativetraditions of Ithe past and to experiment with mechanization,motorization and all other new means of warfare. While thetactical principles set forth appear to be rather visionary,it is believed that they are of sufficient interest to warranttheir being known. AIn lovezber 1933 the attache at Riga forwarded tw o reports analyzing

the conversion of 11th Rifle Division into what he called the Il or 11thKotor-Nechanized Division. In it he identified th e subordinate 31st,32d, and 33d Brigades as regiments. He speculated that the new divisionwould consist of:

2 motorized infantry regiments1 regular infantry regliwat1 tank regiment of not less than 3 battalions1 reinforced field artillery regiment, partly mechanized1 tank unit of unknown comoosition (battalion or regiment)1 zotor-sechanized reconnaissance detachment1 mechanized training regiment.

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The second Soviet Five-Year Plan, adopted in 1933, envisioned asizeable expansion of mechanized forces. It stipulated that by 1January 1938, th e Red Army was to include twenty-five mechanized andtank brigades, including those in th e mechanized corps and those formedfrom existing tank regiments. This program was designed "to achievesuch a scale of mechanization of the army, which would permit mechanizedforces to become one of the chief, decisive elements in combatoperations. ,6

Vithin this guidance, th e motor-mechanization program accelerated.The most important element was th e mechanized corps, which was toperform operational missions as part of- cavalry-mechanized groups. Twoadditional mechanized corps joined the force structure in 1934: the 7thMechanized Corps of the Leningrad Military District (which replaced the11th, which moved to the Transbalkal MD); and the 5th Miechanized Corpsof the Koscow .ilitary District, which was formed on the base of theolder 1st Mechanized Brigade.A

Exercises held in 1934 provided experiences upon which to base a newrestructuring of the four existing mechanized corps. In those exercisesthe corps proved cumbersome and, because of lack of reliablecommunications, they were difficult to command and control. Inaddition, serious logistical shortfalls led to a high mechanicalbreakdown rate in the corps, which, in turn, blocked th e roads andhindered the movement of other forces. Consequently, in 1935 th eSoviets reorganized the corps and shifted logistical support organs from

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corps level into the component brigades. The new mechanized corpsstructure, approved on 28 January 1935, included:

2 nechanized brigades (BT)1 rifle-machine gun brigade1 separate reconnaissance (tank) battalion1 signal battalion

Corps strength was 463 tanks and tankettes (348 BT tanks, 63 T-37 tanks,52 flame tanks), 20 guns, 1,444 vehicles, and 8,965 personnel. 6 7Additional engineer, antiaircraft, and other supporting units would beprovided by the RGK, tailored to precise needs of the corps inparticular combat circumstances. Although truncation and streamliningof the corps i-proved its mobility, continued comnnications weaknessesmade effective command and control in battle impossible.

Separate mechanized brigades, as independent formations designatedto support army operations or as a part of the mechanized corps, alsounderwent significant changes. The reorganized brigades consisted of:

3 tank battalions1 rifle-machine gun battalion1 combat support battalion1 repair-reconstruction battalion1 auto transport company1 signal company1 reconnaissance company.

Brigade strength amounted to 2,754 men, 145 tanks (T-26), 56 artilleryand machine gun tanks, 28 armored cars, 482 vehicles, and 39 tractors. re

Subsequent Western intelligence reports fleshed out the full picture"of he notor-mechanization program as it expanded. A January 1935assessment counted two motor-mechanized divisions (and a possiblethird), seven mechanized brigades, and four tank regiments. Th e

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brigades consisted of 3-4 tank battalions, a notorized artillerybattalion, signal and pioneer companies, an XC O school, and supportunits., 9

A l]arch 1935 report from Riga fo r the first time recognized the term*corps, whose organization contained:

2- otor-mecbanized brigades (one T-26, one BT)1 motorized rifle brigade1 motor-mechanized reconnaissance detachment1 field artillery regiment1 separate signal battalion1 separate engineer battalion1 ICO school.

The brigades were organized as follows:First brigade (Jotor-Xech) Seond brad (Eotor-Rech)3 tank battalions (T-26) 2 tank battalions (BT)1 motorized infantry battalion 1 motorized infantrybattalion1 field artillery battalion (76=) 1 field artillery battalion

(76mm)3 motorized infantry battalions1 field artillery battalion (76mm).The report identified motor-mechanized detachments of infantry divisions(one coupany and a tankette platoon or one to tw o companies, a tanksection or tankette company) and mechanized detachments of cavalrydivisions (armored car battalion, tankette squadron, and tw o tanksquadrons). In addition, it provided the organization of separate tankbattalions (3 companies of 3 to 5 tank platoons each) and separatemechanized brigades (reconnaissance group, 3 to 5 tank battalions, onemotorized infantry battalion, and one motorized artillery battalion).' 0

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Throughout 1935 and 1936 U.S. asseasments of Soviet motor-mechanizedstrength remained fairly static. Attention focused on the Leningrad(the 11th) and Ukrainian (the 45th) military district mechanized corps,which were invariably termed divisions, and on the growing number ofmobile brigades and regiments. Attaches apparently did not detect th ecreation of two additional corps at loscow (the 5th) and Leningrad (the7th) or the movement of the l1th Mechanized Corps to the Far East.Throughout 1936 the new Soviet field service regulation and itsimplications seemed to preoccupy the U.S. intelligence community.

After adoption and implementation of the 1936 Field ServiceRegulation, in November 1937 the Soviets drafted their third Five-YearPlan (1938-1942), a major portion of which emphasized increasingmilitary capabilities. Specifically, the plan envisioned creation of aneven larger mobile force, which could achieve the operational goals ofthe regulation. It recommended creation of a force of four tank corps,twenty-one separate tank brigades, three separate armored brigades, andeleven tank training regiments to replace existing training brigades.The new brigades grew in strength as the standard three-tank platoonexpanded to five tanks. Noreover, the plan called for creation of twotypes of tank brigades (heavy and light). Heavy T-35 tank brigadescounted 148 tanks (94 T-35, 44 BT, 10 flame) and other heavy brigades183 tanks (136 T-28, 37 BT, 10 flame). Light tank brigades had either278 BT tanks or 267 T-26 tanks. Tank regiments numbered between 190 and267 tanks. The plan also required the fielding of tank battalions (twocompanies with T-26 or T-38 tanks) in rifle divisions and tank regiments

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in cavalry divisions.,' To simplify nomenclature of armored forces, allmechanized forces were renamed tank.

Throughout 1938 the Soviets converted their motor-mechanized forcesto the new configuration. The new light and heavy brigades included:

4 tank battalions1 motorized rifle battalion1 ha++A1 ini

support units.Light tank battalions included fifty-four tanks and six artillery tanks.Heavy tank battalions had a lower strength because they maintained theirthree-tank platoon configuration. All tank brigades in the tank corpsadopted an organization similar to that of the separate light tankbrigades. The renamed and reorganized tank corps had a strength of12,710 men and 560 tanks and was organized as follows:

2 tank brigades (BT)1 motorized rifle brigade1 reconnaissance battalion1 signal battalion. 6 2

Western intelligence kept track of the burgeoning Soviet motor-mechanization program. In late 1937 attache reports noted an increasednumber of twelve mechanized and tank brigades in the Belorussianlilitary District alone. 3 Soon after, a War Department General StaffIntelligence Summary quoted from a "reliable* German source that therewere probably five mechanized corps no w in the Red Army force structure,three of which were identified (11th at Leningrad, 81st at Ninsk, and45th at Kiev). This source also reviewed the organization of the corps,mechanized brigades and mechanized regiments of cavalry corps and

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IranL-balikal X!Llir Dlstrlct? Corps Chita

In addition, the report listed five mechanized brigades, two tankregiments, and four tank battalions scattered throughout other militarydistricts. A companion report provided organization data on all typemotor-mechanized forces and pegged total Soviet motor-mechanizedatreagth Cat;

-4 corps comprising 11 brigades (3 corps of 3 brigades and 1 corpsof 2 brigades), fo r a total of 7 mechanized and 4 motorized brigades;-27 separate brigades, either mechanized, motor-mechanized, ortank.Subsequent attache reports In 1938 and 1939 also confirmed that th e

Soviets renamed mechanized corps as tank corps. They did not, however,substantiate Soviet claim that no new tank corps were created after193'. Soviet sources list the four corps existing in 1936 as the 7th inLeningrad, the 5th in Mioscow, the 45th in Kiev, and one corps (the old11th) in the Far East. Other Soviet sources mention a 10th Tank Corpsin the Finnish Var of 1939-40 and participation of 15th Tank Corps(Belorussian) and 25th Tank Corps (Ukraine) in the occupation of easternPoland in September 1939.r67

Attache reports confirm Soviet accounts of the post-1936 corps andrepeatedly provide details of a 1st Tank (Mech) Corps in Minsk,Belorussia. These reports also list the 4th Tank Corps in theTransbaikal Jilitary District. Later reports described existing corpsas follows:

1st Tank Corps Western ID (Minsk)3d Tank Corps Kiev MD4th Tank Corps Transbaikal MD5th Tank Corps Moscow MD

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using large tank units In combat because of the difficulty incontrolling them and because of their vulnerability to artillery fire.Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September 1939 highlighted th ecommand and control and logistical difficulties involved in employinglarge motor-mechanized forces. The 15th and 25th Tank Corps, whichparticipated in that operation, suffered greatly from mchanicalbreakdown and logistical shortages. 70 G. 1. Zhukov's successful use oftank forces against the Japanese on the Kbalkhbn-Gol [river] in August1939 received attention--not for the successful use of tank forces--butrather for the excessive amount of tima required to crush the stubbornJapanese resistance. Moreover, Zhukov employed multiple small tarkbrigades and armored brigades rather than the larger corps. 71 All ofthese instances led to a Jovenber 1939 Soviet decision to disband thetank corps.

To a degree, Soviet confusion in the strategic realm reflectedconfusion in the political realm. The policy decisions to abandonsupport-cf popular fronts and to sign nonaggression pacts with the mostthreatening of capitalist powers, Germany and Japan, were paralleled bythe lack of Soviet study of the nature of the initial period of war,specifically, the likelihood of enduring and repelling a surpriseattack. After 1939 the Soviets would have bu4 two years to establishdefensive plans and a force structure to carry them out. Sovietunpreparedness in June 1941, in the face of a clear and impendingthreat, resulted from Soviet failure to respond adequately to strategicdilems---a failure since 1956 attributed directly to Stalin.

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views, the most important of which was that of the Chief of the Armored-Tank Administration, Koukor D. G. Pavlov, who had served in Spain.7

Pavlov declared it was inexpedient to maintain large tank corps,stating that th e use of these corps for araids in th e enemy rear wasnot successful, since the possibility of such a penetration of th e enemyfront, after which the too unwieldy tank corps would be used to developsuccess, was out of the question. Pavlov asserted it was even moreimportant and necessary fo r coubined-a--s, like infantry, artillery,and aviation to cooperate closely with the armor. 7 1 To include allthese elements in a single tank corps would make th e corps impossible tocommand and control.

Despite Pavlov's arguments, the commission's majority reconnendedretention of th e corps, but with some significant changes in itsorganization. These changes were:

1. The tank corps is to remain, having excluded from itscomposition the rifle-machine gun brigade. Excludethe rifle-machine gun battalion from th e structureof the tank brigade.2. On th e offensive, th e tank corps must work for th einfantry while developing the penetration. In theseconditions t.-nk brigades operate in close coordinationwith infantry and artillery. The tank corps cansometimes operate independently, when the enemy isin disorder and not able to defend.77

The commission further recomuended that th e corps' brigades be of twotypes: first, a BT-equipped brigade to conduct independent actions;and, second, T-26 and T-28 brigades to reinforce rifle divisions.

In late Novenber the Main Kilitary Soviet approved the conmission'sreco-mendations. The poor performance of the 15th and 25th Tank Corps

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during operations In eastern Poland affirmed the wisdom of the decisionof the lain lilitary Soviet. At the same time, however, it mandatedcreation of a force, which, it felt, could accomplish the missions ofthe former tank corps. On 21 1ovember it ordered the formation offifteen new motorized divisions, eight of which would form in 1940 andthe remaining seven during the first six months of 1941.18Simultaneously, the Soviets created motorized rifle divisions with alighter armored compoent.79

The new motorized division would consist of two motorized rifle, onetank, and one artillery regiment; reconnaissance, signal, lightengineer, antiaircraft, and antitank battalions; and support units; witha strength of 11,650 men, 275 tanks (258 BT, 17 T-37 and T-40), 98 guns,and 49 armored cars.AO The decision included plans to replace the olderBT-7 tanks with new, modern T-34 tanks as soon as the new tanks wereavailable.

The new divisions, which were considered more practical than theformer tank corps, were to form the mobile group of armies to exploittactical success or become part of a fronts cavalry-mechanized group.Xeanwhile, existing tank brigades of the older tank corps would providearmor support to rifle corps. The Red Army would dispose of thirty-two

* tank brigades and ten tank regiments, which In wartime would convert tobrigades. These brigades were of two types: a light brigade with 258BT-7 and T-26 tanks and a heavy brigade with 156 T-28 and T-35 tanks.In December 1939 the People's Coxmissariat of Defense ordered the tankcorps to disband by 15 January 1940. By -ay 1940 the corps had been

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disbanded, and four motorized divisions organized (1st, 15th, 81s', and109th). 81

The French Army*'s debacle in Kay-June 1940, which repeated thelesson in mobile warfare the Germans had taught the world iu Poland i.iSeptember 1939, stunned the Soviet leadership, who subsequently bitterlynoted that, "Fascist Germany used the methods of deep operations whichwe developed earlier. The Germans bcrrowed the achievements of Sovietmilitary-theoretical thought and with great success used then in the warwith Poland and the Vest. U2 The Soviets responded to the defeat ofFrance with a hasty program to rebuild a large xctanized forcestructure. They began forzing large mechanized corps, each consistingof two tank divisions, one motorized divisioz, a motorcycle regiment,separate signal and motorized engineer battalions, and an aviationsquadron, with a wartime combat strength of 37,200 men and 1,108 tanks.The new tank divisions consisted of two tank, one motorized rule, andone artillery regiment and a variety of support and service subunits,with a strength of 11,343 men, 413 tanks (105 KV , 210 T-34, 26 BT-7, 1'8T-26, and 54 flamethrower), 9' armored cars, and 58 Suns and mortars(greater than 50=m). The notorized division accorded with theorganization of 5 December 1939.0*

The Council of People's Commissars approved the new corpsorganization on 6 July 1940 and ordered creation of eight new corps andtwo separate tank divisions. From July to December 1940, the new forceformed on the base of existing rifle and cavalry corps headquarters inthe following regions:

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Leningrad Military District 1st Mechanized CorpsWestern Special Xilitary District 3d Mechanized Corps6th Mechanzed CorpsKiev Special Military District 4th Mechanized Corps8th Mechanized CorpsOdessa Military District 2d Mechanized CorpsTramsbaikal Jilitary District 5th Mechanized CorpsMoscow Military District 7th Mechanized CorpsTranscaucasus Military District 6th Separate Tank DivisionjCentral Asian Military District 9th Separate Tank DivisionAn additional corps (the 9th) formed in the Kiev Military District byyear's end.8e4As they analyzed German operations in Vestern Europe and pondered theirown exercise data, the Soviets made further minor changes in mechanizedcorps organization during 1941. The most important of these reduced thequantity of heavy tanks in the tank regiment of tank divisions from 52to 31 tanks, thus reducing division strength to 375 tanks and corpsstrength to 1,031 tanks."

More importantly, in early 1941 the Soviets decided to increase itstotal number of corps twofold. In February the People's Commissariat ofDefense ordered the formation of toenty-one additional corps throughoutthe remainder of the year for a total force of thirty mechanized corps.By 22 June 1941 twenty-nine mechanized corps, sixty-one tank divisions,and thirty-one motorized divisions were in various stages offormation.- These forces, however, were beset by a host ofdifficulties incident to their hasty creation and the weak Soviettechnological base. As one Soviet analyst nozed:

"The new organization of the mechanized corps in 1940was accepted without experimental tests. The communicationmeans which were provided the corps were the same that wereprovided the 1939 corps, specifically 71 TI radio stationsand 5 AK nobile vehicle stations. It is well known thatthe corps commander could not cope with command and controlof the earlier 560-tank corps with the help of these radios.

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The Soviet motor-mechanization program developed through threedistinct phases, each characterized by a unique intellectual context,concrete theoretical direction, and specific force structuring measures.These phases were:

Phase I-To 1930Phase 2-1930 to 1938Phase 3-1938-1941Ihile the first two phases formed a continuum in term of positiveSoviet intent and accomplishments, the last period exhibited indecisionand marked lack of focus.

in the late 1920s, the Soviets formulated a conceptual framework forthe motorization and mechanization of its ;irces. Having pondered therequirements for future war, the Soviets articulated the concept of deepbattle as a means for converting success in individual engagements(battles) into success in operations. Deep battle required creation ofan armored and mechanized force which could satisfy that requirement.The Soviets planned for an economic leap forward, which would provide anindustrial base capable of producing equipment necessary to create tankand mechanized forces. In the meantime, the Red Army fieldedexperimental tank forces as a test bed for even larger forces in thefuture. In essence, the theoretical work of the 1G20s, together withforce experimentation, represented a promise to achieve deep battle, apromise that could only be realized when a more mature industrial baseexisted. By 1930 that base was emerging.

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The years 1930 to 1937 form one of the most productive periods forSoviet military art and science. Theoretical concepts for the use ofthe ar=red forces born in the 1920s matured in th e 1930s in what was avirtual renaissance in military thought. The theory of deep battlereached fruition and evolved into an even grander concept for deepoperations. The expanding Soviet industrial base produced the rawmaterial necessary to create a nodern notor-mechanized force, whichcould, with further refinement, translate th e theory of deep operations

into practice. Soviet theoreticans articulated theory and tested forcesand weapons conceptually and through an extensive field exerciseprogram. :e were, of course, serious deficiencies, which onlyfurther th-dght, training, and technological progress could overcome.In time, it seemed that even these problems could be surmounted. Tine,however, was not available, since in 1937 Stalin crushed and eradicatedthe brightest minds and most talented field commanders within th e RedArmy officer corps. Deprived of its brain, the Red Army atrophied. Aperiod of indecision, turmoil, and peril ensued, which undid virtuallyall of the progress made in th e previous two years.

The purges of 1937 ushered in a new period of regression in Sovietmilitary thought, which were reflected as well in the Red Army's forcestructure. While the purges unfolded, the Red Army was unable tocontinue positive development of its advanced military concepts. Thespirit of reform died with its creators, the theory of deep operationsfell into temporary disrepute, and the disciDles of th e purged theoristswere unable to revive it. Compounding this tragedy, the skilled minds

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necessary to analyze objectively the mixed experiences of the SpanishCivil Var were notably absent. Imagination fell victim tc mentalstagnation as the 3ediocre inherited the matle of the brilliant.Deadening of theory was the first legacy of the purges. The notor-xechamization program faltered soon after. The decision to abolish th etauk corps was the first retreat from creativity. The embarrassinsperformance of the Red Army in Poland and Finland was the second.-

In nid-1940 necessity in the form of the specter of future defeatraised the Red Army from its lethergy. The spectacle of victoriousGermn bitzkrieg in the Vest starkly set against the backdrop of th emiserable Soviet perforzance in the Finnish Var forced the Soviet HighCom.nd to act. It did so in late 1940 like a fighter only partiallyawakened from a stupor. Overnight the Soviets attesmted to undo th ewholesale dazage done in the previous two years. In so doing, itcommitted the twin cardinal sins of attezpting simultaneously torestructure and reequip its entire mobile force structure. In a periodof tranquility, such a task would have been Herculean; in a period ofperil it almost proved fatal. As a consequence, it would take two mreyears of catastrophic losses before a new generation of talented Sovietmilitary leaders would be able to realize the drea3L of their equallytalented but frustrated forebears of the 1930s.

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OIMES (Continued)12. V. Matsulenko, ORazvitie taktiki nastupatel'nogo boiaw [Thedevelopment of th e tactics of offensive battle], !IZ, to . 2 (February1968), 28-29; 1. Zakharov, 0 teorii glubokoi operatsiit [Concerning th etheory of deep operations], MZh, No. 10 (October 1970), 10-13.13. A. Riazansky, "The Creation and Development of Tank-Troop Tacticsin th e Pre-Var Period,' Io j vestk Eilitary herald], (Jovember1966), 25-32, translated in Slected Rpadingg JA Xiia Hist=:Soviet !ilitary Hisory. The1 Red LrjW 1918-1945, (Combat Studies"Institute,-Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1984).14. J. F. Kuz' un, I& strazbe. A1rngga triuda (On guard over peacefulwork], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), 114.15. OTam_--vyi polk" [Tank regiment], Sytska&& voemnala entsiklojediia[Soviet military encycl.Dedia], 8 Vols. (Joscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980,7:674, hereafter cited as M with appropriate volume.16. Kuz'min, 114; A. Ryzhakov, OK voprosy o stroitel'lstvebronetankovykh voisk Krasnol Armii v 30-e gody' [Concerning th eformation of Red Army armored forces in the 1930s], NIZh,o. 8 (August1968), 105.17. Ryzhakov, 105-106.18. Ibid., 106; Kuz'un, 114.19. OTables of Organization of Armred Detachments of the Red Army,'* Factor-ussia. Q2 o 2611. (Washington, D.C.: MilitaryIntelligence Division, Var Department, larch 21, 1922).20. *Organizational Training, Criticism of Tank Training, iICDmbat2. G=2, Rp .f22=fi=, (Vashington, D.C. : MilitaryIntelligence Division, Var Department, January 18, 1927).21 . OOrganization of Units, 3d Independent Tank Regiment (PeaceOrganization), R0ngia jQxba2.,Q,-2 R pr I 596. , (Vashington,D.C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department, April 27, 1927).22. *Dislocation of the Red Army and Personnel According to MilitaryDistricts,' Q2. eRt. 7087-6180, (Washington, D.C.: MilitaryIntelligence Division, Var Department, December 10, 1928), originallyprepared by the Latvian General Staff.23. Ryzhakov, 106.

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NOTES (Continued)36. Ryzhakov, 106.37. Ibid., Kuz'uin, 175; I, Krupchenko, "Razvitle tankovykh voisk vS"eriod nzhdu pervoi i vtoroi mirovyzi voinazll [The development of tankforces in the period between the First and Second Vorld Vars], Y.Ik No.5 (Way 1968), 41-42, list brigade strength as 90 tanks and 17 armoedcars.38. Ryzhakov, 116; Kuz'zin, 175.39. Ryzbakov, 106-107.40. Ibid., 107.41. Ibid.42. Ibid.43. 'Distribution of Troops-The Red Army," Rugla (C.nbat) Q=-2, RenrNo. 7513-6180 Vashington, D.C.: Nilitary Intelligence Division, WarDepartment, July 1, 1930).44. "Arnored, Motorized and Mechanized Troops, Red Army,*(Cmat). G2.? 3Re o.3 ],16170 (Washington, D.C.: MilitaryIntelligence Division, War Department, March 24, 1932).45. =Progress of Motorization and Nechanization in the Red Arzy,"Soviet Rur&a (Combat), QZ. Rlart In,_0, 5 (Vashington; D.C.:Kilitary'Intelligence Department, Var Department, July 13 , 1933).46. "Deep Tactics,0 G-2,epot ID,. B4U1 from N/A, Riga, Latvia,(Vashington, D.C.: Military intelligence Division, Var Department,September 20, 1933).47. Ibid.48. Ibid.49. "Xotor-lechanized Units in the Leningrad Military District,O SovietRussa _(CaiL. Ga2 RaR= ]o,8-. 0 (Vashington, D.C. : 11itaryIntelligence Division, War Department, Tovember 9, 1933).50. "Organization of Notor-Nechanized Units,* Sovzit Ru-mia (G-2 Report8508-6170, (Vashington, D.C.: Nilitary IntelligenceDivision, War Department, Jovenber 9, 1933).

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NOTES (Continued)51. "Distribution of Motor-Mechanized Units and Armored Trains,O SovietRuiiia (Combat), QZ R g 8601-6170/6180, (Vashington, D.C.: M ilitaryIntelligence Division, Var Department, January 11, 1934).52. ODistribution of Army and Air Units,' Soviet R iCombatL. -2.RaIt 8678-6180 (Vashington, D.C.: Military Intelligence Division,Var Department, March 20, 1934).53. 1na1gjp Suma7 for Apr11 20._ 194 Io. 562, (Vashington,D.C.: M ilitary Intelligence Division, Var Department, April 20, 1934).54. OTank Tactics," Soviet Rug1a Xishat. G-2 Raort Ii.-.O700.(Vashington, D.C.: Military Intelligence Division, Var Department,February 4, 1935).55. Ryzhakov, 108.56. -Ibid.57. Ibid.58. Ibid.59. "Distribution of Majpr Units of th e Red Arxy,w SovietlaICmbat), G-2.RapaL 8949-6100/6120/6130/6140, (Vashington, D.C.:Military Intelligence Division, Var Department, January 7, 1935).50. wOrganization of Xotor-lechanized Units," So viet Russla (Cobat).g2-Raprt . 90186170. (Vashington, D.C.: Military IntelligenceDivision, Var Department, March 6, 1935).61. Ryzbakov, 108-109.62. Ibid., 109; Krupchenko, 42 .63. ODistribution of Mechanized Units in th e Red Army,w Soviet(Coinbat-Arn). L-2. Ror 28Z=1fM (Vashington, D.C.: MilitaryIntelligence Division, Var Department, August 15, 1937).64. 7nt1lIIgej. ( uL = acpber 2AL. 193, (Vashington, D.C.:Military Intelligence Division, Var Department, Decenber 24 , 1937).65. "Distribution of Major Motor-Mechanized Units,O UOS (Cnmbat-Ar=y).C-a Rep o . (Vashington, D.C.: MIlitary IntelligenceDivision, War Department, September 20, 1938).

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NOTES (Continued)66. "Organization and Strength of Motor-Nechanized Units, S(Cnibat-Army), G-2 a ][ . 10216-6100/6150. (Washington, D.C.:

- - illtary Intelligence Division, War Department, September 20, 1938).67. Ryzhakov, 109-110; A. I. Gribkov et al, ed., I orjja ogrdenxL enDa- -Mni8gradkczn 2 nkruga. (History of the Order of Lenin LeningradMilitary District], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), 160.68. See "Distribution of Major Units and Names of Conmanders,6 ff =(Coiat-Ar=,). G-2. Rar. I1261-6180., (ashington, D.C.: MilitaryIntelligence Division, War Department, November 25 , 1938), whichidentified the Ist lechanized Corps headquarters at Xisk and itssubordinate brigades. This corps is again identified in 0Distributionof Troops: Location by M ilitary Districts, U19 (Cgnbat-Ar). . G-2.R Vashington, D.C.: lilitary Intelligence Division, WarDepartment, August 11, 1939). Finally, a definitive listing Lf tankcorps appears in Order QL BaRattleP- Q. th Re & A= 1-z8. 40., (London: TheWar Office, August 1940), attached to Lia= Attache Rer UtRM ]a.,6115/915 (Washington, D.C.: Military Intelligence Division, WarDepartment, August 6, 1940).69. 0. F. Suvenirov, OVsearmeiskaia tragediiam [An all-army tragedy],YIZM, No. 3 (larch 1989), 41 , lists the cost of the purges as follows:rnmmad Lossest(iudtdBrigade commnders 221 out of 397Division commanders 136 out of 199Corps commanders 60 out of 67Army commanders of 2d Rank 12 out of 12Army comanders of Ist Rank 2 out of 4Marshals 3 out of 5These figures accurately reflect Western assessments of the scale of thepurges. These assessments began appearing days after the purgescommenced.70. Ryzhakov, 110; Krupchenko, 43.71. Among the many sources, see I. Kuznetsov, =U reki Khalkhin-Gol"[Along the Khalkhin-Gol River], IITk, No. 7 (July 1969), 126-128."72. Strokov, 316; Bagramian, 106. For an excellent articulation ofSoviet views on operational art and tactics in late 1940 and 1941, seeZakl luchltel' nala rh!.. narndgo kcissara obarony ZIuza. &Rj 24&.gernia ;L arsbala sk So~uzaB. L, Inigbenirn U& M2nr,=sovebchaail U dakabria 1240g. [Concluding speech of the People'sCo ssar of Defense of th e Soviet Union, Hero and Warshal of th e SovietUnion S. K. Timoshenko at a military conference, 31 December 1940],(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1941). In it Timoshenko fully articulated mobile

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NOTES (Continued)concepts of 1936, stating, "The mobile group in front offensiveoperations is called upon to perform the mission of creating conditionsfo r developing tactical success into operational, and sometimes intooperational-strategic. "73. Bagranian, 111; Strokov, 319. For details on the Soviet debateconcerning use of tanks, see L. ,._ Moscow 'ReDZ In, 1384 19 Nobember1938, which contains a series of articles translated from KrasmaiaZvpezd [Red Star], which provide detfiled analysis of combined-armoperations in Spain and the difficulties encountered there by tankunits.74. Bagranian, 112; Strokov, 321.75 . Ryzhakov, 109.76. Ibid.77 . Ibid.78 . Ibid., 110; I. Krupchenko, ed., Rovetsv! oanka= viska. 194214[Soviet tank forces 1941-1945], (Joscow: Voenizdat, 1973), 12.79. "Motorstrelkovaia diviziia" [Ntorized rifle division], SY.L 5:435.The division consisted of three motorized rifle and one artilleryregiment, tank, antiaircraft , and reconnaissance battalions, andsupporting units for a strength of 10,000 men, 37 tanks, 209 guns andmortars, 58 armored cars, and about 1,400 vehicles.80. Ryzbakov, 110; 1rupchenko, =Razvitie,* 43, pinpoints motorizeddivision strength at 257 tanks, probably a typographical error.81. !bid., 110; Krupchenko, "Razvitie," 42-43.82. Zakharov, OPreduslovie," 23.83. 0. A. Losik, ed., Stroitel 'stvo t boevi 1tankgn~jkb. vo1sk y gU e c Otechestvenmi ya= (The formation andcombat use of Soviet tank forces in the years of the Great PatrioticVar], (Joscow: Voenizdat, 1979)," 44; Ryzhakov, 110.84. Ryzhakov, 110.85. Ibid.86. Ibid., 111.87. Ibid., 110-111.

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Motor Mechanization Program of the Red Army during the Interwar Years

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