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A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT FEBRUARY 1995
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  • A NATIONAL

    SECURITY

    STRATEGY

    OF

    ENGAGEMENT

    AND

    ENLARGEMENT

    FEBRUARY 1995

  • A NATIONAL

    SECURITY

    STRATEGY

    OF

    ENGAGEMENT

    AND

    ENLARGEMENT

    THE WHITE HOUSEFEBRUARY 1995

  • CONTENTS

    Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

    I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . 1

    II. Advancing Our Interests ThroughEngagement and Enlargement . . . 7

    Enhancing Our Security . . . . . 8 Maintaining a Strong Defense

    Capability . . . . . . . . . 8

    Major Regional Contingencies 9

    Overseas Presence . . . . . . 9

    Counterterrorism, Fighting DrugTrafficking and Other Missions10

    Combating Terrorism . . . 10

    Fighting Drug Trafficking 11

    Other Missions . . . . . 11

    Deciding When and How to EmployU.S. Forces . . . . . . . . 12

    Combating the Spread and Use ofWeapons of Mass Destruction andMissiles . . . . . . . . . 13

    Nonproliferation andCounterproliferation . . 13

    Nuclear Forces . . . . . 15

    Arms Control . . . . . . . . 15

    Peace Operations . . . . . . 16

    Strong Intelligence Capabilities17

    The Environment and SustainableDevelopment . . . . . . . . 18

    Promoting Prosperity at Home . 19

    Enhancing American Competitiveness19

    Partnership with Business and Labor19

    Enhancing Access to Foreign Markets19

    The North American Free TradeAgreement . . . . . . . . . 20

    Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation . . . . . . . . 20Uruguay Round of GATT . . . 20

    U.S. - Japan FrameworkAgreement . . . . . . . . . 20

    Summit of the Americas . . 20

    Expanding the Realm of FreeTrade . . . . . . . . . . . 21

    Strengthening MacroeconomicCoordination . . . . . . . . . 21

    Providing for Energy Security . 21

    Promoting Sustainable DevelopmentAbroad . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

    Promoting Democracy . . . . . . 22

    III. Integrated Regional Approaches 25

    Europe and Eurasia . . . . . . 25

    East Asian and the Pacific . . 28

    The Western Hemisphere . . . . 29

    The Middle East, Southwest and South Asia . . . . . . . . . . 30

    Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

    IV. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . 33

  • i

    PREFACE

    Protecting our nation's security — ourpeople, our territory and our way oflife — is my Administration's foremostmission and constitutional duty. Theend of the Cold War fundamentallychanged America's security imperatives. The central security challenge of thepast half century — the threat ofcommunist expansion — is gone. Thedangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and roguestates pose a serious danger toregional stability in many corners ofthe globe. The proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction representsa major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation,exacerbated by rapid population growth,threatens to undermine politicalstability in many countries andregions.

    At the same time, we have unparalleledopportunities to make our nation saferand more prosperous. Our militarymight is unparalleled. We now have atruly global economy linked by aninstantaneous communications network,which offers growing opportunity forAmerican jobs and American investment. The community of democratic nations isgrowing, enhancing the prospects forpolitical stability, peaceful conflictresolution and greater dignity and hopefor the people of the world. Theinternational community is beginning toact together to address pressing globalenvironmental needs.

    Never has American leadership been moreessential — to navigate the shoals ofthe world's new dangers and tocapitalize on its opportunities. American assets are unique: ourmilitary strength, our dynamic economy,our powerful ideals and, above all, ourpeople. We can and must make thedifference through our engagement; butour involvement must be carefullytailored to serve our interests andpriorities.

    This report, submitted in accordancewith Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense DepartmentReorganization Act of 1986, elaboratesa national security strategy tailoredfor this new era. Focusing on newthreats and new opportunities, itscentral goals are:

    o To sustain our security withmilitary forces that are ready tofight.

    0 To bolster America's economicrevitalization.

    0 To promote democracy abroad.

    Over the past two years, myAdministration has worked diligently topursue these goals. This nationalsecurity strategy report presents thestrategy that has guided this effort. It is premised on a belief that theline between our domestic and foreignpolicies is disappearing — that we mustrevitalize our economy if we are tosustain our military forces, foreigninitiatives and global influence, andthat we must engage actively abroad ifwe are to open foreign markets andcreate jobs for our people.

    We believe that our goals of enhancingour security, bolstering our economicprosperity, and promoting democracy aremutually supportive. Secure nationsare more likely to support free tradeand maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies andstrong trade ties are more likely tofeel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likelyto threaten our interests and morelikely to cooperate with the U.S. tomeet security threats and promote freetrade and sustainable development.

  • ii

    Since my Administration began, we have beendeeply engaged in adapting existingstructures, and in constructing new ones, tomeet these goals. To enhance globalsecurity, for example, we have pursued peaceinitiatives in the Middle East; establishedNATO's Partnership for Peace and initiated aprocess that will lead to NATO's expansion;secured the accession of Ukraine,Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty and their agreementto eliminate nuclear weapons from theirterritory, which in turn opened the door tothe ratification and entry into force of theSTART I Treaty; participated in anunprecedented regional security gathering ofthe ASEAN countries and others, includingRussia and Vietnam; and reached an agreedframework with North Korea that halted, andwill eventually eliminate, its dangerousnuclear program. To bolster prosperity athome and around the world, we have securedthe enactment of legislation implementingboth the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),worked to open Asian-Pacific markets throughtwo leaders meetings of the Asia-PacificEconomic Cooperation forum, lowered exportcontrols and held a Western HemisphereSummit in Miami where the 34 democraticnations of this hemisphere committedthemselves to negotiate a free tradeagreement by 2005. To promote democracy, wehave supported South Africa's recenttransformation, provided aid to a newdemocratic Russia and other new independentstates as well as Central and EasternEuropean nations, assisted Cambodia, andworked with our Western Hemisphere neighborsrestoring the democratically electedgovernment in Haiti and hosting the Summitof the Americas, which reaffirmed andstrengthened our mutual commitment todemocracy.

    Our extraordinary diplomatic leverage toreshape existing security and economicstructures and create new ones ultimatelyrelies upon American power. Our economicand military might, as well as the power ofour ideals, make America's diplomats thefirst among equals. Our economic strengthgives us a position of advantage on almostevery global issue. For instance, SouthAfrica and our negotiations with North Koreademonstrate how economic incentives and theimposition — or the threat — of economicsanctions enable us to achieve ourobjectives as part of our determineddiplomacy.

    But military force remains an indispensableelement of our nation's power. Even withthe Cold War over, our nation must maintain

    military forces sufficient to deter diversethreats and, when necessary, to fight andwin against our adversaries. While manyfactors ultimately contribute to ournation's safety and well-being, no singlecomponent is more important than the men andwomen who wear America's uniform and standsentry over our security. Their skill,service and dedication constitute the coreof our defenses. Today our military is thebest-equipped, best trained andbest-prepared fighting force in the world. Time after time in the last year, our troopsdemonstrated their current readiness andstrength: helping to save hundreds ofthousands of lives in Rwanda; moving withlightning speed to head off another Iraqithreat to Kuwait; and giving freedom anddemocracy back to the people of Haiti. I amcommitted to ensuring that this militarycapability is not compromised.

    The United States recognizes that we have aspecial responsibility that goes along withbeing a great power. Our global interestsand our historic ideals impel us to opposethose who would endanger the survival orwell- being of their peaceful neighbors. Nations should be able to expect that theirborders and their sovereignty will always besecure. At the same time, this does notmean we or the international community musttolerate gross violations of human rightswithin those borders.

    When our national security interests arethreatened, we will, as America always has,use diplomacy when we can, but force if wemust. We will act with others when we can,but alone when we must. We recognize,however, that while force can defeat anaggressor, it cannot solve underlyingproblems. Democracy and economic prosperitycan take root in a struggling society onlythrough local solutions carried out by thesociety itself. We must use military forceselectively, recognizing that its use may dono more than provide a window of opportunityfor a society — and diplomacy — to work.

    We therefore will send American troopsabroad only when our interests and ourvalues are sufficiently at stake. When wedo so, it will be with clear objectives towhich we are firmly committed and which —when combat is likely — we have the means toachieve decisively. To do otherwise, risksthose objectives and endangers our troops. These requirements are as pertinent forhumanitarian and other non-traditionalinterventions today as they were forprevious generations during prolonged worldwars. Modern media communications may nowbring to our homes both the suffering thatexists in many parts of the world and thecasualties that may accompany interven-

  • iii

    tion to help. But we must remain clearin our purpose and resolute in itsexecution. And while we must continueto reassess the costs and benefits ofany operation as it unfolds, reflexivecalls for withdrawal of our forces whencasualties are incurred would simplyencourage rogue actors to try to forceour departure from areas where thereare U.S. interests by attackingAmerican troops.

    During the past two years, diplomacybacked by American power has producedresults:

    o When Iraq moved forces towards Kuwait,we reacted swiftly and dispatchedlarge-scale forces to the region underthe authority of the United Nations—butwere prepared to act alone, ifnecessary.

    o In Haiti, it was only when the Haitianmilitary learned that the 82nd AirborneDivision was enroute that we achievedpeacefully what we were prepared to dounder fire.

    o In Bosnia, we have been able to achievelimited but important objectives whendiplomacy has been married toappropriate military power. Forinstance, the Sarajevo ultimatum largelysucceeded because the threat of NATO airpower was judged real; similarly, thethreat of NATO airpower prevented thefall of Gorazde.

    o In Rwanda and Somalia, only the Americanmilitary could have done what it did inthese humanitarian missions, savinghundreds of thousands of lives. However, over the longer run ourinterests were served by turning theseoperations over to multilateralpeacekeeping forces once the immediatehumanitarian crisis was addressed. Nooutside force can create a stable andlegitimate domestic order for anothersociety—that work can only beaccomplished by the society itself.

    Our national security strategy reflectsboth America's interests and ourvalues. Our commitment to freedom,equality and human dignity continues toserve as a beacon of hope to peoplesaround the world. The vitality,creativity and diversity of American

    society are important sources ofnational strength in a global economyincreasingly driven by information andideas.

    Our prospects in this new era arepromising. The specter of nuclearannihilation has dramatically receded. The historic events of the past twoyears — including the hand shakebetween Israel and the PLO, the peacetreaty between Israel and Jordan, andthe transformation of South Africa to amultiracial democracy headed byPresident Mandela — suggest this era'spossibilities for achieving security,prosperity and democracy.

    Our nation can only address this era'sdangers and opportunities if we remainactively engaged in global affairs. Weare the world's greatest power, and wehave global interests as well asresponsibilities. As our nationlearned after World War I, we can findno security for America in isolationismnor prosperity in protectionism. Forthe American people to be safer andenjoy expanding opportunities, ournation must work to deter would-beaggressors, open foreign markets,promote the spread of democracy abroad,encourage sustainable development andpursue new opportunities for peace.

    Our national security requires thepatient application of American willand resources. We can only sustainthat necessary investment with thebroad, bipartisan support of theAmerican people and theirrepresentatives in Congress. The fullparticipation of Congress is essentialto the success of our new engagement,and I will consult with members ofCongress at every step in making andimplementing American foreign policy. The Cold War may be over, but the needfor American leadership abroad remainsas strong as ever. I am committed toforging a new public consensus tosustain our active engagement abroad inpursuit of our cherished goal — a moresecure world where democracy and freemarkets know no borders. This documentdetails that commitment.

    WILLIAM J. CLINTON

  • iv

  • 1

    I. INTRODUCTION

    A new era is upon us. The Cold War isover. The dissolution of the Sovietempire has radically transformed thesecurity environment facing the UnitedStates and our allies. The primarysecurity imperative of the past halfcentury — containing communistexpansion while preventing nuclear war— is gone. We no longer face massiveSoviet forces across an East-Westdivide nor Soviet missiles targeted onthe United States. Yet there remains acomplex array of new and old securitychallenges America must meet as weapproach a new century.

    This national security strategyassesses America's role in this newinternational context and describes theAdministration's strategy to advanceour interests at home and abroad.

    This is a period of great promise butalso great uncertainty. We stand asthe world's preeminent power. America's core value of freedom, asembodied in democratic governance andmarket economics, has gained groundaround the world. Hundreds of millionsof people have thrown off communism,dictatorship or apartheid. Formeradversaries now cooperate with us indiplomacy and global problem solving. Both the threat of a war among greatpowers and the specter of nuclearannihilation have receded dramatically. The dynamism of the global economy istransforming commerce, culture andglobal politics, promising greaterprosperity for America and greatercooperation among nations.

    At the same time, troublinguncertainties and clear threats remain. The new, independent states thatreplaced the

    Soviet Union are experiencing wrenchingeconomic and political transitions, asare many new democracies of Central andEastern Europe. While our relationswith the other great powers are asconstructive as at any point in thiscentury, Russia's historic transfor-mation will proceed along a difficultpath, and China maintains a repressiveregime even as that country assumes amore important economic and politicalrole in global affairs. The spread ofweapons of mass destruction posesserious threats. Violent extremiststhreaten fragile peace processes inmany parts of the world. Worldwide,there is a resurgence of militantnationalism as well as ethnic andreligious conflict. This has beendemonstrated by upheavals in Bosnia,Rwanda and Somalia, where the UnitedStates has participated in peacekeepingand humanitarian missions.

    Not all security risks are immediate ormilitary in nature. Transnationalphenomena such as terrorism, narcoticstrafficking, environmental degradation,natural resource depletion, rapidpopulation growth and refugee flowsalso have security implications forboth present and long term Americanpolicy. In addition, an emerging classof transnational environmental issuesare increasingly affecting interna-tional stability and consequently willpresent new challenges to U.S. strategy.

    American leadership in the world hasnever been more important, for there isa simple truth about this new world:the same idea that was under attackthree times in this Century — first byimperialism and then by fascism andcommunism — remains under attack today,but on many

  • 2

    fronts at once. It is an idea that comesunder many names — democracy, liberty,civility, pluralism — but which together arethe values of a society where leaders andgovernments preserve individual freedoms,and ensure opportunity and human dignity. As the President has said, "We face acontest as old as history — a strugglebetween freedom and tyranny; betweentolerance and isolation. It is a fightbetween those who would build free societiesgoverned by laws and those who would imposetheir will by force. Our struggle today, ina world more high-tech, more fast-moving,more chaotically diverse than ever, is theage-old fight between hope and fear."

    The victors of World War I squandered theirtriumph in this age-old struggle when theyturned inward, bringing on a globaldepression and allowing fascism to rise, andreigniting global war. After World War II,we learned the lessons of the past. In theface of a new totalitarian threat this greatnation did not walk away from the challengeof the moment. Instead it chose to reachout, to rebuild international securitystructures and to lead. This determinationof previous generations to prevail overcommunism by shaping new internationalstructures left us a world stronger, saferand freer. It is this example and itssuccess which now inspire us to begin thedifficult task of a new stage in this oldstruggle: to secure the peace won in theCold War against those who would still denypeople their human rights, terrorists whothreaten innocents and pariah states whochoose repression and extremism overopenness and moderation.

    If we exert our leadership abroad, we canmake America safer and more prosperous — bydeterring aggression, by fostering thepeaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts,by opening foreign markets, by helpingdemocratic regimes and by tackling globalproblems. Without our active leadership andengagement abroad, threats will fester andour opportunities will narrow.

    We must seek to be as creative andconstructive — in the literal sense of thatword — as the generation of the late 1940's. For all its dangers, this new world presentsan immense opportunity — the chance to adaptand construct global institutions that willhelp to provide security and increaseeconomic growth throughout the world.

    The issue for the next decade is whether ourefforts at this construction can succeed inthe face of shifting threats to the idealsand habits of democracy. It is therefore inour

    interest that democracy be at once thefoundation and the purpose of theinternational structures we build throughthis constructive diplomacy: the foundation,because the institutions will be areflection of their shared values and norms;the purpose, because if our economicinstitutions are secure, democracy willflourish.

    While democracy will not soon take holdeverywhere, we know that the larger the poolof democracies, the better off we, and theentire community of nations, will be. Democracies create free markets that offereconomic opportunity, make for more reliabletrading partners, and are far less likely towage war on one another. It is in ourinterest to do all that we can to enlargethe community of free and open societies,especially in areas of greatest strategicinterest, as in the former Soviet Union.

    We can only engage actively abroad if theAmerican people and the Congress are willingto bear the costs of that leadership — indollars, political energy and, at times,American lives. In a democracy, the foreignpolicy of the nation must serve the needs ofthe people. The preamble of theConstitution sets out the basic objectives:

    to provide for the common defense,promote the general welfare, and securethe blessings of liberty to ourselvesand our posterity.

    The end of the Cold War does not alter thesefundamental purposes. Nor does it reducethe need for active American efforts, hereand abroad, to pursue those goals. Onepurpose of this report is to help foster thebroad, bipartisan understanding and supportnecessary to sustain our internationalengagement. A coalition of the centerthrough bipartisan congressionalparticipation is critical to thiscommitment.

    Our national security strategy is based onenlarging the community of marketdemocracies while deterring and containing arange of threats to our nation, our alliesand our interests. The more that democracyand political and economic liberalizationtake hold in the world, particularly incountries of geostrategic importance to us,the safer our nation is likely to be and themore our people are likely to prosper.

    To that broad end, the report explains thethree central components of our strategy ofengagement and enlargement: our efforts toenhance our security by maintaining a

  • 3

    strong defense capability and promotingcooperative security measures; our work toopen foreign markets and spur globaleconomic growth; and our promotion ofdemocracy abroad. It also explains how weare pursuing the three elements of ourstrategy in specific regions by adapting andconstructing institutions that will help toprovide security and increase economicgrowth throughout the world.

    During the first two years of thisAdministration, this strategy already hasproduced tangible results with respect toour security requirements:

    o At the President's direction, thePentagon completed the Bottom Up Review,a full-scale assessment of what defenseforces and systems our nation needs forthis new security era. The Presidenthas also set forth a defense budget forFiscal Years 1996-2001 that funds theforce structure recommended by theReview, and he repeatedly stressed thathe will draw the line against furthercuts that would undermine that forcestructure or erode U.S. militaryreadiness. The swift and efficientdeployment of our forces last October tothe Persian Gulf, and to Haiti andRwanda, clearly demonstrates theircontinued readiness to respond asneeded. The President also requestedCongress to enact supplemental appro-priations of $1.7 billion for FY 1994and $2.6 billion for FY 1995 to ensuretraining readiness is not impaired bythe costs of such unanticipated contin-gencies. In addition, the Presidentadded $25 billion to the defensespending plan over the next six years toprovide more funding for readiness andto improve the quality of life of ourmilitary personnel and families.

    o At President Clinton's initiative, aNATO Summit in January 1994 approved thePartnership For Peace (PFP) andinitiated a process that will lead toNATO's gradual expansion to ensure thatNATO is prepared to meet the Europeanand trans-Atlantic security challengesof this era, and to provide the securityrelationships that will provide theunderpinnings for the democratic gainsin Europe since 1989. Since the Summit,25 countries, including Russia, agreedto join the Partnership for Peace.

    o The United States, Russia, Ukraine,Belarus and Kazakhstan exchangedinstruments of ratification for theSTART I Treaty at the December summit ofthe Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe

    (CSCE), culminating two years of inten-sive U.S. diplomatic efforts to bringthe Treaty into force and paving the wayfor ratification of the START II Treaty. START I requires the permanent elimi-nation of bombers, ICBM silos and bal-listic missile submarine launch tubesthat carried over 9,000 of the 21,000total warheads the United States and theformer Soviet Union declared when theTreaty was signed — a reduction of 40percent. START II, signed in 1993, willeliminate additional U.S. and Russianstrategic launchers and will effectivelyremove an additional 5,000 warheads,leaving each side with no more than3,500. These actions will reduce thestrategic force arsenals of the UnitedStates and Russia by two-thirds. Pre-sidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreedthat once START II is ratified, theUnited States and Russia will beginimmediately to deactivate all strategicnuclear delivery systems to be reducedunder the Treaty by removing theirnuclear warheads or taking other stepsto take them out of combat status, thusremoving thousands of warheads fromalert status years ahead of schedule. The two Presidents also directed anintensification of dialogue regardingthe possibility of further reductionsof, and limitations on, remainingnuclear forces.

    o The President launched a comprehensivepolicy to combat the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and themissiles that deliver them. The UnitedStates has secured landmark commitmentsto eliminate all nuclear weapons fromUkraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and, inDecember, all three nations formallyacceded to the Nuclear Non-proliferationTreaty as non-nuclear weapon states. The United States and over 30 othernations opened formal negotiations on aComprehensive Test Ban Treaty in January1994, producing a Joint Draft Treatytext that provides a baseline forresolving remaining issues. We alsomade significant progress during thepast year in negotiations within theAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty'sStanding Consultative Commission (SCC)to establish an agreed demarcationbetween strategic and theater ballisticmissiles that will allow for thedeployment of advanced theater missiledefense and update the ABM treaty toreflect the break-up of the SovietUnion. The Administration also sub-mitted the Chemical Weapons Conventionto the Senate for ratification andsupported the development of newmeasures to strengthen the BiologicalWeapons Convention.

  • 4

    o The Administration reached an importantagreed framework with North Korea thathas halted, and will eventuallyeliminate, that country's nuclearprogram, greatly enhancing regionalstability and achieving ournonproliferation goals. TheAdministration also reached agreementswith Russia, Ukraine and South Africa tocontrol missile-related technology andsecured China's commitment not totransfer MTCR-controlledground-to-ground missiles.

    o The President's efforts helped bringabout many historic firsts in the MiddleEast peace process — the handshake ofpeace between Prime Minister Rabin andChairman Arafat on the White House lawnhas been followed by the Jordan-Israelpeace treaty, progress on eliminatingthe Arab boycott of Israel and theestablishment of ties between Israel andan increasing number of its Arabneighbors.

    o On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signeda Presidential Decision Directiveestablishing "U.S. Policy on ReformingMultilateral Peace Operations." Thispolicy represents the first,comprehensive framework for U.S.decisionmaking on issues of peacekeepingand peace enforcement suited to therealities of the post Cold War period.

    o In October 1994, President Clintonsubmitted the United Nations Conventionon the Law of the Sea to the Senate forratification. This was the culminationof years of negotiations to ensure anequitable balance between the rights ofcoastal states to control activities inadjacent offshore areas to protect theireconomic, security and environmentalinterests, and the rights of maritimestates to free and unimpeded navigationand overflight of the oceans of theworld. This included an acceptableregime to administer the mineralresources of the deep seabed, therebyprotecting U.S. interests.

    On the economic front, Administrationpolicies have created nearly six millionAmerican jobs and established the foundationfor the global economy of the 21st Century:

    o The President worked with the Congresson effective measures to reduce thefederal budget deficit and restoreeconomic growth. These measures helpincrease our competitiveness andstrengthen our position in negotiationswith other nations.

    o The President secured approval of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) which creates the world'slargest free trade zone and has alreadycreated more than 100,000 American jobs. The vote for NAFTA marked a decisiveU.S. affirmation of its internationalengagement. Through NAFTA'senvironmental and labor side agreements,we are working actively to protect therights of workers and to reduce air andwater pollution that crosses nationalboundaries. When Mexico came undershort-term financial pressures inDecember of 1994, the United States tookthe lead in marshaling internationalsupport to assist the country in meetingthis challenge. This decision reflectedthe President's belief that the UnitedStates has a strong interest inprosperity and stability in Mexico andthat it is in our economic and strategicinterest that Mexico's economic reformprogram succeeds.

    o The Administration stood at theforefront of a multilateral effort toachieve history's most extensivemarket-opening agreements in the GATTUruguay-round negotiations on worldtrade. Working with a bipartisancoalition in the Congress, the Presidentsecured approval of this path breakingagreement and the resulting World TradeOrganization, which will add $100-200billion and hundreds of thousands ofjobs each year to the U.S. economy.

    o The President convened the first meetingof leaders of the Asia- Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC) forum — and tooksteps to expand our ties with theeconomies of the Asia-Pacific region,the fastest growing area in the world. At their second meeting in November1994, the APEC leaders agreed to thegoal of free trade within the region byearly in the 21st Century and to developa blueprint for implementation by theAPEC meeting this year in Osaka.

    o The President hosted the Summit of theAmericas in December, a historicgathering where the 34 democraticnations of the hemisphere committedthemselves to completing negotiations ona regional free trade agreement by 2005. In Miami, the United States, Canada andMexico also invited Chile to beginnegotiations to join NAFTA.

    o We have committed the United States toreduce its greenhouse gas emissions to1990 levels by the year

  • 5

    2000, and we have developed a NationalClimate Plan to achieve that goal. TheUnited States has also taken a leadingrole at the international level towardsphasing out the production of mostozone-depleting substances. Under theMontreal Protocol for the protection ofthe ozone layer, the United States iscontributing to developing countries'efforts to reduce their emissions ofozone-depleting chemicals. In June1993, the U.S. signed the BiodiversityTreaty, and one year later, theDesertification Convention.

    o The Administration has asserted worldleadership on population issues. Weplayed a key role during the CairoConference on Population and Developmentin developing a consensus Program ofAction, including increased availabilityof voluntary family planning andreproductive health services,sustainable economic development,strengthening of family ties, theempowerment of women including enhancededucational opportunities, and areduction in infant and child mortalitythrough immunizations and otherprograms.

    Finally, the President has demonstrated afirm commitment to expanding the globalrealm of democracy:

    o The Administration substantiallyexpanded U.S. support for democratic andmarket reform in Russia, Ukraine and theother newly independent states of theformer Soviet Union, including acomprehensive assistance package forUkraine.

    o The United States launched a series ofinitiatives to bolster the newdemocracies of Central and EasternEurope, including the White House Tradeand Investment Conference for Centraland Eastern Europe held in Cleveland inJanuary. We affirmed our concern fortheir security and market economictransformation, recognizing that suchassurances would play a key role inpromoting democratic developments.

    o Working with the international communityunder the auspices of the UN, wesucceeded in reversing the coup in Haitiand restoring the democratically electedpresident and government. We are nowhelping the Haitian people consolidatetheir hardwon democracy and rebuildtheir country as we complete thetransition from the Multinational Forceto the United Nations Mission in Haiti.

    o U.S. engagement in Northern Irelandcontributed to the establishment of acease-fire, first by the IRA andsubsequently by loyalistpara-militaries. The Presidentannounced in November a package ofinitiatives aimed at consolidating thepeace by promoting economicrevitalization and increased privatesector trade and investment in NorthernIreland.

    o At the Summit of the Americas, the 34democratic nations of the hemisphereagreed to a detailed plan of cooperativeaction in such diverse fields as health,education, counter-narcotics,environmental protection, informationinfrastructure, and the strengtheningand safeguarding of democraticinstitutions, in addition to mutualprosperity and sustainable development. The Summit ushered in a new era ofhemispheric cooperation that would nothave been possible without U.S.leadership and commitment.

    o The United States has increased supportfor South Africa as it conductedelections and became a multiracialdemocracy. During the state visit ofNelson Mandela in October, we announcedformation of a bilateral commission tofoster new cooperation between ournations, and an assistance package tosupport housing, health, education,trade and investment.

    o The United States, working with theOrganization of American States, helpedreverse an anti-democratic coup inGuatemala.

    o In Mozambique and Angola, the UnitedStates played a leading role ingalvanizing the international communityto help bring an end to two decades ofcivil war and to promote nationalreconciliation. For the first time,there is the prospect that all ofsouthern Africa will enjoy the fruits ofpeace and prosperity.

    o The Administration initiated policiesaimed at crisis prevention, including anew peacekeeping policy.

    This report has two major sections. Thefirst part of the report explains ourstrategy of engagement and enlargement. Thesecond part describes briefly how theAdministration is applying this strategy tothe world's major regions.

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    II. ADVANCING OUR INTERESTS THROUGH ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

    The dawn of the post-Cold War era presentsthe United States with many distinctdangers, but also with a generally improvedsecurity environment and a range ofopportunities to improve it further. Theunitary threat that dominated our engagementduring the Cold War has been replaced by acomplex set of challenges. Our nation'sstrategy for defining and addressing thosechallenges has several core principles whichguide our policy. First and foremost, wemust exercise global leadership. We are notthe world's policeman, but as the world'spremier economic and military power, andwith the strength of our democratic values,the U.S. is indispensable to the forging ofstable political relations and open trade.

    Our leadership must stress preventivediplomacy — through such means as supportfor democracy, economic assistance, overseasmilitary presence, military-to-militarycontacts and involvement in multilateralnegotiations in the Middle East andelsewhere — in order to help resolveproblems, reduce tensions and defuseconflicts before they become crises. Thesemeasures are a wise investment in ournational security because they offer theprospect of resolving problems with theleast human and material cost.

    Our engagement must be selective, focusingon the challenges that are most relevant toour own interests and focusing our resourceswhere we can make the most difference. Wemust also use the right tools — beingwilling to act unilaterally when our directnational interests are most at stake; inalliance and partnership when our interestsare shared by others; and multilaterallywhen our interests are more general and theproblems are best addressed by theinternational community. In all cases, thenature of our response must depend on whatbest serves our own long-term nationalinterests. Those interests are

    ultimately defined by our securityrequirements. Such requirements start withour physical defense and economicwell-being. They also include environmentalsecurity as well as the security of valuesachieved through expansion of the communityof democratic nations.

    Our national security strategy draws upon arange of political, military and economicinstruments, and focuses on the primaryobjectives that President Clinton hasstressed throughout his Administration:

    o Enhancing Our Security. Taking accountof the realities of the post-Cold Warera and the new threats, a militarycapability appropriately sized andpostured to meet the diverse needs ofour strategy, including the ability, inconcert with regional allies, to win twonearly simultaneous major regionalconflicts. We will continue to pursuearms control agreements to reduce thedanger of nuclear, chemical, biological,and conventional conflict and to promotestability.

    o Promoting Prosperity at Home. Avigorous and integrated economic policydesigned to stimulate globalenvironmentally sound economic growthand free trade and to press for open andequal U.S. access to foreign markets.

    o Promoting Democracy. A framework ofdemocratic enlargement that increasesour security by protecting,consolidating and enlarging thecommunity of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on strengtheningdemocratic processes in key emergingdemocratic states including Russia,Ukraine and other new states of theformer Soviet Union.

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    These basic objectives of our nationalsecurity strategy will guide the allocationof our scarce national security resources. Because deficit reduction is also central tothe long-term health and competitiveness ofthe American economy, we have made it, alongwith efficient and environmentally sound useof our resources, a major priority. Underthe Clinton economic plan, the deficit willbe reduced over 700 billion dollars byFiscal Year 1998. President Clinton hasalso lowered the deficit as a percentage ofthe Gross Domestic Product from 4.9 percentin Fiscal Year 1992 to 2.4 percent in FiscalYear 1995—the lowest since 1979.

    Enhancing our Security

    The U.S. government is responsible forprotecting the lives and personal safety ofAmericans, maintaining our political freedomand independence as a nation and promotingthe well-being and prosperity of our nation. No matter how powerful we are as a nation,we cannot secure these basic goalsunilaterally. Whether the problem isnuclear proliferation, regional instability,the reversal of reform in the former Sovietempire or unfair trade practices, thethreats and challenges we face demandcooperative, multinational solutions. Therefore, the only responsible U.S.strategy is one that seeks to ensure U.S.influence over and participation incollective decisionmaking in a wide andgrowing range of circumstances.

    An important element of our securitypreparedness depends on durablerelationships with allies and other friendlynations. Accordingly, a central thrust ofour strategy of engagement is to sustain andadapt the security relationships we havewith key nations around the world. Theseties constitute an important part of aninternational framework that will beessential to ensuring cooperation across abroad range of issues. Within the realm ofsecurity issues, our cooperation with alliesincludes such activities as: conductingcombined training and exercises,coordinating military plans andpreparations, sharing intelligence, jointlydeveloping new systems and controllingexports of sensitive technologies accordingto common standards.

    The post-Cold War era presents a differentset of threats to our security. In this newperiod, enhancing American securityrequires, first and foremost, developing andmaintaining a strong defense capability offorces ready to fight.

    We are developing integrated approaches fordealing with threats arising from thedevelopment of nuclear and other weapons ofmass destruction by other nations. Oursecurity requires a vigorous arms controleffort and a strong intelligence capability. We have implemented a strategy formultilateral peace operations. We haveclarified rigorous guidelines for when andhow to use military force in this era.

    We also face security risks that are notsolely military in nature. Transnationalphenomena such as terrorism, narcoticstrafficking, and refugee flows also havesecurity implications both for present andlong term American policy. An emergingclass of transnational environmental andnatural resource issues is increasinglyaffecting international stability andconsequently will present new challenges toU.S. strategy. The threat of intrusions toour military and commercial informationsystems poses a significant risk to nationalsecurity and must be addressed.

    Maintaining a Strong DefenseCapability

    U.S. military capabilities are critical tothe success of our strategy. This nationhas unparalleled military capabilities: theUnited States is the only nation capable ofconducting large-scale and effectivemilitary operations far beyond its borders. This fact, coupled with our unique positionas the security partner of choice in manyregions, provides a foundation for regionalstability through mutually beneficialsecurity partnerships. Our willingness andability to play a leading role in defendingcommon interests also help ensure that theUnited States will remain an influentialvoice in international affairs — political,military and economic — that affect ourwell-being, so long as we retain themilitary wherewithal to underwrite ourcommitments credibly.

    To protect and advance U.S. interests in theface of the dangers and opportunitiesoutlined earlier, the United States mustdeploy robust and flexible military forcesthat can accomplish a variety of tasks:

    o Deterring and Defeating Aggression inMajor Regional Conflicts. Our forcesmust be able to help offset the militarypower of regional states with interestsopposed to those of the United Statesand its allies. To do this, we must beable to credibly deter and defeataggression, by projecting and sustainingU.S. power in more than one region ifnecessary.

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    o Providing a Credible Overseas Presence. U.S. forces must also be forwarddeployed or stationed in key overseasregions in peacetime to deter aggressionand advance U.S. strategic interests. Such overseas presence demonstrates ourcommitment to allies and friends,underwrites regional stability, gains usfamiliarity with overseas operatingenvironments, promotes combined trainingamong the forces of friendly countriesand provides timely initial responsecapabilities.

    o Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. We are devoting greater efforts tostemming the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction and their deliverymeans, but at the same time we mustimprove our capabilities to deter andprevent the use of such weapons andprotect ourselves against their effects.

    o Contributing to Multilateral PeaceOperations. When our interests call forit, the United States must also beprepared to participate in multilateralefforts to resolve regional conflictsand bolster new democratic governments. Thus, our forces must be ready toparticipate in peacekeeping, peaceenforcement and other operations insupport of these objectives.

    o Supporting Counterterrorism Efforts andOther National Security Objectives. Anumber of other tasks remain that U.S.forces have typically carried out withboth general purpose and specializedunits. These missions include:counterterrorism and punitive attacks,noncombatant evacuation,counternarcotics operations, specialforces assistance to nations andhumanitarian and disaster reliefoperations.

    To meet all of these requirementssuccessfully, our forces must be capable ofresponding quickly and operatingeffectively. That is, they must be ready tofight and win. This imperative demandshighly qualified and motivated people;modern, well-maintained equipment; realistictraining; strategic mobility; sufficientsupport and sustainment capabilities, andproper investment in science and technology.

    Major Regional Contingencies

    The focus of our planning for major theaterconflict is on deterring and, if necessary,fighting and defeating aggres-

    sion by potentially hostile regional powers,such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Suchstates are capable of fielding sizablemilitary forces that can cause seriousimbalances in military power within regionsimportant to the United States, with alliedor friendly states often finding itdifficult to match the power of apotentially aggressive neighbor. To deteraggression, prevent coercion of allied orfriendly governments and, ultimately, defeataggression should it occur, we must prepareour forces to confront this scale of threat,preferably in concert with our allies andfriends, but unilaterally if necessary. Todo this, we must have forces that can deployquickly and supplement U.S. forward basedand forward deployed forces, along withregional allies, in halting an invasion anddefeating the aggressor, just as wedemonstrated by our rapid response inOctober 1994 when Iraq threatened aggressionagainst Kuwait.

    With programmed enhancements, the forces theAdministration is fielding will besufficient to help defeat aggression in twonearly simultaneous major regionalconflicts. As a nation with globalinterests, it is important that the UnitedStates maintain forces with aggregatecapabilities on this scale. Obviously, weseek to avoid a situation in which anaggressor in one region might be tempted totake advantage when U.S. forces are heavilycommitted elsewhere. More basically,maintaining a "two war" force helps ensurethat the United States will have sufficientmilitary capabilities to deter or defeataggression by a coalition of hostile powersor by a larger, more capable adversary thanwe foresee today.

    We will never know with certainty how anenemy might fight or precisely what demandsmight be placed on our own forces in thefuture. The contributions of allies orcoalition partners will vary from place toplace and over time. Thus, balanced U.S.forces are needed in order to provide a widerange of complementary capabilities and tocope with the unpredictable and unexpected.

    Overseas Presence

    The need to deploy U.S. military forcesabroad in peacetime is also an importantfactor in determining our overall forcestructure. We will maintain robust overseaspresence in several forms, such aspermanently stationed forces andprepositioned equipment, deployments andcombined exercises, port calls and otherforce visits, as well as military-to-military contacts. These activities provideseveral benefits. Specifically they:

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    o Gave form and substance to our bilateraland multilateral security commitments.

    o Demonstrate our determination to defendU.S. and allied interests in criticalregions, deterring hostile nations fromacting contrary to those interests.

    o Provide forward elements for rapidresponse in crises as well as the bases,ports and other infrastructure essentialfor deployment of U.S.-based forces byair, sea and land.

    o Enhance the effectiveness of coalitionoperations, including peace operations,by improving our ability to operate withother nations.

    o Allow the United States to use itsposition of trust to prevent thedevelopment of power vacuums anddangerous arms races, therebyunderwriting regional stability byprecluding threats to regional security.

    o Facilitate regional integration, sincenations that may not be willing to worktogether in our absence may be willingto coalesce around us in a crisis.

    o Promote an international securityenvironment of trust, cooperation, peaceand stability, which is fundamental tothe vitality of developing democraciesand free market economies for America'sown economic well-being and security.

    Through training programs, combinedexercises, military contacts,interoperability and shared defense withpotential coalition partners, as well assecurity assistance programs that includejudicious foreign military sales, we canstrengthen the local self-defensecapabilities of our friends and allies. Through active participation in regionalsecurity dialogues, we can reduce regionaltensions, increase transparency in armamentsand improve our bilateral and multilateralcooperation.

    By improving the defense capabilities of ourfriends and demonstrating our commitment todefend common interests, these activitiesenhance deterrence, encourageresponsibility-sharing on the part offriends and allies, decrease the likelihoodthat U.S. forces will be necessary ifconflict arises and raise the odds that U.S.forces will find a relatively favorablesituation should a U.S. response berequired.

    Counterterrorism, Fighting DrugTrafficking and Other Missions

    While the missions outlined above willremain the primary determinants of ourgeneral purpose and nuclear force structure,U.S. military forces and assets will also becalled upon to perform a wide range of otherimportant missions as well. Some of thesecan be accomplished by conventional forcesfielded primarily for theater operations. Often, however, these missions call forspecialized units and capabilities.

    Combating Terrorism

    As long as terrorist groups continue totarget American citizens and interests, theUnited States will need to have specializedunits available to defeat such groups. Fromtime to time, we might also find itnecessary to strike terrorists at theirbases abroad or to attack assets valued bythe governments that support them.

    Our policy in countering internationalterrorists is to make no concessions toterrorists, continue to pressure statesponsors of terrorism, fully exploit allavailable legal mechanisms to punishinternational terrorists and help othergovernments improve their capabilities tocombat terrorism.

    Countering terrorism effectively requiresclose day-to-day coordination amongExecutive Branch agencies. The Departmentsof State, Justice and Defense, the FBI andCIA continue to cooperate closely in anongoing effort against internationalterrorists. Positive results will come fromintegration of intelligence, diplomatic andrule-of-law activities, and through closecooperation with other governments andinternational counterterroristorganizations.

    Improving U.S. intelligence capacities is asignificant part of the U.S. response. Terrorists, whether from well-organizedgroups or the kind of more loosely organizedgroup responsible for the World Trade Centerbombing, have the advantage of being able totake the initiative in the timing and choiceof targets. Terrorism involving weapons ofmass destruction represents a particularlydangerous potential threat that must becountered.

    The United States has made concerted effortsto punish and deter terrorists. On June 26,1993, following a determination that Iraqhad plotted an assassination attempt

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    against former President Bush, PresidentClinton ordered a cruise missile attackagainst the headquarters of Iraq'sintelligence service in order to send a firmresponse and deter further threats. Similarly, the United States obtainedconvictions against defendants in thebombing of the World Trade Center.

    U.S. leadership and close coordination withother governments and international bodieswill continue, as demonstrated by the UNSecurity Council sanctions against Libya forthe Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, a newinternational convention dealing withdetecting and controlling plasticexplosives, and two importantcounterterrorism treaties — the Protocol forthe Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violenceat Airports Serving International Aviationand the Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Attacks Against the Safety ofMaritime Navigation.

    Fighting Drug Trafficking

    The Administration has undertaken a newapproach to the global scourge of drug abuseand trafficking that will better integratedomestic and international activities toreduce both the demand and the supply ofdrugs. Ultimate success will depend onconcerted efforts and partnerships by thepublic, all levels of government and theAmerican private sector with othergovernments, private groups andinternational bodies.

    The U.S. has shifted its strategy from thepast emphasis on transit interdiction to amore evenly balanced effort with sourcecountries to build institutions, destroytrafficking organizations and stop supplies.We will support and strengthen democraticinstitutions abroad, denying narcoticstraffickers a fragile politicalinfrastructure in which to operate. We willalso cooperate with governments thatdemonstrate the political will to confrontthe narcotics threat.

    Two new comprehensive strategies have beendeveloped, one to deal with the problem ofcocaine and another to address the growingthreat from high-purity heroin entering thiscountry. We will engage more aggressivelywith international organizations, financialinstitutions and nongovernmentalorganizations in counternarcoticscooperation.

    At home and in the international arena,prevention, treatment and economic alter-natives must work hand-in-hand with lawenforcement and interdiction activities. Long-

    term efforts will be maintained to helpnations develop healthy economies with fewermarket incentives for producing narcotics. The United States has increased effortsabroad to foster public awareness andsupport for governmental cooperation on abroad range of activities to reduce theincidence of drug abuse. Public awarenessof a demand problem in producing ortrafficking countries can be converted intopublic support and increased governmentallaw enforcement to reduce trafficking andproduction. There has been a significantattitudinal change and awareness in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, particularly asproducer and transit nations themselvesbecome plagued with the ill effects ofconsumption.

    Other Missions

    The United States government is alsoresponsible for protecting the lives andsafety of Americans abroad. In order tocarry out this responsibility, selected U.S.military forces are trained and equipped toevacuate Americans from such situations asthe outbreak of civil or internationalconflict and natural or man-made disasters. For example, U.S. Marines evacuatedAmericans from Monrovia, Liberia in Augustof 1990, and from Mogadishu, Somalia, inDecember of that year. In 1991, U.S. forcesevacuated nearly 20,000 Americans from thePhilippines over a three-week periodfollowing the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. Last year, U.S. Marines coupled with U.S.airlift, deployed to Burundi to help ensurethe safe evacuation of U.S. citizens fromethnic fighting in Rwanda.

    U.S. forces also provide invaluable trainingand advice to friendly governmentsthreatened by subversion, lawlessness orinsurgency. At any given time, we havesmall teams of military experts deployed inroughly 25 countries helping hostgovernments cope with such challenges.

    U.S. military forces and assets arefrequently called upon to provide assistanceto victims of floods, storms, drought andother humanitarian disasters. Both at homeand abroad, U.S. forces provide emergencyfood, shelter, medical care and security tothose in need.

    Finally, the U.S. will continue as a worldleader in space through its technicalexpertise and innovation. Over the past 30years, as more and more nations haveventured into space, the U.S. hassteadfastly recognized space as aninternational region. Since all nations areimmediately accessible from space, themaintenance of an international

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    legal regime for space, similar to theconcept of freedom of the high seas, isespecially important. Numerous attemptshave been made in the past to legally limitaccess to space by countries that areunable, either technologically oreconomically, to join space-faring nations. As the commercial importance of space isdeveloped, the U.S. can expect furtherpressure from non-participants to redefinethe status of space, similar to what hasbeen attempted with exclusive economic zonesconstraining the high seas.

    Retaining the current internationalcharacter of space will remain critical toachieving U.S. national security goals. Ourmain objectives in this area include:

    o Continued freedom of access to and useof space;

    o Maintaining the U.S. position as themajor economic, political, military andtechnological power in space;

    o Deterring threats to U.S. interests inspace and defeating aggressive orhostile acts against U.S. space assetsif deterrence fails;

    o Preventing the spread of weapons of massdestruction to space;

    o Enhancing global partnerships with otherspace-faring nations across the spectrumof economic, political and securityissues.

    Deciding When and How to Employ U.S.Forces

    Our strategy calls for the preparation anddeployment of American military forces inthe United States and abroad to support U.S.diplomacy in responding to key dangers —those posed by weapons of mass destruction,regional aggression and threats to thestability of states.

    Although there may be many demands for U.S.involvement, the need to husband scarceresources suggests that we must carefullyselect the means and level of ourparticipation in particular militaryoperations. And while it is unwise tospecify in advance all the limitations wewill place on our use of force, we must beas clear as possible about when and how wewill use it.

    There are three basic categories of nationalinterests which can merit the use of ourarmed forces. The first involves America'svital interests, i.e., interests which areof broad, overriding importance to thesurvival, security and vitality of ournational entity — the defense of U.S.territory, citizens, allies and economicwell-being. We will do whatever it takes todefend these interests, including — whennecessary — the unilateral and decisive useof military power. This was demonstratedclearly in Desert Storm and, more recently,in Vigilant Warrior.

    The second category includes cases in whichimportant, but not vital, U.S. interests arethreatened. That is, the interests at stakedo not affect our national survival, butthey do affect importantly our nationalwell-being and the character of the world inwhich we live. In such cases, militaryforces should only be used if they advanceU.S. interests, they are likely to be ableto accomplish their objectives, the costsand risks of their employment arecommensurate with the interests at stake,and other means have been tried and havefailed to achieve our objectives. Such usesof force should also be limited, reflectingthe relative saliency of the interests wehave at stake. Haiti is the most recentexample in this category.

    The third category involves primarilyhumanitarian interests. Here, our decisionsfocus on the resources we can bring to bearby using unique capabilities of our militaryrather than on the combat power of militaryforce. Generally, the military is not thebest tool to address humanitarian concerns. But under certain conditions, the use of ourarmed forces may be appropriate: when ahumanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the abilityof civilian relief agencies to respond; whenthe need for relief is urgent and only themilitary has the ability to jump-start thelonger-term response to the disaster; whenthe response requires resources unique tothe military; and when the risk to Americantroops is minimal. Rwanda is a good case inpoint. U.S. military forces performedunique and essential roles, stabilized thesituation, and then got out, turning theoperation over to the international reliefcommunity.

    The decision on whether and when to useforce is therefore dictated first andforemost by our national interests. Inthose specific areas where our vital orsurvival interests are at stake, our use offorce will be decisive and, if necessary,unilateral. In other situations posing aless immediate threat, our militaryengagement must be targeted selectively

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    on those areas that most affect our nationalinterests — for instance, areas where wehave a sizable economic stake or commitmentsto allies, and areas where there is apotential to generate substantial refugeeflows into our nation or our allies.

    Second, in all cases the costs and risks ofU.S. military involvement must be judged tobe commensurate with the stakes involved. We will be more inclined to act where thereis reason to believe that our action willbring lasting improvement. On the otherhand, our involvement will be more circum-scribed when other regional or multilateralactors are better positioned to act than weare. Even in these cases, however, theUnited States will be actively engaged atthe diplomatic level. In every case,however, we will consider several criticalquestions before committing military force:Have we considered non-military means thatoffer a reasonable chance of success? Isthere a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the environment of risk we areentering? What is needed to achieve ourgoals? What are the potential costs — bothhuman and financial — of the engagement? Dowe have reasonable assurance of support fromthe American people and their electedrepresentatives? Do we have timelines andmilestones that will reveal the extent ofsuccess or failure, and, in either case, dowe have an exit strategy?

    The decision on how we use force has asimilar set of derived guidelines:

    First, when we send American troops abroad,we will send them with a clear mission and,for those operations that are likely toinvolve combat, the means to achieve theirobjectives decisively, having answered thequestions: What types of U.S. militarycapabilities should be brought to bear, andis the use of military force carefullymatched to our political objectives?

    Second, as much as possible, we will seekthe help of our allies and friends or ofrelevant international institutions. If ourmost important national interests are atstake, we are prepared to act alone. Butespecially on those matters touchingdirectly the interests of our allies, thereshould be a proportionate commitment fromthem. Working together increases theeffectiveness of each nation's actions, andsharing the responsibilities lessenseveryone's load.

    These, then, are the calculations ofinterest and cost that have influenced ourpast uses of military power and will guideus in the future. Every time thisAdministration

    has used force, it has balanced interestsagainst costs. And in each case, the use ofour military has put power behind ourdiplomacy, allowing us to make progress wewould not otherwise have achieved.

    One final consideration regards the centralrole the American people rightfully play inhow the United States wields its powerabroad: the United States cannot longsustain a fight without the support of thepublic. This is true for humanitarian andother non-traditional interventions, as wellas war. Modern media communicationsconfront every American with images whichboth stir the impulse to intervene and raisethe question of an operation's costs andrisks. When it is judged in America'sinterest to intervene, we must use forcewith an unwavering commitment to ourobjective. While we must continue toreassess any operation's costs and benefitsas it unfolds and the full range of ouroptions, reflexive calls for earlywithdrawal of our forces as soon ascasualties arise endangers our objectives aswell as our troops. Doing so invites anyrogue actor to attack our troops to try toforce our departure from areas where ourinterests lie.

    Combating the Spread and Use ofWeapons of Mass Destruction andMissiles

    Weapons of mass destruction — nuclear,biological and chemical — along with theirassociated delivery systems, pose a majorthreat to our security and that of ourallies and other friendly nations. Thus, akey part of our strategy is to seek to stemthe proliferation of such weapons and todevelop an effective capability to deal withthese threats. We also need to maintainrobust strategic nuclear forces and seek toimplement existing strategic armsagreements.

    Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation

    A critical priority for the United States isto stem the proliferation of nuclear weaponsand other weapons of mass destruction andtheir missile delivery systems. Countries'weapons programs, and their levels ofcooperation with our nonproliferationefforts, will be among our most importantcriteria in judging the nature of ourbilateral relations.

    Through programs such as the Nunn-LugarCooperative Threat Reduction effort andother denuclearization initiatives,

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    important progress has been made to build amore secure international environment. Onestriking example was the successful transferlast fall of nearly six hundred kilograms ofvulnerable nuclear material from Kazakhstanto safe storage in the United States. Kazakhstan was concerned about the securityof the material and requested U.S. assis-tance in removing it to safe storage. TheDepartments of Defense and Energy undertooka joint mission to retrieve the uranium. Similarly, under an agreement we securedwith Russia,it is converting tons of highly-enriched uranium from dismantled weaponsinto commercial reactor fuel for purchase bythe United States. The United States isalso working with Russia to enhance controland accounting of nuclear material.

    As a key part of our effort to controlnuclear proliferation, we seek theindefinite and unconditional extension ofthe Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)and its universal application. Achieving aComprehensive Test Ban Treaty as soon aspossible, ending the unsafeguardedproduction of fissile materials for nuclearweapons purposes and strengthening theNuclear Suppliers Group and the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) areimportant goals. They complement ourcomprehensive efforts to discourage the ac-cumulation of fissile materials, to seek tostrengthen controls and constraints on thosematerials, and over time, to reduce world-wide stocks. As President Clinton announcedat last September's UN General Assembly, wewill seek a global ban on the production offissile material for nuclear weapons.

    To combat missile proliferation, the UnitedStates seeks prudently to broaden membershipof the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR). The Administration supports theearliest possible ratification and entry inforce of the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC) as well as new measures to deterviolations of and enhance compliance withthe Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Wealso support improved export controls fornonproliferation purposes both domesticallyand multilaterally.

    The proliferation problem is global, but wemust tailor our approaches to specificregional contexts. We have concluded anagreed framework to bring North Korea intofull compliance with its nonproliferationobligations, including the NPT and IAEAsafeguards. We will continue efforts toprevent Iran from advancing its weapons ofmass destruction objectives and to thwartIraq from reconstituting its previousprograms. The United States seeks to cap,reduce and, ultimately, eliminate thenuclear and

    missile capabilities of India and Pakistan. In the Middle East and elsewhere, weencourage regional arms control agreementsthat address the legitimate securityconcerns of all parties. These tasks arebeing pursued with other states that shareour concern for the enormous challenge ofstemming the proliferation of such weapons.

    The United States has signed bilateralagreements with Russia, Ukraine and SouthAfrica which commit these countries toadhere to the guidelines of the MTCR. Wealso secured China's commitment to observethe MTCR guidelines and its agreement not totransfer MTCR controlled ground-to- groundmissiles. Russia has agreed not to transferspace-launch vehicle technology withpotential military applications to India. South Africa has agreed to observe the MTCRguidelines and to dismantle its Category Imissile systems and has joined the NPT andaccepted full-scope safeguards. Hungary,the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic andPoland have joined the Australia Group(which controls the transfer of items thatcould be used to make chemical or biologicalweapons). Hungary and Argentina have joinedthe MTCR and Brazil has committed itselfpublicly to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have brought theTreaty of Tlatelolco into force. Wecontinue to push for the dismantlement ofall intercontinental ballistic missileslocated in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. With theUnited States and Russia, Ukraine ispressing forward on implementation of theTrilateral Statement, which provides for thetransfer of all nuclear warheads fromUkraine to Russia for dismantlement inreturn for fair compensation.

    Thus, the United States seeks to preventadditional countries from acquiringchemical, biological and nuclear weapons andthe means to deliver them. However, shouldsuch efforts fail, U.S. forces must beprepared to deter, prevent and defendagainst their use. As agreed at the January1994 NATO Summit, we are working with ourAllies to develop a policy framework toconsider how to reinforce ongoing preventionefforts and to reduce the proliferationthreat and protect against it.

    The United States will retain the capacityto retaliate against those who mightcontemplate the use of weapons of massdestruction, so that the costs of such usewill be seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact ofproliferation of weapons of mass destructionon our interests, we will need thecapability not only to deter their useagainst either ourselves or our allies andfriends, but also, where necessary andfeasible, to prevent it.

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    This will require improved defensivecapabilities. To minimize the vulnerabilityof our forces abroad to weapons of massdestruction, we are placing a high priorityon improving our ability to locate, identifyand disable arsenals of weapons of massdestruction, production and storagefacilities for such weapons, and theirdelivery systems.

    Nuclear Forces

    In September, the President approved therecommendations of the Pentagon's NuclearPosture Review (NPR). A key conclusion ofthis review is that the United States willretain a triad of strategic nuclear forcessufficient to deter any future hostileforeign leadership with access to strategicnuclear forces from acting against our vitalinterests and to convince it that seeking anuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintainnuclear forces of sufficient size andcapability to hold at risk a broad range ofassets valued by such political and militaryleaders. The President approved the NPR'srecommended strategic nuclear force postureas the U.S. START II force. The forces are:450-500 Minuteman ICBMs, 14 Tridentsubmarines all with D-5 missiles, 20 B-2 and66 B52 strategic bombers, and a non-nuclearrole for the B-1s. This force postureallows us the flexibility to reconstitute orreduce further, as conditions warrant. TheNPR also reaffirmed the current posture anddeployment of non-strategic nuclear forces;the United States will eliminate carrier andsurface ship nuclear weapons capability.

    Arms Control

    Arms control is an integral part of ournational security strategy. Arms controlcan help reduce incentives to initiateattack; enhance predictability regarding thesize and structure of forces, thus reducingfear of aggressive intent; reduce the sizeof national defense industry establishmentsand thus permit the growth of more vital,nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence incompliance through effective monitoring andverification; and, ultimately, contribute toa more stable and calculable balance ofpower.

    In the area of strategic arms control,prescribed reductions in strategic offensivearms and the steady shift toward lessdestabilizing systems remain indispensable. Ukraine's accession to the NuclearNon-proliferation Treaty — joining Belarus'and Kazakhstan's decision to be non-

    nuclear nations — was followed immediatelyby the exchange of instruments ofratification and brought the START I treatyinto force at the December CSCE summit,paving the way for ratification of the STARTII Treaty. Under START II, the UnitedStates and Russia will each be left withbetween 3,000 and 3,500 deployed strategicnuclear warheads, which is a two-thirdsreduction from the Cold War peak. The twoPresidents agreed that once START II isratified, both nations will immediatelybegin to deactivate or otherwise remove fromcombat status, those systems whoseelimination will be required by that treaty,rather than waiting for the treaty to runits course through the year 2003. START IIratification will also open the door to thenext round of strategic arms control, inwhich we will consider what furtherreductions in, or limitations on, remainingU.S. and Russian nuclear forces should becarried out. We will also explore strategicconfidence building measures and mutualunderstandings that reduce the risk ofaccidental war.

    The full and faithful implementation ofother existing arms control agreements,including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I(START I), Biological Weapons Convention(BWC), Intermediate range Nuclear Forces(INF) Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe(CFE) Treaty, several nuclear testingagreements, the 1994 Vienna Document onConfidence and Security Building Measures(CSBMs), Open Skies, the EnvironmentalModification Convention (EnMod), Incidentsat Sea and many others will remain animportant element of national securitypolicy. The on-going negotiation initiatedby the United States to clarify the ABMTreaty by establishing an agreed demarcationbetween strategic and theater ballisticmissiles and update the Treaty to reflectthe break-up of the Soviet Union reflectsthe Administration's commitment tomaintaining the integrity and effectivenessof crucial arms control agreements.

    Future arms control efforts may become moreregional and multilateral. Regionalarrangements can add predictability andopenness to security relations, advance therule of international law and promotecooperation among participants. They helpmaintain deterrence and a stable militarybalance at regional levels. The U.S. isprepared to promote, help negotiate, monitorand participate in regional arms controlundertakings compatible with Americannational security interests. We will gene-rally support such undertakings but will notseek to impose regional arms control accordsagainst the wishes of affected states.

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    As arms control, whether regional or global,becomes increasingly multilateral, theConference on Disarmament (CD) in Genevawill play an even more important role. TheU.S. will support measures to increase theeffectiveness and relevance of the CD. Armscontrol agreements can head off potentialarms races in certain weapons categories orin some environments. We will continue toseek greater transparency, responsibilityand, where appropriate, restraint in thetransfer of conventional weapons and globalmilitary spending. The UN register ofconventional arms transfers is a start inpromoting greater transparency of weaponstransfers and buildups, but more needs to bedone. The U.S. has proposed that the newregime to succeed the Coordinating Committee(COCOM) focus on conventional arms sales anddual-use technologies. Where appropriate,the United States will continue to pursuesuch efforts vigorously. Measures to reduceoversized defense industrial establishments,especially those parts involved with weaponsof mass destruction, will also contribute tostability in the post-Cold War world. TheAdministration also will pursue defenseconversion agreements with the Former SovietUnion (FSU) states, and defense conversionis also on the agenda with China. TheUnited States has also proposed a regime toreduce the number and availability of theworld's long-lived antipersonnel mines whoseindiscriminate and irresponsible use hasreached crisis proportions. As another partof our effort to address this landmineproblem, the Administration has alsosubmitted the Convention on ConventionalWeapons to the Senate for advice andconsent.

    Peace Operations

    In addition to preparing for major regionalcontingencies, we must prepare our forcesfor peace operations to support democracy orconflict resolution. The United States,along with others in the internationalcommunity, will seek to prevent and containlocalized conflicts before they require amilitary response. U.S. supportcapabilities such as airlift, intelligence,and global communications, have oftencontributed to the success of multilateralpeace operations, and they will continue todo so. U.S. combat units are less likely tobe used for most peace operations, but insome cases their use will be necessary ordesirable and justified by U.S. nationalinterests as guided by the PresidentialDecision Directive, "U.S. Policy onReforming Multilateral Peace Operations,"and outlined below.

    Multilateral peace operations are animportant component of our strategy. Fromtraditional peacekeeping to peaceenforcement, multilateral peace operationsare sometimes the best way to prevent,contain, or resolve conflicts that couldotherwise be far more costly and deadly.

    Peace operations often have served, andcontinue to serve, important U.S. nationalinterests. In some cases, they have helpedpreserve peace between nations, as in Cyprusand the Golan Heights. In others,peacekeepers have provided breathing roomfor fledgling democracies, as in Cambodia,El Salvador and Namibia.

    At the same time, however, we must recognizethat some types of peace operations makedemands on the UN that exceed theorganization's current capabilities. TheUnited States is working with the UN head-quarters and other member states to ensurethat the UN embarks only on peace operationsthat make political and military sense andthat the UN is able to manage effectivelythose peace operations it does undertake. We support the creation of a professional UNpeace operations head-quarters with aplanning staff, access to timelyintelligence, a logistics unit that can berapidly deployed and a modern operationscenter with global communi-cations. TheUnited States will reduce our peacekeepingpayments to 25 percent while working toensure that other nations pay their fairshare. We are also working to ensure thatpeacekeeping operations by appropriateregional organizations such as NATO and theOSCE can be carried out effectively.

    In order to maximize the benefits of UNpeace operations, the United States mustmake highly disciplined choices about whenand under what circumstances to support orparticipate in them. The need to exercisesuch discipline is at the heart of PresidentClinton's policy on Reforming MultilateralPeace Operations. Far from handing a blankcheck to the UN, the President's policyreview on peace operations — the mostthorough ever undertaken by anAdministration — requires the United Statesto undertake a rigorous analysis ofrequirements and capabilities before votingto support or participate in peaceoperations. The United States has nothesitated to use its position on theSecurity Council to ensure that the UNauthorizes only those peace operations thatmeet these standards.

    Most UN peacekeeping operations do notinvolve U.S. forces. On those occasionswhen we consider contributing U.S. forces toa UN peace operation, we will employ

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    rigorous criteria, including the sameprinciples that would guide any decision toemploy U.S. forces. In addition, we willensure that the risks to U.S. personnel andthe command and control arrangementsgoverning the participation of American andforeign forces are acceptable to the UnitedStates.

    The question of command and control isparticularly critical. There may be timeswhen it is in our interest to place U.S.troops under the temporary operationalcontrol of a competent UN or alliedcommander. The United States has done somany times in the past — from the siege ofYorktown in the Revolutionary War to thebattles of Desert Storm. However, under nocircumstances will the President everrelinquish his command authority over U.S.forces.

    Improving the ways the United States and theUN decide upon and conduct peace operationswill not make the decision to engage anyeasier. The lesson we must take away fromour first ventures in peace operations isnot that we should forswear such operationsbut that we should employ this toolselectively and more effectively. In short,the United States views peace operations asa means to support our national securitystrategy, not as a strategy unto itself.

    The President is firmly committed tosecuring the active support of the Congressfor U.S. participation in peace operations. The Administration has set forth a detailedblueprint to guide consultations withCongress. With respect to particularoperations, the Administration willundertake consultations on questions such asthe nature of expected U.S. militaryparticipation, the mission parameters of theoperation, the expected duration, andbudgetary implications. In addition to suchoperation- specific consultations, theAdministration has also conducted regularmonthly briefings for congressional staff,and will deliver an Annual ComprehensiveReport to Congress on Peace Operations. Congress is critical to the institutionaldevelopment of a successful U.S. policy onpeace operations, including the resolutionof funding issues which have an impact onmilitary readiness.

    Two other points deserve emphasis. First,the primary mission of our Armed Forces isnot peace operations; it is to deter and, ifnecessary, to fight and win conflicts inwhich our most important interests arethreatened. Second while the internationalcommunity can create conditions

    for peace, the responsibility for peaceultimately rests with the people of thecountry in question.

    Strong Intelligence Capabilities

    U.S. intelligence capabilities are criticalinstruments of our national power and remainan integral part of our national securitystrategy. Only a strong intelligence effortcan provide adequate warning of threats toU.S. national security and identifyopportunities for advancing our interests. Policy analysts, decisionmakers and militarycommanders at all levels will continue torely on our intelligence community tocollect information unavailable from othersources and to provide strategic andtactical analysis to help surmount potentialchallenges to our military, political andeconomic interests.

    Because national security has taken on amuch broader definition in this post-ColdWar era, intelligence must address a muchwider range of threats and dangers. We willcontinue to monitor military and technicalthreats, to guide long-term forcedevelopment and weapons acquisition, and todirectly support military operations. Intelligence will also be critical fordirecting new efforts against regionalconflicts, proliferation of WMD,counterintelligence, terrorism and narcoticstrafficking. In order to adequatelyforecast dangers to democracy and to U.S.economic well-being, the intelligencecommunity must track political, economic,social and military developments in thoseparts of the world where U.S. interests aremost heavily engaged and where overtcollection of information from open sourcesis inadequate. Finally, to enhance thestudy and support of worldwideenvironmental, humanitarian and disasterrelief activities, technical intelligenceassets (principally imagery) must bedirected to a greater degree towardscollection of data on these subjects.

    The collection and analysis of intelligencerelated to economic development will play anincreasingly important role in helpingpolicy makers understand economic trends. That collection and analysis can help levelthe economic playing field by identifyingthreats to U.S. companies from foreignintelligence services and unfair tradingpractices.

    This strategy requires that we take steps toreinforce current intelligence capabilitiesand overt foreign service reporting, withinthe limits of our resources, and similar

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    steps to enhance coordination of clandestineand overt collection. Key goals include to.

    o Provide timely warning of strategicthreats, whether from the remainingarsenal of weapons in the former SovietUnion or from other nations with weaponsof mass destruction;

    0 Ensure timely intelligence support tomilitary operations;

    0 Provide early warning of potentialcrises and facilitate preventivediplomacy;

    o Develop new strategies for collection,production and dissemination (includingcloser relationships betweenintelligence producers and consumers) tomake intelligence products moreresponsive to current consumer needs;

    o Improve worldwide technical capabilitiesto detect, identify and determine theefforts of foreign nations to developweapons of mass destruction;

    o Enhance counterintelligencecapabilities;

    o Provide focused support for lawenforcement agencies in areas likecounternarcotics, counterterrorism andillegal technology trade;

    o Streamline intelligence operations andorganizations to gain efficiency andintegration;

    o Revise long-standing securityrestrictions where possible to makeintelligence data more useful tointelligence consumers.

    o Develop security countermeasures basedon sound threat analysis and riskmanagement practices

    To advance these goals the Presidentsignificantly restructuredcounterintelligence policy development andinteragency coordination. In a PresidentialDecision Directive (PDD) on U.S.counterintelligence effectiveness, thePresident took immediate steps to improveour ability to counter both traditional andnew threats to our Nation's security in thepost-Cold War era. The President furtherdirected a comprehensive restructuring ofthe process by which our security policies,practices and procedures are

    developed and implemented. The PDD onSecurity Policy Coordination ensures thedevelopment of security policies andpractices that realistically meet thethreats we face as they continue to evolve,at a price we can afford, while guaranteeingthe fair and equitable treatment of allAmericans upon whom we rely to guard ournation's security. Consistent with theprovisions of the FY 1995 IntelligenceAuthorization Act, President Clinton hasalso directed the Chairman of the ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board to conduct acomprehensive review of the roles andmissions of the intelligence community andfundamentally evaluate and define the needfor intelligence in the post-Cold Warenvironment.

    The Environment and SustainableDevelopment

    The more clearly we understand the complexinterrelationships between the differentparts of our world's environment, the betterwe can understand the regional and evenglobal effects of local changes to theenvironment. Increasing competition for thedwindling reserves of uncontaminated air,arable land, fisheries and other foodsources, and water, once considered "free"goods, is already a very real risk toregional stability around the world. Therange of environmental risks serious enoughto jeopardize international stabilityextends to massive population flight fromman-made or natural catastrophes, such asChernobyl or the East African drought, andto large-scale ecosystem damage caused byindustrial pollution, deforestation, loss ofbiod


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