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Issue 8March 2014

ISSN: 2241-438X'NA

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Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal

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2014 COMMITMENTS

▪ Continue to contribute to NATO's specialized training and to support current and future Operations of the Alliance.

▪ Promotetrainingactivitiesandkeepthehighqualityandquantityoftrainings.

▪ Maintain closer contact and promote mutualunderstanding with related NATO entities and other NATO training facilities.

▪ ParticipateinallNATOworkinggroupsrelevanttoMIO.

▪ Participate and contribute to transformational efforts,events and activities related to MIO, enhancingcooperation with Research Organizations and Universitiesinrelatedtopics.

▪ Further exploit all the geographical features offered in SoudaBayinordertoexpandthetrainingscenarios.

▪ OrganizeandfurtherdeveloptheNMIOTCcourse8000"Maritime C-IED" and "MaritimeAdvanced SituationalAwareness".

▪ Organize the first NMIOTC Pilot Course 9000 "LegalIssuesinMIO"

▪ OrganizefivemoretrainingsessionsoftheIMO-DCOCcountries training.

▪ Organize the 5thNMIOTCAnnualConferenceon thetheme: Building a Law Enforcement Cutlure at Sea for a more Secure Maritime Environment

DirectorCommodore,I.PavlopoulosGRCNCommandantNMIOTC

Executive DirectorCdrC.CampanaITANDirectorofTrainingSupport

EditorLtCommanderN.AriatzisGRCNTransformationStaffOfficer

Layout Production ManagerEviSakellaridouMWROffice

Editorial by Commodore IoannisPavlopoulosGRCN

COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL

4 Fighting Pirates from Space byNina-Louisa Remuss, Associatefellow to the European SpacePolicyInstitute

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

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Are your Boarding Teams beingtrained to fight Piracy in the bestwaypossible?byChrisHaarmeijer,Re-LionBV

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ECPERSEUSDemostrationProject- FP7, by Phillipe Chrobocenski,Engineer in Cassidian LEADSCompany

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Legal Considerations in ModernPiracy at Sea, by CorradoCampana,CommanderITAN

NMIOTC TRAINING

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45 VIPvisitorstoNMIOTC

HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

Where is Piracy going from an insurance point of view?, byGeorgePateras, Shipping Advisor ofAMSCC

SHIPPING INDUSTRY

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TripsandExcursions

MWR ACTIVITIES

617kFunRun64

Criminal Procedural Rights in thePreliminary Inquiry of UnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofMaritimeNavigation, by Christos Tsiachris,Jadge at the Military Court ofChania&GuestInstructorofLawattheNMIOTC

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Legal Considerations in ModernPiracy at Sea, by CorradoCampana,CommanderITAN

LEGAL ISSUES

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Maritime Piracy: a laboratory forinformationexchangechallenges12

The views expressed in this issuereflect theopinionsof theauthors,and do not necessarily representNMIOTC or NATO’s official posi-tions.

All content is subject to GreekCopyrightLegislation.Picturesusedfromthewebarenotsubjecttocopyrightrestrictions.

MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

JOURNAL

C O N T E N T S

Autonomous Vessel ProtectionDetachments,bySteveSweeney&MarkWithycombe,Commandersofthe US N

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Maritime Stability Operations: AnOverview, by PhyllisMichalas, USMaritime CivilAfairs and SecuringTrainingCommend(MCAST)

15OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Securing West Africa's Sloc's:Apllying lessons learnt fromcombating Maritime Piracy in theHoaRegion,byDrHenryFouche,UniversityofSouthAfrica

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Themaritimeenvironmentischaracterizedbycomplexityanddiversity.Byitsverynatureitoffersabundantfreedomtoseafarers,butitisalsovulnerabletoactivitiesthreateningNationsinterestsandthefreeflowofworldcommerce.Terroristmovementsorsupporttothem,illicittrafficking,piracyandtheproliferationofWeaponsofMassDestructionarejustfewexamplesofillegalactivitiesthatmaybeconductedfromorthroughthesea.ThethreatemanatingfromtheseahasaglobalreachandthedefenseagainstitisachallengeforNATOmembernationsandpartnerstomeet.

Globalsecuritychallengeslikethosementionedabove,haveledtheAlliancetoseekfornewcapabilities,whichhaveresultedinnewtrainingrequirements.InthefieldofMaritimeInterdictionOperations(MIO),NMIOTCrespondstotheserequirementsandleadstheeffort throughouttheAllianceandbeyond,aimingto improvethecapabilitiesofalliedandpartnernavalunitsinconductinginterdictionoperationsthatwilladdressawiderangeofmaritimesecuritychallenges.

TheCentre,aspartoftheAlliance’stransformationalnetwork,notonlytrainsnavalunitsandspecializedteamsonMIO,butalsoprovidesSACTwithproposalsfornewdoctrines,tactics,methodsandequipmentonawideoperationalrange.OuraimistodevelopadiverseandhighlyeffectiveMaritimeInterdictionOperationsworkforce,viatraining,educationandmentoring,andbyprovidingopportunitiestooperationalteamsandindividualstogainexperienceandrealizetheirfullpo-tentials.ByembracingNATOstandards,andemphasizingoninnovationandexperimentation,aswellassimulationandmodeling,NMIOTCcontributesdirectlytoforceintegrationandimprovementofinteroperabilityfortheAlliedandemergingpartners,whileforgingalawenforcementculture,throughpropertrainingoninternationallaw.

Inorder toachieve thesegoalsandproducethehighestqualityNATOEducationandTraining,NMIOTCrequired im-provementstointernalassuranceprocesses,andprocedureswerereviewedandidentifiedasqualityassuranceelementsalignedwithNATOMinimumQualityAssuranceCriteria,inaprocessofconstantimprovementthatstartedin2012.

AsaresulttotheseeffortsonNovember7th,2013theSupremeAlliedCommandTransformationawardedNMIOTCwitha QualityAssuranceUnconditionalAccreditation,afteritwasfoundtohave:a. Soundinternalqualityassurancesystemsandproceduresfortheassuranceofqualitystandards.b. ProceduresapplyingeffectivelyateachDepthofKnowledgeleveltoensurethequalityofindividualcurriculum.c. Effectiveandregularprocessesofreviewingthequalityofprogramsandthestandardsofcurriculumandimplement-

ingrequiredchanges,developmentsandenhancements.d. Accuratecompleteandreliableinformationaboutthequalityoftheinstitutionprogrammesandthestandardsofits

curriculum.

ThroughacceptingthisUnconditionalQualityAssuranceAccreditation,NMIOTCundertooktheresponsibilitytocontinuestrivingforimprovementsoninternalqualityassuranceandfurtherenhancingeffortstodefineandfollowacademicstan-dardsandBestPractices.

Westandreadytowelcomealliesandpartnerstoourtrainingprogramsandinitiatives,inordertocontributetothecom-binedeffortofdevelopingsolutionsandaddressingcurrentandemergingglobalsecuritychallenges.WorkingtogetherwiththeMIOexpertswillenhancethereadiness,capabilityandcapacityofalliesandpartnerstoachievemissionobjec-tiveswhileconductinginterdictionoperations.

“If you want to go fast go alone. If you want to go far go together”

old African Proverb

NMIOTC Commandant’s Editorial

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Before the 2000s, piracy andarmed robbery against shipswere concentrated in the Far East, particularly the waters

of the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. Between 2006 and 2007,justwhenthenumberofSoutheastAsianincidentsstartedtodecrease,thenumberofreportsrelatingtoSomalipiracybegan

torisedramatically,andstilltodaySomalipiracy is a phenomenon that continuestomenacetheworldtradeonastrategicsea line of communications, threateninginnocentseafarerswith injuryanddeath,andcostingbillionsofdollars incounter-piracymeasures,ransompayments,andre-routing.Dozens of states, under different Coali-

tions, have provided significant navaland military assets to contribute tothe protection of merchant shippingin the waters off Somalia, though theinternational effort and naval actionagainst Somali pirates has not beenfree from complications and challenges,particularlyintermsofthelegalaspects.Theinternational lawrelatingtomaritime

Legal Considerations on Modern Piracy at Sea

by Corrado CampanaCommander ITA N

piracy isnot indeedamodelofclarity intermsof issuessuchastheidentificationof the crime, the arrest, detention,and prosecution of suspects and the protectionofhumanrightsofbothvictimsandcriminals.Article15ofthe1958GenevaConventionontheHighSeas(HSC),andArticle101ofthe1982UnitedNationsConventiononthe Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), providethe world community with what today isgenerallyacceptedasthedefinitionofthehighseascrimeofpiracy.Inaccordancewith these articles, it may be said thatforanact tobeconsideredpiracyunderinternational law, thefollowingconditionsmustbemet: Theactmustbean illegalactofvio-lence, detention, or depredation (the“illegalviolencerule”). Theactmustbemotivatedbyprivategain(the“lucricausarule”). Twoshipsmustbeinvolvedinthein-cident–thevictimshipandthepirateship(the“two-shiprule”). The act must be committed on the

high seas or waters outside thejurisdictionofanystate(the“highseasrule”).

Whenexamined in the light ofpirateattacks,theseconditionswereoftenthesubjectofsomecontroversyandconsideredasfrustrating complications whenattemptingtoidentifythecrime.Thefirstelementontheabovelist is straightforward. All pirate attacks are illegal actsof violence since these arecommitted by elements otherthan naval forces or otherpublic instruments of violencesanctionedbythestate.Withregardtothesecondpoint,thereiscontroversyonwhetherthe reported attacks are motivated byprivate gain or by public gain. Indeed,somearguethatthetwoarenotnecessarilymutually exclusive. In fact, privateaimsalways constitute an important part ofpublicaims,becausepublicaimscannotexist without individuals. If a persontruly associates himself with a particulargroup,theaimsofthisgrouparealsohisindividualaims.The third point constitutes the “two-shiprule”, which means that for an act to

qualify as piracy under UNCLOS, botha pirate ship and a victim ship must bepresent. Inactual fact,even in thecaseofSomalipiracy,puristsmightarguethatdespitetheuseofmothershipstoextendtherangeofpirateboardingteams,mostvictimshipsareboardedbyperpetratorsusingskiffsorothersmallboats,insomecases also rubber boats, which are not,strictlyspeaking,ships.Finally,thefourthpointlistedabovemeansthat,dependingonhowArticle58(“RightsandDutiesofOtherStatesintheExclusiveEconomicZone”)andtheconceptof“highseas”inArticle101(“Definitionofpiracy”)ofUNCLOSareinterpreted,theactwouldneed to have occurred either outsidethe 12 nautical mile limit (i.e., beyond

UNCLOSdefinitionofpiracybyresortingtotheexpandedconstruction“piracyandarmedrobberyagainstships”.IMO, in its Code of Practice for theInvestigationoftheCrimesofPiracyandArmed Robbery against Ships (January2002), defines armed robbery againstshipsas “anyunlawfulactofviolenceordetention or any act of depredation, orthreatthereof,otherthananactofpiracy,directed against a ship or against persons orpropertyonboard sucha ship,withinaState’sjurisdictionoversuchoffences”.One crucial implication of identifyingan act as piracy under UNCLOS is thatit gives any state the option to claimuniversal jurisdiction by invoking Article105(“Seizureofapirateshiporaircraft”),according to which “every State may

seizeapirateshiporaircraft,or a ship or aircraft taken bypiracyandunderthecontrolofpirates,andarrestthepersonsand seize the property onboard. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure maydecideuponthepenaltiestobe imposed,andmayalsodetermine the action to betakenwithregardtotheships,aircraft or property, subjectto the rights of third parties actingingoodfaith”.Until recently, this remainedmainly a hypothetical optionbecausemostreportedattacksdid not meet the UNCLOScriteriaastheyoccurredwithin

theterritorialseasofacoastalstate,sobytheearly-2000stheconceptof“universaljurisdiction over piracy” was largelyconsidered to have little or no modernrelevance.As said, until recently. Until the recentoutbreak of piracy phenomenon off thecoast of Somalia, where most attacksfrom themid-2000s onwards have beenreportedoutsidewhatwouldtheoreticallybe Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.However,whileattacksbySomalipirates

LEGAL ISSUES

the territorial sea) or as far out as 200nauticalmilesfromshore(i.e.,beyondtheexclusive economic zone). To this aim,piracycouldseemtohavebeenvirtuallyeliminated when UNCLOS pushed thehigh seas to as much as 200 nauticalmilesfromshore,thoughthemostrecentlegalorientationseemstoconsiderthe12nauticalmile limit of territorialwaters forthepurposeofidentifyingpiracyacts.In itsmaritimesecuritydeliberations, theInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)circumventsthecomplicationposedbythe

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easily fall within theUNCLOS definition,which is therefore perfectly adequateto deal with the present situation,states tackling the maritime criminalphenomenonintheHornofAfricastillfacenumerouschallenges.The nominal availability of universaljurisdiction for piracy does not actuallylead to put an end to impunity for thiscrime.Becausetheexerciseofuniversaljurisdiction over piracy cases is only arecentphenomenon,statepracticeisstillin a very early and inefficient stage ofdevelopment.Thenecessaryproceduresand facilities to ensure arrest and prosecution, detention, extradition, andimprisonmentarebarelyinplace.Arresting states often transfer suspects to third states, like Kenya, which hasprosecuted several piracy caseswith noclear Kenyan interests involved. Thereis an obvious strain on the country’sresources, resulting in backlogs that notonly delay justice, but also weaken thearrests’ deterrent effect. On the otherhand,trialsinthecourtsofarrestingstates,possibly locatedthousandsofmilesfromthe actual theatre of operations, are nomore efficient, not only because of theobviousdelayintransportingthesuspectsbut also for the difficulty of assemblingwitnesses based in different countries around the world. In the worst case,insufficiencies in thedomestic legislationof arresting states or unwillingness to commencedomesticcriminalproceedingsleavethenaval forcesof thesecountriesno choice but to release the alleged perpetratorssoonaftertheyarecaptured.TheUNSecurityCouncil,initsResolution1851 (UNSC Resolution 1851 on theSituation in Somalia, December 2008),noted with concern “that the lack ofcapacity,domestic legislation,andclarityabout how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has hindered more robustinternational action against the pirates off thecoastofSomaliaand insomecasesled to pirates being released without facingjustice”.

Evidence handling and crime-scenepreservation also represent a crucialarea that requires improvement. Withnavalforcesbeingdeployedtodeterandarrestpirates,ratherthancoastguardorconstabulary forces, it is not surprisingthatevidencecollectionhasbeenfocusedon intelligence gathering and maritimetarget development, rather than onbuildingacriminalcaseagainstsuspectedpirates.This lackofskillandknowledgein gathering and handling evidence hasaffecteditsadmissibilitybeforethecourtsand, in some cases, allowed pirates toavoidpunishment.Anothercontributoryfactortoinefficiencyin arrest and prosecution under the current regimeofuniversaljurisdictionoverpiracycases is the failure to fully observe the

LEGAL ISSUEShuman rights of the suspected pirates.It is not rare that criminal prosecutionsfail because arrests, investigative stepsor handovers are carried out not in fulladherenceofhumanrights.Eventhoughthe legal instruments governing counter-piracyoperationsdonotexplicitlymentiontheapplicablehumanrightsnorms,theseactivities cannot be exercised in a legalvacuum, and the already mentionedUNSCR1851statesthat“anymeasures…shall be undertaken consistent withapplicableinternationalhumanitarianandhumanrightslaw”.A further issue is the question whetherarrested piracy suspects are entitledto protections under the law of armedconflict and international law in general.To this questionM. Bahar, former StaffJudge Advocate for the Nassau StrikeGroupduringtheUSNavy’sfirstcaptureof suspected pirates, gives the followinganswer: “Pirates are not combatantsor enemy prisoners of war, but they areinternational maritime criminals entitledto international and constitutional due process protections” (M. Bahar –“Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: aLegalandStrategicTheoryforNavalAnti-piracyOperations”).To make a complicated situation evenmore complex, it has been recognizedthat a significant number of pirates areactually only 15 years old or younger,and this brings into the picture another importantareaof treaty law,suchas theInternationalConventionontheRightsoftheChild (1989) and theWorst Form ofChildLabourConvention(1999).Becauseglobaltradeandcommercearedependentonsafeandefficientmaritimetransport,itisineverystate’sinterestthatthe fightagainst piracy isgiven thebestchances for success by ensuring thatoperations remain legally and morallybeyondcensure.Forsure,theproblemofSomalipiracycanonlybesolvedbylong-termmeasurestorestore political, social, and economicstability in Somalia, though in terms ofimmediate relief the international effortconsisting of the multinational navalforcesdeployedofftheSomalicoasthasbeen and continues to be of paramountimportance. Unfortunately, because ofthenatureofthecrimeanycounter-piracyoperation faces huge challenges, not

Achieving clarity in the international law and in the legal framework of maritime piracy is of primary importance to provide a fast relief from one of the most deplorable scourges affecting the shipping industry, and the NMIOTC is proud to contribute to this aim with activities carried out within NATO and cooperation programs such as PfP, MD and ICI.

leastintermsoftherelevantinternationallegal aspects. A key to the effectiveness of the effortseemstobetheimprovementoflevelsofcooperationamongall theactors,and inparticular military forces, national policeorganizations, Interpol, merchant shipoperatorsandcrews,plusofcourselegalcapacitybuildinginthestatesaffectedbypiracy.Achieving clarity in the international lawand in the legal framework of maritimepiracyisofprimaryimportancetoprovideafastrelieffromoneofthemostdeplorablescourges affecting the shipping industry,andtheNMIOTCisproudtocontributetothis aimwith activities carried out withinNATOandcooperationprogramssuchasPfP,MDandICI.

Commander Corrado CampanaCommander Corrado Campana attended theItalian Naval Academy from 1987 until 1991,whenhewascommissionedasEnsign.Hehasachievedthequalification inNavalArtilleryandMissileSystemsandthespecializationinNavalWeaponsDirection.HeservedonboardseveralItalianNavyshipssuchasthefrigatesLibeccioand Maestrale and the destroyers Ardito andLuigiDuranddelaPenne,andwasappointedasCommandingOfficeroftheauxiliaryshipPonzaandofthefrigateGranatiere.HeservedininternationalstaffssuchastheForceHQoftheMultinationalForceandObservers(M.F.O.)inEl-Gorah(Sinai,Egypt)asNavalAdvisor,andtheEUNavalForceOHQinNorthwood(UK)asACOSCJ3Operationswithintheanti-piracyOperationATALANTA.HeservedinnationalstaffssuchastheCommandinChiefoftheItalianFleetasHeadoftheArtilleryandMissileSystemsSection,theCommandofItalianMaritimeForcesinTarantoasACOSN3OperationsandattheItalianJointOperationsHQin Rome, as Head ofMaritimeOperations Section (J3). He attended the Italian JointWarCollegeandtheCourseinInternationalHumanitarianLawattheCentreforDefenceHighStudiesinRomeandalsoservedasTutorfortheattendees.CommanderCampanahas achieved theDegree inMaritimeandNavalScienceat theUniversity ofPisa, theDegreeinPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofTrieste,andtheMasterinInternationalandMilitary-strategicStudiesattheL.U.I.S.S.University“GuidoCarli”inRome.Sincethe1stAugust2013heisappointedattheNATOMaritimeInterdictionOperationalTrainingCentrein Souda Bay, Crete, Greece as Director of the Training Support and TransformationDirectorate.

LEGAL ISSUES

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In addition to their military tasks,naval forces are used by statesin law enforcement operations on

the high seas in an effort to suppress variousunlawful acts. For example, the1988 Convention for the Suppressionof Unlawful Acts of Violence againstthe Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUAConvention) and the 2005 Protocol toit (SUA Protocol) define a list of violentcrimes which constitute a serious threatformaritimenavigation.EachStatePartyto the SUA Convention and Protocolundertakestheresponsibilitytoprosecutethe alleged perpetrators of these crimesandtotakenecessarymeasuresinorderto establish its jurisdiction over thosecrimes.The prosecution of alleged perpetrators of unlawful acts of violence against thesafety ofmaritime navigationmay proveproblematicinmanycases.Atfirst,therearemanywaysofestablishingjurisdiction,describedinArt.6oftheSUAConvention,henceitispossiblethatmorestateshaveestablished and are willing to exercise their jurisdiction over the same offenceatthesametime(concurrentjurisdiction).Interestedstatesmayeitheragreeintheprosecution of the alleged offender byone of them or disagree. The decisionon which state will eventually prosecutethe alleged offender may prove crucial,because criminal law is not uniform inall states. Depending on the nationalcriminallawthatwilleventuallybeapplied,the outcome of the prosecution may bedifferent.Seriousproblemsmayalsoarise,ifthereis no compatibility between the differentnational legislations that will apply toeachstageofthecriminalprocedure.Forexample, Art. 7 of the SUAConventionprovides that a state, which takes into

custodyasuspect,shalleitherprosecuteor extradict him. In any case, this stateshall immediately make a preliminaryinquiry into the facts, inaccordancewithits national legislation. Consequently,during the preliminary inquiry, this statewillapply itsnationalcriminalprocedurallaw,whichcontainsrulesonthecollectionof evidence and recognizes certainrights to the suspect. In case that thisstate decides to extradite the suspect to anotherstate,bythetimethatthesuspectis extradited a different national law is applicable.Theaforementionedprogressofacriminalcase may raise legal issues during thetrial of the suspect in front of a national court. Theallegedoffendermay submitan objection against the use of proofscollected during the preliminary enquiryor may claim that the whole procedureshallbedeclaredas invalidbythecourt,because his rights were violated duringthepreliminaryenquiry.Theseobjectionsmaybebasedinthefactthatthecriminalproceduralrulesfollowedbythestatethattookhimintocustodyandconductedthepreliminary enquiry are not compatiblewith the criminal procedural rules of thestatewherethecaseisbeingjudged.Theaforementioned situationmay rarelyoccur because criminal procedural rulesaresimilar inmanystates. Thismaybeattributedtotheprovisionsofinternationalandregionalinstrumentsofhumanrights,such as the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, the EuropeanConventionofHumanRights,theAfricanConventionofHumanandPeoples’Rightsetc. Nevertheless differences still existand may be used by alleged offendersnotonlyinfrontofcourtsbutalsoduringpreliminaryinquiries. Safeguarding the criminal procedural

rightsofthesuspectisalwaysachallengingissue,especiallyinthecontextofMaritimeInterdiction Operations, when thepreliminaryinquiryhastobeconductedbyNavy officers’ onboardwarships. Underthese circumstances, special care mustbetaken,inordertoavoidthepreliminaryinquirytobedeclaredinvalidbyacourt.For example, if an alleged offender oftheSUAConventiongetsarrestedbytheHellenic Navy in the Indian Ocean, theHellenic Navy officers must immediatelyconductpreliminaryenquiry,accordingtotheGreeklaw.Giventhat:according to Art. 6 of the ECHR

“Everyone charged with a criminaloffence has the following minimumrights: […] (c) to defend himself inperson or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he hasnot sufficient means to pay for legalassistance, to be given it free whentheinterestsofjusticesorequire[…]”and

accordingtoArt.96,98and100oftheGreek Code of Criminal Procedure,the accused has the right to be represented by up to two defencelawyersduringthepreliminaryenquiry,

it isprofound that thepreliminary inquirywill be invalid, if the suspect has askedto be represented by a defence lawyerand he was not been provided with atleast one. But, is it possible for officersconductingapreliminaryinquirytoappointadefencelawyertoasuspect,whenthewarship sails in themiddle of the IndianOcean?Likewise, problemsmay occur as far asthe transferof thesuspect to the judicialauthorities is concerned. According to Art. 5 par. 3 of the ECHR “Everyonearrestedordetained[…]shallbebroughtpromptly before a judge or other officer

Criminal Procedural Rights in the Preliminary Inquiry of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

by Christos Tsiachris1

1. JudgeattheMilitaryCourtofChaniaandGuestInstructorofLawattheNMIOTC(e-mail:c.n.tsiachris@army.gr

authorised by law to exercise judicialpower and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonabletime[…]”.Eachnational lawalsocontainsprovisionson the time thatisallowedtothelawenforcementagentsin order to transfer and present suspects tothejudicialauthorities.Moreover,eachnationalcourtmay interpret inadifferentwaytheterm“reasonabletime”.Acertaintimeperiodthatmaybejustifiedaccordingtoastate’snationallawmaybeaviolationof the suspect’s rights according toanotherstate’snational law. In thecaseof Maritime Interdiction Operations onthehighseas,what is thedeadline foracommandant of a warship to present asuspect to the judicialauthorities?Whendoesadelayconstituteaviolationof thesuspect’scriminalproceduralrights?TheEuropean Court of Human Rights hasissued a relative decision [Rigopoulosv.Spain,37388 (dec),12January1999]ontheissue.Itreflectedonwhen,undercertaincircumstances,theperiodinvolvedbetween the arrest of a suspect on the high seas and his appearance before a judgeisexcessiveornon-excessive.Concluding, the answer to these andsimilar questions is quite difficult anddepends on various factors. Since nouniformcriminalprocedurallawexists,thebest solution for Navy officers involvedin preliminary inquiries on the high seaswould be to apply their national lawtaking into consideration, if possible, theinternational legal standards on criminalprocedural rights, which derive frominternationalconventionsonhumanrightsand the case law of international courts.The aforementioned issues are amongthose that will be discussed during the upcoming NMIOTC Pilot Course 9000“Legal Issues in MIO” and NMIOTCAnnualConference2014“BuildingaLawEnforcement Culture at Sea for a moreSecureMaritimeEnvironment”.

LEGAL ISSUES

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Acts of maritime piracy off thecoastofSomaliaandintheGulfof Aden have, since 2008,seri-

ously affected the maritime right to freepassageandhaveimpactedonEuropeaninterests, and those of the InternationalCommunity at large. The sudden surgein piracy cases and the absence of anycredible local lawenforcement capabilitytoinvestigateandtoprosecutetheselocalcriminal networks in the Horn of Africa-forced European and other law enforce-mentagenciestotakeaction.OntheinitiativeoftheDutchpoliceauthor-ities,Europolorganised inJune2009anexpertmeetingonmaritimepiracyduringwhichanumberof participatingmemberStates expressed provisional interest inparticipating in an Europol intelligenceproject on the subject matter. During afollowingoperationalmeetinginJuly2009threeEUMemberStateswithon-goingin-vestigations intohijackingsofvesselsoffthecoastofSomaliacomparedtheirdata.TheInitialassessmentoftheseEuropeaninvestigations indicated that there werenumerous links between the separatecases.Assuch,itseemedthattheinitialnationalinvestigationswerelookingatthesametargetgroupandthateachseparateinvestigationheldadifferentpieceof theinvestigative puzzle which could lead to

theidentificationoftheculprits.Theobvi-ouslogicalstepwastolaunchacommonanalysisproject(oranalysisWorkfile)un-dertheauspicesofEuropolwiththeaimto support the competent investigativeauthoritiesoftheMemberStates.On13July 2009 Europol received a formal re-quest(dd.11-07-2009)oftheDutchcom-petent authorities to open an Analyticalwork file (AWF) on the subject of piracyandconsequentlytheprojectwasformal-lyandofficiallyopenedbytheDirectorofEuropolinMarch2010.This common analysis project, currentlyknown as Focal Point (FP) Maritime Pi-racyprovidessupporttotheparticipatingservicesthroughcollectingandanalysinginformation concerning criminal, sus-pects,associatesandcontacts, theirvic-timsandpersonsprovidinginformationonthecriminalbehaviourinrelationtopiracyactivities,armedrobberyatseaandlinkedcrimeareas.Thepurposeof theFP is to support thecompetent authorities of the MemberStates,asmentioned in3of theEuropolCouncil Decision and theAnnex toArti-cle4, inpreventingor combatingcrimescommittedorlikelytobecommittedinthecourseofarmedrobberyatseaandpira-cy1 activities against life, limb, personalfreedomorproperty,andrelatedcriminal

offences associated with armed robberyatseaandpiracyperpetratedby individ-uals,groups,networksororganisations.In parallel to the Europol activities, theDutchauthoritiesequallyapproachedEu-ro-justwitha request toassist in settingupajudicialcoordinationbetweenthedif-ferent involvedEUprosecution services.UndertheguidanceoftheDutchnationaldeskatEuro-just andon the initiativeofthe Dutch national prosecution serviceRotterdam, Euro-just organised a seriesof coordination meetings which broughttogether thevarious involved judicialau-thorities. As a result of the continuous consultationbetweenthedifferentjudicialauthorities, the prosecution services ofGermany and the Netherlands decidedtosetupaJointInvestigativeTeam(JIT)with investigators from theDutchKonin-klijke Marechaussée, the German Lan-desKriminalamtNiederSachsenandtheGerman Bundes Kriminalamt, supportedby the Europol analytical support team,FPMaritimePiracy.TheJIT,codenameOperationNEMESISwasformallysetuptorunfrom01January2012to31Decem-ber2013andwashostedfromthestartinJanuary2012toJune2013inEuropolHQinTheHague.When inSpring2009 theDutchnationalcrimesquadcontactedEuropoltodiscuss

Maritime Piracy: a laboratory for information exchange challenges

1. PiracyisdefinedbytheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)as: a) anyillegalactsofviolenceordetention,oranyactofdepredation,committedforprivateendsbythecreworpassengersofaprivateshiporaprivate

aircraft,anddirected i)onthehighseas,againstanothershiporaircraft,oragainstpersonsorpropertyonboardsuchshiporaircraft; ii) againstaship,aircraft,personsorpropertyinaplaceoutsidethejurisdictionofanyState; b) anyactofvoluntaryparticipationintheoperationofashiporofanaircraftwithknowledgeoffactsmakingitapirateshiporaircraft; c) anyactincitingorofintentionallyfacilitatinganactdescribedinsub-paragrapha)orb) PiracyisconsideredtooccurininternationalwaterswhileArmedRobberyatSeaoccursinterritorialwatersorinport. TheEuropolSecureInformationExchangeNetworkApplication(SIENA)foreseesthreehandlingcodes

by Peter VergauwenEuropol Operations Department Senior Specialist

thepossibilitytoopenananalysisprojectonmaritimepiracy the first reactionof anumberofseniormanagerswasthatgiv-en the geographical scope of this crimephenomenon surely Interpolwould be inthelead.Asamatterinfact,InterpolhadaprojectonmaritimepiracycalledBADAwhich was more of a strategic nature.Equally,somememberstatesexpressedtheir concerns regarding themandate ofEuropol indealingwiththisphenomenonandthepossibleoverlapwithInterpolac-tivities.EventswerehappeningatahighpaceintheGulfofAdenandintheSomaliBasinand EU law enforcement professionalswere in need for a secure platform forcommon analysis, expertise and coordi-nation.Giventheurgentneedandseeingthis project as an opportunity to deepenand to strengthen the organisations` stra-tegic commitment towards cooperationwith Interpol, the Europol senior man-agementdecidedtocommitresourcestoestablishananalyticalprojectonmaritimepiracy.Theinitialassessmentontheavailablein-formationmadeitclearthatthisanalyticalprojectwouldbesomehowdifferent thanthe traditional projects, whereas EU lawenforcementagencieswouldbethemainprovidersofinformationtowardstheproj-ect.InFact,besidesthetraditionalinfor-mationflowcoming from theEU lawen-forcement agencies, it became apparentthatindealingwiththisphenomenon,theprojecthadtoestablishlinkswithvariouspartnerssuchasInterpol,themilitaryandother organisations.Seniorlevelmanagementofbothorgani-sations,EuropolandInterpolhaveovertheyearsexpressedtheirwill tobettercoop-erateinordertomakeacoherentserviceoffertotheirrespectivemembercountries.Sterilecompetitionbetweenorganisationswouldnotadvancethefightagainstmar-itime piracy or organised crime at large,whilstatthesametimethiscouldbecon-sidered as a waist of police resources. As from thestart of thisproject itwasclearfor theprojectmanagement that a closecooperationwithInterpolwouldbevitaltosecurea“windowontheworld”.Clearly,fromtheperspectiveoftheEuropolFocalPointMaritimePiracy,Interpolcouldserve

as a gateway to local jurisdictions andlaw enforcement agencies in the region.The reality of the matter is that a lot ofinformationandintelligencethatcouldbeusefultodevelopoperationalanalysisfortheparticipatingEUservices isavailablewithin law enforcement agencies in TheSeychelles, theRepublic ofSouthAfricaandotherswithwhichEuropolorotherEUlaw enforcement agencies has noformalcontact or cooperation agreement what-soever.SinceInterpolandEuropolhaveestablished a full operational cooperation agreement,therearenoformalobstaclesforInterpoltojoinaFocalPointgroup.InMarch2010Interpolbecameafullopera-tionalmemberoftheFocalpointMaritimePiracy.AsfromthestartInterpolbecameoneof themaincontributors to theanal-ysis project but at the same time bothorganisationsbecameawareofthelimita-tionsofthecooperation.AsInterpolwasproviding (useful) information that couldbecrosscheckedand linked to informa-tionavailableinEuropol,itwasnotalwayspossible for the latter to provide Interpolanditsmembershipaclearandcompre-hensiveanswer.Infact,EUlawenforce-

mentagencies,providinginformationtoaFocalPointwithinEuropol remainownerofthatinformationandcanexercisecon-trolon thedistributionof that informationthroughtheuseofthesocalledHandlingCodes2. As some EU law enforcementagencies were clearly hesitant to shareinformationandintelligenceanalysiswithnon-EUcounterpartsthroughtheInterpolchannel,Europolcouldnotalwaysprovide“enriched” informationbackto Interpol tosharewith itsnon-EUmembers. Havingsimilar functionalities andmissions, bothorganisationsserveonlypartly thesameaudience and one can only understandthat Interpol choose to develop its ownanalyticalcapabilitywiththe“GlobalMar-itimePiracyDatabase”whichonthesur-facemaylooklikeaduplicationofeffortsbut is in facta tool for Interpol todeliveraddedanalyticalvaluetoallitsmembers.Bigisbeautiful,ismaybenotalwaystruebutasfarasoperationalanalysis iscon-cernedthisisdefinitelythecase.Todate,intermsofsizetheEuropolprojectdata-basecontainssome60.000entitiesgen-eratedby contributions stemmingmainlyfrom EU law enforcement agencies and

2. TheEuropolSecureInformationExchangeNetworkApplication(SIENA)foreseesthreehandlingcodes H1:Thisinformationmustnotbeusedasevidenceinjudicialproceedingswithoutthepermissionoftheprovider. H2:Thisinformationmustnotbedisseminatedwithoutthepermissionoftheprovider H3:Otherrestrictionsapply

LEGAL ISSUES LEGAL ISSUES

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PeterVergauwen,49yearsold,hailsfromGentBelgiumandholdsamaster’sdegreeinContemporaryHistory(GentUniversity,1986).Equally,hestudiedInternationalRelationsatthe“AcadémieInternationaledeGéopolitique”(ParisSorbonneUniversity–LiegeUniversity,2003).AfterafouryearstayintheBelgianArmyasacommissionedofficerintheRegimentParacommando,hejoinedtheBelgianFederalPolicein1991wherehecurrentlyholdstherankofSuperintendant.Followingthe9/11attacks,hejoinedEuropolservingasaterrorismspecialistintheCounterterrorismTaskForceuntilDecember2006.In2008heservedasTeamLeaderintheInternationalCriminalCourtandin2009here-joinedEuropolwherehecurrentlyservesasaSeniorSpecialistwithintheOperationsDepartment,dealingamongstothertopicswithmaritimepiracy.PeterVergauwenhasbeenmarriedfor23yearsandhasthreechildren.Inhissparetimehehasakeeninterestinmartialarts(JudoandBrazilianJiuJitsu).

creatingsome600.000links,bywhichthisdatabase isby far thebiggest repositoryof relevant maritime piracy informationavailabledirectlytothe(EU)lawenforce-mentcommunity.Already,inDecember2008theEuropeanUnion(EU)launchedtheEuropeanUnionNaval Force (EU NAVFOR) OperationATALANTA within the framework of theEuropeanCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy (CSDP) and in accordance withrelevantUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutions and International Law. ThismovecameinresponsetotherisinglevelsofpiracyandarmedrobberyofftheHornofAfricaandintheWesternIndianOcean.Besides this EUmilitary operation othermilitary operations and taskforces, such

asoperationOCEANSHIELD,TaskForce151andCoalitionMaritimeForcesareac-tiveintheSomaliareaofoperations,with-inoroutsidetheframeworkofNATOandwithslightlydifferentmandates.The ATALANTA mandate has over theyearsundergonesomeminoradjustmentsbutbasicallyaims(1)toprotectvesselsofthe World Food programme (WFP) andsupplyshipsoftheAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia(AMISOM)(2)todeter,preventandrepressactsofpiracyandarmedrob-beryofftheSomalicoast(3)toprotectvul-nerableshippingofftheSomalicoastonacasebycasebasis(4)tocontributetothemonitoringoffishingactivitiesoffthecoastofSomalia3 LookingattheATALANTAandothermili-

tarymandatesonecanonlysaythatthesemissionsareessentiallyofaconstabularynature,meaningthattheseoperationsaremainlyfocusedonmaintaininggoodorderatsea.Clearlytheinformationthatisgen-eratedbyaconstabularymissionwill al-wayscontainelementsofinformationthatareof interest for further investigationbyjudicialauthorities.From day one, Europol has pursued anactivepolicyintryingtoestablish(in-)for-malworkingrelationswiththeIntelligencebranchofATALANTAoperationalHQ.Inthe absence of any formal, legal frame-work this cooperationwas based on thepositive attitude and the professionalismofallactorsinvolved.Equallythe“Euro-pean” political framework of ATALANTAwasconductive foraproactiveapproachtowards a police/military cooperationwhichwasgreatlyhelpedbytheeffortsoftheUKEuropolnationalUnitwhichplayeda vital legal role as information hub be-tweenATALANTAandEuropol. Intermsofinformationexchange/cooperationwithothermilitaryactorsmuchremains tobedone.Reflecting back on five years of counterpiracy activities Europol believes that ithas provided a meaningful contributionin combating this phenomenon by deliv-ering relevant and dedicated analyticalproducts and information exchange sup-port,At thesame time thisphenomenonhascompelledorganisations,bothpoliceasmilitarytoenlargetheirtraditionalpart-nerships with new actors. This coopera-tionhashad itshiccupsandflawsbut ingeneral all stakeholders involved havelearned from each other and have, overtheyears, improved their informationex-changeroutinesandhavethusenhancedtheiroperationalperformance.

LEGAL ISSUES

Maritime Stability Operations: An Overview

support other stability-related functions,such as providing humanitarian reliefand emergency reconstruction of keyinfrastructure.Maritime operations are distinct fromothermilitaryoperationsinthreeaspects–maritime domain, maritime laws andforceauthority.The principal distinction between the Naval Service and the other ArmedServices is the area of operations. TheNaval Service operates primarily withinthe maritime domain, which consists oftheoceans,seas,bay,estuaries,islands,coastal areas including the littorals. The significant distinction between maritimedomain and maritime environment isthe inclusion of the term littoral, whichis comprised of two parts –the seawardportion and the landward portion. The

seaward portion is that area from theopen ocean to the shore that must becontrolled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland fromtheshorethatcanbesupportedanddefendeddirectlyfromthesea1. Approximately eighty percent of the1932 countries of theworld aremaritimenations linked together by the seawardportion of the maritime domain. Navaloperations in this area are subject totidal variations, weather, water depth,current, and corrosive influence of saltwater. Many nations dispute territorialboundarieswiththeirmaritimeneighbors.Tensofthousandsofcommercialmaritimevessels, the backbone of the globaleconomy, transit the global commonsdaily.Oftenmaritimegeography,suchasstraits or canals, concentrates seagoing

1. Naval Operations Concept 2010 - Implementing the Maritime Strategy(pdf),USNavalService.p.16,Retrieved7May2012.2. Thereare193membersoftheUnitedNations.Unfortunately,thenumber193istoooftenusedtorepresentthenumberofcountriesintheworld.Although

thisnumberrepresentsalmostallofthecountriesintheworld,therearestillindependentcountriessuchastheVaticanCityandKosovo,thatareindependentandarenotmembersoftheU.N.so193isnotthenumberofcountriesintheworld.

by Dr Phyllis MichalasUS MCAST

Understanding Maritime Stability OperationsThis article provides an overview to theunique aspects of the maritime stabilityoperations.Operating from the sea, naval servicesextendsinfluenceoverlandtoensurethatthemaritimecommonsanditsstructuressupport the safe flow of commerce andcontribute to good governance. Also,bydenying thosewhowish toengage inillegalactivity,usingthemaritimedomain,theNavalServicecontributestostability.The naval forces’ primary contributionto stability operations is the provisionof maritime security, associated withprotecting populations and maritimeresources, while strengthening gover-nanceinwaysthatpromoteeconomicandpoliticalprogress.Navalforcesmayalso

3. Councildecision2010/766/CFSPof7December2010amendingJointAction2008/851/CFSP

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vessels into restricted spaces, creatingadditionalchallenges. Thecombinationsof water, land and airspace, as wellas space and cyberspace, conspire topresentuniqueoperationalchallenges tonavalforces.

Maritime Stability Operations: A Legal UnderstandingMaritime law is another important di-stinction in maritime stability operations.Domestic law includes the legal statutesofthecoastalstatethatapplywithintheirmaritime jurisdiction. International lawincludes both customary internationallaw stemming from various treaties andconventionstowhichanationissignatory3. Often participating nations will enter into bilateral agreements for cooperationin suppressing activity such as illicittraffickingofnarcoticsandhumans.The underling concept of the law of the seaisbasedonfreedomoftheseas,witha nation’s control of the oceans limitedto narrow bands adjacent to its coasts.This coreelement establishes standardsby which forces operate in themaritimedomainwithrespecttosovereignrightsofcoastalstatesandfreedomofnavigationofallstates.Itisacriticalelement.Theinternational instrument regulating the

uses of the seas andmaritime rights ofthe world’s nations is the 1982 LOSC.Although not a party to LOSC, theUnited States recognizes the LOSC’snavigational provisions reflect customaryinternational law4. The world’s oceans are divided intotwo parts with each containing variousmaritime regimes or zones underinternational law. The first are nationalwaters –internal waters, territorialseas and archipelagic waters. These national waters are subject to territorialsovereignty of coastal nations, withcertainnavigationalrightsreservedtotheinternationalcommunity.Thesecondareinternational waters –contiguous zones,waters of the exclusive economic zone(EEZ),andthehighseas.Ininternationalwaters, all nations enjoy the high seasfreedoms of navigation and over flight,whichincludetherighttoconductmilitaryoperations in these waters.

The Current Maritime Environment and Sources of InstabilityToday’s economy increasingly relies ontheworld’soceans.Morethan80percentoftheworld’stradetravelsbywater.Abouthalfoftheworld’strade(byvalue)and90percent of theworld’s general cargoare

transportedincontainersembarkeduponseagoingvessels.ThirtymegaportsandcitiesspreadacrossAsia,NorthAmericaandEuropeconstitutetheworld’sprimary,interdependenttradingcomplex.Seventy-fivepercentoftheworld’smaritimetradeandhalfofitsdailyoilconsumptionpassthrough international straits and canals5. Astablemaritimeenvironmentcontributestoglobalsafetyandsecurity.Thestabilityof the maritime domain is challenged inmanywaysbyavarietyofactors.Theseactors can be grouped as nation states,terrorist and transnational criminals andpirates. For example, events over thepast decade – the tsunami that struckthe east coast of Japan (2004); the 11September 2001 terrorist attack of theUS; and the 2011 uprisings in NorthAfrica and the Middle East –representthe complex challenges affecting thesecurityenvironment.Additionalmaritimechallenges, such as natural disasters,environmental destruction, and illegalseaborne migration are also maritimesourcesofinstability.

Traditional State ChallengesThere are global and regional powers exhibiting nationalism and assertivenessthat test theresolveof theUnitedStatesand its partners. For example, thedynamics in Asia and the Middle Eastmay challenge regional stability. Somestates provide safe havens for criminaland terrorist organization that use these countries as bases of operations to exportillicitactivitiesthroughthemaritimedomainandintootherareasoftheglobe.Analternativedangeristhataforeignstatewillprovidecriticaladvancedconventionalweaponry, components of weaponsof mass destruction (WMD), deliverysystemsandrelatedmaterials.TheWMDissues are of great concern because the maritimedomainisthemostlikelyvenuetoaccommodatethetransport.

Terrorist ChallengesState-sponsored terrorists, terroristgroups, and nonstarter actors exploitopen borders, challenge the sovereigntyof nations, and increasingly threateninternational affairs. Successful at-

3. Examples,UnitedNationsConventiononLawoftheSea,alsocalltheLawoftheSeaConvention,[LOSC]andthe1974InternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea[SOLAS].

4. UnitedStatesPresidentialProclamationofMarch10,1983.5. Illegal Fishing Market Value-Havocscope Black Market,RetrievedApril17,2010.

OPERATIONAL ISSUEStacks in or through the maritime do-main provide opportunities to causesignificant disruption to regional andglobaleconomies. Today’s terroristsareincreasing their effectiveness and reachby establishing links with other like-minded organizations around the globe.Someterroristgroupshaveusedshippingasameansofconveyanceforpositioningtheir agents, obtaining logistical support,andgeneratingrevenue. Terroristshavealsotakeadvantageofcriminalsmugglingnetworks to circumvent border securitymeasures.Thecapabilitiestoboardandcommandeer large underway vessels–demonstrate in many piracy incidents–could also be employed to facilitateterrorist acts6. Terroristscanemployarangeofmaritimeattack capabilities from a variety ofplatforms,including,butnotlimitedto:• Explosives-laden suicide boats, light

aircraftandsubmersibles• Merchant and cruise ships used as

weapons to ram and other vessel,warship, port facility, or offshoreplatform

• Commercial vessels as launchplatformsformissileattacks

• Underwater swimmers to infiltrateports

• Unmanned, underwater, explosivedeliveryvehicles

• Mines, which are low cost, readilyavailable, easily deployed, difficult tocounter,andrequireminimaltraining

• A vessel’s legitimate cargo, i.e.,chemicals,petroleum,canbeusedastheexplosivecomponentofanattack.

Transnational Crime and Piracy ChallengesThe continued growth in legitimateinternational commerce within the mari-time domain has been accompanied bygrowthintheuseofthemaritimedomainfor criminal purposes. The smugglingof people, drugs, weapons, and othercontraband,aswellaspiracyandarmedrobbery against vessels, producesinstability in the littorals and elsewhere.Piracy and incidents of maritime crimetendtobeconcentratedinareasofheavycommercial maritime activity, especiallywhere there is significant political andeconomicinstability,orinregionswithlittle

ornomaritimelawenforcementcapacity7. Just as theworld’s oceans are avenuesfor a nation’s overseas commerce, theyare also the highways for the import orexport of illegal commodities. Maritimedrugtraffickinggeneratesvastamountsofmoney for international organized crimesyndicates and terrorist organizations.Laundered through the internationalfinancial system, this money provides ahugesourceofvirtuallyuntraceablefunds.Thesemonetaryassetscanthenbeusedto bribe officials, bypass establishedfinancial controls and fund additionalillegalactivities,includingarmstrafficking,humansmugglingandterroristoperations.Furthermore, these activities can ensureasteadysupplyofweaponsandcashforterroristoperatives,aswellasthemeansfortheirclandestinemovement.

Natural DisastersEarthquakes, mudslides, hurricanes,and tsunamis are examples of naturaldisasters that often occur in the littoral regions of theworld. Dependingon theseverity of the disaster, a regional orinternational response may be required.Naval forces,asa resultof their forwarddeployed posture and their organiccapabilitiesandinadditiontotheirabilitytoremainoffshoreininternationalwaters,arefrequentlyprovidedtoassistcountriesstruggling to recover from a naturaldisaster.

Environmental DestructionIntentional acts or acts of nature thatresultinenvironmentaldisasterscanhavefar-reaching and negative effects on theeconomicviabilityandpoliticalstabilityofaregion.Inrecentyearscompetitionfordeclining marine resources has resultedin a number of violent confrontations assome of the world’s fishermen resortto unlawful activity. The most obviouseconomic impactofillegal,unreportedandunregulated (IUU) fishing on developingcountries is the direct loss of the value

of the catches that could be taken bylocalfishermeniftheIUUfishingwasnottaking place. Available estimates placetheeconomic lossof illegalfishing tobebetween$10billionto$23billionannually.In addition, there are indirect impacts intermsof lossof incomeandemploymentin related industries; any loss in incomewill also have impacts on the consumerdemandsoffamiliesworkinginthefishingindustry8. IUU fishing can also lead to increasedpressure on endangered fish species.IUU can directly affect the population offishspeciesby increasing thenumberoffishcaughtwithin thepopulation inspiteofpopulationmanagementeffortsby theinternationalcommunity.

Illegal MigrationThe unsafe transfer and smuggling ofundocumentedmigrantsisalongstandingissue that will remain amajor challengetoregionalstabilityandprobablygrow inscopeandseverityasthenumberoffailedor failing states increases. Transnational migration,promotedbyadeclineofsocialwell-beingorinternalpoliticalunrest,hasbecomecommonover thepastdecadesandwill continue to drive themovementof many people, with the potential toupset regional stability because of thestrainthatmigrantsandrefugesplaceonfragile economics and political systems.Insomecountries,thecollapseofpoliticalandsocial orderpromptsmaritimemassmigrations,suchaswhattheUnitedStateshasexperienced fromCubaandHaiti orthatEuropehas experiences fromNorthAfrica. Immigrationcanalsobeusedasa political tool such as mass migrationsfromCubatotheUnitedStatesthatwereunleashedbyFidelCastor. Whenmassmigrations occur, the humanitarian andenforcement challenges presented bythe response to suchmigrations requirea significant commitment of maritimesecurityresources.

6. Global Challenges in Maritime Security, Institution of Engineering and Technology[http://www.theiet.org/sectors/transport/resources/maritime-security.cfm?type=pdf.]7. Nelson,Rick,Combating Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities for Regional and Private Sector Involvement,CSIS,June2012.8. http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/illegal_fishing/index_en.htm

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Piracy has, and always will bepresentinthemaritimedomain.Recent events have broughtthe problem of piracy to the

attention of the international maritimecommunity, who now fully recognize thethreat to their strategic lifelines. The NATO Alliance, despite six decades ofexperience managing traditional conflict,finds itself faced with non-traditionalasymmetric opposition at sea.Sincethe beginning of the upsurge in piracy,individual nations, NATO, EU, and theinternational maritime community havebeen actively seeking and discussingways to address piracy. What has notyet been developed is guidance on howto address the government’s option ofdevelopingandestablishinganoptionatthetacticallevel.

CombinedJointOperationsfromtheSeaCentreofExcellence

Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachments

option. This article, a condensed ver-sion of the original AVPD White paperpublishedbyCJOSCOE, isdesigned toprovidea general overview from whicheach individual nation can build on; andserves as a stepping stone in the futuredevelopmentofCounter-Piracytactics.

Command & ControlThe control of the AVPD will be donethrough the military channels. It isrequired that each AVPD uses theirown chain of command and Rules OfEngagement (ROE). The Officer inCharge(OIC)oftheAVPDwillholdtacticalcontrolofthedetachmentwhenembarkedonaship,witharobustROEprofileandMemorandumsofUnderstanding(MOU’s)thatcoveranyrestrictionsimposedbytheship’sMaster,Owner,orFlagState.

An Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment (AVPD) is a military teamwhich will embark on a ship to providesecurity, protection and deterrenceagainstpiracyandarmedrobberyatsea.Teams will provide guidance to ship’sMastersregardingtheimplementationandapplicationofBestManagementPractices(BMP),which theAVPDwillcomplementtoprovidemaximumprotection.AnAVPDwilloperateautonomouslyandwillnotrelyon an assigned warship in company forimmediatesupport.Thisprovidesmilitarycommanders’flexibilitytotasknavalunitsinotherdistinctorcomplementaryrolesinmaritimesecurityoperations.While there are a number of dealingwith private security companies andthe protection of ships, there is limiteddocumentation referencing the military

by Steve Sweeney & Mark WithycombeCommanders US N

It is important to note that the ship’sMaster is ultimately responsible for thesafety of the ship, crew, and embarkedAVPD detachment. Signed MOU’s andprior coordination and training will be requiredpriortodeployment.

Operational Considerations& Core ComponentsTheAVPDmustbeasinglefightingunitformed with personnel from the samenation; a mix of nationalities withinthe AVPD will significantly complicateintegrationbetweenthemselves,andwiththemerchantvesselcrew.TheOICshouldbefluentinEnglish(tocommunicatewiththeMaster), and the detachment size isappropriately for the threat and vesseltype. Capabilities should include globalcommunications,medicalcorpsman,anda 24-hour watch schedule. Weaponsembarked by the team are dependentuponMOU’sandmulti-lateralagreementsbetweennationsforpossession,storage,security,and transit. The recommendedcache should consist of weapons that are moreaccurateandlonger-rangedthanthetypicalpirateRPG/AK-47threat,includingsniper rifles, RPG’s, machine guns, andhand guns. Non-lethal options such asspecializedammunitionandweaponsarealsorecommended.

Legal ConsiderationsThe legal issues dealing with piracy isone of the largest concerns with anydetachment.Whileoperatingundereachnation’s own ROE, AVPDs will need tobe briefed and trained on current legal issues.ItisimperativethatspecificMOUsor agreements are signed between theaffected organizations, and states.TheseMOUs and agreementsshould cover asmany anticipated scenarios as practicalto safely and judiciously accomplish themission.TheMOUandagreementsneedto be coordinated through respectivestates of the ship’s owner/company, theship’s Master, and the AVPD team andshouldincludeallrelevantissuessuchasCommandandControl(C2)relationships,weaponsstowageandotheradministrativeandoperationalsubjectsastheirnationallegislation dictates. Additionally, therewill need to be relationships developedthrough third-party countries whichmay aid in the logistical aspects of themovementoftheAVPD.Thiswillbuildthe

relationshipandassistinanydeliberationofpossibleactionstakenbytheAVPD.

Tactics: AVPD’s as a Complement to BMP’sWhile there is a great utility for AVPDsaboardeachmerchant ship, it has tobeemphasizedthattheshipmustcontinuallyincorporateBMPseachtimeitgoestosea.AVPD tactics need to fully be integratedand coherentwithBMPmeasures. It istheresponsibilityofboththeshipandtheAVPDtocontinuallyincorporateanynewtacticstocounterthecontinuousevolutionof pirate operations.The primary objective of the AVPD isdeterrence - simply to keeppirates fromboarding the ship or causing the ship any structural damage. When potentialpiratesseethepresenceofarmedguardsonboardtheshipitself,theywillmostlikelystayawaycompletely.Deterrenceislesseffective at night, and therefore sentrypositioningandlightingmustbereviewedtooptimizethedeterrenteffect.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

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Inordertotryandkeeppreservationoflifeasahighpriority,theAVPDshouldemploynon-lethal tactics against pirates. Whenthesituationdictates,non-lethalmeasuresneed to be employed to the highest ex-tent possible. Somenon-lethal methodsthat are currently available include firingflares,usingalongrangeacousticdevice(LRAD),anduseoffirehosesforclose-indeterrence.ManyofthesetechniquesarecurrentlylistedinthecurrentBMP.

Layered Defensive ZonesThe use of a multi-layered self-defensezoneisanappropriatewaytoaddresstheoverall defense of the ship; these areaswill set a baseline for each individualAVPDtofollow.Whileeachsituationwillbe unique, the determination of thesezones will aid in the understanding and theexecutionoftheROE.Surveillance Zone:Usingarangeof6-12miles,theAVPDandshipshouldbeableto locate contacts within this range viaradar, thermal imagers, and informationgathered throughout all availablemeans. This should includeattention toNAVWARNS,agoodVHFwatch,anduseof counter piracywebsites.Lookouts andship’spersonnelneedtobetrainedtospotcontacts that appear to be loitering, ormaneuveringinawaythatappearstobeclosingtowardstheshipinanaggressivemanner. To aid all mariners in locatingpossible threats, each ship should relaypossiblepiratesortheir“motherships”toeachotherthroughradioorothermeansofcommunications.Alert Zone: Thiszonecanbedefinedwitha range of 1 to 6 miles –subject to thelevelofciviliantrafficandthelikelyspeedof the threat. With the main weaponryof pirates being small arms and RPGs,the immediate threat to the ship is stillminimal. Visual surveillance or electro-optical imaging at night, combined withrecognition of pirate activity throughcommon identifiers (i.e. mother shipslaunching skiffs), leads the AVPD toexercisedeterrenceandbecomingahardtargetbyshowing that there isamilitary

presence onboard. AVPD personnelshouldbeginbymanninganysortofnon-lethalweaponsuchasLRADifavailable.ItisimportantthattheAVPDteammembersare in a positionwhere they are able tohave proper protection with appropriateexit routes in order to take up moredefensive positions if needed. Civilianmariners and medical personnel shouldbe prepared to evacuate areas outsidetheskinof theship,suchasacitadeloranyothersafeareaofthevessel.Warning Zone:At a range of 1000-2000yards, justoutside thepractical rangeofatypicalpirateRPG,theAVPDwillbeatareadypositiontointerceptorneutralizeany sort of attack while maintaining awatch. The watch will need to identifypositive visual threats such as weaponsand offensivemaneuvering of the piratevessel.Depending on the indication bythesuspectedpirates,inaccordancewithROE in force and by order of theAVPDleader,warningshotswithliveammunitioncanthwartapotentialattacker.Dependingon the capability of theAVPDpersonneland the situation, the use of a possiblesniper shot could also be used to disable thesuspectedpiratevessel.Intervention Zone: The last and mostdangerous area occurs when an immediate pirate attack is happening.At this stage, the AVPD leader will en-sure the detachment is properly armed,and in accordance with ROE,has au-thorization for the use of lethal force against the attackers. While unlikely,considerationmustbegiven toactions iftheattackisoverwhelming,orthepiratessuccessfullyembark;whether to regrouporindependentlyproceedtothecitadelorsafe area on the ship.Finally, while not an actual weapon, thecapability of an AVPD to get video andaudio recordings of any sort of pirateattack or pre-attackcould be beneficialin both legal and tactical matters. Thisfootagewillaidinanysortoflegalactionor conflict resolution scenarios takenagainstthepiratesortheAVPDandserveas training aids for future teams. This

would also give up-to-date intelligenceon current pirate tactics that could be distributed ina fairlyquickmanner toallinterested stakeholders.Following anysortofpirateattack,itistheresponsibilityoftheAVPDOICandtheship’sMastertofollow the proper reporting procedures set throughtheBMP.

TrainingEach individual nation will have to setup a training process to enhance the effectiveness of the detachment. Theprimarytrainingwillneedtobescenario-based,threatrelevant,ROEspecific,andutilizecurrentBMP’s. While this trainingwill need to focus on small boat attacksanddefensivemeasures,each individualteamwillneedtobecurrentandproficientin theareaofsmallarms,closequarterscombat,andmedicalaid.Duetouniquesituationsthatresultfromeachindividualcountry’s ROE, training should remaintheresponsibilityofthatindividualnation;however employing a specific traininggroupwithineachcountrywillenhancetheworkoftheunitsbeingdeployed.Usingacommonbackgroundfortrainingpurposesbased through a NATO organization would onlybebeneficialfortheentireAlliance.Besides the focus on specific combattactics, the AVPD team will need tobe trained in maritime damage control(DC). Each individualmemberneeds tounderstand basic DC functions aboardships to includefire-fightingandfloodingprocedures.Also,witheachship’scargobeing unique, it is important the AVPDunderstand different variances whendealing with the ship’s requirements.For safety considerations, ships thatarecarryingoilor fuelwillhavedifferentsafetyregulationsthanashipwhichmaybe carrying food or other such cargo.The AVPD’s understanding of theseregulations will need to be addressed in earlytrainingandincorporatedpriortothedeploymentonboardtheshipitself.

LogisticsDetermining who will pay the costs oftravelandintegratedexpenseshastobedetermined by each individual country,shipping company, and organizationresponsibleforthetrip(i.e.UnitedNationsWorld Food Program), or a combinationthereof, which could be included in anMOU. Theadditionalexpenses incurred

bydeployingactivedutymilitarymembersshouldbemuchlessthanwhatwouldbespentonprivatesecuritycompanies.AVPDelementswouldhavetobeflowntoaport city anddeployonboard the ship,be onboard amilitary ship, or fly fromalandbaseviahelicopter.Determiningtheproperwayofdeploying thedetachmentwould be in the hands of the militarycommanders and the vessel’s owner,with theproper diplomatic authorizationsgrantedpriortotheAVPD’sdeployment.Onepossibledilemmacouldbewith thetransferofweapons.Whenadetachmentisdeployedandhasacacheofweaponsand gear, military members could haveconsiderable problems getting throughcustoms and other local authoritieswhile traveling. A significant amount ofpaperwork will have to be completedthroughsupportactivitiesandwouldneedhigh level intervention if the situationdictates.Toalleviateanyoftheseissues,AVPDsshouldbedeployed frommilitarycheckpoints or established ForwardLogisticSites(FLS)asmuchaspossible.The AVPD must be capable of self-sustaining logistically and medicallywhenembarked.Inanycaseofamajorcasualty, the ship or theAVPDneeds tohaveapre-plannedcontingencyprocessto communicate to the nearest warshipwithanavailablehelicopterforevacuation.Theexactscaleofmedicalpersonnelandequipmentwillbedefinedbyeachnation,withtrainingandskilledsupporttakeninto

consideration during the planning and pre-deploymentThe shipping company operating thevessel should ensure sufficient accom–modationandprovisionof food;meetingthe minimum standard as stated bythe nation of the AVPD. If this cannotbe ensured, the AVPD must be able tooperatewithoutvessel foodprovision foraspecificnumberofdaysandshouldbeclearlystatedpriortoAVPD’sembarkationof the ship. The capabilities of nearbynaval units in the Area of Operations(AOO) to provide emergency supportfor accommodation, food, and transferof the AVDP between the embarkation/disembarkation point and nearest ShoreBaseshouldbeinvestigatedandknown.While each AVPD could be either in ashore base, onboard a Counter PiracyTaskForce surface ship, or onboard theshipwhichitisprotecting,it isthenationthattheAVPDrepresentsthatisultimatelyresponsible for the AVPDs re-supply,training and ashore transport within the AOO.

ConclusionIn the current economic climate with

insufficient traditional maritime forcesavailable to address a burgeoningthreat, the deployment ofan AVPD toprotectamerchantvessel isaviable,andpossiblyamoreeffectiveoption.Itshowspoliticalintenttokeeptheseassafeforanation’smarinersandcouldbeavaluablecontribution to coalition/alliance efforts.Eachnationwillconstantlyneedtofocuson education and training of current piracy operations and tactics. It is onlysafe to say that the tactics used by thepirateswill continue toevolve,andeachnation’srespectiveAVPDteamswillneedtobeable toevolveaccordingly inordertomaintain proper defensive tactics andmanning.TheuseofAVPDswill haveanextremebenefit for ships transiting throughtroubled waters. NATO and the EUshould consider developing a greaterunderstanding regarding the legal implications to build on the capabilitiesfor each nation. Developing specializeddocumentation and understandings witheachnationwillenablethemilitaryteamsto fully understand legal issues to helpwith training efforts. Most of the workwill need to be done through diplomaticmeans.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES OPERATIONAL ISSUES

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IntroductionIn the 20th century the highest numberof attacks against ships occurred in theterritorial waters of states1 and the hot spot forpiracy,wheremostoftheattackswererecorded by the International Chamberof Commerce’s International Maritimebureau(ICC-IMB),wasSoutheastAsiainIndonesia,theMalaccaStraits,Malaysia,the Philippines and Singapore Straits2. In2003–28attacksagainstshipsintheMalaccaStrait,throughwhichone-thirdoftheglobalshipping tradeandone-halfofthe world’s cargoes pass, prompted thecountriesborderingtheStrait,Singapore,Malaysia and Indonesia, to launch co-ordinatednavalpatrolsoftheStraitinJuly2004, to stampout piracy3. Nature also tookahandandinDecember2004piracyattacksintheMalaccaStraitceaseddueto thedevastatingTsunami thatwreakedhavoc in North Sumatra with a largenumber of casualties on 26 December2004. The pirates, like the rest of thepopulationlostvitalequipmentandsomeeventheirlives4.In 2005 attacks on ships carrying foodaidtodroughtstrickenSomaliapromptedthe International Maritime Organisation(IMO)tocallonstates,operatingwarshipsand aircraft in the vicinity, to assist inpreventing such attacks5. In spite ofthis call however, the number of attackson ships off Somalia continued to rise

SECURING WEST AFRICA’S SLOC’s: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNT FROM COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY

IN THE HOA REGION

1. BarryDubner inM.Meija&P.K.Mukherjee,Selected issues of law and ergonomics in maritime security,Journalof Internationalmaritime law,10(4)August-September2004,pp.301-325.

2. ICC-IMBPiracyandarmedrobberyagainstshipsreportsduringtheperiod1992to1999.3. YaleGlobalOnline:Indonesia,Malaysia,SingaporeLaunchCoordinatedPatrolofMalaccaStrait-TheJakartaPost20July2004availableonlineathttp://

yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/indonesia-malaysia-singapore-launch-coordinated-patrol-malacca-straitaccessed15/06/2013.4. ICC-IMBPiracy and armed robbery against ships annual report,1January-31December2004,p.25.5. IMOResolutionA979(24),Nov23,2005.WassubsequentlyrevokedbyresolutionA1002(25)IMODoc.A1002(25)Nov29.2007.

drasticallycontributingtoAfricabecomingthenewhotspot forpiracy in2007,with

the number of attacks against ships offAfrica, recorded by the ICC-IMB, for the

by Dr Henry FoucheUniversity of South Africa

firsttimeexceedingthenumberofattacksrecorded in Southeast Asia6. Contributing tothisrecordnumberofattacksoffAfricain 2007 were, apart from 31 attacks offSomalia and 13 attacks in the Gulf ofAden,42attacks recordedagainst shipsoff Nigeria7.For the ensuing five years, however,available resources,mediaattentionandworld focus on the problem of piracy inSomaliatookprecedenceovertheeventsrelating to piracy and armed robberyof ships unfolding in West Africa andtheGulf ofGuinea. TheUnitedNationsSecurity Council took cognisance of theinability of states to prevent the attacksoff Somalia and in 2008 issued UNSCresolutions8,permittingstatestoenterthesovereignterritoryofSomaliainpursuitofpirates.WhatfollowedwasanarmadaofwarshipsfromtheEuropeanUnion,NATOandindividualstatesnaviescommencingpatrolsofftheaffectedregion.Inareportissued in 2011 by the Special Advisorto the Secretary-General of the UnitedNationsonlegalissuesrelatedtopiracyoffthecoastofSomalia9,itwasreportedthatoverhalfofthesuspectedpiratescaptured

by the navies patrolling off Somaliasince 2008 were released without beingprosecuted. The International MaritimeOrganisation’s (IMO) guidelines for theinvestigation of piracy10, points out thatthe capture, prosecution and sentencingof pirates and perpetrators of armedrobberyagainstshipsisprobablythemostappropriatedeterrentactionagainstpiracyavailable togovernments. The failure toinitiateprosecutionsagainstmanyof thecapturedpirateshighlightedtheproblemssurrounding lack of domestic legislationand legal frameworks to prosecute. Inresponse to this challenge The Contact grouponPiracyoffthecoastofSomalia11,(CGPCS) called on the internationalcommunity to update existing legislationand other additional mechanisms toensure that pirates are prosecuted. The groupwentontomakeacalltoallparties

tomaximizeefforts topreserveevidenceand facilitate successful prosecution of pirate activity wherever possible12. The special advisor on legal issues relatedtopiracyoff thecoastofSomaliahavingconcludedthatthedifficultyofassemblingevidence as being themain reasonwhypiratesescapepunishment13.Since 2008 a number of successfulinterventions,not the leastofwhichwasinterdiction by naval vessels, and bestpractices applied by the internationalcommunity in response to the UNSCresolutions to address the problem ofpiracy off Somalia14, led to a markeddecrease in attacks in this region. In2012fortynine(49)attacksagainstshipswererecordedoffSomaliaandforthefirstthreemonthsof 2013only five incidentswere recorded, including thehijackingofafishingvesselwhichwasinterceptedbynavalforcesbeforethevesselcouldreachSomaliandthecrewfreed15.In contrast to the decrease andcontainment of the number of incidentsoff Somalia, a total of fifty five (55)attacks were recorded as having takenplace in theGulfofGuinea in2012withten vessels hijacked and 15 attacks inthefirst threemonthsof2013with threevessels hijacked16. What is particularlyperturbing about the Gulf of Guineapiracy is that whereas the hijacking ofvessels in the past was limited to thewaters off Nigeria, these type of attackshavebecometransnational,occurringoffBenin,Togoand inDecember 2012andthefirstthreemonthsof2013offTheIvory

6. ICC-IMBPiracyandarmedrobberyagainstshipsannualreport1January-31December20077. Same as 4 above. 8. UNSCresolutionsin2008:1816,1838,1846and1851.9. ReportoftheSpecialAdvisortotheSecretary-GeneralonLegalIssuesRelatedtoPiracyoffthecoastofSomalia.AnnextoUNSCS/2011/30dated25

January2011,formtheSecretary-GeneraltothePresidentoftheSecurityCounciloftheUnitedNations,p.21.10. IMOCodeofPracticefortheinvestigationofcrimesofpiracyandarmedrobberyagainstships.IMOResolutionA1025(26)adoptedon2December2009.11. ThecontactgrouponpiracyoffthecoastofSomalia,basedonUNSCresolution1851,helditsfirstmeetinginJanuary2009andidentified,amongstother,

thetaskforitselftostrengthenjudicialframeworksforarrest,prosecutionanddetentionofpirates.CongressionalResearchServicereport:Piracy off the Horn of Africa,April19,2010.Availableatwww.crs.gov

12. Eleventh Plenary session of the contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.NewYork,29March2012.13. Same as 10, p. 23.14. ICC-IMBPiracy and armed robbery against ships,annualreport,1January,31December2012.15.ICC-IMBPiracy and armed robbery against ships,firstquarterreport,1January,31March2013.16.Same as 15 above.

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Coast17. Reuters reports in an article in theMaritimeExecutive thataccording toanalyststhefiguresrecordedbytheIMBreflectafractionofthetotalincidentsdueto under reporting. The under reporting is accredited to little hope of rescue and anincreaseininsurancepremiumsiftheincident is reported18.Arecentexampleofpurported non reporting of an incident was broughttolightinMay2013.AccordingtoJonGambrell19, of the associated press,private security officials reported that on26May2013a fuel tankerwashijacked40 nm off Nigeria’s Bayelsa state andthat a number of crew had been takenhostage. On 28 May 2013 a Nigeriannavy spokesman said that no report ofthehijackinghadbeenmade toofficials.Gambrellpointsoutinthepressreportthatsomeshippersintheregionfail toreporthijackings publically as they fear thatinsurance premiums may be increasedas a result of the incident. This fear is basedoninsuranceincreaseswhichhaveoccurredduetoincidentsofpiracyagainstships off certain areas of the African continentandhaveresulted in increasedcostsforshippingcompanies.In2008theMarine Insurer Group in London raisedpremiumratesforshipsmakingthevoyagethrough the Gulf of Aden and the Suezcanal resulting in an estimated increaseinpremiumsofbetween$US10,000and$US 20,000 per trip through theGulf ofAden20.InAugust2011,Benin,intheGulfofGuineawasadded to the list of high-risk countries compiled by the MarineInsurer’sGroup21. Asaconsequenceof

17. Same as 14 above.18. TheMaritimeExecutive.Reutersarticle“NigerianPirategangsextendreachoffWestAfrica”byMarex,May29,2013.19. JonGambrell,TheAssosciatedPress,May28,2013,Pirates reportedly hijack fuel tanker off Nigeria’s oil-rich delta, kidnapping sailors, http://www.canada.com/

news/Pirates+reportedly+hijack+fuel+tanker+Nigerias+oilrich+delta/8443647/story.html20. CongressionalResearchService:PiracyofftheHornofAfrica.April19,2010page147-5700/R40528availableatwww.crs.gov21. Same as 20 above.22. S/2012/45dated19January2012Report of the United Nations assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,p.p.7-24,November2011.23. UNSC1976S/RES/1976(2011),11April2011.24. UNCLOS1982,NewYork,UnitedNations.25. UNODC,Vienna,UnitedNations,NewYork,2010.26. S/RES/2039(2012),29February2012.27. AUConventiononthepreventionandcombatingofterrorismavailableonlineathttp://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_CONVENTION_PREVENTION_

COMBATING_TERRORISM.pdf

this listing, insurance rates for vesselsoperatinginBenin’swaterswasincreased.To avoid the increased premiumscompaniesreroutedtheirvesselstoportsinneighboringcountriesresultingina70per cent decline in the number of shipscallingatBenin’smainportCotonou.Thisin turncausedanestimated lossof$US81millionincustomsrevenuefor2011forBenin,furthercontributingtopovertyandunemploymentintheregion22.

Problems Encountered In Somalia whilst Combating Piracy and Possible Best practices for the gulf of GuineauLack of Legislation Onthe23rdApril2011theUNSCissuedResolution 197623, on the situationin Somalia in which it reaffirmed thatinternationallaw,asreflectedintheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)24, and in particular in articles100, 101 and 105, sets out the legalframeworkapplicabletocombatingpiracyandarmedrobberyatsea. At thesametimetheresolutionnotedwithconcernthatthe domestic law of a number of stateslacksprovisionscriminalisingpiracyand/or procedural provisions for effectivecriminalprosecutionofsuspectedpirates.The resolutionurgesall states, includingstates in the region to criminalise piracyundertheirdomesticlawandemphasisesthefurtherimportanceofalsocriminalisingincitement, facilitation, and conspiracyandattemptstocommitsuchacts.Theresolutionrecognisesthatindividuals

and entities who incite or intentionallyfacilitateanactofpiracyare themselvesengaging in piracy as defined underinternational law.The UNODC Regional programme forWestAfrica,2010-201425,pointsout,thatlike EastAfrica,many countries inWestAfricadonothaveanadequatelegislativeframeworktoaddressactsofpiracy.Onthe29thFebruary2012theUNSCissuedResolution203926,onthesituationintheGulf of Guinea in which it affirms thatUNCLOS provides the legal frameworkapplicable to combating piracy andarmed robbery and urges states in theregion toestablisha legal framework forthe prevention, and repression of piracyand armed robbery at sea as well asprosecution of persons engaging in those crimes,andpunishmentofthoseconvictedofthosecrimesandencouragesregionalcooperation in this regard. States are thus urgedtocriminalisepiracyintheirdomesticlaw, pursuant of their membership oftheUNCLOSconvention. Thescheduleof the African Union Convention on thePreventionandCombatingofTerrorism27,alsolistsUNCLOSamongstthetraditionalCounter-Terrorism Conventions andProtocols, in respect of which memberstates of the African Union have theobligationtobecomepartyto,assoonaspossibleandtoenactdomesticlegislationinordertogiveeffecttothoseconventions.Even if international instruments woulddefine illegal or criminal acts, such actsonly become enforceable once enablinglegislation, jurisdiction and penalties areenacted indomestic laws. States in thegulf ofGuinea need to adopt a uniform/harmonisedapproachwhendevelopingadomestic legal framework to ensure thatpiracyandarmedrobberyagainstshipsiscriminalisedandthatadequateguidelinesareputinplacetodealwiththequestionof

OPERATIONAL ISSUESjurisdiction, the conduct of investigationsand the prosecution of offenders. Cole28,describes an adequate legal frameworkas one having to provide for, apart fromthe criminalisation of acts of piracy, theextensionofthejurisdictionalreachofthenational courts beyond the normal limitof thenationalcriminal jurisdiction in theterritorial sea. Healsostates that tobeeffective such a framework should alsoprovideforthecriminalisationofconspiracyand attempt to commit piracy. In thisregard,takingintoaccountthedevelopingtransnationalnatureofpiracy in theGulfof Guinea, it is likely that acts of piracycouldbeplanned inneighbouringstates,including land locked states adjacentto the littoral state off whose waters the incidentoccurs.DuringanopendebateintheUNSecuritycouncil inOctober2011on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Nigeriaunderlinedthatthefightagainstpiracyisacollectiveresponsibility.DuringthesamedebateBeninpointedout that ifpiracy isnotaddressedproperly, itcanjeopardisesocio-economicdevelopmentandforeigninvestmentintheGulfofGuinearegion29. The Brenthurst Foundation Discussionpaper30,reachestheconclusionthatinthelong run, it will be intra-Africanmaritimepartnerships that will determine Africa’scapacity toaddressmaritimechallenges.TheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECCOWAS)31,andtheEconomicCommunity of Central African States(ECCAS)32, provide existing regionalmechanisms, through which increasednational, bilateral and trilateral initiativesto combat piracy and armed robberyagainstshipscanbeinitiated.Anexample

of a recent imitative is the meeting ofWestAfricanheadsofstateinJune2013in Benin to discuss the adoption of a codetofightpiracy.Theoutcomeofthemeetingwas that22WestAfricanstatesbecamesignatoriestoananti-piracycodeofconduct forWestandCentralAfrica33,which incorporates many elements ofthesuccessfullyappliedDjiboutiCodeofconductsignedby20states inEastandSouthern Africa.

East Africa: Trilateral Initiative to combat piracyOn 9 August 2011 the heads of stateof the Southern African Developmentcommunity (SADC) adopted an SADCMaritimesecuritystrategyamidstgrowingconcernaboutthreatssuchaspiracyandothercriminalactivitiesintheseasofftheAfrican continent34.Onthe13thDecember2011threeEastAfricamembercountriesof SADC, the Republic of Mozambique,the Republic of South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania signed a MemorandumofUnderstandingbetweenthe three governments on MaritimeSecurity Cooperation. The purpose oftheMOUis toregulatethearmedforcesof the three countries during the conduct ofCombinedMaritimeOperations in theterritorialwatersofeachcountrytoprotectthe territorial waters against any illegal

activities that undermine security andeconomicdevelopment.TheMOUgivesthe forces of the participating states the right to patrol, search, and arrest, seizeand undertake hot pursuit operations onany maritime crime suspect or piracy35. This operation which is supported by alogistics base and an aircraft stationed at Pembe inMozambique is ongoing. TheSouthAfricanMinisterofDefencein2013indicated that in the current defence budget R585million rand (US$ 5,8 million) hasbeen allocated to the operation36. Since thecommencementoftheoperationtherehavebeennosuccessfulpirateattacksintheMozambiqueChannel.

West Africa: Bilateral Initiative to combat piracy On 28 September 2011 the heads ofstate of Nigeria and Benin commencedanagreement to jointlypatrol thewatersoff Benin. Since the start of the operation the number of successful pirate attacksdecreased. In contrast to the operationin East Africa this joint operation wasconstrainedbyalackoflogisticalsupportintermsofrefuelingandrepairsfacilitiesnotbeingavailablecloseby37. According to a spokesperson from the NigerianNavy in September 2012, the presenceof the naval ships has reduced piracysignificantly. The spokesperson also

28. AlanCole,Prosecuting piracy: challenges for the police and the courts,GlobalChallenge,RegionalResponses:ForgingacommonapproachtoMaritimePiracy,April 18-19, 2011,Dubai,UnitedArabEmirates. Selectedbriefingpapers:Published in 2011by theDubaiSchool ofGovernment,Dubai,UnitedArabEmirates.www.dsg.ae

29. Same as 22 above.30. Brenthurst Foundation discussion paper 2010/03, available online at http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commisioned_Reports/

BD1003_Maritime-Development-in-Africa.pdf31. ECCOWASMemberstatesareBenin,BurkinaFaso,CapeVerde,IvoryCoast,Gambia,Ghana,Guinea-Bissau,Liberia,Mali,Mauritania,Niger,Nigeria,

Senegal,SierraLeoneandTogo.32. ECCASMemberstatesareAngola,Burundi,Cameroon,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,Congo,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,EquitorialGuinea,Gabon,

Rwanda,SaoTomeandPrincipe.Iflegislationtocombatpiracyislackingorinneedofharmonizationamonglittoralmemberstates,thesecurityCommitteeofECCAScouldprovideanadditionalinstrumenttoassistinthisregard.

33. Regional anti piracy code for West Africa,Lloyd’sList,PostedonTuesdayJuly2nd,2013,byDebbie.Availableonlineathttp://www.intermanager.org/2013/07/west-african-states-sign-anti-piracy-code/

34. Cambell,K.,2012,SA Navy Budget set to rise as piracy threat to SADC grows. CreamerMedia’sengineeringnews [online],11April,Availableathttp://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-navy-budget-set-to-rise-as-piracy-threat-to-sadc-grows-2012-04-11(accessed2012/05/12)

35. Mashamaite,K.P.,2012,Minister Sisulu signs Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Maritime Security Cooperation with Tanzania and Mozambique,16February2012,[online]availableathttp://www.dod.mil-za/news/news2012/february/mar-sec-coop-tan-moz.htm.(Accessed2012/04/12).

36. KimHelfrich,Galeshewe takes over from Amatola in the Mozambique Channel,30May2013,DefenceWeb.www.defenceweb.co.za37. S2012/45reportoftheUNSCmission(sameas22above).

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stated that due to the success of the operation it was being contemplated towidenitsscopebyincludingthenaviesofTogoandGhana,ifpossible38.

Best Practices: Joint patrols by naviesOn 23 November 2005, in response toattacks by pirates on ships transportingfood aid to Somalia, the InternationalMaritime Organisation (IMO) adopted aresolution on piracy and armed robberyagainst ships39, in which it appealed toall partieswhichmight be able to assistto take action, within the provisions ofinternational law, to ensure that all actsor attempted acts of piracy and armedrobbery against ships were terminatedforthwith. The resolutionalso requestedthe Secretary-General of the IMO tocontinue monitoring the situation inrelation to threats to ships sailing off the coast of Somalia. On March 15, 2006,

the President of the Security Council ofthe United Nations issued a presidential statementon thesituation inSomalia, inwhich the Security Council encouragedmemberstateswhosenavalvesselsandmilitary aircraft operate in internationalwatersandairspaceadjacenttothecoastof Somalia to take appropriate actionto protect merchant shipping againstattacks. This callwasa clear indicationthatSomaliawasunabletoprotectshipson innocent passage through its territorial waters.ThisinabilityresultedintheUNSClater issuing resolutions40, permittingwarshipstoenterthesovereignterritoryofSomaliainpursuitofpirates.In the Gulf of guinea, at present all thecountries have functioning governmentsand criminal justice systems. Accordingto Dr Augustus Vogel41, however, thereare fewer than 25 maritime craft longerthan25metersavailableoffofwestandcentral Africa for interdiction operations.

The report of the United Nations assessmentmissiononpiracyintheGulfofGuinea42,pointsoutthatnocountry inthe region has the capacity to deal withmaritime insecurityaloneasmanypirateattacks occur beyond territorial watersand in the exclusive economic zones.Thereportrecommendsthatinternationalpartners provide funding and support toensureadequatepatrols off the coast ofBenin. Asan immediate step the reportrecommends that international partnerscontributefundsforthepurchasebyBeninof naval vessels and aircraft, or donatesupporting infrastructure and equipmentas well as assisting with capacity –building to enhance Benin’s maritimesecuritycapabilities.Willthevertiguosincreaseinpirateattacksandtheimmediatelackofadequatenavalresources necessitate assistance fromforeign navies, similar to the assistanceprovided off the Horn of Africa, to deal

38. WillRoss,BBCNews,Lagos,Surviving the pirates off the coast of Nigeria, availableonlineathttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-1955533439. IMOResolutionA.979(24).40. UNSCresolutions1816,1838,1846and1851.41. DrAugustusVogel,Investigating in Science and Technology to meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges, AfricaSecurityBrief:ApublicationoftheAfricaCentrefor

strategicStudiesNo10,February2011,http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/africa-security-brief/asb-10.pdf42. S2012/45reportoftheUNSCmission(same as 22 above).

with the scourge of piracy and keep thesealanesintheGulfofGuineaopen?Incontemplating this question one wouldfirst need to assess the effectivenessof capacity building assistance in theregion and concomitant ability of statesto singly or jointly patrol their territorialwatersbeforepossiblyconsideringlimitedinternational patrols of the high seas off west Africa.

Best practices: Liaison between Navies and Interpol One of the problems identified in EastAfrica was that the naval forces thatarrested the suspected pirates between 2008and2010didnotnecessarilyhaveaccesstoacriminaldatabaseonpersonalinformation, fingerprints and DNA ofsuspects. Such information, which isessential for comparison with data onapprehended pirates to assist in the investigationandprosecution,arenormallystored on police databases. This short-coming was overcome by INTERPOL,the International police organization,proposing different models by whichinformation regarding law enforcementactivities could be shared betweennavies and national police forces43. By2011prosecutorsand judgesof regionalstates were routinely reporting to theUNODC that cases prepared by foreignnavies were among the best that theyhad seen in their courts44.TheimportantroleplayedbyInterpolwhendealingwithpiracy in the Horn of Africa region hasbeen recognized and documented bythe United Nations in UNSC Resolutions resolution’s1950(2010)and1976(2011).UNSC Resolution 1950 urges states tocooperate with Interpol and Europol inthe investigation of international criminalnetworks involved inpiracyoff thecoastof Somalia aswell as those responsiblefor financing and facilitating piracy. TheSecretaryGeneralofInterpol,Mr.RonaldNoble, commented on the resolution bysayingthatitrecognizedthatinternational

law enforcement provided the criticallink between arrests made by militaryintervention and the investigation andprosecution of maritime pirates andassociatedcriminalnetworks45.UNSC resolution 1976 highlights theimportance of collecting, preserving andtransmitting evidence of acts of piracyand armed robbery with guidance fromINTERPOL.Incommentingonthereso-lution, Mr. Ronald Noble described theresolution as a clear sign that membercountries need to make sure that thebasicsareinplaceandthattheyworkwithINTERPOLtobringcriminalstojustice46.In dealing with piracy in West Africathe advantage of liaison with Interpolis highlighted in the report of the United Nations assessment mission on piracyin the Gulf of Guinea47. The report recommends that to combat piracy thegovernment of Benin make use of thesystem,toolsandservicesofINTERPOL.Further that the government of Beninutilise existing networks and coordinatewith international bodies to support law enforcement with respect to crimescommitted at sea. The report statesthat the European Union is funding thedevelopment by INTERPOL of a policeinformationsystemforBeninandGhanaunder which a single database on organizedcrimewillbecreatedandmadeavailabletoallfifteenWestAfricanStates.Best practices can best be served bynavies maintaining and strengtheningtheir relationship with INTERPOL asmaritime crime such as piracy, drugsmuggling, human trafficking and illicitarmssmugglingwillremainontheirradarsandisunlikelytodisappearanytimeintheforeseeable future.

ConclusionPiracycanbestbedealtwithoperationallyby neutralising the perpetrators througharrest, investigation and prosecution.Due to the transnational nature of thiscrime, however, no single state caneffectively deal with the problem on itsown. Statesneed toassess theirabilityto police their own territorial waters,bearinginmindthatthisprocessincludesall those lawful actions (processes)undertakenbythestatetocreatenationallaws (legislative), to administer suchlawsand relevant international lawsandconventions(forexampletheactivitiesofgovernment departments and agenciesconcerned with transport relations and the administrationofthemarineenvironmentwithin that states offshore jurisdiction),and the application of such laws (byagencies and government departmentssuchasthepolice,navy,coastguardandmarineandcoastalmanagementagencycharged with law enforcement withinthe states offshore jurisdiction). Afterassessment and taking into account theoutcome, states can then consider thenatureoftheirabilitytocontributetojointeffortstodealwiththeprobleminregionalcontextthroughagreementsandorMou’sbetween states. In theprocess the roleand contribution whichmust and shouldbe made by landlocked states adjacenttolittoralstatesshouldnotbeoverlooked.Politicians and communities need to bemadeaware, throughexistingstructures,of the importance of maintaining goodorder at sea to create andmaintain thepoliticalwilltodealrobustlywithcrimeinthemaritimedomain.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

43. Y.G.Gottlieb,Combating Maritime piracy: Inter-Disciplinary Cooperation and information sharing,Paperbasedonpresentationat1stcombinedMaritimeSecurityConference,Kiel,2-5May,2011.

44. A.Cole,Prosecuting piracy:challenges for the police and the courts, GlobalChallenge,RegionalResponses:ForgingacommonapproachtoMaritimePiracy,April18-19,2011Dubai,UnitedArabEmirates.Selectedbriefingpapers,Publishedin2011bytheDubaiSchoolofGovernment,Dubai,UnitedArabEmirates,www.dsg.ae

45. Interpolmediarelease24November2010,Unanimous support by UN Security Council for INTERPOL and Europol role in combating maritime piracy networks, www.interpol.int

46. Interpolmediarelease12April2011,UN Security Council reolution underscores role of INTERPOL in securing maritime piracy convictions.47. Same as 22

28 29

In recent decades the threats to security both internally and externally have changed drastically and now in clude indirect threats

such as terrorism, organized crime and piracy, as well as resource and energy scarcity, climate change and natural catastrophe. To find solutionsand mitigate these threats, science,researchandtechnologythusincreasinglycomplement politics, polity and eco-nomics. For technologies to continuetoprovideanswers to currentand futurethreatscenarios,thecontinuouspursuitofsecurityresearch,andspaceapplicationsinparticular,isofutmostimportance.

The Emergence of Piracy and Why it MattersSomaliPiracymatterstotheinternationalcommunity for four primary reasons:the effect on Somalia, the impact oninternational trade, the danger to theenvironment, and lastly, the potentialconnection with the terrorist threat.TheRANDCorporation,aU.S.thinktank,has identified seven Causative Factors

(CF)accountingforthecurrentemergenceof piracy2. Accordingly, removal orinterruptionofanyoneoftheseCFswoulddisruptorreducepiracy.TheseCFsare:- Massive Increase in CommercialmaritimeTraffic(CF1)

- Narrow and Congested MaritimeChokepoints(CF2)

- LingeringEffectsoftheAsianFinancialCrisis/ProfitasaMotivation(CF3)

- Difficulties with Maritime Surveillanceas a result of the events of 9/11 andtheconcomitantpressurethathasbeenexertedonmanygovernmentstoinvestin expensive, land-based homelandsecurityinitiatives(CF4)

- LaxCoastalandPort-SideSecurity(CF5)- Corruption/SafeHeavens(CF6)- GlobalProliferationofSmallArmsandLightWeapons(SALW)(CF7)

The Role of Space Applications in Counter-Piracy Operations and PolicyClearly, space applications cannotcounterthemassiveincreaseinmaritimetraffic (CF 1), decentralise narrow andcongestedmaritimechokepoints(CF2),

providetheSomalipopulationwithmoneyto overcome the lingering effects of theAsian financial crisis (CF 3), or countercorruption(CF6).Spaceapplicationscan,however, improve maritime surveillance(CF 4) as well as coastal and port-sidesecurity (CF 5) and provide supportivetools to combat illegal trafficking of, forexample,SALW(CF7). Inshort, spaceapplications can have an impact on theeffectivenessofcounter-piracyoperationsandpolicy.Space applications offer the possibilityof monitoring specific large geographicareas, in a non-intrusive manner thatis legally valid over otherwise deniedterritories. Given their multipurposecharacteristics, satellites can deal withthethematicdiversityofmaritimesecuritythreats in a optimal manner. Coveringlarger zones in on shot satellites allow foranoptimaluseofavailableresourcesandofferashared resourceby fosteringintra- and inter- national cooperation.On the downside, the satellites currentlyused for maritime surveillance were notoriginally designed for this purpose.3

FightingPiratesfromSpaceUsing Space Resources in the Fight Against Piracy

by Nina-Louisa Remuss, Associate fellow, European Space Policy Institute1

Thecontentofthisarticleisbasedon:Nina-LouisaRemuss,FightingPiratesfromSpace,UsingSpaceResourcesintheFightAgainstPiracy,publishedinTheJournaloftheJAPCCedition13(April2011).www.japcc.org

Technical capabilities depend on the area of application and are elaborated upon in greaterdetailinthesubsequentsections.One of the main examples of thecontributions of space applications to the fight against piracy is the EuropeanUnion Satellite Centre’s (EUSC) support

of ATLANTA NAVFOR. Relying onspace applications EUSC continuouslymonitorspirateoperatingbasesandskiffactivity, Somalia’s borders (for Ethiopianmilitary activity) and possible terroristtraining camps. It identifies potentialpirate camps on the Somali coastlineand offshore islands and provides battledamage assessments of Somali towns.Findingsareissuedintheformofimageryintelligence reports or digital geographic informationproducts(DGI).

Causative Factor 4:Difficulties with Maritime SurveillanceSpace applications fulfill a threefoldrole in improving maritime surveillancethrough three types of applications.Earth and signal monitoring, SatelliteCommunications,andSatelliteNavigation.Space applications mainly contribute to‘observe’ and ‘detect’ functions and arecomplementary to other surveillancesystems, such as coastal RADAR,Automated identification System (AIS),patrolvesselsandaircraftorhelicopters,by extending their surveillance range.Space applications are already present

on many vessels for communication,thuspresentingthepossibilityoflow-costdata collection or positioning. Usually itis the combination of cooperative andnon-cooperative signalswhichallows forthe detection of a potentially dangerousvessel.Spaceapplicationshaveprovenvaluablein findingpiratebases, but pure satelliteimageryisoflimiteduseandneedstobeplace into context with all other possible sources of information (GEOINT). Inaddition, change extraction techniques(change detection, categorization andclassification) are used to identify piratebases on to analyse changes in theirstructures.Space-based imagery is also used fortrackingpirateskiffsandlocatinghijackedvessels. This is done by relying on sa-tellite imagery. Easy detection with thehuman eye in optical imagery of 2,5meter resolution or better is possible forlargershipssuchasacontainerships,oiltankersandbulkcarriers.Opticalimageryalso allows for ship size estimation.Difficulties in vessel-type-identification inopticalimagery,however,persistforsmall(<10m) vessels, which are still detectedbuttheirclassificationisimpossible.JointResearch Centre (JRC) benchmarkingtestsofradar imagerycapabilities,whichanalysed almost 900 known fishing shippositions in 100 images, further indicatean80%detect-abilityrateforlargerfishingvessels (45m average)4 and >90% forsmallerones(35maverage)5.6Radar imagery also allows for a lengthestimate.Fewsatellitescurrentlyprovidespeed and target estimation. No vesseltype identification is possible so far.

Satelliteobservationworksespeciallywell with the large geographyand thematic diversity of maritimeactivities requiring monitoring andsurveillance. Satellites are multi–purpose, non-intrusive, and notlimited by national boundaries.Although some limitations existand improvement must be made,spaceapplicationinthefightagainstpiracyareresultinginatremendouspositiveimpact.

TargetPoint

Through space-based collection suchas AIS signals, non-cooperative (pirate)vessels or the position of hijacked shipscanalsobeidentified.

Causative Factor 5:Lax Coastal and Port-Side SecurityThere is a growing interest in the use of Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR)imagery for maritime border control.Optical imagery and change detectiontechniques indicate illegal activities,and space-based collection of signalscan help indentify vessels involved inillegal,unreportedandunregulated(IUU)fishery.Satelliteimageryfurtherallowsformappingofportsforemergencyplanning.

Causative Factor 7:Global Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)Space applications can also be used to monitor illegal transportation, such ascontainersecurity (trackingof containersthrough Satellite Navigation) and seaborder/sea transport monitoring. Thereis currently still the need for intelligencesources to identify something assuspicious before a certain container is tracked.Large vessels used for smuggling oftenanchor off the coast to transfer the load to smaller vessels. The challenge is todetect small boats that may be on thewater foraveryshort time inacrowdedarea,andtorecognisetheirhostileintent

Conclusions and RecommendationsSatellite observation fits particularly wellthe geographic and thematic diversity ofmaritimeactivitiesrequiringmonitoringandsurveillance. The global characteristic,of monitoring from space make spacesystems particularly attractive for long-termmonitoringofaverylargegeographicarea. Satellite observation systems aremultipurposeandnon-intrusive. Satellitedataisnotlimitedtoborders(legallyvalidoverforeignterritories)andiscontinuouslyavailable, allowing for continuous andfrequent observation of large areas in

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

30 31

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

order to aid early detection of potentialthreats.Further,spaceassetsarecomplementaryto ground, sea and air assets. Theyindicate ‘where to look’. Userscan thenactivate other systems to identify andconfirm the threat. Space applicationscomplementexistingcoastalsurveillancesystems such as coastal RADAR, AIS,patrol vessels and aircraft. In doing so,they extend the surveillance range (tobetter anticipate threats), cover largerzones in one shot (optimisation ofresourcesandmoney)andofferasharedresource by fostering intra and inter-national cooperation.Satellitesthatcansupportcounterpiracymissions are already in place. There isno need to wait for new technology todevelop; the challenge is to better usewhat already exists. The current datasituation in Europe often results in theabsence of necessary information dueto a lack of coordination across bordersand between levels of government anda lack of common standards for theiruse. These is compartmentalisationand a lack of interoperability of differentinformation systems for monitoring theposition of ships at sea. The result is incompatible information and informationsystems,fragmentationofinformationandredundancy. Acomprehensiveapproachto the sharing of maritime surveillancedataisrequired.As has been explained, the satelliteswhich are currently used for maritime

surveillance have not been designed forthispurpose.Thus,adedicatedmaritimesurveillance mission is need (seeendnote).8 Additionally, wake detectionmust be improved. The continuity ofinformationatalltimesneedstobeensuredandrealtimeavailabilityandcreativenessin case of unplanned events andemergencies increased. The availabilityof space systems and their capacity tobereplacesofaugmentedforoperationspurposes remains weak and barelyreactive.Spacesystemshavetobecomemore responsive9 and should be treated as critical infrastructures as informationdependence increases10. At the sametime, light, flexible and cost effectiveapplications for all actors concerned (developingcountries,privatesector,andindustry) are needed.11 Europe shouldcontinuetoworkonaEuropeanAIS-S.Amoreintegratedapproach,fusingsatellitedata and all other available data, isrecommendedtoensurethatsurveillancemaybeconductedanywhereatanytimetodetectsuspiciousactivity.TheEuropeanCommission’s Draft Roadmap towardsestablishing the Common InformationSharingEnvironment for thesurveillanceof the EUmaritime domain12, present inOctober 2010, is a first step to achievetheseaims.As with any ISR system, there arelimitations anda need for improvementsinthekeyareaslistedabove.Thisshouldnot detract, however, from the importantandsuccessfulwork thatspacesystems

are adding to counter-piracy operationsoff the coast of Somalia, nor should itinhibit the application of space systemsin themaritimedomain. Foracompletecopy of the study on the use of spacerecourses in the fight against piracy,includingadditional recommendationsontechnical capabilities, regional capacitybuilding, an coordinative issues, pleasecontacttheauthordirectlyat:nina-louisa.remuss@espi.or.at

1. ThisarticlestronglydraysonthefindingsofRemuss,Nina-Louisa ‘Space Applications as a SupportingTool for Counter Piracy – Outline for a EuropeanApproach’,ESPIREPORT29.Vienna:ESPI,2010.Foracopyofthefullreportdownloaditdirectlyfromtheinstitute’swebsite:www.espi.or.at

2. Chalk,Peter.‘TheMaritimeDimensionofInternationalSecurity –Terrorism,Piracy andChallenges for theUnitedStates’,Pittsburgh:RANDCorporation,2008.Xi

3. Koppe, Rüdiger. ‘Industrial Approaches to Piracy– Securing Maritime Transportation from Piracy’.Presentation. Space and Maritime Security –Strategies and Capabilities to Counter Piracy.Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, Vienna,Austria. 30November2009.

4. In RADARSAT ScanSAR Narrow B images (50mresolution)

5. In RADARSAT ScanSAR Standard images (25mresolution)

6. Itisduetothehighestresolutionof25mintheStandardimages, compared to the 50m in the ScanSARimagesthatresultedinabetterperformance.Indetailthismeans, for theScanSARmeasurements, targetsize/imageresolution=45m/50m=0,9whilefortheStandardmeasurementstargetsize/imageresolution=35m/25m=1,4,whichledtothesmallimprovementfrom80%to90%. Formore informationdirectlycf.HarmGreidanus, andNaoumaKourti. ‘Findings ofthe Declimes Project – Detectionand Classificationof Maritime Traffic from Space’. Proceedings ofSEASAR2006, 23-26 January2006,Frascati, Italy,ESA14Feb.2011.

7. Joined Research Centre. Surveillance ConTraffic:MonitoringContainerTraffic’JointResearchCentre,2008. Available from http://ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu /showdoc.php?doc=promotional_mater ia l /JRC42970_contraffic_leaflet.pdf&mime=application/pdf

8. Recommend the dedicated maritime surveillancemissionbecomposedof:radarandopticalsatellites:(1) high resolution radar satellite (countrywithERSand ENVISAT class radars); (2) an optical imagingsatelliteattwospecialresolutions:(a)highresolutionfor local and regional operational monitoringapplications continuity of SPOT and Landsat class)and (b) medium resolution for global applications(continuityofENVISAT).

9. For more information on how to make Europeanspace assets more reactive refer to Remuss,Nina-Louisa. ‘Responsive Space to Europe –Elements for a Roadmap for Europe based on acomparative analysis with the U.S. OperationalResponsive Space Concept. ‘ESPI Report 22.Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, 2010.<http://www.espi.or.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=469&Itemid=1>

10. cf Remuss, Nina-Louisa. ‘The Need to CounterSpaceTerrorism –A European Perspective’. ESPIPerspectives17. Vienna:ESPI

11. Idid.

Nina-Louisa Remuss*Is Associate Fellow of the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI),Vienna,Austria.Sherecentlypublishedastudyonspaceapplicationsinthefightagainstpiracy.SinceJuly2008shehasbeencontributingto ESPI’s Research Programme, Space and Security. She has xo-authoredastudyonEurope’sroleinthepeaceful-usesofouterspace,andledastudyandarelatedworkshoponthecontributionofspaceapplication to homeland security. Shealso published a short policypaper on the vulnerability of space assets in the context of terrorist intended harmfulinterferences. She holds aMaster’sDegree in International Security Studies from theUniversityofSt.Andrews(UnitedKingdom).*Nina-LouisaRemussisworkingfortheGermanAerospaceCenter(DLR)sinceSeptember2011.Theopinionexpressedinthisbookchapterisherpersonalopinion.

NavyfleetsandCoastGuardswithauthority regularly act, jointlyor independently, under NATOand/or a Ministry of Homeland

Securitytointerdict,apprehend,andrefersuspected criminals for prosecution. Toperform in such activities the dedicatedteamsareexpected tostrictly followandtrain teamwork for ship’s visit, board,searchandseizure(VBSS)andtoconductmaritimelawenforcementoperations.

re-lion’s objective is to provide the besttrainingsystemwhichenhancesboththeindividualand teamexpertise–skill andknow-how– inany jointNavyandCoastGuard’s partnership, so they can workmore hand-in-hand thus outperformingintruders. Thereto re-lion builds ‘gamechanging’ virtual systems in a way thatteammemberscan(jointly)trainboththeir

individual and team capabilities on anyintroduced virtual ‘operational platform’.Thisarticleexplainsthebenefitsofusingvirtual simulations to train visit, board,searchandseize. Itspecifically focusesontheinfiltration,objectiveandexfiltrationphasesinnon-compliantandopposingboarding.

Are your Boarding Teams being trained to fight Piracy in the best way possible?

opposingnon-compliantcompliant

deploymentisertioninfiltrationobjectiveexfiltrationextraction

by Chris HaarmeijerRe-lion BV

32 33

Challenges in training of boarding teamsInboardingoperations; Tacticaldecision-makingiscomplex;

- highlysituational;- performed under demanding

circumstances.

Duringtraining:- Theprocessofachieving,acquiring

and maintaining situationalawarenessareoftentheonesmostneglected;

- Field training exercises (FTX’es)cannot always provide all thestimuli that are required for anoptimaltrainingofoperators.

Thechallengesfoundduringtraining,bothfrom a ‘Quality’ and from an ‘Efficiency’pointofview,havebeencompiledbasedoninterviewswithsubjectmatterexperts.The validity of these will vary with yoursituation.

QualityStatic physical environments limit

thenumberofsituationstotrain;The training environment does

not exactly match the operationalenvironment.

Missionrehearsalisnotpossible;Using teammates as role players

resultinanegativeeffectontraineemindset;

Liveroleplayersdonotalwaysgivetherequiredtrainingeffect,astheyaredifficulttocontrol;

It is not possible to work withcertain role players e.g. children,elderly,animals,etc.;

The training of challenging scenarios is prohibited by safetyregulations;

Protective gear limits the trainingeffectduetosafetyregulations,

Discussingand reflectingon teambehavior–bythetrainees–isnotperformed based on an objective

recording from multiple points ofview.

Efficiency Planning of training with live,

often scarce, assets is logisticallydemanding;

Physical environments requiretraveltimetoandwithinthetrainingareas;

It is costly to hire actors as roleplayers;

Security clearance for specifictactics, techniques & procedures(TTP)makeitalmostimpossibletohireactors;

Live training assets have a hightotalcostofownership(TCO);

Cost associated with wear & tear of weaponsystemsandconsumablesplayarole.

FTX’s are generally not veryefficientasthereisagreatdealofwaitinginvolved.

Becauseoperatorsandtopathleteshavea great deal in common, the conceptbelowhasbeenadoptedfromtheathletedevelopment strategy (LTADS). Themodelisbasedon4interlinkedelements: Physicalskills,thebasis; Technicalskillsareadded; Tacticalskillsaretrained; Mentalskillsareapre-requisite.

Optimalperformancecanonlybereachedprovidedalloftheseskillsarebeingfullydeveloped.

Is game technology for nerds only?Just for the sake of being complete, 3definitionsthatwillbeusedfurther inthetext:Livetraining:realpeopleoperating

realsystems.Virtual simulation: real people

operating simulated real systemsinarealisticartificialworld.

Serious gaming: real peopleoperatingsimulatedsystemssittingbehindadesk.

Due to thechallengesmentionedearlier,livetraininghasgoodeffectonthephysicaland technical skills however less on thetactical skills. According to [HU2012],situational assessment, the process ofacquiring and maintaining situational

1. Physical 3. Tactical

2. Technical 4. Mental

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

awareness, is most neglected duringregularFTX’s.Dismountedtrainingisstilldominatedbylivetraining.

Virtual training, if available to operators,is mostly used for static small armstraining. This in contrast with for instance fast jetorhelicopterpilot training. Pilotscansimplynotgowithoutvirtualtraining,becauseofthecomplexityofthetaskstobeperformed.Dependingon thedesign,virtual traininghasgoodeffectofthetacticalandmentalskills and less on the physical andtechnicalskills.Thiswasdemonstratedinanexperiment for theNetherlandArmedForces [KO2011]. In this experiment,trainees at the beginning of their education were split into a live and a virtual group.

Duringtheexperiment,bothgroupswereinstructed to clear a series of roomsvarying from simple, square rooms withonehostileoffriendlytargettocomplex,UandL-Shaped roomscontainingmultipletargets, again varying from hostile tofriendly. The live group used physicalbuildingsfortrainingandphysicaltargetswhile the virtualgrouponlyusedbuildingsandvirtualtargetsfortraining.Tomeasuretheresultof thesetypesof training,bothgroups were confronted with the samefinal test using physical buildings andphysicaltargets.

And the winner is……Inasimplesituation,thelive group scored slightly better due to a better result onthe physical and the technical skills. In

a complex situation, the virtual group scored significantly better: they are 30%faster in completing the test, using lessammunition. Also, trainees from the live trained group more often shot friendlytargets than those trained virtually.

Balance in training methodsVirtualsimulationshouldnevercompletelyreplace live training. You can howeverdecrease cost and win in results byscaling back a bit in live and replacing that training timewith virtual simulation. Theexperiment shows that a good balancebetween live and virtual is the preferredway.Likeyinandyang.

Mostoftheissuesintrainingofboardingteams can be categorized into thefollowing4elements:

1. Physicalenvironment2. Roleplayers3. Logistics4. Cost.

Virtualsimulationandseriousgamingcanremovemanyofthechallengesposedinthe beginning of this article.The figure below shows an example onhow to incorporate the different tools in thetoolboxofthetrainerandwheretheyfit.Aprimeexampleoftheuseofseriousgamingis“Boarder’sAhoy”developedforNATO.Backtotheinitialmatrix:seriousgamingisverygoodatthecompliantsideofVBSSwhereitissometimesusedassimulationandsometimespurelyasvisualization.Aswaspromised,thefocusinthisarticleis on the non-compliant and opposingside of boarding and specifically duringthe infiltration, objective and exfiltrationphases. This iswherevirtual simulationhas the edge.

1. Physical 2. Tactical

2. Technical 2. Mental

LIVE TRAINING VIRTUAL TRAINING

Serious gaminge.g.trainingteamleaders1 Live training

e.g.fildtrainingexperience(FTX)3Virtual Simulatione.g.trainingthecompleteteam2

34 35

Virtual simulation in boarding training?Virtual simulation –or Virtual Reality– asit issometimesreferredto,takesseriousgaming a leap further. Quoting BruceSterling[BS1993]whowrotethefollowinginanarticleinWiredMagazine:“Virtual Reality allows a more naturalized interface with the computer that goes far beyond the point and click graphical user interface that ate so popular now. With Virtual Reality, the user is surrounded by his environment and an interface can be established not through the conventional keyboard and mouse but via tracking systems that keep record to the whole human body posture”.

Virtual simulation can also be describedusingtheformula:

Virtual simulation = reality – X + Y

WhereX is the part of training that youdoinlivetrainingandcannotdoinvirtualsimulationandY is the part of training that you cannot do in live training but can do usingvirtualsimulation.Anexampleofboth:X:breakingtheglasswindowusing

thestockofyourweapon. Y: having a fully armedopposing,

computergeneratedcharacter, fallfromahiddenplace in the ceilingrightinfromofyournose.

The picture below was taken from anexercise in CQB and shows a novelapproach to dismounted simulationwhere the operators are wearing sensor veststhatrecordstheirexactpostureandposition in real-time. This posture andposition is directly linked to a computeravatar thereby allowing the operator fullcontroloveritinanaturalway.Also,theyare wearing a headset that includes a displayinfromoftheireyes,speakersandmicrophone. When the operator looks

through the display, he effectively seeswhatthecomputeravatarisseeinginthevirtualenvironment.Ofcourse,heisnotalonebutpartofthisteam.The idea behind this setup is that it allows maximumflexibility inthetypeoftrainingenvironment while maintaining a train as you fightmethodology. No joystick ofmouse.Justyou,yourteamandweaponsof choice.Also,theconceptismobile,easytosetupandfits inacoupleofflightcases. Thishastwoadvantages:

1. Mobility;- as mentioned earlier, generally

duringFTX’salotofwaitingtimeisincluded;

- extra practice, this system canbetakenbyaunitonanFTX;

- instructors can take it to theunitsfortraining;

2. Substantially less dependency onfixedinfrastructure.

Poweringthisconceptissolidtechnologyfrom the gaming, rehabilitation and

consumer industry, properly adaptedand ruggedized to work in a physicallydemandingenvironment.

Nineteen (19) benefits of virtual simulation in boarding operationsLooking back at the original issues intraining of boarding specifically in theinfiltration, objective and exfiltrationphases, virtual simulation offers thefollowingadvantageswith respect to livetraining:

Quality Enables training in all kinds of

environments resulting in sheerunlimitedsituations;

Exactvirtualreplicaofthemissionenvironment can be made andusedtotrainin;

Teammatesas virtual role playerslookculturallycorrect;

Theeffectofacomputergeneratedrole players can be exactlycontrolled;

It is possible to insert computer

opposingnon-compliantcompliant

deploymentisertioninfiltrationobjectiveexfiltrationextraction

Serious gaming

Virtual simulation generated roleplayers resemblingchildren, victims, elderly people,animals,etc;

Enables training that would betoodangeroustoconductinaliveenvironment;

Discussing and reflecting onteam behavior by the trainees issupported by a full after actionreview (AAR) recording from allpointsofview.

Efficiency Enablesgeographicallydistributed

training i.e. force-on-force, redream/blue team, one instructorteachinginmultiplelocations;

Provides an on-demand trainingsolution;

Reduces exercise planning and preparation;

Eliminatestraveltimetoandwithinphysicaltrainingareas;

Enablesgreatertrainingfrequencywhilemitigatingsafetyrisks;

Computergeneratedcharactersasroleplayersarefreeofchargeanddonotrequiresecurityclearance;

Reduces ammunition and fuel

expendituresinpreparationforlivetraining;

Reduces training area and range maintenance;

Frees up capacity in live trainingassets;

Avoidswearandtearonequipment; Eliminates impact on constraints

relatedtotheenvironment; Enablesextratrainingduringdead

hoursinFTX’s.

ConclusionsAs shown, a better balance in trainingmethodsaidsinefficiencyandquality.Donot beafraid that these typeof systemsisareonlyintroducedduetobudgetcuts:ifdesignedproperly, itwill lowerthetotalcost of ownership while maintaining oreven–increasing–qualityofoperators!In the integrated manor proposed, thespecialist can train and improve someof their methodologies. (Joint) training

in self-developed VBSS exercises willclearly improve the skill set of theseprofessionals. Because these selected men get to do their job every day andbringalotoflawenforcementexperiencetothetable,re-lioniseagertocooperatewiththesespecialiststo‘tailormake’theirsystem, for them to grow and advancetheirskills.If you think that operating and financingthese systems will be a hurdle in yourorganization,dorememberthattherearesolutionforthisinplace:fromgovernmentowned,governmentoperated(GoCo)viagovernment owned, contractor operated(GoGo) to contractor owned, contractoroperated(CoCo).Re-lion’s virtual training system will bedeployed promotingmaritime interdictionoperations, theater security cooperationeffortsandsupportmissionsforoperationsgloballyintheforeseeablefuture.

Bibliography▪ [HU2012]A.v.d.Hulst&M.Ruijesendaal,ProceedingsonPDSG-2-12,Serious Gaming for Complex Decision Making.▪ [KO2011]C.Koerhuis&O.Binsch,Comparing two different training methods (conventional and virtual) fro military operations on urban terrain.▪ [BS1993]B.Sterling,War is Virtual Hell, http://tinyurl.com/3batabf,checkedonApril9th,2013.

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

36 37

GeneralPERSEUSprojectcontribute toEurope’sefforts to combat illegal migration andgoods smuggling by proposing a largescale demonstration of a EU Maritimesurveillance System of Systems, inte-grating the existing national systemsand platforms, enhancing them withinnovativecapabilitiesandmovingbeyo-nd EUROSUR’s 2013 expectations.PERSEUS addresses the following keychallenges:• supporting the network created

by National Coordination Centres(NCCs), Frontex and EMSA throughincreasedcapabilitiesincludingtrans-nationalexchangeofusefulandavai-lable information, and associatedproceduresandmechanisms therebycreatingthecommoninformationsha-ringenvironment

• generation of a common situationalpicture

• improved detection and identificationof non collaborative/suspicious smallboatsandlowflyingaircraft

• enhancedandincreasinglyautomateddetection of suspicious vessels andbehaviours, identification of threatsand tracking of reporting and non-reportingvessels

Theprojectarticulatesthisdemonstrationthrough five exercises grouped in twocampaigns in the Mediterranean sea,implementingmissionsofdrugtraffickingandillegalmigrationcontrolanddeliveringsurveillancecontinuityfromcoastalareasto high seas. PERSEUS also aims at delivering a

comprehensive set of validated anddemonstrated recommendations andproposed standards.PERSEUS has assembled major usersandproviders,ensuringprivilegedaccessto existing surveillance systems andassets for an optimised coverage of theareaofinterest.Theseuserswilldefine,assessandvalidate thealignmentof theproject’srecommendationstotheirneeds.PERSEUS also includes an evolutionmechanismtoenlargetheuserbaseandintegrateemergingtechnologiesduringitslifetime.Theprojectwillaugmenttheeffectiveness of operational capabilities of the existing

systems – a real-life, credible, relevantand coordinated contribution to the establishmentofanintegratedEuropean-widemaritimebordercontrolsystem.Theconsortiumencompassestwentyninepartners covering all the stakeholdersin the domain, Large Industry, SMEs,Research labs, universities under thescrutiny of the most relevant end-usersthat should operate the system (CoastGuards,Navies,Customs,BorderPolice,etc.).Theuserspresentlyinvolvedintheproject(aspartnersorasmembersofuserpanel)arepresentedinthefollowingpicture:

PERSEUS phases

EC PERSEUS demonstration project – FP7

Finland–Border

CoastGuards

JointArmyForcesHellenicCoastGuards

GuardiaCivilNavy

PortofAlgeciras

RoyalMaroccanNavy

NationalMaritimeCollegeofIreland

Gardai(IrishNationalPolice)

FrenchNationalPolice(Border+NationalPolice)

NavyMaritimeAffairs

UPM(MediterraneanUnion)Customs

PortugueseAirForce(FAP)/Academy

GNR

MinistryofInteriorNavy

SicilianFisheriesCoastGuards

RomanianBorderPolice

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

by Philippe ChrobocinskiEngineer in Cassidian LEADS Company

Theprojectisbuiltaroundfourmainstepsaspresentedonthepicturebelow:

During the first year (2011), in closecoordinationwiththeoperationalpartners,the project set up a referential systemencompassing:• A synthesis and an analysis of user

requirements,• Systemofsystemsspecifications,• System architecture both with Eu-

ropean dimension and Nationalcomponents.

Thesecondyear(2012)wasusedtodefinetheWesterncampaignandthesupportingscenarios plus the necessary metricsand transversal studieson the legalandproceduralconstraints.Thedevelopmentof the innovative components was thenstarted.The third year (2013) allowed to finishthe developments and to integrate thesystemfortheWesternCampaign(againat European level and at country levels,namelyPortugal,Spain,FranceandItaly)andperformtheusertraining.TheexercisesfortheWesternCampaignstarted in September 2013 and werecompleted end of November. Theycovered the typical scenarios ofPERSEUS: Illegal immigration towardsCanary Islands, Smuggling in AlboranSeaand illegal trafficking in theWesternMediterraneanbasin.Leveragingtheoutcomesandcomponentsof the Western campaign, 2014 will bededicated to organise and perform the

Eastern campaign in Greece, largelysupportedbyHellenicMinistryofDefenceandHellenicCoastGuards.TheEasternCampaignwillhandleseveralchallenges:• Deploy a full PERSEUS system

capability,• Demonstrate enhanced capability in

Aegean Sea (with very short earlywarningduetotheproximityofTurkishcoast),

• Demonstrate enhanced capabilityfor large area monitoring (South ofCrete), largelysupportedbyairborneplatforms,

• Demonstrate the interoperability withItaliansystemsintheAdriaticSea.

Step 0 - Define & Deploy2011 Design phase to elaborate the PERSEUS target vision.

Step 1 – 2013ValidateWestern CampaignDemonstration

Step 2 – 2014Validate

Eastern CampaignDemonstration

Step 3 – 2014Contribute

Set-up and propose a European "standard" for Maritime Surveillance Systems for 2015/2020

The project will terminate (Step 3) inthe second part of 2014 by elaboratingrecommendations for the future deve-lopment of PERSEUS capabilities, pro-posing technical roadmapsand fosteringstandards and norms to facilitate thedevelopmentof theexpectedoperationalcapabilities.

An illustration: PERSEUS Exercise 4 in the Western campaignThe last demonstration of the WesternCampaignofPERSEUSECproject tookplace on November 28th, distributedbetween Lisbon (PT), Madrid (SP), LaCiotat(FR)andRome(IT).

LA CIOTAT PERSEUS configuration (from left to right: UAV ground stations, RCC configuration and SPATIONAV workstations, central and local)

38 39

Thedemonstration integrated the legacysystems from Portugal (Air Force UAV,Navy C2 and Coast Guards C2), Spain(SIVE), France (SPATIONAV) and Italy(SMART)andimplementedthePERSEUS

innovationsdevelopedduringtheproject.For the first time, all the PERSEUSdimensionsweredemonstratedwith:• International strategic exchanges

between National Coordination

Centres, in accordance withEUROSURrulesandPERSEUSdatamodel;

• Continuity of vessel tracking fromAtlantic Ocean to Italy through themulti-National and multi-agenciesexchanges of tactical informationand tracks between the 4 countriesbased on PERSEUS recommendedstandards;

• National demonstrations showingthe implementation of PERSEUS

architecture and innovations at eachlevelof thechainofsurveillanceandofthechainofcommandandcontrol;

• Full integration of a UAV complete

UAV mission planning and monitoring

segment (TANAN), representingthe common surveillance tools ofEUROSUR.

The demonstration took into account

fixed sensors connected to CoastalSurveillance stations (French equivalent:Sémaphores)equippedwithSPATIONAVV2,aFrenchregionalcoordinationcentre

Detection of a small boat with the UAV HD gimbal

�RCC-(FrenchCOM)andFrench,Italian,Spanish and Portuguese NCCs. TheUAV was connected and tasked by theRCC.Thedemodidn’tuseofcoursetheoperational systems but the system andcomponentsusedwerethesameandallthe data were real.

The Exercise was organized andcoordinated by Cassidian as TechnicalManager and main Integrator of theproject.The organization and performance of

Operational assessment

The next future2014 will be the year of the Westerncampaign in Greece. The definition ofthe system configuration, deploymentandscenarioshasalreadystarted. This

The French-Greek team in La Ciotat

campaign will be actively supported byHMODandHellenicCoastGuards. Notonly as observers but also as activeplayersthatwillbringassets(vesselsandaircraft).BesidetheHQsaroundAthens,

thedemowillbeplayedinSamos,CreteandAdriaticSea.MMIOTCwillofcoursebewelcometoattend.

the exercise was evaluated as good bytheoperationalend-users (amongwhomFrench Navy and Greek Navy) invitedto assess the usability and relevanceof the system for enhanced maritimesurveillance.

The outcomes and components of theexercise will be used to support 2014 demonstrationforEasternMediterraneanSeainGreece.

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUESTECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

40 41

In theGulfofAdenand the IndianOcean, activities have quelled,but ransoms have becomeastronomical,itisreportedthattheransom to release the SMYRNI

reached16milliondollars,after13monthshigh-jacked, and that does not includethe ransom delivery costs, the moneyinsurance costs, and the ship-ownersand crew claims for damage, sickness,repatriation,property lossandfuelcosts.Additionally ithasbeenreportedthatthe

Owners are claiming for a Total Loss ofthevesselasshewasdetained foroversixmonths,andaccordingtothecontractterms they are entitled to do so. Themarket underwriters are challenging theclaim because the ship was, eventually,released and so not lost to the owners. Thiswillmean increased legalexpensesandapotentialclaimfortheinsuredvalueof the vessel; we are talking in millionshere and not in thousands.On the other hand, the Gulf of Guinea

has become a veritable hive of activity,withalmostdailyattacksbeing reported.Unfortunately, attacks in this region aremostlysuccessfulandoftenleadtoalossoflifeasopposedtoafairlylowsuccessrateofftheEastcoastofAfrica.From an insurance point of view I cangiveyousomedata,basedoninformationprovided by the Hellenic War Risksinsurance association, this mutual insu-rance association covers about 70% oftheGreekownedfleet forwar riskswith

Where is Piracy going from an

insurance point of view?by George Pateras

Shipping Advisor of AMSCC

40

a total insured value of about 90 BillionDollars.thereportedtransitshavevariedovertheyears from2009 to2013. Oneanomalyis the fact that the Gulf of Aden/IndianOceanAreawasgreatlyextendedin2011–hence thesharp rise in thenumberofreported transits. The figure for 2013 isat theendofApril; soproportionally thatwould represent about 2500 transits forthewholeyear.Ibelievethatthisdoesnotactually represent a reduction in transitsbut a reduction in reported transits, asownersbecomecomplacentas theyseereported Piracy activity reducing. Thisfact is also confirmed by the data on“Noncompliance” to BMP, released bythe MSC HoA. You are all aware that

compliancetoBMP,soasnottobeontheirlist,justmeansreportingthetransittotheMSCHoA.ActualphysicalcompliancetoBMPinvolvesfarmorethanjustreporting;it involves a whole series of deterrentstepssuchascitadelsandrazorwireetc,whichIamsureyouareallfamiliarwith.This begs the question: Is piracy in theGulfofAdenandtheIndianOceanonthedecline, or are the Pirates getting wiseto thefact that therearemoreandmoreweapons on commercial ships. So arethey just holding back until we becomecomplacent? There are many factorsinvolved:firstly the impressiveprotection

provided by the Navy ships, for whichwe are all truly grateful, secondly thegeneral awareness by the crews, thirdlythe increase use of guards, both armedandun-armedandfinallythepoliticalanddiplomaticworkinSomaliaitself.It isworthyofmention that thiscanalsobeseenininsuranceterms;in2011,itwasestimated thatapproximately25%of theships transiting theHRAreceiveda30%war risk discount for the use of armedguards,in2012itwasestimatethat50%

SHIPPING INDUSTRY

41

42 43

of ships receive a 40% discount for theuseofarmedguards.So let’s nowlookat the seizure statisticsoverthepast5years;pleasebearinmindthese are the statistics of the HellenicWar risk association and not based onGlobalfigures.Onethingthatcomesoutimmediatelyisthatwehaveexperienced,onapercentagebasis,farmoresuccessfulattacks in theGulfofGuinea than in theGulfofAdenand IndianOcean. That iswhy the Additional War Risks premiumisabout5 times theprice. Forexamplea 55,000 MT handy-max Bulk carrierwill pay approximately between 10 and12,000US$totransittheGulfofAdenandIndianOcean (including a 50% discountforarmedorun-armedguardsonboard)comparedtoover50,000US$fora7daystayataNigerianport.Thesefiguresarebasedonashipvalueofabout40milliondollars.DespitethefactthattheLloydsjointWarCommitteeconsiders theGulf ofGuineafarmoredangerousthantheGulfofAden,as reflected in the additional premiumrate, the claims paid are less only dueto the volumeof transits. In very broadterms, the totalcost for theHellenicWarRisksInsuranceAssociationofallGulfofAden/IndianOcean claims (includingnotonlyransoms,butalsoshipdamagesanddetention, aswell as crew claims) since2009areintheregionof85millionDollarswere as the claims paid over the sameperiod for theGulf ofGuinea is about 3milliondollars.The fundamental differencebetween the“opus operandi” of West African piratesand East African pirates is that WestAfrican pirate is more violent, has noregards forhuman lifeashe isafter thecargoandnot the ship, theEastAfricanPirateisaftertheShip,heissellingbackthe ship to the Owners and the Owner is actually buying back their crew. Thesepirates are not ideologically motivated,they have no political agenda, they arecommon thieves. What a sorry state ofaffairwefindourselvesinatthedawnofthe21stcentury. Noseamansignedupforthistypeofaggravation.DespitethelongestcoastlineinAfrica,at3025 kilometres, Somalia has not beenable tomake proper use of its seaportsashasitsneighboursDjiboutiandKenya.TheannualGDPpercapitaisabout$600,and the young adult unemployment isat astronomical levels, so the possibility

of a pirate earning up to $6,000 for asuccessful hijacking of a commercialvesselmakesgoodbusinesssense.To further exasperate the situation the one timeprofitableSomali fishing industry is,andhasbeen insteadydecline forquitesometime.DespiterepeatedaccusationsofillegalfishingandtoxicwastedumpinginSomaliwaters,noconcertedinternationalefforthasstarted,thiscombinedwiththefishermenbeingrestrictedtolocalmarket,has reduced their income to a level thatreiterates the benefits of becoming apirate or a people-smuggler. Thankfully,many families rely on remittances fromSomalisworkingabroaditisreportedthatthediasporassendbacktoSomaliaabout$1.6billioneachyear.Itisreportedby“OceansBeyondPiracy”andfrom“reactions.net”thattheeconomiccostofSomaliPiracy in2012wasabout6BillionUS$. Interestingly1%ofwhichcovers the insurance costs and about10% the ransoms and added expensesof release. This is in fact about a 13%decreasefromthepreviousyear2011.Furthermore, the UNCTAD 2012 reviewof Maritime Transport notes that theaverage hull value of vessels transitingthe Suez Canal was estimated at 26.6millionUS$which isan increaseof10%onthepreviousyear.Thisisattributedtolesslowvaluevesselstransitingandmorehighvaluevessels.Tankers forexample,predominantlyhighvalue vessels, represent 19.7% of the2011totaltrafficand21.6%in2012.Thisimplies to me that fewer Ship-ownersare reporting transits through theGulfofAden, as War risk premiums are basedon ships value, during this poor freightmarket, and this in conjunction with thereduction inattackscanexplainthe13%dropintheeconomiccostofSomalipiracymentionedearlier.Movingon to theGulfofGuinea,whatamess,witheffectfrom00:01hoursBSTon01September2011,BeninandtheGulfofGuineahavebecomeAdditionalPremiumAreas. This additional premium area orHighRiskAreaisdefinedas:TheGulfofGuinea, but only in respect of the areaenclosed by: On the northern side, thecoast of Benin and Nigeria on the western side,astraightlinefromtheborder,onthecoast,ofBeninandTogotoposition3°N,1° 38'E on the southern side a straightlinefromtheretoposition3°N,8°Eandon the eastern side, a straight line from

44 45

thereto4°N,8°31'Eandthenfromtheretotheborder,onthecoast,ofNigeriaandCameroon,incidentallytheIvoryCoastisalsoareportableadditionalpremiumarea.SowhilstthingsareeasingintheGulfofAdentheoppositecanbesaidfortheGulfofGuinea.Thereareoftencongestiondelaystotheberthingofvesselsespeciallythebulkersinthecementandricetrades,where30to40daydelaysarenotuncommon.Thesevesselsdrift100orsomilesofftheWestAfricancoastkeepingawatchfuleyeoutfor pirates. Of course the tankers withdistillate fuels such as diesel or gasoline arefarmoreatriskthanthebulkcarrier,nevertheless the ruthlessness of theregional pirateswarrantsa vigilant crew.Sowhyhave thingsdeteriorated tosuchan extent in the vicinity of such oil richWestAfricannations.We must not only look at the financiallosses, Nigerian government estimatesare said to be asmuch as 400,000 bbl/day or about 60,000. MT/day which isapproximately equivalent to 1.3 US $billionamonth,butattheseriousdangerto the crew and the risks to the flow ofenergy.

Why is the Gulf of Guinea important?QuotingAmbassadorUkonga:• Geographicallocation:Itisanimportantmaritimeroute. intheglobalsupplyofenergy.

• A major source of hydrocarbon re-sources:Theregionproducesabout5.4millionbarrelsofcrudeoilperday.

• Investment: Oil companies from theWest and the East have made hugeinvestments forboth onshore and off-shore drilling.

• Richfishingandothermarineresources:Fishingtrawlerscometotheregionfromallovertheworld.

• Rich forestry, agricultural and mineralresources: All these are exportedthrough theGulfofGuinea tomarketsinEuropeandAmerica.

The Gulf of Guinea region supplies theworld markets with about 5.4 millionbarrelsofoilperday(bbl/d).Puttingthisinperspective, this isequivalent tomorethan the totalamount importedbyEU27countries in 2008 (4.9 mbbl/d)and overhalfofUScrudeoil imports in2008(9.8mbbl/d).Oilsupplyfromtheregionin2011wasequivalentto40%oftotalEU27and29% of total US petroleum consumptionin the same year. Angola and Nigeria

account,respectively,for34%and47%oftheregion’stotaloilsupply.Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea accountedfornearly30%ofattacks(427of1,434)inAfricanwaters,East andWest, between2003 and 2011, and that proportion isincreasing.Thisispartlyduetosuccessfulcounter-piracyoperationsoffthecoastofSomaliaasmentionedbefore.One needs to identify the reasons inordertofindthesolution.Theunderlyingproblemsandrootcausescannotsimplybe pinned solely on Nigeria, maritimesecurity is a regional rather than apurelyNigerianconcernaspiratescrossinternational boundaries in order to seize valuable cargos from commercial ships.TherisksarenotlocalizedinNigeriaaloneascanbeseenbytheregioncoveredbythe additional premium insurance areaand the wide ranging areas of attackalongacoastlineofover6,000kmfromGuineasouthtoAngola.Obviouslypiracyattacks are more focused on Nigeriaas the largest,by far,oilproducer in theregion.On29November2012,theGulfofGuinea

Commission(madeupof:Angola,Nigeria,Cameroon,EquatorialGuinea,SaoTomeand Principe, Gabon, Congo and DRCongo) signed the Luanda Declarationon Peace and Security in the Gulf ofGuinea Region. The declaration statesthat in response to increasing maritimeinsecurity, GGCmember states need toestablish regional cooperation and inter-state dialogue.It is blatantly plain to the markets thatthis deteriorating situation is increasing thecostofmaritime transportationmuchthesameas in theGulfofAdenthroughhigher insurance premiums, decreasingrevenuesforportsoftheregionasfewerships are willing to risk the maritimeadventure, serious oil theft, with somecountries losing up to a third of production tooffshoretheft;poachingandoverfishing,with disastrous consequences for localfishing communities with the depletingfishstocks,andpoliticalunrestleadingtodisruption of oil production.So what can be done to improve thesituationbeyondtheveryproactiveeffortsoftheGulfofGuineaCommission?MuchasintheGulfofAdeneffortswerestartedwithanavalpresence,operation“Atlanta”and the introduction and compliance to,Best Management Practices, and morerecently the diplomatic and politicalsolutionashore.Allthesecombinedeffortshave,asweallwant tobelieve, reducedthe level of piracyactivity inTheGulf ofAdenandIndianOcean.Iappreciatethatthere are serious differences between the tworegions,firstlySomalia isapoorcountry and basically a failed state;whereas Nigeria is one of the richest oil producing countries in the area and has ademocraticallyelectedgovernmentandto a certain extent is subject to the ruleof law.As a marine insurance association theHellenic covers the entire maritimeadventure,thisincludesthedamagetotheships,thelossofthecargo,thedeathandinjury to thecrew. Wedonotonlyhavethevesselsseizedoffshoreandthecargostolenwehaveviolenceagainstthecrewand property damage whilst in port; wehave crews kidnapped for quick ransomsettlements. The kidnappers come onboard,usuallyincahootswiththecorruptlocalofficialsandviolentlytakehighvaluecrewthatarereleasedafewdayslaterforsumsupwardsofafewhundredthousanddollars.

As a marine insurance association the Hellenic covers the entire maritime adventure, this includes the damage to the ships, the loss of the cargo, the death and injury to the crew. We do not only have the vessels seized off shore and the cargo stolen we have violence against the crew and property damage whilst in port; we have crews kidnapped for quick ransom settlements.

HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

The visit of the Greek Minister of National Defence, Mr D. Avramopoulos

The visit of the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff of the Royal Navy, Admiral Sir George Zambelas, KCB DSC ADC DL

46 47

The visit of the Ambassador of USA to the Hellenic Republic, Mr David D. Pearce

The visit of the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff , General Martin E. Dempsey

The visit of the Commander US Sixth Fleet, Commander TASK FORCE SIX, Commander STRIK FORNATO, Deputy Commander US Naval Forces Europe, Deputy Commander US Naval Forces Africa, Join Force Maritime Component Commander Europe,

Vise Admiral Philip S. Davidson, US N

The visit of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF) Commander, Rear Admiral Joese De Andrade Bandeira Leandro BRA (N)

HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTSHIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

48 49

The visit of the Commander General of US MEF RAYMOND FOX

The visit of the Commander in Chief of Montenegrin Navy Captain Darko Vukovic MNE (N)

NMIOTC TRAININGHIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

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NMIOTC TRAININGNMIOTC TRAINING

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NMIOTC TRAININGNMIOTC TRAINING

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NMIOTC TRAININGNMIOTC TRAINING

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NMIOTC TRAININGNMIOTC TRAINING

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NMIOTC TRAININGNMIOTC TRAINING

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TheMorale,Wellfare&Recreation(MWR) is a subordinate officewhich is manned on a volunteer

basis by dependent members of NMI-OTC’spersonnel.ThisOfficeisprovidingservicesforthebenefitofthetrainees,theattendeesandvisitorsofNMIOTC,aswellas for the permanent staff of theCentreandisresponsibleforthefollowing:a. Organization of cultural events and

trips in historical sites and natural monuments.

b. Organizationof ceremoniesandpro-tocolevents(lunches,cocktailsetc.).

c. Organizationofceremoniesregardingthewelfareofthestaff(Christmastreeceremonyetc).

d. Organizationofathletic/sportsevents.e. Achieving and maintaining positive

contacts with POC from local enter-tainmentproviders.

f. ThemanagementandtheoperationofthelibraryoftheCentre.

g. Cooperatationwith the respectiveof-fices of NAMFI and NSA in order tocoordinate the required actions andbecomecosteffective.

MWR OFFICE activities

Group photo in the entrance of the Samaria Gorge

NMIOTC TRAINING

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Excursions & Trips

Group photo. Trekking to Milia

From Samaria GorgeGroup photo from the trip to Istanbul

Excursions & Trips

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7k Fun Run7k Fun Run

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5th Annual Conference

BUILDING A LAW

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AT SEA FOR A MORE

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24-26 JUNE 2014

NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center

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