Opinions on University of Notre Dame v. Kathleen Sebelius

8/13/2019 Opinions on University of Notre Dame v. Kathleen Sebelius

1/44

In the

United States Court of AppealsFor the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No.133853

UNIVERSITYOFNOTREDAME,

PlaintiffAppellant,

v.

KATHLEENSEBELIUS,SecretaryofU.S.Departmentof

Health&HumanServices,etal.,

DefendantsAppellees,

and

JANEDOE1,etal.,

InterveningAppellees.

____________________

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe

NorthernDistrictofIndiana,SouthBendDivision.

No.3:13cv01276PPSCANPhilipP.Simon,ChiefJudge.____________________

ARGUEDFEBRUARY12,2014DECIDEDFEBRUARY21,2014

____________________

BeforePOSNER,FLAUM,andHAMILTON,CircuitJudges.

POSNER,CircuitJudge.TheAffordableCareAct requires

providers of health insurance (including companies that

administerselfinsuredemployerhealthplans)tocovercer


2/44


3/44

No.133853 3

Rev. Pub. Health 371, 37576, 379 (2010). Because outof

pocketexpenditures

on

female

contraceptives

can

be

sub

stantial formanywomen, seeSuYingLiangetal.,Wom

ens OutofPocket Expenditures and Dispensing Patterns

forOralContraceptivePillsBetween1996and2006,83Con

traception 528, 531 (2011), the provision of such contracep

tives without cost to the user canbe expected to increase

contraceptive use and so reduce thenumberbothofunin

tendedpregnanciesandofabortions.SeeJeffreyF.Peipertet

al., PreventingUnintendedPregnanciesbyProvidingNo

Cost

Contraceptives,

120Obstetrics

&

Gynecology

1291,

129596(2012).Furthermore,womenwhocansuccessfully

delayafirstbirthandplanthesubsequenttimingandspac

ingof theirchildrenaremore likely thanothers toenteror

stay in schooland tohavemoreopportunities foremploy

ment and for full social or political participation in their

community.SusanA.Cohen,TheBroadBenefitsofInvest

ing inSexualandReproductiveHealth,7GuttmacherRep.

onPublicPolicy,March2004,pp.5,6;seealsoMarthaJ.Bai

ley et al., The Optin Revolution? Contraception and the

GenderGapinWages,pp.19,26(NationalBureauofEcon.

Research Working Paper No. 17922, 2012), www.nber.org/

papers/w17922.pdf.

Like other universities, the University of Notre Dame

provides healthbenefits toboth its employees and its stu

dents. It selfinsures its employees medical expenses,but

hashiredMeritainHealth, Inc. toadminister theemployee

healthplanwithoutprovidinganyinsurancecoverage(Mer

itainisthereforewhatiscalledathirdpartyadministrator

ofahealth

plan).

To

take

care

of

its

students

medical

needs,

NotreDamehasacontractwithAetna(whichhappenstobe

Meritainsparent) thatgives the students theoptionofob


4/44

4 No.133853

taining health insurance from Aetna. Meritain administers

coveragefor

some

4600

employees

of

Notre

Dame

(out

of

a

totalof5200)and6400dependentsofemployees.Aetna in

sures 2600 students and 100 dependents; Notre Dame has

about11,000students.Butmanyofthemhavecoverageun

dertheirparentshealthinsurancepolicies.

Because Catholic doctrine forbids the use of contracep

tives(therhythmmethodofavoidingpregnancy,whichis

permitted, is a form of abstention, not of contraception),

Notre Dame has never paid for contraceptives for its em

ployeesor

permitted

Aetna

to

insure,

under

the

Aetna

Notre

DameHealthPlan,NotreDamestudentsfortheexpenseof

contraceptives. Cognizant of the religious objections of

Catholic institutions to contraception, and mindful of the

dictateof theReligiousFreedomRestorationAct,42U.S.C.

2000bb1(a),(b),thatGovernmentshallnotsubstantially

burdenapersonsexerciseofreligioneveniftheburdenre

sultsfromaruleofgeneralapplicability,unlessitdemon

stratesthatapplicationoftheburdentotheperson(1)isin

furtheranceof

acompelling

governmental

interest;

and

(2)

is

theleastrestrictivemeansoffurtheringthatcompellinggov

ernmentalinterest,thegovernment,somemonthsafterthe

enactmentof theAffordableCareAct, createdbyadminis

trativeregulationareligiousexemptionfromtheguidelines.

SeeGroupHealthPlansandHealth Insurance IssuersRe

lating to Coverage of Preventive Services, 76 Fed. Reg.

46621, 46626 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R.

147.130(a)(1)(iv));seealso77Fed.Reg.8725,872729(Feb.

15,2012).Butatfirstitwasnarrowlydraftedandasaresult

excludedCatholic

institutions

that,

like

Notre

Dame,

are

in

corporated as nonprofit rather than religious institutions.

Thatprecipitatedthefilingin2012ofafederalsuitbyNotre


5/44

No.133853 5

Dameagainst thegovernment,claiming that thecontraceptive

regulations

infringed

rights

conferred

on

the

university

byboth the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb1. That suit was dis

missedon standingand ripenessgrounds, thegovernment

havingpromisedthatNotreDamewouldnthavetocomply

with the regulations for one year, during which time new

regulationswouldbeissued.UniversityofNotreDamev.Se

belius,2012WL6756332,at*34(N.D.Ind.Dec.31,2012);see

Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care

Act,77

Fed.

Reg.

16501,

1650203

(Mar.

21,

2012).

The new regulations were issued aspromisedand, as

expected, they enlarged the exemption. See Coverage of

CertainPreventiveServicesUndertheAffordableCareAct,

78 Fed. Reg. 39870, 3987590 (July 2, 2013); 29 C.F.R.

2590.7152713A(a);45C.F.R.147.131(b).Asaresult,Notre

Damenowcamewithin itsscope.Toexercise itsright thus

conferred tooptoutofhaving topay forcoverage forcon

traceptives,eitherdirectlyorthroughahealthinsurer,such

asAetna,

the

university

had

to

fill

out

EBSA

Form

700

Certification.See45C.F.R.147.131(b)(4).Theform(www.

dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/preventiveserviceseligibleorganizationcer

tificationform.pdf) isshort, itsmeat the followingsentence:

Icertifythat,onaccountofreligiousobjections,theorgani

zation opposes providing coverage for some or all of any

contraceptive services thatwouldotherwisebe required to

becovered; theorganization isorganizedandoperatesasa

nonprofit entity; and the organization holds itself out as a

religiousorganization.The form states thattheorganiza

tionor

its

plan

must

provide

acopy

of

this

certification

to

theplanshealth insurance issuer(for insuredhealthplans)

orathirdpartyadministrator(forselfinsuredhealthplans)


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6 No.133853

inorderfortheplantobeaccommodatedwithrespecttothe

contraceptivecoverage

requirement.

So

Notre

Dame

was

required togivecopiesboth toAetnaand to theemployee

plansthirdpartyadministrator,Meritain.

TheAffordableCareActrequiresprovidersofhealthin

surance(includingthirdpartyadministratorsofselfinsured

healthplans,even though theyareconduitsrather thanul

timatepayorsofplanbenefits)topayforcontraceptivesfor

women, see 45 C.F.R. 147.131(c)(2)(i)(B), (ii); 29 C.F.R.

2590.7152713A(b)(3); the form alerts Aetna and Meritain

thatsince

Notre

Dame

is

not

going

to

pay,

they

will

have

to

pay.Thecompanieshaveneitherreligiousobjectionstopay

ing for contraception nor financial objections. The govern

ment will reimburse at least 110percentof the thirdparty

administrators (Meritains) costs, 45 C.F.R. 156.50(d)(3),

and Aetna can expect to recoup its costs of contraceptive

coverage from savings on pregnancy medical care, since

there will be fewer pregnancies if contraception is more

broadly available, at no cost, to Notre Dames female em

ployeesand

students,

as

well

as

from

other

regulatory

off

sets.SeeCoverageofCertainPreventiveServicesUnderthe

AffordableCareAct,supra,78Fed.Reg.at3987778.

The regulations require Aetna and Meritain, but not

Notre Dame, to inform the universitys female employees

and students that those companies willbe covering their

contraceptive costs. See 26 C.F.R. 54.98152713A(d); 29

C.F.R.2590.7152713A(d).Thecompaniesmayeitherpro

videpaymentsforcontraceptiveservicesthemselvesor,al

ternatively,

arrange

for

an

issuer

or

other

entity

to

provide

paymentsforthoseservices;eitherway,theymaynotim

pos[e]anycostsharingrequirements(suchasacopayment,


7/44

No.133853 7

coinsurance,oradeductible),orimpos[e]apremium,fee,or

othercharge,

or

any

portion

thereof,

directly

or

indirectly,

on theeligibleorganization, thegrouphealthplan,orplan

participants or beneficiaries. 29 C.F.R. 2590.715

2713A(b)(2),(c)(2).Theregulationsthusseekanaccommoda

tionbetweenthesecularintereststhatmotivatethemandate

to provide contraceptive services to women free of charge

andtheinterestsofreligiousinstitutionsthatprovidehealth

services. Accommodation is consistent with thebalancing

act required by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(substantialburden,

compelling

governmental

interest,

leastrestrictivemeans).

When thenew regulationswerepromulgated inJulyof

lastyear,NotreDamedidnotat firstbringanew suit (re

member that itsprevioussuit,broughtwhen theuniversity

was excluded from opting out of contraceptive coverage,

had been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, and those

groundsareirrelevanttoasuitchallengingthenewregula

tions).Monthspassed.NotuntilDecemberdid theuniver

sityfile

the

present

suit.

The

delay

in

suing

was

awkward,

since theregulationswere to takeeffectwithrespect to the

employeehealthplananddidtakeeffectonJanuary1of

this year. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under

theAffordableCareAct,supra,78Fed.Reg.at39889.(The

studenthealthplan,however,theAetnaplan,hasuntilAu

gust of this year to comply. See id.; University of Notre

Dame,20132014StudentInjuryandSicknessInsurancePlan3,

5,http://uhs.nd.edu/assets/108455/nd_brochure_1314.pdf.)

With

the

January

deadline

for

compliance

with

the

regu

lationsapplicabletotheemployeeplanlooming,theuniver

sity,lessthanaweekafterfilingitssecondsuitonDecember


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8 No.133853

3,movedfortheentryofapreliminary injunction.Thedis

trictcourt

denied

the

motion

on

December

20,

and

Notre

Damefileditsappealfromthatdenialthesameday.OnDe

cember31,thelastdaybeforeitwouldbepenalizedforvio

lating the regulations,NotreDame signedEBSAForm 700

andtherebyoptedoutofpayingforcontraceptivecoverage

foritsemployees.

Becausetheappealasksustoreversethedistrictcourts

denialofapreliminaryinjunction,weneedtoemphasizethe

limitations on our consideration of the appeal that result

fromits

interlocutory

character

(that

is,

from

the

fact

that

it

wasbeforecompletionofthelitigationinthedistrictcourt).

The lawsuit was only a few weeks old when the district

judge suspended all proceedings in his court pending our

considerationof theappeal.Thepartieshavethushadlittle

opportunitytopresentevidence.Sothequestionbeforeusis

not whether Notre Dames rights havebeen violatedbut

whether thedistrictjudgeabusedhisdiscretion inrefusing

tograntapreliminaryinjunction.Thatdependsonsuchcon

siderationsas

whether

Notre

Dame

will

experience

irrepara

ble harm if denied preliminary reliefthat is, harm that

cannotbeeliminatedbya finaljudgment in favorofNotre

Dameaswellason the likelihood that theuniversitywill

winitscasewhenthecaseisfinallytriedinthedistrictcourt.

Kraft FoodsGroup Brands LLC v.Cracker BarrelOldCountry

Store, Inc.,735F.3d735,74041 (7thCir.2013).Weempha

sizethatwiththeevidentiaryrecordvirtuallyablank,every

thing we say in this opinion about the merits of Notre

Dames claim and the governments (and intervenors) re

sponseis

necessarily

tentative,

and

should

not

be

considered

aforecastoftheultimateresolutionofthisstillsoyoungliti

gation.


9/44

No.133853 9

Aninitialpuzzleisthattheuniversityhasnttolduswhat

exactlyit

wants

enjoined

at

this

stage

in

the

litigation.

It

has

goneaheadandsignedtheEBSAForm700andsentcopies

to Aetna and Meritain, and the latter has notified Notre

Dames employees of the contraceptive coverage that it is

offeringthem.(Aetnahasnotnotifiedthestudents;remem

berthatithasuntilAugusttodoso.)Theuniversityhasthus

compliedwiththestatute,albeitunderduress.Thepenalties

forviolatingtheapplicableregulationsareindeedstiff:$100

perdayforeach individual towhomsuchfailurerelates,

26U.S.C.

4980D(b)(1),

which

would

cost

Notre

Dame

roughly$685,000perday,assumingplausibly thathalf the

13,700 covered employees, students, and dependents are

womenthus$250millionperyear.Thereisanannualcap

onsuchpenaltiesof$500,000,butitisapplicableonlytoun

intentional violations of the regulations. 4980D(c)(3). If

NotreDamedropped itsemployeehealthplan, thepenalty

wouldbe only $2,000 per fulltime employee per year, 26

U.S.C.4980H(a),(c)(1),orroughly$10millionayear.That

iswellwithinNotreDamesabilitytopaybutisstillanum

ber largeenough tocaptureauniversityadministratorsat

tention.

Butweareleftwiththequestion:whatdoesNotreDame

wantustodo?Tellitthatitcantearuptheformwithoutin

curring a penalty for doing so, even though the govern

mentsregulationsrequire thereligious institution toretain

itaftersigningit,26C.F.R.54.98152713A(a)(4),thoughnot

tosubmit it to thegovernment?Butwhateffectwould that

haveexcepttorescindtheuniversitysexemptionfromthe

requirementof

paying

for

the

contraceptive

services

that

Meritain isnowofferingasaconsequenceofNotreDames

choosing to exempt itself from the contraception regula


10/44

10 No.133853

tions?Nocertification,noexemption.Weimaginethatwhat

theuniversity

wants

is

an

order

forbidding

Aetna

and

Mer

itain toprovideanycontraceptivecoverage toNotreDame

stafforstudentspendingfinaljudgmentinthedistrictcourt.

Butwecantissuesuchanorder;neitherAetnanorMeritain

isadefendant(theuniversitysfailuretojointhemasdefen

dantspuzzlesus),sounlessanduntiltheyarejoinedasde

fendantstheycantbeorderedbythedistrictcourtorbythis

courttodoanything.Furthermore,whileareligiousinstitu

tionhasabroadimmunityfrombeingrequiredtoengagein

actsthat

violate

the

tenets

of

its

faith,

it

has

no

right

to

pre

ventother institutions,whether thegovernmentorahealth

insurance company, from engaging in acts that merely of

fendtheinstitution.Lyngv.NorthwestIndianCemeteryProtec

tiveAssn,485U.S.439,45051(1988);Bowenv.Roy,476U.S.

693,699700(1986).

The regulation towhichNotreDame takes the sharpest

exceptionstatesthatthecopyoftheselfcertification[EBSA

Form700]providedbytheeligible[tooptout]organization

[NotreDame]

to

athird

party

administrator

[Meritain]

(in

cludingnoticeoftheeligibleorganizationsrefusaltoadmin

ister or fund contraceptivebenefits) shallbe an instru

ment under which the plan is operated, [and] shall be

treatedasadesignationof the thirdpartyadministratoras

theplanadministratorundersection3(16)ofERISAforany

contraceptive services required to be covered under

2590.7152713(a)(1)(iv)ofthischaptertowhichtheeligible

organization objects on religious grounds. 29 C.F.R.

2510.316.NotreDametreatsthisregulationasmakingits

mailingthe

certification

form

to

its

third

party

administrator

thecauseoftheprovisionofcontraceptiveservicestoitsem

ployees, in violation of its religiousbeliefs. Not so. Since


11/44

No.133853 11

thereisnowafederalright,unquestionedbyNotreDame,to

femalecontraceptive

services,

the

effect

of

the

universitys

exerciseofitsreligiousexemptionistothrowtheentirebur

denofadministrationoftherightontheentities(Aetnaand

Meritain) thatprovidehealthservices toNotreDamesstu

dents and staff. The university is permitted to opt out of

providing federally mandated contraceptive services, and

the federal government determines (enlists, drafts, con

scripts)substituteproviders,andnaturallytheyarethepro

viderswhoarealreadyprovidinghealthservicestotheuni

versitypersonnel.

Fearingthepenaltiesforviolatingthecontraceptiveregu

lation,theuniversityhascompliedandasaresultAetnaand

Meritainhavebeendesignated toprovide theNotreDame

staffandstudentswithfemalecontraceptiveservices.Unlike

theLittleSistersofthePoor,whofiledtheirsuitinSeptem

beroflastyear,wellbeforetheJanuary1deadlineforcom

pliance with the contraceptive regulation, and obtained a

stay pending appealequivalent to a preliminary injunc

tionbeforehaving

to

comply,

see

Little

Sisters

of

the

Poor

Homefor theAgedv.Sebelius,134S.Ct.893 (Dec.31,2013),

NotreDamefiledsuitatthelastminute.Itcouldhavesued

in July, when the regulations were amended to include

NotreDameasareligiousorganizationentitled tocontinue

refusingtopayforcontraceptiveservices.Still,NotreDamescompliancehasnotmootedthecase.

Onecanimagineanalternativeformofrelieftoturningthe

clockback;andbeingabletoimagineanalternativeformof

relief

is

all

thats

required

to

keep

a

case

alive

after

the

pri

mary relief sought is no longer available.Hoosier Environ

mentalCouncilv.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers,722F.3d1053,


12/44

12 No.133853

105758 (7th Cir. 2013). For example, the university could

askthe

district

court

(because

the

case

is

before

us

on

an

in

terlocutoryappeal,ourrulingwillnotend the litigation) to

orderthegovernmenttonotifyallofNotreDamesstudents

andemployeesoftheuniversitysexemptionfromhavingto

providecontraceptionandofitsoppositiontohavingtono

tifyAetnaandMeritainoftheirdutiesundertheAffordable

CareActwithregardtocontraceptiveservices.

Buthereweneedtoremindthereaderthattheonlyissue

beforeusiswhetherNotreDameisentitledtoapreliminary

injunction.It

faces

an

uphill

struggle

for

that

relief.

One

rea

sonisthatbecauseoftheuncertaintyinvolvedinbalancing

theconsiderationsthatbearonthedecisionwhethertogrant

a preliminary injunctionan uncertainty amplifiedby the

unavoidablehastewithwhichthedistrictjudgemuststrike

thebalanceweappellatejudgesreviewhisdecisiondefer

entially.PlannedParenthoodofWisconsin,Inc.v.VanHollen,

738F.3d786,795 (7thCir.2013).Anotherobstacle is thata

sinequanon for such relief isproofof irreparableharm if

theinjunction

is

denied:

A

plaintiff

seeking

apreliminary

injunctionmustestablishthatheislikelytosufferirrepa

rable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.Winter v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008).For if the harm canbe fully repaired in the final

judgment,thereisnoreasontohurrytheadjudicativeproc

ess.KraftFoodsGroupBrandsLLCv.CrackerBarrelOldCoun

tryStore,Inc.,supra,735F.3dat740.Aswecannotfigureout

whatNotreDamewantsinthewayofpreliminaryrelief,we

cannotmake a determination that itwill suffer irreparable

harmif

we

affirm

the

denial

of

such

relief.


13/44

No.133853 13

Another requirement for preliminary relief is that the

plaintiffbe

likely

to

win

its

suit

in

the

district

court.

The

Su

premeCourtsdecisionintheWintercasestatesflatlythata

plaintiffseekingapreliminaryinjunctionmustestablishthat

heislikelytosucceedonthemerits.555U.S.at20.Sohav

ingexplainedtheotherobjectionstotheappealletsturnto

themerits.

Notre Dames principal claim is thatby requiring the

universitytofilloutEBSAForm700andgivecopiestoAet

na and Meritain, the government has substantially bur

den[ed]apersons

exercise

of

religion

(the

university

is

a

nonprofit corporate person; cf. 1 U.S.C. 1; Korte v. Se

belius,735F.3d654,674(7thCir.2013)),andthatnocompel

ling governmental interest justifies that burdening. Reli

giousFreedomRestorationAct,supra.Buttheuniversityhas

notyetshownthatthereisasubstantialburden.Theformis

two pages long737 words, most of itboringboilerplate;

the passages we quoted earlier, the only ones of conse

quence,consistofonly95words.Signingtheformandmail

ingit

to

Meritain

and

Aetna

could

have

taken

no

more

than

fiveminutes.Theuniversityclaims that thereareotherpa

perworkrequirements; therearent.Theonlycolorablebur

denitcomplainsabouthasnothingtodowithtimeorcost;it

is thatby fillingout the formandsending it to thecompa

niesittriggerstheircoverageofthecontraceptioncostsof

the universitys female employees and students, and that

thismakes theuniversityanaccomplice in theprovisionof

contraception,inviolationofCatholicdoctrine,whichinthe

name of avoiding scandal forbids the encouragement

(equivalentto

aiding

and

abetting)

of

sinful

acts.


14/44

14 No.133853

Thetrigger theorywas stated clearly,which isnot to

sayconvincingly,

in

arecent

district

court

decision

where

we

read thattheselfcertification formrequires the [religious]

organizations todomuchmore than simplyprotestorob

ject.Thepurposeoftheformistoenabletheprovisionofthe

verycontraceptiveservices to theorganizationsemployees

that the organization finds abhorrent. East Texas Baptist

Universityv.Sebelius,2013WL6838893,at*20(S.D.Tex.Dec.

27,2013).Thekeywordisenable,anditsinaccurate.Fed

erallaw,notthereligiousorganizationssigningandmailing

theform,

requires

health

care

insurers,

along

with

third

party administrators of selfinsured health plans, to cover

contraceptiveservices.ByrefusingtofillouttheformNotre

Damewouldsubjectitselftopenalties,butAetnaandMerit

ainwouldstillberequiredbyfederallawtoprovidetheser

vicestotheuniversitysstudentsandemployeesunlessand

untiltheircontractualrelationwithNotreDameterminated.

(Obviously if they were no longer providing any health

benefitstotheuniversitysstudentsandstafftheywouldnot

beprovidingthemwithanycontraceptiveservicesorcover

age.)

NotreDamesaysnothathaditnotfilledouttheform,

Meritain and Aetna wouldnt havebeen authorized to pro

videcontraceptiveservicesbecauseneitherwouldhavebeen

a plan administrator under section 3(16) of ERISA, 29

U.S.C.1002(16),andthuswouldnothavebeenplanfiduci

aries entitled to make expenditures (as for costs of contra

ceptives)onbehalfoftheplan.Astheplanssponsor,Notre

Dame isaloneauthorized todesignateaplan fiduciary,29

U.S.C.1102(a)(2),

and

it

made

that

designation

in

the

form

and thus is complicit in the provision of contraceptives to

theuniversitysstudentsandstaff.


15/44

No.133853 15

Thisargumentwasmade for the first timeatoralargu

ment,and

so

has

been

forfeited.

In

any

event

its

unconvinc

ing. For one thing it fails to distinguishbetween Meritain

andAetnathe latter is thestudentshealth insurerandso

alreadyaplanfiduciary,29U.S.C.1002(21)(A),andthere

fore requiredby theAffordableCareAct toprovide (come

August)contraceptivecoveragetoplanmemberswhetheror

not Notre Dame signs the form. 45 C.F.R. 147.

130(a)(1)(iv),147.131(f).EvenastoMeritain,althoughmany

agreements between third party administrators and plan

sponsorsprohibit

third

party

administrators

from

serving

as

fiduciaries, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Un

der theAffordableCareAct, supra,78Fed.Reg.at39879,

many is not all or even most. Notre Dame has pre

sentednoevidencethatitscontractwithMeritainforbidsthe

lattertobeaplanfiduciary.

Moreover,theuniversityhasnotbeentoldtonameMer

itain as a plan fiduciary. Rather, the signed form shall be

treated as a designation of the third party administrator as

theplan

administrator

under

section

3(16)

of

ERISA

for

any

contraceptive services required to be covered. 29 C.F.R.

2510.316(b)(emphasisadded).Treatedanddesignatedby

whom? By the government. The delivery of a copy of the

formtoMeritainremindsitofanobligationthatthelaw,not

theuniversity, imposeson ittheobligation topickup the

ball ifNotreDamedecides,as is itsright, todrop it.Notre

DamessigningtheformnomoretriggersMeritainsobli

gation to provide contraceptive services than a tortfeasors

declaringbankruptcytriggershiscotortfeasorsjointand

severalliability

for

damages.

Meritain

must

provide

the

ser

vicesnomatterwhat;signing the formsimplyshifts the fi

nancialburdenfromtheuniversitytothegovernment.


16/44

16 No.133853

Thepartieshavenot toldus the termsofNotreDames

contractswith

these

providers.

For

all

we

know,

the

con

tracts permit the university at any time to disable them

from providing medical services, including contraceptive

services, simplyby ceasing todobusinesswith them.Stu

dents and employees would make their own health insur

ancearrangementsmoststudentsalreadydo (76percent),

andsodomanystaff(12percent).NotreDamewouldbeoff

thehookwithouthavingtosignthecertificationform.

The followingexamplemayhelpmakeclear the fallacy

inNotre

Dames

triggering

metaphor.

Suppose

the

United

States, like Canada and manyother foreign nations, had a

singlepayerhealth care system.Thatmeans thegovern

mentpaysthecostofcoveredmedicalservices(iftheUnited

Stateshadsuchasystem,itwouldbetheequivalentofMed

icare foreveryone), rather thanemployers,health insurers,

andpatients, thoughpatientsmay inasinglepayersystem

bechargeddirectly for someof theexpenseof themedical

care provided by the system, as distinct from indirectly

throughtaxes.

Now

suppose

our

hypothetical

single

payer

system paid the full expense of female contraceptives. We

dontthinkNotreDamewouldarguethatthesystemplaced

asubstantialburdenon theuniversityscompliancewith

Catholicdoctrine.NotreDamedoesnotdeny theexistence

of legitimate secular interests, some noted at the outset of

thisopinion,thatcanjustifyafederalprogramofpayingfor

medical expenses, including contraceptive expenses. (For a

summary of those interests, see Coverage of Certain Pre

ventiveServicesUnder theAffordableCareAct, supra,78

Fed.Reg.

at

3987273.)

In

fact

we

know

it

wouldnt

object,

at

least on religious grounds,because it advised the district

court that one method by which the government could


17/44

No.133853 17

achieveitsassertedinterestswithoutforcingNotreDameto

violateits

religious

beliefs

would

be

for

the

government

to

directly provide contraceptive[s] to the universitys staff

and students and another method wouldbe for it to di

rectlyofferinsurancecoverageforcontraceptiveservices:in

eithercaseasinglepayersystem,atleastforcontraceptives.

ThemaindifferencebetweensuchasystemandtheAfford

ableCareActisthatundertheActthegovernmentinstead

of providing medical services directlyuses private insur

ance providers and health plan administrators, such as

Aetnaand

Meritain,

as

its

agents

to

provide

medical

ser

vices,subsidizedbythegovernment.

If thegovernment isentitled to require that femalecon

traceptivesbeprovided towomen freeof charge,wehave

trouble understanding how signing the form that declares

Notre Dames authorized refusal to pay for contraceptives

foritsstudentsorstaff,andmailingtheauthorizationdocu

menttothosecompanies,whichunderfederallawareobli

gated topickup the tab, couldbe thought totrigger the

provisionof

female

contraceptives.

Consider thisfurtherexample illustrativeofourdoubts.

Supposeitiswartime,thereisadraft,andaQuakeriscalled

up.ManyQuakersarepacifists,andtheirpacifismisatenet

of theirreligion.Suppose theQuakerwhosbeencalledup

tellstheselectiveservicesystemthathesaconscientiousob

jector. The selective service officer to whomhe makes this

pitchacceptsthesincerityofhisrefusaltobeararmsandex

cuseshim.ButastheQuakerleavestheselectiveserviceof

fice,

hes

told:

you

know

this

means

well

have

to

draft

someone in place of youand the Quaker replies indig

nantly that if thegovernmentdoes that, itwillbeviolating


18/44

18 No.133853

hisreligiousbeliefs.Becausehisreligion teaches thatnoone

shouldbear

arms,

drafting

another

person

in

his

place

wouldmakehimresponsibleforthemilitaryactivitiesofhis

replacement, andby doing so would substantiallyburden

hisown sincere religiousbeliefs. Would thismean thatby

exemptinghimthegovernmenthadforcedhimtotrigger

thedraftingofa replacementwhowasnota conscientious

objector, and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

wouldrequireadraftexemptionforboththeQuakerandhis

nonQuakerreplacement?Thatseemsafantasticsuggestion.

Yetconfronted

with

this

hypothetical

at

the

oral

argument,

Notre Dames counsel acknowledged its applicability and

saidthatdraftingareplacementindeedwouldsubstantially

burdentheQuakersreligion.

Anotherwaytoseetheerrorofthinkingthatbysigning

thecertificationformNotreDamewasenablingAetnaand

Meritain to violate its religious freedom is to ask what

would happen if the university refused to sign the form

while adhering to its longstanding refusal to pick up any

partof

the

cost

of

contraceptives.

The

answer

is

that

the

fe

maleemployeesandstudentswouldstillhaveafederalright

tofreecontraceptivesfromMeritainandAetnaunlessNotre

Dame stopped offering health services to its students en

tirely. Health groups would lose no time in acquainting

thoseemployeesandstudentswiththeirfederalrights.

Tonaildownthefallacyofthetriggerorenablement

interpretationsof thecertification formweneedonlyparse

carefully its instructionsthe statement thattheorganiza

tion

or

its

plan

must

provide

a

copy

of

this

certification

to

theplanshealth insurance issuer(for insuredhealthplans)

orathirdpartyadministrator(forselfinsuredhealthplans)


19/44

No.133853 19

inorderfortheplantobeaccommodatedwithrespecttothecon

traceptivecoverage

requirement

(emphasis

added).

Remember

that accommodation in this context means accommodat

ingtheAffordableCareActtoreligiousbeliefs.Theaccom

modation in thiscaseconsists in theorganizations (that is,

NotreDames)washingitshandsofanyinvolvementincon

traceptivecoverage,andtheinsurerandthethirdpartyad

ministratortakinguptheslackundercompulsionoffederal

law. Notre Dame is tellingAetna andMeritain: were ex

cusedfromthenewfederalobligationrelatingtocontracep

tion,and

in

turn,

the

government

tells

those

insurance

companiesbutyourenot.Thisisawarning,notatrigger.

Itenablesnothing.The soleenabler is the federal statute

thatNotreDamehasbeenallowedtooptoutof.

Theuniversityarguesalternativelythatiftheformisnta

trigger,itshealthplansaretheconduitthroughwhichthe

employeesandstudentsobtaincontraceptivecoverage,mak

ingNotreDamecomplicitinsin.Buttheuniversityslawyer

toldusatoralargumentthathisclientwouldhavenoprob

lemif

each

of

its

female

employees

signed

and

mailed

to

Meritain(anditsstudentsmailedtoAetna)aformsayingI

have insurance through Notre Dame, but the university

wontcovercontraceptiveservices,sonowyoumustcover

them.Wecant seehow thatwouldmake thehealthplan

lessofaconduit.

Theuniversityhas stillanother argument: that the con

traception regulation imposesasubstantialburdenon itby

forcing the university to identify[] and contract[] with a

third

party

willing

to

provide

the

very

services

Notre

Dame

deems objectionable. Its true that Meritain could exit its

contractwithNotreDamewithout liability if itdidntwant


20/44

20 No.133853

toprovidecontraceptiveservices.SeeCoverageofCertain

PreventiveServices

Under

the

Affordable

Care

Act,

supra,

78Fed.Reg.at39880.ButasMeritaindoesnotobjecttopro

viding themand isdoing soalready, theburdenalleged

byNotreDame isentirelyspeculativeandsonotaground

forequitablerelief.SeeCityofLosAngelesv.Lyons,461U.S.

95,10405(1983).

ThenoveltyofNotreDamesclaimnot for theexemp

tion,whichithas,butfortherighttohaveitwithouthaving

toaskforitdeservesemphasis.UnitedStateslawandpub

licpolicy

have

ahistory

of

accommodating

religious

beliefs,

asbyallowingconscientiousobjectiontothemilitarydraft

andnowexemptingchurchesandreligiousinstitutionsfrom

theAffordableCareActs requirementsofcoverageofcon

traceptive services.Whatmakes thiscaseandothers like it

involving thecontraceptionexemptionparadoxicalandvir

tuallyunprecedentedisthatthebeneficiariesofthereligious

exemptionareclaimingthattheexemptionprocessitselfim

posesasubstantialburdenontheirreligiousfaiths.Theclos

estanalogues

we

have

found

are

cases

in

which

churches

seekingrezoningorvariancesclaimthattheprocessforob

tainingpermissionissocumbersomeastoconstituteasub

stantialburdenonreligiouspractice.E.g.,SaintsConstantine

&HelenGreekOrthodoxChurch,Inc.v.CityofNewBerlin,396

F.3d895,901(7thCir.2005),andcasescitedthere.Consider

alsoUnitedStates v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 94748 (10th Cir.

2008),inwhichamemberofatribehadbeenprosecutedfor

killing,withoutapermittodoso,abaldeagle,foruseina

religiousceremony.Thecourtexpressedskepticismthatthe

permittingprocess

itself

might

have

imposed

asubstantial

burdenonareligiousexercise.Cf.UnitedStatesv.Oliver,255

F.3d588,589(8thCir.2001)(percuriam).


21/44

No.133853 21

Theprocessofclaimingonesexemptionfromthedutyto

providecontraceptive

coverage

is

the

opposite

of

cumber

some. It amounts to signing ones name and mailing the

signedformtotwoaddresses.NotreDamemayconsiderthe

process a substantialburden,but substantialitylike com

pelling governmental interestis for the court to decide.

Mahoneyv.Doe,642F.3d1112,1121(D.C.Cir.2011).Other

wisetherewouldhavebeennoneedforCongressintheRe

ligious Freedom Restoration Act to prefix substantial to

burden.

NotreDame

can

derive

no

support

from

our

decision

in

Kortev.Sebelius,735F.3d654(7thCir.2013),heavilycitedin

theuniversitysbriefs.Thequestioninthatcasewaswhether

twoforprofitcompaniesthathadhealthplansfortheirem

ployeescouldrefuse,becauseofthereligiousbeliefsoftheir

Catholic owners, to comply with the contraceptive regula

tion.Weorderedthedistrictcourttoenterapreliminaryin

junctionagainstenforcing themandateagainst theemploy

ers. But Notre Dame is authorized to refuse, and it has re

fused.Provided

it

overcomes

the

intervenors

sincerity

at

tack in the district court when the litigation resumes there

(seebelow), itwillbe in thesameposition thatweallowed

thecompanyownersintheKortecasetooccupypendingthe

resolutionoftheircase:fullyentitledtothumbitsnoseatthe

contraceptiveregulation.

Weneed to say somethingabout the threeNotreDame

students whom we have allowed to intervene. They had

filedatimelymotioninthedistrictcourttointerveneinthat

court

under

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

24.

Having

stayed

the

litigation

pending theresolutionof thisappeal, thedistrictjudgedid

notruleonit,sothestudentsmovedforleavetointervenein


22/44

22 No.133853

this court. Although the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce

duredo

not

provide

for

intervention

other

than

in

cases

in

volving review of certain administrative rulings, interven

tion ispermitted inothercasesasamatterof federalcom

monlaw,withRule24supplyingthestandardfordetermin

ingwhether topermit intervention inaparticularcase.Au

tomobileWorkersv.Scofield,382U.S.205,217n.10(1965);Si

erraClub, Inc. v.EPA, 358F.3d 516, 51718 (7th Cir. 2004).

Thestudentintervenorsinourcaseexpressconcernthatthe

university isseeking toobtainaruling from thiscourt that

maythwart

their

right

to

contraception

under

the

Affordable

Care Act. The concern is natural though perhaps exagger

ated,sinceNotreDamehascompliedfullywiththeAct,but

wedecidedthattheconcernwassufficienttowarrantinter

vention.Andwedecided topermit the intervenors topar

ticipate under pseudonymsbecause of the privacy interest

involved in contraceptive use and their concern that they

mightbe subjected to harassment were their identities re

vealed. When the litigation in the district court resumes,

theypresumablywillbeallowedtointerveneinthedistrict

court.

In thebrief theyve filed in this court they say they in

tend,when litigation in thedistrictcourt resumes, topress

the issueofsincerity.Toobtain thecontraceptiveexemp

tion, or other exemptions from secular requirements, the

leadershipofareligiousorganizationmustactuallybelieve,

not simply pretend, that its religious teachings require the

exemption.See,e.g.,Gonzalesv.OCentroEspiritaBeneficente

UniaodoVegetal,546U.S.418,42829(2006);InternationalSo

cietyfor

Krishna

Consciousness,

Inc.

v.

Barber,

650

F.2d

430,

441

(2dCir.1981).Althoughthegovernmenthasnotquestioned

Notre Dames sincerity, the intervenorsbrief has. It inti


23/44

No.133853 23

mates thataplausible inferencefrom the timingand tactics

employedby

Notre

Dame

in

this

litigation

is

that

in

chal

lenging the contraception regulation the university is re

sponding to outside pressures. We express no opinion on

whether the intervenors willbe able to substantiate their

doubtsaboutthesincerityofNotreDamesoppositiontothe

useofcontraceptives,when,upontheresumptionoftheliti

gationinthedistrictcourt,theyhaveanopportunitytopre

sentevidence.

For now the important point is that Notre Dame has

failedto

demonstrate

asubstantial

burden.

We

find

support

for this conclusion inJudgeDavidTatelsdissent from the

grant (made without accompanying explanation) of an in

junction pending appeal in Priestsfor Life v. U.S. Dept of

Health&Human Services, No. 135368, and Roman Catholic

Archbishop ofWashington v. Sebelius, No. 135371 (D.C. Cir.

Dec.31,2013)(percuriam):

BecauseCongresshasimposedanindependentobliga

tionon insurers toprovidecontraceptivecoveragetoAp

pellantsemployees,

those

employees

will

receive

contra

ceptivecoveragefromtheirinsurersevenifAppellantsself

certifybutnotbecauseAppellantsselfcertify.Inother

words, itwasCongressthatauthorizedinsurerstopro

vide contraceptive coverage to Appellants employees

servicesthoseemployeeswillreceiveregardlessofwheth

erAppellantsselfcertify.

AlthoughwemustacceptAppellantsassertionthat

the scheme itself violates their religiousbeliefs, we need

not accept their legal conclusion that their purported in

volvementin

that

scheme

qualifies

as

asubstantial

burden

underRFRA.Cf.Kaemmerlingv.Lappin,553F.3d669,679

(D.C.Cir.2008)(Acceptingastruethefactualallegations


24/44

24 No.133853

that Kaemmerlingsbeliefs are sincere and of a religious

naturebutnot

the

legal

conclusion,

cast

as

afactual

alle

gation, that his religious exercise is substantially bur

denedwe conclude that Kaemmerling does not allege

factssufficienttostateasubstantialburdenonhisreligious

exercise.).Appellantsparticipation is limitedtocomply

ingwithanadministrativeprocedurethatestablishesthat

theyare,ineffect,exemptfromtheveryrequirementsthey

find offensive. See id. at 678 (An inconsequential or de

minimisburdenonreligiouspracticedoesnotriseto[the

level of a substantial burden under RFRA], nor does a

burdenon

activity

unimportant

to

the

adherents

religious

scheme.). At bottom, then, Appellants religious objec

tionsaretothegovernmentsindependentactionsinman

dating contraceptive coverage, not to any action that the

government has required Appellants themselves to take.

ButAppellantshavenorighttorequire theGovernment

to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport

with the religiousbeliefs of particular citizens.Bowen v.

Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986). Religious organizations are

requiredtofilemanyformswiththegovernment,suchas

applications

for

tax

exemptions,

even

though

they

may

have religious objections to a whole host of government

policiesandprograms.

Id. at 34 (emphases in original). See alsoJudgeJacksons

districtcourtdecision intheRomanCatholicArchbishopcase,

denying preliminary relief. 2013 WL 6729515 (D.D.C. Dec.

20,2013).

NotreDamedoesntplaceallitseggsintheRFRAsub

stantialburdenbasket,butonlytwoofitsotherarguments

warrant

discussion.

(The

rest

add

nothing

to

its

RFRA

ar

guments.) The first is that the exemption for religious em

ployers(essentiallychurches,asdistinctfromotherreligious


25/44

No.133853 25

organizations, such as Catholic universities, see 45 C.F.R.

147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B))

violates

the

establishment

clause

of

the

FirstAmendmentbecauseitfavorscertaintypesofreligious

organizations (churches or other houses of worship) over

others (like Notre Dame). The religious employer doesnt

havetosignormailacertificationforminordertoclaimits

exemption; its exemption from the contraceptive guideline

appears to be automatic. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 147.130

(a)(1)(iv)(A);U.S.HealthResources&ServicesAdministra

tion,WomensPreventiveServicesGuidelines,supra;U.S.

Departmentof

Labor,

Affordable

Care

Act

Regulations

and

Guidance, www.dol.gov/ebsa/healthreform/regulations/

coverageofpreventiveservices.html.Butreligiousemployers,

definedasinthecitedregulation,havelongenjoyedadvan

tages(notably taxadvantages)overotherentities,26U.S.C.

6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii), without these advantages being

thoughttoviolatetheestablishmentclause.See,e.g.,Walzv.

TaxCommissionofCityofNewYork,397U.S.664,666,67273

(1970). The establishment clause does not require the gov

ernmenttoequalizetheburdens(orthebenefits)thatlawsof

generalapplicabilityimposeonreligiousinstitutions.Alaw

exemptingchurchesorother religiousproperty fromprop

erty taxes willbenefit religious denominations that own a

greatdealofproperty,tothedisadvantageofdenominations

with modest property holdings (such as storefront

churches).Thisunequaleffectdoesnotcondemnthelaw.

Notre Dames second nonRFRA claim, which is more

substantial, is that the regulations violate the freespeech

clauseoftheFirstAmendmentbyprovidingthatanexempt

organization,such

as

Notre

Dame,

must

not,

directly

or

in

directly,seek to interferewitha thirdpartyadministrators

arrangements to provideor arrange separatepayments for


26/44

26 No.133853

contraceptive services for participants orbeneficiaries, and

mustnot,

directly

or

indirectly,

seek

to

influence

the

third

party administrators decision to make any such arrange

ments. 29 C.F.R. 2590.7152713A(b)(1)(iii); 26 C.F.R.

54.98152713A(b)(1)(iii).Obviously thereare formsofin

fluencethatarenotprotectedbythespeech,press,orpeti

tion for redress of grievances clauses of the First Amend

ment. But most speech or writing intended to influence

someonesdecisiontopersuade someone todoornotdo

somethingisprotected.

Thereis

agreat

variety

of

female

contraceptives,

see

U.S.

Food&DrugAdministration,BirthControl;MedicinesTo

Help You, www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwo

men/freepublications/ucm313215.htm, including agreat va

rietyjust of contraceptive pills. Mayo Clinic, Choosing a

Birth Control Pill, www.mayoclinic.org/bestbirthcontrol

pill/art20044807.NotreDamesstudenthealthservicemight

haveviewsconcerningtherelativemedicalrisksofdifferent

female contraceptives; it would certainly be entitled to

communicatethose

views

to

its

third

party

administrator,

Meritain. Its true that the regulation requires provision of

all FDAapproved female contraceptives,but the health

service could try to persuade the administrator to recom

mend to the physicians in its network one FDAapproved

drugoveranother,suchasprogestinIUDsovercopperones,

oreventoadvisetheFDAtoalteritslistofapprovedfemale

contraceptives. The university has a responsibility for the

healthandsafetyofitsstudentsandstaff.

A

footnote

in

the

commentary

to

the

regulation

states

thatnothing in thesefinalregulationsprohibitsaneligible

organization from expressing its opposition to the use of


27/44

No.133853 27

contraceptives. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services

Underthe

Affordable

Care

Act,

supra,

78

Fed.

Reg.

at

39880

n.41.Thatsnotveryreassuring.Theexamplewegavewas

notofastatementofoppositiontotheuseofcontraceptives,

butofastatementintendedtoinfluencethechoiceofcontra

ceptives that the thirdpartyadministratoror thehealth in

suranceproviderwouldcover.Thefootnoteisanunsatisfac

toryafterthought.

Against this itcanbeargued that the regulation isonly

aboutpayments,andnotabouttheprovisionofcontracep

tives,as

in

our

example

of

student

health

services

being

concernedwiththesafetyofparticularcontraceptives.Atthe

oralargumentthegovernmentslawyersaidthattheregula

tion, despite its wording, is not limited to wrangling over

payments; that it also concerns theprovisionof contracep

tives,asinourexampleofanattemptatinfluencethatcan

notbeprohibitedwithoutinfringingfreedomofspeech.The

regulationsspecifythecontraceptivesthathealthplansmust

provide for womennamely all Food and Drug Admini

strationapproved

contraceptive

methods,

sterilization

pro

cedures,andpatienteducationandcounselingforallwom

en with reproductive capacity, U.S. Health Resources &

Services Administration, Womens Preventive Services

Guidelines, supraand the governments lawyer seemed

(nostrongerwordispossible)toimplythatforNotreDame

tourgeaplannot toprovideaspecificsuchcontraceptive,

evenbecauseofa sincerehealthconcernby theuniversity,

wouldviolatetheinfluenceregulation.

Were

troubled

by

the

seeming

vagueness

of

the

regula

tionasdraftedandasfurthermuddiedbythefootnoteinthe

commentary (why isnt it in the regulation itself?),andwe


28/44

28 No.133853

fearthatitmayhaveperniciousconsequencesifunderstood

toforbid

or

inhibit

the

kind

of

discussion

between

the

uni

versityandthecontraceptivesproviderssketchedinthepre

cedingparagraphs.But thepartieshave failed toplace the

issue in focus.NotreDamehasnt tolduswhat itwants to

saybutfearstosay(exceptthatitatleastwantstobeableto

tellMeritainnot toprovidecontraceptivecoverageatall

which sounds like urging civil disobedience) and the gov

ernment hasnt clearly embraced an interpretation of the

regulation that would give rise to the concerns weve ex

pressed.The

issue

must,

for

now,

be

left

for

further

explora

tioninthedistrictcourt.

Twolooseendsremaintobetiedup.Theyrelatetomo

tions thatNotreDame filed in thiscourtafter filing itsap

pealbutbeforeoralargument.Firstwasamotionitfiledon

January20,sixdaysafter thestudentsmotion to intervene

wasgranted,askingustodismissitsappealorinthealterna

tivetoorderalimitedremandtothedistrictcourt;thestated

purpose of either alternative was to provide Notre Dame

withan

opportunity

to

depose

the

three

student

intervenors.

We took the motion under advisement, the appeal having

beenscheduledforimminentoralargumentwithexpedited

briefingunderwayand the intervenorshavingnotyet filed

theirbrief,whichmadethemotionpremature.Itwasappar

entthattheappealwouldberefiledafterdiscoveryrelating

to the intervenors or resumed if we ordered a limited re

mandinlieuofdismissal.Sodismissalorremandwouldbe

aninterruptionratherthanaterminationasourceofdelay

harmfultobothpartiesanddisruptiveofthiscourtssched

ule.


29/44

No.133853 29

Wehavetheauthoritytodismissanappealattheappel

lantsrequest.

Fed.

R.

App.

P.

42(b);

United

States

v.

Hager

man,549F.3d536,538(7thCir.2008).Butitisauthorization,

notcommand.E.g.,Albersv.EliLilly&Co.,354F.3d644,646

(7thCir.2004)(percuriam).Asinthecasejustcited,herewe

havethoughtitbesttocarrythroughsothattheinvest

ment of public resources already devoted to this litigation

willhavesomereturn.So themotionhas remainedpend

ing,andisnowmootin lightofouraffirmingthedenialof

preliminaryrelieftoNotreDame.

OnJanuary

28

the

university

filed

arenewed

motion

for

aninjunctionpendingappealithadfiledsuchamotionon

December23,butwehaddenied thatmotionaweek later

whenweorderedexpeditedbriefingoftheappeal.Thesole

ground for the renewed motion was the Supreme Courts

orderofJanuary24intheLittleSisterscase,2014WL272207.

ThatgroundwasanoddoneforNotreDame toassert,be

cause the university disagrees with the Courts order. The

Courtsorderconditioned the injunctionpendingappeal in

thatcase

on

the

Little

Sisters

sending

aletter

to

the

govern

ment declaring its opposition to paying for contraceptive

servicesandattheoralargumentofourcaseNotreDame

toldus that itwould consider sending such a letter an in

fringementof itsreligious freedom.Anotherdistinctionbe

tween that case and this one is that unlike Meritain, Little

Sisters thirdparty administrator, Christian Brothers, is a

churchplanadministratorand sowouldntprovide con

traceptiveservicesanyway,orberequiredtodoso.Wenow

deny therenewedmotionforan injunctionpendingappeal

asmoot

because

the

appeal

has

been

resolved.


30/44

30 No.133853

ChiefJudge Simons denial of preliminary relief in the

districtcourt

is

AFFIRMED.


31/44

No.133853 31FLAUM,CircuitJudge,dissenting.WhileNotreDamesap

pealfrom

the

district

courts

denial

of

apreliminary

injunc

tionwaspendingbeforethiscourt,wegrantedthestudents

motiontointervene.NotreDamethenmovedtodismissthe

appeal inorder to conductadditionaldiscovery in thedis

trictcourt.Dismissalwouldnotprejudicethegovernmentor

thestudentintervenors.Norwoulditinhibitthiscourtsre

viewof theultimate issues at a later stage in theproceed

ings.Because Iseeno reasonnot toacceptplaintiffsdeci

sion to proceed to trialwithout interim relief, Creaton v.

Heckler,781

F.2d

1430,

1431

(9th

Cir.

1986),

Iwould

grant

NotreDamesmotionanddismissthisappeal.

Themajoritydoesnotagree,however,andsotheappeal

remainsbefore us. Facedwith themerits, I conclude that

NotreDamehasmadeoutacredibleclaimunder theReli

giousFreedomRestorationAct.I thereforewouldgrant the

university a preliminary injunction forbidding the govern

ment from penalizingNotreDame for refusing to comply

withtheselfcertificationrequirement.

I.NotreDamefiledanemergencymotionforaninjunction

pendingappealonDecember23,2013.At thatpoint, itsat

tentionwas fixedon the loomingJanuary1,2014deadline,

thedatethatthemandateandrelevantregulationswouldgo

intoeffect.ThecourtdeniedthemotiononDecember30and

orderedexpeditedbriefing.Thefollowingday,theuniversi

tyforced, in itswords, to choosebetween potentially

ruinousfinesandcompliancewith theMandateoptedto

submitits

self

certification

form

while

it

continued

to

litigate

thisappeal.SeeNotreDame IssuesStatementonContraceptive

CareInjunctionDenial,WNDU.com(Dec.31,2013),available


32/44

32 No.133853

athttp://tinyurl.com/kyhn6op (lastvisitedFeb.20,2014).On

January14,

the

day

after

Notre

Dame

filed

its

opening

brief,

thecourtgrantedthestudentsmotiontointervene.Thestu

dentsintendedto,andinfactlaterdid,advanceanumberof

argumentsthatthegovernmenthadnotpursuedinthedis

trictcourt.Shortlythereafter,NotreDamemovedtodismiss

itsappeal.Thegovernment tooknopositionon themotion

for voluntary dismissal, and the students opposed it. The

motionwastakenunderadvisement.

Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 42 permits us to

dismissan

already

docketed

appeal

on

the

appellants

mo

tionontermsagreedtobythepartiesorfixedbythecourt.

Fed.R.App.P.42(b).Evenwherethepartiesdonotagreeon

terms,weapplyapresumption in favorofdismissal,Al

bers v.EliLilly&Co., 354F.3d 644, 646 (7thCir. 2004)as

wellwe should, for normally itmakes very little sense to

forceanappellantintocourtagainsthiswill.Thispresump

tionwouldappear tobestrongerwhen theappeal isan in

terlocutoryone.Suchadismissalwillnotprejudiceany fu

turedetermination

on

the

merits

and

will

put

the

appellee

in

noworsepositionthaniftheappellanthadnottakenanap

pealtobeginwith.Atthesametime,however,thispresump

tionmaybe overcomeby other prudential considerations.

Appellatereviewisnotabargainingchiptobeplayedand

then casually concededafter abad card isdealt. Id. (citing

U.S.BancorpMortgageCo.v.BonnerMallPship,513U.S.18

(1994)).

Invoking theAlbers case, the studentintervenorsaccuse

Notre

Dame

of

procedural

gamesmanship

for

moving

to

dismiss theappealafter itspleas forurgent reliefearlier in

thelitigation.ButforNotreDame,thecircumstancesofthis


33/44

No.133853 33casechangedsignificantlyonJanuary1,bywhichpointthe

expeditedbriefing

schedule

had

already

been

set.

They

changed yet again on January 14, when the student

intervenors entered the case.CertainlyNotreDame is not

thefirstpartytoreassessthewisdomoftakinganappealin

lightoflaterdevelopments.Cf.TyndaleHousePublishers,Inc.

v.Sebelius,No.135108,2013WL2395168 (D.C.Cir.May3,

2013)(grantingthegovernmentsopposedmotionforvolun

tarydismissalinacontraceptivemandatecasebroughtbya

forprofitreligiousemployer).Inmyjudgment,iftheuniver

sityis

willing

to

return

to

the

district

court

and

forego

any

chanceatapreliminaryinjunction,weshouldnotholditto

anexpeditedschedule that itdidnotrequestand toanap

peal involvingpartiesandarguments that itdidnotantici

pate.

Importantly,NotreDamehasnot soughtdismissal for

the purpose of evading appellate determination. United

Statesv.Wash.DeptofFisheries,573F.2d1117,1118(9thCir.

1978).Tothecontrary,theuniversitytellsusthatitfullyex

pectsto

be

back

in

this

Courteither

from

its

appeal

or

the

Governmentsappealfollowing thedistrictcourtsruling

onapermanentinjunction.Thisisafarcryfromacaselike

Albers, where counsel for the appellant essentially

conced[ed] thathedecidedafteroralargument todismiss

theappealforopportunisticreasons,inorder totryagain,

with adifferent client, at adifferent time or in adifferent

court.354F.3dat646.

ThiscaseisalsoverymuchunlikeUnitedStatesv.Hager

man,

where

we

denied

an

imputed

motion

for

voluntary

dismissalbecauseitarosewiththeappealfullybriefedand

themeritsfreefromdoubt.549F.3d536,538(7thCir.2008).


34/44

34 No.133853

NotreDamerequesteddismissalaweekbefore thegovern

mentsand

intervenors

briefs

were

due;

Notre

Dames

reply

brief(whichaddressedanumberoftheintervenorsnewar

guments)wasdueaweekafterthat.Moretothepoint,and

withrespectformycolleaguesviews,Idonotfindtheques

tion in this case tobe clear cut.There havebeen nineteen

caseschallengingtheapplicationofthemandatetoreligious

nonprofits todate,andeveryplaintiffbesidesNotreDame

hasreceivedaninjunction.1IncontrasttoHagerman,themer

1Mostplaintiffs receivedapreliminary injunction in thedistrictcourt.

SeeAveMariaFound.v.Sebelius,No.13cv15198,2014WL117425 (E.D.

Mich.Jan.13,2014);CatholicDioceseofBeaumontv.Sebelius,No.1:13cv

709,2014WL31652(E.D.Tex.Jan.2,2014);RomanCatholicDioceseofFort

Worth v. Sebelius,No. 4:12cv314 (N.D. Tex.Dec. 31, 2013) (Doc. 99);

SharpeHoldings,Inc.v.U.S.DeptofHealth&HumanServs.,No.2:12cv

92,2013WL6858588 (E.D.Mo.Dec. 30, 2013);Diocese ofFortWayneS.

Bend v. Sebelius,No. 1:12cv159, 2013WL 6843012 (N.D. Ind.Dec. 27,

2013);GraceSchs.v.Sebelius,No.3:12cv459,2013WL6842772(N.D.Ind.

Dec.27,2013);E.Tex.BaptistUniv.v.Sebelius,No.H123009,2013WL

6838893 (S.D.Tex.Dec. 27, 2013);S.NazareneUniv. v.Sebelius,No. 13

1015,2013

WL

6804265

(W.D.

Okla.

Dec.

23,

2013);

GenevaColl.v.Sebelius,

No.120207,2013WL6835094 (W.D.Pa.Dec.23,2013);ReachingSouls

Intl,Inc.vSebelius,No.131092,2013WL6804259(W.D.Okla.Dec.20,

2013);Legatusv.Sebelius,No.1212061,2013WL6768607(E.D.Mich.Dec.

20,2013);RomanCatholicArchdioceseofN.Y.v.Sebelius,No.122542,2013

WL6579764(E.D.N.Y.Dec.16,2013);Zubikv.Sebelius,No.2:13cv1459,

2013WL6118696(W.D.Pa.Nov.21,2013).Ahandfullostinthedistrict

courtbut later received an injunctiononappeal.SeeLittleSisters of the

Poorv.Sebelius,No.13cv2611,2013WL6839900(D.Colo.Dec.27,2013),

injunctionpending appealgranted,No. 13A691 (U.S.Jan. 24, 2014);Mich.

CatholicConf.v.Sebelius,No.1:13CV1247,2013WL6838707(W.D.Mich.

Dec.27,

2013),

injunctionpendingappealgranted,

No.

13

2723

(6th

Cir.

Dec.

31,2013);CatholicDioceseofNashvillev.Sebelius,No.3:131303,2013WL

6834375(M.D.Tenn.Dec.26,2013),injunctionpendingappealgranted,No.

136640 (6thCir.Dec. 31, 2013); Roman CatholicArchbishop of Wash. v.


35/44

No.133853 35itsinthiscasearehardlyfreefromdoubt.Id.Isuggestthat

grantingthe

motion

to

dismiss

the

appeal

is

the

more

pru

dentialapproach.

II.

Onthemerits,IbelievethatNotreDamehasmadeouta

credible claim that the Patient Protection and Affordable

Care Act and accompanying regulations are a substantial

burden on its exercise of religion. Accordingly, I would

grant the universitys request for apreliminary injunction.

SeeEzell

v.

City

of

Chicago,

651

F.3d

684,

694

(7th

Cir.

2011)

(setting forth the legal standard for a preliminary injunc

tion); cf.ACLU of Ill. v.Alvarez, 679F.3d 583, 589 (7thCir.

2012) (noting that the lossofFirstAmendment freedoms,

forevenminimalperiodsoftime,constitutesanirreparable

injuryforwhichdamagesarenotanadequateremedy).

TheReligiousFreedomRestorationActprovides that a

federal lawmaynotsubstantiallyburdenapersonsexer

ciseof religionunless thegovernmentdemonstrates that

application

of

the

burden

to

the

person

is

in

furtherance

ofacompellinggovernmental interestandis the leastre

strictivemeansof furthering thatcompellinggovernmental

interest. 42U.S.C. 2000bb1. For purposes of this litiga

tion, the government concedes that the leastrestrictive

means exception does not apply, sowe need only decide

Sebelius,No.131441,2013WL6729515(D.D.C.Dec.20,2013),injunction

pendingappeal

granted,

No.

13

5371

(D.C.

Cir.

Dec.

31,

2013);Priests

for

Life

v.U.S.Dept ofHealth&Human Servs.,No. 131261, 2013WL 6672400(D.D.C.Dec.19,2013),injunctionpendingappealgranted,No.135371(D.C.

Cir.Dec.31,2013).


36/44

36 No.133853

whethertheburdenthattheAffordableCareActimposeson

NotreDame

is

substantial.

InKortev.Sebelius,thiscourtsaidthatasubstantialbur

den arises when the government put[s] substantial pres

sureonanadherenttomodifyhisbehaviorandtoviolatehis

beliefs.735F.3d654,682(7thCir.2013)(quotingThomasv.

ReviewBd. of Ind.EmptDiv., 450U.S. 707,718 (1981)).Put

anotherway,governmentactionsubstantiallyburdens reli

gious exercise if it necessarilybears direct, primary, and

fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exer

ciseeffectively

impracticable.

CivilLibertiesforUrbanBe

lieversv.CityofChicago,342F.3d752,761(7thCir.2003)(in

terpretingaparallelprovisionintheReligiousLandUseand

InstitutionalizedPersonsAct).

ItisclearthatifNotreDamewereforcedtopayforcon

traceptivecoverageagainstitsreligiousbeliefsorelse incur

significantmonetarypenalties, thiswouldbe a substantial

burden.SeeKorte, 735F.3d at 68285.Unlike the forprofit

plaintiffsinKorte,however,theuniversityhasanadditional

choice:aspecially

crafted

accommodation

whereby

the

ob

jectingemployergivesnoticetoitsinsurancecarrierandthe

insurer issues a separate policywith themandated cover

age.Id.at662.Thisaccommodationpermitsareligiousor

ganizationtodischargeitsobligationstoprovidecontracep

tive coverageby selfcertif[ying], in a form andmanner

specifiedby the [government], that the organization op

posesproviding coverage for some or all contraceptive

servicesonaccountofreligiousobjections,isorganized

and

operates

as

a

nonprofit

entity,

and

holds

itself

out

as

a

religious organization. 26 C.F.R. 54.98152713A(a).

Amongother things, theorganizationmustprovideacopy


37/44

No.133853 37oftheselfcertificationform,knownasEBSAForm700,toits

insuranceissuer

or

third

party

administrator;

those

entities

are thenrequired tooffersegregatedcontraceptiveservices

directly toplanparticipantsandbeneficiaries. Id.54.9815

2713A(b)(c). However, if the organization does not self

certifyandalsodoesnotprovide therequired,religiously

objectionablecoverageitcontinuestofacethesameruin

ousfinesthatconstitutedasubstantialburdeninKorte.735

F.3dat684.

Idonotquestionthattheaccommodationisthegovern

mentsgood

faith

attempt

to

meet

religious

objectors

half

way, and itmakes this a somewhat closer case thanKorte.

Nevertheless, by putting substantial pressure on Notre

Dame toact inways that (as theuniversitysees it) involve

the university in the provision of contraceptives, Ibelieve

thattheaccommodationstillrunsafoulofRFRA.

The district court reasoned that the selfcertification

schemeisnotasubstantialburdenbecausetheschemedoes

notrequiretheuniversitytomodifyitsbehaviorinanyway.

Accordingto

the

court,

Notre

Dame

need

only

step

aside

fromcontraceptioncoverage,asithasalwaysdoneandmost

assuredlywouldalwaysdo.Similarly,thegovernmenttells

usthatbyselfcertifying,theuniversityissimplycomplet

ingaformconveyingthattheUniversitydoesnotintendto

providecontraceptivecoverage.

Idonotviewtherequiredactsomechanistically.Theac

commodationdoesnotmerely require the religiousorgani

zation to step aside from contraceptive coverage. It re

quiresthe

organization

to

perform

anew

act

that

it

did

not

havetoperformbefore:completinganddeliveringtoitsin

surer or thirdparty administrator the official EBSA Form


38/44

38 No.133853

700. In the universitys eyes, this forms purpose and ef

fectevidentfrom

the

face

of

the

regulationsis

to

ac

complishwhat theorganization finds religiously forbidden

andprotests.E.Tex.BaptistUniv.v.Sebelius,No.H123009,

2013WL 6838893, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2013). As to

healthplans administeredby thirdparty administrators in

particular,theformflatlystatesthatitisaninstrumentun

derwhichtheplanisoperated.HavingtosubmittheEBSA

Form 700,NotreDamemaintains,makes itcomplicit ina

gravemoralwrongby involving itwithasystem thatde

liverscontraceptive

products

and

services

to

its

employees

andstudents.

Themajorityhas troubleaccepting thisposition, inpart

due to the universitys statement that its signature will

trigger contraceptive coverage,because themajority un

derstands federal law to requirecontraceptivecoverage re

gardlessofwhatNotreDamesignsordoesnotsign.Butsee

RomanCatholicArchbishop ofWash. v. Sebelius,No. 131441,

2013WL6729515,at *17, *22 (D.D.C.Dec.20,2013) (distin

guishingbetween

group

health

insurers,

which

have

an

in

dependentobligationunder theregulations toprovidecon

traceptive coverage, and thirdparty administrators,which

donot).Yetwearejudges,notmoralphilosophersortheo

logians; this isnotaquestionof legalcausationbutof reli

gious faith.NotreDame tellsus thatCatholicdoctrinepro

hibits theaction that thegovernmentrequires it to take.So

longasthatbeliefissincerelyheld,Ibelieveweshoulddefer

toNotreDamesunderstanding.2

2Theintervenorsinsinuatethatsincerityisatissue,hintingatthepossi

bility of lastminute influenceby a group called the Sycamore Trust.

Whilethedistrictcourtmayfindawarrantforthissuggestiononcedis


39/44

No.133853 39ThedistrictcourtreliedinpartonBowenv.Roy,476U.S.

693(1986),

and

derivatively

Kaemmerlingv.Lappin,

553

F.3d

669 (D.C. Cir. 2008), which the court thought foreclosed

NotreDamesobjectiontoamereadministrativetool,used

to relieveNotreDameof liability fornotprovidingcontra

ceptivepayments.IdonotreadRoyascuttingsobroadly.

Infact,fivejustices in thatcaseexpressed theview thatthe

plaintiffswereentitledtoanexemptionfromananalogous

administrativerequirementthatwelfarerecipientspro

videasocialsecuritynumberontheirapplication.Michael

W.McConnell,

Free

Exercise

Revisionism

and

the

Smith

Deci

sion,57U.Chi.L.Rev.1109,1127(1990)(emphasisadded).

RoyinvolvedaFreeExerciseClausechallenge tofederal

regulations governing staterun foodstampprograms.The

plaintiff Roy, amember of theAbenaki tribe, had sought

benefitsforhis twoyearolddaughter.Royobjected to two

distinctaspectsoftheregulations.First,heobjectedtoare

quirementthateachapplicantfurnishasocialsecuritynum

berontheapplication.Second,hechallengedarequirement

thatstates

utilize

social

security

numbers

in

administering

theprogram(principallytopreventabuseorwaste).See476

U.S. at 699.Roy refused to furnish hisdaughters number

becausehefeareditsusewouldrobherspiritanddimin

ishherspiritualpurity.Id.at696.Duringthelitigation,itbe

came clear that the government had somehow obtained a

socialsecuritynumberforRoysdaughterindependently.Id.

at 697. The government argued that the case hadbecome

moot,butRoydisagreed.Id.

coveryproceeds,sofarasIcandetermine,thereiscurrentlynobasisin

therecordforconcludingthatNotreDamehasbeeninsincereinadvanc

ingthislitigation.


40/44

40 No.133853

Asthedistrictcourtinthiscasecorrectlynoted,theCourt

squarelyrejected

Roys

free

exercise

challenge

to

the

states

useof the social securitynumber, concluding that theFirst

Amendmentdoesnotrequire theGovernment to conduct

itsown internalaffairs inways thatcomportwith the reli

giousbeliefsofparticularcitizens.476U.S.at699.Butama

jority ofjustices indicated that the requirement that appli

cantsfurnishasocialsecuritynumberwasadifferentmatter.

Fivejusticeseitherconcludedorstronglysuggestedthatthe

government could not require an applicant to provide the

numberon

abenefits

application

if

the

applicant

had

asin

cerereligiousobjectiontodoingso.

JusticeOConnor,joinedbyJustices Brennan andMar

shall,determinedthattherequirementburdenedRoysexer

ciseofreligion,andthatthegovernmenthadfailedtoshow

thatgrantingareligiousexemptiontothosewholegitimate

lyobject toprovidingaSocialSecuritynumberwilldoany

harmtoitscompellinginterest.476U.S.at732(OConnor,

J.,concurring inpartanddissenting inpart).JusticeWhite

agreed;he

would

have

enjoined

both

the

provision

and

use

requirements. Id. at733 (White,J.,dissenting).Finally,Jus

ticeBlackmunwouldhaveremanded thecase todetermine

whether the issuewasmoot.However,hestated that if the

issueweresquarelypresented,hewouldhaveagreedwith

JusticeOConnor and held that the government could not

denyassistancebasedonaparentsreligiousrefusaltopro

vide a social security number. Id. at 71416 (Blackmun,J.,

concurringinpart).

To

be

sure,

because

only

four

justices

actually

reached

thequestion,thisconclusiondoesnotconstitutepartofRoys


41/44

No.133853 41holding.Nevertheless, it provides a useful framework for

analyzingthe

facts

of

this

case.3

UnderRoysapproach,itisclearthatRFRAdoesnotau

thorize religious organizations to dictate the independent

actions of thirdparties, even if the organization sincerely

disagreeswith them. See 476U.S. at 700 (noting thatRoy

couldnomoreprevailonhisreligiousobjectiontotheGov

ernmentsuseofaSocialSecuritynumber forhisdaughter

thanhecouldonasincerereligiousobjection to thesizeor

color of the Governments filing cabinets). That is true

whetherthe

third

party

is

the

government,

an

insurer,

astu

dent,orsomeotheractor.Cf.Korte,735F.3dat684([I]tgoes

withoutsayingthat[theplaintiffs]mayneitherinquireabout

nor interferewiththeprivatechoicesoftheiremployeeson

these subjects.);RomanCatholicArchdiocese ofN.Y. v.Sebe

lius,No.122542,2013WL6579764,at*13(E.D.N.Y.Dec.16,

2013)([I]tseemsunlikelythatplacingnewlegalobligations

onthethirdpartieswithwhomplaintiffscontractcouldbea

substantialburden onplaintiffs religion.). So long as the

governmentdoes

not

require

the

university

itself

to

take

ac

tion,RFRAdoesnotgiveNotreDamearighttopreventthe

government from providing contraceptives to its students

andemployees.Indeed,atoralargument,counselforNotre

Dameacknowledgedthattheuniversitywouldhavenoob

jectionif thestudentsoremployeeshadtoopt in toreceive

contraceptivecoveragefrominsurers.

3

Although

Royis

a

Free

Exercise

Clause

case,

not

a

RFRA

case,

Con

gress was clear that RFRA codifies preSmith freeexercise jurispru

dence.Korte,735F.3dat679(referringtoEmploymentDivisionv.Smith,

494U.S.872(1990)).


42/44

42 No.133853

Buttheselfcertificationrequirementisdifferent.Itisone

thingfor

the

government

to

take

independent

action.

It

is

quiteanotherforthegovernmenttoforce[]theuniversity

to cooperateactivelywith theGovernmentby themselves

providing the EBSA Form 700a form that, in Notre

Damesview,endorsestheprovisionofcontraceptivestoits

studentsandemployees.Roy,476U.S.at714(Blackmun,J.,

concurringinpart).Thattypeofcompulsiontakesthiscase

outof the realmof independentactionand into the sortof

direct, primary, and fundamental pressure that renders

religiousexercise

effectively

impracticable.

Civil

Liber

tiesforUrbanBelievers,342F.3dat761.

The SupremeCourts recentdecision togrant a tempo

rary injunction inasimilarRFRAchallengesuggests tome

thatamajorityofjusticesmaycontinuetoholdthisviewof

freeexerciserights(althoughnowasastatutorymatter,and

notaconstitutionalone).SeeLittleSistersofthePoorv.Sebe

lius, No. 13cv2611, 2013WL 6839900 (D. Colo. Dec. 27,

2013),injunctionpendingappealgranted,No.13A691,2014WL

272207(U.S.

Jan.

24,

2014).

Notably,

the

burden

on

the

plain

tiffs inLittleSistersappears lesssignificant than theoneon

NotreDame.ThegovernmenttellsusthatLittleSisterspro

videsgrouphealthinsurancethroughaselfinsuredchurch

planthat,becauseofapeculiartwistinERISA,isitselfex

emptfromtherequirementtoassumeresponsibilityforcon

traceptivecoverage.Underthecurrentregime,theformthat

Little Sisters refuses to sign is entirelyunconnected to the

actualprovisionofcontraceptive services,yet theSupreme

Court still granted the requested injunction. Should the

mandatebe

enforced

in

this

case,

by

contrast,

Notre

Dame

willcontinuetoselfcertifyaspartofaschemethatwillac

tuallydeliverproductsandservicestowhichtheuniversity


43/44

No.133853 43hasa religiousobjection. Iamwellaware that theorder in

LittleSistersshouldnot

be

construed

as

an

expression

of

the

Courtsviewsonthemerits.2014WL272207,at*1.Howev

er,IbelievetheCourtsactionstrengthensthecaseforapre

liminary injunctionhere,where theburden is, if anything,

moreconcrete.

Now thatNotre Dame has signed the selfcertification

form, themajoritydoubtswhetherwecouldgrant theuni

versityanyformofmeaningfulrelief.Iagreethatwecannot

enjointheuniversitysinsurersfromprovidingcontraceptive

coverageor

require

the

government

to

forbid

the

insurers

from doing so.However, this only underscores the point

thatNotreDamedoesnot (andcannot) take issuewith the

independent actions of thirdparties.Meaningful relief fol

lowsfromwhatNotreDamedoesobjectto:aregulationthat

requires it either to pay for contraceptive services or self

certifythatithasareligiousobjectioninordertoavoidsub

stantialfines.Iwouldthereforeenjointhegovernmentfrom

enforcingthepenaltyagainstNotreDamefornotproviding

contraceptivecoverageeven

if

Notre

Dame

revokes

or

fails

tomaintain its EBSA Form 700, refuses tomake the form

availableforexaminationuponrequest,or takesanyaction

otherwiseinconsistentwith26C.F.R.54.98152713A.

III.

Myconclusion isnot intended todisparage thegovern

mentseffortsataccommodationinthisdifficultarea.Espe

ciallyafterEmploymentDivisionv.Smith,494U.S.872(1990),

howbest to accommodate the twin demands of religious

faithand

secular

policy

has

become

achallenging

political

problemasmuchasalegalone.OurinterpretationofRFRA

canonlygosofarinsolvingit.Cf.Lyngv.Nw.IndianCeme


44/44

44 No.133853

teryProtectiveAssn,485U.S.439,452(1988)([L]egislatures

andother

institutions,

not

courts,

must

reconcile

the

vari

ous competing demands on government, many of them

rooted in sincere religiousbelief, that inevitablyarise in so

diverseasocietyasours.).Whatevertheeventualoutcome

of this litigation, itwouldbeunfortunate if itdissuadedei

ther the government or religious institutions from taking

furtherstepstowardmutuallyacceptableaccommodation.

* * *

Because

dismissal

of

this

appeal

is

no

longer

an

option,

I

concludethatNotreDamehasshownalikelihoodofsuccess

onthemerits,andthatithasmettheotherrequirementsfor

apreliminary injunction. Iwould therefore reverse thedis

trictcourtsorderdenyingrelief.Irespectfullydissent.

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