POLICY BRIEF SECURITY POLICY RESEARCH CENTER SPRC...

1

Security Policy Research Center – SPRC - Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të

Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika - Security Policy Research

Center – SPRC - Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje

bezbednosnih politika - Security Policy Research Center – SPRC - Qendra

Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika -




bezbednosnih politika - Security Policy Research Center – SPRC -





Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika -





Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih

politika - Security Policy Research Center – SPRC - Qendra Kërkimore

për Politika të Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika -

Security Policy Research Center – SPRC - Qendra Kërkimore për Politika

të Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika - Security Policy

Research Center – SPRC - Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë - Centar za

istraživanje bezbednosnih politika - Security Policy Research Center – SPRC -

POLICY BRIEF

SECURITY POLICY RESEARCH CENTER – SPRC 07/2017

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE BALKANS

A raising concern for Kosovo

(Policy Brief)

www.sprc-ks.org July 2017 Prishtina

2

Security Policy Research Center

Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë

Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika

www.sprc-ks.org, [email protected], Ulpiana, D9, H-6, No:6, 10000 Prishtina

Russian influence in the Balkans: a raising concern for Kosovo (Policy Brief)

Published by:

Security Policy Research Center - SPRC

(Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë)

Author:

Burim Ramadani

Contributer:

Eris Hana

Prishtina,

July 2017

The original Report is written in Albanian language

© All Rights Reserved by Security Policy Research Center. Intellectual property rights are protected by

Law no. 04.L-065 on Copyright and related rights and Law no.05/ L-047 on amending and supplementing

the Law no. 04 / L-065 on copyrights and related rights.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electoral,

mechanical or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

3

POLICY BRIEF

Russian influence in the Balkans: a raising concern for Kosovo

Content:

1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 4

2. ‘Soft Power’ - an integral part of Russia's influence in the Balkans ................ 5

3. “Humanitarian” Center in Serbia - "Access to Russian satellites" .................. 8

4. Russian propaganda: "Kosovo – a criminal enclave" ................................... 11

5. Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................ 14

Notes ................................................................................................................ 15

4

1. Introduction

The role and influence of Russian Federation in Western Balkans countries and Kosovo has been

seen manifested either in terms of disrupting some of the Western Balkan countries’ stability, or

EU or Euro-Atlantic paths 1.

This argument is even more credible, given the Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, point C,

which states that “Russian’s foreign policy activities shall be aimed at accomplishing the

following main objectives: c. to consolidate the Russian Federation’s position as a centre of

influence in today’s world” 2. However, Russia's influence in the region and especially in

Kosovo has not been adequately researched and analyzed.

Therefore, this policy brief aims to contribute to raising institutional and social awareness of the

necessity for better understanding, identification, analysis of tools, methods, mechanisms and

level of influence of the Russian Federation in Kosovo.

Despite the fact that most of Kosovo's population, as well as Kosovo's institutions are clearly

pro-West oriented, Kosovo's institutions and activists in Kosovo must measure and determine the

influence of the Russian Federation in general in Kosovo, but also focused especially in

communities, civil society, media and economy / business. Such an approach is indispensable to

assist Kosovo's institutions in the decision-making process and in its efforts to remain steadfast

and secure on its path to Euro-Atlantic integrations.

The analysis is based on research on Russia's objectives in Kosovo and the Western Balkans.

Also in analysis related to Russia's level of Information War and propaganda in relation to

Kosovo, including the official response of the Moscow authorities in relation to developments in

Kosovo, and which could have an impact on the economy/business, civil society, Media and

non-state actors in Kosovo.

1 http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_163_RETURN_TO_INSTABILITY.pdf, p.6

2 http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248

5

2. ‘Soft Power’ - an integral part of Russia's influence in the

Balkans

Different methods, including the modern technology methods are the tools being used by

Russian authorities to achieve the objectives.

In its Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation - approved by President of the Russian

Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016 – it is very clearly emphasized the that the

“soft power” mechanisms show the new efforts and methods for achieving Russian objectives.

“Alongside military might, other important factors allowing States to influence international

politics are taking centre stage, including economic, legal, technological and IT capabilities…” 3,

and “In addition to traditional methods of diplomacy, "soft power" has become an integral part

of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives. This primarily includes the tools offered by civil

society, as well as various methods and technologies – from information and communication, to

humanitarian and other types 4.

The authorities of the Russian Federation through propaganda interpretations about

developments in Kosovo seem to have a clear intention to increase confusion over the state of

Kosovo's stability. It is commonly noticed that Russian authorities represent Kosovo's statehood

as something completely temporary and that Kosovo's status will be a new issue in relations in

the Balkans and beyond. Moreover, it is noticed that in the last two years Russian authorities

have increased intensively the commenting of developments in Balkans in general and in

Kosovo, in particular.

Information campaigns are nothing new for Russia, which is leading them in the Balkans for at

least the last eight years, as Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Its strategy is to

3 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, Chapter II: Modern World and Foreign Policy of the

Russian Federation, point 8, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-

/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 4 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, Chapter II: Modern World and Foreign Policy of the

Russian Federation, point 9, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-

/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248

6

create a perception of Russia as a powerful ally, with little substance behind it, in investments or

donations to countries in the region5.

Through the news agency, Sputnik6, which produces multimedia content in more than 30

languages around the world and has started work in November 2014, the Russian information

war has received a special dimension in relation to the Balkans and Kosovo. In a large number of

articles, including opinions and blog posts, Kosovo is portrayed as a territory occupied by the US

and NATO.

The title and illustrative

photo of the quoted

article, where in the

'background' section the

propaganda war in

relation to the truth in

Kosovo is clearly evident.

In an article titled “Second Kosovo?...”, Sputnik in a part of the commentary as the background

to the article, aims to compare the situation of Kosovo with that of Syria, propagating the

artificial ignition of ethnic tensions in the Balkans. "As for Kosovo, US military strategists had to

legitimize their military presence in the region. First, the US fueled ethnic tensions and clashed

and then NATO invaded Kosovo with the declared goal to stabilize the situation. Finally, the

region was declared a sovereign state, with NATO and US military structures deployed there"7.

5 For more, see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/19/heres-how-russias-trying-to-

sway-opinion-in-serbia-and-the-balkans/?utm_term=.38294c29c5ca 6 For more detailed information, see: https://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html

7 For more, see: https://sputniknews.com/politics/201706181054739824-us-plan-syria/, published on 18 june 2017

7

At the same time, Russia has repeatedly encouraged conflicting agendas and attitudes towards

NATO and the EU in various countries in the Balkans.

Russia is strengthening its ties with nationalists in Serbia, encouraging Bosnian Serbs in their

struggle for more independence - or entirely - in Bosnia and has encouraged Kosovo Serbs to

insist on the same outcome in front of Kosovo. Also, "through its support for the opposition in

Montenegro, has kept it under tension”8.

The Russian propaganda campaign is very focused, targeting in general Serbian Slavic

communities in the Balkans. Russia's main policy tools are the television network, the internet

portal RT (formerly Russia Today) and the Sputnik Srbija news and broadcasting service. "Since

the beginning of 2015, both have had, and have combined, a relatively small staff of about 30

people"9.

Russia’s policy towards the Western Balkans, in the present circumstances of confrontation and

assertiveness towards the West, constitutes an immediate challenge to the EU’s objectives of

transformation. It seems that, “Russia is back, though its presence varies across different

countries, and in an unpredictable manner”10

.

Creating the balance of forces in the Western Balkans is a substantial part of Russian foreign

policy. “We have close ties in the field of military and technical cooperation. We are ready to

consider constructively any request that our Serbian friends can formulate to ensure the credible

protection of their country and certainly in the context of the overall balance of forces in the

region” 11

.

8 For more, see: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-never-went-away-from-the-balkans-01-18-2017

9 For more, see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/19/heres-how-russias-trying-to-

sway-opinion-in-serbia-and-the-balkans/?utm_term=.38294c29c5ca 10

For more, see: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_163_RETURN_TO_INSTABILITY.pdf, p. 4 11 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking and answering media questions at the joint conference after

meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, Belgrade, 12

december 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-

/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/2559907

8

3. “Humanitarian” Center in Serbia - "Access to Russian

satellites"

Russia's intentions and efforts to influence and play a role in the Western Balkans are obvious.

High profile government officials of the Russian Federation have publicly mentioned Russia's

national interest and specific objectives in the Western Balkans. Here, indispensably, two

extremely important events are involved, one of which continues to be a 'quarrel evidence' in the

Balkans and the other that was prevented.

More specifically, the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis of Serbia, which was

founded in 2012, and is constantly seen in the dimension of a Russian espionage center and

attempted-coup in Montenegro in 2016.

In the case of Montenegro, the angry reaction of the Russian Federation with regard to the path

followed for NATO membership has been commented to have followed with actions that aimed

a coup.

As published in The Economist: "When NATO invited Montenegro to become the 29th member

of the military alliance on 2 December 2016, Russia reacted with anger. It was a controversial

open move, the foreign ministry said in a statement, and Russia will "respond accordingly."

"Russia is still making its most vulnerable presence in the Balkans. The government-funded

Sputnik Agency broadcasts radio and television news in Serbian language, in competition with

Western countries" 12

.

According to official judicial proceedings in Montenegro, on October 16, 2016, a plot was

organized, which failed to reach its objective. Montenegrin authorities have accused the Russian

Federation of planning to enter parliament and bring pro-Russian power. Montenegro's special

prosecutor, Milivoje Katnic, said that "nationalists from Russia were behind an attempt to kill the

prime minister and make a coup"13

.

12

For more, see: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21683967-montenegros-accession-fills-one-few-

remaining-gaps-western-alliance 13

For more, see: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37890683

9

Meanwhile, as before, Russia has been paying considerable attention to Belgrade for a

considerable period of time. Also, traditionally Belgrade had confirmed ties with Moscow.

During 2016, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic flirted with Putin while at the same time trying

to bring Serbia closer to the EU. In 2013, during a visit to Putin's summer residence in Sochi,

Nikolic signed a statement on the strategic partnership between Belgrade and Moscow. Later that

year, Serbia signed a military co-operation agreement with Russia. “And in October 2014, much

to Berlin’s chagrin, Serbia rolled out the red carpet for Putin, with Nikolić awarding him the

country’s highest order Moscow is focusing increasingly on the Western Balkans because it does

not want the region to become part of the West”14

.

Russia and Serbia have jointly established the "Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center" in the city

of Nis in Serbia. On April 25, 2012, the agreement on the establishment of this center was signed

by Russia's Minister of Emergency Situations, Vladimir Puchkov and Serbian Minister of

Internal Affairs, Ivica Dacic. But the official goal of this agreement does not only include Serbia.

“The Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center was founded in order to provide humanitarian

emergency response in Serbia and other Balkan states”15

.

Although this Center is officially devoted to emergency situations and humanitarian response, it

has not avoided its involvement in social life in Serbia. This, of course, is also related to the

purposes of 'soft power' as defined in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept. “Fulfilling its

mission of humanitarian organization the Center is an active participant in the social life of

Serbia. It cooperates with the non-governmental, religious and veterans’ organizations, schools

and media”16

.

Moreover, according to the initial agreement, Serbia has pledged to grant the diplomatic status of

the employees in this Center, which has two co-directors17

: Bojan Glamoclija from the Serbian

side and Viacheslav Vlasenko, acting director from the Russian side.

14

For more, see: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/57301 15

For more, see: http://en.ihc.rs/about 16

For more, see: http://en.ihc.rs/about 17

For more, see: http://en.ihc.rs/org

10

The Russian-

Serbian

Humanitarian

Center (RSHC)

intends to have

access to Russia's

Spatial Satellites.

Hence, Russia

insists on a special

status for the

Center and

immunity and

diplomatic

protection for its

employees.

The American response to this center has included Washington's concern “not so much for what

it is now, but what it might become if it receives what Russia has been asking from Serbia, which

is some kind of special status, a protected diplomatic status or immunity”18

.

“If it allows Russia to create some kind of a special center for espionage or other nefarious

activities, it will lose control over part of its territory”, said Yee19

.

Although the leaders of this center have tried to explain their activities as related to civil

emergency issues, the intent of accessing Russian satellites has never been concealed.

“Through the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center, we have the opportunity to get information

from the National Center for Emergency Management in Russia about the dangers threatening

our country,”20

.

18

See Senate Statements by US State Deputy Assistant, Hoyt Brian Yee, on 15 june 2017,

https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spy-outpost/3902402.html 19

Ibid. 20

See Glamoclija's interview, on 28 june 2017,

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=06&dd=28&nav_id=101665

11

4. Russian propaganda: "Kosovo – a criminal enclave"

An illustrative case for the Russian Federation's propaganda interpretation for Kosovo is the

commenting through the official communication of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the results

of the 11 June elections in Kosovo, presenting these results as a "political radicalization of the

authorities in Pristina, such as the result of a silent agreement between the US and the EU"21

.

In general, regarding Kosovo, the Russian Federation is challenging to recognize Kosovo's

statehood, while President Putin has stressed his contradictions against Western countries on

several occasions. “We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is

some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is

the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal

argument? The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double

standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make

everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow. According

to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses. “22

.

Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov mentions UNSC Resolution 1244 as the

only legal basis for Kosovo. “We support all the actions that are being undertaken to resolve the

Kosovo problem in strict compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244. We stand in

solidarity with our Serbian friends and will resist attempts to unilaterally rewrite this resolution.

Any solution can only be subject to a general consensus between Belgrade and Pristina“23

.

21

For more, see the special press release from the Ministry of External Affairs of the Russian Federation for the

election results to 11 June 2017, published on June 14, 2017: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-

/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2783567?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTAN

CE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB 22

Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, in front of the deputies of the State Duma, members of the Federal

Council, leaders of Russian regions and representatives of civil society in the Kremlin, March 18, 2014,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 23

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking and answering media questions at the joint conference after

meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, Belgrade,

December 12, 2016,http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-


12

Moreover, it seems that different methods - including the information war - were used to create

the perception of Kosovo as a "criminal enclave". “This territory has become a criminal enclave

and a hideout for bandits and terrorists (let’s call things by their real names), rather than a

prosperous state, as had been promised by the Western community”24

.

The meeting

between Russian

President

Vladimir Putin

and Prime

Minister of

Serbia (now

President),

Aleksandar Vucic,

on March 27,

2017 in Moscow

(Kremlin's official

web site).

Finally, during the meeting Putin - Vucic in Moscow (March 27, 2017), the Russian President

itself spoke about the security situation in the Western Balkans region. “...Of course, we very

much want to discuss with you the situation in the region today, because various outside signs

suggest that a degree of escalation is taking place”25

. In addition to Security, Putin was also

talking about economic projects in bilateral relations with Serbia.

24 Press conference of the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Maria Zakharova, Moscow,

March 16, 2017,

http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2687802

President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, during a meeting with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar

Vucic, Moscow, March 27, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54109

13

“We saw a slight increase of around 2 percent in bilateral trade last year. Your Government’s

efforts meant that this increase was mostly thanks to growing exports from Serbia to Russia.

Some sectors were leaders in this, agriculture, for example, with an increase of around 40

percent. We have good joint projects that are developing actively, especially in the energy sector.

I am sure we will discuss all of this today “26

.

For regional security and economic ties, the Prime Minister of Serbia was cituar as follows:

“I want to say that we need to thank you personally and the Russian Federation for supporting

the Republic of Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. As you said, I hope and am sure

that we will have plenty of opportunities to increase our bilateral trade and economic ties. .... It is

very important that, as you know, we remain committed to our national independence, freedom

and military neutrality. We will discuss together all of this and examine the steps we need to take

for the future”27 .

26

Ibid. 27

Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, 27 March

2017, Moscow , http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54109

14

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Given the context of the abovementioned developments, the concrete actions interconnected

particularly with the "Humanitarian Center in Nis", the attempted-coup in Montenegro, the

information propaganda war on Kosovo and the truth of Kosovo, it can be clearly concluded that

the Russian Federation intends to spread global confusion around Kosovo.

This can also be clarified by analyzing the main objectives of the Russia's Foreign Policy

Concept, which specifies the dimension of 'soft power' as a strategy for achieving goals in the

Western Balkans and in this context, as well as in relation to Kosovo.

The main elements of the Russian Federation's propaganda war in relation to Kosovo seem to be

summarized in at least as following:

- Distortion of Kosovo's truth from abroad and in relation to other states,

- Presentation of Kosovo as "territory occupied by the US and NATO",

- Strengthening the mechanisms, beside others, also Satellite in neighborhood (in Serbia),

- Confusion about the sustainability of the state of Kosovo and the "necessity" of finding

another legal status of Kosovo,

- The aim to portray Kosovo as "criminal enclave", as well

- The persistent and aggressive accusations of the "US-EU hidden agreement on the

political radicalization of Kosovo's authorities".

Therefore, a comprehensive institutional and Kosovar society approach to confront Russia's

propaganda war against Kosovo is indispensable and requires strategic clarification.

Also, full research is important to enlighten on Russian influence in the region and in Kosovo.

15

Notes

http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_163_RETURN_TO_INSTABILITY.pdf, p.6

http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-


Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, Chapter II: Modern World and Foreign

Policy of the Russian Federation, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-


https://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html

https://sputniknews.com/politics/201706181054739824-us-plan-syria/, publikuar më 18 qershor

2017

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-never-went-away-from-the-balkans-01-18-2017

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/19/heres-how-russias-trying-

to-sway-opinion-in-serbia-and-the-balkans/?utm_term=.38294c29c5ca

http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_163_RETURN_TO_INSTABILITY.pdf, p. 4

http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-


http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21683967-montenegros-accession-fills-one-few-

remaining-gaps-western-alliance

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37890683

http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/57301

http://en.ihc.rs/about

http://en.ihc.rs/about

http://en.ihc.rs/org

https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spy-

outpost/3902402.html

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=06&dd=28&nav_id=101665

http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-

/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2783567?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02B

w&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-


http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-

/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2687802




16

Cataloging in Publication – (CIP)

National Library of Kosovo “Pjetër Bogdani”

327(47:497)(091)

327(47:(496.51)(091)

Ramadani, Burim

Russian influence in the Balkans: a raising conern for Kosovo : (Policy

Brief) / Burim Ramadani. – Pristina : Security Policy Research Center,

2017. – 17 f. ; 21 cm.

ISBN 978-9951-8949-1-3

17

Security Policy Research Center – SPRC - Qendra Kërkimore për

Politika të Sigurisë - Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika -









Security Policy Research Center – SPRC -Security Policy Research

Center – SPRC - Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë - Centar

z

SECURITY POLICY RESEARCH CENTER – SPRC

Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika

www.sprc-ks.org, [email protected]

July 2017 Prishtinë

Date post:	01-Dec-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	vantuong
View:	221 times
Download:	0 times

POLICY BRIEF SECURITY POLICY RESEARCH CENTER SPRC...

Documents